

THE STREAM OF

American History

BALDWIN

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Providence has not created mankind entirely independent or entirely free. It is true that around every man a fatal circle is traced beyond which he cannot pass, but within the wide verge of that circle he is powerful and free; as it is with man, so with communities. The nations of our time cannot prevent the conditions of men from becoming equal; but it depends upon themselves whether the principle of equality is to lead them to servitude or freedom, to knowledge or barbarism, to prosperity or wretchedness.

—Alexis de Tocqueville,
Democracy in America, 1835

An aerial, black and white photograph of a city. A wide river flows from the top left towards the center. A long bridge with many arches spans the river. The city below is densely packed with buildings, streets, and trees. The image has a high-contrast, grainy quality.

THE STREAM OF

American Book Company



American History

NORTHEAST TWO

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University of Pittsburgh

NEW YORK CINCINNATI CHICAGO BOSTON ATLANTA DALLAS SAN FRANCISCO

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Baldwin: *The Stream of American History, Volume Two*
Manufactured in the United States of America E. P. 2

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To Ruth,
who has been my companion voyager on
The Stream of American History

PREFACE

THIS book is in large part an examination of American dilemmas and of how they have been met or evaded. It originated in the profoundly rooted belief that only truth can set men free. While I certainly cannot claim to have proved anything which reaches the dignity of a historical law, there nevertheless have arisen a number of attitudes and approaches about which the reader is entitled to know.

(1) I believe that the historian has a cultural and moral duty. Historians have long been plagued by the guilty feeling that their presentation of history is influenced as much by their personal and cultural views as by facts. And yet "we cannot sacrifice the demand for scientific certainty without injury to the conscience of our civilization." So says the Dutch historian Johan Huizinga* as he addresses himself to the problem of defining history. His definition in the end is this: "*History is the intellectual form in which a civilization renders account to itself of its past.*" History, to telescope his explanation, is broader than the organized facts and at the same time more precise, inasmuch as it seeks to find their essential meaning—the truth behind them. If history is called an intellectual form, the destructive split between historical research (the facts) and the cultural bias of historical writing is thus removed. Every culture creates this form anew in accord with the critical requirements of its conscience.

History is far more than facts; it is an insight into the processes of human life. *Truth* is not the sum of the facts, for they can be and are marshaled to prove any point of view. That the adult is sometimes surprised when he learns this reality seems to me a striking proof of John Dewey's observation that the schools tend to create a fictitiously idealistic picture of our society. But, asks the neutral, how can we be sure of the eternal verity of the supposed truth even after careful analysis (whether

* "A Definition of the Concept of History," in Raymond Klibansky and H. J. Paton, eds., *Philosophy and History* (1936), 8–9. An opposing view is set forth by H. Butterfield in *The Whig Interpretation of History* (1951).

or not scientific) of the facts and their meanings? The answer is that we can't, but if we wish to survive we must accept it as the basis for action in this generation. To deny that knowledge of history should be one of the determinants which shape our course of action is to turn the writing of history into something which is not even an art, for it is sterile—and art is fructifying. It is to accept the philosophy of acquiescence, which is the hallmark of defeat and from which even the Orient is turning.

(2) I believe in democracy. Traced to its sources all human action stems from the acceptance of certain axiomatic values by acts of faith. In that sense I cannot be neutral, for I have accepted the democratic way with its inherent values of human dignity and high moral aspirations. I believe, however, that a candid study of the facts of history will strengthen the conviction that democratic values are true values; I am a propagandist for democracy because I believe in the propaganda of truth.

Enemies of democracy and even some naïve idealists assert that the "American way" is one of intolerance, race prejudice, and legal and economic oppression. Nothing could be more wrong. American history is concerned with those problems not because they are more common here than in other nations but because the American as a man of conscience has refused to become reconciled to them and give up the fight against them. With Boyd Bode I believe that we can afford to tell the truth because democracy is more concerned with the citizen's growth than with his conformity, and because we believe in the innate sense of the common man and that *truth* will prevail if it is given a decent chance to be heard.

(3) I believe in the unity of history. History is dynamic, a stream which presents primarily the conflict between freedom and slavery. Into this there enters, now in one way, now in another, the conflict between the local and the universal, between nationalism and internationalism, and between free international co-operation and enforced co-operation. Thus the history of the United States is an integral and necessary part of the world pattern and must be treated as such.

While I believe that history shows unity and pattern, and I believe that the outcome will be good, I can sympathize with the claims of those who deny these ideas. I cannot apportion good to Jefferson and evil to Hamilton, for the total triumph of either could have been disastrous. In any case, however one-sided our sympathies may be, we cannot afford to confuse constructive conservatives like Hamilton and Rockefeller with statist wreckers like Hitler and Stalin. What the future will say of the contestants in our day is beyond my ken—I must view them in the light of my conscience, else I am a traitor to the process of history.

I say this despite the fact that I cannot prove that history shows that there has been progress in the usually accepted sense of that disputed word. Indeed, any logical pattern that I devise may be ripped to pieces

by tomorrow morning's newspaper. But I believe that there is a discernible process at work, even though we may not always be sure of its logic.

Kierkegaard nailed down the smug certainty of his age when he said: "Take away the paradox from the thinker and you have the professor." *Mea culpa!* I have sinned along with others of my craft. What I offer therefore is a balance of Yes and No, an equilibration of uncertainties. I am concerned with the contradictions and conflicts in the historical process as steps to what came next—often further contradictions and conflicts, but on another and, I believe, higher plane.

Herein lies the hope and comfort of man so far as the secular world can take him. The act of equilibrating uncertainties gives us moments of tranquil faith almost mystical in their poignancy. The act of combating the demonic forces which strive for mastery both within us and in the social order around us breeds self-reliance. Here is neither Hegel nor Marx, nor is it altogether Kierkegaard, for there is no room for pessimism; we may never arrive at our goal but we have the infinitely greater pleasure of a journey in which new vistas of truth are continually unfolding. Here is the prospect of American maturity, the promise of a splendid new world of understanding and justice.

This presentation is the result of years of study and reflection on the meaning of history, some of the steps in which appeared from time to time in print. I have drawn largely on those publications in so far as they apply to American history and its world setting. I must also apologize if I have engaged in unconscious plagiarism. I have the feeling that I have drawn from the historian's stock in trade striking phrases and ideas which might with enormous labor be traced to specific inventors. I hope that if such inventors recognize their handiwork they will consider my borrowing a compliment rather than a deliberate theft.

I am under no illusion that an adequate view of American history can be presented so simply that it can be understood without pauses to reflect and without frequent review of what has gone before. This book deliberately seeks to furnish something which the reader must stretch his mental powers to grasp, but which can be reached if he is willing to put forth the effort. I am well aware that many instructors will prefer a plain, factual "handbook" as a text. Still, American history is far too extensive to be covered adequately in class lectures and discussions, and it may be that they will find it of value to assign as readings those phases which they do not have time to cover in class.

I cannot close without expressing my thanks for the stimulus offered by my students and the help and encouragement given by my colleagues at the University of Pittsburgh. Especially helpful was Professor Asher Isaacs, who carefully coned the entire manuscript from the standpoint of

an economist; he is not, of course, responsible for all of the views which I retained. I wish also to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Allan Nevins of Columbia University, who was instrumental in helping me to avoid a number of pitfalls. Mr. Richard R. Smith has most kindly assisted me throughout the task with counsel which could have been given only by one with a long experience in textbook publishing. Lorene Byers rendered valuable aid in research and checking. Lastly I must mention my wife's patient assistance through the long years spent in research and writing.

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PART IV

**"ONLY THE PRODUCTIVE ARE STRONG, ONLY THE
STRONG ARE FREE."**

I believe in America because in it we are free—free to choose our government, to speak our minds, to observe our different religions.

Because we are generous with our freedom, we share our rights with those who disagree with us.

Because we hate no people and covet no people's lands.

Because we are blessed with a natural and varied abundance.

Because we have great dreams and because we have the opportunity to make those dreams come true.

* * *

There are no distant points in the world any longer—our thinking in the future must be world wide. . . .

Freedom is an indivisible word—we must be prepared to extend it to every one, whether they are rich or poor, whether they agree with us or not, no matter what their race or the color of their skin.

The only soil in which liberty can grow is that of a united people—we must have faith that the welfare of one is the welfare of all—we must acknowledge that all are equal before God and before the law.

Only the productive are strong, only the strong are free.

It is inescapably true that to raise the standard of living of any man anywhere in the world is to raise the standard of living by some slight degree of every man, everywhere in the world.

—The words of Wendell Willkie carved on a granite book at his grave in Rushville, Indiana.

THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONALISM

1877-1917

THE CIVIL WAR WAS FOUGHT BY AN ALLIANCE OF EASTERN industrialists and Western farmers against the South. Three basic motives existed in the North from the first or were gradually clarified as the struggle progressed: (1) to preserve the Union on the Northern basis by settling once and for all in favor of the Federal government the issue of whether state or nation was sovereign; (2) to free the slaves; and (3) to reinstitute democracy—again in the Northern understanding of the term. The Union was preserved and the sovereignty of the nation established. The slaves were freed in a technical sense but remained an inferior class whose condition often resembled serfdom or peonage. Democracy, as we shall see, earned the right to continue the fight for existence.

The triumph of nationalism over sectionalism set the stage for two generations of nationalist ascendancy. This was not an isolated phenomenon, for nationalism reached its heyday in Europe and the Western Hemisphere in the same period and, indeed, received much of its encouragement from the Union victory. After the settlement of the Southern problem American politics entered an era of doldrums, in which democracy narrowly escaped losing the fruits of the victory it had won over the aristocratic agrarian South. Presently, however, politics changed its focus of conflict from the farm to the city and began the evolution which culminated in the New Deal, whose significance is still a subject of debate. In a curious sense, however, this very negation of democracy was the result of the consent of the people. This was the great day of the middle class, fostered by the triumph of industrialism, and the middle class in return voted Republican and believed in the Gospel of Wealth and its identification of morality with success.

This was in the United States a period of the most remarkable technological and economic progress the world has ever seen. Freed from agrarian controls, capitalism rapidly completed the conquest of the wilderness and

4 • THE CONSOLIDATION OF NATIONALISM

began a period of internal expansion which by the beginning of World War II had created within our borders one third of the world's developed wealth. This tremendous task was largely accomplished through the corporation, an old institution which took on a new importance as the (sometimes unwilling) right hand of nationalism, and which conceivably may yet be ranked as the most significant of modern phenomena. Its effect on all aspects of life has been incalculable: social, economic, political, constitutional, military, and imperial—the one link which unites and molds the diverse aspects of modern life into one dynamic civilization. It is no exaggeration to say that the rise of the corporation ranks with the Commercial and Industrial revolutions.

Very early in this evolution American enterprise began to spill over the national border and find expression in political and economic imperialism. In 1898 this new phase of imperialism led to the Spanish-American War and to the unconscious acceptance by the United States of responsibilities which were almost world-wide. The election of 1900 confirmed the new order of economic and imperial concentration and marks the climax of the movement begun by the Radicals of the reconstruction era. Immediately afterward the Progressive Movement began to attempt to modify the decision.

Chapter XXIX

THE POLITICAL FAÇADE, 1877-1893

1 *The Nature of the Political Struggle*

THE political history of the thirty years after the Civil War, except for its reconstruction aspect, is a tale full of sound and fury but signifying little. The Presidents were usually able and high-minded men, but one finds it difficult to remember them in their proper order. The Federal government had gathered great powers into its hands during the war, but it now sought to retain only those which would benefit the men who had appropriated the real fruits of the struggle. On the whole, people agreed with the *status quo*; nevertheless, democratic checks and balances had little opportunity to operate. The Northern Radicals (radical because they were uprooters of the old order) were now Conservative champions of the new order which they had introduced. The liberal function as the spearhead of progress was thwarted so successfully that even a great and courageous reforming leader like Cleveland was able to get no more than an eight-per-cent reduction in the tariff. Marxists claimed to see here the proof of their assertion that in a capitalist democracy all parties are mere puppets of the economic lords.

The sham
battle of
politics

The parties did eventually develop significant differences, but until the mid-1890's politics was chiefly a contest over jobs. Actually, though the government was usually Republican, the Democrats were strong in the states, and they frequently controlled the national House of Representatives. They were thus able to impose legislative deadlock in Congress if they so desired. This situation had some effect in hampering party measures of the Republican leaders, but it was not as destructive as one might suppose, for the two parties agreed pretty well on basic policies.

Fundamen-
tal agree-
ment

Americans fought the political battle over what we now think of as

superficial issues largely because *most* of them sincerely believed that there was nothing fundamentally wrong with the American economy. Certainly the people as a whole had no sense of avoiding important issues but believed that they were facing up to them realistically. If some of the more perceptive political leaders refused to recognize the existence of vital issues—or at least refused to tackle them—it should be remembered that the last time they had tackled vital issues there had been a civil war. Their course was all the more logical because government did not deal with as many economic and social problems as it does now, and the people would have resented any attempt of the government to handle them. It was the eventual entry of these problems into the scene that broke down the political façade and began the evolution toward the welfare state.

Of course, there were vital and dangerous issues developing beneath the surface, and the longer they waited the more dangerous they became. Five of the more important issues should be noted here. (1) The small farmer was in danger of being squeezed out of existence. (2) Labor's protests were met by bullets. (3) The money problem in an expanding economy was ignored. (4) The race problem, especially in the South but also in the North, was eating at the vitals of democracy. (5) Natural resources were being dissipated in an orgy of heedless waste.

These problems arose in part because of the enormous power of business over government and over the lives of the people. Business was in the saddle and was coolly indifferent to party. Rival party machines and their legislative cat's-paws were either purchased by Big Business or were so amenable that they did not need to be bribed. It is clear that business owed its power less to political machines than to friendly public opinion, but its control was none the less rigid. Frederick T. Martin, a wealthy and socially conscious clubman of New York, strikingly portrayed the obstinate determination of his class to maintain its hold.*

It matters not one iota what political party is in power, or what President holds the reins of office. We are not politicians, or public thinkers; we are the rich; we own America; we got it, God knows how; but we intend to keep it if we can by throwing all the tremendous weight of our support, our influence, our money, our political connection, our purchased senators, our hungry congressmen, and our public-speaking demagogues into the scale against any legislation, any political platform, any Presidential campaign, that threatens the integrity of our estate.

On the surface the above statement would seem to indicate that American life was given over to greed and stagnation. It was not. We have from

* Frederick Martin, *The Passing of the Idle Rich*, 149. Copyright 1911 by Doubleday & Co., Inc.

time to time shown how Americans favored the weakest possible government consistent with public safety. Jefferson and Jackson actually thought of themselves as shearing government of some of its powers which were in danger of interfering with the liberties of the citizen. Even the most ardent centralizers among the Northern Radicals of the Civil War and reconstruction era desired to strengthen the Federal government only to squelch Southern interference with business and, of course, to make it a positive aid to business enterprise. Their intent was to enlarge the realm of individual freedom, not constrict it. City laborers and Western farmers frequently saw even the mild centralization of the post-bellum period as a form of tyranny, and occasionally political corruption was used to smother their protests.

**Fear of
government
regulation**

Effective American public opinion, however, was heartily pro-business and agreed that what was good for business was good for the country. Steeped in the economic liberalism of the English classical school, public opinion ordinarily regarded regulation of private affairs as unnecessary, unjustified, and unmoral. Even undoubted reformers like Schurz and Cleveland believed that government regulation of private enterprise should be undertaken only under the clearest necessity and after the most careful study.

In looking back, one may well question that before the late 1880's there was a real need for Federal regulation. Certainly such clumsy regulative techniques as were known to that time would have fostered graft and pressure politics and blighted the economic growth of the country—not to mention outraging public opinion—with the result that we would have faced the perils of this century with far less strength than we have. Controls, if such were needed, had to come slowly. It is well to remember that in that day the country recovered rapidly from economic depressions; in this day of government interference, it is still doubtful that anything less than unlimited pump-priming will assure prosperity.

It is fair to suggest that the wisdom of the hands-off policy of government was shown by the tremendous growth of the American economy. Indeed, this growth was never greater than at the very time when farmers and laborers were calling loudest for regulation of industry and finance and heading their predictions of doom with anecdotes of the plundering activities of the "robber barons." We shall see that there were such plunderers, and that on occasion even the greatest builders were driven to predatory tactics in order to build their empires.

**Economic
vitality**

On the other hand, no great economy was ever built at so small a cost to the common man in depriving him of the surplus needed to erect a capital structure. The misery of the working classes during the Industrial Revolution in Great Britain found only partial echo here, while certainly

there was nothing like the barbaric oppression and starvation of Russia's Industrial Revolution.

With the country in general agreement on broad issues, there was little for the parties to fight about. The intraparty battles (in so far as they possessed rhyme or reason) were three-cornered struggles among factions which in the latter 1870's came to be known picturesquely in the Republican Party as Stalwarts, Half-Breeds, and Mugwumps. Each had its parallel in the Democratic Party, but the Democrats' long absence from the Federal feed trough minimized incentives to intraparty rivalry until the victory of 1884.

The Stalwarts were basically political pirates who fought for the thrills, the power, and the spoils. Though they had risen to power on the shoulders of the businessman, they were callously indifferent to whether they milked the public treasury or bilked the businessman who was seeking government favors. They comprised most of the old-line state bosses, usually Senators, who rode high during the era of Grant and reconstruction. Among them were John A. ("Black Jack") Logan of Illinois, a Doughface Democrat who had evolved into a Union general and a Radical Republican; Oliver P. Morton, founder of the Republican Party in Indiana and welder of the most ruthless and efficient machine in the nation; Zach Chandler, who held Michigan in fee simple; Simon Cameron, all but undisputed boss of Pennsylvania; Ben ("Beast") Butler, brilliant and cynical manipulator of Massachusetts factions, the stormy petrel who rode the waves of four parties; and Roscoe Conkling, a handsome, strutting giant who held New York in the hollow of his hand and dominated the Stalwarts, the Republican Party, and the nation.

The typical state boss sent himself to the Senate, and partly for this reason the Senate became ascendant over the House, which had predominated as the national forum before the Civil War. These bosses were almost invariably wealthy, as also were the men whom they brought into the Senate with them; so, presently the Upper House became known as a "millionaires' club."

The Stalwarts' ruthless and successful pre-emption of political power and spoils had made irreconcilable enemies of numerous less successful politicians. The Half-Breed faction thus found its origin in personal rivalries, but circumstances forced it to advocate a less cynical program than did the Stalwarts. When business became tired of being bilked by the Stalwarts, it turned to the Half-Breeds and found them less greedy and more disposed to be faithful to their paymasters. They believed, as did almost everybody, that the public welfare would be promoted by the enhancement of business interests, but for their services they asked only the comparatively modest rewards of market tips and of continuance in political office.

The moderate tendency of the Half-Breeds was fostered by their two

greatest leaders, the temperamentally moderate but eminently successful politicians Sherman and Blaine. "Uncle John" Sherman had come into the public eye long before his brother, the red-headed victor of Atlanta, and had remained there as semipermanent Senator from Ohio. Personally irreproachable, Sherman served Big Business because he believed in it, but he did not let his natural conservatism wean him from his political duty of finding compromises with more liberal demands. Sherman, like Ohio, was the pivot between the ideas of East and West and was long recognized as the grand old man of the Republican Party. Nevertheless, he failed in his ambition to reach the presidency, though he saw the prize go three times to fellow Ohioans.

**John
Sherman
(1823–
1900)**

If any colossus bestrode the field of politics during the generation after the Civil War, it was James G. Blaine. Brilliant, magnetic, imaginative, farsighted, an unrivaled parliamentarian, Blaine was a peerless leader without a cause, thus portraying the superficiality and futility of his political era. Though born in southwestern Pennsylvania, his marriage to a Maine girl opened the way to a journalistic career in the latter state. He was one of the earliest Maine Republicans, became chairman of the state committee in 1859, served in the state legislature as speaker of the house, and then in 1863 went on to Congress, where he became one of the few of Lincoln's dependables. He early incurred the enmity of Roscoe Conkling, and the subsequent struggle between the Stalwarts and Half-Breeds was often, with some justice, interpreted by a fascinated public as a duel between the two champions. Blaine was Speaker of the House during the Grant era, then Senator, presidential candidate, and twice Secretary of State. It was in the latter position that he left his most enduring stamp on history, especially in connection with Latin-American relations.

**James G.
Blaine
(1830–93)**

The Achilles' heel of the Half-Breed warrior lay in his business operations, for though he neither inherited nor married wealth he managed to live extravagantly and amass a small fortune with little visible income beyond his salary and journalistic investments. Probably he got his money by playing the market and acting as stockbroker, but rumors of corruption were a constant embarrassment to his political progress.

Blaine's political strength lay partly in his solid control of Maine, a state whose early elections kept it in the public eye as a supposed barometer of coming political weather. The saying "As Maine goes, so goes the nation" received more popular credence than it deserved. Another source of Blaine's power lay in his peculiar hold over the normally Democratic Irish vote, probably because his mother had been an Irish Catholic and because he was an enthusiastic twister of the British lion's tail.

The Stalwarts and Half-Breeds were professional politicians; the Mugwumps were mostly earnest amateurs who were ready to support any party

which would promise reform, chiefly civil-service reform. Their name apparently was first bestowed on them during the Blaine presidential campaign of 1884, but they had made their power felt as early as 1872. The name may have been Indian in origin, but campaigners delighted to pass on the sneer of a Stalwart that the Mugwump was a bird that sat on a fence "with his mug on one side and his wump on the other." Among the leaders were such men as the popular preacher Henry Ward Beecher; Lyman Trumbull, Lincoln's friend; Carl Schurz, the spark plug of the Liberal Republican revolt of 1872; and E. L. Godkin, editor of the *Nation*.

No less significant was George William Curtis (1824-92), who had some solid pretensions to scholarly and literary ability and as editor of *Harper's Weekly* was a stern champion of purity in public and private life. Long associated with him was Thomas Nast (1840-1902), *Harper's* vitriolic cartoonist. As early as the war period his cartoons had become so popular that Lincoln declared that "he has been our best recruiting sergeant." During reconstruction he was an intemperate Radical but took time out to launch his famous and decisive campaign which (with Tilden's leadership) broke up the Tweed Ring. He popularized the Tammany tiger as an emblem and by 1874 had invented the Republican elephant and the Democratic donkey.

Democracy in a complex society must work through shifting alliances of pressure groups. These groups may be social or economic (rarely religious), but if one of them becomes overwhelmingly powerful the democratic process is arrested. This is what happened after the Civil War when the industrial lobby was in public favor and was able to crush or buy off the protests of those who opposed it. Indeed, Congress, especially the Senate, took on the coloration of a congeries of representatives of economic interests—a fact which cartoonists quickly caught and translated into bitter caricatures of bloated and appropriately labeled sugar, iron, and oil trusts occupying the legislative chambers. As we shall see later on, labor had little political power as a class, and the farmer was either chained to the Republican chariot wheel or driven into third parties where his advocacy of political and economic panaceas exercised little more than a nuisance value.

More successful, because it asked for money rather than economic reform, was the Grand Army of the Republic. The G.A.R. was founded in 1866 at Springfield, Illinois to promote the mutual benefit of Union veterans and their widows and orphans. Presently it fell under the domination of "Black Jack" Logan, who welded it into a powerful political pressure group which cynically played off the parties against each other in its bid for high pensions. On the whole, the Republicans offered the higher bids, so the G.A.R. was usually regarded as a Republican pressure group.

The Mug-
wumps

Pressure
groups

Veterans'
organiza-
tions

At the height of its power in 1890 the G.A.R. had 400,000 members joyously engaged in draining away the Federal surplus. New issues and the call of the last long roll sapped its strength, and the organization was disbanded at the last national encampment in 1949. The Confederate Veterans was a similar organization founded in 1889, but its program was limited by the poverty of the South and its devotion to the one-party system. It did manage, however, to wangle small pensions from the states.

Reformist pressure groups had difficulty in coalescing and therefore could at times be used against each other by political manipulators. Tariff reform never had a chance because the industrial lobby could not see its value. Civil-service reform fared differently. Jacksonian democracy had fought jealously any attempt to set up a permanent, experienced bureaucracy lest it come to control the processes of government and hamper the democratic process. Nevertheless, the growing complexity of the American economic and governmental structures made it absolutely necessary that there be a reliable channel through which the two could deal with each other.

**Springs of
civil-service
reform**

Business has an obvious interest in the efficient, and if possible sympathetic, administration of public functions such as taxation and policing. For a few decades the party machines attempted to furnish this liaison, but the cynical excesses of the Stalwarts alarmed business. It now saw the advantage to itself of dealing with a Federal bureaucracy of honest, experienced men who could carry on routine government administration with a minimum of political interference. The Half-Breeds saw the signs and obediently took over the Mugwump issue of civil-service reform.

Professional politicians, such as Blaine, became adept at concealing real issues and whipping up tidal waves of partisan enthusiasm over superficial or psychological issues. Such emotional crises were less dangerous than the brawls of the 1850's only because they could not in the context of the times be connected with any issue as basic as slavery had been before the war. "Respectable" people actually doubted the moral integrity of Democrats; as a Republican humorous saying had it, not all Democrats were horse thieves but all horse thieves were Democrats. Waving the bloody shirt was a popular exercise of Republican orators, and when that palled they twisted the lion's tail, warned of the yellow peril (the immigration of Chinese into California), or prated of the connection between high tariff and high wages.

**Method of
control**

They claimed for the Republican Party credit for everything worth having; even good weather became "Republican weather." Colonel Robert G. Ingersoll (1833-99) was a Puritan atheist of Vermont stock, who might have had a brilliant political career if he had not insisted upon devoting his life to pointing out the "Mistakes of Moses." Nevertheless, he became a Republican as well as an atheistic evangelist. "I belong," said he, "to the party that believes in good crops; that is glad when a fellow

finds a gold mine; that rejoices when there are forty bushels of wheat to the acre. . . . The Democratic Party is a party of famine; it is a good friend of an early frost; it believes in the Colorado beetle and in the [*boll*] weevil." It was Ingersoll who in the Republican convention of 1876 glamorized Blaine as the "Plumed Knight" and thus gave to his leadership a specious air of chivalry which could not be resisted by a highly emotional generation.

Realistic politicians, however, knew better than to put all their eggs into the basket of oratory, for some voters refused to allow their attention to be diverted from social and economic ills. Insurance could be purchased from local bosses at the cost of from five to twenty dollars a vote, depending upon the bidding. These bosses, most numerous in New York and Indiana, controlled shoals of "floaters" or "voting cattle" sometimes in blocks of thousands. These men might be *bona fide* residents or hired drifters, but their votes could be delivered because the parties supplied the ballots and the contractor could watch the ballot until it was deposited. The secret ballot did not begin its entry until 1892. It is probable that Garfield, Harrison, and Cleveland owed their elections to purchased votes. Of course, there was in addition a considerable number of thrifty or cynical voters who individually sought bids for their votes.

The patronage balance between the parties, at least after 1876, was not as unequal as might seem to be shown by the disproportionate victories of the Republicans in national elections. The Democrats firmly controlled all the Southern states and from time to time won decisive control of Northern states. They were able also to build up effective city machines, some of which (notably Tammany in New York) paid richly and reliably. A common practice was to assess office holders a part of their salaries, usually two per cent, a custom now sometimes known as macing. Stalwarts and their ilk not only shook down contractors and business interests in search of favors but used their control of legislative bodies to extort contributions under threat of discriminatory legislation.


In the long run this was poor strategy, for business interests found it worth while to subsidize the machines of political bosses who could be relied upon to protect their interests without continual threats and bargaining. The new type of boss was a Half-Breed or a "reformed" Stalwart like Thomas C. Platt of New York or Matthew S. Quay of Pennsylvania. These men tended, as time went on, to rely more on quiet manipulation than on histrionics, and with their rise the orator began to go out of style. While they engaged in a little quiet graft, their chief support came from macing and business contributions. Quay's Harrisburg Ring was probably the most quietly efficient

machine in the country. Rather more dramatic was Tom Platt's Sunday School. Each Sunday morning in the Fifth Avenue Hotel in New York City Platt's lieutenants met to report and receive instructions; the room where they met was called the Amen Corner because of their hearty affirmative responses to his orders.

While Quay and Platt have remained the pattern of the typical boss, evolution has brought forward new types. The businessman-as-political-boss we shall see illustrated by such men as Mark Hanna of Ohio; the bluestocking-as-boss by Henry Cabot Lodge and Theodore Roosevelt; and the reformer-as-boss by numerous realistic machine builders such as the senior La Follette in Wisconsin and Hiram Johnson in California.

The Stalwarts' heyday came during the Grant administration, when they had the pickings from the Federal government, the Southern Republican states, and the businessmen.

**Stalwart
heyday**



New York Public Library

Nast's cartoon: The Tweed Ring's "Brains"

The political scandals of the Grant era were not solely engineered to line the pockets of the bosses—some were strictly honest in personal affairs—but were “patriotic” moves to get the money to pay the necessary expenses of the party. As does any profession, the Stalwarts insisted that politics was a “mystery” which laymen could not penetrate, and they went to the extent of turning down one of Grant's Cabinet nominees because he was a merchant and not a politician. However, the politicians' plundering soon began to excite the alarm, and perhaps the jealousy, of businessmen. It would seem to have been the resentment of the businessmen at Tammany's drain on their profits which stirred Tilden to action against the Tweed Ring. Horatio Seymour dryly commented to Tilden, “Our people want men in office who will not steal, but who will not interfere with those who do.”

2 *The Republican Ascendancy*

The plunder of the public treasury by politicians during the Grant era was matched by the way in which industrialists and railroad builders got away with the public lands and public subsidies. Though it should be

The troubles that began in 1872 understood that few office holders profited personally by these actions, they helped to stimulate the futile Liberal Republican revolt of 1872. That campaign served to purge the Radical idealists and to leave the control of the Republican Party in the hands of the Radical professionals, soon to become the Stalwarts and Half-Breeds. The *Crédit Mobilier* Scandal, which appeared frequently in the headlines in 1872 and 1873, may have done less to arouse the opposition of the average citizen than the Salary Grab of the latter year. By this act Congress not only increased its own salary by half and doubled that of the President, but made the increase retroactive for two years.

After the war Congress had lowered or removed most of the nuisance taxes and had done away with the income tax. The high tariff of the war years had been defended as necessary to produce revenue but ostensibly was intended to be temporary. The Tariff Act of 1870 lowered duties on some imports but not on any important home product except sugar; indeed, iron and steel received added protection. However, as the Treasury surplus mounted, protest, especially in the West, mounted with it. A bill was introduced in 1872 to reduce drastically the duties on iron, wool, coal, salt, and lumber. The Senate balked and forced on the House a compromise which permitted a decrease of about ten per cent yet affected important interests but little.

It was clear that the policy of high protection was there to stay, and Republicans gradually dropped their excuse that it was a temporary war measure. S.S. ("Sunset") Cox of New York impaled the protectionists in a humorous speech (probably cribbed from the Frenchman Frédéric Bastiat) in which he impeached the sun as a foreigner and demanded that all windows be kept shut and curtained because free sunshine was encroaching on the rights of Pennsylvania coal. The logrolling incident to tariff bills he denounced as "reciprocal rapine." "Michigan steals on copper," he cried, "Maine on lumber; Pennsylvania on iron; North Carolina on peanuts; Massachusetts on cotton goods; Connecticut on hairpins." He was right. The tariff on steel rails, to cite one instance, was one factor which enabled Carnegie and others to charge double the English price and launched a boom in the Bessemer steel industry.

The period from 1850 to 1873 saw the first climax of the impact of the Industrial Revolution. It was a period of unprecedented economic and commercial expansion, particularly evidenced by the digging of the Suez Canal and the construction of railroads in various parts of the world. The dislocation of old trade customs was tremendous: the Suez Canal, for instance, since it was not suitable to west-bound sailing vessels wiped out at one swoop much of the world's investment in ships. The canal, the steamship, and the marine

cable revolutionized the warehousing and distributive system of the world and wiped out more investments.

A series of destructive wars all over the world, culminating in the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), blew up wealth, held back useful production, and hastened an economic crisis. European bankers, who had financed much of American railroad building, were forced to begin calling in their loans, and this movement was hastened by a panic on the Vienna Bourse in May 1873. Since railroads could not expect to earn immediate profits in newly-opened and undeveloped regions, the managers found themselves pushed for funds—a situation which was made worse by the way in which they had drained away reserves by such devices as the *Crédit Mobilier*.

One feature of the period of economic expansion was the sudden increase of American imports over exports, which piled up private debts in addition to the national debts. By 1868 the United States owed abroad a sum in excess of \$1.15 billion and paid annual “tribute” of possibly \$130 million. The overbuilding of Western railroads together with the flagrant financial abuses which accompanied it was the straw which broke the camel’s back. Jay Cooke had undertaken to build the Northern Pacific with astonishingly generous government aid, but when European financial aid failed to materialize he tied up his own bank’s resources in the venture.

**Panic of
1873**

The crash came in September 1873, when the firm was forced to close. Wholesale bankruptcies followed, and the country entered upon a six-years period of economic depression. The farm prosperity born of the war years collapsed and made no decisive recovery until the close of the century. Labor had profited but little from the war boom, but capital seemed to expect it to bear the brunt of the depression. To the surprise of the public, labor reacted sharply and undertook the first serious rebellion in its history. This only reflected, of course, the new importance of industry and the industrial workers in the postwar economy.

Increasing economic distress brought forward a demand for inflation, a demand never far from the surface in the rural parts of the United States. It is certainly true that as business transactions expand, the amount of currency must keep pace; otherwise those who hold money will be able to force interest rates up and will perhaps be able to ruin borrowers and annex their assets. Scarcity of specie was a continual problem, and inflationists proposed to use paper instead. Let the government simply announce that paper was money, and it would be money—“fiat” money. Such currency, however, should be solely of government issue; to leave it in the hands of bankers, as had been done by the National Bank Acts, was to give them the power to contract currency (deflation) and by withholding loans force anyone they chose into bankruptcy.

**The theory
of fiat
money**

The theory of fiat money has two fallacies (among others). First, nothing can serve as money unless people are willing to accept it as such; long usage had made gold and silver acceptable, but paper was worth only the gold or silver which bankers or governments were willing to give for it. Second, a rise in the quantity of money (even if paper were acceptable) was no economic panacea. True, it might help the farmer who had purchased a reaper for \$100 (or 100 bushels of wheat at \$1 per bushel) and had found that he must pay out 200 bushels because wheat had declined to 50 cents. The rub was that when the farmer went to buy the lumber for a new barn, he would find that though his wheat had now (perhaps) doubled in price with the flood of fiat money, so had the price of lumber. To reduce the problem to naïvely simple terms, the fundamental danger is that doubling the amount of money in circulation without a similar increase in goods and services available will tend to double prices.

These economic fundamentals were not understood by the American people; nor, for that matter, are they yet. The suspension of specie payment during the war and the issuance of greenbacks had been welcomed by inflationists. The suggestion that at least part of the Civil War bonds should be paid off in greenbacks (the "Ohio idea") had gained favor during the campaign of 1868, but responsible leaders on both sides quietly shelved it after the campaign. Farmers felt that it was unreasonable to limit the amount of currency to a percentage of the government bonds held by banks and even more unreasonable to try to peg the currency to gold. They pointed out that the high price of United States bonds made it more profitable for the banks to sell them than to use them as a basis for banknotes. In 1876 the banknotes in circulation amounted to only \$291 million, and by 1891 they were to descend to \$168 million.

The National Bank Act did not permit national banks to loan money on real estate. Critics saw in this a bankers' conspiracy to deflate the currency and to take over farms and industries by hastening bankruptcies through the refusal of loans at reasonable interest rates. Beyond this they saw an international bankers' conspiracy, engineered in London, the economic capital of the world, to contract world currency by pegging it to the limited supply of gold and thus garner the wealth of the world into the hands of bankers. They pointed to the British Currency Act of 1844, which had strictly limited paper currency by pegging it to gold and had thus enabled British bankers to control money and credit so absolutely that they were able to bring pressure on chosen enterprises and to milk them or annex them as they desired. Critics even felt that the United States government was sympathetic to the conspiracy since an undue part of the gold received by the government was

kept in the Treasury, thus limiting the amount available for legitimate trade purposes, such as the movement of crops and international payments.

The worst fears of the inflationists seemed about to be realized when, in September 1869, Jay Gould and James Fisk made their celebrated attempt to corner the limited supply of gold outside the Treasury and ran the price from 130 to 162. Black Friday, 24 September, saw the climax, but when the government decided to release Treasury gold the price fell back to 135. Gould and Fisk escaped unscathed, but many speculators were ruined, and legitimate trade transactions were hampered.

**Black
Friday**

As though this were not enough, early in 1870 the Supreme Court in the first of the legal-tender cases decided that Congress had had no right to declare greenbacks legal-tender. This four-to-three decision had been made by the curtailed Court which Congress had decreed to keep Johnson from adding new appointees. When Congress restored the normal nine, the two whom Grant appointed joined the minority in overturning the former decision in two similar cases. Doubts as to the right of Congress to reissue these greenbacks in peacetime were finally resolved by a decision of 1884.

**Legal-tender
cases**

The growing unrest was shown when in the elections of 1874 the Democrats captured the House of Representatives. The frightened conservatives retaliated in the lame-duck session by pushing through fiscal legislation intended to forestall the inflationists. (1) The tariff was boosted back to the old standard; (2) greenback circulation was to be reduced to \$300 million; and (3) specie payments were to be resumed on 1 January 1879. Inflationists were already so irked that in 1874 they had formed the Greenback-Labor Party out of various protest groups. In 1876 the party ran, for President, Peter Cooper, builder of the first American locomotive and well-known New York philanthropist; he polled only 81,000 votes.

**Conserva-
tives pro-
vide for
resumption**

When Hayes decided to obey the mandate for resumption and set his Secretary of the Treasury, John Sherman, to gathering gold the Greenbackers were outraged. As luck would have it, the free-silver issue came ready-made to their hands. The old legal rate of sixteen ounces of silver to one of gold had for forty years failed to result in much silver coinage because silver bullion was scarce and brought such high prices in the market that it did not pay to coin it. In a mint-reform act of 1873 the silver dollar was quietly dropped, and the country went over to a gold standard, though no silver dollars already in circulation were withdrawn. This action was in line with the current European move to demonetize silver.

**The silver
issue**

This movement, however, tended to bring down the market price of silver, and almost immediately silver strikes in the West so flooded the

market with the metal that the price plunged until in 1876 there was only seventy-six cents' worth of silver in a silver dollar. Silver miners hoped to raise the price by forcing the government to purchase metal at the old ratio of 16-to-1, and inflationists saw here a new means of inflation which they hoped would appeal to the more conservative East.

They straightway labeled the abandonment of bimetallism the "Crime of '73" and accused Congress of having deliberately sought deflation. No evidence has ever appeared that Congress had even thought of such a thing. However, it is not likely that bankers were unaware of the power they would exercise if specie were limited in quantity, and business was dependent upon their administration of bank credit. It seems fair to point out that the danger of the silverites' proposals lay not so much in the expansion of silver currency as in the pitfall of bimetallism. Since there is no permanent ratio between the market prices of the two metals, and according to Gresham's well-known law the cheaper metal drives out the dearer, it would have meant that one of the two standards (probably gold) would have been withdrawn by hoarders and business would have been more upset and erratic than ever.

Representative Richard P. ("Silver Dick") Bland of Missouri introduced a bill for the restoration of bimetallism, but its opponents managed to water it down into the Bland-Allison Act, passed over Hayes's veto in February 1878. Sherman was ordered to purchase at market rates between \$2 million and \$4 million in silver bullion monthly and to coin it into 16-to-1 legal-tender dollars. Silver miners were satisfied, but inflationists were not. That autumn the Greenbackers reached their peak with a total vote of one million and the election of fifteen Representatives. Business was already recovering, and specie payments were quietly resumed two weeks ahead of schedule.

Greenbacks were now exchangeable at par, and Congress gracefully allowed all outstanding paper (about \$347 million) to remain in circulation. Inflationary sentiment died down for the nonce except in the prairie provinces. Actually Sherman and his successors purchased and coined the minimum amounts of silver and announced their readiness to exchange gold dollars for silver, though the silver in a dollar was worth less than the gold in a dollar. Nevertheless, the country's stock of currency increased \$378 million during the twelve years in which the act was in operation.

President Hayes was an intelligent, high-minded, and able man, but he possessed no great political sex appeal, and his term was shadowed by the steal which had put him in office. The Stalwarts had wanted Grant, and when they had failed to get his renomination they accepted Hayes with misgivings. They saw their worst fears realized, for Hayes was determined, as they put it, to "pander to reform" and made clear his preference for Sherman and the Half-Breeds.

The economic troubles of the country complicated Hayes's situation, but he strove to clean up the rotten spots and to reorganize government administration "on business principles." Even as it was, the spoilsmen entrenched themselves in the Post Office Department, awarded bids to fellow conspirators, and then raised the payments on flimsy excuses. These "Star Route Frauds" mulcted the government of about \$4 million, and no one was ever punished!

The crux of the struggle was for control of the immensely important New York Customs Office, then under Collector Chester A. Arthur, a creature of Conkling. In his desperation Hayes was forced to ape the methods of the spoilsmen, and Conkling seized on the fact with glee. Reformers, proclaimed Conkling in his singularly sarcastic and effective drawl, were merely wolves in sheep's clothing. Their real object was office and plunder. "When Doctor-r-r J-a-awnson said that patr-r-riotism was the l-a-w-s-t r-r-refuge of a scoundr-r-rel, he ignor-r-red the enor-r-rmous possibilities of the wor-rd r-r-refa-awr-r-rm!"

Hayes won the round, but Conkling won the bout by making the President unacceptable for renomination. Hayes acknowledged his frustration and retired from the race with relief. Conkling seemed to bear a charmed political life in the way in which he survived scandal. Kate Chase Sprague, still unhappily married to her alcoholic Rhode Island multimillionaire, broke into the headlines again in scandalous conjunction with Conkling. Sprague, it was said, had surprised them together in his Narragansett home and had driven the magnificent Conkling out at the muzzle of a shotgun. The Stalwarts merely chuckled and took over the New York State machine from the "man milliner" reformers, swept the state elections, and sent Arthur to the Senate.

They then turned to their long-laid plan to restore Grant. Soon after Grant left office the Stalwarts had gotten him out of the critical public eye by sending him on a leisurely tour of the world. The reports which came back of his royal reception in every land filled Americans with pride and boosted his stock once more. Conkling had planned to keep him away until after the nominating convention, but the iron-whimmed Mrs. Grant cut the trip short at twenty-six months. The panic-stricken Stalwarts rushed him out of sight on a trip to Latin America, but Mugwump sentiment was again astir. As a matter of fact, Grant was the Stalwarts' last hope of a national restoration, and, calling themselves the Old Guard, they approached the convention somewhat in the spirit of the boast that "The Old Guard dies, but it never surrenders." They failed to put Grant over, but the name survived as a term for Republican extreme conservatives.

**Conkling
plans to re-
store Grant**

**Passing of
Grant**

Grant, though disappointed, took the defeat like a soldier. He tried to

earn a living in New York as a broker, but the firm failed and he was forced to depend on a fund raised by admirers. Stricken by cancer of the throat, he began writing his memoirs in a desperate effort to provide for his family. The venture brought a small fortune, but he died (1885) before he could profit by it.

The Half-Breed strength had grown during the last four years as business had begun to see the advantages of civil-service reform. Both Sherman and Blaine were hopeful of receiving the Republican nod in 1880, but

Half-Breed victory though they were ready to coalesce against Grant neither would yield to the other. The result was a deadlock among the three, broken finally by the nomination of James A. Garfield of Ohio, leader of the House and like Hayes before him a war hero of the third class. Conkling refused compromise to the bitter end, but the Half-Breeds sought to curry Stalwart favor by adding the politically odorous Arthur to the ticket. The Democrats countered by selecting a more authentic war hero, Winfield Scott Hancock of Gettysburg fame, who promptly announced that he favored sound money and a protective tariff.

James Abram Garfield, the last President to have been born in a log cabin, had come up from poverty through diligence and hard work, touching on the way the fields of teaching, preaching, law, and soldiering.

James A. Garfield (1831-81) Blessed with a magnificent presence and good luck, he added enough hard work and sound sense to amass some military fame, rising finally to become Rosecrans's chief of staff. He then retired (December 1863) to take a seat in the House of Representatives, where he was identified with the Radicals. Mild, just, and cautious, he rose in the party through the exercise of his single outstanding political gift: the ability to reconcile rival factions. Though he was devoted to the public interest and held ideas far more constructive than most of his associates, he could not conceal from those who knew him best that politically he was weak and vacillating, no man to be relied on in a pinch.

Until late in the campaign the glamorous Hancock seemed to have the edge, and in retrospect Garfield cuts a pathetic figure as he scurried about placating all elements of his party. In the end Conkling relented and per-

Campaign of 1880 formed various distasteful but necessary services, among them the purchase of floaters in Indiana and New York.

Those two states swung the election to the Republicans, 214 to 155; in the total national popular vote Garfield squeaked through by 10,000 votes. General James B. Weaver began a long national political career by polling 308,000 votes for the Greenback Party. It was in this campaign that the term Grand Old Party (later abbreviated to GOP) came into use as a synonym for the Republican Party.

Garfield acknowledged Conkling's vital help and wished to conciliate all factions in his appointments. Conkling, however, claimed that Garfield had promised to let him write his own ticket in exchange for his aid and

was determined to control domestic appointments, though he was willing to let foreign posts go to the Half-Breeds. Garfield was in an agony of indecision, but he could not refuse the State Department to Blaine, who had whole-heartedly supported him and pardonably expected to become the power behind the throne. By inauguration time the factions were openly at each other's throats. Garfield had mapped out a great domestic and foreign program in which Blaine was to play a vital role, but now it seemed about to be thwarted as he was pulled and hauled between the factions.

**Republican
factional
fight**

When Garfield finally nominated a Blaine man to the New York customs post, Conkling knew that he was lost. Nevertheless he fought a grim Homeric battle, impaling his enemies with Rosconian philippics and crying out his betrayal by the man whom he had made President, while the nation looked on in wonder, delight, and shame. The bewildered Garfield, conscious of his own rectitude and ready to pay his political debts, seems to have grasped for the first time the real nature of the political scene through which he had been moving for twenty years. As he paced the floor of the White House he must have thought back to the life of his natal log cabin with intense longing. "My God!" he cried. "What is there in this place that a man should ever want to get into it?"

The sudden disclosure of the Star Route Frauds made it certain that the Senate would confirm Blaine's nominee to the New York customs post. Thereupon Conkling and Thomas Platt, junior Senator from New York, resigned their offices and went to Albany to seek vindication and re-election at the hands of the legislature. For two months they waited and lobbied. Then one night some members of the legislative opposition took turns in climbing a stepladder outside Platt's hotel room and gazing through the transom. Tom Platt's political career came to a sudden—though it proved temporary—halt. Platt withdrew his candidacy in order to avoid compromising Conkling's chances, but it was no use. Conkling went down to obscurity and died while walking the streets of New York during the great blizzard of 1888.

**Conkling's
eclipse**

If anything more was needed to write finis to Conkling's reign, it came on 2 July 1881 when Garfield and Blaine, conversing about their great program for the nation, were walking across the Union Station plaza in Washington on their way to take a train for a New England vacation. At this moment a disappointed and crazed office seeker named Charles J. Guiteau slipped up and discharged a pistol into Garfield's back. "I am a Stalwart, and Arthur is President now!" cried the demented man. The President lingered in agony through the long, hot summer, then passed away on 19 September. A grief-stricken nation took no heed of the assassin's mental condition, and he was hanged in recrimination.

**Assassina-
tion of
Garfield**

The death of Garfield at the hand of a spoilsman brought home to the

public with stunning force the issue of civil-service reform. For the first time something more than ineffective gestures was made, and even the

Pendleton Act, 1883 Stalwarts did not dare to protest too loudly. The bipartisan Pendleton Act became law in January 1883. A Civil Service

Commission of three members was established to prepare rules for a classified service and to recommend appointments on the basis of competitive examinations. The President was authorized to place categories of offices under classified service as he chose. Macing was prohibited. On the whole the system has worked well, and few Presidents have failed to add to the classified service—usually toward the end of their terms. By now almost all but policy-making and judicial positions are under civil service.

When it became known that Chester Alan Arthur would enter the White House, the shocked appraisal of one acquaintance was: "My God! Chet Arthur President of the United States!" True enough, Arthur had
Chester A. Arthur (1830-86) been Conkling's chief political fixer and as such probably had waded through more filth than any other man who ever became President. Under the circumstances it seems paradoxical to insist that he was personally honest, but so he seems to have been. As a bachelor man-about-town he had delighted in good living, and he now entertained gracefully in the White House and gave it more of an air of social gaiety than it had seen since the days of Buchanan. As teacher, lawyer, and desk general during the war, Arthur had always performed ably and skillfully, and he rose to his duties as President with tact and efficiency. The exception may have come in permitting legal obstacles to be thrown in the way of the conviction of the Star Route defrauders.

The pleasurable anticipation of the Stalwarts was thwarted, however, when Arthur refused to allow the wasteful dissipation of the Treasury surplus, which was growing as prosperity returned, and punctuated his refusal by vetoing a fat pork-barrel bill—though the punctuation mark was erased when spoilsmen of both parties united to override the veto. Some of the surplus he was ready to devote to beginning the construction of a modern navy under the guidance of Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt, but his recommended cure was the reduction of the tariff.

This curious advice from a politician of such experience was followed by the appointment of a tariff commission which, though packed with representatives of the "interests," actually proposed a twenty-per-cent
Tariff of 1883 reduction. At the moment, it was claimed, the great industrialists were willing to sacrifice part of their precious protection, doubtless because they feared the effect of the surplus in disarranging trade through demobilizing cash and driving up the price of United States bonds to the point where bankers could not afford to hold them as the basis for the issuance of currency, which industrialists needed.

However, the Democrats had captured the House in the elections of 1882, and protectionists proposed to pass a tariff in the lame-duck session which would satisfy the populace without being as low as Western and Southern Democrats desired. A bill introduced by the old Pennsylvania protectionist William D. ("Pig Iron") Kelley was taken up by a coterie of brilliant young leaders and crammed through in considerably altered form. Prominent in the battle were the newly-rich young Senator from Rhode Island, Nelson W. Aldrich, who was to be for a generation the open champion of the "interests" in Congress; the ironic Thomas B. Reed of Maine, a rival of Blaine as a parliamentarian; and William McKinley, who would at the drop of a tariff schedule weep over the rights of the iron workers in his native Mahoning Valley—he even refused in the showdown to vote for the tariff because it did not do enough for iron.

3 *The Cleveland Era*

Arthur enjoyed living in the White House and wanted very much to stay on, but his quiet attempt to lay the groundwork in New York for nomination in 1884 received a serious setback when the New York machine was split. As a result the Democrats elected Grover Cleveland, the reform mayor of Buffalo, as reform governor of New York. Cleveland thus automatically became an aspirant to the presidency, and a little judicious fence building gave him the Democratic nomination on the second ballot. Thomas A. Hendricks of Indiana was placed on the ticket with him. Blaine, who had retired from the State Department on Garfield's death, was now the all but undisputed leader of his party. Without undue delay he swept into the nomination and gave the vice-presidential place to "Black Jack" Logan as a sop to the Stalwarts and to the West. The campaign which followed was one of the most bitterly contested in American history.

Stephen Grover Cleveland was born in a New Jersey Presbyterian manse. The death of his father cast the burden of family support upon him and kept him out of the army, to his later political disadvantage. Presently he moved to Erie County, New York, studied law, and began an unspectacular rise in Democratic politics. He remained a bachelor until his second year in the White House, when he married Frances Folsom, daughter of his former law partner.

Nomina-
tions of
1884

Grover
Cleveland
(1837–
1908)

Unimaginative and heavy-handed though he was, Cleveland's bleak honesty ("ugly honest") and his mastery of the common touch were early recognized as priceless assets by local party leaders. On many an occasion he sallied forth to drink beer with the workingmen and to convince them in a half-articulate manner which they well understood of the desirability

of the policies which the party leaders wished to put into effect. As county sheriff and as mayor of Buffalo he undertook a series of reforms which probably appealed to him less for their moral value than for their efficiency and straightforwardness.

It was natural for Tilden's state machine to select him as candidate for governor when it sought a man who stood outside the "ring" and could thus wean away Republican votes. As governor, Cleveland went his tactless, stubbornly honest way and won the distrust of the state machine and the antipathy of Tammany. These disadvantages, however, were more than offset by the brilliant Wall Street lawyer William C. Whitney (1841-1904), who joined with a number of Cleveland's friends to construct a "reform" machine. This backing was not known widely, and Cleveland gained, and relatively deserved, a reputation for independence and stainlessness. Meanwhile Whitney beat the nation's bushes in support of his man. He managed to convince the hungry Democrats that they could win with Cleveland; spoilsmen and their industrial paymasters were persuaded that Cleveland was a "safe" man, and contributions began to roll in to support his candidacy.

The problem of Cleveland's true political character has exercised the loyalties and the prejudices of two generations. He was physically unimpressive, short and unduly fat, but the public presently built up a picture of him as a man of stolid and immovable power. His unpolitical imaginativeness usually saved him from the typical Anglo-character Saxon search for sophistries useful in reconciling the ideal and the practical. He simply saw honesty as the best policy and plowed ahead without undue obeisance to pragmatism on one side or opportunism on the other. This habit resulted not only in bad timing on a number of occasions but made him flout the duty of the politician to compromise—of course he called it adherence to principle.

It may not have been sound philosophy or sound politics, but it was magnificent. In public relations his honesty appeared as stubbornness, tactlessness, suspiciousness, and irritability, but these qualities were attractive to those citizens who were tired of the specious gloss of the Plumed Knight. He was widely regarded as one who "wore no man's collar" and of whom it could be said, "We love him most for the enemies he has made." The difficulty in judging Cleveland is that his two administrations as President were different in character because of the problems they presented and because of Cleveland's own development. Basically, like most of his contemporaries, he saw government not as a weapon to enforce social reform but as the cop on the beat where social forces met and jockeyed for power; the time came when he felt forced to use the government itself as a social force.

Cleveland probably owed his nomination to a desperate Democratic

attempt to capitalize on a scandal in Blaine's background. Years before this time, the Plumed Knight had used his position as Speaker to save a land grant for the Little Rock and Fort Smith Railroad, *after* which he asked for and received the privilege of selling the railroad's bonds on commission. His claim was that he lost money on the deal, for when the bonds fell he felt obliged to reimburse the purchasers. The fact seems to be that he sold them to the Union Pacific and other railroads at prices considerably above the market rate. Rumors of the whole transaction leaked out and were so embarrassing to his pursuit of the 1876 Republican presidential nomination that Blaine requested an investigation. This the Democratic House granted but, Blaine claimed, packed the committee with Southern brigadiers.

The Mulligan Letters

Presently the committee found a witness named Mulligan, who possessed a parcel of Blaine's letters—the "Mulligan Letters"—which it was supposed would prove his guilt. Blaine got possession of the letters and in a brilliant performance before the House read portions from them and successfully beat down the charge. He knew that the chairman of the committee had received a telegram in his favor but had not presented it in evidence. Therefore at the climactic moment Blaine walked down the aisle to the chairman and boldly charged him with suppressing evidence. The man had no answer and cowered before the accusation. Galleries and members broke into applause, and Blaine was vindicated.

For the moment. Afterthought disclosed that there was something specious about the passages which Blaine had read from his letters, and the odor of scandal twice hampered his bid for the nomination. When he received the party nod in 1884 the Democrats saw an excellent opportunity to win with the stainless Cleveland. Republican Mugwumps led by Carl Schurz bolted the party, and young leaders like Lodge and Roosevelt visibly held their noses even though they accepted the party dictum. So far as fundamental issues were concerned, the only difference lay in the greater partiality of most tariff protectionists for Blaine. Actually Cleveland drew many industrial supporters (some contributed to both sides, as was becoming the habit) on his promise that "no harm shall come to any business interest." This promise was natural and proper, but many of the little people who voted for him did so in the hope that he would wreak definite harm at least to monopolies and tariff.

Lack of issues

The campaign was a rich lesson in the political uses of slander, as campaign managers on each side sought to win the "moral" advantage. Republican bloodhounds found and exhumed an old story that as a young man Cleveland and others had become involved with a fancy young widow who presently bore an illegitimate son, male parent not proven. The scrupulous Cleveland, however, had agreed to

Slander

support the infant, and the alcoholic mother used the fact to blackmail him. Presently, for the good of the child, it was removed from the mother's care. When confronted with the story, Cleveland calmly admitted it.

Editors and preachers were still rolling this morsel about when some new Mulligan Letters were found and published. The evidence was damning: Blaine had significantly footnoted one of them "Burn this letter." Cleveland, however, put a stop to an attempt to blacken Blaine's domestic life, which to tell the truth was singularly felicitous. A Mugwump humorously assessed the sexual aspects of the campaign by recommending that "we should therefore elect Mr. Cleveland to the public office which he is so well qualified to fill, and remand Mr. Blaine to the private station which he is admirably fitted to adorn."

As the campaign progressed and emotional temperatures climbed, the nation seemed to have gone mad. Conventions, addresses, banquets, barbecues, and pilgrimages whipped up the hysteria. Columns of men wearing firemen's hats and carrying smoky torches paraded the streets. Democrats chanted in unison:

Emotional
pitch

Blaine! Blaine! James G. Blaine!
The con-ti-nen-tal liar from the State of Maine!
Burn this letter!

Then from the Republican ranks would come the derisive taunt:

Ma! Ma! Where's my pa,
and would be answered by the Democrats:

Gone to the White House, Ha! Ha! Ha!

Through it all, the parties seemed to be running about even, and the probability developed that New York would decide the election. Republicans had habitually denounced the Democrats as the opponents of temperance and the party of disunion and Irish Catholicism.

Culminat-
ing events

A few days before the election a prominent New York minister headed a delegation which greeted Blaine in a crowded and noisy hotel room with an address of welcome which denounced the opposition as the party of "Rum, Romanism, and Rebellion." Blaine may not have heard the phrase in the confusion; at least he did not deny the slander. But it had been caught by a Democratic shorthand reporter, and the Democrats proceeded to broadcast it. Blaine's traditional Irish supporters turned against him at once, and there was no time to repair the blunder. To make matters worse, Blaine attended a banquet where his managers had gathered a crowd of prominent Wall Streeters to give him a chance to wheedle them out of much-needed funds. Word leaked out, and the meeting was promptly dubbed Belshazzar's Feast and portrayed as the seal on a pact between Blaine and Wall Street.

Election day was rainy in New York, a circumstance which cut down the Republicans' rural vote. New York went Democratic by 1149 votes

out of 1,125,159 cast for the two parties, whether because of the rain, the defection of the Irish, Belshazzar's Feast, or because of Whitney's timely purchase of several thousand voting cattle. Several other states swung to Cleveland by the slimmest possible margins, but New York tipped the scales, 219 to 182. The candidacy of John P. St. John on the Prohibition ticket and of old Ben Butler on his own Anti-Monopoly ticket (which won Greenback support) had polled enough votes to seriously weaken the Democrats in a number of states.

**Cleveland's
election
and pros-
pects**

A Democratic President was in the White House for the first time since 1861, but, as Woodrow Wilson pointed out in later years, Cleveland was really "a conservative Republican." In a party sense the habit of a Congressional deadlock was continued, for the Republicans retained control of the Senate. Cleveland incurred criticism by appointing former Confederates to his Cabinet and by ordering the return (canceled as a result of the outcry) of captured Confederate battle flags to Southern state capitals, but there seemed to be little chance that he would accomplish much that was positive.

Despite his theoretical rejection of aggressive presidential policies, Cleveland struggled manfully to force a positive program on Congress and the executive departments. He tried to protect the advances already made by civil-service reform, he fought hungry Democratic spoilsmen and managed to hold removals of officials not under civil service to about two thirds of the total. This was a striking achievement when one considers that his Cabinet, though exceptionally able, had practically been dictated by party exigencies and that his own private secretary established a secret pipeline to the aged and ailing but still ambitious Tilden. Nevertheless, in the end he fell between the stools of high principle and political necessity and antagonized both the bosses and many of the Mugwumps. Even Whitney, quietly going forward with the construction of the modern navy, saw the trend and, though remaining personally friendly with Cleveland, made common cause with the bosses.

**The
spoilsmen**

Cleveland was no more fortunate in his tariff program. The "tariff for revenue only" movement was popular not only among rank-and-file Democrats but among Republican Mugwumps. The mounting Treasury surplus worried Cleveland because it hampered business and afforded a temptation to Congress to spend recklessly. The logical solution was a downward adjustment of the tariff, and he said so in his first annual message, though he denied any threat of free trade. Whether or not because of the tariff issue, the electorate responded with a drastic reduction of the Democratic majority in the House. The dogged Cleveland refused to let go, and when the new Congress began its session he met it with an annual message (1887) devoted solely

**Tariff
reform fails**

to the tariff and proposing a tariff for revenue only. "It is," said he, "a condition that confronts us, not a theory." The Mills Bill, which reduced the average of 47 per cent by about seven per cent, went through the House but died in the Senate. Cleveland accepted the challenge as the issue for 1888.

In truth, he had sadly disappointed his business backers, and they were not mollified by his tender treatment of the milkers of the Union Pacific and Central Pacific when the public demanded their blood. His veto of pension steals did nothing to recommend him to the Cleveland line. His veto of the Texas Seed Bill (1887) showed clearly his conception of the rôle of government and antagonized many of the commoners among his supporters. This was a bill to appropriate \$10,000 for the purchase of seed grain for the use of Great Plains farmers who had been ruined by drought. The measure, he argued, was unconstitutional:

I do not believe that the power and duty of the General Government ought to be extended to the relief of individual suffering which is in no manner properly related to the public service or benefit. A prevalent tendency to disregard the limited mission of this power and duty should, I think, be steadfastly resisted, to the end that the lesson should constantly be enforced that though the people support the Government the Government should not support the people.

Cleveland's tactless honesty obscured in his time the fact that, like most of the American people, he sided with the economic theory that any legitimate policy which promoted business prosperity was to the advantage of the worker and the farmer. The growing counteropinion that this prosperity did not sift through to the worker and the farmer served only to convince Cleveland that the performance rather than the theory was wrong. He tried to do something about it. His last annual message after his defeat in 1888 was a philippic against "the communism of combined wealth and capital." Said he, "The outgrowth of overweening cupidity and selfishness, which insidiously undermines the justice and integrity of free institutions, is not less dangerous than the communism of oppressed poverty and toil, which, exasperated by injustice and discontent, attacks with wild disorder the citadel of rule."

As Allan Nevins points out, Cleveland was not a progressive but a reformer; that is, he aimed at "purifying the existing process of government and effecting more completely its traditional aims." His administrative reforms were of incalculable benefit to a government which had been racked by Stalwart spoilsmen. As we shall see, he favored and was in part responsible for the Interstate Commerce Act, the Dawes Indian Severalty Act, and the creation of the Department

of Agriculture. He shook the bloodsuckers out of the Land Office and forced railroad land grantees to return illegally held land. He stubbornly refused to permit Congress to squander the surplus, and he attacked the high tariff as unnecessary, dangerous to soundly conservative government, disruptive of competitive business, and an unjust tax on the common man.

Cleveland's strength with the people was so evident in 1888 that even those party leaders who opposed him did not dare to drop him. In any case, he was the logical champion on the only issue in sight: the tariff. Blaine had become a hypochondriac and on the ground of poor health refused at the last minute to run. However, he suggested Benjamin Harrison of Indiana, who after three

**Campaign
of 1888**

days of bickering was chosen along with the veteran financier and spoilsman Levi P. Morton of New York. The Old Guard Republicans made every effort to convince the nation that the issue lay between protection and free trade, and in their search for votes they made recklessly contradictory promises to reformers, spoilsmen, veterans, inflationists, and sound-money men. That eminent merchant prince and Bible-class teacher John Wanamaker was diligently and successfully "frying the fat" by his solicitations to Big Business to contribute to the Republican campaign chest.

To those in the know it was evident that Big Business had abandoned Cleveland. Once more New York was the deciding state. Governor David B. Hill had captured it from Cleveland, and though now ostensibly supporting the President he made no effort to force Tammany into line. It is probable that Matt Quay, acting for the Old Guard, bought enough Tammany votes to carry the state for Harrison; at least there was the curious fact that Hill ran 14,500 and Harrison 13,000 votes ahead of Cleveland. Harrison won 233 to 168, but he received 100,000 votes less than Cleveland in the national poll. Moreover, third parties once more made a showing and may have vitally influenced the outcome; indeed, no President from 1876 through 1892 could claim more than a plurality of the total national vote.

Benjamin Harrison, grandson of Old Tippecanoe, was a lawyer of Indianapolis who had served creditably as a brigade commander with Sherman. After the war he resumed his progress in law and politics, developed into an ardent Radical, and after holding a succession of respectable but not eminent political positions became a Senator and a logical presidential contender from a key state. He early developed a reputation as an unusually effective political speaker, but his critics charged him with being cold as an iceberg, and it does seem that he was far from a good mixer.

**Benjamin
Harrison
(1833–
1901)**

A small, neat, well-organized man, politely considerate of others and (after Radical days) moderate in his views, he was an eminently respectable front for the party machine in whose more sordid activities he never

dabbled. A Presbyterian elder for forty years, he was rigidly pious and perhaps a little humorless in his assessment of moral issues and of the way in which a beneficent Providence watched over the interests of Benjamin Harrison. The story is told that Harrison turned down Matt Quay's request for a Cabinet position for a henchman. "Why," exclaimed a friend, "doesn't he know that you made him President?" "No," replied Quay in disgust, "Benny says that God did it." Quay's disgust was natural: he had good reason to know, as he said, that "Providence hadn't a damn thing to do with it!"

The jubilant Republicans quickly solved the problem of what to do with that Treasury octopus, the surplus. They spent it. "God help the surplus!" was the cry of the Republican hordes as they took over presidency and Congress. Democratic obstruction in the House was broken down when "Czar" Reed, the new Speaker, refused to recognize dilatory motions and arbitrarily counted as present members who were in the chamber but had refused to answer to their names in the hope of preventing a quorum. After two weeks of wrangling the House upheld him, and both policies were adopted as rules. Congress now proceeded to provide twelve dollars a month for any Union veteran of ninety days' service who was unable to perform manual labor. "Corporal" James Tanner, legless veteran and commissioner of pensions, interpreted the new law so generously that it was said he would reward any veteran who could prove he had been kicked by a mule. For the nonce even the G.A.R. was satisfied.

Secretary of the Navy Benjamin F. Tracy was given the money for enough steel ships to raise the navy from twelfth to fifth place. Coast defenses were strengthened, pork barrels were awarded to deserving Republican legislators, the direct taxes collected during the Civil War were returned to the states, postal subsidies to steamship lines were increased, Indian wars were financed, and government bonds were bought up. In its two sessions the Fifty-first Congress spent about a billion dollars, as a critic pointed out to Reed. The Speaker's retort was to the point: "This is a billion-dollar country!" By the end of 1892 the surplus had become a deficit.

Meanwhile the Republicans had attacked the surplus from another direction. It was discovered that the true strategy for preventing the high tariff from accumulating a surplus was to make the tariff so prohibitively high that imports would be eliminated. The inventor of this remarkable sophism was a Pennsylvania Democrat, Sam Randall, who popularized the slogan "no imports, no revenues." With Aldrich leading in the Senate and McKinley in the House, the Republicans wrote a new tariff designed to foster infant industries such as tin plate and armor plate. Henry O. Havemeyer, the sugar-refining monopolist, got raw sugar put on the free list (refined sugar was protected),

The Billion-Dollar Congress, 1889-91

McKinley Tariff, 1890

and Louisiana sugar growers were protected by a bounty; the government's loss, and at least in part Havemeyer's gain, was \$50 million. One by one the various "interests" came before the committees and dictated their terms.

Perhaps it was Havemeyer's comment, "The mother of all trusts is the customs tariff," that stirred the generous McKinley to do something for the farmer. Hitherto few farmers besides wool growers had received tariff aid, but now potatoes, bacon, eggs, barley, etc. were given protection. The rub was that very little of these products had ever been imported. Meanwhile Blaine, once more Secretary of State and pursuing dreams of expansion of trade with Latin America, had demanded a system of reciprocity. In the end Congress provided that coffee, tea, raw sugar, molasses, and hides be admitted free. The President, however, was empowered to impose specified duties on these articles when they came from countries which he felt were discriminating against American products. The threat was sufficient to wangle concessions in a dozen countries and colonies.

The Republican Party, even while it was engaged in digging its own grave with the McKinley Tariff, strove to placate the Senators from the agrarian states with the weakly worded Sherman Antitrust Act and the newly-admitted prairie and silver-mining states with the Sherman Silver Purchase Act. The latter act provided that the Secretary of the Treasury must each month purchase 4.5 million ounces of silver, paying for them with Treasury notes which, of course, would expand the currency. These notes were to be redeemable in gold or silver at the discretion of the Secretary, "it being the established policy of the United States to maintain the two metals on a parity with each other upon the present ratio." In its resentment at this surrender to radicalism, business forgot the tariff and other benefits showered upon it by the Billion-Dollar Congress. Indeed, the silver Senators had driven a hard bargain and had got most of what they wanted before they permitted the tariff bill to go through on 1 October. Merchants immediately boosted their prices and blamed the new tariff.

**Sherman
Silver Pur-
chase Act,
1890**

President Harrison had found that he could not even name his own Cabinet. The party managers, as he put it, had "sold out every place to pay the election expenses." Harried as he was by demands for the payment of all the contradictory promissory notes signed by the party during the campaign, the able but uninspiring President found his position intolerable. The reformers on one side and the Old Guardsmen like Matt Quay and Tom Platt on the other gradually fell away. A month after the McKinley Tariff passed, the voters expressed their resentment by taking 88 House seats from the Republicans and turning most of them over to the Democrats.

**Harrison
stymied**

Once more Congress marked time while the silver sentiment of the West continued to rise, the bankers withdrew gold from the Treasury and

hoarded it, business showed signs of collapse, and the government resorted to deficit financing. Poor Harrison unjustly received the blame from every side. Actually he was helpless. His appointments were not confirmed, and the departments ceased to function beyond the most routine procedures. The whole government was paralyzed as though by a tacit slow-down strike.

And yet the Republicans could not refuse Harrison the renomination without repudiating their record. Actually, few of the leaders cared; they confidently expected defeat, for business had now cynically abandoned Harrison as it had abandoned Cleveland four years before. Curiously enough, Cleveland was now back in favor. When he left the White House with his bride in 1889 he had associated himself with the Wall Street law firm of Bangs, Stetson, Tracy, and MacVeagh, which did much of the legal work for the House of Morgan. Here Cleveland was thrown into the company of men like J. P. Morgan; Francis Lynde Stetson; W. C. Whitney, now the boldest plunger on the Street; and Henry Villard, a rising railroad tycoon. They read to the man from Buffalo the signs of the times and saw with satisfaction that three years among the seats of the mighty had strengthened his fear of the "wild asses" of free silver and had bred a new tolerance for the ascendance of financial power. They began once more to groom him for the presidency.

It was chiefly the lordly and subtle Whitney who deftly pulled the wires which returned his friend to the White House. Many of the people, disgusted with Harrison, were ready to welcome back their tribune, and the Mugwumps, disgusted by Half-Breed rule, joined in. Whitney gave the movement the necessary impetus when he slapped down the Hill machine and gave New York to Cleveland as a springboard. Recalcitrant Western silverites and Southern anti-monopolists were headed off, and spoilsmen were dealt with in the way they best understood. The Democratic convention writhed with all the emotions, but in the end it surrendered, for Cleveland looked like a winner. Adlai E. Stevenson of Illinois was added to the ticket as vice-presidential nominee. The platform was equivocal on silver, but "Marse Henry" Waterson, editor of the Louisville *Courier-Journal*, forced a drastic tariff-reduction plank into it.

Actually the Whitney coterie did not worry. The word had gone out that this time Cleveland was really "safe," and Whitney was able to raise the biggest fund ever devoted to a presidential campaign up to that time.

However, there was little enthusiasm among ordinary party workers on the hustings; a contemporary noted that "each side would have been glad to defeat the other if it could do so without electing its own candidate."

Enthusiasm was rather the property of the new People's Party (Populists), strongest on the prairies, which nominated the old Greenbacker James Weaver on a free-silver ticket. Since the states west of the Mississippi were normally Republican, the Democratic managers made deals with the Populists by which the Democratic ticket was withdrawn in five states and informally abandoned in four others, while word was passed out that Democrats should throw their support to the inflationist and free-silverite Weaver. This arrangement was intended to insure that if Cleveland did not win, the election would be thrown into the House of Representatives. The compact did much to shatter the strength of the Western wing of the party and to convince the voters that the Democrats had gone Populist. Cleveland himself was to pay a severe penalty for this departure from his usual forthrightness, though in this election he won 277 electoral votes to Harrison's 145 and Weaver's 22. The popular vote for Cleveland was 5,556,000; for Harrison 5,175,000; and for Weaver 1,040,000.

For the first time since 1858 the Democrats had control of the presidency and both houses of Congress. Cleveland had planned on saving his party by harnessing the "wild asses" of the West and South in support of sound money, a moderate tariff, and honest and frugal administration, but the growing impact of the Panic of 1893, which began two months after he took office, accentuated the intraparty differences. Labor warfare broke out, government finances deteriorated, and free-silverites made converts in hundreds of thousands.

Cleveland's
second term

A more opportunist party leader might have made more headway, but Cleveland's tactlessness lost supporters who might have been won with a little cajolery and defeated causes which might have been saved by better timing or by a spirit of accommodation. He fell into the habit of arraigning those who did not agree with him and of complaining to callers about his burdens. Presently party leaders began to avoid the White House like the plague. In the end the "wild asses" got the bits in their teeth and dragged Cleveland from the driver's seat. Business once more changed sides. This time Cleveland went with it and openly denounced Democratic actions. The occurrences of Cleveland's second term betokened the renewal of the political struggle over fundamental issues. As such we shall leave the details for later treatment.

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Chapter XXX

OPENING THE FAR WEST


1 *The Miners' Frontier*

THE Far West differed from all previous Wests in as much as its problems required new techniques for their solution. The Indians were more indomitable than the Woods Indians had been, and traveling by horse and subsisting upon buffalo they were hard to conquer. Over much of the Far West there was a scarcity of wood and water, dire handicaps to pioneers whose technology had been built upon the existence of a superabundance of both. It was only gradually that substitutes were found: imported lumber and the sod house for the traditional log structure; barbed wire for the rail fence; coal and then kerosene for stove wood; and artesian wells and windmills to provide water. The tough sod of buffalo grass was broken by Oliver's chilled-steel plow, "the sod buster." Last, but possibly most important single factor, was the railroad, which by bringing in the settlers and the materials of the new technology and carrying out the grain and the raw materials hastened the conquest of the Far West. A curious reversal of the traditional pattern of settlement was that after the exploitation of gold in California there followed an *eastward* movement through the mountain area in search of gold and silver.

Special
problems of
the Far
West

The California gold rush was the earliest and in many ways the most typical of the gold fevers which did so much to open the Far West. When in January 1848 James Marshall found traces of gold in the tailrace of John Sutter's mill on the American River, the two men tried to keep the secret. Even when the secret leaked out, the news was received with skepticism. At this time a certain Sam Brannan, who was running a store at Sutter's Fort (Sacramento), decided to stir up a little business in the gold country, and so one day (according to the usual story) he appeared in San Francisco holding a bottle of gold

Gold in
California



Adapted from Ray A. Billington, *Westward Expansion*, copyright 1949, The Macmillan Company. Used by permission.

dust above his head and bellowing, "Gold! Gold! Gold from the American River!"

The result was all that Brannan could have wished. San Francisco was almost denuded of men. Sailors jumped ship, and soldiers deserted the army. Sutter's New Helvetia domain was invaded by a horde of strangers who seized his stock, squatted on his land, and reduced him to poverty. Not only the United States went wild, but Europe as well. Beginning in 1849 the brains, brawn, capital, and offscourings of both poured into California. Men crowded into square-rigged windjammers for the long trip around the Horn. Others took the

short cut across Panama or Nicaragua, and many succumbed to malaria or yellow fever. At Panama men paid \$1000 just for standing room on a mail steamer bound for California.

By the end of 1849 about 50,000 men had reached California, men of all social and cultural degrees and of diverse nations, even a goodly number of Chinese and hundreds of the Australian convict element known as Sydney "coves" or "ducks." The first on the scene were experienced Mexican miners, chiefly Sonorans, whose customs and methods became basic in the gold fields. They were, however, ruthlessly ousted by later comers; and many of them, with understandable resentment, turned to banditry.

Overland emigrant trains, consisting usually of a dozen or more "prairie schooner" wagons drawn by horses, mules, or oxen, and numbering thirty or more members, gathered at Council Bluffs, Independence, Fort Smith, or other convenient frontier towns, ready to move as soon as the spring grass was high enough to feed the stock. Each train had an experienced guide and elected a captain and governing committee to handle routine matters, though important problems were from time to time submitted to the entire company. A captain deficient in wisdom or leadership, or an outbreak of dissension might easily lead to disaster or, at least, to a split into separate trains.

**Emigrant
trains**

Even with the smoothest direction and with the most willing co-operation there were problems of rain, wind, and dust, and rivers to be crossed and mountain escarpments to be scaled. Buffaloes were welcome as food, but a caravan caught in the path of a stampede was in dire peril. Indian attacks were met by drawing the wagons into a ring with the stock in the center, while all hands fired at the Indians who circled outside on their swift ponies. Sickness was common, with cholera and scurvy leading the list and fever and ague not far behind. Deaths, weddings, and births were a part of the routine of the wagon train. Almost always there was a goodly number of women with a wagon train, and it is recorded that without a murmur they did their share—and more. A balladeer has given the women a well-deserved stanza:

Susanna, Betsy, Clementine,
The troubles they went through:
They had to stand what the men folks stood,
And stand for the men folks too.

The routes taken by emigrants to California were those found by the mountain men or by the early Spanish traders. The most popular one followed the Oregon Trail up the course of the North Platte River to South Pass. West of Fort Bridger the California Trail passed either north or south of Great Salt Lake. The latter route was the worst because of its long stretch of salt-encrusted

**Emigrant
routes**

desert. Trains poured through the Great Basin, sometimes scarcely a mile apart. Those with competent guides usually got through, ragged and starving but without serious losses. The others lined the trail with broken-down wagons and goods cast aside to lighten loads, and carcasses of horses and oxen tainted the air. Hundreds of people perished of starvation, thirst, and scurvy, or went mad with the heat of the sun or blind with its rays on the white salt pans. Half-demented creatures staggered on toward the distant Sierras or turned in a desperate attempt to reach the succor of the Mormon settlements.

Once the emigrants reached the steep eastern face of the Sierra Nevadas they had a choice of passes, all difficult; most of them crossed just north or just south of Lake Tahoe. A longer but safer route, the Mormon Trail, led southwest from Salt Lake City along the Old Spanish Trail; impatient travelers, however, took a short cut through Death Valley and sometimes perished. Alternative routes across the Plains led from Independence or Fort Smith to Santa Fe, thence to Tucson (in Mexico until 1853) and across the Colorado River at Yuma. Southern gold seekers often traveled across Texas to El Paso and thence to Tucson.

The goal of the California emigrants was the "Mother Lode Country" on the western slopes of the Sierras. There it was possible for a man with a basin to wash up to \$50 in gold per day out of the sands of the mountain streams, while the use of rockers and sluices increased the take. Work in "the diggings" entailed the most arduous toil with pick and shovel—something not bargained for by many who had expected merely to pick up nuggets like pebbles. Curiously enough, Congress made no regulations for gold mining until 1866, and then it scarcely did more than approve of the mining code which had grown up in the Far West. This was in part based upon Mexican custom.

Each community had its miners' association which elected officers, set the rules for the size and registration of claims, and listened to disputes in open miners' court and made a decision on the spot. The size of claims varied according to the district but was ordinarily fifty by one hundred feet. The discoverer was entitled to two claims, and others to one apiece, but these claims had to be worked to be held. The water essential to placer mining belonged to the man who used it first, even though he might have diverted it through a sluice and left prospective claims farther down without water.

Before long it became apparent that some men had chosen the easier way of either robbing the successful toilers or seizing the claims of those fortunate enough to have struck it rich. The prospect of easy pickings as well as Western reluctance to ask about a man's background had attracted numerous criminals, and the miners sang an ironical song about the newcomers:

The mining
code

Character
of the
miners

Oh, what was your name in the states?
 Was it Thompson or Johnson or Bates?
 Did you murder your wife
 And fly for your life?
 Say, what was your name in the states?

Towns bore picturesque names, such as Whiskey Bar, Skunk Gulch, and Hell's Delight. Of course, there was a strong core of responsible men among California's gold seekers, but it must be understood that they had been attracted by the prospect of adventure and easy wealth, while their sudden plunge into a desperate frontier environment and an almost wholly male society led to the loosening of Eastern inhibitions. Where men had to fight to hold their claims, life became cheap.

When California became a state it acknowledged the legality of the mining code, but its enforcement was still up to the miners' associations. When claim jumpers became too bold or when criminals resorted to violence in the mining towns, the miners descended upon them and after an admirably prompt and simple trial hanged them, flogged them, or drove them out of camp. The method was by no means new on the frontier—farther east such men who took the law into their own hands were called regulators, but in California they received the name of vigilantes.

The vigilance committee (frequently self-appointed) became a common mining-country institution when the law broke down or fell into the hands of criminal manipulators. As one might suppose, there were occasions when the vigilante method was used by seamy characters to seize control of the community's legal machinery in order to pave the way to power and spoils. Mining camps, it has frequently been pointed out, went through four phases: (1) the strike and the proving; (2) the rush, ending usually in wild disorder; (3) the vigilantes' imposition of order; and (4) the coming of the law.

San Francisco became the most remarkable boom town in American history. It was the starting point for all ventures, the entrepôt for supplies, and the depot for gold. Rents and prices shot sky-high within a few weeks after the strike, and farsighted men came back to the metropolis after a fling at finding gold had left them with only blisters for reward. Indeed, the real fortunes were made by the gamblers, the merchants, and the speculators—the men who mined the miners. San Francisco was a city of tents, shacks, gambling halls, and shooting scrapes. Its mud (it was said) would cover a mule to the ears. Six times in eighteen months the city was gutted by fire, but each time its citizens rebuilt with unquenchable optimism and good humor.

The city fathers were elected with all the boisterousness of an Irish fair; then their authority was blandly ignored. Not that they cared, for

they were more interested in graft than law enforcement. No one paid taxes; the city raised money by selling lots and issuing scrip. Thus affairs limped along until 1851, when a vigilante movement made the first step toward order and progress; accusations were not lacking that the vigilantes were led by crooks bigger and smarter than the criminals they ran out of town. At any rate, San Francisco was launched upon the career which was to make it the commercial and financial center of the Far West, while its Barbary Coast was to become the synonym for glittering sin and its Nob Hill the symbol of stuffy elegance.

California's deposits of alluvial gold that could be worked by crude placer-mining methods had been pretty well exploited by the middle 1850's. Thereafter the gold deposits had to be blasted loose from the hillsides and then washed down by powerful hydraulic jets; or the quartz-imbedded lodes had to be mined underground, the rock crushed in heavy stamping mills, and the gold separated by the mercury process. Such methods were too expensive for the ordinary digger; so California's placer miners fanned out over the West in search of deposits which they could work by the means at their disposal. Sometimes they were drawn to new regions by the merest rumor, almost as though they were driven by a craze. At the same time they looked for other types of deposits which might be attractive to the capitalists, who were showing an increasing interest in Western minerals.

For the next thirty years one strike after another drew its thousands of hopeful diggers, and down to this day "desert rats" with picks and grub stakes carried by pack burros roam the wastelands in search of the big strike which is to crown a life of patient effort. The great strikes of the mining frontier fall into six chief geographical areas: (1) California's Mother Lode Country; (2) the silver mines, particularly the Comstock Lode, of western Nevada; (3) the gold regions of Idaho and Montana; (4) the gold and silver of Colorado; (5) the gold of the Black Hills of South Dakota; and (6) the silver of Arizona and New Mexico.

The miner, indeed, was important in all of the Far Western states and was a principal agent in "opening up" most of them. Even the vast ideological struggle of the Civil War had little interest for the miners.

Doubtless some of them were refugees from military service, or perhaps they went to the West because they could not decide which side to support. At any rate, their primary interest was in getting rich; wealth in gold or silver was one thing that they could depend on, whatever the outcome of the war. As it was, Western gold and silver were indispensable financial supports of the Union cause and eventually aided the return to specie payment.


The streams from the snow peaks of the Sierra Nevada had by 1851 attracted a few settlers to western Nevada, then a part of Utah Territory. Presently placer miners came in, and in 1859 a rich vein of gold was struck

in the Washoe region. Henry Comstock, a brash and drunken miner who horned in on the find, gave his name to this, one of the richest strikes in history. The diggers were annoyed by quantities of "worthless blue stuff" in which the gold was imbedded. Finally someone thought to have the "stuff" assayed; it yielded about \$1600 in gold and \$4800 in silver per ton—or so it is said! Strike after strike followed, culminating in the Big Bonanza of 1873. San Francisco capital was dominant from the first. Indeed, it was Nevada that built up Frisco's great fortunes and crowned Nob Hill with mansions.

But Nevada also profited. Virginia City, clinging precariously to the side of Mount Davidson, became a fantastic new boom town. From an original camp of caves, burlap tents, and makeshift shanties, Virginia City developed into a straggling collection of somewhat better shacks centered on proud jigsaw palaces housing roaring saloons and bawdy houses, a stock exchange, five newspapers, and several hotels in which miners brought up on bacon and beans banqueted on champagne and oysters. Since the miners could not afford the machinery necessary to operation, many of them now spent their time staking out claims and peddling them to each other—

The Comstock Lode

Virginia City



investing the profits of their own frauds in the frauds of others, as someone has put it. In the end only a dozen or so of the three thousand claims were profitable, but by 1880 they had produced about half a billion dollars. Then came the long slump and the political battle for the remonetization of silver.

Nevada's mines were so important that in March 1861 Congress set the area apart from Utah. Mark Twain came to the West with his brother, the secretary of the new territory, and as a newspaper writer helped to publicize the new silverado. Nevadans, of course, panted for statehood, and it was granted because the Republican Party needed every available vote for the Thirteenth Amendment and for the presidential election of 1864. So, though the population was probably no more than 20,000, Nevada was voted into the Union and its admission proclaimed 31 October 1864. In 1866 Nevada was enlarged by the addition of one degree taken from Utah, and by the wedge-shaped section west of the Colorado River formerly held by New Mexico.

When a gold strike on the Fraser River (British Columbia) petered out in 1859, thousands of disappointed placer miners moved eastward. Strikes were made during the following years at numerous points in Idaho and spread across the divide into what is now Montana. Northwest- Steamers ascended the Columbia and Snake rivers to Lewis-
ern strikes ton, and there trains of pack animals met them, bringing gold and silver and carrying back supplies. As in California, the alluvial gold was soon worked out and mining was taken over by capitalists. Lead and copper were to prove in the long run as profitable as gold and silver. The old Oregon Territory had extended from the continental divide to the Pacific, and when Oregon was admitted as a state (1859) the remainder of the territory was reconstituted as Washington Territory. The miners' clamor for self-government resulted in a number of reorganizations out of which presently emerged Idaho, Montana, and Wyoming.

Meanwhile Colorado had come into the mining picture. A party of Cherokee on the way to California in 1850 found a little gold near the site of Denver, and in 1858 some of the party returned to the spot. Other placer-
mining parties were in the vicinity, and among them they
Pikes Peak found enough gold to make them optimistic. Some of the
rush, 1859 miners built a log village which they named Denver (for the governor of Kansas) and settled down to wait for spring. Others carried the news back to the East, snowballing it on the way. The result was that in 1859 there was a rush of gold seekers (variously estimated at from 50,000 to 100,000) to the "Pikes Peak region," as the country was called for lack of a specific name. The wagons of the "Fifty-Niners" carried the vaunting slogan "Pikes Peak or Bust"; and when it was found that gold

could not be picked up like pebbles, the wagons rolled back to "The River" (the Missouri) with the acknowledgment "Pikes Peak and Busted."

Nevertheless, some diggings were found where toil would be satisfactorily rewarded. Farmers and cattlemen moved in to supply the miners. Toll roads were built up the canyons. A private mint was set up to stamp gold coins. Denver became a bustling market town. As early as November 1858 Denver sent a delegate to Congress with a demand for political autonomy and, when Congress ignored the matter, actually set up the "Territory of Jefferson," which exercised a shadowy authority until the creation of Colorado Territory in 1861.

**Colorado's
difficulties**

The Civil War brought serious divisions among the people of the territory, and to these were added crop failures, Indian troubles, and the exhaustion of the placer gold mines and the lack of capital or of scientific knowledge to extract gold from the ore-bearing rocks. Finally, worst blow of all, the Union Pacific passed far north of Denver. But the Denverites were hardy and self-reliant entrepreneurs, not to be lightly ignored. They managed to connect with the Union Pacific by a spur line and joined in promoting the Kansas Pacific connection with Kansas City. When the Santa Fe Railroad threatened to wean away southern Colorado from Denver, the Denverites promptly fought back by building the Denver and Rio Grande Railroad.

Colorado had its reward. In 1876 it was admitted to the Union as the "Centennial State." New means of extracting gold were making the mines profitable, and in 1875 silver was discovered in the Leadville district. The result was a crop of silver monarchs whose antics enliven Western history. They embellished the roaring mining camps with elaborate "opera houses" and brought in theatrical troupes. Denver became famous not only for its mile-high capitol building set in sight of the snow peaks but for its lavish hotels and gambling houses, its pistol-brandishing editors, and its cavorting Bonanza Kings. The monetization of silver was padded by the discovery of gold on Cripple Creek (1891) and by the rise of cattle grazing, farming, coal mining, and steel manufacture.

**The silver
strikes**

The last of the greater gold regions to be opened up was the Black Hills. Rumors of the existence of gold in its streams had been circulating for years; if they proved true, the government feared that the ensuing rush would precipitate hostilities with the warlike Sioux, who regarded the region as sacred. Finally, to allay the rumors, the War Department in 1874 dispatched a well-equipped scientific mission with a cavalry guard under Lt. Col. (once General) George A. Custer. The stunning result was the discovery of rich gold deposits.

**Black Hills
rush, 1874**

The news could not be concealed; and though the army forbade the entry of prospectors, some managed to get through. By the summer of 1875 miners were converging on the Black Hills from all directions, and it was found impossible to keep them out. When the Sioux refused to sell their claim to the area, the government became disgusted and threw it open to miners provided they entered at their own risk. President Grant gave one reason for the action when he explained that if troops were sent in to eject the miners, they would desert.

By 1876 a series of boom towns had sprung up—Custer City, Lead, Spearfish, and Deadwood. The expected Sioux war came, but the miners left it to the army. The Black Hills, indeed, were enjoying a brilliant exhibition of frontier lawlessness. In Deadwood:

the faro games were wilder, the hurdy-gurdy dance halls noisier, the street brawls more common, than in any other western town. There congregated road agents, gunmen, murderers, bawds, and gamblers driven from more orderly communities by vigilantes—Wild Bill Hickok, California Jack, Bed Rock Tom, Poker Alice, Calamity Jane. There stagecoaches were robbed with such monotonous regularity the local paper dismissed one such incident with: "We have again to repeat the hackneyed phrase, 'the stage has been robbed!'" There desperadoes from the hills regularly roared in to "take over the town," while storekeepers boarded up their doors, shut out their lights, and unashamedly hid until danger was past. There the vigilance committee "stretched hemp" over the necks of more unregenerate cutthroats than in all the gold fields from Pikes Peak to Sutter's Fort. Deadwood's place in the criminal sun was brief, but during those hectic years no other spot in the nation could boast such unrestrained lawlessness as that famous mining camp.*

Less lethal, perhaps, but no less renowned in American legend is the silver-mining town of Tombstone, Arizona—"Helldorado." There around 1880 its gambling palaces, its plush jigsaw hotels, and its Bird Cage Opera House sheltered a strange assortment of French chefs, white-coated bartenders who knew all about the latest cocktails, evening-gowned demimonde with their dress-suited escorts, and bad men from Deadwood, Texas, and far-off Sydney, while Apache bands prowled about the outskirts of the little city. Curiously enough, Tombstone regarded itself as "not a bad town. There were no holdups or burglaries. People who minded their own business were let strictly alone by the gunmen. Women were as safe as though they were in God's pocket."†

Nevertheless, here flourished some of the boldest gunmen of the West, and its Boot Hill was filled with silent citizens who had died with their

* Ray A. Billington, *Westward Expansion*, 632, copyright 1949 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

† William M. Raine, *Famous Sheriffs and Western Outlaws* (1929), 92.

boots on. At the time Arizona was becoming cow country; so Tombstone's feuds involved gamblers, miners, and cowboys. Here the famous Earp family upheld the law (after their fashion) and finally fell into such bad odor that they found it advisable to leave. By 1900 Tombstone's silver had played out, but Arizona, now undoubted cow country, was still enthusiastically lawless as rustlers operated back and forth across the border and cattlemen went gunning for each other. Arizona, indeed, was the last state to lose its frontier character, and then only because it took a leaf from Texas's book and organized a company of Rangers.

Problems of transportation followed the mining frontier as it had all others. Small steamboats plied the Western bays and rivers and received exorbitant passenger and freight rates. Overland trails were traversed by pack trains or by heavy freight wagons drawn by oxen and driven by a breed of men called bullwhackers, notorious for their toughness and their fluent profanity. Much like them were the mule drivers known popularly as mule-skinners. Stage wagons soon offered passenger service over dusty, bumpy roads, but most travelers found it more pleasant and speedy to buy or hire saddle horses.

**Transport
problems**

The demand for mail service resulted in the letting of contracts to carriers who operated stage wagons or packhorse lines. There were hazards of mud, snow, and hostile Indians, and mail service was notoriously expensive and unreliable. Mail destined for the West coast went by way of Panama, and most Congressmen saw no reason to institute through overland routes. Finally Congress was goaded into spending a few hundreds of thousands to lay out roads by the South Pass route and through New Mexico.

Pressure from California, which included a monster petition with 75,000 signatures, led in 1857 to the passage of the Overland Mail Bill after long bickering between North and South as to which route should be adopted. In the end a Southern Postmaster-General selected a 2800-mile arc (the Oxbow Route) from St. Louis through Fort Smith, El Paso, and Yuma to San Francisco.

**Overland
mail**

The contract was let to a group which included John Butterfield and William G. Fargo. They established stations at ten- to fifteen-mile intervals over most of the route, bought improved Concord coaches, and hired several hundred rough and tough men as drivers, agents, hostlers, and guards. The service was semiweekly, took twenty-five days and nights, and the fare was \$200.

The Southern (or Butterfield) Overland Mail was a prestige success but disappointing financially. The Postmaster-General grudgingly authorized improvements in the mail service on other routes, and Congress accused him of using the mails as an excuse to subsidize transportation

agencies. By 1859 six mail lines (two by sea) were running to the Pacific coast, but in that year a new Postmaster-General undertook ruthless retrenchments despite the anguished cries of Westerners.

Semimonthly mails had been carried over the central route by the freighting and staging firm of Russell, Majors and Waddell, dominated by William H. Russell. In April 1860 Russell launched a pony-express service from St. Joseph to Sacramento which took ten days. Remount stations were established at ten- to fifteen-mile intervals, and the best riders and horses were used. The venture was more romantic than financially rewarding. With the beginning of the Civil War the government took over the Pony Express and maintained it until the Overland Telegraph was completed in October 1861. The Overland Mail was also moved to the central route and became a daily service, but it did so badly that in March 1862 it was sold to an old-time bullwhacker by the name of Ben Holladay. He put the business on its feet, expanded and extended it, and then sold out to Wells, Fargo and Company, which was building a monopoly of Western lines. Though the rapid expansion of railroads put an end to the company's through stage lines, its express business survived, especially in the gold fields, and it became an important banking concern.

2 *Clearing Away the Indians*

In 1849, when the Indian Bureau was taken over by the Department of the Interior, the policy of dissolving the Indians' social organization was brazenly accelerated. At this time there was endemic warfare between the Civilized Nations of Indian Territory and the Plains Indians, though the Cross Timbers was tacitly accepted as the boundary between the two. The Cross Timbers, one of the few prominent landmarks on the Southern Plains, was so called because it ran north and south across the main trails and the courses of the rivers. It was a belt of post oaks and blackjacks which began in a thin sprinkling in Kansas and extended almost to Brownwood and Waco in Texas.


During the Civil War some members of the Civilized Nations took the side of the South, probably because they held Negro slaves, though more took the side of the Union. Nevertheless, after the war Congress seized the opportunity to abrogate their treaties on the excuse that the liberated slaves must be given lands. The Civilized Nations were then forced to share their eastern holdings with other Indians from Kansas and to give up their western holdings, roughly the part west of the Cross Timbers, to the conquered Plains nations.

Meanwhile the process of "clearing away the Indians" was being vigorously prosecuted throughout the West. Oregon led the way. One of the settlers recorded the attitude of his fellows:

It was customary to speak of the Indian man as a Buck; of the woman as a Squaw; until at length, in the general acceptance of the terms, they ceased to recognize the rights of Humanity in those to whom they were so applied. By a very natural and easy transition, from being spoken of as brutes, they came to be thought of as game to be shot, or as vermin to be destroyed.*

**Oregon
Indian
wars**

During 1847 white travelers brought an epidemic of measles to the Cayuse. Dr. Whitman, who had a mission among the Cayuse, tried to




Courtesy Carolyn Thomas Foreman

save them, but they died off in swarms while the whites recovered. The Cayuse could not be expected to understand the mysteries of immunity and blamed Whitman; so they presently rose and massacred fourteen of the missionary personnel in the vicinity (including Whitman) and held about sixty more as hostages. A trader managed to ransom the captives and, after a period of frontier raiding, the Willamette Valley settlers marched on the Cayuse and wreaked vengeance. The entry of miners into southern Oregon led to the Rogue River War (1850–55). Attempts by the

* John Beeson, *A Plea for the Indians; With Facts and Features of the Late War in Oregon* (1857), 17.


INDIAN WARS IN THE SOUTHWEST



government to coop up the Indians on reservations led to a long series of clashes which culminated in the Yakima War (1855-59). The Modoc War (1872-73) was an attempt to capture a small band under a chief called Captain Jack which had taken refuge in the lava beds of the Tule Lake country. The last of the Indian wars in the Northwest was the Bannock War of 1878, brought on by Indian discontent with reservation policies. The Nez Percé War of 1877 we shall mention in another connection.

The California Indians and most of those of the Great Basin were in a low stage of culture, weakly armed, and divided into numerous small tribes. Since they lived largely on nuts, berries, and roots they were contemptuously lumped together as "Digger Indians." They had been decimated under the Spanish and Mexican régimes; now they were all but exterminated. The miners enslaved them, took their women for immoral purposes, or drove them out of their native valleys. When the Indians struck back ineffectually in defense of their homes, the miners poisoned the springs and spent Sundays and holidays in organized hunts which ended in brutal massacres when-

No wars in California



ever their quarry was cornered. In the south a few of the Indians were more aggressive and occasionally attacked ranches and emigrant trains and drove off horses and cattle. A number of white retaliatory expeditions were organized, but they can scarcely be dignified with the name of wars. Massacre, disease, and starvation so effectively worked to solve the California problem that the original estimated 150,000 Indians had by 1900 declined to 15,000.

In Arizona and New Mexico the sheep-herding Navahos of the north were warlike, while the several branches of their Apache relatives to the south—Mescalero, Jicarilla, Chiricahua, etc.—were even more so. Mangas Coloradas (d. 1863?) and Cochise (d. 1874) were the Apache leaders. Cochise was probably the most superb strategist among Indian leaders. In 1861 he had been one of a party which went to a fort under a flag of truce, and there a lieutenant had seized the party, acting under the white maxim that no faith needed to be kept with Indians. The deputation was hanged except for Cochise, who escaped and with Mangas Coloradas led a terrible war of reprisal.

Early
Southwest-
ern wars

The Indians divided into small bands which could not be easily followed by troops, but which could take full advantage of the country and harry ranches and stage and freight stations. Mangas Coloradas was murdered, and in 1863-64 about 1800 troops based on a number of forts undertook a series of grand campaigns which had sweeping success. Most important of all, Colonel Kit Carson was so fortunate as to trap 7000 Navaho in a canyon and force their surrender. Navaho and Apache were then forced to settle on reservations.

The post-bellum period in the Southwest was one of chaos. Texas and Mexican borderers had long engaged in cattle-stealing raids, and now as Texans moved westward along the border the state of endemic warfare moved with them. Apache and Comanche also carried on their feuds with Mexicans and Mexican Indians, and occasions were not lacking for renewal of war with American miners and cattlemen. From 1874 to 1880 a chief named Victorio terrorized New Mexico and adjacent Mexico until he was caught by Mexican troops and killed.

The Arizona Apache "outlaws" were led by Cochise with such success that the white settlements were isolated for long periods, and troop detachments were frequently massacred. Finally in 1872 General Oliver Otis Howard, "the Christian general," succeeded in persuading Cochise to retire to a reservation. There Cochise died in 1874. One of his chiefs, named Geronimo (1829-1909), remained unreconciled and led a long series of outbreaks. It soon became a national custom to note that Geronimo had "escaped" again from the reservation. Through many of the long years of conflict General George Crook, in command of the army, was the nemesis of the Apache.

By the time of the Civil War disease had swept away numbers of the Plains Indians and effectively removed some of the most powerful nations as factors in the post-bellum picture. Among those who remained were in the North the seven branches and numerous subdivisions ("bands") of the Sioux or Dakota, a notoriously divided and contentious nation; the allied Cheyenne and Arapaho in Wyoming and southward; and the allied Kiowa and Comanche from Kansas southward. There were also others, among them the Blackfeet and Crows in Montana and the Pawnee on the Platte River; these nations were hostile to those mentioned above and often furnished scouts to the American Army. The recent introduction of the horse ("the Big Wolf") on the Plains had enabled the nations of that area to follow the buffalo, and tribes were known to wander as much as a thousand miles in a summer. They were thus relatively self-sufficient, could if necessary get along without civilized goods, and in time of war could vanish like ghosts into the limitless Plains.

Culturally the Plains was a melting pot in which there had come together elements from all the periphery, warring and borrowing, never at rest. Since war was the all-important fact of life, it was natural that society should be based upon a series of graded military fraternities, and that boys must prove themselves by excruciating tortures before they could be called men. Maize was fast losing its old cultural significance, and the medicine bundle of charms supplanted the sacred fire as the center of religious life, though the sun dance with its self-inflicted tortures may have been an attempt to remember the fire. The significance of the horse made it the grand prize of warfare, the rival even of scalp taking. The psychic adaptation of the Indians to the harsh, nomadic life of the Plains had an obvious relationship to the stubbornness and savagery with which they were to contest the march of the whites.

Culture of
the Plains

For nearly twenty years the light cavalry of the Plains Indians, drawn from a population that probably was never more than 140,000 all told, was able to meet the United States Army on fairly equal terms. An army officer complained that it actually cost the government \$1,000,000 to kill one Indian. It was cheaper to feed the Indians than to fight them, said the army, though there was no scarcity of military men whose solution to the whole problem was to wipe them out. Since white men and red took directly opposite attitudes toward their relationship with Nature, it was evident that in the long run one side would be forced to adapt itself to the other—and clearly it was not going to be the whites who changed.

Why the
Indians
fought

Indian warriors, of course, possessed the barbarian's desire for combat and plunder, but they were also urged on by other factors. There were the encroachments of white farmers, the friction with emigrants and miners, and the cheating and exploitation by Indian agents. As serious as any of these was the deliberate slaughter of the buffaloes, which was confronting the Plains nations with the prospect of starvation. It was clear to thoughtful Indian leaders that they were doomed as a race, for whisky, smallpox, tuberculosis, and syphilis were depleting their numbers even more rapidly than warfare. Some would have gladly gone over to the white man's ways and become farmers, but neither government nor settlers were willing to leave them alone, and the young warriors, angered by injustice and reared in the warlike tradition, refused to spend their lives following the plow.

The confusion in relations with the Indians was increased by the antagonism between the army and the Indian Bureau. The latter was shot through with politics and corruption, especially on the level of actual contact with the Indians, but it must be recognized that it also had many honest agents whose intentions were honorable and who frequently managed against all odds to turn in

Army ver-
sus Indian
Bureau

creditable performances. The bureau in its anxiety to promote Indian welfare (and sometimes to get lucrative contracts for its officials and favorites) gave the Indians blankets and clothing, and guns to use on their buffalo hunts, often better guns than the army possessed. The Indians themselves obtained more weapons from traders, though they never managed to get enough and many of them had to rely on bows and arrows. Yet they constituted what was probably the world's best light cavalry; many of them were expert snap shots while clinging to the side of a running horse; they came and went swiftly, carrying few supplies and living on the buffalo. The army had to fight them with poorly mounted heavy dragoons, insufficient in number, armed with carbines that fouled after a few shots, and fed by favored contractors with rations which would have been disdained by a section hand.

The army was distinctly annoyed by the bureau's pampering of the Indians. It pointed out that Indians preferred to hunt buffaloes with silent bow and arrows rather than noisy guns, and accused bureau personnel of profiting by arming the Indians. It showed that there was a pattern to the Indians' behavior; in the spring they took their guns on the warpath, lived on buffalo meat, and plundered white ranchers and travelers; then in the autumn they appeared at the bureau's agencies, made proper penance, received winter clothing and rations and new guns and ammunition—and sold their plunder to white traders. The Indians, said the generals, should be treated with stern firmness and justice; guns should be forbidden to them; and raids or even wandering from the reservations should be promptly punished.

With the slaughter of the buffalo—the beast known to scientists as the American bison—the Indian commissary was gone. There is no way of knowing how many buffaloes there were before the slaughter got under way, but estimates (or, rather, informed guesses) ran as high as 30 million. The development of emigrant routes across the Central Plains divided the buffaloes into the northern and southern herds as early as the 1840's. After 1815 hunters began to kill buffaloes for their hides, which were used for carriage and sleigh robes and overcoats; and as the beaver trade declined, the buffalo-hide trade rose.

In 1870 Eastern tanneries found a use for hides, and presently somewhere around three million buffaloes a year fell prey to commerce. The coming of railroads made it possible to reach the farther herds and to carry out the hides. The sport of buffalo hunting became a Western passion. Railroads ran excursion trains into the buffalo country, and it was common to shoot the animals from the moving cars. On occasion the buffaloes got revenge, for sometimes trains

The Amer-
ican bison

Slaughter of
the south-
ern herd

caught in a stampede were overturned. Dodge City became as much a buffalo-hunters' town as a cow town.

William F. ("Buffalo Bill") Cody (1847-1917) obtained his name and fame as a hunter for the Kansas Pacific Railroad, killing 4280 in eighteen months.* Later he went on to careers as a scout in the Sioux wars and owner of the first Wild West Show. By 1880 the southern herd had disappeared—perhaps a total of 10 million animals—except for a few thousand scattered head, and old hunters were left the dismal task of gathering and cording their bones for use in sugar refineries and fertilizer factories.

Meanwhile the northern herd had been melting, probably with the encouragement of Indian agents and army commanders. Here the Northern Pacific was the means of access. With the passing of the southern herd, many hunters moved north and the story was repeated. By the end of 1883 the northern herd had practically vanished, and its adjunct on the Canadian prairies had gone the same way. When in 1886 the National Museum wished to obtain a few specimens for mounting, it found that the only sizable herd remaining (about 600) was in the inaccessible Canadian woods; after weeks of hunting in Montana, its expeditionary force managed to obtain a score of hides. After 1900 government action both in the United States and in Canada was taken to preserve the few hundred animals kept here and there behind fences by sentimentalists.

**Slaughter of
the north-
ern herd**


There had been a number of minor clashes on the Plains during the 1850's but no general war. The purchase of Minnesota from the Sioux had led to a number of injustices, but one Indian party, called the "farmers," tried to make the best of the situation. The other, the "blanket" party, refused to be reconciled and in the summer of 1862 began at New Ulm a series of massacres which claimed over 700 lives. General Henry Hastings Sibley now moved against the Sioux under Little Crow and defeated them in a series of engagements which extended into the next year. Thirty-eight of the marauders were hanged for murder at Mankato, and Congress expropriated the land of all the Sioux and moved them out.

**First Sioux
War,
1862-63**

Meanwhile the encroachments of Colorado and Wyoming miners and ranchers on the hunting grounds of the Cheyenne and Arapaho led to hostilities, beginning in 1861. For three years the crescendo of attacks mounted, and at times Denver was completely isolated from the East. Finally, late in 1864 Black Kettle (d. 1868), chief of the southern Cheyenne, asked for peace and after some

**Cheyenne
War,
1861-65**

* Buffalo Bill was given to expanding the truth, so it is hard to know what to believe about him; however, see Richard J. Walsh, *The Making of Buffalo Bill* (1928).



talk with the commander at Fort Lyon, which he understood to be a guarantee of safety. he settled with about seven hundred tribesmen in winter quarters at Sand Creek. Here, in November 1864, a thousand Colorado militia under Colonel John M. Chivington, a Methodist preacher, no less, fell upon the encampment and massacred Indians to a number estimated as high as five hundred, chiefly women and children. Whatever the excuses for the Sand Creek Massacre (and they were long bitterly debated), the war was immediately renewed. Julesburg was raided twice, a small fort was taken, and the soldiers lost a battle.

The rush of miners to Montana led the Federal government in 1865 to begin to build a road from Fort Laramie, Wyoming to Bozeman, Montana—the so-called Bozeman Trail. Chief Red Cloud (1822–1902) of the

Sioux protested vigorously but unavailingly that his people's hunting grounds would be ruined. The Sioux then attacked all along the line, with the Fetterman Massacre (Dec. 1886) and the Wagon Box Fight (Aug. 1867) outstanding. In the latter action 32 soldiers with magazine rifles behind wagon boxes stood off 3000 Sioux. Nevertheless, the soldiers were in effect pinned to the forts. The names of Red Cloud's chiefs have always been the schoolboy's delight: High Backbone, Crow King, Sitting Bull, Rain-in-the-Face, Crazy Horse, Iron Horse, American Horse, and Man-Afraid-of-His-Horses.

**Second
Sioux War,
1865-67**

At this juncture a Congressional committee made a report which pitched upon the army as a scapegoat. Actually, the precipitous reduction of the army after the Civil War had not left enough soldiers to keep peace in the West, and the parsimonious solons, always suspicious of military men, were trying to starve them. There was plenty of money (this was the day of the Grant scandals), but Congress saw no reason for putting it into good horses and repeating rifles. Congressional do-gooders now came up with the so-called "peace policy," and its cheapness appealed to the lawgivers. A mixed commission of Congressmen, soldiers, and Indian agents planned to set up a great system of reservations for the "wild" Indians. The purpose was to give the Indians settled homes and to encourage them to take up farming and abandon tribal institutions. Rations and clothing were to be issued periodically.

**The peace
policy**

At a great council at Medicine Lodge Creek in 1867 the southern Plains nations agreed and took up their new residences in Oklahoma west of the Cross Timbers. The Apache and the mountain nations were taken care of similarly. The Bozeman Trail project was abandoned, and at Fort Laramie in 1868 the Sioux accepted hunting grounds which were stipulated to extend from the Big Horn Mountains in Wyoming to the Missouri River in what is now central South Dakota, including the Black Hills. Then, to top it all off, Congress in 1871 by law abandoned the age-old policy of treating the Indian nations as dependent nations. The campaign to break down the institutional basis of Indian resistance was now official. However, there can be no doubt that the government really wanted reform, and Congress agreed to some rather unusual experiments.

**The
reservations**

It was all very well for despondent old chiefs to sign away the rights of their people, but many vigorous younger men refused to go along. Under Indian ideas of individual rights they were entitled to do as they pleased. Black Kettle quite naturally became the leader of the dissenters, and in 1868 war broke out again. Chief Roman Nose besieged a party of fifty scouts on the Arickaree (near Wray,

**Black Ket-
tle's War,
1868-69**

Colo.) for nine days until a relief expedition found it; Roman Nose was killed in the fight. Sheridan, in charge of operations, deliberately waited until the Indians should be gathered in winter camp, meanwhile training his soldiers in winter warfare. Then in November he sent columns converging from several directions in an effort to force the Indian war parties toward western Oklahoma. Black Kettle's camp was attacked (Battle of the Washita), and he fell in the fighting. Other Indian defeats followed, and that summer the bulk of the remaining southern Plains nations were forced to enter their Oklahoma reservations.

Certain fragments had escaped Sheridan's net and under the leadership of Satanta and other chieftains continued raiding the vicinity of the Texas and Oklahoma panhandles. By 1874 the raids had reached the status of warfare, and Sheridan once more sent in converging columns, and the beaten tribesmen were cooped up in Oklahoma while their leaders were exiled to Florida.

The Sioux Reserve was, as usual, supposed to be "perpetual," but by 1875 the Northern Pacific was creeping across the Plains, the buffaloes were perceptibly diminishing, and miners were invading the Black Hills, the sacred stronghold of the Sioux. This time Red Cloud held aloof, and the Sioux, a notably jealous and quarrelsome people, fell into war and peace factions. Bands of "non-treaty" Sioux and Cheyenne were in Wyoming, and now they were joined by the new dissenters. Their most prominent war chief was Crazy Horse (c. 1849-77), while in council and diplomacy the lead was taken by Sitting Bull (c. 1834-90).

Sheridan, in charge of the Western army though his headquarters were in Chicago, now brought Crook to command in Wyoming. In the spring of 1876 three converging columns were set in motion from south, east, and west, intending to catch the Sioux between the Yellowstone River and the Big Horn Mountains. Crook, in command of the southern column of some 1400 troops and Indian scouts, fought (17 June) the desperate Battle of the Rosebud with Crazy Horse and was forced to pull back. The Indians then crossed to the Little Big Horn River, up which the united eastern and western columns (about 1500 men) were advancing under Gen. Alfred H. Terry. Terry now sent Lt. Col. George A. Custer to cut off the Sioux retreat toward the Big Horn Mountains while he struck their front.

Not long before this Custer had been unjustly rebuked by Grant for testifying against the President's brother in a case involving fraud in the Indian Service, and he longed to vindicate himself by some heroic action. A dashing figure with long yellow hair and mustaches, he had a romantic public reputation to sustain. As on the morning of 25 June he approached the Indian encampment, he saw his chance. He divided his force into four parts for an attack, but for some reason his plans miscarried. Custer with 207 men of the

Battle of
Little Big
Horn, 25
June 1876

Seventh Cavalry was left to bear the brunt of an attack by 2500 warriors under Sitting Bull. By nightfall every soldier was dead; Custer himself, who was a blood brother of Sitting Bull, was spared, but it is supposed that under the impression that he was being saved for torture he shot himself. The other divisions of his command were saved by Terry's appearance or by a voluntary withdrawal of the attackers. Custer's defeat was one of the most severe in all the Indian wars, but it won him enduring fame. For a generation no barroom was complete without a painting or a chromo of Custer's Last Stand.

The Indians now scattered, for they were short of ammunition and, moreover, had to hunt for the winter's meat. All that summer the troops combed the mountains, rounding up small bands and sending them to the reservations. Crazy Horse surrendered and was presently killed in the struggle when reservation police tried to arrest him and exile him to Florida. Sitting Bull had fled to Canada but was so unwelcome there that he nearly starved; in 1881 he returned to the United States and after two years "detention" was allowed to live on the Standing Rock Reservation in southern South Dakota. Later on he spent a season as the stellar attraction in Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show.

The captured Cheyenne were sent to Indian Territory, but they longed for their old home in the North. In September 1877 something over 300 of them departed suddenly. For four months they eluded or outfought the troops sent against them, suffering terribly meanwhile and with numbers dwindling as groups split away or were killed by pursuers. A pitiful remnant fought, was captured, and escaped to fight again. The end came when three bloody heroes rose from among their fallen comrades and charged the rifles of 300 blue-coated soldiers.

The last generation of warfare had seen many instances of co-operation among Indian nations who were traditional enemies. Defeat brought even more striking evidences of fellow feeling. History shows that when a people is beaten physically and morally it often turns for comfort and hope to a messiah. Naturally the Indians had never seen any reason to accept the white man's estimate of his own superiority and, indeed, pointed for disproof to the white man's bad manners, greed, treachery, and slaughter of women and children. The explanation of the white victory lay between the power of the white God and the Indians' own abandonment of their heaven-bestowed traditions.

As a result they began to assimilate some Christian tenets and find prophets of their own. About 1860 a Northwestern Indian named Smohalla (c. 1815-1907) began to preach the Dreamer religion. Wisdom, he proclaimed, came in dreams, and dreams would not be given to those who wounded the breast of Mother Earth and planted seeds. The Great Spirit was angry with his Indian children because they had abandoned his ways, but was about to raise the dead, drive out the whites, and restore the old


The sequel

The
Dreamers

INDIAN WARS IN THE NORTHWEST

Statute Miles
0 50 100

Bear Paw Mts.
(Joseph surrendered)



Modoc War 1872-73

J. W. CLEMENT CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.

order. His doctrine convinced a band of the Nez Percés who lived in the Wallowa Valley of northeast Oregon under a remarkable leader called Chief Joseph (c. 1840–1904).

The Nez Percés boasted that in fifty years they had never taken the life of a white man; whites could make no such claim concerning the Nez Percés. In 1877 some of the Indians, angered by squatter and miner atrocities, attacked near-by white settlements. Chief Joseph reluctantly took the lead, but the power of the United States Army was too great for the Dreamers, and about 200 warriors and 600 women and children decided to escape to Canada. Actually the so-called Nez Percé War was more a chase than a war. Though Joseph ably led his people hundreds of circuitous miles through the mountains from Oregon to Montana and beat off his pursuers a number of times, he was forced at last to surrender within thirty miles of the Canadian border. It took 5000 troops, led by the unusually able O. O. Howard and Nelson A. Miles and all the resources of the telegraph to do it. Cornered at last, with his people wounded, ill, and starving, he fortified and fought a five days' battle—then surrendered. His words to the pursuing commander might well stand for all the beaten and dejected Indian peoples:

**Nez Percé
War, 1877**

I am tired of fighting. Our chiefs are all killed. . . . It is cold and we have no blankets. The little children are freezing to death. My people—some of them—have run away into the hills and have no blankets, no food. . . . Hear me, my chiefs, my heart is sick and sad. From where the sun now stands, I will fight no more, forever!

But the Dreamer religion did not disappear. About 1886 a Nevada Paiute named Wovoka (c. 1856–1932) began to have visions. He taught that because the whites had rejected the messiah, he had now returned as an Indian in the person of Wovoka. Let the Indians instead of warring upon each other live in peace and brotherhood; let them watch and pray, and give up firearms and whisky. Though the warlike Sioux could not altogether accept its patient resignation, Wovoka's religion spread rapidly among them and the other Plains nations. Wovoka's ritual "Ghost Dances," as the whites called them, were performed in the villages, and the dancers fell into trances and dreamed dreams. Sitting Bull encouraged the new cult.

**Wovoka,
the messiah**

When troops moved into the Pine Ridge Agency in November 1890, the people took fright and stampeded into the Badlands. When the Indian police (Sioux enemies of Sitting Bull) tried to arrest him, the old chief's friends rallied to his support and the police shot him. Other Indians fled to the Badlands. Troops followed and on 29 December tried to disarm an encampment and force the Indians back to the reservation. The terrified fugitives refused to obey and, armed mostly with knives, clubs, and

**Fourth
Sioux War
(Ghost
Dance
War), 1890**

revolvers, engaged in a hand-to-hand struggle. The Hotchkiss guns were loosed on the tepees crowded with women and children. Other Indians heard the firing and attacked, but within a few days all were disarmed and returned to their reservations. Well over 200 Indians and at least 29 soldiers had died. The interesting thing is that Sioux police and scouts took an active part against their own people. And so at Wounded Knee in the Badlands of South Dakota ended the struggle which had begun almost three centuries before, at Jamestown.

There is something ironic in the fact that reform of Indian administration was able to make little headway until the Indians had been crushed by military action and despoiled of the best of their lands. The prevailing sentimentality of the time among missionaries, ministers, and most reform elements could envision no more worthy end than the introduction among the Indians of the obviously superior institutions of Christian civilization; moreover, as stanch capitalists the reformers were desirous of tearing down the "communistic" institutions of the red man. These ends were sought by such reform organizations as the Indian Rights Association (1882) and a spate of biased and emotional literature, such as Helen Hunt Jackson's *A Century of Dishonor* (1881). These reformers rather generally advocated the gradual abolition of reservations and the settlement of Indians on individual farms. Land-hungry Westerners and land speculators enthusiastically seconded the policy because it would throw open millions of acres to settlement.

The result was the passage of the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887, favored by Cleveland and sponsored by Senator Henry L. Dawes of Massachusetts, chairman of the Senate Indian Committee and long a friend of the Indian. By this act the President was authorized to divide tribal lands at such a time as he judged wise, 160 acres to each head of family. The holdings, however, were to be held in trust by the government for twenty-five years to prevent their alienation before the family became adjusted to the new mode of life. Such families were to become United States citizens immediately. Tribal lands remaining after the division were to be sold and the receipts put into a trust fund for educational purposes.

Even Dawes soon recognized the imperfections of the law, notably that it left too much to the judgment and honesty of administrators. The Burke Act of 1906 made certain modifications. The automatic right to citizenship was withdrawn, but it was possible to obtain the title to land and with it citizenship in less than twenty-five years. Intoxicating liquors were prohibited to Indians not citizens. By one means or another, two thirds of the Indians were citizens by 1924, and an act of that year extended citizenship to all.

[illegible]

Adapted from C. O. Paullin, *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States*, 1932. Carnegie Institution of Washington.

The Dawes Act was long regarded as a laudable though tardy recognition of Indian rights. The view is open to question. The Indian Bureau was now able systematically to weaken the power of the chiefs and to vest

Breaking down nationalism judicial powers in councils or special courts and finally in Federal courts. With missionary and church encouragement, "pagan" ceremonies were prohibited when possible, especially the Sun Dance ritual, which in each of the Plains nations welded its people together as firmly as allegiance to a common flag.

The Indian school at Carlisle, Pennsylvania was opened to Western Indian youth, and Congress rapidly increased appropriations for other schools. It became a practice forcibly to remove Indian children from their families and bring them up in boarding schools under white instructors. Since children of the various nations were mixed, the tendency was to break down national rivalries and, contrary to official intentions, increase Indian consciousness of common interests. Education, moreover, proved no open sesame to the white man's way of life, for there were few opportunities open to Indians, though some of them became valued agents in the Indian service. Many a college graduate returned to the ancestral hogan and served as a bulwark in his people's stubborn fight to retain their old institutions.

It cannot be said, therefore, that the policy of assimilation was successful except to a certain extent among the Five Civilized Nations of Oklahoma, who it will be remembered had been moving toward agriculture since the eighteenth century. As the Indians of Oklahoma and Indian territories received individual allotments, more and more land was thrown open to white settlement. Finally Congress threw the two territories together and in 1907 admitted them as the State of Oklahoma. At the time there were in the area about 75,000 Indians and mixed-bloods, 110,000 Negroes, and about a million whites. Designing whites had long since discovered that marriage to an Indian would cut them in on tribal incomes, and the discovery of oil on tribally held Oklahoma lands (especially Osage) led to open abuses. There was also the pleasant racket of obtaining an appointment as "guardian" of tribal interests, which enabled the draining-away of enormous legal fees.

3 *The West Moves North*

The frontiers of the lumberjack and of Canada and Alaska were closely connected with the movements which we have treated above. Of course, timber cutting was actively carried on everywhere, but the commercial lumbering frontier followed white pine or similarly

Lumber-jacks' frontier: North-east easily worked timber; in later years lumbermen were to return to glean the spruce and hemlock. The original home of the industry was Maine, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia,

and there the fundamental technology was developed or applied: the sled drawn by "bulls" (oxen) for winter logging, the peavey, the steam engine, the circular saw, the spring log drive on the streams, the storage boom, and the log conveyor.

Here also was set the tradition that the lumberjack must chew tobacco, drink his whisky straight, roar like one of his own bulls, fight and raise hell for the pure love of it, and curse a stream which would curl the bark of a hemlock. And with it all he was to be an expert with the tools of his trade, ride the rolling logs in the spring freshets, part gladly with his money at the end of the run, and return to another winter's work of dawn to dark. These were traditions which were to move with the lumberjacks' frontier to the Pacific Coast, then die away in the puerile civility of the twentieth century.

Commercial cutting was under way in Pennsylvania and western Virginia by 1800, and it grew until for an ecstatic moment in the 1870's Pennsylvania led the nation. Old-timers still tell of the mighty log drives on the rivers and of the enormous boom at Williamsport churning with millions of feet of timber. By the 1840's Maine lumbermen were merrily "letting the daylight" into the white-pine forests of Michigan, Wisconsin, and Minnesota. Here the loggers developed the "big wheels" by which oxen pulled the summer-cut logs to the streams; here also the crosscut saw was used in felling trees.

Great Lakes
states

It was migrant Down-Easters, Blue Nosers, and French Canucks who in winter evenings by the bunkhouse stove embroidered tales of the gigantic lumberjack Paul Bunyan and his blue ox Babe. Here they were joined by Irish, German, and Scandinavian recruits. Here were gargantuan revels in the great white-pine houses of sin, the echoes of which still ring down the corridors of time. And here, finally, the lumberjack left a solitary wilderness of stumps and slashings over a vast area where the soil was too thin to support farming, and where no one had the foresight to plant the forest anew.

Timbermen found it literally impossible to believe that timber could be exhausted, and the end in any area usually struck them with surprise. A few forehanded cruisers had journeyed to the Pacific Coast, and tales they brought back of trees three hundred feet high and twelve feet in diameter were received with tolerant jeers. Nevertheless, when they went to see for themselves, the lumber entrepreneurs found that they had spent their lives hacking at matchsticks; in the Far West one acre held as much timber as five in the East. Along the coastal strip from San Francisco northward flourished the redwood, the *Sequoia sempervirens*—not the larger and longer-lived *Sequoia gigantea*, which is useless for lumber; farther north were the Douglas firs, only less majestic; and inland, on the slopes of the mountains from Arizona northward, were vast quantities of pine. By the 1890's timbermen

Pacific
Northwest

were falling with insatiable fury upon this new (and of course infinite) forest.

The commercial exploitation of timber in the Pacific Northwest was under way as early as 1848 and was accelerated by the gold rush. Native lumberjacks and recruits from the Great Lakes had to work out a new

New technologies technology for handling the gigantic coastal timber. The flow of pitch forced them to leave stumps ten to fifteen feet high. Since there was no snow for sleds and the ground was too soft for big wheels, they invented the skidroad—logs laid across the forest roads and half buried—down which the bulls pulled the logs to the mills. In the 1890's the bulls were displaced by donkey engines, which wound a cable on a drum and pulled logs promptly into desired positions. Presently this method was improved by the "high lead," by which the cable passed through a pulley slung from a high spar tree; and even this was bettered by an aerial trolley swung between two spar trees. Though there were few rivers suitable for floating logs, the Columbia, the Fraser, and the inlets of Puget Sound were found useful. One entrepreneur even performed the hitherto impossible feat of building log rafts which withstood the ocean voyage of a thousand miles from the Columbia River to a San Diego sawmill.

The original prosperity of the Pacific Coast's northern cities was founded on the timber business. In every city there was located close to the waterfront the "skidroad," where lumberjacks disported themselves

The last frontier in their semiannual periods of relaxation at Christmas and the Fourth of July. Log pirates operated, especially on the intricate waterways of Puget Sound. Here also the rumblings of labor discontent, which had found early expression in Pennsylvania and Michigan, finally burst into conflagration with the entry of the Industrial Workers of the World: the Wobblies of labor song and story. Here also the dynasties of entrepreneurs, some of which had followed the lumberjacks' frontier from Maine, made their last and greatest splurge as they acquired millions of acres of timber from the government or from the Northern Pacific's land grants. In 1909 the peak of production was reached in the United States with the sawing of 45 billion feet of lumber. Thereafter rival building materials made headway, the public was concerned with conservation, and even the once-reckless lumber barons began to turn to "selective logging" and to planting.

The enforced union in 1821 of the Hudson's Bay Company and the North West Company had brought peace to the vast stretch of northern wilderness between Lake Superior and the Pacific. The remnant of Lord Assiniboia Selkirk's Scots remained on the Red River of the North, while around Fort Garry (Winnipeg) on long strips of land (so formed to let them all face on navigable streams) similar to those in

Québec lived a community of ten thousand half-breed French-Canadians called métis. The Red River area was crudely organized as the District of Assiniboia and was ruled by the Bay Company, though there was a shadowy jurisdiction by Canadian courts. As late as the 1860's the settlements were supplied with manufactured goods by way of either Hudson Bay or Minnesota. Creaking, high-wheeled Red River carts were the chief means of transport; in them the Scots settlers carried their wheat to St. Paul, and the métis brought back from the Plains the results of their buffalo hunts.

The organization of the Dominion of Canada led to the surrender by the Bay Company of its political sway and its economic monopoly, though it remained in business and is still a powerful factor in the Canadian West. The Red River country was now reorganized (1870) as the Province of Manitoba, and the Plains and the Arctic wilderness became the North West Territories; Saskatchewan and Alberta did not become full-fledged partners in the dominion until 1905. A Canadian homestead system somewhat like that of the United States was put into effect and presently began to attract American settlers. The buffalo vanished, and from 1879 ranchers driving Texas longhorns and pure-bred bulls moved into the Plains but were largely displaced by farmers as varieties of wheat suitable to the Canadian Plains were developed after 1890. The building of the transcontinental railroads brought in additional thousands, not only French-Canadians but Russians, Volga Germans, Hungarians, and other nationalities so varied that the Canadian Plains seemed about to become as polyglot as the United States.

Peopling
the Plains

The métis had lived a rough life, but they loved it and resented the intrusion of new settlers. A number of factors led to active protest: the disappearance of the buffalo; the fact that the newcomers were largely Protestants; and the fear that they would lose their strip farms (on which they had no legal claim) and would have to take less satisfactory square holdings. Led by one of their number, the ambitious Louis Riel, the métis set up their own government, refused to admit the Canadian governor, and executed an Orangeman who opposed them. The Canadian government feared that the situation would be used by Fenians or Americans to split the West from Canada and therefore sent in troops (1870).

Riel's
Rebellions,
1870, 1885

But resentment smoldered among the métis, and in 1885 again broke into rebellion in Saskatchewan, whither many of them had moved. Louis Riel returned from exile in the United States and managed to get a few Indians to join the movement, with the result that there was a massacre of white settlers at Frog Lake. Militia and Mounted Police fought the métis in a sharp action at Batoche (1885) and defeated them. Riel was taken and hanged. The result was a political and religious quarrel which for several years threatened to dissolve the dominion.

The project for a transcontinental railroad had been one of the inducements which led to the formation of the Dominion of Canada, and it was abundantly evident that without it the union might fall apart. The Transcontinental railroads project, however, became a political football, and the Canadian Pacific was not completed until 1885 and then only by the aid of such vast cash and land subsidies that the scandal rocked the dominion. In later years two other transcontinental railroads were built with government aid—the Grand Trunk Pacific and the Canadian Northern—but at the close of World War I were in such bad financial shape that they were taken over by the government and united with some lesser lines as the Canadian National Railways.

Order in the Canadian West was markedly superior to what it was in the United States. There were a number of reasons. Canada had fewer Indians, and it possessed vast stretches of wilderness which were not exploitable by current technologies (so did not attract hordes of whites), and there the red men could find comparative freedom from interference. Canada's long experience under royal controls had delayed and modified the development of democratic consciousness among the common people, and therefore it lacked the popular pressures which at times nullified reasonable controls south of the border. It was because of this background that the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (organized in 1873 as the North West Mounted Police) was able to take over law enforcement and make the Canadian wilderness almost as orderly as Toronto. The Mounties' superb training and *esprit de corps*, their red jackets, and their reputation for always getting their man have come down through the generations as the stuff of romance.

One striking contrast between the American and the Canadian westward movement lay in the quietness and efficiency with which the latter solved the Indian problem. As in the United States, the Indians were long under military administration, and after 1830 the object was Canadian Indian policy assimilation. After 1860 Indian affairs were placed in charge of the Crown Lands Department. A reservation and annuity system was worked out and set up by treaties, and plans were made for schools and agricultural training. Though tribal rule remained, the reservation Indians were also subject to provincial laws.

Today Canada has about 120,000 Indians (forty per cent of them in the East) on 2200 reservations comprising about 5.5 million acres. British Columbia is an exception to the rule. When it was organized as a Crown Colony in 1858, a strong-headed Bay Company official was made governor, and he proceeded to appropriate all Indian lands to the Crown. Each family was given the plot of ground which it actually occupied, but tribal authority was ignored and the Indians were simply assumed to be a part

of the general population. The Indians, thus thrown suddenly on their own, fell prey to exploitation and disease and declined in numbers.

The development of British Columbia was beset with difficulties. Vancouver Island was made a Crown Colony in 1849, the mainland in 1858, and the two were united in 1866. The gold rush of 1858 led to few disorders of the type familiar in the United States. There were a number of reasons. The government was responsible to London and could not be swayed by local pressures; criminals on Vancouver Island found it difficult to escape, while those in the diggings could get out only by the Fraser River; and, lastly, the diggings were not rich enough to attract many of the lawless element.

Develop-
ment of
British
Columbia

During the early period the people of British Columbia seem to have been largely American, while economic ties were with San Francisco. During the later 1860's there was perceptible agitation for annexation to the United States, but the influx of Canadians and Britishers made the real argument hinge on whether the Crown Colony status should be maintained or the colony should join the Dominion of Canada. The latter course prevailed, and in 1871 British Columbia, with a population of less than ten thousand, became a Canadian province. Already British Columbian dependence on lumber, fish, and mines had become evident. American miners from the Rockies spilled over the border and opened up veins of gold, silver, lead, zinc, and copper. The mines were in considerable part subject to American capital and constituted a part of Spokane's Inland Empire.

Fisheries, with salmon as the mainstay, became one of the principal industries of the Pacific coast from California to the Aleutians. There are five varieties of salmon known by various local names, with Pinks the most plentiful and Sockeye (Blueback, or Alaska Red) the most valuable. The life cycle of the salmon is well known from its emergence from the upper streams to its return several years later to leap the rapids, spawn at its place of origin, and die. The canning industry began on the Sacramento River in 1864. The two million or so cases canned in California, Oregon, and Washington have sunk to less than half, while British Columbia's 2.5 million cases is reduced to a paltry 100,000.

Salmon
fisheries

Alaska's salmon have been worth twice as much as its gold. Alaska began canning in 1878, by 1936 had reached 8.5 million cases, and then began a drastic decline. Canning, of course, is chiefly responsible for the passing of the salmon; but power dams have blocked the access of breeders to the upper streams, and rigid government controls are all that now prevent its extinction.

Alaska, purchased in 1867 ostensibly as a favor to Russia, has become


a vital center of raw materials and strategic power. If superimposed on a map of the United States, the sprawling territory (though it has less than 600,000 square miles) would actually stretch from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from Canada almost to Mexico. The southern shores, bathed by the Japan current, are a land of fogs and rains, rich in timber, gold, copper, coal, and fish. The vast interior, cut off from the coast by mountains except by way of the Yukon and Kuskokwim rivers, is edged on west and north by tundras which extend into the Arctic Zone.

Since the tundras accumulate little snow and their vegetation flourishes vigorously in the summer, they afford excellent pasturage for caribou (wild reindeer), reindeer, and musk oxen. It was estimated that as late as 1919 about 20 million caribou roamed the Canadian North—a figure to rival the buffalo—but that ten years later they had declined to 3 million. The Canadian government then had to introduce domesticated reindeer from the herds that had been multiplying in Alaska. The herds of native musk oxen have also been sadly reduced, largely because of their habit of forming a circle, horns out, to repel danger; hunters can thus slaughter them at leisure.

Though Alaska is in the same latitude as Sweden, only a few fertile southern valleys have thus far been adapted to agriculture. Parts of the Yukon Valley may eventually be exploited, for the intense heat of the long summer days balances the long season of frost. In the southeast is the Alaskan Panhandle, which shuts off northern British Columbia from the coast and which, when the fogs lift and the rain clouds drift away, is seen to be a land of magnificent mountains and fiords. In the southwest the Alaska Peninsula leads into the treeless Aleutian Islands, a long arc which stretches 1200 miles toward Asia and once teemed with fur-bearing seals. From the tip of Seward Peninsula in the concave western coast of Alaska's mainland one can on rare clear days see the coast of Asia.


The reluctance of Congress to spend money or effort on territories was never more aptly illustrated than in Alaska. It was not even dignified with the name of territory but was merely a district with the Treasury's Collector of Customs at Sitka nominally in charge. After the cession, most of the Russians left and there was a short-lived inrush of turbulent pioneers who found plenty of elbow-room for lawless activities. The country was actually controlled (so far as controls existed) by the Alaska Commercial Company of San Francisco, which for its own reasons opposed the introduction of an effective civil government. Even the tiny military force committed to Alaska was permitted to dwindle and in 1877 was withdrawn to fight the Indian leader Captain Jack and his band of Modocs. There was relief when the military

Early
problems



ALASKA
Statute Miles
0 50 100 150 200

Alaska and United States on same scale



Longitude East 180° West 180° Same scale as main map

departed, for their rule was arbitrary and poorly suited to the Indians' understanding, while the soldiers did little but rob and debauch the natives. When the Tlingit Indians of the Panhandle, angered by white exploitation, threatened trouble, the Sitkans managed to get the protection of a British naval vessel. It was not until 1879 that the United States Navy took up a sort of watching brief, and that only continued for five years.

Several attempts by the people to organize a kangaroo government fell through. Alaska was regarded by Congress as "Indian country"; actually there were about 25,000 natives to 5000 Russian "creoles" and probably less than 1000 whites. Liquor was prohibited to the Indians, but they provided their own "hootchinoo," and anyhow law enforcement was so absurdly lax that saloons abounded and the liquor trade with the Indians flourished. Some gold had been found during the Russian days, and as prospectors worked their way north several minor strikes were made. In 1880 the first important strike led to the growth of the new town of Juneau. Meanwhile a number of missionaries, notably Sheldon Jackson, a little man but "by inside measurement a giant," had entered, and their pressure added to that of the old-timers persuaded Congress to pass the Organic Act of 1884. Though the district had no legislature, it at least had a governor, a judiciary, and an Indian education department under Jackson.

Meanwhile exploring parties led by army officers were supplementing the knowledge of the interior gained by Russian and British explorers. The Alaska Company managed to run out individual fur traders, but on the whole it treated the Indians well, and it operated much-needed steamboat services on the rivers. Its monopoly of the seal fisheries was taken over in 1890 by the North American Commercial Company. Gold hunters traversed the country, and in 1886 a profitable find was made on Fortymile River near the Alaska-Canada border. The vicinity soon yielded a number of other strikes. There was some doubt as to which country the gold strikes were in; but as the miners were demoralizing the Indians, a North West Mounted Police detachment was sent in 1895 to impose order though it did not interfere with the miners' (mostly Americans) administration of their claims.

In August 1896 an American squaw man named George Washington Carmack, following the advice of a Nova Scotian prospector named Robert Henderson, made the famous Klondike strike on a Canadian tributary of the Yukon. When shortly afterward a shipment reached Klondike stampede, 1896-98 Seattle that was advertised as a ton of gold, the result was the greatest stampede in gold-mining history. The long way around by Yukon steamer was safest and surest, but many preferred what seemed to be the quickest approach overland. This was by the two forks of Lynn Canal: one led from Skagway through White Pass; the other, farther north, led from Dyea through Chilkoot Pass. At the highest point

of Chilkoot the ascent was impossible for horses, so goods had to be carried by the travelers on their backs, and the animals were literally hauled up one side and slid down the other. Before many years the traverse through White Pass was made easy by a railroad.

Skagway sprang from a log cabin to a town of transient thousands, ruled by as callous a thug and murderer as ever terrorized a Western town, the infamous Soapy Smith. What Soapy Smith left to the cheechakos (newcomers) was usually gleaned by United States and Canadian customs officials, who were carrying on a feud over the conditions of entry. The Klondike also had its lawlessness, but the watchful Mounties prevented it from getting far out of hand.

Mining in the frozen gravels of the Klondike was not like that in the California placers, but the "pans" yielded far more than anything the Forty-Niners had known outside of their dreams. With perhaps 25,000 miners in the Klondike, and the new town of Dawson already a metropolis of 5000, Canada decided to set up the Yukon area adjacent to Alaska as the Yukon Territory in 1898. As in other fields, the simple placers eventually were worked out and capital took over with its heavy machinery. The peak year was 1900, when \$22 million were taken out; mining has now declined and with it population. One result of the gold rush was the Alaskan boundary controversy, which will be noticed in another connection. As might have been expected, few prospered outside of those first on the scene. Prices shot sky high, and many a cheechako was glad to leave at public expense; the rest remained and became sourdoughs, probably working for someone else or wandering over the Arctic wastes vainly looking for the strike that was never made.

The gold strikes naturally attracted many prospectors to Alaska. In 1898 a strike on Seward Peninsula led to the founding of Nome—from a misprinting of "No name" for a near-by cape on the map. Nome proved to be less profitable than the Klondike, but it was enlivened by placer mining in the sands of the beach and by the actions of a United States district judge who organized a gang which used his judicial power to secure control of claims. Another strike in 1898 led to the rise of Fairbanks on the Tanana River. Meanwhile copper prospectors had met with success on the Chitina River. In 1908 the Guggenheims founded Cordova and began building a railroad up the Copper Valley to the copper country.

With the end of the Spanish-American War Congress tardily began to provide Alaska with schools, a homestead act, a code of laws, and additional courts. The capital was removed from Sitka to Juneau. In 1905 the Supreme Court ruled that by the treaty of cession Alaska had become an incorporated part of the United States and was entitled to representation. The name "district" was

The Yukon

**Alaskan
gold strikes**

**Govern-
mental de-
velopment**

thereupon changed to "territory," and authorization was given for the choice of a delegate to Congress. The coveted legislature was granted in 1912, but the territory was given no control of its resources nor could it legislate on fish, game, liquor, and gambling. Alaska thereupon entered on the thorny road of self-government, a road marked by financial hardships, resentments at Federal checks and restrictions, and suspicion of Washington and the governors it sent out to preside over the territory. Fairbanks became in 1922 the terminus of the Alaska Railroad, built by the government from Anchorage and Seward on the coast, and of the Richardson Highway built from Valdez.

Government protection of Alaskan natives, it must be admitted, came only after decades of white rapine and exploitation and native losses through imported diseases, added to the natives' own facility at making hootchinoo. The Tlingit Indians of the Panhandle originally possessed an advanced culture marked by massive log and plank houses and curiously carved and painted totem poles, sometimes of immense height and girth. The coastal Indians were largely salmon catchers, though they also depended for food on seals, berries, and the caribou. The interior Indians lived by hunting and by the annual runs of salmon.

Congress, where necessary, has set aside reservations on which the Indians can live and carry on their traditional existence, minus the hootchinoo. Some communities actively engage in salmon canning and timber cutting for commercial purposes. Church and government schools have been established, and the liquor traffic prohibited. Jackson's introduction of domesticated reindeer proved to be a lifesaver to those tribes which depended on the fast-vanishing walrus, seal, and caribou. Reindeer culture was also extended to the Eskimo, "God's frozen children," who inhabit the vast tundras of the western and northern coasts and who have traditionally found their larder in the sea. The native population of Alaska, estimated at 25,000 in 1867, is now considered to be about 30,000 exclusive of whites.

Alaska, with only some 100,000 white people in 1950, can find only seasonal employment for most wage earners. The New Deal's inflation of gold and the airplane's ability to carry machinery to hitherto inaccessible places boomed gold mining, but this was not all clear gain. Underprivileged Alaska is afflicted by a vicious circle: underpopulation makes transportation and living costs high; therefore production costs are high, and development is discouraged; consequently people find it hard to make a living and stay away in droves. To this should also be added the demand of Seattle transportation and financing interests for excessive profits.

Nevertheless, Alaska has returned from taxes on the seal fisheries alone far more than its purchase price. Up to 1937 Alaska's fish, furs, and timber had yielded two billion dollars—three times as much as all its minerals, of which gold supplied only half a billion. Alaska does not possess the power or the money to utilize its resources and so can develop neither mining nor industry. Advocates of statehood hope to use Congressional representation to unlock Alaska's resources to private enterprise either by Federal action or by turning them over to the state for disposal.

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Chapter XXXI

DISPENSING THE PUBLIC DOMAIN

1 *Prodigal Democracy*

THE Homestead Act of 1862, which gave every impecunious American and immigrant the right to 160 acres of land, marked the culmination of a long fight for free land, an integral part of the democratic movement. And yet the act was to prove to be a sore disappointment. In the first place, the frontier had almost reached the western edge of the well-watered country, and relatively little of the land beyond was suitable to the traditional agricultural methods. The act itself and its later amendments were so laxly drawn that it was an invitation to fraud, especially in cattle and timber country. The allotted acreage was too little for grazing or dry farming and too much for irrigation. In any case it required know-how to conquer the Plains. By far the most of the homestead registrants were Western farm boys, and up to 1890 two thirds of them gave up the struggle. While during the forty years after the act went into force about 400,000 registrants proved up and kept their claims, the population of the country went up 45 million and the farm population increased by about 9 million.

Even in areas open to and suitable for homesteading it was still possible for speculators to precede the settlers and buy up the choicer sections. An Iowa land company advertised its lands as better than free homesteads and succinctly and truly summarized the disadvantages of free lands: "Under the homestead law the settler must, in order to get a good location, go far out into the wild and unsettled districts, and for many years be deprived of school privileges, churches, mills, bridges, and in fact all the advantages of society." It was no wonder that cynical folk described the Homestead Law as Uncle Sam betting 160 acres of land against a \$10 fee that the homesteader couldn't live on it for five years.

The Homestead Act was supplemented by other acts intended to give away land or to permit its sale cheaply after the registrant had resided on it for a few months. To begin with, the old Pre-emption Act of 1841 continued in effect, and it was possible for the homesteader after six months of residence on his tract to buy the land under that act. The Timber Culture Act of 1873 gave additional Plains land to owners who planted trees on the new property; though the law was repealed eighteen years later, about ten million acres were granted under its provisions—many of them undoubtedly acquired fraudulently. Contrary to the usual opinion, however, trees flourished on land where owners took their duties seriously.


General settlement laws

The Desert Land Act of 1877 seems to have been designed for the great cattle companies, for it was actually applied to grazing lands; it granted 640 acres to a claimant on condition that certain rather absurd irrigating conditions were met. Since the grant could be purchased after a year for \$1.25 an acre, many drifters found it profitable to serve as dummies for the cattle companies. It is estimated that about 95 per cent of the land transfers (the total was about 8 million acres) under this act were fraudulent. More conscientious witnesses watched a bucket of water being poured on the section and were thus able to swear that they had "seen water upon the claim," thus swearing to the fulfillment of the irrigation proviso. In areas where all four acts could be invoked, it was possible for a settler to take up 1120 acres of public land.

Lastly, the Timber and Stone Act of 1878, though ostensibly intended to apply to nonarable and nonmineral lands, enabled lumber and mining companies to engross vast tracts (all together about 12 million acres) of timber and mineral lands at a minimum cost of \$2.50 an acre through dummies who received a fee that ranged from \$10 down to a beer.

The railroads were, next to the states, the greatest beneficiaries of Federal land grants. About 134 million acres came to them direct and 49 million more were passed on through the states or granted by the states. The total was thus about 183 million acres—somewhat larger than Texas—and worth perhaps about a dollar an acre, though the railroads managed to get a total of two or three times as much out of them. Railroad lands consisted of sections chosen alternately like the squares of one color on a checkerboard, and extended from 20 to 40 miles on each side of the track. A complaisant government not only closed these belts to settlement until the railroads had selected their shares, but widened the closed belts to 60 to 120 miles until the railroads had sold such of their land as they chose. One of Cleveland's most courageous acts was to throw open to settlement government land in these strips (1887). Though wise railroad administrators sold their arable lands to settlers in order to provide freight and revenues, there were occasions

Railroad land grants



when they did not do so; at one time the Northern Pacific ran from Minnesota to Puget Sound through a 120-mile belt of reserved land.

Naturally the railroads took every possible advantage of the situation: they sold their arable land at prices that ranged up to \$10 per acre, cut their timber on government squares, traded in their sterile or cut-over areas for better land, and disposed of timber and mineral lands to insiders, though technically railroad grants were not supposed to include mineral lands. Railroad lands became the nuclei of many fortunes besides those of railroad promoters. Chief among these beneficiaries was Frederick Weyerhaeuser, a director of the Northern Pacific and the "Lumber King" of the Northwest. It is said that of Weyerhaeuser's two million acres of timber land, four fifths came from the Northern Pacific. It should be understood that well over ninety per cent of American railroad mileage was built without Federal aid; land-grant railroads also were obliged to transport government civil and military personnel and goods without charge, but this provision was later changed to a fifty-per-cent charge of the normal rate and in 1946 Congress provided that the civil category would pay full rates.

Until 1889 the Federal government permitted unlimited cash purchases of land in all except a few reserved areas of the public domain. Such timber and mineral lands as remained in the Lakes and Gulf states were for sale, and purchases of hundreds of thousands of acres were common. After 1889 all sales or claims under any of the acts were limited to 320 acres. Sales from 1862 to 1904 totaled 108 million acres, over one third of the total sold since 1784. Land could also be obtained in exchange for Federal scrip issued to the states as claims

on swamplands, or claims on other lands donated to the states as endowments for mechanical and agricultural colleges. Indian nations parted with their lands on condition that they receive the proceeds, so they were usually sold en bloc to railroads and land companies. Enormous aggregations of land were held by businessmen as grazing, timber, or mineral lands, or as the so-called Bonanza Farms, great tracts farmed by machinery and devoted largely to wheat. Eleven timber companies owned 12 million acres of forest land, and twenty-nine foreign corporations or individuals controlled 20 million acres of grazing lands.

Much of California was pre-empted by vast estates based on vague "Spanish Grants" and sometimes comprising 50,000 acres, most of these acres illegally acquired; the majority of the remaining lands fell promptly into the hands of speculators. Most epic theft of all, however, was the famous Maxwell Grant of 1,700,000 acres of rich mineral, timber, and grazing lands on the upper Rio Grande in New Mexico and Colorado. This theft, ostensibly based on a Mexican grant, was engineered by Stephen B. Elkins, later West Virginia coal and senatorial tycoon, and was so cleverly masked that it was actually approved by the Supreme Court of the United States.

The Federal law, as we have seen, said little about mineral lands, and it had no mining code until 1866. When gold and silver lands were disposed of at no more than \$5 an acre, one could scarcely expect base metals to cost any more. In 1873 the Iron Lands Act specifically provided that iron-ore lands should be sold at auction at a minimum of \$1.25 an acre, the usual price of nonmineral lands. Iron ore began rapidly passing into the hands of speculators and corporations, though in many cases it was cheaper for them to acquire it by special arrangements with railroads and state governments or by dummies who took up claims under various land acts. The Coal Lands Act of 1873 offered to dispose of 160 acres of coal to individuals and 320 to associations at \$10 to \$20 an acre, depending on distance from railroads. Here again it was usually cheaper to acquire the land by other means than straight entry and payment. Meanwhile millions of acres of coal, iron, and timber lands in the South passed into the hands of corporations at \$1.25 an acre under a law of 1876.

Wherever one looks in the postwar history of the public lands, he finds their disposal honeycombed with fraud. The laws were so defectively drawn, their interpretation so lax, and their administrative staff so meager that fraud was invited. Agents sometimes were set over districts 20,000 miles square, an area simply impossible for one or two clerks to check carefully. Moreover, agents depended on fees, so collusion with lawbreakers became a great temptation.

It is not to be supposed that Congress did not know what was going on,

Land thefts

**Mineral
lands**

**Deliberate
waste**

for the watchdogs of the public resources were barking on every side. At the beginning of its reign the Republican Party had deliberately planned on disposing of the public lands in order to weld the union of West and East, upon which its existence depended. The easiest political course was to give both sides all they wanted even at the cost of equipping the laws with obvious loopholes. Public opinion, still mesmerized by the traditional idea that our resources were infinite, approved of the use of these loopholes and seldom censured the claimant who swore falsely in order to acquire a portion of the public resources.

The advantage which wealth possessed in the race for public lands caused a swelling chorus of complaint among the common people and Mugwump reformers, and whenever possible they brought political pressure to force equalization. Carl Schurz, Secretary of the Interior under Hayes, urged reform; and at his instigation a specially appointed Public Land Commission made an investigation and report (1880) which was influential in the long view. Cleveland appointed W. A. J. Sparks as Land Commissioner, and he undertook vigorous reforms. The railroads were forced to disgorge lands illegally held. Public lands along the railroads were opened to entry. Fences were ordered removed from the public domain, a blow at cattle companies which had appropriated vast acreages by fencing in the only available water holes. The Sparks reforms rallied special interests against him and presently he was forced out.

In 1890 the Billion-Dollar Congress demanded that railroads return the remaining lands which were not being utilized, but the move was successfully fought in the courts. In its last days, however, the same Congress passed the General Revision Act of 1891, which repealed the Pre-emption Act and the Timber Culture Acts; reduced Desert Land Act acreage to half a section; raised to fourteen months the time necessary for a homesteader to reside on his quarter-section before he could purchase it; abolished sales by auction; and gave the President the right to set up national parks.

Since the Civil War there had been a growing public awareness of the relation of forests to irrigation, flood control, erosion, and the preservation of a proper water supply. The year 1872 marked the institution of Arbor Day and the setting-up of Yellowstone National Park. The Forest policies Land Office had become aware that great areas of timber were being swallowed up by lumber companies at a fraction of their true value but could do nothing about it except to recommend the creation of forest reserves. The General Revision Act of 1891 gave the President this right, and Harrison took prompt advantage of it to create six reserves. Nevertheless, the act did not and probably was not intended to stop the grabbing of timber lands under the Timber and Stone Act and

NATIONAL PARKS, MONUMENTS, AND FORESTS



others allied to it. In 1896, Cleveland, at the urging of the American Forestry Association and other scientific organizations, appointed a commission which made a study of Western forests and recommended the creation of thirteen additional reserves. Cleveland created them just before he went out of office in 1897.

The storm of Western protest, while not unexpected, was amazingly bitter. Graziers, prospectors, and hand loggers insisted that they were being shut off from their birthright and that the growth of the Western states was being retarded. Western extremists even challenged scientific claims about the hydrological necessity of forests. The root of the protest, of course, lay in the belief that, now that the great corporations had surfeited themselves, the remaining treasures were being locked away. As a result the compromise Pettigrew Act of 1897 granted to the settlers, stockmen, and miners rights in timber and stone sufficient to satisfy their local needs, and forest reserves were opened to prospectors and miners under limited conditions.

Stockmen could get access only by special permission of the Secretary of the Interior, and though he set up a system of permits there was complaint that it was discriminatory against sheepmen. It does seem that it favored big stockmen against the little ones. Protest against the Pettigrew Act was swelled by the passage of the Forest Lieu Amendment, which gave owners in forest reserves the right to surrender their claims and choose others. Though intended to benefit small holders, it was a godsend to the large. For example, James Hill, then in charge of the Northern Pacific, claimed the right to exchange 500,000 acres of worthless land in the Mount Ranier reserve. The result was to destroy what psychological value there may have been in the Pettigrew Act and redouble the agitation against Federal policies.

It was expected that the Great Plains would soon be thickly dotted with farmsteads, and land speculators and irrigation companies hastened to assure themselves of a rich harvest. A shortsighted government shared this optimism and undertook to discourage the stockman in favor of the farmer. The series of crop failures which came with the drought of the 1880's led to Congressional inquiries and to limited modification of the urge to settle unsuitable lands with farmers. Presently the Carey Desert Land Act of 1894 granted each Western state one million acres of arid lands on condition that it irrigate them and pass them on to small farmers. The work, however, was beyond the financial abilities of the states, and by the Newlands Act of 1902 the Federal government assumed the duty of reclamation.

The problem of what to do with the public domain had by the 1890's clearly risen into the realm of national politics and demanded a solution by national political action. Congress had made the showdown inevitable

by its more or less deliberately chaotic policy, which in general favored the big operator, and had long stubbornly refused to recognize the fact that the arid and semiarid West required different policies from those which had been traditionally applied to the well-watered East. Whether this refusal was deliberately planned to favor the big operator was a subject for debate, but the West was thoroughly aroused to an awareness of its own interests. And so was the East. One of the reasons for growing public concern was the realization that the public domain no longer afforded easy opportunities for either farmers, prospectors, or lumbermen. A bulletin of the Census of 1890 pointed out that "the unsettled area has been so broken into by isolated bodies of settlement that there can hardly be said to be a frontier line." It was this statement which set Frederick Jackson Turner's mind on the path which led to his famous Frontier Hypothesis. The net result was that the public was soon shocked out of its easy faith in the concept of infinite resources and set about locking the barn door after the horse had been stolen.

Conservation becomes a national issue

In general the West (like Old Bullion Benton before the Civil War) felt that the best solution was to turn the public lands over to the states, on the ground that the states were best fitted to foster local interests. This action would appeal particularly to stock graziers, hand loggers, mineral prospectors, and the rising power industry. On the other hand, Eastern conservationists demanded a continuance of Federal control (whatever its shortcomings) on the ground that the states had never shown a willingness to withhold their resources from local pressure groups. They were joined by Western moderates, by reclamationists who desired vast irrigation projects at Federal expense, and by the big lumbermen who (said the West) already had immense reserves and were desirous of squeezing out hand loggers and keeping prices up.

Sectional differences

2 *The Cattle Kingdom*

Lower Texas is a varied country, offering grassy savannas interspersed with patches of timber; stretches of tall prairie grass as extensive as the smaller Eastern states; even more extensive stretches of creosote and mesquite bush; and chaparral, that is, dense, thorny bushes and dwarf trees, often so high that a man on horseback cannot see over them. Here Mexican vaqueros herded cattle for generations before Americans moved in to take over. The Americans not only took over Texas but added to their own knowledge of cattle the lingo, equipment, and methods of the vaquero.

Origins of the Cattle Kingdom

By the end of the Civil War the Texas cowboy had become a well-recognized professional herder of steers. Branding, roping, line riding, and

spring and fall roundups were practiced. High-heeled boots kept the cowboy's feet securely in the stirrups; leather chaps protected his legs from chaparral; a high-crowned "ten-gallon" hat protected his head and neck from sun and rain; a neckerchief was always ready to serve as a dust mask; and a six-shooter was used to kill rattlesnakes or, in case of a bad stampede, to shoot the lead steers and deflect the torrent. As he rode around their nightly bedding ground he sang "*lam-ents*" to the steers to keep them quiet. Cow ponies were being trained to think as one with their riders. The "cow customs" of the range were being worked out and accepted by habit and common consent.

By the end of the Civil War the Texas cattle country had begun to expand northward toward the Red River. In Texas the Cross Timbers marked approximately the line between the "settled" country and the Comanche-infested Great Plains; Plains Indians avoided timber whenever possible. From the Red River to the Rio Grande the border was cattle country—and the border was almost the same as the state of Texas.

Other states were carved or born;
Texas grew from hide and horn.

Other states are long or wide;
Texas is a shaggy hide.*

Before the Civil War Texas cowboys had driven their herds to St. Louis, Chicago, and Shreveport, or to New Orleans on the "Beef Trail." Thousands of cattle were driven to California and Colorado, and a start was made at stocking the Wyoming range. The Confederate armies were fed with Texas beef pushed across the Mississippi until the river was closed by Union victories. Then Texas herds, already outgrowing available economic uses, were allowed to run and breed unhindered and largely unbranded. By 1866 it was estimated that there were five million cattle in Texas, many of them "mavericks": unbranded and unclaimed, free to anyone who wished to slap his brand on them.

The meeting of American and Mexican herds had led to the development of several fairly distinct breeds. Those in the east were fairly manageable, but as one traveled south toward the Rio Grande or west toward the Cross Timbers the cattle became half wild—some of them wholly wild. The latter, known as "wild bulls" and descended from Spanish black cattle (famous in the bull ring), were almost throwbacks to the primitive urus and were hunted as big game. It was such a wild bull that scattered Zachary Taylor's marching regiments "like chaff," and similar ones in Arizona attacked the 300 men of the Mormon Battalion. More numerous and of greater historic impor-

* "Cattle," by Berta Hart Nance, in *Road to Texas* (1940), Kalcidograph Press.

tance were the longhorns, apparently sprung from more nondescript ancestry, which roamed the fringes of the settlements and composed the bulk of the range herds. They were famous for their horns, which spread from four feet to an occasional seven or even more. The longhorns were of many colors and ranged from scrawny, wiry, skin-bones-and-horns creatures to magnificent wild bulls. Longhorns were fleet, self-reliant, and full of intellectual curiosity. They were inured to the heat of summer and the blizzards of winter, to drought and scanty forage, and were able to defend themselves and their young against beasts of prey; on occasion a longhorn was even known to kill a grizzly bear.

The Civil War left Texas prostrate and a prey to carpetbaggers. Its only negotiable assets were a little cotton and the millions of cattle which roamed its chaparral and grassy plains. But cattle (unless they were in unusually good condition) brought little more than two or three dollars a head. At this time the Northern cattle market was booming, and fat steers were bringing as much as \$40 a head. Texans naturally began to think of taking their half-wild cattle north. True, longhorn beef was tough, but it was good enough for section hands; anyhow, the steers could be fattened in Northern feed lots for the Chicago market. Accordingly, early in 1866 a number of herds were started north through Indian Territory, Arkansas, and Missouri to the Sedalia railroad. Preyed upon by Indians and bandits, and met by angry farmers who feared the spread of the "Texas fever" to their own cattle, the drovers managed to get to Sedalia only a few of the estimated 260,000 cattle that started. But it was demonstrated that the Long Drive was feasible.

The Long Drive

An Illinois cattle dealer named Joseph M. McCoy saw the possibilities in the situation and set up loading facilities at Abilene, Kansas, then the end of the Kansas Pacific Railroad. The next spring, when the Sedalia drive began again, McCoy's riders were able to deflect some of the herds to Abilene. Thereafter this route was traveled by several million cattle. The name of Chisholm Trail was given to it for reasons never satisfactorily explained; actually this trail, like all cattle trails, was more a network of routes than a single well-defined route. As the Kansas Pacific and the Santa Fe railroads moved west, other towns attracted cattle—Newton, Ellsworth, Caldwell, Wichita, and Dodge City—and many cattle were driven up west of the Cross Timbers along what came to be called the Western Trail. The Long Drive had its heyday during the 1870's, but with the extension of farms into Kansas and of trunk lines into Texas it was gradually discontinued. All together, cattle estimated at something under ten million moved out of Texas to the Kansas railheads up to about 1888.

The Kansas terminals

The demand for Texas cattle for beef and range stock led to the occupation of West Texas in the 1870's by cattle barons, corporations, and small



Adapted from Walter P. Webb, *The Great Plains*, published by Ginn and Company

ranchers who obtained grants from the state or merely appropriated range land. Tascosa, adobe village near modern Amarillo, became the capital of the region and rejoiced in its reputation as the wickedest town in the cattle country. As the buffaloes were killed off and the Indians cooped up in reservations, vast new ranges were stocked by Texas longhorns. The Goodnight-Loving Trail opened the way to New Mexico and Arizona and led up the Pecos to Colorado and Wyoming; an extension known as the Long Trail led on into Canada, while routes were opened into the Great Basin of Utah, Nevada, and Oregon.

Ranchers had settled in Colorado and northward before the Civil War to raise beef for emigrants and miners; probably most of their brood stock was purchased from among the culls of passing emigrant trains. After the war thousands of Texas cowboys with small herds of cattle (often rustled or "mavericked") moved west or north to set themselves up in business growing the steers sought by the railroads which were pushing across the Plains. Their life was a constant battle with drought, winter, cattle disease, Indians, and rustlers, but many of them succeeded handsomely and became "cattle barons." Profits were often high and lost nothing in the telling. Bill Nye gave a tongue-in-cheek version of one tale: "Three years ago a guileless tenderfoot came into Wyoming, leading a single Texas steer and carrying a branding iron; now he is the opulent possessor of 600 head of fine cattle—the ostensible progeny of that one steer."

The appropriation of government land enabled ranchers to hold vast ranges on the Northern Plains and led to the development of famous cow towns: Ogallala, Cheyenne, Laramie, and Miles City. Texas itself had become a land where 20,000-acre ranches were small compared to the King (Santa Gertrude) Ranch of 84,000 acres, while it in turn was dwarfed by the 3,000,000-acre XIT Ranch in the Panhandle which was turned over to a Chicago syndicate in exchange for building the state capitol.

Dodge City was the dream capital of the cowboy, with its pleasure palaces offering all the delights of alcohol, gambling, and complaisant women. There many a cowboy bound on painting the town red lost all he had earned in the arduous drive from the Rio Grande, and sometimes his life with it. And yet Dodge City was merely Cow towns a larger version of the cow towns and trail towns whose name is legion. Except for some adobe versions in the South they were hastily thrown together with green lumber and, unpainted and unrepaired, soon gave an appearance of antiquity. The stores with their false fronts tried vainly to give an impression of dignity, but it was ruined by the rickety wooden sidewalks and wooden awnings and by the mud and dust of the unpaved street.

There might be a bank, a courthouse, a few general stores, hotels, restaurants, livery stables, and boot-makers' and saddlers' shops, but most of the business went to the saloons, which usually also were gambling dens and "dance halls." Usually well away from the "business" section were the modest dwellings of the merchants. No pretense was made at beautification, even such a simple thing as planting trees. The town might be able to afford a one-room school, but churches were rare indeed.

The great day of the Cattle Kingdom coincided with the day of the free range. Cattlemen did not need to own the land their herds grazed but were free to occupy unappropriated public lands from a running stream

The free-range industry back to the top of the watershed. Sometimes they homesteaded or purchased strategic sections, especially where water holes offered the only available water over large areas. Leasing Indian-reservation grass from the Indian nations was a common device. Congress refused to change its homestead limit of 160 acres—an absurdity where a family needed to run a thousand cattle to make a living and where a single steer required from 20 to 120 acres a year. However, Congress seemed indisposed to prevent the free use of public grass, with the result that cattlemen came to look upon the land they occupied as their own.

Such was the unwritten range law, but it was common for small graziers to encroach on the big ranges, while sometimes overly greedy cattlemen, with the aid of Texas "gunnies," drove out their smaller competitors and won control of vast ranges. The booming demand for cattle led to the creation of great enterprises financed by capital from the East and—curiously enough—from Scotland. In 1883 there were twenty corporations in Wyoming with a total valuation of \$12 million; the largest was worth \$3 million and controlled a range 50 by 150 miles.

The interests of the cattle industry were watched over by associations, usually organized and dominated by the cattle barons. They lobbied in Congress and in Austin (for Texas controlled its own public lands), hired wolf hunters, fought prairie fires, supervised roundups, settled disputes over ranges, dealt with the railroads, and ruthlessly pursued rustlers. Market demand was growing as transportation and refrigerating methods improved; American beef all but took over the European market until inspection laws limited its importation. Profits were occasionally as high as forty per cent, and except for a period in the 1870's always ran high enough to attract capital.

The associations and corporations imported blooded bulls to breed up the rangy longhorn stock into shorthorns, usually white-faced Herefords, though Brahma blood eventually proved useful in the terrific heat of the deserts. The dilution of longhorn blood, however, meant that the animals were less able to maintain themselves against natural enemies, while they had to be fed during the severe winters. The demand for range stock had led also to the bringing-in of Eastern stock which was quite unable to make its own way on the Plains.

By 1880 it had become evident that the Cattle Kingdom had overexpanded. Not only was the pasture wearing thin from overgrazing, but sheepmen and farmers were jockeying with cattlemen for the land. The better-heeled cattlemen began to lay in hay for winter feed—much to the disgust of old cow hands—and protected their holdings by barbed-wire fences regardless of whether they blocked their neighbors from water holes and the trails to market. At first

Coming of
barbed wire

the barbs injured and lamed horses and cattle, but eventually stock became so wary that it could scarcely be forced to pass between two posts, while horses would not cross a line of posts but would follow out to the end and then turn.

By 1883 the small cattlemen began to snip the wires, the fencers retaliated, and the so-called "fence-cutting wars" were on. Most of them were in Texas. The trouble was complicated by the entry of sheepherders, who found their passage blocked, and by farmers—called "nesters" or "grangers"—who were hemmed in by the great ranches or whose own wires were cut by cattlemen. However, before long, state and territorial legislatures met the situation with suitable laws, with the result that the open range soon passed away.

The passing of the Northern Range was hastened not only by such conditions as those noted above but by a series of further events. Beef prices had dropped with overstocking of the range, and Cleveland's order of 1885 prohibiting the leasing of lands in Indian Territory forced 200,000 additional cattle into the surrounding range. That winter was unusually severe in Kansas and Colorado and was followed by panic selling. The summer was hot and dry, and streams and grass were inadequate. The winter of 1886-87 was the worst on record and resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of cattle.

Not only did the unseasoned Eastern cattle and the diluted longhorn strain suffer, but also the longhorns. Hitherto longhorns had managed to survive blizzards by drifting with the wind, but now they piled up against the fences and froze to death; survivors were unable to paw through the ice to the skimpy grass beneath and so perished of starvation. The blow was all but fatal to the cattle syndicates, and Cleveland was ill-advised enough to make certain of their bankruptcy by refusing to loosen the prohibitions against the leasing of Indian lands and the fencing of public lands. Farmers now owned much of the once-free range, and the cattle industry was forced to undergo a drastic reorganization.

Individual operators had always called themselves ranchers, but their holdings were more often called ranges than ranches. However, when cattlemen found themselves confined to land that they owned or leased, their holdings came to be called ranches. With the change few men could afford not to take advantage of loopholes in the land laws to get possession of as much land as possible. Ranches supplanted the range. Ranchers are now as much farmers as cattlemen, for they must grow forage for winter feed. Barbed-wire fences separate their pastures, and there is considerable reliance upon irrigation. The open range survives here and there or at least fenced domains so vast that they amount to open ranges.

The Western sheep industry, like that of cattle, had its rise among the Mexicans. Whatever the qualities of the sheep first brought by the Span-

yards, the frontier from California to Texas produced a type of *chaurro* with stringy meat and scanty wool. The entry of Americans into the Southwest led to the rapid movement of New Mexican flocks northward and to the introduction of Spanish merino and other rams to improve the breed. Sheepherding was a lonely life, and at first only Mexicans engaged in it; later on Scotsmen and Americans took it up, but such men were usually accused of being misanthropic if not actually crackbrained.

On the whole, sheep had the advantage over cattle. They multiplied faster, they could find forage where cattle would have starved, could withstand thirst, and did not need to be rounded up and branded; nor did they have a tendency to go wild and take off to the chaparral. On the other hand, they needed protection against wild animals and had to be folded during the worst of the winter. But mutton and wool prices were more stable than beef and hide prices, and wool received generous tariff protection. Profits in sheep were so large and so reliable that many cattlemen held their noses and changed over from "dogies" to "woolies" or added flocks of sheep as "mortgage lifters."

Clash between sheepmen and cattlemen was inevitable. Sheep, well termed "hoofed locusts," gnawed and killed saplings; cropped the grass so closely that it could not grow again unless favored by rain and a rest period; and their sharp hoofs cut and badly damaged the turf and packed the earth solidly. Cattle disliked the odor of sheep and would refuse to graze in the same pastures or drink at the same watering places. Clashes here and there resulted in a division of the range, but there was also a series of so-called "sheep wars." Sheepherders controlled large areas of Arizona, and conflicts with neighboring cattlemen led to the Tonto Basin War (begun in 1887), in which thirty-two men were killed and the cattlemen were defeated. Further hostilities (1903-09) in Colorado and Wyoming did not go as well for the sheepmen; probably sixty herdsmen were murdered, while it was claimed that 600,000 sheep perished, largely driven over cliffs.

Sheepmen may have lost most of the battles, but they won the war, going about where they pleased and being reinforced by cattlemen who were attracted by the profits in wool. The state governments had at first been dominated by cattlemen and refused to protect sheepmen or punish their murderers; presently this was changed even in Texas as the sheepmen increased in number and formed political alliances with the farmers. The end of the open range pretty well put an end to hostilities.

The American West included the miner, the farmer, the lumberjack, and the shepherd, yet American song and story has made it overwhelmingly the habitat of the cowboy. Even the Indian and the Seventh Cavalry

play a poor second. The cowboy led a monotonous, grueling, and underpaid life, yet he has been endowed with romantic attributes which he would be at a loss to recognize. The glamor and, indeed, many of the characteristics of the cowboy and of the Westerner in general were the creation of the East. He himself sang:

The roman-
tic West

"Oh, bury me not on the lone prairie!"
These words came low and pleadingly
From the pallid lips of a youth who lay
On his dying bed at the close of day.

"Oh, bury me not on the lone prairie,
Where the coyotes'll howl and growl o'er me!"
And he gazed around with a despairing eye
On the cowboys who'd gathered to see him die.

"Oh, bury me not"—and his voice failed there,
But we heeded not his dying prayer.
In a narrow grave just six by three
We buried him there on the lone prairie.

Yes, we buried him there on the lone prairie,
Where the owl all night hoots mournfully,
And the blizzard beats and the wind blows free
O'er his lowly grave on the lone prairie.

Walter Prescott Webb has pointed out that the West was the meeting place of North and South and so focused the attention of the remainder of the country. Moreover, the West developed during a day when railroads and telegraphs and cheap newspapers and books enabled the nation to watch what was going on—to visualize Custer's Last Stand, the trains pushing through herds of buffaloes, vigilance committees hanging Sydney ducks, and cowboys riding up the Chisholm Trail and spreeing in Abilene. A romantic and sentimental nation glamorized what it saw, and the process has continued. We have even added a cowboy eschatology, as witness the songs *Roll on*, *Little Dogies* and *Ghost Riders in the Sky*.

In reality the Westerner was more frequently than not rough, uncouth, dirty, blasphemous, drunken, and careless of human life—that is, by the standards of the more effete East. Actually the Westerner drank hard, but he worked hard also. Cleanliness was difficult in the muck of the mine or in the dust of the trail. His manners were certainly unpolished, but he meant no offense, and he showed a considerateness in important things which was quite beyond Eastern comprehension. Still, he did possess certain of the popularly supposed at-

The
Westerner

tributes. He was quietly behaved, courteous, soft-spoken, and usually taciturn—though whisky might negate all these qualities for a night. The acme of self-reliance, he was slow to give offense but quick to resent insult, for upon his “honor” (he would never have dreamed of calling it that) depended his standing in the community and his ability to move about without hindrance or challenge. On the whole, he was a good citizen as citizenship was understood then and there.

There may have been little of formal law in the West, but there were none the less social restraints well known to modern movie addicts as the Code of the West. A man must be ready to take his own part, to defend his reputation, his women, his property. Respectable women were to be treated with respect; one notable result was that women obtained the franchise in the West long before they did in the progressive East or the chivalric South. There was little petty theft, but stealing cattle was a capital offense; even worse was taking a man’s horse, for setting him afoot was often a sentence to death. One never shot an enemy in the back (“dry-gulching”) or pulled a gun first, but it was legitimate to goad another into drawing and *then* “beat him to the draw”: that was justifiable homicide. Range and water rights were governed by elaborate customs, but Federal land laws were so clearly inappropriate that no onus was attached to obtaining land by fraud.

There was, of course, law of a sort in the West, but to obtain popular support it had to adopt some peculiar forms. Vigilance committees usually referred their actions to community mass meetings and took a vote before they proceeded to execution. Such informal jury action was certainly an improvement over the Eastern mob action (“lynch law”), which was basically actuated by nothing more than private prejudice, vengeance, or sadism. Even ranchers who caught suspected rustlers usually gave them a chance to clear themselves, a procedure not quite in keeping with the common law but still an improvement over mob action.

Sometimes Western judges showed queer ideas of the law, but such ideas were usually in keeping with community standards. One justice was familiarly known as “Old Necessity”—because he knew no law. A famous “jurist” was the self-appointed “Judge” Roy Bean, half vigilante, half racketeer, and worshiper (from afar) of the beautiful actress, Lily Langtry. He boasted that he was the law west of the Pecos; still, he did maintain order of a sort.

Most famous of all the Western forces of law and order were the Texas Rangers. First organized for defense against Mexican and Indian raiders, they were reorganized in the 1870’s to carry law to the cattle country. Texas had long been a refuge for outlaws; G.T.C.—“Gone to Texas”—were initials understood even in Europe. When the Rangers moved in, out-

laws fled by the hundreds to happier gunning grounds. Never large in number, the Rangers possessed uncanny skill in hunting down outlaws and controlling tense situations. The rule, it was said, was "one riot—one Ranger."

Cattle and mining towns hired marshals to keep the peace among the roistering miners and cowboys and the rough element which gathered to prey on them. A marshal had to be not only a master of the six-shooter but a man of cool nerve and resourcefulness. Such a man was Wyatt Earp, a native of Illinois who served in Dodge City, Deadwood, and Tombstone (the unholy trinity among frontier towns) and lived to referee the Fitzsimmons-Sharkey fight and die at last in bed. An associate of Earp was William ("Bat") Masterson, peace officer, professional gambler, and eventually sports writer; another was William Tilghman, who had the distinction of serving as peace officer in cattle towns and much later in an oil-boom town.

**Frontier
marshals**

Many Westerners were eaten by the sadistic urge for dominance which existed on all frontiers, and it seems reasonable to suppose that the job of marshal carried with it a certain satisfaction of this urge along with social approval. This was demonstrated by the frequency with which some marshals shuttled from one side of the law to the other. Such a one was James Butler ("Wild Bill") Hickok, who died at last in Deadwood, shot in the back.

The term "bad man" did not necessarily refer to an outlaw but to one with whom it was bad to tangle. Obviously this could include self-reliant citizens and peace officers as well as lawbreakers. Outlaws were by no means stereotyped. Many cowboys and cattlemen were not above a little cattle rustling when the occasion offered but did not make a habit of it. Sometimes men might be attracted by the excitement or driven by need or by false accusations to "take the hoot-owl trail." There were of course thoroughly evil men who were such by choice, either because they were natural enemies of society, or because they were possessed by lust for money or blood.

**The West-
ern bad
man**

The outlaw was not necessarily either a quick or a dead shot any more than was the average cowboy. Expertness with a six-shooter came not only from incessant practice (which few cowboys could afford) but from a superb combination of coolness and muscular co-ordination which few men possessed. Six-shooter experts might come from anywhere, but Texas led in their export; it may be significant that even today its men are most prominent in the armed services. Life was cheap, and many men held their own lives cheaply, for they were continually ready to engage in the exciting game of gun play. There was never for very long a lack of participants. The man who gained a reputation for a lightning draw lived in continual danger from other champions, no matter how peaceable were his

intentions; and the more men he had killed, the greater the danger he ran, for there were not only the friends of those he had slain but others who sought to annex his glory by killing him.

Most people have an exaggerated idea of the amount of crime in the West, yet it must be recognized that there was plenty of it. The earlier border outlaws were debris from the Civil War, especially the interrelated families of James, Younger, and Dalton, some of whose members had ridden with Quantrill. Most notorious was Jesse James (1847-82), reputed inventor of train robbery, a cold-blooded killer whom legend has given an ill-deserved reputation as a sort of Robin Hood. Eventually he retired to St. Joseph under the name of Howard, and there a reward-seeker shot him in the back while he was hanging a picture in his home.

Some
outlaws

Poor Jesse left a wife to mourn all her life,
His children three were brave,
But the dirty little coward that shot Mr. Howard,
He laid Jesse James in his grave.

Baxter Springs at the meeting point of Missouri, Kansas, Indian Territory, and Arkansas became a famous resort of outlaws who preyed upon Indians and cattlemen. As civilization pushed them westward they and their ilk, joined by refugees from the Texas Rangers and gold-camp vigilantes, found various new bases of operation. They engaged in robbery and cattle rustling or hired out as guns in the range and sheep wars. There were, of course, many whose names have entered into Western legend: John Wesley Hardin, a minister's son who was supposed to have killed thirty-nine men by the time he was twenty-one; caught by a Ranger and sent to prison for seventeen years, he was assassinated soon after his release. Sam Bass led a gang of bank and train robbers until he died at the hands of a Ranger.

Sam Bass was born in Indiana which was his native home,
Before he reached young manhood, the boy began to roam.
He first came out to Texas, a cowboy for to be—
A better-hearted fellow you scarce could hope to see.

Wars over control of the range or to oust rustlers or sheepmen or nesters were often called range wars. We have already noted the sheep wars. Such activities always brought in scores of gunnies, usually from Texas, who were willing to engage in pitched battle or to kill fair or by dry-gulching. There were, of course, various kinds of range wars. Sometimes they were between big outfits, sometimes between big ones and alliances of small ones, or even between big cattlemen and groups of men made up of small cattlemen, rustlers, and nesters. The

Range wars

Johnson County War in Wyoming in 1892 seems to have been of the latter sort. One thing led to another until a group of Texas gunnies in the hire of the big cattlemen was besieged in some ranch buildings and was rescued only by U.S. troops.

Even more extensive was the Lincoln County War in New Mexico, a long struggle between a cattle baron named John S. Chisum and some business associates on one side, and an alliance of small cattlemen, rustlers, and nesters on the other. After a series of dastardly murders the feud culminated in 1878 in a battle in the streets of Lincoln, while U.S. troops under a poltroon officer stood helplessly by. Nevertheless, so many of the leaders were killed or bankrupted that the feud died down.

One of the most cold-blooded of the killers in the hire of the Chisum faction was baby-faced William H. Bonney (1859-81), better known as Billy the Kid. Though born in New York City, he had been reared in the West. He had committed his first murder at twelve and boasted just before his death at twenty-one that he had killed a man for each year of his life. After the Lincoln War

**Billy the
Kid**

Billy went back to cattle rustling and killing at the head of a gang. This war had attracted national attention, and President Hayes sent General Lew Wallace (of *Ben Hur* fame) as governor of the territory to make peace. Wallace in a personal interview offered Billy a pardon if he would surrender and stand trial, but the Kid merely laughed at him. Chisum, like all the other leaders, had claimed to stand for law and order and now undertook to clean up the county. He backed the redoubtable Pat Garrett for sheriff and obtained his election. Garrett succeeded in capturing the Kid, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to hang but made an almost miraculous escape. Some weeks later, however, Garrett cornered and shot him.

3 *The Farmers' Frontier*

The farmers' frontier in the Trans-Missouri West was not always the slow movement of a wave of settlement which occupied contiguous territory. True enough, this was the usual pattern of advance from east to west on the Plains, but patches of farmers had already sprung up at likely locations all over the West. Oregon had been agricultural from the advent of the first American missionaries, and agriculture remained its chief interest. The Spanish missions had made California a land of grain and cattle; American farmers found that fruits would flourish if water was ditched in, and therefore irrigating works and artesian wells became common. Farmers found it profitable to settle near mining areas; others found that the garrisons of the forts dotted all over the Indian country afforded a market for potatoes, grain, and forage. It

**Farmers
beyond the
Plains**

must be recognized, however, that these settlements remained thin until the railroads enabled reinforcements to enter en masse.

The most important single agricultural settlement in the early period was Utah. The clear-sighted Mormon elders sought isolation, and to obtain it were willing to tame the inhospitable flats around the Great Salt Lake by laboriously ditching in water from the Wasatch Range. **Deseret** Agriculture, they realized, was the only possible basis for the maintenance of a large population, and they successfully withstood the lure of gold mining and of cattle ranching and held their people together. Immigration was elaborately organized and subsidized as much as the Mormons' meager resources permitted. Ten companies (3000 people) of poor immigrants came through, pushing handcarts; two trains caught by winter lost 200 members even though supplies were rushed through from Salt Lake City.

The Mormon settlements expanded by the 1860's into Idaho, Nevada, and down the Mormon Corridor to San Bernardino, California. The proposed State of Deseret ("land of the honey-bee," from the *Book of Mormon*) claimed an immense domain including the Great Basin, the Colorado River Valley, the Snake River Valley, and even a seaport at San Diego. It is said that 360 Mormon settlements were founded in the West during the first generation.

Mormon relations with the Indians were for the most part amicable, and Mormons treated transient immigrants fairly and saved many a company from starvation. Miners and cattlemen, however, soon began to eat **Federal** at the edge of the Mormon domain and force its contraction. **authority** Moreover, as the surrounding states and territories were **in Utah** established the Mormons found their Zion reduced to the present limits of Utah. Even there political control was menaced by the entry of "Gentile" miners, shepherders, and farmers. Most serious of all was the attitude of distrust on the part of the Federal government, induced by the Mormon espousal of polygamy and by a flood of literature purporting to expose Mormon oppression of the rank and file and its massacres of Gentile immigrants.

In 1850 President Fillmore made Brigham Young (the head of the Mormon Church) governor of the Territory of Utah and appointed other officials from among both Mormons and Gentiles. The latter found that they were in effect powerless because of Mormon loyalty to Young and his hierarchy. By 1857 it became evident that something had to be done. Young was displaced as governor, and a new man was sent out with a military escort under Albert Sidney Johnston. The Mormons, with poignant memories of their persecution in the East, prepared to resist. However, moderate counsels prevailed, and the new governor took office without opposition.

One effect of the invasion was that Young pulled in the settlers from distant places and concentrated them in Utah. Thereafter Mormons obeyed the laws but used the courts as little as possible. Mormon organization placed all essential controls in the hands of the hierarchy of elders: a logical outcome of one aspect of the New England Calvinism which lay at the root of Mormonism. Co-operation under firm leadership, it should be added, was also made necessary by the circumstances of settlement. At any rate, the Mormon Church became a successful co-operative business enterprise and is still the most potent economic (as well as religious and political) force in Utah.

**Rivalry of
Mormons
and
Gentiles**


Such controls were a violation of traditional frontier concepts, and the Gentiles of Utah bitterly resented them and so informed the nation. Partly for this reason but also because of Mormon polygamy, Congress persistently denied Utah admission as a state. In 1882 it passed the Edmunds Law to fine and imprison those found guilty of polygamy, and Gentile courts and marshals enforced it rigorously. Finally in the Manifesto of 1890 the Mormon hierarchy capitulated and forbade the practice. As a result, in 1896, fifty years after the settlement, Utah was admitted to statehood.

By the end of the Civil War the frontier line in the east included much of Minnesota and Iowa and considerable segments of Nebraska and Kansas. These were hilly regions or prairie, not the Plains proper. During the next decade, as Indians and buffaloes were displaced, broad areas of settlement developed near the westward-pushing railroads. The eastern fringe of the Plains (roughly the part east of the 98th meridian) proved to have sufficient rainfall. Wheat and corn farmers nibbled at the edge of Dakota Territory and moved as far west as central Nebraska and Kansas. Cattlemen had expected to fall heirs to the Indians and buffaloes, but the land was so clearly adaptable to agriculture that they fell back.

**Farmers
move into
the Plains**

The settlers of the eastern Plains were of diverse origins. Most numerous, of course, were the sons of farmers in states bordering the Mississippi, and among them were many Canadians who found the area more attractive than their own inaccessible West. Then there were Irishmen who had first seen the country as soldiers or section hands, and a mass of Germans, Bohemians, and Scandinavians. Foreign groups naturally desired to settle in communities when possible, and frequently they did. Most of them had been attracted by steamship and railroad propaganda which flooded Europe with books, brochures, and posters picturing the Plains as an earthly paradise. Thirty bushels of wheat per acre or seventy of corn were represented as not unusual. Seconding these glowing accounts were the activities of the state Bureaus of Immigration. Set-

Their origin



Adapted from Ray A. Billington, *Westward Expansion*, copyright 1949, The Macmillan Company. Used by permission.

tlers and settlements furnished freight for the railroads and taxes for the states; both had land for sale and were glad to dispose of it on easy terms.

For several years after the Civil War farming was an immensely profitable business, and the first comers to the Plains prospered. But the bubble was pricked by the price deflation which began with the Panic of

1873. Pioneering on the Plains, however, had not been easy at any time. The first few years were frequently passed in sod houses, a form of architecture copied from the Indians. The walls of sod were surmounted by a canvas roof or by poles which were covered with sod and earth. Such quarters furnished some warmth in winter but were smoky, damp, and vermin-ridden. No settler failed to provide himself with a log house or a frame cottage, however cramped, as soon as possible.

**Techno-
logical
problems**

Water also was a problem and frequently had to be hauled for miles in barrels. The introduction of steel windmills driven by the incessant winds of the Plains was a boon to the more prosperous, but it was years before every farm could afford one. Fuel was another problem. "Buffalo chips" (dried buffalo dung) were burned while they lasted; then farmers turned to stoves called hay-burners, which burned twisted hay and corncobs. Presently railroads brought in coal, and eventually a practical kerosene-burning stove was evolved.

Such hardships could be overcome by technological improvements, but there were others not as easily met. Undulant fever ("milk sickness") and typhoid ("prairie fever") were endemic. Prairie fires not infrequently sent the farmer's crops up in smoke, and he had to protect his home by keeping a perimeter of bare soil around it. Blizzards were sometimes terrific; the farmer crowded as much of the stock as he could into his sod house, but the remainder had to fend for itself. Crop diseases appeared from time to time, and in some years plagues of grasshoppers left "nothing but the mortgage." Nor for that matter were the eastern Plains immune from seasons of drought.

**Hostile
nature**

The easing of the hard times of the 1870's and the defeat of the Indians in North and South led, around 1878, to a surge out to the High Plains. At the time the semiarid High Plains were enjoying a succession of rainy years, and it was easy to convince settlers that the climate of the Great American Desert was changing for the better. The second "Dakota boom" peopled that territory as far as the Indian reservations on the Missouri. Farmers pushed across Nebraska and Kansas into eastern Colorado. Experimenters with irrigation and dry farming entered Montana and Wyoming. These movements depended upon the railroads, and the areas of thickest settlement were accessible to rail transportation. Farmers did not and could not occupy all of the Plains, for there were areas where rainfall was less than the required thirty inches and where irrigation was out of the question. Cattle-men therefore managed to hold on to considerable tracts.

**Peopling
the High
Plains**

One of the most interesting activities of the wheat-growing West was "bonanza farming." This was introduced in 1875 by the bankrupt Northern Pacific in an attempt to attract more entrepreneurs and provide more

Bonanza farming, 1875-90 freight. Bonanza farming was simply the use of the most up-to-date equipment on enormous acreages to mass-produce wheat, which could be sold profitably even at a low price. These farms, located chiefly in the valley of the Red River of the North, comprised from 1000 to 60,000 acres and were usually financed by Eastern syndicates. As the seasons became dryer and prices continued to drop, bonanza farming became less profitable. By 1890 most of the large farms had been broken up.

Even during the boom, settlers on the High Plains had suffered from drought or, just as bad, floods or rains that came too early or too late. By 1887 the wet cycle had ended, and the first Dust Bowl was forming. Impoverished farmers gave up the struggle in such numbers that the High Plains seemed destined to be turned back to the cattlemen. However, the dry cycle ended and the farmer once more entered, but this time more cautiously. The dry-farming technique was utilized. Artesian wells were drilled in regions where the underground flow from the Black Hills could be utilized, and where that was not available steel windmills were erected to provide water for stock and gardens.

Meanwhile a parallel movement of farm population was occurring in Texas. Indian Territory was still ostensibly reserved to the Indians, but it had a growing number of squatters, and thousands of would-be settlers and land speculators called Boomers were demanding that it be opened to white settlement. At this time there existed in the very heart of Indian Territory a tract of about two million acres called the Oklahoma District, which had not been assigned to any tribe. From 1879 onward bands of men drifted furtively into the Oklahoma District. Year after year the army drew a cordon to keep them out or rounded up those who slipped through and escorted them to the Kansas border.

Finally Congress, under Western pressure, moved to extinguish the Indian title to the Oklahoma District, and on 22 April 1889 threw it open in the first of the so-called "runs." This meant that 50,000 land seekers lined up on the boundary, some of them on trains whose speed was to be held down to fifteen miles an hour, but most of them riding horses or wagons. At the signal shot they dashed wildly away to seek places where they could stake out homestead claims. There was violence, of course, among the rival claimants, not to mention fights with "Sooners" who had managed to slip through ahead of time, and thousands of home seekers were disappointed. By the end of that day the whole of the Oklahoma District was staked out; Oklahoma City and Guthrie had been laid out and boasted their thousands. The next year Congress organized the Territory of Oklahoma.

The Dawes Severalty Act made other large tracts available up to 1906, as Indians were given their 160-acre tracts and the remainder of their tribal lands were sold to speculators or opened to homesteaders either by "runs," by lottery awards, or in the case of less desirable lands by mere entry. The Oklahoma Panhandle, the Public Land Strip left between the Texas Panhandle and Kansas, was added to the Territory. The last run was in 1895 with the opening of the Kickapoo district, but the greatest of all was the opening of the 6,000,000-acre Cherokee Outlet, or Strip, on the Kansas border, 16 September 1893. It was claimed that 100,000 men and women participated in this, the last picturesque outburst of Western wildness.

Opening
Indian
lands

The phenomenal rise in the population of the northern Plains and mountain territories naturally led for agitation to admit them to the Union. However, since most of them were likely to be Republican, the Democrats opposed the move, and they had enough power in Congress to prevent it. When in 1888 the Republicans won control of Congress, the Democrats tried to link the admission of Democratic New Mexico with the northern territories; but the Republicans would have none of it. As soon as they came into power the Republicans cannily divided Dakota into two parts and authorized North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and Washington to draw up constitutions. In November 1889 they were admitted by one bill as the "Omnibus States." Idaho and Wyoming, irked by their failure to be included, nevertheless drew up constitutions and Congress, which was in a permissive mood, admitted them the next year. Utah, as we have seen, was admitted in 1896 and Oklahoma in 1907. Arizona and New Mexico were not admitted until 1912.

New states

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Chapter XXXII

THE TRIUMPH OF CAPITALISM

1 *The Great Entrepreneurs*

BEFORE the Civil War the word monopoly was generally applied to concerns which gained advantages through government favors, notably the two Banks of the United States. Actually business competition was hog-wild—precisely as Jacksonian Democrats would have wished. Occasional combinations of manufacturers were viewed with alarm, as also was the first American monopoly (in the modern sense), the Western Union Telegraph Company, which after a bitter struggle united fifty competing concerns. The larger antebellum fortunes were usually gained in merchandising or in real-estate speculation in the phenomenally growing cities. Manufacturers were confronted by deadly competition, by a dearth of capital which was largely due to the distrust of the merchant capitalists, by the opposition of planters and farmers, and by the growing suspicion of the public and the resentment of labor.

The Civil War accelerated the growth of American manufactures much as the Napoleonic Wars had accelerated British manufactures. Government purchases, often at outrageous prices, lined the pockets of industrialists with profits and enabled them to expand their plants and install improved machinery. In effect, the shortage of capital which had hampered industry during the agrarian ascendancy was suddenly eased by the government's intervention. Capital was transferred by taxes and war loans from the pockets of the people to those of the industrialists. The transfer of capital continued after the war partly through the benevolence of the government and partly through new techniques of persuasion. In addition, the United States became once more the happy hunting ground of the European investor.

These facts, however, do not tell the complete story. The United States

would have become industrialized even had there been no Civil War, perhaps even more soundly than it did. The tremendous natural resources, mineral and agricultural, of the country could not under the circumstances have long been unexploited. The unsurpassed free domestic market, constantly being expanded as population grew, was an inducement to manufacture of which even many Southerners were covetously aware. Excellent and relatively cheap transport paved the way to the exploitation of raw materials and markets.

Even before the war a burst of new technological developments gave promise of further revolutionizing transportation, machinery, metallurgy, lubrication, and illumination. New techniques were accepted because of the country's relative freedom from traditional ways of doing things and because there was only slight pressure from employers' guilds and laborers' unions. Partly the result of the Civil War, but only in part, were the Federal government's contributions: its benevolent refusal to lay down effective rules which might hamper the industrialists' rise to power, its protection of industry against foreign competition, and its willingness to dispose of natural resources at rock-bottom prices.

Last, and perhaps most important, we must call to mind once more the ingrained American approval of freedom of enterprise. Most people instinctively favored the rugged individualist wing of Jeffersonianism; that is, they preferred Jefferson's weak central government to Hamilton's strong central government. They believed that a man could do as he pleased with his own property and were even at times inclined to agree that economic power carried the right to political power. Government favors to business were regarded as beneficial to the whole country, and people and politicians united with businessmen in resenting the Mugwump's efforts to withhold natural resources from exploitation or to force regulations upon private enterprise. We have seen that this was good liberal doctrine at the time, and it scarcely behooves us to criticize the men of that generation for not instituting the controls with which we are so familiar. Such controls would doubtless have been not only premature but morally and materially destructive. This fact should be borne in mind if some of the actions of the businessmen of that time do not seem to square with our ideas.

During the period after the Civil War there was a continuation of the westward movement of the center of industry. Meat packing, flour milling, lumbering, and mining of ores, which among them accounted for the bulk of American production, naturally had to move westward as new areas of supply were opened. Industries dependent upon specially trained labor had a tendency to develop in the vicinity where they were begun. Thus the manufacture of firearms, watches, fine tools, silverware, carpets, hats, collars and cuffs, and shoes remained largely centered in the East.

New England's possession of labor, capital, and water power had attracted the textile industry to its river towns, but by 1900 a combination of factors had begun a decisive movement of cotton-textile manufactures



W. A. Rogers in *Harper's Weekly* implied that rugged individuals were not too rugged to accept government aid.

to the South. For a time it seemed that the coal resources of the Appalachians would center in that area most of the industries dependent upon steam power, but Illinois coal encouraged competition in St. Louis and Chicago, and presently the growing use of electrical energy enabled industry to scatter even further. The superior coking coal of the upper Ohio Valley made that region the logical center of the iron and steel industry, but even the discriminatory freight rates long embalmed in "Pittsburgh Plus" could not prevent the rise of rivals in Alabama, Indiana, and Colorado.

There had been important textile and iron industrialists before the Civil War, but by 1875 there had arisen a new class of entrepreneurs who for the sheer audacity of their maneuvers were to cast most of the older

The Great Entrepreneurs generation into the shade. For the most part they dealt with new products, or at least new forms of old products or new markets and sources of supply. Among them may be mentioned McCormick in agricultural machinery; Carnegie in steel; Rockefeller in oil; the Big Four in meat packing; Westinghouse in electrical equipment; Havemeyer and Spreckels in sugar; Duke and Reynolds in tobacco manufacture; the Guggenheims in copper; Weyerhaeuser in lumber; and, somewhat out of season, the Mellons in aluminum and Ford in automobiles. Closely related to the foregoing were the railroad barons: Vanderbilt, Scott, the Pacific Associates, and those rising welders of railroad empires, Gould, Hill, and Harriman.

Most of the Great Entrepreneurs got their start in the booming period between the beginning of the Civil War and the onset of the Panic of 1873. The fact that an unusual proportion of them had been reared in bitter poverty may have prompted their determination to achieve material success at any cost, but these men also brought to their task tremendous analytical abilities which they trained with almost ascetic singleness of mind upon their one object of attaining wealth and power.

They succeeded because the spirit of the times was in their favor. Popular opinion regarded them as builders. The economy of the United States was expanding so swiftly and surely that success was possible for more men than ever before, especially if they possessed a modicum of shrewd sense and the readiness in a pinch to relegate moral scruples to their "proper" place in the Sunday-morning sermon. The problem of obtaining venture capital had not been altogether solved, but it had been greatly eased, for the Civil War had transferred vast quantities of capital to hands connected with shrewd brains which were quite capable of hatching schemes for attracting more money either as profits or as investments. Speculation in stocks now charmed the dollars out of grandfather's sock just as land speculation had in earlier years. Also, as we have seen, the entrepreneurs obtained from a complaisant government cheap raw materials, subsidized transportation, a protective tariff, an absurdly low income tax (none at all after the Supreme Court in 1895 obligingly declared it unconstitutional), and a benevolent toleration of some sharp practices.

By no means all of these sharp practices were illegal, nor for that matter were they deplored by current moral opinion. Laws intended to handle conditions in a nation given over to small businesses were inadequate when big businesses suddenly appeared. Still, many of the Great Entrepreneurs gladly employed lawyers who, as Mr. Dooley said, could transform a stone wall into a triumphal arch. They took advantage of inadequacies or crevices in the law

and even sought to equip new legislation with loopholes expressly designed for the passage of corporation chariots.

The corporation, on its moral side, was a lovely Calvinistic device which enabled the entrepreneur to avoid seeing the sordid results of his actions, for naturally conditions in the mill towns were not visible in a New York office. Capitalism's hold was further helped by the continuous social displacements, which kept large segments of the population milling about the country, and by the immigrants' ignorance of how to get their rights. There was, moreover, the old belief that any man could fill any government job; since low pay made talent reluctant to enter public service, civil servants were often incompetent in their enforcement of the laws. And then, also, they were frequently open to influence.

The term Robber Baron has frequently been applied to the Great Entrepreneurs, but it is not altogether appropriate. True, these men milked the national economy, sometimes retained an undue share of profits, and in the end threatened to reduce the country to chaos by their predatory tactics. Yet the fact remains that they used their profits to help build up a greatly needed industrial plant, and one is entitled to wonder how else it could have been done so quickly and with so small a cost to society. In the long view they accomplished their mission: to pave the way for mass production, which was to lay the foundations of national power and of the American standard of living.

**Their
mission**

One of the most colorful and in many ways the most typical of the Great Entrepreneurs was Andrew Carnegie. Born in Scotland, Carnegie was brought to Pittsburgh in 1848 by his family and became a bobbin boy in a cotton mill. Small, shrewd, alert, and cheery, the lad quickly absorbed the national spirit of "go ahead." Presently he became a messenger boy, then a telegrapher, and eventually an official of the Pennsylvania Railroad. Meanwhile he amassed a little capital, and in 1863 he ventured some of it in the reorganization and expansion of a forging shop which was filling railroad and government orders. Carnegie had a congenital fear of pioneering, but his fortune was actually based on ventures into which he was pushed by his partners and which he and they then labored to make into successes.


**Andrew
Carnegie
(1835-
1919)**

Manufacture of mild steel by the Kelly-Bessemer process had sprung up in a number of places after 1864, and the Carnegie Associates now built on Braddock's Field an up-to-date mill for the manufacture of steel rails. By great good fortune the new enterprise was able to open (1875) with a staff of experienced men headed by William R. Jones, one of the great mechanical and production geniuses of the steel business and a pioneer in shop efficiency. The venture quickly prospered and in 1883 added a rival mill set up in near-by Homestead by

**The
Carnegie
Associates**

a disgruntled partner. The Carnegie enterprise was a limited liability partnership, and from first to last at least forty men were numbered among the associates. A strong factor in the rise of the Carnegie interests was the colorless and conservative Henry Phipps, who watched costs carefully and pioneered in devising and utilizing chemical and tensile tests of materials. There was also the genial Charles M. Schwab, later head of Bethlehem Steel.

Best known, however, was Henry Clay Frick (1849–1919), cold, imperious, and a management genius. Frick got his start by furnishing to the steel industry coke made from the excellent coking coal of his native Connellsville region. He became manager of the Carnegie mills in 1889, and nursed them through a period of financial crisis and labor strife. Frick saw the advantages of getting control of all needful raw materials into the company's hands. Over Carnegie's opposition he made an alliance with the Rockefeller interests, which had developed Lake Superior ore mines, built a fleet of ore boats, and developed loading equipment so efficient that ore mined in Minnesota on Monday could be turned into steel rails in Pittsburgh by Saturday night. In some ways the cool, efficient, and silently ruthless Frick was more typical of the Great Entrepreneur than was Carnegie with all his blarney and ballyhoo.



Though Carnegie so frequently appeared in the role of an opponent of pioneering and was superficially a dispenser of charm, it must not be overlooked that he was the real center and driving power of the associates and deserved the name of genius. Always an omnivorous reader, he managed to remedy the defects in his education, became a favorite dinner guest in New York and

London, and aspired to become a writer. His productive efficiency, unbeatable espionage, and ruthless labor policies gave him a strong hold on the steel industry, the key to all industrial control. He callously broke contracts when it paid to do so, bribed purchasing agents, and broke away from agreements with competitors. One of his chief functions was that of salesman. This was not so much in selling rails—that was easy—but in marketing the stocks and bonds which railroads paid over instead of cash for steel.

Carnegie was thus able to divide most of his time between New York

and Europe, but he never dropped the reins in Pittsburgh. He ruled by alternate praise and sarcasm and enjoyed setting the partners against each other. Partners who showed undue independence were bought out at the book value of their stock under an "Ironclad Agreement" designed to give him final control. In only one case did he fail, when in 1900 he tried to force Frick to sell. That hard-boiled realist promptly went to court and revealed that annual earnings were well over book value of the stock. Carnegie quickly came to heel in order to forestall further disclosures.

Meanwhile there had grown up in the Chicago region a group of steel mills large enough to rival Carnegie. Their chief promoter was the colorful John W. Gates (1855-1911), salesman extraordinary, promoter deluxe, and stock-market marauder in the most flamboyant piratical tradition. His audacity was well illustrated by his popular nickname of "Bet-you-a-million Gates." He gained his start as a barbed-wire salesman, when in 1878 he convinced skeptical Texas ranchers of the utility of his product by building a barbed-wire corral which held their wildest steers. Presently he organized the American Steel and Wire Company and set the Illinois Steel Company on its financial feet.

Apparently it was Gates who first promoted the United States Steel Corporation as a vast combination of lesser steel enterprises, but it was his associate, Elbert H. Gary (1846-1927), a Morgan lawyer, who handled the details. Gates's ebullient forays eventually began to annoy J. P. Morgan, the Grand Mogul of Wall Street, who thereupon drove him into exile in Texas. It is said that Gates complained, "I only do openly what Morgan does behind closed doors." When Morgan heard this, his retort was: "That is what doors are for."

The geographical advantage of the Chicago region was evident not only in its steel industry but in meat packing and the manufacture of agricultural machinery. Meat packing, originally a term applied to salt-pickling in casks and to dry-salting and smoking, was begun about 1845 in Chicago and soon flourished so mightily that the city displaced Cincinnati as the country's chief packing center. Various factors were turning the meat-packing industry into one that required considerable capital. Among them were the delay between purchase of cattle and the final sale of the meat, the rise of canning, the utilization of by-products, and the growth of refrigeration with its need for expensive experimentation and the building of special cars and warehouses. Among the meat-packing names which became famous were those of the "Big Four": Armour, Swift, Wilson, and Hammond. On the whole they were successful in forming common policies which prevented ruinous competition. While small community slaughterhouses were gradually displaced, the situation actually permitted the number of packers to increase.

**Meat
packing**

In contrast to the co-operation of the meat packers was the cutthroat competition among the manufacturers of agricultural equipment. The two hundred enterprises which struggled to make headway in the 1860's were effectually reduced to a half dozen really important competitors during the next decade. Cyrus Hall McCormick (1809–84), inventor of one of the better reaping machines, had set up his factory in Chicago and determined to destroy all competitors. He bore a messianic conviction that the reaper was his and nursed a bitter animosity against competitors as thieving interlopers. Actually the Marsh platform reaper was more efficient and was the favorite until 1874, when McCormick brought out a machine which bound the sheaves of grain with wire. Eventually the wire came to be regarded as dangerous, and the new Appleby-Deering twine binder forced McCormick to imitate it or perish.

McCormick, indeed, might have lost out if it had not been for his stubborn business genius. He established agents in every rural community, attracted and accommodated purchasers by using the installment plan, and challenged all competitors to field contests in which the sturdily built McCormick machines won a fair share of victories. At the time of the founder's death the McCormick enterprise was leading in the field, but profits were so low for all the competitors that they were in serious danger of committing economic suicide.

With the warning that the evolution of control followed different patterns in different industries, we will set forth here the usual line of development. The first and least formal method attempted was the *agreement*. By this each competitor agreed to certain standardized prices and policies; usually they were promptly broken when someone saw a chance to undersell his rivals. The next step, the *pool*, was a division of marketing areas, freight, or earnings; it also fell through when one member saw a chance to grab off a large order or to pre-empt a certain field, but it by no means was discarded and, indeed, the modern trade associations bear some resemblance to it.

The search for uniformity was next sought by the mutual *exchange of stock* and by *interlocking directorates*. That is, the directors of any corporation sat upon the boards of allied corporations and strove to reconcile policies and minimize competitive clashes. The method was more successful than the others (and is still used), but it was cumbersome. Exchange of stock, moreover, was illegal in some states, for a rising public opinion disapproved of one corporation owning stock in another. It was Rockefeller, as we shall see, who introduced the next step, the *trust*, and ushered in the era of industrial concentration.

Among the new enterprises in which the Great Entrepreneurs flourished

most verdantly was the petroleum industry. This had originated in northwestern Pennsylvania just before the Civil War and had grown wildly during the war. Forests of derricks sprang up at dozens of points, and cities of 50,000 came into existence where a few weeks before there had been nothing but pasture. Bucolic landowners found themselves suddenly enriched; one of them, it is said, visited the city and, wishing to spend his money but having no experience in the line, finally bought and shipped home a carload of molasses. The oil fields were as much a frontier as the gold fields, and were invaded by much the same sort of rough characters. Men murdered to get possession of oil leases, set fire to their rival's derricks and tanks, hijacked oil shipments, and utilized high-priced lawyers to invoke the law's delays. Later on these same manifestations were to appear in the oil-boom towns of Texas, Oklahoma, and California and were to rival in wickedness and picturesqueness the Babylons of mining camps and Cattle Kingdom.

The oil boom

It was on the oil boom that the most successful of all the Great Entrepreneurs built his fortune. This was John Davison Rockefeller, who not only built up a huge petroleum business but made it the basis of a great finance-capitalist empire. Rockefeller grew up as a devout Baptist, a diligent worker, and a thrifty saver and investor. At nineteen he was able with two partners to set up a commission house in Cleveland; the first year the partners did a business of nearly half a million dollars. By the end of the war he was well established in Cleveland's business life, a tall, thin young man with a fox-shrewd face, cold eyes, a gentle, almost silken, manner, an unusually patient and astute bargainer, an efficient organizer and manager, a pillar of the Baptist Church, and an always reliable Sunday School teacher. Already he had developed his hallmarks of unending attention to small economies that others regarded as piddling, absolute precision in estimates and planning, perpetual study of men and markets, and a passion for order.

John D. Rockefeller (1839–1937)

The booming petroleum business had meanwhile been revolutionizing illumination and lubrication. Oil from the fields of northwestern Pennsylvania was refined in three centers: Cleveland, Pittsburgh, and the Eastern seaboard. Now kerosene prices varied greatly because production of petroleum fluctuated wildly as old fields were depleted and new ones were brought in and as swarms of small free enterprisers waged a bitter and mutually destructive warfare. Since Cleveland was the largest refining center, Rockefeller had been attracted to the business as early as 1862. He quickly perceived that stability could be gained not by the control of the sources of petroleum but only by the control of refining. Whoever succeeded in uniting the refiners would be in a

His object

position to dictate policies and prices to both drillers and retailers. By the time he was thirty Rockefeller had begun to put his plan into effect, and by the time he was forty it had been almost completed.

The refiners of Cleveland were united after a campaign that has rarely been equaled for shrewdness and ruthlessness. The size of his shipments enabled Rockefeller to wangle railroad freight rates (then a common practice) to give himself such an advantage over competitors that he held their fates in his hands. Those who joined him, and most did, received a fraction of the real value of their enterprises either in cash or in stock of Rockefeller's Standard Oil Company of Ohio; those who took stock were wise, for it flourished mightily.

His
methods

With the Cleveland refiners conquered, Rockefeller moved on to the other centers and subdued them. With about ninety per cent of the country's oil refineries in his hands Rockefeller was able to force the railroads to surrender their oil terminal stations, to grant ruinously cheap freight rates to Standard Oil, and to report on the shipments of his competitors; he even managed to force them to give him rebates on the money he paid them and in addition to turn over to him part of the freight paid by his rivals.

The secret of Standard Oil's success, however, lay not so much in its fight for power as in its intelligent financing and management. Standard Oil not only plowed its profits back into the business but kept large liquid assets on hand and acquired banks in which to deposit them. Rockefeller knew men, and he attracted a coterie of brilliant assistants whose names became only less well known than his own: Flagler, Archbold, Rogers, Harkness, Payne, and Pratt. The giant corporation which they raised was built on little things as well as big ones. Rockefeller made his own barrels, acids, and other supplies in order to eliminate unnecessary expense, created his own sales force, and found production and chemical experts who developed cheaper processes. When a bold entrepreneur built over the Appalachian Mountains a pipeline which threatened to undercut his near-monopoly of oil transportation, he fought and won a stubborn battle for its control.

Intelligent
financing
and man-
agement

Carnegie's forays concerned railroad steel, which in the popular mind was not directly connected with the cost of living; Rockefeller's concentration of the oil industry was connected with kerosene, a vital necessity in every home. As a result the public watched with great interest the struggle between the bandits of the oil industry and the man who was trying to organize or eliminate them—a job which needed to be done. Lies, innuendoes, accusations of sabotage, and sob stories about bereaved widows were diligently spread; for almost forty years the officers of the company were rarely free from legal action instituted by either private interests or public agencies.

Construc-
tive contri-
butions

While acknowledging that Rockefeller's methods were sometimes ruthless, especially in the early years, Allan Nevins, his biographer, insists that on the whole he was the most honest and constructive of all the great leaders of industry. Nevins points to the Standard Oil's "elimination of waste and introduction of manifold economies; its application of . . . [*new processes*]; its standardization of products on a high level of quality; its development of valuable by-products; its ready assistance to other industries, particularly in improving lubricants; its efficiency in home distribution, and its bold vigor in conquering world markets."


The Standard Oil's stock had always been held by a few men; and as subsidiaries were acquired and alliances made, these same few men continued in control. Unfortunately for them, state laws seldom permitted one corporation to own stock in another, so they often operated under handicaps. Some way was needed to evade regulatory laws and weld these many concerns into a whole. Finally in 1882 the able corporation lawyer Samuel C. T. Dodd came up with a simple but effective device. The Standard Oil Trust was formed, and all owners of stock in allied concerns turned over their stock to the nine trustees of the Trust and received in exchange "trust certificates." The owners thus received their dividends, but the trustees ran the business.

The Standard Oil Trust

The device was widely imitated and as we shall see led to public protest and government prosecution. Ohio forced (1892) the dissolution of the Standard Oil Trust, and the assets were eventually (1899) transferred to the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey, which continued to do business until it was broken up by the United States Supreme Court in 1911.

The Standard Oil, octopus though it was, did not quite succeed in extinguishing all opposition. One rival, the Pure Oil Company, under the magnificent rule of the maverick Lewis Emery actually survived and grew in Rockefeller's own Eastern stronghold. Standard's great mistake was in ignoring the West; it is said that when someone suggested to Archbold that the mid-continent area might yield oil, he laughed and said that he would undertake to drink all the oil found outside Pennsylvania. Nevertheless occasional wells were brought in during the 1880's, chiefly in Kansas, and gradually extended southward to the Gulf of Mexico. Pennsylvania wildcatters led the movement. Corsicana went into production in 1897; Spindletop, near Beaumont, in 1901; Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1901; Caddo, Louisiana in 1906. It was easily apparent that the Southwest was underlaid with wealth, and petroleum and chemical companies set about turning it into a significant industrial area. Pure Oil moved in early, and the Pittsburgh Mellons financed the Gulf Oil Corporation, which made its start at Spindletop on the basis of James M. Guffey's strikes. The Texas Company ("Texaco") originated about the same time; and Sun, Sinclair, and

Rise of the independ- ents; the mid-conti- nent fields



British-controlled Shell were not far behind. Meanwhile, of course, Standard had repented its early neglect and from the Kansas days onward engaged in the development of the mid-continent fields.


2 *The Crisis of Capitalism*

The short and sharp depression of 1884 drove home to the more thoughtful entrepreneurs the fact that the American economy stood in real danger of collapse. A number of reasons were cited, but interest centered upon the political struggle over a sound currency, the erratic nature of the business cycle, cutthroat competition, and the suicidal effects of reckless financing and market manipulation. We have already treated the currency problem at some length and shall recur to it later. Here we shall deal with the other factors in order to lay the background for the rise of finance capitalism.

The business cycle, the "constant recurrence of irregularly separated booms and slumps," has been the *bête noire* of capitalism, though no one has yet proved that it would not also exist under other economic systems.

Be that as it may, about one quarter of American national history has been passed in periods when the business cycle was in a slump—panics to our fathers, depressions to us. The slump usually originates from the curtailment of the prospect of profits, and the coming of the crisis is marked by the sudden failure of business houses and/or a break in the stock market. (Local booms and breaks, such as the Florida real-estate cycle of the 1920's, are not a part of the general cycle.) Businesses cannot meet their obligations and those which have expanded without sound prospects probably fail; buying is cut down; inventories are liquidated, and prices of goods and of stocks fall; and unemployment is widespread.

Presently those with money feel the need for new goods and so begin to buy; retailers order new goods; manufacturers summon workmen back to the shops; stock and commodity prices rise; expanding business asks



the banks for new credits and receives them. The boom is on. But presently bankers grow cautious as it becomes apparent that overoptimistic businessmen are overexpanding; interest rates stiffen; the prospect of profits is curtailed; business houses fail, stock prices sag, and we are on the way down to another depression.

Economists have separated into bitterly antagonistic schools over the care and feeding of the business cycle. Some say that the slump is a beneficent purge which kills off inefficient entrepreneurs and cuts away dead wood from the economic system. One ingenious theory blames the cycle on sun spots. It has been suggested that an early rise in interest rates (which can now be engineered by the Federal Reserve system) would prevent disastrous overborrowing. In the 1890's considerable hope was placed in the supposed stabilizing effect of consolidation and monopoly. The Keynesians, who became prominent during the New Deal, hold that prosperity and depression are merely normal levels on which the economy for various complex reasons becomes stabilized for longer or shorter periods.

What to do
about it?

We turn now to the stock market and finance. The Stock Exchange, located on Wall Street on lower Manhattan Island, was the place where entrepreneurs raised new capital by selling issues of stock and where old stocks were bought and sold. These were essential functions in a modern society, and by and large the business was carried on in a conservative and rather humdrum manner. The actual trading in listed stocks—those which met the conditions for publicity of their financial conditions—was carried on by brokers who held memberships called “seats” in the Exchange and executed orders from nonmembers. The “floor” where the trading went on often became a center of noise and confusion, which sometimes approached violence as brokers tried to force their way into the tight knots of traders.

Wall Street

By the 1860's insurance companies, banks, commercial houses, and the various commercial exchanges had become concentrated in the same area, and Wall Street became the term applied to the American financial world.

Wall Street is not and never has been a unit either in its politics or in its policies. Certainly it has never constituted a gigantic conspiracy to enslave the nation, as so many of its critics have assumed; nor can it ever, now that it has been subjected to tight regulation by the New Deal legislation of the 1930's.

The bankruptcy legislation of the Jacksonian era had been intended to break the throttle hold of "monopoly" over farmers and small businessmen by thwarting the "sanctity of contracts." Such laws proved unexpectedly useful to unscrupulous stock manipulators, who plunged into sweeping efforts to grab control of railroads and industries. If they failed, the penalty was small: they simply went bankrupt and began over again. The staid Stock Exchange did not permit such ventures to be launched on the "floor," so they were handled in basement offices known collectively as the Coal Hole. By 1869, however, risky enterprises had proved so successful that in the first flush of post-bellum optimism the Coal Hole was merged with the Stock Exchange. Unlisted and presumably more risky stocks were now remanded to the Curb Market, whose regulations for publicity were not so strict.

The rules of the Stock Exchange, however, left a certain latitude in which venturesome traders could develop a technique for fleecing inexperienced "lambs" and for seizing control of enterprises. These dramatic operations were called "gambling" by the public; they are not so characteristic of our own day. Men acquired stock when they expected it to rise, often buying it on "margin" (a small down payment) and taking a chance on paying the remainder when they sold it at a higher price. Sometimes they sold "short," that is, sold stock when it was high even though they did not possess it and made delivery with borrowed stock. They were gambling on the price falling and enabling them to pick up the stock cheaply, in time to return what they had borrowed.

Shrewd manipulators called "plungers" developed complicated means of "rigging the market" and stampeding the hangers-on into buying or selling and forcing prices up or down. A "bull market" existed when prices were rising; it might be an indication of prosperity or it might be a clever move on the part of a "bull" who was "long" on stock to raise prices so that he could unload his large holding; when he got out, the price usually fell and the margin-buyers held the bag. A "bear market" existed when prices were falling; it might reflect either hard times or a clever move on the part of a "bear" to make a quick profit by unloading a large holding of stock—thus becoming "short"—and buy it in again when it hit bottom. Bulls and bears, of course, were inextricably bound up with the efforts of important manipulators to gain control of certain railroad or industrial stocks.

There now had entered the scene a new type of entrepreneur, men who dealt primarily in securities and only secondarily (if at all) in the actual physical management of property. They lived and conquered by their knowledge of market habits and shrewd guesses as to what their associates were up to. They were usually rigidly respectable in their private lives, upholders of the moral code, and faithful if not devout churchgoers. But all this had nothing to do with the playing of the stock-market game. Partners in stock-manipulating schemes watched each other warily, for good faith might be undermined by temptation. A few men thought nothing of dining with a friend in the evening, then ruining him financially the next day; they were swashbucklers who sought first excitement and power over their fellows, and wealth only secondarily.

**The Wall
Street
breed**

Usually strong-nerved men fresh from the farm, they were bundles of contradictions. Silent as the Sphinx about their own business, they were adept at launching specially tailored rumors, yet were themselves an easy prey to rumors. Apparently unemotional and able to take gains and losses without turning a hair, when ruin overtook them some of them shot themselves; it is difficult to avoid the feeling that suicide came in a moment of clarity, when the game palled and the search for power appeared in its true and futile light.

New York manipulators were far more brash than their European counterparts, but they paled beside the new men from the American West. Cleveland was to contribute the "Standard Oil crowd" and Pittsburgh its "Pittsburgh millionaires." Chicago, however, yearned for stock corners and corporate amalgamations, and it had been used to the gigantic operations in "futures" and "hedges" in the Board of Trade grain exchange known as the Pit. Attempts to corner world wheat had been favorite amusements of the Pit operators. In the early 1880's "Crazy" Harper would have accomplished it had he possessed one more paltry million dollars; when his dream crashed, he became a raving maniac. A few years later another man made himself immortal by accomplishing it. It is noteworthy that a Chicagoan, John W. Gates, that Gargantuan poker player, had a great deal to do with infecting the New York scene with the virus of consolidation and wild speculation.

**Westerners
invade
New York**

The rise of a breed of market manipulators who dealt solely in securities and paid no attention to production was calculated to arouse resentment among both conservative businessmen and the people at large. These manipulators falsified statements of profits and financial status to conceal their irresponsible tactics. They drained away profits, ran up debts, neglected maintenance and capital replacement, sold watered stock or issued it to insiders, and played the market with their own stock, using the most conscienceless bull and bear

**Manipulation breeds
chaos**

tactics. Their effect was to throw the market into a more or less continuous state of commotion and to make it impossible for stock prices to find a natural level. The effect upon corporation policies and prices is readily evident. Industry and transportation were in a perpetual fever, and the national economy became artificially erratic.

Of course, there were other factors which promoted the same end, notably cutthroat competition. Reckless railroad men overbuilt their railroads into unsettled areas which could not repay expenses for many years; others built competing roads in settled areas which could not possibly support more than one road. The result was that shippers were overcharged and stock purchasers mulcted. **Ruinous competi-**
tion Competing industrialists overexpanded their plants and sought to survive by underpaying their labor and cutting the quality of their goods and services. It was not clear to them, as it is to us, that expansion must depend primarily upon the existence of purchasing power in the hands of laborers and consumers. They were in effect limiting the only forces that could buy their goods and enable their overexpanded industries to escape disaster. Agreements were sometimes broken when one party saw a chance to make an unusual killing by shading the agreed-upon price, and pools were broken up when one member saw a chance to grab off an unusually luscious order.

It must be repeated that the world of that day accepted the concept of the classical economists that there could never be a sufficient supply of goods to fill all demands. Therefore the interest and, indeed, the only **Practical**
meaning of **laissez faire** salvation of the producer lay in getting a monopoly in his field—not in our social and mass-production ideal of maximum production for the lowest price. Though there was much lip service paid to laissez faire, the practical effect of the belief in scarcity was that competition (and laissez faire) would last only until one producer managed to swallow or destroy the others. Free enterprise meant the right of a man to risk his stake in the competition—and the right of the victor to keep the spoils. The result frequently was wastefulness, mutual destruction, and in the end almost certain chaos.

Of course, laissez-faire theory regards the government merely as a benevolent policeman, but American businessmen have upheld that idea only when they wanted to be let alone. They did not oppose government action in itself—only action which did not promote their individual interests. If anything could be gained by government action they favored it, whether it was the promotion of transportation facilities, acquisition of cheap resources, or the legal hamstringing of a rival. Some observers have been so bold as to assert that the effective struggle against monopoly in this country was sparked by businessmen who saw themselves in danger of being squeezed out of business and fought to restore laissez faire by legislation against monopolies. We have the paradox that government's destruc-

tion of laissez faire has from the first been motivated by a desperate attempt to preserve laissez faire.

In the 1890's oil refining, whisky distilling, salt manufacture, and meat packing were largely controlled by effective industrial agreements or centralized management, but these agreements actually increased the economic chaos. The companies involved forced suppliers and railroads to give them special low rates, which the losers had to recoup by mulcting other customers. Industries and railroads thus held each other over a barrel whenever possible. Many elements in steel, copper, sugar, tobacco, railroads, and public utilities were so weakened by suicidal exploitation and internecine warfare that it was clear that another panic like the one of the 1870's might ruin them.

Growing
economic
crisis

The failure in 1890 of the English investment house of Baring after its overexpansion in Argentine financing sent a premonitory chill through Wall Street. European capital stopped flowing into the United States and began flowing out. The Treasury's gold began to melt away, precipitating a crisis which will be treated in connection with its political aspects. Briefly, Morgan managed to stop the withdrawal of gold but could not prevent the collapse of insecure business houses. By May of 1893 the panic was under way. New money was hard to find, industry languished, and unemployment was widespread. Conservatives naturally believed that investors had been scared off by the Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, and that the Wilson Tariff of 1894 by lowering duties had brought hardship to those industries which had depended on tariff protection.

Panic of
1893

The return of the Republicans to power under McKinley in 1897 brought (or at least coincided with) a renewal of business activity, but responsible businessmen were now determined to take steps to see that the debacle was not repeated. The way had already been shown by the amalgamation of certain railroads and public utilities and by Rockefeller's industrial empire. The five years 1898-1902 were to see the movement reach its climax.

3 *The Rise of Finance Capitalism*

The growing crisis of capitalism attracted the attention not only of more responsible men among the Great Entrepreneurs, like Rockefeller, but of the group of merchant capitalists who had stuck pretty well to transportation and government financing. They now saw a chance to take over the control of the industries which they had refused to aid—a movement which had almost exact precedents in England, France, and Germany. Their weapons were all but unbeatable, for as bankers in a nation with an expanding economy and a serious shortage of currency they had a throttle hold on

Opportu-
nity for
finance
capital

credit. When they undertook to crack the whip over the chaotic industrialists, the latter had to meet their terms or accept ruin.

Recently there had appeared upon the scene a propaganda for a live-and-let-live policy based upon the "community of interest" among businessmen. The doctrine envisioned a monopoly (or near-monopoly) in each field of production, and in natural monopolies (such as railroads) the formation of common policies and a division of the traffic. The program of consolidation and monopoly which soon began to be put into effect was held to be vital to the salvation of business; and probably it was. First, business had to be saved from itself, that is, from the reckless financial policies, irresponsible raids, and cutthroat competition which were ruining it. Second, the rise and fall of prices must be minimized and the disastrous effects of the business cycle padded. Third, the rising power of labor must be blocked at all costs, or capitalism would eventually give way to socialism. Lastly, the program would enable the entrepreneurs to make savings in buying and manufacturing processes, and to control prices and raise profits.

Finance capitalism means control of enterprise by banks and other financial institutions; some prefer the term security capitalism because capital takes the form of securities, that is, stocks and bonds. The financial institutions which now took control were private or investment banks, commercial banks, trust companies, and insurance companies. The private bankers were, on the whole, able to control the others and, as the great masters of capital, called the tune to which American industry and transportation were reorganized in the 1890's and early 1900's. The dominant leaders were J. Pierpont Morgan and John D. Rockefeller, but there were a number of lesser lights such as August Belmont, second of the name, who represented the Rothschilds in America; Jacob Schiff, who as a partner in Kuhn, Loeb & Co. represented German capital; Henry Lee Higginson, who as head of Lee, Higginson & Co. represented Boston's "spendthrift trusts" in search of investments; and others like Speyer, Seligman, and Brown Brothers.

Whatever the truth in the claim that we were for a hundred years politically isolated from Europe, we certainly were never economically isolated. Our exports of grains and raw materials considerably exceeded our imports of foreign goods; that is, of about \$2 billion in annual trade around the turn of the century we exported more in visible items than we imported. However, the excess was spent in a growing sum of investments abroad, in tourists' purchases, in freight payments, immigrants' remittances, and payment of interest on borrowings. In the end we owed Europe, and Europe put that excess into American investments.

By the beginning of World War I it is possible that as much as \$7 bil-

lion of American investments were held by foreigners. Most of this amount was owed to Britons, but Dutch and Germans were important creditors. Though this was but a fraction of the total investments in the United States, it was sufficient to make us, if not actually a European economic province, at least peculiarly sensitive to European economic conditions. Our panics, as we have seen, were usually started by European selling of American securities, though it must be hastily added that wild financing in the domestic scene made such actions more upsetting than they should have been.

It is an interesting fact that both American and English finance-capitalist houses often rose from the ranks of cloth merchants who had loaned money to their customers and had held and transmitted funds. They had thus laid the foundation of private banks. Along with their other activities they combined a knowledge of the eccentricities of the stock market and gained skill in attracting investors, first for their trading voyages, then later for their ventures into the financing of roads, canals, steamships, and railroads. The rise of the House of Morgan can serve as an illustration.

**Their
origin**

George Peabody (1795–1869) was a New England lad who worked up to the senior partnership in a cloth-merchandising business. Meanwhile he had dabbled in the importation of capital, for in those days America was a rather profitable investment field. In 1837 he moved to London to devote himself to specializing in foreign exchange and American securities, and in time his hands-across-the-sea dinners became famous. His American business came to surpass that of the Barings and the Rothschilds, and, though he remained an American and refused an English baronetcy, he did not scruple to conduct the flight of American capital from New York at the beginning of the Civil War. In the end he died full of honors, willing his fortune to American philanthropies in what was then regarded as a notably spendthrift manner. In 1854 Peabody had been joined by another New Englander, up from a cloth merchant house, Junius Spencer Morgan (1813–90). His son was J. P. Morgan—"Morgan the Magnificent."

**The House
of Morgan**

John Pierpont Morgan was educated in Boston, Switzerland, and Germany. Though he returned to the United States in 1857 and under a number of firm names carried on the American end of his father's business, he maintained two residences in England and returned every year to renew business and social contacts. The House of Morgan was essentially bi-national, a fact which propagandists effectively used against it in America. Young Morgan's rise was not spectacular until 1873, when he managed to horn in on Jay Cooke's monopoly of government financing. Cooke's failure that same year left Morgan in control of the field. In 1879 Morgan refinanced the New York

**J. P. Mor-
gan (1837–
1913)**

Central with \$25 million of English money, a feat which brought him much prestige. He had already ventured to refinance railroads and had made the discovery that they quickly fell prey again to reckless exploitation. This time he demanded and received a share in the control of the Central in order to protect his investors.

For the next third of a century Morgan was the outstanding American. In Wall Street his ascendance was all but unquestioned among conservatives, and even the more reckless raiders feared his power. By the end of the period the "money trust," of which Congress's Pujo Committee reported he was the heart and center, operated through 341 directorships (72 held by Morgan partners) in 112 corporations and controlled \$22 billion in assets. Morgan stoutly denied before the committee that he exercised any controls or that the presence of Morgan partners in interlocking directorates implied centralized policies either in banking, industries, or railroads. These men, he asserted, acted independently simply because they were the best men for the positions. Strength in the business community lay not in the control of banks, securities, and property but in character.

The Jupiter of Wall Street was in his heyday the very portrait of a dictator. Big and bulky, his jowls and his drooping mustache gave him a mastiff-like appearance. He had been troubled with skin disease from boyhood, but now *acne rubirosa* settled in his nose and turned it into a huge, glaring deformity which absorbed the beholder's embarrassed attention until he saw the fierce direct hazel gaze from under shaggy brows. He possessed vast powers of concentration and an unusually brilliant mathematical mind; it was his custom, on some occasions, to seek relaxation in playing the foreign exchange market—a difficult feat when one considers the vagaries and complexities of the world's currencies. His actions were often abrupt when his attention was diverted, but his brusqueness melted before the boldness of any man who knew whereof he spoke.

Though he was arrogantly conscious of his hegemony and was sometimes arbitrary (often with reason, which characteristically he did not bother to explain), he knew how to be gracious and even kindly. The most prominent Episcopal layman in the country, he attended Triennial Conventions regularly (together with his chef) and passed the collection plate at St. George's. Religion was to him as much a part of life as breathing, and he never ceased to be amazed by impiety. He believed that the Bible was inspired, word for word, and his will opened with a profession of faith that reads like an excerpt from *Pilgrim's Progress*. He was notably charitable, but since he felt that a gentleman would not allow his philanthropies to be known many of them were concealed. The result was that he lost much public credit, which he badly needed. It was a matter of indifference

to him; he hated publicity and was so indifferent to public opinion that he was in effect insulated from it.

He lived lavishly but not pompously, as did some of his contemporaries, nor could his brownstone home on Madison Avenue or Cragston, his country home on the Hudson, vie with theirs. Nevertheless, he ate prodigiously, appreciated fine wines, and indulged in gay parties with unconventional companions. He delighted in travel, sometimes on a series of increasingly luxurious yachts, all named *Corsair*, sometimes by ocean steamer or train. Every year he went to Europe, usually spending the spring in England, then moving on to Paris, Aix-les-Bains, the Riviera, Venice, Rome, and finally Egypt. Eventually he became a collector of manuscripts, rare books, and the many forms of art which became the core of the collections of the Metropolitan Museum of Art.

To charge that this action was pure ostentation would probably be unjust, for under his hard exterior Morgan reeked with sentimentality and human feeling. Few knew that as a young man he had dropped his career, had married the young woman of his choice even though she was far gone with tuberculosis, and had taken her to the Mediterranean in a vain attempt to save her life. Actually his personal fortune was never large; he left \$68 million at his death, and his collections might have raised it to \$100 million.

Only less in the public eye than the Magnifico himself were the Morgan partners. Prospective heir, of course, was John Pierpont Morgan, Jr. (1867-1943), known to his confreres as "Jack," a level-headed and hard-working young man though scarcely more than a rubbed carbon copy of his father. The other partners were so invariably superbly handsome men that there was a saying, "When the angels of God took unto themselves wives of the daughters of men, the result was the Morgan partners." Robert Bacon, handsomest of them all and titular head, was the original Harvard football hero who gained fame and wealth as a bond salesman. Charles H. Coster, the expert on railroads, worked himself into an early grave. George W. Perkins was an insurance expert and a political manipulator, but he was concerned in most of the big reorganizations.

The Morgan partners

No partner, but none the less important, was Francis Lynde Stetson, "Morgan's attorney-general" and the brainiest lawyer in Wall Street, who had a hand in numerous reorganizations and invented no-par-value stock and probably the holding company. Morgan partners had to be brilliant, for they were called upon to act as experts in reorganizing industries with which they had had no previous contacts. It is said that it was nothing unusual for a Morgan partner to absorb this knowledge in thirty days. Of course the pace was killing; old Jupiter was killing off his second generation of partners when he died in 1913.

Morgan's financial power lay—next to character—in the absorptive power of the banks, trust companies, and insurance companies which he controlled. Nexus of this combination was the First National Bank under the guidance of bewhiskered George F. Baker, one of the most astute financiers in New York. Among the dominated insurance companies at one time or another were New York Life, Equitable Life Assurance, and Mutual. Morgan's issues of stocks and bonds were apportioned to such members of the empire as Morgan saw fit or offered for sale to the public. It was not until the last year of his life that these sources of capital began to fail. Morgan also exerted himself to attract European capital, and for this reason he sought to moderate the saber-rattling and tail-twisting activities of the politicians. To him the worst aspect of Cleveland's First Venezuelan Incident was its interruption of the flow of British capital.

In 1899 the Supreme Court, after some dawdling decisions, had finally (in the *Addyston Pipe Case*) so weakened the legal basis of the Rockefeller form of trust as to make it untenable. Even before this, Big Business had seen the trend and had felt compelled to seek some other means of control. Fortunately for it, the *holding company* form was now available. In 1889 New Jersey had passed legislation permitting corporations chartered in that state to hold stock in other corporations, thus reversing the all but universal common-law practice. This action, apparently promoted by a lawyer named James B. Dill, was intended to attract taxable corporations to the state. New Jersey charters have ever since remained favorites among big corporations, but eventually other states followed suit. Francis Lynde Stetson was particularly active in adapting the holding-company form to the New York situation on behalf of Morgan's reorganizations and of public-utility amalgamation.

The holding company is a corporation that owns enough stock in subsidiary corporations to be able to control their policies; it is possible for the subsidiaries to hold other subsidiaries on a third level, and so on downward. The holding company may engage in business operations, or it may be designed strictly as a means of policy control. Actually stock ownership is so widely scattered in the modern corporation that it is often possible to control a corporation's policies through ownership of a block of stock amounting to as little as five per cent of the whole. The word *trust*, though no longer strictly accurate, was continued in use to denote any large business combination, regardless of its legal form. It should be pointed out that the holding company by no means did away with mergers.

There were certain definite principles on which Morgan operated in his reorganizations. In the first place, he never accepted a task until the

owners were ready to place absolute control in his hands. It seems correct that he had his own ways of hastening such a surrender. He then estimated the actual value of the assets and the earning capacity. If necessary, he pared down the debt to a sum commensurate with this estimate and assessed the stockholders for working capital. Watered stock—that is, new stock issued without a corresponding increase in tangible assets—was distributed freely, both to reimburse the House of Morgan and to sweeten the proceedings for those whose support it was necessary to have. In addition Morgan also received some cash and a generous commission on stock sales, and he retained a significant voice in the management. The weak point in the procedure lay in the use of watered stocks, sometimes so lavishly that when more new money was needed it could be obtained only through burdensome bond issues, which, of course, the House of Morgan stood ready to handle.

**Terms of
reorgani-
zation**

The specialty of the House of Morgan was railroad reorganization, but since railroads composed an empire with its own history and provenance we shall hold them over for another chapter. The first important industrial reorganization was that of the electrical industry into General Electric. Chiefly instrumental in this was Charles A. Coffin, who managed to squeeze out English patent interests but failed to bring in the immense Westinghouse interests. The latter fell eventually to Rockefeller and to the Mellons of Pittsburgh. Later reorganizations included the agricultural-equipment industry into International Harvester Company, which at the time of its formation in 1902 made and sold about seventy per cent of the production in its field.

**Principal
reorgani-
zations**

Morgan's greatest venture, however, was in steel. Carnegie had not suffered appreciably by the panic and was in an excellent position to ruin competitors. On the other hand, he was growing old and longed to retire to a life of literary contemplation and of spending his fortune for the public welfare. When the Western steel men applied to Morgan for protection, he organized American Steel and Wire Company and Federal Steel under the aegis of Gates and Gary, but this limited commitment was no shield against Carnegie if he chose to offer battle.

**Carnegie
sells out**

Carnegie saw this opportunity, and shrewdly announced plans for expanding his interests into all branches of steel fabrication. The panic-stricken Westerners again besieged Morgan, and after a period of bargaining the coy Carnegie agreed to sell out for about \$500 million. Carnegie had little faith in the prospects of the combination and took over his own share in bonds, a fortunate choice, for stock prices did presently go into a decline. Morgan had always regarded the brash little Scotsman as an upstart and "no gentleman" and had hesitated to do business with him. Some time afterward Carnegie cornered Morgan on a transatlantic liner

and suggested that he should have asked for another hundred million. "If you had I'd have paid it," replied Morgan icily, "if only to be rid of you."

The bargain with Carnegie did not end Morgan's troubles. The Westerners, now that Carnegie was out of business, held their interests at inflated figures, while Rockefeller's control of Mesabi iron ore meant that



Donahy, permission Cleveland Plain Dealer

Americans may have criticized Morgan and the trusts, but there was also a note of pride in their view of the accomplishments of Big Business.

Formation of U.S. Steel he had to be bought out at his own price. Then there were the Moore brothers, who, after successfully organizing the trusts built around the Diamond Match Company and National Biscuit Company, had organized American Tin Plate, National Steel, and other steel combines. In the end Morgan brought in all the interests he chose, leaving out only the small companies which formed the nucleus of Little Steel, now not so little. Rockefeller accession was indeed an asset, for it meant that Standard Oil would not seek to set up a rival steel network. So in 1901 the United States Steel Corporation of New Jersey was formed, with a total capitalization of \$1,400,000,000—just about double the value of its physical assets. At the time of its formation U.S. Steel made about two thirds of American steel; now it makes about one third.

The birth of Big Steel was the high-water mark of Morgan's career. There were, of course, plenty of carping critics at home and abroad, and in time their uproar was to swell in volume. Just as evident at the time

was America's pride that it could do business on such a scale. Morgan's unfortunate ventures in New England railroads, shipping, and shipbuilding were in the future, so now his prestige was unchallenged. Mr. Dooley pridefully recited his praise in inimitable Chicago Irish:

**Morgan's
prestige**

Pierpont Morgan calls in wan iv his office boys, th' prisidint iv a national bank, an' says he, "James," he says, "take some change out iv th' damper an' r-run out an' buy Europe f'r me," he says. "Call up the Czar an' th' Pope an' th' Sultan an' th' Impror Willum, an' tell thim we won't need their savices after nex' week," he says. "Give thim a year's salary in advance. An', James," he says, "ye betther put that r-red headed book-keeper near th' dure in charge iv th' continent. He doesn't seem to be doin' much," he says.


We turn now to the shift of the Rockefeller interests to finance capitalism. Until recently Wall Street had no vision of the future of American industry and regarded its entrepreneurs—particularly the oil refiners—as mere speculators. So Standard Oil over a period of years lifted itself by its own financial bootstraps and in the process learned the techniques of banking and industrial management. Industry and the petroleum business, it developed, were here to stay, and Rockefeller's faith and watchful care were rewarded by the way in which the golden tide lifted him to financial eminence among the once-scoffing investment bankers of Wall Street. In the middle 1880's Standard Oil headquarters were moved to 26 Broadway and actively began the search for investments for its mushrooming surplus.

**Rockefeller
enters Wall
Street**

Rockefeller brought to the Wall Street game the same hardheaded financial and managerial genius which had made Standard Oil. He played his cards close to his chest and made few mistakes. He was a better judge of men than Morgan; Nevins aptly compares Rockefeller to a Puritan and Morgan to a Medici prince. One of Rockefeller's early ventures outside of oil was the acquisition of the Mesabi iron-ore properties from the Merritt brothers. This was not on the face of it a good risk; even Carnegie had pooh-poohed Lake Superior ore and would have nothing to do with it until Frick dragooned him. In the end the Mesabi mines gave Rockefeller an important stake in U.S. Steel, though he retained scattered steel interests in New York, Virginia, Alabama, and Colorado.

The Rockefeller Group was transferred almost bodily from the oil business. It is essential, however, to qualify carefully. By the middle 1890's John D. Rockefeller's hand was being withdrawn from the helm, for his health was bad and he was increasingly preoccupied with his philanthropies. As a result his associates came to the front, and the "Standard Oil crowd" diverted its attention to other enterprises which were not managed by Standard Oil but by

**The
Rockefeller
Group**



Courtesy Moody's Investors Service

Standard Oil men using their personal profits from Standard Oil. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., then serving his apprenticeship, was an administrator rather than a plunger and had little to do with the outside activities of the group.

The management of Standard Oil itself fell into the hands of John D. Archbold, a fiery and audacious man who did not hesitate to skate on thin legal ice, but who kept the profits rolling in. Henry M. Flagler, brisk, imaginative, and a farsighted railroad organizer, put Florida on the resort map. Standard Oil's rise to power had not always given off a sweet odor, but it now began to suffer acutely in public estimation as a stock-market raider. This situation was chiefly due to William Rockefeller, the less shrewd brother of John D., and to Henry H. ("Hell Hound") Rogers, a swashbuckling, mercurial, witty, and dynamic social rounder and spectacular market manipulator. An invaluable ally was the silent, inscrutable James Stillman of the old and respected National City Bank.

While we may think of a large part of American business after 1900 as gathered into two associations, the Morgan and Rockefeller groups, it would not do to portray them as hard and fast alliances or to insist that their control was universal and absolute. Morgan had sought to impose community of interest and to reduce the cutthroat competition and stock manipulation which had threatened to bring economic collapse. He certainly forestalled the collapse, but he

did not succeed in abolishing all abuses. Moreover, there were bickering and back-stabbing within each main group; individual members moved from one group to the other or undertook ventures on their own.

Also, there were finance capitalists who owed allegiance to neither. By World War I the Mellon empire monopolized aluminum, controlled a growing minority share of oil, and (outside of steel and glass) had been acknowledged by the Morgan and Rockefeller groups as the dominant financiers of the rich Pittsburgh area. After the war the Detroit area saw Ford fight and win a battle for financial independence, and the new Bank of America interests controlled by Amadeo Giannini annexed California. Smaller financiers and market operators aped the big groups in their reorganizations. There were not only steel, oil, sugar, tobacco, and flivver kings, but kings of sulphur, shovels, cash registers, baking powder, and goobers. It is said that about the turn of the century New Jersey was chartering an average of over two thousand corporations a year. Obviously not all of them were backed by the great capitalists; a considerable part of them were launched on a shoestring and a prayer, while some turned out to be heartless schemes for embezzlement.

Rogers and William Rockefeller were the leaders in the formation of the Copper Trust. They purchased a number of copper mines, including the famous Anaconda, and gave a check for \$39 million which, it was specified, must be deposited in the National City Bank and remain there for a stated time. They then organized the Amalgamated Copper Company with a capital stock of \$75 million; sold the mines to it for \$75 million, taking its entire capital stock in payment; borrowed \$39 million on it from the National City Bank and made good their check; then sold the stock in the market at face value, thus emerging with a profit of \$36 million.

**Copper
Trust**

Of course they kept control, for enough of the stock had gone to Standard Oil banks to serve that purpose. Nevertheless the Amalgamated failed in its grand aim of cornering the world's copper resources. More successful was their American Smelting and Refining Company, but only because in 1901 it took in the extensive Guggenheim copper-smelting interests on terms which assured the family of virtual control. Meyer Guggenheim and his seven sons had fought the "Standard Oil crowd" to a standstill.

The so-called Rockefeller Group was also connected with the two outstanding market operators, Whitney and Ryan, who were looked upon askance by conservative Wall Streeters. William C. Whitney, whom we have already met as a powerful Democratic strategist and builder of the new navy, was a brother-in-law of Oliver H. Payne, long one of the Rockefeller associates. Unlike most of the nation's money men, Whitney possessed education and sophistica-

**Whitney
and Ryan**

tion, but these did not prevent him from overvaluing sensual things. Thomas Fortune Ryan, orphaned son of a poor Virginia farmer, was in the words of Whitney, "adroit, suave, and noiseless." With their favorite corporation lawyer, Elihu Root, to find legal ways to do what they wished, the combination was unbeatable. Basically their power depended upon an alliance with Tammany Hall, which usually controlled New York City. Curiously enough, Whitney had won his political spurs as an ally of Tilden in the battle against the Tweed Ring.

The rising importance of public utilities had led in nearly every city to their unification under centralized control, a movement which was accelerated as the use of electricity spread to light, traction, and industrial power. Centralization was essential, but financial abuses were almost universal, for not only did the entrepreneurs reward themselves richly but they had to buy up or lease existing franchises at exorbitant prices—and if they happened to own the franchises, they paid themselves no less. The result was that in most cities the centralized utility corporations watered their stock outrageously and were burdened down by obligations to pay large annual sums to canny franchise holders and their heirs, known sometimes as "underliers."

In the middle 1880's Whitney and Ryan began to unify the traction lines of New York City. Francis Lynde Stetson dreamed up for them what is usually thought to be the first holding company, the Metropolitan Traction Company (1886). Franchises were purchased or leased at fantastic prices; in one case, it is said, they acquired and then paid themselves one million dollars for a horse-car line worth at the most \$15,000. Payments, of course, were in bonds or in stocks which were sold on the market; when the price showed signs of sagging, it was bolstered with luscious dividends paid with borrowed money. Whitney died in 1904, leaving \$40 million but not a share of Metropolitan stock; Ryan waited only to seize August Belmont's new subway, then got out also, leaving the lines to collapse.

Whitney-Ryan operations were by no means confined to traction but extended to gas and electricity and presently covered other cities. Transformation of the traction lines to electricity and expansion into the suburbs were immensely profitable, for the old *Crédit Mobilier* construction-company method could be used to milk the assets. Another profitable promotion was the Tobacco Trust (American Tobacco Company), formed in 1901 in collaboration with the shrewd North Carolinian, James B. Duke. This trust controlled the American market and a large part of the world market until the Supreme Court forced its dissolution in 1911.

The great era of industrial combinations lasted from 1898 to 1902, but this period was merely the apex of a movement long under way. Railroads and public utilities had been consolidating since the Civil War; by 1904

about 95 per cent of American railroad mileage had been drawn into six great groups, four if one remembers that some of them were allied. Utility capitalization was about half as large as that of industry. Writing in 1904, John Moody listed 318 principal industrial trusts with a capitalization of \$7.25 billion—about forty per cent of the national total—and 5288 plants. All together, consolidation had brought together capitalizations of \$20 billion.*

Extent of
combina-
tions

Relations between the two dominant finance capitalist groups were not always pleasant, though their most titanic struggle occurred in the railroad field and will have to be left for later treatment. Other struggles, probably the crucial ones, occurred in the fields of industry and finance. The reorganizations of the period around 1900 had drawn in most of the available capital of banks and stock purchasers and, moreover, New York state laws had intervened to limit the use of bank funds for speculative purposes. A flurry in 1903, known as the "millionaires' panic," had bankrupted a number of poorly financed undertakings.

Trust-
insurance
scandals

Through some oversight trust companies were not as strictly limited and could engage in activities not open to banks. Insurance companies, though they were forbidden to speculate, could loan to trust companies. The result was that by 1905 insurance-company funds had been drained into projects so speculative in character that their financial foundations were shaking. The situation hit public attention with a thud when the Rockefeller side, failing to get its desired share of Equitable Life, openly brought charges against the House of Morgan, particularly George W. Perkins. A legislative investigation made under the direction of the brilliant lawyer Charles E. Hughes led to much-needed regulatory legislation. Many of the lesser exploiters went to jail, but none of the greater; Perkins was absolved on the ground that if he had committed grand larceny he had done it without criminal intent!

The warnings conveyed by these premonitory rumbles were not misleading, though the market continued to rise and overspeculation continued. There was even a growing conviction that reorganization had done its perfect work and that panics were things of the past.

Panic of
1907

They were not. Early in 1907 the market began to crumble, and in March it sank alarmingly. Government and financiers rallied and "cleaned house," but by autumn the downward march was resumed and a series of crises followed. Morgan the Peerless was never more in his element than now, as he rallied the "money trust." Each bank was assessed to make up successive rescue funds, and the Federal government added at least \$50 million; these sums Morgan loaned to whomever he chose to favor—but at twenty-per-cent interest. When he drove down

* John Moody, *The Truth about the Trusts* (1904), 440ff.

Broadway behind his gray cob, the cheering crowd ran alongside to catch a glimpse of him; and when he walked into his office at 23 Wall Street, it was between lines of financial tycoons.

During one particularly grueling crisis he sat apart in his magnificent library, where the madonnas of the Italian Renaissance looked down upon a strange scene. For he was imperturbably playing solitaire, sometimes holding a card in suspension while he listened to reports or plans, then briefly expressing his decision and laying down the card. In the end he won. It is not likely (as was freely claimed) that the Houses of Morgan and Rockefeller created the panic to ruin their smaller rivals, but it had that result—especially when Morgan, perhaps justifiably, refused to use the rescue funds to support their tottering little kingdoms. The Rockefellers emerged with rich spoils in copper and with a share of Westinghouse; Morgan added to his steamship holdings and, with the consent of President Theodore Roosevelt, bought out at half price U.S. Steel's chief competitor, the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company.

The Panic of 1907 was called a "bankers' panic," and indeed on the surface it seemed to be financial in nature; as such it promoted a demand for a centralized bank. However, the tremendous amounts of watered
Effects of stocks and bonds which had been thrown upon the market
Panic of during the past decade saddled industry with an interest
1907 and dividend burden which it could not bear. Employment slumped, and soft spots remained in the economy until World War I brought prosperity; indeed, the war was all that saved the country from a depression which would probably have ranked with those of the 1870's and 1890's. Some economists insist that the depression which was scotched by Morgan in 1907 and averted by World War I was the one which finally arrived in 1929.

The Panic of 1907 was in a way a lesson to the great finance capitalists, though it was not until the death or retirement of some of the worst swash-bucklers that the two great groups were able to patch up a peace. Each retained its own empire, but as time went on their interests joined at more and more points; one of them was the National City Bank, whose control they share and which has become the pledge of mutual loyalty. The pattern of Big Business was formed, and the fevered political campaign against the trusts, though it broke up a number of them into smaller units, did not halt the growth of great corporations.

One result of the growth of community of interest was that there was a new understanding of the part that business confidence plays in a cen-
Growth of tralized economy. New techniques were being developed to
business give it a solid foundation. Say Cochran and Miller* of the
confidence new generation of businessmen:

* Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller, *Age of Enterprise*, 151-52, copyright 1942 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

They were coming more and more in their fiscal transactions to deal in stocks and bonds, in rights to property rather than in physical property itself. They were using checks canceled through central clearinghouses, rather than cumbersome commercial paper. Their commodity transactions were increasingly conducted through negotiable bills rather than in raw products themselves. In almost all our large cities in these decades commodity exchanges began bringing buyers and sellers into immediate contact, standardizing quality, codifying trade practices and developing systems of business ethics that speeded all transactions by making unnecessary the legal paraphernalia of competitive contract making—the jargon, the endless details, the interminable oaths and affidavits. There was little need, now, to go to the warehouses to test the quality of the wheat or to the docks to test the cotton. Varying qualities were classified by the exchanges and offered for what they were. As in stocks, frauds were perpetrated. Poor produce was passed off as the best, just as unauthorized stocks were sold as gilt-edged securities. But the markets responded each time with better regulations. Their very existence depended upon trust, upon the faith businessmen had in the reliability of their representations. It was axiomatic, therefore, that the exchanges must extend themselves to preserve this trust. They were generally successful in doing so, though raiders like Gould, who depended upon this general faith for the success of their own malpractices, frequently did their unwitting best to shatter business confidence.

There remain, however, several interesting questions. How clearly did men like Morgan and Rockefeller envision the results of what they were doing? It is evident that they knew they were riding an expanding economic wave and had every confidence in the country's future, provided that future was not cut short by wreckers. They themselves were not wreckers—all legends to the contrary. Indeed, some of their acts which are often interpreted as wrecking (such as stock watering and forced bankruptcies) were necessary devices to consolidate control in their own hands in the belief, naturally, that they were best fitted to govern.

What vision did they have of the future?

Probably they had no faith in democracy as a process of compromise but would have interpreted it to mean that the best man should win. But they did believe in American institutions, at least as they then existed. Probably, had they ever stopped to state their beliefs, they would have agreed that the United States was and ought to be a plutocratic republic. They doubtless saw themselves as laying the foundations of an order in which merit would rise to the top of the economic heap, and because it occupied that place would hold the veto (and when necessary the initiative) in national affairs. Men like Rockefeller had begun as Jeffersonian rugged individualists, then had graduated into the school of Hamilton. The rise of "socialistic" doctrines—mostly mere populism—tinted some of them with Hamiltonian pessimism.

Again, what of the business ethics of the finance capitalists? They were not greatly different from the ethics which spring up in any predominantly business civilization and which the Protestant Ethic (particularly Calvinism) systematized and excused. As early as the 1850's American business, says J. T. Adams,* "ceased to be a mere occupation which must be carried on in accordance with the moral code. It had itself become part of that code. Money-making having become a virtue, it was no longer controlled by the virtues, but ranked *with* them, and could be weighed against them when any conflict occurred."

How far were businessmen interested in public welfare? Certainly they regarded themselves as public benefactors both by their reorganizations and by their enormous philanthropies; we shall have occasion to note the latter in another connection. They argued sincerely that (quoting James J. Hill) "the aim in business, as in politics, is to do the greatest good to the greatest number; and the greatest number—so far as we can now see—is apparently benefited by the consolidations." It is notable that our generation almost instinctively identifies ethics and public welfare. That generation had not yet lost sight of the individual, however "rugged" its concept may seem to us. Business had its ethical code, but in dealing with the maverick or the scoundrel the code was laid aside; it never occurred to these men that ethics could counsel submission if not actual ruin in a financial battle. Nor did it ever occur to them that after swinging a notable reorganization they were not entitled to a generous cut for their invaluable services, even when it ran above forty per cent. They knew that their cut was paltry when laid beside the future social benefit.

Doubtless they sincerely felt that to surrender their hard-won control would be to betray the public welfare. What was good for business was good for the country, for if no profits were made no wages could be paid. Labor and capital each paid its way, but labor was definitely subordinate to and dependent on capital. It was, of course, the oft-ridiculed "drip down" theory of economics. So firmly did they believe this that, though they sought for and willingly accepted government favors, they resented government supervision on the logical ground that it thwarted the natural law of supply and demand. For the same reason they opposed unionization. They professed themselves willing to pay labor as much as circumstances permitted, but if the laboring man was destitute he should take humble thought of the prior rights of property and accept his lot as his due for having fallen behind in the race. After all, as Morgan himself had proclaimed, character always won.

* J. T. Adams, *Epic of America* (1931), 191.

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ROCKEFELLER: The works on Rockefeller and Standard Oil are legion. Henry D. Lloyd opened the ball with *Wealth against Commonwealth* (1894), a diatribe which utterly failed to grasp the real significance of the developing economic picture. Ida M. Tarbell, *History of the Standard Oil Company* (1904) is careful of facts and censorious of ethics. Allan Nevins, *John D. Rockefeller* (2 v., 1940) makes a grim and on the whole successful effort to be fair; the quotation from Nevins is found in 2: 708. A useful collection is Earl Latham, ed., *John D. Rockefeller: Robber Baron or Industrial Statesman?* (1949). The reader should also become acquainted with John D.'s own *Random Reminiscences of Men and Events* (1909).

The Crisis of Capitalism

BUSINESS CYCLES: The definition is by Herbert Hoover in the foreword to *Business Cycles and Unemployment* (1923). See also Carl Snyder, *Capitalism the Creator* (1940); Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Business Cycles* (2 v., 1939); and Wesley C. Mitchell, *Business Cycles and Their Causes* (new ed., 1941).

WALL STREET: Alexander D. Noyes, *Forty Years of American Finance, 1865-1907* (1909); Henry Clews, *Fifty Years in Wall Street* (1908); Margaret G. Myers and Others, *The New York Money Market* (4 v., 1931-32).

The Rise of Finance Capitalism

GENERAL: John Moody's *Masters of Capital* (1919), though written by a man who had ample opportunity to observe, is brief and superficial; his *Truth*

about the Trusts (1904) is a catalog rather than a narrative. Gustavus Myers, *History of the Great American Fortunes* (first pub. 1907) has gained stature with time but like Matthew Josephson's colorful *Robber Barons* (1934) suffers from a preoccupation with diabolism. George W. Edwards, *The Evolution of Finance Capitalism* (1938) is of less value to the general reader. Useful summary is Harold U. Faulkner, *Decline of Laissez Faire, 1897-1917* (1951). See again Allen's *Lords of Creation* and Cochran and Miller, *Age of Enterprise*. For Whitney and Duke refer to Mark D. Hirsch, *William C. Whitney, Modern Warwick* (1948); and John W. Jenkins, *James B. Duke, Master Builder* (1927).

MORGAN: There is no detailed and at the same time impartial biography of the Magnifico. Herbert L. Satterlee, *J. Pierpont Morgan* (1939) was written by a worshiping son-in-law; Lewis Corey, *The House of Morgan* (1930) is probably the best, though castigative; Frederick L. Allen, *The Great Pierpont Morgan* (1949) is clear, simple, and absorbing.

Chapter XXXIII

RAILROAD CAPITALISM

1 *Welding the Eastern Trunk Lines*

THE period of economic expansion after the Civil War was marked by a leap in railroad building which turned American transportation almost into a railroad monopoly and from 1865 to 1920 made the railroad king. True, there was a revival of river steamboating in the 1870's and 1880's, but it was only a brief revival of the romantic past. Even the Erie Canal had to give up the struggle as the centers of industry moved farther west. In our time the rivers and surviving canals are used chiefly for slow and heavy freight, and there is question whether they could bear even that economically without Federal maintenance of the right of way. When the railroad was king

On the other hand, Great Lakes transportation grew amazingly. Part of this growth was owing to technological advances both in ships and in loading equipment. Much of it, however, resulted from the need for cheap transport of bulky freight such as coal, iron ore, and wheat. The opening of the Soo and Welland canals and the arrangement for shipping American products down the St. Lawrence were valuable incentives to lake transport. One other survivor of the ante-bellum days was coastwise shipping, still attractive as a carrier of heavy freight. Here, as to a certain extent on the Great Lakes, a period of warfare was followed by the railroads' acquisition of their steamship rivals. Last of all was the electric interurban, which by 1917 boasted 18,000 miles of line, but which all but vanished before the onrush of the automobile.

The decades after the Civil War saw the growth of Chicago as the peerless metropolitan, industrial, and railroad center of the West; the joining of Atlantic and Pacific by rails; and the amalgamation of countless

Railroad
progress


small railroads into giant systems, each of which fed one or two trunk lines. Roadbeds were made heavier, curves were straightened, and tunnels dug to permit faster schedules. These decades saw the building of bridges to eliminate transfers, the adoption of one standard gauge in place of the eight ante-bellum gauges, the double-tracking of all important lines, and the replacement of flimsy iron rails by heavy steel. Block signals were introduced, air brakes replaced hand brakes, Pullmans displaced the rude sleeping cars of the war era, dining cars displaced station "eating cribs," and steam heat displaced pot-bellied wood stoves.

At the close of the Civil War there were less than 31,000 miles of railroad; by 1900 the mileage reached over 193,000 and in 1920 the peak of 253,000 was attained; since then there has been a perceptible decline. No less remarkable was the opportunity opened to investors, for railroads soon became the basis of the most important single class of securities and comprised perhaps one tenth of the nation's developed wealth; in 1921 their total capitalization was over \$22 billion, and they employed more than 1,680,000 men and women.

The tremendous assets of the railroads made them a constant temptation to financial wreckers. The process of milking a railroad was relatively easy because assets were conveniently available in the form of stocks and bonds. New roads could be built out into nonproductive areas, and the stock could be sold before the collapse; if Federal land and mortgage subsidies were granted in aid—and they often were—insiders could organize their own construction company (as in the case of the *Crédit Mobilier*) and drain off the assets in payment for the work of construction. In the case of an established road the procedure was to issue quantities of watered stocks and bonds (buying legislative consent when necessary) and sell them. Sometimes wreckers wormed themselves into control and let the road go to physical ruin while they drained off as much as possible of earned and borrowed cash in the form of dividends.

Competition among railroads was as mutually destructive as in industry. Parallel lines engaged in rate wars which had to be financed by charging outrageous freight rates to shippers who had but one outlet; thus, shippers from Chicago to New York might be able to select among five rivals, but Altoona could depend only on one. This abuse was called that of the *long haul* and the *short haul*; that is, in the face of competition goods would be carried a long distance at a lower rate than that charged for carrying them a shorter distance when there was no competition. Frequent efforts were made to moderate competition by *pools*, intended to divide traffic fairly so that rates could be kept high; they never lasted very long, for one party was

Railroad
abuses of
the public



certain to see a chance to make a quick profit. *Rebates*, usually supposed to be secret, were habitually granted to large shippers, and this practice was excused as being in the same class as saving by buying in quantity.

Political influence was absolutely essential to the railroad, and legislators expected and received free passes and sweeteners of cash and stock. It is evident that the patrons were losers both in service and in money paid for fares and freight. Actually the railroad and the public both suffered, whether the operators were honest men or wreckers, for the losses due to political expenses or to competition with parallel lines had to be made up by excessive charges in another direction and/or by neglect of maintenance. Their competitive policies, even admitting their goodwill, pitted industries against each other and wrought havoc.

Before the Civil War only one through line (the Virginia and Tennessee Railroad) ran from the Atlantic coast to the Mississippi River; the task of consolidation was the work of the decade after the war. The New York Central, as we know it today, was basically the creation of Cornelius Vanderbilt, founder of the Vanderbilt family and fortune. He began life as a Staten Island ferryman. Big, blond, blatant, and bursting with initiative, the ferryman soon entered the service of Thomas Gibbons and was an important factor in the latter's successful battle to break the Fulton-Livingston steamboat monopoly. After this Vanderbilt went into business for himself and gradually built up the control of a steamship line which gave him the enduring title of "Commodore." Meanwhile his dutiful wife gave birth to thirteen children, which may or may not have prompted his magnificent offer to finance a joint monument to himself and George Washington.

**Cornelius
Vanderbilt
(1794–
1877)**

We have already noted the part Vanderbilt played in ruining William

Walker's plan for a great Middle American empire. Though his grammar and spelling remained atrocious to the day of his death, there was no deficiency in the Commodore's brain. By the time of the Civil War he had decided that the future lay in railroads, so to the dismay of his friends he took the chance to sell out his ships at war prices and put the money into railroads. At the age of sixty-six he thus embarked upon a new career.

At the close of the Civil War there were two railroad routes which connected (or almost connected) New York and Buffalo. The first led up the east bank of the Hudson to a point opposite Albany, then by the recently organized New York Central to Buffalo. The other, the Erie, left the west bank of the Hudson and ran through the mountains and hills of southern New York State. Vanderbilt attempted consolidation of his lines out of New York City with the New York Central, using all the brutal devices which a generation of canal and railroad exploiters had developed. He planned to extend his lines to Chicago; but, since the management of the Erie planned a similar move, he felt compelled to spike its competition by taking it over.

Now the Erie had fallen into the clutches of its treasurer, Daniel Drew (1797-1879). Drew was an illiterate farm boy who had risen by his wits from drover and horse trader to Wall Street predator and in the process had built up a legend of mingled parsimony, naïvety, and sanctimoniousness. For many years Drew had systematically been robbing the Erie and now had joined to himself in the good work two rising young men, James Fisk (1834-72), the very portrait of the hearty and expansive villain, and the more reserved and secretive Jay Gould (1836-1892). Gould had made the beginning of a fortune during the Panic of 1857 and added to it by unscrupulous plunder during the lush times of the Civil War.

In the struggle for the Erie, Gould furnished (in the words of Allan Nevins) "the strategic imagination while Drew contributed low cunning and Fisk impudence." It is a sore temptation to linger over this campaign, probably the most colorful in Wall Street history. But we must cut short the recital of the events of 1867 and 1868. When Vanderbilt began buying Erie stock, the Erie trio fed vast quantities of it into the market. As Fisk said, "If this printing press don't break down I'll give the old hog all he wants of Erie." Finally Vanderbilt saw what was happening and obtained an injunction from one of his kept judges. Thereupon the trio fled to New Jersey and put up in the Hotel Taylor's Castle, which they furnished with patrol boats, guards, cannon, and light ladies. When an attempt at kidnaping failed, Vanderbilt suddenly gave up and permitted Gould to have the fraudulent stock legalized by "cultivating a thorough understanding" with the New York

legislature. In the end the Erie trio returned two thirds of Vanderbilt's losses; the remaining loss he accepted with the philosophical observation that "it never pays to kick a skunk."

Gould now entered upon a spectacular career as a railroad wrecker. He took over the Erie and when Drew became obstreperous cynically drove him to bankruptcy; strangely enough, the old rascal is remembered now chiefly as the founder of Drew Theological Seminary. **Gould and his associates** Fisk became Gould's vice-president in charge of Tammany Hall, and after a few flamboyant years as speculator, opera impresario, and voluptuary was shot by the lover of one of his mistresses.

The period between 1865 and 1893 was a time not only of vast railroad expansion but of vast swindles. Oftentimes seemingly plausible and straightforward, the swindlers were widely admired and imitated. A disgusted Senator characterized them bitterly, "When they speak, they lie; when they are silent, they are stealing." At the core of the most gigantic swindles were Sidney Dillon, one of the original Union Pacific crowd, Russell Sage, and Jay Gould. Russell Sage is remembered now as a philanthropist; that term is not accurate, for it was his widow who set up the Russell Sage Foundation in his memory after his death and gave largely to other enterprises.

Sage and Dillon were old in railroad sin before the Civil War, but there was nothing they could teach their much younger associate. Gould was a little man with a timid, rather ineffectual air, but he was the *stupor mundi et immutator mirabilis* [wonder of the world and marvelous manipulator] of an age which worshiped audacity and cleverness. Flashing through the stock market, attacking and annexing weakened railroads like a lobo pulling down a sick calf, Gould was only the most successful of a large number of market depredators. Twice he controlled the Union Pacific and sucked it dry; the Missouri Pacific he retained as a conduit through which to drain the incomes of dependent roads; his interests in Southern Pacific and Santa Fe will be noted; he seized the Wabash, formed from a network of small Middle Western roads; thimblerrigged the New York City elevated system; and wrung Western Union Telegraph from the surprised and outraged Vanderbilt family and used it to dominate the Associated Press. He was thus in a position to use the press to undermine public confidence in his intended victims.

His later career

The ethics of such men as Morgan and Rockefeller meant nothing to him. All together, he was probably as sinister and cold-blooded a leech as ever fastened himself on the American financial structure. He bought only to wreck, and reorganized only to suck out the last delicious drops. The market was as familiar to him as the score to an orchestra leader, and like that leader he brought out the nuances which suited his purpose. Never

once was he caught in serious error; those who thought they had trapped him discovered to their sorrow that he was master of the trap and they themselves were caught. Dark, spiderlike, lusting for destruction, even those who snubbed his family socially felt Gould's revenge through their pocketbook nerves.

But to return to a man who, whatever he may have garnered in speculative profits, was yet a builder. Vanderbilt picked himself up from his Erie defeat and went on with the unification and expansion of the New York Central. This was no task for a squeamish man, but there was nothing squeamish about the old Commodore. On one occasion when his lawyers warned him that a certain move was not legal, he exploded: "What do I care about the law? Hain't I got the power?" To him, as to most of the men of his generation, there was but one answer to his question, "Can't I do what I want with my own?" Around 1873 the acquisition of the Lake Shore and Michigan Southern and other lines gave him entry to Cleveland, Detroit, and Chicago. Despite his highhandedness, he was a progressive manager and turned his string of burnt-out railroad properties into an up-to-date and profitable system.

When Vanderbilt died he left an empire worth about \$100 million to his son and principal heir, William Henry Vanderbilt (1821-85). The latter successfully expanded toward the Ohio River and St. Louis and, it is said, doubled the value of the system. One New York-to-Chicago competitor he bought out; and with the others, including Gould's Erie, he waged successful warfare. Though his "The public be damned!" was widely quoted, he was quite cognizant of public censure of his single-handed control of the New York Central and in 1879 sold out part of his holdings to British investors and in so doing made the system the nucleus of the Morgan railroad empire.

Most formidable rival of the New York Central in tapping the riches of the Middle West was the Pennsylvania. That line, built to connect Pittsburgh and Philadelphia, had under the guidance of J. Edgar Thompson become the best managed, most progressive, and most profitable railroad in the nation; to this day it alone among American railroads has never passed up a dividend. The Pennsylvania Company, formed in 1870 and sometimes claimed to have been the first holding company in the nation, built an empire based on the transportation of coal, steel, petroleum, lumber, beef, and grain. The final step in the Pennsylvania's expansion was taken under Alexander J. Cassatt, who tunneled the Hudson River to carry the lines into New York City and across Manhattan Island to connect with Long Island and New England. This project, the most stupendous in railroad history, clinched the Pennsylvania's position as the greatest railroad system in the nation, not in trackage but in gross revenue and freight tonnage. Powerful

enough to hold Morgan and Rockefeller in balance, the Pennsylvania was variously rated as an ally of either. It is now largely an adjunct of the Mellon empire.

2 *Building the Western Trunk Lines*

The consolidation of American railroads has taken such form that they are divided by the Mississippi River into Eastern and Western systems. The chief exceptions are those Western lines which cross the river to make Chicago their terminal—but no railroad company has dared to extend its tracks through the city. So rigid has been the dividing line that a publicity-conscious railroad executive gained much notoriety by his query: "Pigs can go through Chicago without changing cars; why can't people?" This pertinent query stimulated enough halfhearted co-operation to result finally (1948) in sending several passenger trains a week directly through Chicago from New York to the West Coast and others through St. Louis from New York to Mexico City.

Enough has been said to show the financial abuses connected with the building of the Union Pacific Railroad, for the Crédit Mobilier mulcted from the road a sum estimated at \$50 million and left the enterprise on the verge of bankruptcy. This fact does not, however, detract from the praise due General Grenville Dodge (1831–1916) as chief engineer. Hampered by silly restrictions imposed by Congress and with his gangs continually menaced by the Plains Indians, Dodge completed the line from Omaha to Ogden in three years.

As the movies long ago realized, there has been no more colorful episode in American history than the building of the Union Pacific. To a very great extent the efficiency with which this road was laid was due to experience gained by Dodge and his engineers in reconstructing and equipping military railroads during the Civil War. Crews of discharged veterans and shanty Irish graded and laid the roadbed and built bridges; a light flat car then was hauled up to the "end of track," and other crews laid the ties, strung the rails, and gauged, bolted, and spiked them. All this had to be done with scouts on the lookout and with rifles stacked near by for use in case of Indian raids. Even as it was, rails were sometimes laid at the rate of ten miles a day.

No less picturesque was the scene at the camps where workmen chomped their hasty meals of tough Texas longhorn beef and then, when possible, sought relaxation in the saloons, gambling dens, and brothels of "Hell on Wheels." This adjunct moved frequently to be near the fool and his money, striking its tents and shacks in the morning, loading them on flat cars, and setting up in time for the evening's trade. "What had been Julesburg in the morning became Cheyenne at night."

Meanwhile from the West, Central Pacific crews, rather more sedate

because they were blue-denimed Chinese, were battling the ramparts of the Sierra Nevada and braving the desert heat. At last early in 1869 the two railroads approached each other. The nation waited with bated breath for the rails to join, then broke into a roar of laughter. Congress had left the point of junction undecided, and now the grading crews of the two railroads began moving along parallel lines in plain sight of each other, while Irish and Chinese dynamited each other and the owners applied for their mileage bonuses from the government. A red-faced Congress hastily set Promontory, Utah as the meeting place. There on 10 May two locomotives drew up facing each other. A couple of golden spikes were driven to mark the joining of the tracks, then hastily pulled out. Cowcatchers touched, and the engineers broke bottles of champagne over the opposite pilots. It was a moment whose thrill has never yet been duplicated in American history—unless by V-J Day.

The Central Pacific was the property of four men known as the Pacific Associates. Collis P. Huntington (1821–1900), the leader, was a Connecticut Yankee who had come out to California in 1849 but had sought his gold not in the sands but as a merchant in Sacramento. The undoubted head of the associates, he was bold, deliberate, and tireless; on the other hand he was narrow, untruthful, sarcastic, and vindictive. Leland Stanford, a San Francisco merchant and lawyer, was as governor and Senator an indispensable social and political front. Charles Crocker, trained in the iron business, was a man of extraordinary physique and the driver and construction head of the quartet. Last was Mark Hopkins, the bookkeeper, whose skill was devoted among other things to so befuddling the accounts of the associates that they have never been disentangled; of course, the destruction of the books by fire was some help. The remarkable thing is that through three decades of association the Pacific quartet maintained unbroken discipline, and it was not until 1890 that Huntington and Stanford openly quarreled.

The Pacific Associates had been aroused to the possibilities of a trans-continental railroad by Theodore Judah, an engineer who had located a practicable route across the Sierras. In 1861 Huntington took \$100,000 scraped together by the associates and went to Washington to petition the new Republican Congress for a charter. He returned without the money but with the Central Pacific charter (incorporated by act of Congress) and liberal grants in land and cash. San Francisco capitalists, satisfied with the twenty-four-per-cent interest rate that their money was drawing, were not interested in a railroad.

Thereupon the associates peddled \$27 million in bonds, largely to states, counties, and towns. When necessary they bribed public officials or

threatened to leave towns off their railroad. Government subsidies (secured by a second mortgage) for both Central and Union Pacific were \$16,000 per mile in level country, \$48,000 in mountains, and \$32,000 between. The inducement to build in the mountains was sometimes decisive despite crags and snow. Altogether the Central Pacific drew \$24 million and nine million acres from the government; its construction company received, it is claimed, around \$80 million, about half of which was in excess of all reasonable costs. This total does not include the valuable water frontages wrested from cities.

The associates had planned to sell the Central Pacific after wrecking it, but as its financial condition was well known no one could be persuaded to buy it. As a result they were forced to undertake to keep it alive, and Huntington, at least, seems to have gradually become entranced by the vision of wealth, power, and distinction to be gained in railroading. Feeder lines into Oregon or toward the south were built or acquired; and, with the rail system of the state in their control, they pushed fares up to ten cents a mile, the highest in the country. Their position entailed great risks and great worries, and much of their gains had to be expended for bribery in Sacramento and Washington. When the competition of the Pacific Mail steamship line proved embarrassing, they had to set up their own line and pay blackmail to the Pacific Mail to stay away from California.

Most serious was the threatened entry of rival transcontinental roads into southern California. Fortunately there were only two feasible crossings of the Colorado River, one at Yuma and the other at Needles. Gould had found new ways of wringing money out of the Erie, and with this and other spoils he had moved in on the Union Pacific. Though he soon lost control, he proposed to retake it by encirclement. One of his instruments was a chain of roads out of New Orleans called the Texas and Pacific, which he proposed to build on into southern California. This project, under the management of Thomas A. Scott, then president of the Pennsylvania, attracted a great deal of Eastern smart money which believed in Gould's star.


The Southern Pacific

Huntington hastily pre-empted the Yuma crossing, then departed for Washington to get the approval of Grant and the War Department. He succeeded and continued to push across Arizona and New Mexico to El Paso. There a truce between Huntington and Gould in 1881 led to the eventual formation of the Southern Pacific. Its affiliation with Gould's Missouri Pacific also gave it entry to St. Louis. The Pacific Associates now turned their main interests to the Southern Pacific and to southern California, which they built up in one of the greatest real-estate operations ever undertaken. Huntington's boundless energy and ambition had led him as early as 1869 to acquire as a personal venture the coal-carrying Ches-

peake and Ohio, which he extended on the west to Memphis and on the east to Newport News, which he founded as a salt-water terminus.

A group of Boston financiers in control of the Atchinson, Topeka and Santa Fe now threatened the flank at Needles. The Santa Fe, unexpectedly prosperous from cattle shipping diverted from Denver's Kansas Pacific, had threatened the well-being of Denver. Businessmen and miners of that area thereupon began to build the Denver and Rio Grande across the mountains into New Mexico, intending to extend it to El Paso and Mexico City. The Santa Fe refused to be headed off and continued building southwest. A race ensued for con-

The
Santa Fe



trol of Raton Pass, the most feasible northeastern entry to New Mexico; the Santa Fe won. But presently the D. & R. G. in an armed clash called the "Rio Grande War" or the "Canyon War" (1879) seized entry to the rich Leadville mining district.

The Denver and Rio Grande, though significant in Colorado's development, remained a local road until 1927, when the Moffat Tunnel gave it a direct line westward under the Rockies and made it part of the Missouri Pacific's transcontinental line. The Santa Fe after its victory at Raton Pass built rapidly westward, only to find Huntington seizing the Needles crossing. Then, to make the defeat complete, it was found that Gould and the Pacific Associates had managed to acquire the Santa Fe's basic charter. The Santa Fe entered California, but as a prisoner of the Southern Pacific.

Huntington's worries included a desperate battle in the North to preserve his control of the Oregon gateway. Among the charters authorized

by Congress was one for a Northern Pacific Railroad, intended to reach Puget Sound. Strange as it may seem, the charter went begging, though it offered 44 million acres of land. Finally in 1869 Jay Cooke, flushed with success and dinero from his financiering of the Civil War, took on the charter largely as a generous effort to make his friends rich. In typical Jay Cooke style the venture was launched with lyrical paeans in praise of the Great Northwest. "There is nothing on the American continent equal to it. Such timber—such soil—such orchards—such fish—such climate—such coal—such harbors—such rivers."

Jay Cooke
and the
Northern
Pacific

Since the line of the proposed railroad and its chosen lands were shaped like a banana and were lauded as such a tropical paradise, they naturally came to be known as "Jay Cooke's Banana Belt." Cooke even managed to get Congress to raise the ante almost out of sight; then he sent agents to Europe to drum for immigrants while he (with the normal financial abuses) thrust his line out into the wilderness from Duluth. Then, just as the road reached Bismarck, North Dakota, on the Missouri River, Jay Cooke went bankrupt. The Northern Pacific did not hold up for long.

One of Cooke's European drummers was a German emigré named Henry Villard (1835–1900), who as correspondent for the New York *Staats-Zeitung* had reported the Lincoln-Douglas debates, was a personal friend of Lincoln, and began the first collection of Lincoln stories. In 1866 Villard had married Helen Garrison, daughter of the Nemesis of the South, who became a renowned reformer in her own right. After some experience as a railroad receiver he went into business for himself. Attracted by the Oregon country, he went there in 1879 and for \$100,000 picked up an option on a Columbia River steamship line, incorporated the option, watered the stock generously, sold some of it, and paid for the line with the proceeds. He went on from there, adding other steamships and some railroads.

Villard and
the North-
ern Pacific

Fearing that the Northern Pacific (now again on the march) would divert traffic to Seattle, he blocked the mountain passes while he proceeded to buy into it. When his money ran out he formed the so-called "Blind Pool" to raise money for an object so secret that he did not dare to disclose it, and such was the confidence of those who knew him that before he was through he had raised \$20 million. With this money he gained control of the Northern Pacific and in 1883 was able to complete the line over the mountains and join it to his Oregon properties. Soon afterward he lost control through bad management; and though he returned in 1888 with the backing of German capital, he was forced out in 1893.

During his maneuvers Villard had managed to antagonize not only Huntington and Gould (whose Central and Union Pacific empires adjoined

his) but, more to the point, the House of Morgan, which had marketed a big bond issue of Northern Pacific and was backing the Hill and the Great Northern under that outstanding railroad man James J. Hill (1838–1916). Born in Ontario, Hill arrived in St. Paul in 1856 and became a steamboat and railroad agent engaged in trade down the Mississippi and into Canada. When in 1873 Dutch bondholders of the decrepit little St. Paul and Pacific Railroad appeared to investigate their property, Hill quietly fed their despondency. Soon afterward with the help of Canadian capital Hill acquired the road and set it on its feet. It was connected with Winnipeg; then, as the Great Northern, it ran through North Dakota and Montana, across the Rockies and Cascades, and finally in 1893 to Puget Sound. This feat, performed in less than twenty years, was all the more remarkable in that it was largely accomplished without government aid.

Hill's work illustrated the driving power of the man, his insistence upon a knowledge of details, and his lucidity of thought and expression. He selected areas which were sure to yield revenues and extended his railroad into them, building economically but not shoddily, as did so many others. His management was careful, and, though he was ready to charge all the traffic would bear both on his railroads and on his auxiliary lake steamships, he was not willing to kill the goose that laid the golden egg. He knew that the Northern Pacific was overcapitalized, and his fear was that in case it collapsed its receivers would force a destructive rate war. The Panic of 1893 precipitated the crisis, and Hill, though he was enjoined from gaining complete control, acquired enough personal interest in the Northern Pacific to enable him to direct its policies and save it from ruin. The Northern Plains and the Pacific Northwest not unnaturally became known as the "Hill Country."

The Western railroads had been chartered and aided by Congress not to give fortunes to deserving entrepreneurs but to provide an impetus for the opening-up and development of the West. This they accomplished handsomely despite the abuses. After the Union Pacific and Central Pacific crowds took such cynical advantage of their mortgage money, Congress preferred to subsidize further building by land grants only. Though its grants were generous, it should be remembered that the government price on arable land was only \$1.25 an acre, and in any case only eight per cent of the total railroad mileage of the country received government aid.

About 134 million acres of the public domain, out of a total of around 1400 million acres, were acquired by the railroads—and, of course, some were of doubtful value even for grazing. At any rate, the "Pacific" roads greatly stimulated the upbuilding of the West. Though the roads fell behind in the interest payments on their mortgages and at times seemed

about to repudiate them, they came through in the end with sums which made it amply worth the government's while to enter the mortgage business.

3 *Reorganizing the Railroad System*

Western railroads were not alone in building uneconomic feeder lines and ruinously competitive roads. Gould was an adept at blackmailing a well-established road by building a shoddy competing line which the former would have to purchase at Gould's price. However, he did not always succeed. Up the west bank of the Hudson he had built the West Shore Road, announced as going through to Buffalo and designed to blackmail W. H. Vanderbilt. The latter refused to bite, and the West Shore went bankrupt and then fell into the hands of the Pennsylvania, the New York Central's most formidable competitor. Vanderbilt retaliated by laying out the South Pennsylvania Railroad from Reading to Pittsburgh, whose steel masters welcomed the prospect of relief from the Pennsylvania's near-monopoly.

Morgan, who saw his New York Central interests jeopardized by the situation, summoned the contestants to a conference aboard the *Corsair* in the summer of 1885 and laid down the law. The West Shore went to the New York Central, and the South Pennsylvania was abandoned; its road-bed and its tunnels through the Appalachian Mountains now are used by the Pennsylvania Turnpike, the nation's first long, nonstop, four-lane superhighway. Meanwhile the coal operators of the anthracite fields of northeastern Pennsylvania, chiefly under the control of the various local railroads, were cutting each other's throats. Morgan, then engaged in reorganizing the Reading Railroad, imposed peace, limited coal output, and raised prices. Two years later the Baltimore and Ohio, victim of the ruthless bookkeeping of the Garret family, had to be refinanced. In both cases Morgan failed to retain control, and the railroads promptly went back to their bad habits.

By 1887 railroad capitalization had become so inflated that revenues were insufficient to pay reasonable dividends. Protests came on one hand from investors and on the other from small shippers, particularly farmers and merchants, who were feeling the pinch of outrageous freight rates. One result was the passage of the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, intended to forbid rebates and limit rates. In January 1889, Morgan called a meeting of the presidents of the major roads and tried to get them to agree to stop cutting rates and building competitive roads. They agreed—though they did not fail to point out that the abuses rose in part because investment bankers were ready and anxious to provide the money. Morgan hedged in his

**Bickering
and lurid
financing**

**Deteriora-
tion of
railroad
situation**


answer, for he obviously could not control wreckers like Gould and wild financiers like Villard. As one president said at one of Morgan's meetings, as gentlemen he respected every man there, but as a railroad executive he would not trust him with his watch.

At any rate, the situation continued to deteriorate until the Panic of 1893 knocked the bottom out of railroad financing. In two years one quarter of the railroad capitalization of the country passed into the hands of receivers; this comprised almost 200 roads with 40,000 miles of track. Among the railroads which went under before the crisis ended were the Reading, the Erie, the Baltimore and Ohio, the Santa Fe, the Union Pacific, the Northern Pacific, and a whole complex of Southern roads. It was typical of the time that railroaders refused to blame their own wild policies but cast the onus on the poor, impotent Interstate Commerce Act!


Morgan had seen his work go to pot in the cases of the Reading and the B. & O. and did not propose to be taken in again. This time he insisted upon retaining control. The network of bankrupt railroads in the South Morgan's was reorganized into the new Southern System, which com-
reorgani- manded the area of the old Confederacy east of the Missis-
zations sippi. This ascendancy did not last long, for competing systems soon sprang up, amalgamated under the names Atlantic Coast Line and Seaboard Air Line. Morgan passed on to the reorganization of the Erie, the Reading, and other Eastern lines and backed Jim Hill in rehabilitating the Northern Pacific and the B. & O. Added to Morgan's existing influence over the New York Central and the Pennsylvania, and Hill's control of the Great Northern, the Morgan-Hill alliance now controlled something under half of the railroad mileage of the country and more than half of the earnings.

The Morgan-Hill empire did not stand alone very long. When Gould died in 1892 he was possessed of the Wabash, the Missouri Pacific, and the Union Pacific. His intention had been that his son, George Gould, would
Edward H. operate this empire, but George proved unequal to the task.
Harriman The first mortgage of \$70 million, which the Union Pacific
(1848- owed the government, was to fall due in 1899 and there was
1909) no chance that the railroad could anywhere near meet it.
The railroad, indeed, was contemptuously described by its builder as "two dirt-ballasted streaks of rust." But a certain small, nervous man, well-hidden behind spectacles and a huge mustache, thought that he could make it pay. He was a rather obscure Wall Streeter, already middle-aged, named Edward H. Harriman. He had won his spurs as an efficient administrator of the Illinois Central Railroad and now that he had reached his "fiery forties" was possessed of a desperate urge to become a railroad imperialist. Putting up the Illinois Central as guarantor, he made an alliance with the Rockefeller interests and the investment bankers Kuhn,


PENNSYLVANIA SYSTEM, 1914




NEW YORK CENTRAL SYSTEM, 1914



JAMES J. HILL SYSTEM, 1914



HARRIMAN SYSTEM, 1912



Union Pacific (Center and North)
Southern Pacific (South)
Los Angeles, San Pedro, and Salt Lake

Loeb and Co., which enabled him to buy control of the Union Pacific. To the surprise of everyone he promptly took it out of the red.

He then went on to acquire a favorable alliance with the Santa Fe and, on Huntington's death, bought the Southern Pacific and the Central Pacific. When the younger Gould stood in his way with a project for a trans-continental road, Harriman ruthlessly tore into the rickety empire set up by the Wolf of Wall Street and appropriated such parts as he coveted. George Gould managed to retain (for a while) the Missouri Pacific and its links with San Francisco and Chesapeake Bay. However, Harriman's opposition, poor administration, and a ruinously expensive fight with the Pennsylvania over entry to Pittsburgh finally sapped the strength of the empire and led to its alienation. As for Harriman, though he pridefully did right by the Illinois Central and the Union Pacific, his record in many other cases was no better than that of Jay Gould.

Now Harriman's empire impinged, in the Columbia River and northern Rocky Mountain areas, on the Hill Country. A crisis broke in 1901, when Harriman discovered that Hill had been buying into the Chicago, The Burlington and Quincy Railroad. This system comprised a heavy network in Illinois, Iowa, Missouri, and westward to Denver; while it could not exactly block either Hill or Harriman from access to Chicago, it would form a useful source of revenue and a weapon against the other by whichever one controlled it. Harriman boldly retaliated by buying Northern Pacific stock and, between himself and the Hill-Morgan forces, drove the price up until it hit \$1000 a share. No more was to be had, for each had bought more than a majority; numbers of "short" speculators who had sold for future delivery, hoping meanwhile to pick up shares cheaply, were on the brink of ruin. Morgan was in Europe, but Hill and Harriman agreed to compromise. Actually Morgan could have ousted Harriman by redeeming the preferred stock, which comprised most of his purchases, but Morgan still thought in terms of community interest.

The result was that the contestants jointly formed the Northern Securities Company, capitalized at \$400 million, to hold the Northern Pacific, the Great Northern, and the C. B. & Q. The outstanding quarrels with the Union Pacific were settled amicably by a division of territory. This arrangement was in the eyes of President Theodore Roosevelt a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and he ordered suit begun. In 1904 the Supreme Court ordered the Northern Securities Company dissolved and provided that its shareholders receive equal parts of Northern Pacific and Great Northern stock. Harriman, who still owned a majority of Northern Pacific's stock and desired to control the road, petitioned against this partition on the ground that it was illegal since it left actual control unchanged. He lost and, selling his

northern railroads stock at a tremendous profit, retired from the field.

Harriman now turned to the East with the Union Pacific's profits and bought into the New York Central and the Erie and obtained a controlling interest in the B. & O. This last, joined to the Union Pacific by his Illinois Central and other lines, meant that he literally bestrode the nation. His lines, second only to Morgan's, spread like the strands of a web into every section except New England and the northern Plains. He was laying plans to acquire the Trans-Siberian Railroad and certain European railroads in order to weld together a round-the-world railroad when, in September 1909, he died. Harriman was the last of the railroad giants; since then railroad systems have been held by banks and family trusts in which no single person rises very far above the ruck. Even the Van Swearingen brothers of the fevered 1920's were scarcely more than momentary meteorites.

The advocates of community of interest had believed that railroad combination under banker control would cure the ills which afflicted the business. Probably it did do something to reduce competitive waste, but even the best of bankers could not always avoid a tempting opportunity to make a killing. Nor did combination always provide speed, safety, prompt and impartial services, efficient terminal facilities, or passenger comfort and convenience. Indeed, American railroads were falling behind those of Europe, even those operated by governments. That the public was aware of the situation is shown by the continued pressure on Congress for remedial legislation.

This pressure largely took the form of opposition to combinations. Both Morgan and Harriman were bucking public opinion, but Harriman as the more dramatic "collector of railroads" bore the somewhat exaggerated reputation of personifying everything evil in Wall Street. The basic trouble, of course, lay in the fact that railroads were natural monopolies (at least before the plane and the auto), and wholehearted competition was impossible (in all but a few cases) without destructive abuse. That every effort was made to force railroads to compete came about simply because people believed in the universality of the rule that competition is the life of trade. Since then public opinion has come to see that railroads are natural monopolies and has approved of carefully regulated combinations. But the damage had been done. The demand for competition had invited the waste of capital in over-expansion, promoted destructive rate wars, bred wreckers and bloodsuckers, and forced expensive reorganizations. The financial burden was too much for the railroads to bear. Even now, forty years later, they have not recovered the strength to withstand the competition of new methods of transportation, nor is it likely that they will in the foreseeable future.

**Harriman
the co-
lossus**

**Combina-
tion no
panacea**

**Lessons
learned—
too late**

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Chapter XXXIV

THE ROAD TO MASS PRODUCTION

1 *The Scientist and the Inventor*

THE United States has frequently been called the most European of all nations because its citizens are descended from all European peoples. It is no less fair to speak of the United States as economically and technologically the culmination of European evolution. Europeans do not relish the idea, yet it seems that America's resources and freedom from tradition have enabled it to short-cut European economic and technological evolution and produce (as though born out of time) a society much like what the European future would have become. The impact of American mass production upon the world has been tremendous and will receive careful examination as we go on. Here we are concerned with (1) its scientific and engineering bases, and (2) its development by managers, engineers, and salesmen. Later on we shall take up its interrelationship with the corporation, the typical and apparently inevitable form of business in the modern world regardless of whether an economy is capitalist, socialist, or totalitarian.

U.S.
short-cuts
European
evolution

The United States made relatively few contributions to pure science before World War I, but it was in the front rank in the development of practical applications of science and in making engineering refinements. Even in these fields, while it may have had primacy, it was by no means dominant; nor for that matter was any single nation. Advancement was the product of international inter-change of information; the so-called "inventions" were mostly the culmination of successive evolutionary changes made by a series of contributors. Indeed, the developments in mathematics, physics, chemistry, and metallurgy were so essential to each other that in their applications they could only move abreast. True, the United States did make unique contri-

Scientific
interde-
pendence

butions to industry, but these, as we shall see, were overwhelmingly in the fields of management, marketing, and sometimes engineering.

American industry (given the human and scientific requisites) was certain to prosper because water power, coal, petroleum, wood, ores, and the silicates proper for glass and ceramics were present in such abundance.


Bases of modern industry Of these petroleum was for a time all but an American monopoly. The significance of petroleum derivatives in lubrication and heating is obvious. They drive internal-combustion engines, and as such power automobiles, airplanes, locomotives, motorships, and stationary engines. Coal and water power built a tremendous electrical industry which revolutionized lighting, the power basis of industry, urban transport, communication both by wire and wireless, refrigeration, air compression, and the extractive industries.

The chemical industries, based partially on coal-tar and petroleum derivatives but drawing heavily on mineral and agricultural resources, revolutionized medicine and food preservation, introduced plastics, developed soil science, found new uses for rubber, founded a new entertainment industry, and seared the face of Mother Earth with explosives. In so far as the technological aspects of living are concerned, George Washington would have been more at home in ancient Egypt than in an American city of 1920.

Before the Civil War, Bessemer and Kelly had been working separately on their process for converting pig iron into "mild" steel, but in the end it was found necessary to combine certain features of their two methods. Their mild steel was found to be useful for rails, **Steel** structural beams, and plates; and the process was adopted by the iron manufacturers of the Pittsburgh area in the 1870's. The process was not suited to the use of iron ore with a high phosphorous content, and within twenty years it therefore began to give way to the open-hearth or Siemens-Martin process, developed in Europe. By 1900 Lake Superior ores had displaced local ores in western Pennsylvania and spread the steel industry to eastern Ohio and the Chicago area. Ore is brought to the Lakes ports in special ore boats and shipped to inland points. For the most part it is cheaper to carry the ore to the coal, though in some places the mill is located on the lake shore and coal and ore meet there.

Fully as significant as the development of mild steel has been the development of alloys. Mild steel is usually regarded as an alloy of iron and carbon, but most alloys are combinations of metals. Chemical advance and

Alloys the use of the electrolytic process gave the metallurgist many new metals to work with, and microscopic study of crystalline structure and the development of testing machinery made it possible for him to develop such useful alloys as high-speed tool steels and stainless steel.



The lightest, strongest, and most useful of all the alloys are based upon aluminum, the commonest metal in the earth's crust. It had long been known as a rare metal, but in 1886 Charles Martin Hall learned how to extract it cheaply by electrolysis. Out of this process grew the giant Aluminum Company of America ("Alcoa"), which has diligently sought and found new uses for the metal and has made it well-nigh indispensable. Some aluminum alloys are stronger than steel and weigh one third as much; the alloy with magnesium has become vital in the construction of planes.

The basic development in the electrical industry was the dynamo. Principal forerunners were Joseph Henry and Michael Faraday, and various experiments with generators led at last to Edison's designs for commercially practical dynamos to furnish electric lights for Lower New York City. Thomas Alva Edison was the son of a Canadian rebel of 1837 who had fled to the United States. The Edison family, established in Michigan, was prosperous, and the boy did not lack for opportunities, but he was described as "addled." Nevertheless, he early developed a passion for reading, began to perform simple experiments in chemistry, and while still a boy built up a prosperous enterprise as a train "butcher" selling magazines and candy.

Thomas A. Edison
(1847–1931)

At sixteen Edison became a wandering telegrapher and presently began to make little labor-saving improvements in telegraphy—chiefly to give himself more time for study. A series of inventions along electrical lines brought him little recognition and less money until 1870, when a successful sale enabled him to set up an "invention factory" and gather about him a group of young men who were to become famous engineers and inventors.

In 1876 he moved to Menlo Park, New Jersey and in 1887 to West Orange, where he carried on his work during the remainder of a long and fruitful life.

Between 1870 and 1880 Edison contributed improvements to the telegraph and the telephone, invented the phonograph, and developed the dynamo and the incandescent electric lamp from earlier experiments by others. Actually he made his most brilliant successes during those years. His later life was devoted to refining and promoting his earlier inventions, efforts in which he had the help of a large and competent staff. He possessed the ability to envision practical uses for his own and others' developments and launched them upon the market under his own name, a perfectly legal process which, however, sometimes deprived other men of proper recognition. Thus he has been erroneously credited with the *invention* of the electric dynamo and motor, the incandescent lamp, and the moving picture.

His contributions

Edison sought to make society the beneficiary of his work but realistically saw that it must be done through commercial channels. Invention, as he quite frankly said, must put commercial feasibility ahead of human values. This was not because he wanted money, for he was quite uninterested in it except as it provided the means for his one impassioned activity: research. Indeed, he seems to have been peculiarly devoid of the common emotions such as jealousy, love, hatred, and fear. He possessed unusual powers of concentration (his deafness was actually helpful), the capacity for taking vast pains, and the ability to inspire those who worked with him. There his genius stopped; indeed, it conformed to his own definition that "genius is two per cent inspiration and ninety-eight per cent perspiration."

The Edison myth

The Wizard of Menlo Park was the creation of the popular imagination which in a crudely formative age was awed by the seeming miracles which he wrought. He worked chiefly by trial-and-error and possessed a vast contempt for the orderly scientific and mathematical processes which could have spared him much of his labor. Actually he made only one significant scientific contribution—the so-called "Edison effect," which he set aside as curious but unimportant and which was to become the basis of the revolutionary vacuum tube.

The first successful electric lighting system was the arc light, developed by Charles F. Brush from a Russian experiment. The Brush system was installed in San Francisco in 1879, and during the next year in Wabash, Indiana and on lower Broadway in New York City. The arc light was widely employed for a generation but eventually gave way to Edison's incandescent lamp. In 1882 Edison opened the Pearl Street Station of the Edison Electric Illuminating Com-

Rise of the electrical industry

pany, the first central power plant in the United States for a commercial system of incandescent lighting; his Holborn Station in London was opened a few months earlier. The steam-driven generators and practically all of the equipment were of Edison's own design. Edison used and remained stubbornly loyal to direct current through the "Battle of the Currents" with the advocates of alternating current.

Strong champions of the latter were George Westinghouse (1846-1914) and William Stanley (1858-1916). Westinghouse, a young machinery manufacturer of Pittsburgh, had patented the air brake for use on railroad cars and had successfully solved the technical problems in the distribution of natural gas. Westinghouse and Stanley now acquired the American rights to the transformer and launched the Westinghouse Electric and Manufacturing Company, which successfully installed lighting systems using alternating current. The greatest Westinghouse triumph was the building of the giant generators installed in 1895 at Niagara Falls, which first made hydroelectric power available on a large scale. The General Electric Company, formed in 1892 by the union of Edison and other interests, transmitted this power. It was General Electric that in 1897 acquired the steam turbine, the invention of Charles G. Curtis. An indispensable co-worker on the theoretical side was the hunchbacked little German genius Charles P. Steinmetz.

Numerous electrical experimenters had seen the immense possibilities in the use of the electric dynamo as a motor, but it was a Croatian immigrant, Nikola Tesla, who contributed the most to perfecting it. Frank J. Sprague had already begun to apply it to practical labor, adapting it to the elevator, to driving machinery, and finally in 1888 putting it into successful operation in trolley cars in Richmond, Virginia. The change-over of urban horsecars to electricity was all but completed in the 1890's, and by 1895 General Electric was offering to the railroads the first electric locomotive.

During the next decade there was placed on the market a locomotive which was capable of generating its own electricity by means of an internal-combustion engine. In 1897 the electric motor was successfully adapted to the elevated lines of Chicago, and in the same year to the Boston subway, the first in America. The electric interurban netted much of the Northeast part of the country between 1897 and 1917 with 18,000 miles of lines, which seemed to promise solution of the rural problem of rapid transit. The rise of the automobile, however, wiped out the interurban except in congested areas.

By 1870 the demonstrations of Helmholtz showing that sounds were produced by vibrations and carried by air waves had led to the idea that the vibrations of the human voice could be carried over wires by electrical

The telephone impulse and be reconstructed at the other end as sound waves. Among those interested were Elisha Gray (1835–1901), an electrical inventor established near Chicago, and Alexander Graham Bell (1847–1922), a Scotchman who had settled in Boston as a teacher of the deaf. Bell, though relatively inexpert in science, was apparently the first to hit upon the solution to the problem of how to vary the intensity of an electrical current and thus translate sound waves into electrical impulses. On 14 February 1876 he applied for a patent; two or three hours later Gray applied for a caveat, or warning that his invention was well under way.

Actually Bell's first intelligible message was not transmitted until 10 March, three days after he had been granted a patent. A bitter legal battle began and was further complicated by the entry of Western Union as a telephone competitor, and by the invention by Edison and others of transmitters and other parts superior to Bell's own developments. Up to 1900 Bell and his backers had to contest about 600 cases. Nevertheless, the telephone proved to be an enormous money maker, for its success was almost instantaneous. Within ten years the worst mechanical bugs had been removed, the boy operators (who had not hesitated to cuss out the customers) were displaced by the "hello girls," and intercity communication was expanding. New York and Chicago were linked in 1892, but efforts to talk across the continent were not satisfactory until 1915.

The Bell interests were incorporated in 1885 in New York as the American Telephone and Telegraph Company. A.T.&T. was so magnificently administered, first by Gardiner G. Hubbard, one of the original "A.T.&T." patentees, and later by such men as Theodore N. Vail, that it was able to maintain its start even after the expiration of its patents. One unalterable policy was that equipment could only be leased; thus, though independent companies sprang up, they were unable to maintain their freedom but were usually brought under more or less complete control of the Bell interests. The Western Electric Company, A.T.&T.'s research and manufacturing subsidiary, was, wryly enough, the creation of Elisha Gray. Telephone engineering had become unbelievably complicated; its adaptation to teletype, transmission of radio programs, and its change-over to the dial system are but illustrations of the problems which have been met and surmounted.

Marconi's application of the discoveries of Maxwell and Hertz resulted in the development of wireless telegraphy, which entered the commercial field under British financial auspices. While it was still in the experimental stage it attracted numerous other inventors, among them Lee De Forest (b. 1873), an Iowa lad who was to become "the father of radio," and Reginald A. Fessenden (1866–1932), a University of Pittsburgh professor. With the aid of Er-

Rise of radio

nest F. W. Alexanderson (b. 1878) of General Electric, Fessenden built an alternator capable of transmitting over electromagnetic (radio) waves at a frequency of 50,000 cycles per second. The result was that on Christmas eve, 1906 wireless-telegraph operators off the Massachusetts coast were amazed to hear human voices coming from their earphones, and presently a violin solo. At almost this moment the discovery of crystal radio detectors made it possible for the radio "ham" to enter the scene.

The Alexanderson alternator revolutionized radio transmission and threatened the control of the air waves, which had been gained by the British companies. But an even more fundamental revolution was already under way. The "Edison effect" had piqued the curiosity of a number of investigators who step by step led, by 1907, to De Forest's three-electrode thermionic valve—the audion tube. A few years later Irving Langmuir and Bion J. Arnold raised the vacuum in the tube and presented to the world an instrument destined to lay the foundations of the entirely new science of electronics.

Refrigeration, now closely allied to the electrical industry, had been an American interest from colonial days; the export of New England ice to the tropics was a thriving business long before the Civil War. In 1869 a Chicago meat packer made an experiment with shipping dressed beef in freight cars refrigerated by ice. The method was successful, and within a few years the packers were operating refrigerator cars, icing stations, and cold-storage warehouses. Small slaughterhouses could not compete, even locally, and presently (for this and other reasons) began to decrease in number.

Refrigeration

Before long refrigerating equipment was installed on ocean steamers, and it was possible to transport dressed meats, butter, eggs, vegetables, and fruits to any desired port. Australia and New Zealand (as well as Chicago) became sources of supply of meats to Europe. Perishable tropical fruits began to appear in American markets, and by 1899 the United Fruit Company had organized to grow bananas in the Caribbean countries and by 1904 was transporting them to the United States on the specially constructed Great White Fleet.

These results were not all accomplished with ice. The principles of mechanical refrigeration had long been known, and ice-making had begun as early as 1846. During the 1870's mechanically chilled air began to supplant ice and presently came into favor with the meat packers. The application of electrical power to refrigeration has made storage and shipping more efficient, and in the household it has all but displaced the icebox. Quick freezing is growing rapidly in importance and has made it possible to place cleaned and fully prepared (even cooked) foods at the disposal of the housewife.

Electrical refrigeration

Not only has refrigeration revolutionized the processing of foods and

altered the national diet, but it seems to be on the verge of air-conditioning the American home. Already it has become indispensable in theaters, and in factories and offices where an even temperature is important to the manufacturing process or to the comfort of the workers. The preservation of foods in glass and in tin-coated metal containers was introduced from Europe early in the nineteenth century, but the canning industry did not boom until the Civil War. Since that time research has made great strides and done its share to spread the American table with out-of-season fruits and vegetables.

The petroleum industry, begun in 1859, had by the close of the Civil War revolutionized machinery lubrication and street and household illumination. Kerosene, at first supposed to be petroleum's most important derivative, became the stock in trade of the mushrooming "oil trust" but soon had a rival in the natural gas usually found near the petroleum. Manufactured gas had long been used to light London, Paris, and New York. As early as 1824 a natural gas "spring" was furnishing street lights in Fredonia, New York, and natural gas found occasional use in towns and factories during the next generation. In the late 1870's it found large-scale use in Pittsburgh and was set on its financial and technological feet by George Westinghouse. The "Gas Belt" from Sandusky to Indianapolis gave a sudden impetus to manufacturers in that region, but the incredible wastage led to quick depletion.

For a generation gas was regarded as a nuisance by oil drillers, and it was a common practice to set fire to it and let it burn. Even in cities it was cheaper to let street lights burn all day than to hire a man to turn them off, and when factories shut down on Saturdays they relieved the gas pressure by burning it at standpipes. Gaslight, a great improvement over kerosene, gradually gave way before electricity, though gas is still widely used for household cooking and heating and in manufacturing and chemical industries. Strangely enough, the efficient Welsbach mantle was not developed until 1885, when electricity had begun to displace gas.

Petroleum's most startling effect was wrought in the field of transportation by the application of gasoline, the derivative for which Silliman had found no use. Indeed, its effect was so great that only recently has the cheaper derivative, fuel oil, begun to find wide use with the increasing use of Diesel engines. Of course, the automobile might have developed without gasoline; as early as 1865 steam-driven buggies had become such a nuisance on English roads that Parliament passed a law that when self-driven vehicles used the highways a man carrying a red flag must walk before them. This effectually discouraged English inventors; at any rate, it was a series of Germans who developed the internal-combustion engine, driven first by gas and then by gasoline. German and French inventors worked to such good purpose that by 1894 the French Panhard car possessed most of the features that

**Kerosene
and natu-
ral gas**

**The auto-
mobile**

are now so familiar. The indispensable pneumatic tire was a Scottish invention, first widely used on the bicycle.

The gasoline automobile was thus a European development. However, a number of Americans, quite unknown to each other, were stimulated to experiment by news of the first crude German efforts and were advancing on parallel lines. A mechanically inclined patent attorney named George B. Selden improved the internal-combustion engine of George B. Brayton and in 1879 drew plans for a vehicle; he did not, however, take out a patent until 1895.

**Develop-
ment in
the United
States**

Meanwhile, the brothers Charles E. and Frank Duryea of Springfield, Massachusetts actually produced a car in 1893 and in 1896 made their first sale. Other men bearing once famous names had been at work—Maxim, Haynes, Winton, Apperson—as well as some whose names are still seen on every highway: Ford, Buick, Olds.

Michigan and Ohio had long been the center of the wagon-building industry, and in addition Detroit had been manufacturing gasoline-driven marine engines. Now certain Detroit citizens induced Ransom E. Olds to move his nascent automobile manufactory from Lansing to Detroit: his prosperity made Detroit capital motor-minded at a time when Easterners were definitely bearish. The result was that Detroit became the motor capital of the country; and in 1904, when there were 131 companies making cars, many of them were in the Detroit area. The mortality among companies during the next thirty years was high. In the end three giants emerged: the Ford Motor Company, a billion-dollar personal empire that will be considered later; General Motors Corporation, created by the organizing and promoting genius of William C. Durant, who after a series of spectacular financial coups lost control to Morgan and the Du Ponts of Delaware; and the Chrysler Corporation, headed by Walter Chrysler with the backing of Dillon, Reed and Company of Wall Street.

Petroleum was remaking the nation and, indeed, the world. Not the least of its effects was the realization of man's age-old dream of directed flight. True, Frenchmen had risen in a balloon as early as 1783, and the next year, by amazing luck, a Frenchman and an American had flown across the English Channel. Thereafter balloon ascensions increased in number, and by 1900 a county fair was scarcely complete without its balloonist and parachute jumper.

**Lighter-
than-air
flight**

As early as 1851 a Frenchman named Henri Giffard propelled a balloon with a steam engine. Presently the gasoline engine was successfully used for power, and in 1878 a powered balloon built by one Caesar Spiegler made a flight at Lancaster, Pennsylvania. In 1901 Brazilian Santos-Dumont won a prize by successfully completing a course which included a flight around the Eiffel Tower. The next step was the rigid *Zeppelins* used in World War I and the *Shenandoah* of tragic fame. Meanwhile a series of daring men were trying out grotesque variations of the glider and slowly

learning about air currents and equilibrium. Among these was an elderly American engineer named Octave Chanute, who designed a five-planed glider which carried him a thousand feet.

Samuel Langley, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, spent many years and \$50,000 of Federal money in studying flight and building a powered biplane. Though his mechanically propelled models had flown successfully, the large "aerodrome" failed in two tests in 1903 (8 October and 8 December), possibly more because of defects in the launching apparatus than from any defect in design. Meanwhile two brothers, young bicycle mechanics of Dayton, Ohio, Wilbur Wright (1867-1912) and Orville (1871-1948), had educated themselves in engineering and begun a painstaking study of aerodynamics. After successful experiments with gliders they shipped a powered biplane to Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. There, on 17 December 1903, nine days after Langley's last failure, Orville successfully flew the plane for 59 seconds.

Longer flights followed during the next two years, and in 1906 the Wrights took out a patent. Nevertheless the newspapers, disgusted by the failure of so learned a savant as Langley, refused to pay much attention to the Wrights, who saw their hopes of financing themselves through the sale of machines fade away. However, European governments were interested and opened negotiations for patent rights; the conservative Army Signal Corps finally broke down and in 1909 received its first plane.

Meanwhile other young men, in the United States and abroad, had been experimenting. One of the most successful of these was Glenn H. Curtiss, who captured a number of prizes, constructed hydroplanes and flying boats, and set up aviation training schools. There was a period of bitter litigation between Curtiss and the Wrights, but eventually the two interests were merged (1929) in the Curtiss-Wright Corporation. Another pioneer was Glenn L. Martin, who was associated with the Wrights briefly but presently set up his own company in Cleveland (later Baltimore).

Since commercial aviation was as yet out of the question, plane manufacturers sent young men out on exhibition tours. The death rate among these reckless youngsters was appalling, but it was such "barnstormers" who popularized flying. World War I wrought a sudden revolution. An industry that had not yet built 200 planes was suddenly ordered to produce 29,000; by turning to the automobile industry for the Liberty Twelve motor, it had actually by the armistice reached a production rate of 17,000 per annum.

While petroleum and electricity were reshaping the modern world, the chemical industries were by no means behind. As early as 1856 an English chemist had opened up the new world of coal-tar derivatives; as a result

the coking industry was revolutionized. Petroleum chemistry presently revealed another related world. Meanwhile the brilliant mathematician-physicist Josiah Willard Gibbs of Yale had laid in 1876 the basis for physical chemistry, out of which has come the vast array of synthetics loosely known as plastics. Thus new uses were found for cotton, wood, cornstalks, soybeans, and numerous other vegetable products. Chemistry has also proved of enormous value in restoring and enriching the soil, while its contributions to medicine have been incalculable. The chemical industry has found bases in the pine forests of the South, the saline pools of Michigan, the sulphur of Louisiana, the gas and petroleum of Texas, the coal of Pennsylvania, and the vast Du Pont manufactories of explosives and synthetic textiles in Delaware.

**Chemical
industries**

The moving-picture industry had its rise partially from the genius of Edison. Edison had made his first phonograph in 1877, but it was not until a decade later that it occurred to him that it would be more interesting and useful if combined with a moving picture. He never accomplished his object with marketable success, but in the search he helped to improve the silent motion picture. A number of inventors had been working on the principle of "persistence of vision"—the lingering of a visual impression upon the retina of the eye—but Edison now contributed a sprocket control and a device for moving the film. Basic to the "kinetoscope," as he called his machine, was the roll film, invented by Hannibal W. Goodwin and marketed by the Ansco Company and the Eastman Kodak Company.

**Develop-
ment of
the motion
picture**

In 1894 the Kinetoscope Parlor opened on Broadway as a sort of glorified peep show. The next year some exhibitors built a machine to project the image on a screen and managed to convince Edison of its value. Moving pictures soon became adjuncts of vaudeville shows, and in 1903 *The Great Train Robbery* introduced the story sequence. Meanwhile the first motion-picture theater was opened in 1902 in Los Angeles, and the next year the Warner Brothers opened one in Newcastle, Pennsylvania. In 1905 Harry Davis and John P. Harris opened in McKeesport, a suburb of Pittsburgh, the first continuously showing movie theater, the "nickelodeon." That the new medium met a public desire for escape was shown by the popularity of "Bijou Dream" as a name for motion-picture houses.

The idea swept the country, and soon the new industry had drawn to itself, as exhibitors, producers, or exchange men, a number of names which were to become famous: Warner, Zukor, Loew, Laemmle, Fox, Goldwyn, Mayer. The easy money to be made on a shoestring investment had naturally attracted to the production end a mob of business cutthroats, who presently were somewhat tamed by Edison's organization in 1908 of the Motion Picture Patents Company, which included all the important producers. A rebellion of the exchange

**Business
takes over**

men against the monopoly had no sooner been quelled than one broke out among the exhibitors, who proceeded to enter production with bootlegged Edison cameras or imported European machines. Adolph Zukor organized Famous Players and began imitating the French feature-length pictures. Zukor's first full-length feature was *The Prisoner of Zenda*, issued in 1912. The Patents Company refused to change its policies and presently faded. One result of the warfare was that the independents took refuge in Hollywood, a suburb of Los Angeles, where behind high wooden fences they could ward off the process servers and the goons of the Edison company and, if need be, dash across the Mexican border.

Early picture production was in the hands of Edison's Edwin S. Porter, a young man who knew all about poverty and frustration. Impressed by French leadership in camera technique and story telling, Porter in 1903 made the one-reel dramatizations *The Great Train Robbery* and *The Life of an American Fireman*. His early pictures leaned heavily on subjects with social significance which were close to the lives of their working-class clientele. Motion pictures not only cut heavily into attendance at churches and legitimate theaters but frightened conservatives by their subject matter. The result was the first censorship movement, which forced them to lay more stress on entertainment value.

If the American motion picture had any father in an artistic sense it was David Wark Griffith. A Kentuckian of aristocratic lineage and flat purse, Griffith moved from playwriting and acting into the cinema. Griffith relentlessly led the evolution of camera techniques and story material, often against the bitter opposition of his employers, the Biograph Company. About 1909 he had been using a Canadian child-actress named Gladys Smith in ingenue parts, billing her as "Little Mary." Presently the foxy independent producer Carl Laemmle found that audiences were asking for more "Little Mary" pictures, and he enticed Gladys Smith into his fold and advertised her as Mary Pickford. This was the virtual beginning of the star system. Griffith welcomed the multiple-reel feature pictures and began to make them. As a result he presently split with Biograph and moved to Hollywood.

There Griffith made the first motion-picture spectacle, *The Birth of a Nation* (1915). He may not have intended it, but the picture was a bitterly anti-Negro preachment of the Civil War and reconstruction periods. It lifted the plebeian "fillum" into the realm of high-class entertainment, played in legitimate theaters, and was the first motion picture shown in the White House. It "typed" actors and confirmed the star system. Its social effect was tremendous, for it led

to rioting between races and in the end to the recrudescence of the Ku Klux Klan. Woodrow Wilson—a Southerner—spoke of it as “like writing history with lightning.”

Even more, the picture began the long reign of motion-picture kings and queens. Henry B. Walthall, its hero, became the pattern of young men. Lillian Gish, its heroine, brought in the slim feminine figure which has ever since remained the American ideal. A quality of mistiness about her was apostrophized as playing “behind a veil of silver chiffon,” and she was immortalized in and as Joseph Hergesheimer’s *Cytherea*, and in James Branch Cabell’s *Jurgen* as Queen Helen, “the delight of gods and men.” Griffith’s amazement at the recriminations brought by *The Birth of a Nation* tempered his later efforts but did not abate his moral preachments, which he continued to offer behind a façade of pageantry. The wild 1920’s put an end to Griffith’s vogue, and he spent the last twenty years of his life living obscurely in a hotel in the Hollywood which he had done most to create.

The tempo of American business communication had been stepped up by the telegraph and the telephone, and the printing telegraph had made its entrance as early as 1867 in the form of the stock ticker. During the generation after the Civil War bookkeeping was revolutionized by the evolution of adding and calculating machines from European forerunners. The cash register provided a check upon careless and dishonest clerks. The typewriter copied correspondence and accounts legibly and made as many copies as were desired. The typewriter was an evolution, but the first commercially successful machine was patented in 1868 by Christopher L. Sholes and his associates. Soon afterward the Remington gun company began to manufacture in quantity “this curiosity-breeding little joker,” as Mark Twain called it. His *Tom Sawyer* in 1875 was the first book manuscript to be presented in typescript. During the next decade the Hollerith system of compiling, recording, and tabulating was introduced.

**Business
tempo**

Businessmen, it would seem, were conservatives, for none of these innovations were readily accepted. It was objected that they destroyed the homely touch of personal service, roused suspicions of rascality by their slickness, cost outrageously, and frequently broke down. It was true that they needed further perfection, and indeed they are still being improved, but by 1900 they had become necessities in up-to-date business offices.

With them had entered the stenographer-typist, trained in newly-established “business colleges.” The employment of women was by no means new, but business machines opened new vistas of accomplishment to them. The effect of these machines (and others too numerous to mention) was to divide office labor efficiently, open the way to specialization,

and provide constant checks on production and sales, despite the reduction in office personnel. The speed-up in outside production and distribution was finding its parallel in the office.

This recital of inventions could go on indefinitely with mention of the linotype, which made cheap typesetting at last possible; of the half-tone process, which enabled the reproduction of photographs; of the monotype and new methods of engraving, which made possible books and magazines of a physical excellence never before attained in such quantities. Out of these also arose the first serious attempts at advertising, a business which was to boom after World War I. Wire had taken on a new significance with its use in telegraph, submarine cables, telephones, and barbed-wire fences; it now found a use in the great twisted cables which the Roebling family used in throwing the Brooklyn suspension bridge across from Manhattan to Long Island (1883).

Other inventions

The flood of patent applications was the wonder of the world; from 25,000 in the 1850's it jumped to 220,000 in the 1890's—some obviously of foreign origin. More to the point, the individual inventor in his attic or cellar was beginning to fade out, and the corporation hireling was taking his place. Few inventors can now afford to be thorough individualists; they work for more economically successful individuals or corporations. Obviously their labors are more fruitful when they work in teams, and regardless of the value they receive are more useful to society.

2 *The Manager and the Machine*

Effective mass production developed first in the United States because it was promoted by a combination of fundamental and peculiar characteristics which around 1900 existed there and nowhere else. First was American receptivity to new methods, promoted by liberal patent laws, the early application of laboratory tests and research, and by the fact that no restriction on new processes had been laid down by guilds, labor unions, or hereditary social or economic castes. Second was the intelligence and know-how of American workmen who had been familiar with tools from boyhood—often power-driven tools, at that. Third, the scarcity of labor promoted the invention of labor-saving devices. This meant that power was applied to manufacturing processes wherever possible, that machinery and parts were standardized, that American products were pre-eminently machine-made, and that the bulk of our manufactures made small changes—as in meat packing, flour milling, lumbering, dairying, and oil refining. Fourth was the vast store of natural resources easily and cheaply available to entrepreneurs. Fifth, and as vital as any of the above, was the vast expanding domestic

Factors that bred mass production

MAJOR IRRIGATION AND POWER DAMS

1 CHEROKEE
2 DOUGLAS
3 WATERVILLE
4 CALDERWOOD
5 CHEOAH
6 FONTANA
7 SANTEE
8 NANTAHALA

J. W. CLEMENT CO. BUFFALO, N. Y.

- # MAJOR IRRIGATION AND POWER DAMS
-
- 1 CHEROKEE
2 DOUGLAS
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- J. W. CLEMENT CO. BUFFALO, N. Y.

market, unvexed by internal inspection or customs barriers. Lastly was a unique contribution possible (at the moment) only in America: this lay in the American genius for teamwork, on the part of both management and labor, for out of these rose the triumph of mass production.

We have seen how the evolution toward mass production had gotten well under way before the Civil War. The gunmakers of the Connecticut Valley had introduced the interchangeable part, designed elaborate machine tools, and applied power to machinery. These applications had spread throughout the country, and the demands of the Civil War had accelerated their application. As soon as machine tools began to pour out nuts, bolts, nails, wire, and gadgets, the early stages of mass production were really under way. Efficient methods and laboratory tests were introduced. Bill Jones never hesitated to discard even a good machine for a better one, and Carnegie used to open his board meetings with the query, "Well, what machines shall we throw away this time?"

Oliver Evans had long since developed his process of automatic milling, but apparently it was not the first example of continuous automatic production, for as early as 1617 an English traveler saw the principle at work in a Spanish mint. Probably as early as 1835 Cincinnati meat packers were using the belt conveyor, and in the 1870's the Chicago meat packers introduced an overhead conveyor which carried carcasses along a "disassembly" line. In the 1890's freight-car trucks were hauled along a track while workmen on scaffolds alongside completed the superstructures. Actually the assembly line was not new. As early as the fifteenth century Venetian shipbuilders had floated their hulks down narrow canals while workmen stationed in windows en route completed the ship.

These preliminaries, though doubtless each of them was carefully thought out, were basically no more than common sense. There remained the fourth step: scientific management. The leader in this advance was Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856-1915), a Philadelphia engineer who in

Frederick W. Taylor: scientific manage- ment	1893 set himself up as an engineering consultant with "Systematizing Shop Management and Manufacturing Costs a Specialty." Taylor believed that by planning and routing work through the factory and by job and time studies he could set up reasonable and efficient production standards.
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The slide rule, the stop watch, photography, and Taylor's own development of high-speed tool steel were essential parts of the research of the new school. He was well aware that workmen "soldiered" on the job, and he laid it to the existing antagonism between worker and manager. He hoped to allay this growing antagonism and at the same time increase production by advocating a wage system based on the "differentiated piece rate," which would stimulate and reward the efficient workers and would intro-

duce a new spirit of co-operation—essentially the extension of democracy to industry.

Taylor and the enthusiastic associates who quickly gathered about him saw the industrial problem not only in terms of machines and efficiency but also in terms of human relations. High wages, high standards of safety, and good working conditions entered into their calculations, and they were even aware of the effect of the social conditions in the community upon the job. At first business, rolling luxuriously in profits, hesitated to adopt Taylor's ideas, and they actually found a warmer reception in Europe. By the time his book was published, in 1911, profits had come down and entrepreneurs

Gradual
adoption
of Taylori-
zation



From "Life," 1913

Efficiency Crank: "Young man, are you aware that you employed fifteen unnecessary motions in delivering that kiss?"

The efficient method is not always the socially desirable method.

were ready to try anything which would reduce costs. Possibly this came about at least in part through the closing of the frontier and the growing realization that easily adaptable materials were no longer to be had for the taking; probably other factors such as overcapitalization and the demands of labor were also present. Unfortunately management refused at first to adopt Taylor's well-rounded plans but accepted only the aspects which immediately cut costs and raised production. The adoption of the remainder has come about partly by enlightened management, partly by legislative and labor-union pressure.

The logical outcome of "Taylorization" was the assembly line, and it was only natural that it should first reach perfection in the automobile

industry, then the least enslaved by tradition. The man who inspired this revolutionary change was Henry Ford, a Michigan farm-boy machinist who had become an Edison power-company engineer. As early as 1893 Ford began to construct a car out of odds and ends, and when it actually worked he resolved to make cars for the market. After two heartbreaking false starts the Ford Motor Company finally got under way in 1903. The company had been financed only with difficulty, and competition was brisk, but business was excellent, at least partly because Barney Oldfield, recently a bicycle racer, began a long automobile racing career by driving a Ford to a walk-away victory over Winton.

During the first summer the new venture, financed with \$28,000 in cash and notes, cleared \$36,000; in the depression year of 1907 it made a million. Much of this was due to Ford's own courage. At this time motor-car makers were forced to pay royalties to the Electric Vehicle Company of Connecticut, a concern which had acquired Selden's patent and which was owned by W. C. Whitney, the Wall Street plunger. Ford refused point-blank to pay and after eight years of litigation broke the motor monopoly (1911). However, fifteen years of association had laid the groundwork of the cross-licensing system which has kept the automobile industry relatively free from patent conflicts.

During the early years automobiles were largely luxuries which could be afforded only by the well-to-do, and manufacturers accepted the fact of a limited market and added to the price as much as they dared under the highly competitive conditions. Mass-production methods were used in the production of American cars from the first, and in 1906 Cadillac mechanics in London amazed British manufacturers by assembling three cars from piles of parts and then putting them through track tests with perfect scores. Henry M. Leland was the genius behind this demonstration, but it was only the beginning of what was to come.

Ford now resolved to mass-produce a good light car which would be cheap enough to tap the rural and middle-class market. Economies were made in design and fuel consumption, vanadium steel was utilized, and production was limited to one type of engine and chassis. Even the bodies were strictly utilitarian, and no aberrations were permitted; a current joke had it that the customer could have any color he wanted so long as it was black. This was the famous Model T, which was first produced in 1909 and with slight changes remained in production until 1927. All together about 15 million copies of Model T were sold, half the cars on American roads, while the price descended from \$850 at the beginning to \$290 in 1924.

In 1914 Ford wrought two revolutions: the introduction of the conveyor-belt assembly line and the institution of the five-dollar-a-day wage. More than this, he resolved to pour practically all of the profits into expansion, and when the minority stockholders objected he won independence by buying them out. Meanwhile he bought ore and coal mines, ore boats and a railroad, put up blast furnaces and steel mills, and acquired parts factories. By 1927 he had set up a new center for his vast empire at River Rouge, where endless conveyor belts carried the slowly growing cars before lines of automatons, each devoted to his minute task and nothing else. Ford's crisis came in the primary postwar depression of 1920-21, when he was financially overextended and General Motors, backed by Wall Street capital, was fighting for the market. Ford could have obtained relief by surrendering to the bankers, but he refused. Gathering up all available parts, he put together 125,000 cars and shipped them to his dealers, in effect forcing them to furnish emergency finances. The Ford Empire was saved.

Ford was tall and thin, with the eyes of a zealot and the persistence of a leech. His leaping imagination was that of an empire builder, but—and this is the secret of empire building—it was strictly limited by the practical and conformed to the ideals of the people who were to compose the empire. All his life Ford sought to strengthen in the American people the Calvinist virtues of caution, self-assurance, thrift, and deference to success. Provincial in speech and manner, ignorant of everything save mechanics ("I don't like to read books; they muss up my mind"), utterly unable to compose or deliver a speech, Ford was a man of action rather than thought. He seldom pondered abstract matters for long and apparently reached his decisions by intuitive jumps. A self-made man and in the beginning something of a populist, he despised the *rentier* who lived on "unearned" profits, and he never learned from the past ("History is bunk") beyond catching a nostalgia for old pewter and square dancing. To him beauty lay solely in utility, and esthetics was no more than harlotry.

The incredible Ford

He domineered over his executives, sweated his employees and spied on them, all but ruined his distributors and parts contractors, sowed racial bigotry and unrealistic pacificism with equal conviction and naïvety, was a fanatical faddist on food, tobacco, and alcohol, and quite innocently disavowed any inclination to do-goodism which did not also bring a profit in dollars and cents. Hard-souled, stubborn, efficient, wrapped up in his work, suspicious of amusements, reverencing accomplishment and power, indifferent to the fate of individuals, determined to have social and economic progress but to make it pay its own way, Ford was simply the typical American raised to the *nth*

His methods

power. And the American people awarded him a faith in his capacity for industrial statesmanship and in his dictum that "machinery is the new messiah" that was not shaken until the Great Depression. Such were the characteristics of the people whom he found, the characteristics which despite himself he was to alter so profoundly. He lived to see the result of his work and to die disillusioned, bitter, and uncomprehending.

Henry Ford's engineers in their search for means of speeding up production and lowering costs had adopted some of Taylor's principles and had laid out their departments and machines in such a way as to feed parts efficiently to the central assembling area; in the latter area specialization was already under way, as certain workmen were assigned to gangs which performed certain functions in the assembling. This led to a greater demand for parts, and experiments were begun in specializing parts production and assembly. Gravity slides between benches helped to hasten the work, but presently the engineers began to apply the overhead-conveyor principle already in use by the Chicago meat packers. The result was that sub-assembled parts were fed to the assembly area so fast that chaos threatened.

The desperate engineers then devised an endless-chain or belt conveyor which carried the chassis past lines of workmen, each of whom performed a carefully planned and limited function in assembling the car. The introduction of the automatic conveyor (January 1914) was the final step in the evolution of assembly-line mass production. Within three months Ford workmen were assembling a Model T in ninety-three minutes; on 31 October 1925 they turned out a car for each ten seconds of the working day.

Ford thus expressed his method:

- (1) Centralized management;
- (2) Control of raw materials by the manufacturer;
- (3) Specialized tools and machinery without regard to initial cost;
- (4) Subdivision and specialization of labor;
- (5) Motion study and efficient shop management;
- (6) High wages and short hours, but no tolerance of shop rules or trade-union demands that might curtail production;
- (7) Abolition of red tape and ritual.

This is the technique properly called mass production. Anything less falls short by so much of true mass production until at some undetermined point it becomes merely large-scale production, which, as in most European industries, makes up in weight of hours and man power and individual skill for its lack of the mass-production technique.

In practice mass production means that the shaping of every part must be reduced to its simplest terms—so simple that it can be performed by an automatic machine or by a machine operated (in most cases) by a

worker who at best is semiskilled. Ford estimated in 1922 that of his jobs eighty-five per cent required less than a month of training, while forty-five per cent took only one day. Drucker thus describes the preparations for mass production of planes in World War II.*

**Reduction
to simplest
terms**

First came the design—not of machines but of the plane as an assembly of identical and interchangeable parts. Then came the analysis of each part as a problem in mass production, as something that is being produced in a sequence of elementary and basic operations, performable fast and accurately by an unskilled or semi-skilled worker. Next came the task of merging the production of each part into a plant producing the whole—a task involving three distinct problems of organization: one of people working as members of a team to a common end, one of technical processes, one of materials-flow. Finally came the job of training thousands of new workers and hundreds of new supervisors many of whom had never seen the inside of a plant before. On those four pillars, design of the final product as a composite of interchangeable parts, design of the production of each part as a series of simple, repetitive operations, design of a plant to integrate human labour, machines and materials into one whole, and training in skills and in team-work, rested every achievement of our war production. Whenever, because of ignorance or urgency, the attempt was made to slight one of these four tasks of organization—and the temptation to do so was great as each of them is time-consuming and can be speeded only with difficulty—the result was failure to produce.

Thus it is not enough to put the principles of centralization into operation. Once established they must be continually kept up to date. Successful mass production calls for continual alertness and study by management; a willingness to change methods and machinery frequently; a large and, if possible, growing marketing area; and the co-operation of labor. European industries which have tried to adopt mass-production techniques have almost invariably failed at one of these points; they are unwilling to replace a new machine by a better one, they sweat their labor, or they do not possess a large enough market to absorb their product.

**Mass pro-
duction a
continuing
process**

Henry Ford violated some of his own canons and paid a severe penalty. His relations with labor were bad (after the first few years), and his boasted high wages turned out to be shams inasmuch as they either were not paid as claimed or were earned by an unmerciful speed-up of the production line. Even more serious, perhaps, the Model T was practically frozen for nineteen years, and the Ford organization did not develop the knack of retooling for a new

**Ford fails
in flexi-
bility**

* Peter Drucker, *Big Business* (1947), 24–25; also issued as *Concept of the Corporation* (1946). Copyright by The John Day Company and used by permission.

model without seriously interrupting production. The result was that by 1927 Chevrolet had passed Ford in sales. The Model T was so outdated that it had to be dropped, and the vast thousands of Ford workers were thrown on public charity for more than a year while the factory retooled.

The mass-production technique had passed beyond the ken of its greatest genius and had become devoted to flexibility of method and product, more organizational than technical. It was this fact which made possible the production miracles of World War II. There was a limit beyond which even the mass-production process could not be profitably subdivided. For example, Ford stubbornly handicapped himself by insisting upon too many special-purpose machine tools; General Motors found it better to use more general-purpose tools, which would not have to be scrapped with every change of model.

The mass producer brings his materials in either raw or finished form from all over the country at calculated intervals; to build up too great a stock would tie up capital and perhaps wipe out the thin margin of profit.

Supply and marketing In effect he makes lumber camps, mines, glass, paint, fabric, and tire factories, and railroads and steamship lines a part of his assembly line. Just as revolutionary are the marketing concepts of mass production. Basically it is not brought on by demand but creates its own market. Said Ford: "Mass production begins, then, in the conception of a public need *of which the public may not as yet be conscious* and proceeds on the principle that use-convenience must be matched by price-convenience. . . . Mass production precedes mass consumption and makes it possible, by reducing costs and thus producing greater use-convenience and price-convenience."

Thus, with every reduction in cost a new market is tapped among people in the next lower income stratum. Mass-production industries are easily affected by changes in economic conditions, for it is possible to make a snug profit at ninety per cent of full production but to lose heavily at sixty per cent. The result is that there is a limit to which mass production can be applied with social profit. One way in which industries sought to overcome this situation was to open new markets by wooing new buyers with advertising. The serious overproduction of the 1920's led to an astounding development of this "art."

Mass production is popularly identified with the assembly line. Actually that is the final stage of only one type. Behind it lies the production line in which each part, for example a crankshaft, is machined by a succession of workers, each performing a separate operation. Then comes the sub-assembly line in which the parts are fitted together to form, for example, an engine. The sub-assembly lines then feed their products at proper intervals to the assembly line on which the automobile, the reaper, or the refrigerator gradually

Types of mass production

takes final form. But the assembly line is *not* an essential feature of all mass production, as will be recognized by anyone familiar with those automatic "ribbon" production-line industries such as paper making, strip steel milling, and incandescent lamp manufacture, which are automatic in a way that automobile manufacture can never be. Oliver Evans's automatic flour mill of 1783 was as authentic a form of mass production as Ford's assembly line. Then, of course, there are mass-production industries in which hand work still necessarily plays a large part—as the garment-making industry. It may be technically possible to invent machines which by certain alterations with wrench and screw driver can be used to make automatically a variety of articles, but it is difficult to conceive of machines that can make garments without human intervention.

It might be well to interject a word of caution here. The mass-production technique has *not* taken over all of American industry—nor can it. We have seen how the Model T created a market which it could not hold against the Chevrolet and Plymouth with their greater power and luxury and more graceful lines. In the same way mass production has called forth tastes and needs that we never knew we had, while rising income enables us to gratify them. The demand for specialty, luxury, and custom-made goods is rising. By far the most of our industrial establishments are still on a small scale. In 1939 only 176 industrial establishments—about one tenth of one per cent of the total—employed more than 2500 workers; forty per cent employed five or less. Out of 8 million industrial fabricators thirty per cent worked in factories which employed 100 or less, and only twenty-five per cent worked in factories which employed 100 or more.

Limits of
mass pro-
duction

Nevertheless, the American standard of living depends basically on cheap raw materials and on the mass-production technique. Ford's ego-mania led him to disclaim "any dependence on scientific management." His engineers knew better. Ford might claim the credit for the development of mass production, but actually he was merely the latest and greatest of a long line of contributors which included such names as Evans, Whitney, North, Blanchard, Colt, Edison, Sprague, and Taylor—not to mention Ford's own men: Couzens, Flanders, Knudsen, Emde, Klann, Avery, and above all the brutal, blustering, brilliant "Great Dane," Charles E. Sorensen. Ford's publicity machine was geared to give him all honor, so it was natural that before long public and industrialists alike were acclaiming him as the father of mass production. The world listened with respect when he proclaimed that "Machinery is the new messiah" and had faith in his glowing picture of a new and better material world. In Europe mass production became known both as "rationalization" (from its reasoned, scientific orderliness) and Fordism.

Ford's
place in
mass pro-
duction

Nevertheless, it was the genius of Ford as an engineer and manager which lay behind the triumph of the mass-production technique. The effect upon the United States can best be illustrated by brief reference to the automobile. Its first effect was industrial, for competitors were forced to ape Ford's methods, and the technique presently leaped to other fields. The entire emphasis of the economy was shifted, and the American standard of living shot upward. The automobile industry gives direct and indirect employment to six million workers and is an enormous consumer of steel, nickel, lead, alloys, plate glass, fabrics, and plastics. It put Texas and Oklahoma on the map of prosperity with its booming demand for gasoline and oil. Its rubber purchases raised Malaysia to enviable prosperity—until Japanese conquerors and synthetic rubber came along.

The automobile industry speeded up the marketing of farm products, accelerated the turnover of goods, and hastened business procedures. It lifted the country out of the mud by a stupendous roadbuilding program—in 1950 there were about 3.6 million miles of improved roads and streets for the use of almost 50 million vehicles. It has remade the political, social, and psychological outlook of the country by telescoping rural distances, spreading out the cities, affording a cheap and easy means for shifting population, has changed leisure habits, popularized the "touring" vacation, and integrated the nation as never before.

On the other hand the country's railroad system, already ailing from financial abuse, was reduced to bankruptcy by the competition of trucks, buses, and passenger automobiles. The automobile has encouraged foot-looseness and irresponsibility, inculcated the bad habit of installment buying, has weakened family ties, and has taken a million lives and maimed many more. The taste it gave of luxurious living whetted the American appetite for more and gave an impetus to the propaganda for the welfare state. When the coo of the political turtle dove was heard over the radio, the citizen was ready to listen. In the nineteenth century it was Daniel Webster who had taught the sovereignty of the nation over the state; in the twentieth century it was Henry Ford, the cantankerous and individualistic populist of Dearborn.

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Chapter XXXV

THE COMMONER IN TOWN AND COUNTRY

1 *The Melting Pot*

IN EVERY generation since 1830 the United States has been confronted by the task of educating and indoctrinating in democracy a new horde of strangers. It is also true that we have had an equally difficult task of adapting ourselves to the rush of material and cultural change—some of it brought by the immigrant—and of learning to live with the problems we could not solve. Post-bellum America was a melting pot of nationalities, cultures, and prejudices, into which went not only the newly-arrived immigrants but the native American as well. The American as a rule objected fervently to the melting process and, as we shall see, built up a most interesting insulation of rationalizations and prejudices, but in the end there emerged a new and perhaps in some ways a better nation.

The half-century after the Civil War saw the most tremendous folk movement in history, excepting perhaps the present Russian movement into Siberia. During that time a total of nearly 25 million immigrants came to the United States, by far the most of them to stay; during six separate years after 1900 over a million a year entered the country. In 1870 one person in seven was foreign-born, in 1920 one person in nine; though the number of foreign-born residents had more than doubled, the population of the country had jumped about 280 per cent—from 38 million to 106 million. In 1890 the foreign-born in New York-Brooklyn were two fifths of the population; in Philadelphia one fourth; in Boston one third. At one time New York City boasted (whether or not correctly) that it had more Italians than any


city except Rome; more Irish than any city except Dublin; more Germans than any city except Berlin; more Greeks than any city except Athens; and more Jews than any other city in the world. At the base of the Statue of Liberty, Bartholdi's heroic bronze of "Liberty Enlightening the World," contributed by the people of France and placed on Bedloe's Island in New York Harbor in 1886, were placed these lines by Emma Lazarus:

. . . Give me your tired, your poor,
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free,
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore.
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me;
I lift my lamp beside the golden door.

One of the most striking things about this immigration was the change in its sources. In the decade of the 1860's almost nine tenths came from Northern and Western Europe; in the decade of World War I about six tenths were coming from Southern and Eastern Europe. **Change in origins of immigrants** That is, immigrants were no longer the easily assimilable elements whose culture and political institutions were much like those of the United States, but the quite different Latins and Slavs. Irish and Germans had naturally been rather clannish, but now Little Italies, Little Warsaws, and Jewish "ghettos" became features of all big cities. Europe was not the only source of supply; the Near East sent Syrian and Armenian peddlers and rug merchants; China and Japan sent laborers to the fields of Hawaii and the Pacific Coast; Canada's French descended upon the New England textile towns; and by the end of the period Cubans were moving into the South and Mexicans into California.

Why this apparently endless flood? Immigrants came, of course, to get work, but even before the Civil War industrialists in their search for cheap and docile labor had advertised in Europe. After the war the steel and coal interests discovered that Italians and Slavs were more tractable than Irishmen and imported them into their areas. The result was considerable racial jealousy—which **Why they came** too often suited the purposes of entrepreneurs. Steamship lines in search of fares, and states and railroad companies in search of purchasers for their lands, portrayed the United States as a Western Utopia, and many immigrants, delighted by their high wages helped to swell the paean so perceptibly that postal authorities in Europe began censoring their letters.

Hard times may have stimulated the movement, but it is quite evident that the reasons lay more in the American invitation and in the immigrant's hope of betterment. There were, however, the additional incentives of escape from military service and from political or religious persecution. Political refugees, especially from the Slavic lands, were sifting into America all the time. The principal religious refugees were Jews, also from



the Slavic lands. Hitherto Jewish immigrants had come from the Sephardim, or Mediterranean and Spanish Jews from Western Europe. The Ashkenazim of Middle and Eastern Europe were for a while represented only by South German Jews, but the pogrom of Polish Jews in 1881 began an exodus to America which assumed the size of a folk movement.

The greater tendency of the "new immigration" to be clannish rose naturally from its relative difficulty in learning American ways and from the hostility of English-speaking natives and immigrants. The "old immigration" persisted in the pattern set before the Civil War: Where they went the Irish settled in the cities, Germans in the cities and the rural areas of the upper Mississippi, Scandinavians in the woods and wheatlands of the North, and English and Scots quietly sank into American life wherever it suited them without leaving much trace. The Jews almost invariably preferred the cities, particularly New York, where about 1.5 million of them stayed, one half the American total and one eighth of world Jewry. They found employment largely in New York's sweatshops, but also as pushcart peddlers, merchants, and finally factory operators and financiers—not to mention an unusual proportion in the medical, legal, and learned professions. Italians settled largely in mining and industrial centers as laborers, barbers, shoe cobblers, stone masons, and building contractors; many of them, as soon as they won a stake, bought up run-down farms in the surrounding areas and became truck farmers and dairymen.

Many Czechs went to the West, probably attracted more by *cheap*

land than by the free land somewhat speciously offered by the Homestead Act. Slavs in general became miners and laborers, then rose to mechanics or went on the farm. Portuguese went into the fisheries in New England and on the Pacific Coast. Levantines operated restaurants and fruit stores, were pack peddlers or rug merchants.

Chinese, after a long and discouraging effort against native opposition to get a foothold in lumbering, mining, fisheries, and agriculture, gave up and went into hand-laundry work, merchandising, or small manufactures, usually in urban areas called Chinatowns. The Japanese at first refused to be segregated and sought to compete with natives on all fronts, but were gradually pushed into the occupations of gardeners, truck farmers, and merchants. Three immigration movements that were little noted amid the clash of incoming Europeans were the passing of numerous French-Canadians to the mill towns of New England, of English-speaking Canadians into American professions and industries, and of Mexicans finding a precarious living in the border states as herdsmen or seasonal workers in fields, orchards, and canneries.

American natives, especially laborers, have never been disposed to welcome newcomers without reservation. The opposition to Germans and Scotch-Irish was sometimes violent during the colonial period, and later on the flood of Irish and Germans which began after 1830 was regarded as a menace to political institutions and the standard of living. Opposition increased as the "new immigration" swelled. It was asserted that Latins, Slavs, and Jews were weak stocks, given to disease and crime. Instances in which European judges gave criminals the choice of "prison or a ticket to America" were cited as evidence that the United States was becoming the cesspool of Europe. The "new immigration" was declared to be politically unassimilable and therefore not wanted; on the other hand, nativists criticized those who did not come to stay and become citizens but only to win a stake and return to the old country, and represented their remittances to Europe as exploiting and draining our resources. Nativism found vent in the East (as it had before the Civil War) in anti-Catholic movements, particularly the American Protective Association—the "A.P.A."—which exercised considerable influence in the 1890's. Agitation against Chinese and Japanese will be outlined in a later chapter.

There is no denying that the "new immigration" has greatly affected American history since 1865. There can be no doubt that it slowed down cultural unification and development and encouraged political corruption in urban centers, though political corruption certainly existed in rural communities in which few foreigners lived. Probably the labor-union movement was retarded by the antipathy between natives and foreign-born. It would be unfair to blame all urban shortcomings on foreigners, yet it is true that it took three gen-

Nativism

**Effects
of immi-
gration**

erations for most of the "new immigration" to become acclimated to American life, and in the meanwhile there were serious maladjustments which encouraged delinquency and crime.

On the other hand, immigrants contributed in labor more than they received in wages. Individuals contributed largely to every field of professional and political life, as must have become evident as we have called the roll of great names. Even in the early years the "new immigration" was prominent in the professions; note in science the names of Tesla and Pupin, in journalism of Pulitzer, and in music an all but complete monopoly of opera singers and orchestra conductors. It is evident now that Latins, Slavs, and French-Canadians make as good Americans as the older elements, while Jews and Italians have so frequently beaten Americans at the typically American game of competition that they have been accused of not playing fair—a common rationalization when anyone loses.

The inundation of immigrants served to multiply the number of political pressure groups, of which the Germans and the Irish were before World War I the most powerful. The Irish, indeed, showed a genius for the small change of politics which goes to make up the bank accounts of the national parties, and Irish political bosses became familiar phenomena. The Irish were by tradition Democrats, and when they took over the political direction of New England (under the suzerainty of the "spendthrift trusts") the antipathetic French-Canadians of the mill towns flocked into Republican ranks. Unfortunately there was a tendency to make Irishness a profession and to measure all things in foreign policy by how much they would damage Britain. There is evidence that it was the professional Irish of Boston who dictated Henry Cabot Lodge's opposition to the League of Nations and so may possibly have changed world history.

Germans, whether or not they or their fathers were refugees, were notably loyal to German culture, and during the World Wars this loyalty was too often translated into support of the German cause and so became a ticklish problem for politicians. An alliance of Germans and Scandinavians actually forced Illinois and Wisconsin to permit public schools to teach in the language of the immigrant settlement in which they were located. The use of the immigrant pressure group to force American policy to favor their interests or those of the nation from which they had come had been well systematized by World War I and was sometimes invoked by home governments. Its real power was shown later on when the Irish-Americans practically forced the British to permit the setting up of Eire; when Germans plumped for the cancellation of World War I reparations; and when the Latin and Slavic nations fought the imposition of the quota system on immigration unsuccessfully, but accepted loans instead. The crowning example came when American Jews were able to force the



*J. N. Darling (Ding). Copyright, New York Herald Tribune, Inc.
No European Entanglements*

Executive to adopt an anti-British and anti-Arab policy during the Palestine crisis of 1948.

Americans expect each man to look out for himself; immigrants, especially the "new immigrants," found this obligation difficult because the new milieu was so strange and the language so different. They had built up a dream portrait of America which could not possibly be true, and those who found themselves trapped in a city sweatshop or pounding the pavements in search of jobs blamed America rather than their own gullibility. Such people were loath to admit that what they had found was at least an improvement over rule by lords and cossacks.

Maladjustments

On the other hand, America was by no means blameless. Immigrants needed to be patient, industrious, and thrifty, for their right to work at reasonable wages and under reasonable conditions was so frequently violated by selfish employers that they sometimes became cynical about

American tolerance and goodwill. Even the law frequently lifted a prejudiced hand against them at the behest of the employers. To make matters worse, there developed in every immigrant element human bloodsuckers who preyed upon their more ignorant fellows, using every wile to deceive and exploit them. The Federal government made a few regulations to govern immigration and imposed a few health and literacy tests, but there was no attempt at selection on the other side of the Atlantic, and Ellis Island, the principal immigrant receiving station, was slackly run by political appointees.

Worst of all, there was no official Federal attempt to help the immigrant to become adjusted, once he was in. Settlement houses and schools undertook special programs to teach American customs and institutions and the English language; but "Americanization" was, as observers have pointed out, merely benevolent nativism. The aim was to get the immigrant to slough off his old character in a hurry and take on the American character. Naturally this was resented by the foreign-born, who, like as not, regarded their own culture as superior to American. More tragic was the situation of the second generation, which often despised its parents and their culture without yet understanding American culture and institutions. The result was the deliberate destruction of much in immigrant culture which would have enriched the pattern of American life.

The United States of the 1870's was overwhelmingly rural. Three fourths of the people lived on farms or in towns of less than 2500; in 1920 the honors were to be evenly divided. In 1870 the rural population was growing in the West and South, but declining in East and
 Rural decline Midwest even though states in that area grew. Parts of New England dropped alarmingly during the postwar generation, though they were to begin a recovery with the rise after 1900 of dairying, truck farming, and the coming of immigrant farmers, small industries, and the summer boarder.

The lure of the city was over the land, felt most by ambitious youngsters and by farm wives who were tired of the isolation of the farm and coveted educational and cultural opportunities for their children. The young often struck out for themselves directly to the cities, but the pattern of family movement was more likely to be from farm to village, from village to town, and from town to city. The movement was so general in some areas that alarmists feared that the farms would be depopulated. A not unnatural result was the growth of a "town and country mouse" literature which laid horrendous stress on the pitfalls and evils of the cities and sought to scare rural youths into staying at home on the farm or in the village. There is ample evidence that it had little effect.

This was also the great day of the country town. Sometimes it boasted a railroad station, at which the citizenry could gather at the proper times

to watch the trains come in; or there might be a river with an occasional packet boat or with coal flats or lumber rafts. If there were neither, it did not matter much, for the country town had a life of its own. Its dusty streets were infested with boys and dogs and lined with farmers waiting for their womenfolk to finish shopping in the fascinating disarray of the general stores. Its livery stables were redolent of ammonia, and its blacksmith shops with the odor of coal smoke and burning hoofs. A wooden Indian stood in front of the cigar store, and a wooden horse displayed shining brass and gleaming leather before the harness shop. Its steepled church rang with shouting Methodist revivals. Then there was its rickety old frame school, where one learned the Three R's, did surreptitious courting, and attended box socials. Near by was the old swimming hole, and no farther than a hayride away were the barns where rollicking barn dances were held.


The coun-
try town

All these were to be remembered with nostalgia by the generation of Americans which rose to power in the business, political, and intellectual realms between the Civil War and our own day. That world is gone now, routed by the automobile, the radio, and the movie, and there is scarcely a man with gray at the temples who does not feel that something fine, unhurried, and neighborly has gone out with it. On the other hand, the cult of respectability was more powerful in the town than in the city. In the latter a man might choose his associates and escape or ignore the censure of others; in the town everyone knew everybody else, and if community opinion was a powerful rein on personal behavior, the residents supported each other against strangers and gave help in time of need.

But the day of the city was upon us. By 1920 about 51 per cent of the population of the country lived in towns of more than 2500. In 1870 only five cities had held more than 200,000 people; by 1920 there were thirty-three. New York City had jumped to 5.5 millions. In 1880 New York had boasted of being the only city of more than a million; in 1890 Chicago and Philadelphia had passed the mark. Such growth was bound to bring physical and psychological confusion, whether the people came from the American countryside or from European cities and farms. The country was static, individualist, and agrarian; it kept order by social pressure. The city was dynamic, collectivist, and industrialist; it kept order by legal and police pressure—if it kept order.

City
problems

Cities were actually growing faster than the development of the technology needed to solve their problems, and the situation was made worse by the inability of planners to see more than a generation ahead. Traffic congestion, water famines, fire hazards, sanitary failures, and the growth of slums were well-nigh inevitable. The new problems posed by cities would have daunted civic leaders determined to solve them; as it was,



the guidance fell into the hands of men who saw improvements primarily as a means of lining their own pockets and those of their friends. As we have seen, these were not solely the politicians, for businessmen were determined to acquire the special privileges needed to consolidate their power and build their fortunes and were callously ready to promote civic corruption to win their end.

Problems were solved slowly and expensively. Cobbles, bricks, wood, macadam were tried for paving before it was found that concrete and asphalt were best. Horsecars, cable cars, and elevated steam trains were tried, but in the end electric cars came into use and in the 1890's took over streets, subways, and elevateds. The motor bus became common about the time of World War I, and the electric bus has come in since. The development of rapid transit at last gave cities the chance to spread out and enabled those who could afford it to live in airy suburbs; conversely it led to the concentration of business districts and the development of the skyscraper.

Gas street lights were replaced by electric arc or filament lights after

1880. Water purification was begun in the 1880's, but curiously enough it was one of the improvements most vigorously fought by the old-fashioned and the tight-fisted. Sewers were originally open drains into which garbage and dead animals were dumped. Storm and refuse sewers finally came in, and garbage was collected and dumped at sea, burned, or fed to hogs; the last practice, unfortunately, is not yet obsolete. Fire departments had long been organized on a volunteer basis and were matters of community pride and rivalry. The great fire of 1872 in Boston, but particularly that of 1871 in Chicago, which all but wiped out the city, stimulated the organization of paid fire departments. Nevertheless, the matchwood nature of American building materials still gives us about the highest rate of fire destruction in any Western nation.

The movement of great segments of city population to the suburbs did not solve the problem of the underpaid and sporadically employed pool of cheap labor in the congested slums. In these areas huge tenement walk-ups of half a dozen stories, with small rooms, narrow shafts for light and air, and utterly disgraceful water and sanitary facilities were crowded with hundreds of families, sometimes one or more families to a room. Fire, filth, disease, and vice were inevitable accompaniments of such conditions. Criminals found refuge in such dark warrens, as did organized gangs which terrorized peaceful citizens and extorted "protection money" from merchants and bawdy houses. Many boys and girls in such surroundings were attracted by the glamour and easy living of the criminal life or became hopeless and cynical. At any rate, juvenile delinquency increased.

**Poverty
and crime**

"Tramps" appeared during the hard times of the 1870's and soon developed into a class of vagrants, beggars, and occasional criminals who rode "the rods" or "side-door Pullmans," pestered housewives for hand-outs, and gathered in camps known as "hobo jungles." An even worse indication of social deterioration was homicide. The murder rate was appalling, especially in the cities but also in areas heavily populated by Negroes; in 1898 it reached 107 to the million. It was easy to blame this on the heritage of frontier lawlessness and the maladjustments of urban life, but there was some evidence that crime was not more common but only better publicized. James Bryce, an English observer, asserted that Americans were on the whole law-abiding.

The incidence of crime rose in part from police laxity, but the police, controlled by politicians who were in league with special privilege on one hand and outright criminals on the other, could do little. Their chief aim was to keep things quiet enough to forestall public protest—a difficult task, for crime was widely publicized by the cheap press, and reformers existed everywhere. The police themselves, not often overtalented but certainly underpaid, were ordinarily not

**Police
laxity**

above taking a little graft. Nevertheless, some progress was made in crime detection by the use of stool pigeons, the collection of pictures in files known as the rogues' gallery, and by the introduction of the Bertillon fingerprint system.

There was a dreadful sameness about American cities, in both their good points and their bad. There were the same select neighborhoods with their horrible Victorian houses; the block-long rows of adjoining brick houses for workingmen, usually on "the wrong side of the tracks"; the jumble of tenements and once-gracious homes in the slums; the wilderness of railroad tracks, stockyards, grain elevators, saloons, and flophouses; the business districts made up of jerrybuilt stores and lofts and more solid but overly pretentious office buildings. New York boasted the greatest wealth and the greatest poverty; the brownstone mansions of the upper Fifth Avenue area were actually within a stone's throw of the pigs and goats of the slum dwellers. "New York," said an observer, "is a lady in ball costume, with diamonds in her ears, and her toes out at her boots."

Of course, on the other hand, cities were sprouting new parks with triumphal arches and classic sculptures at the entrances. Golf courses, tennis courts, playgrounds, and swimming and wading pools were appearing more or less appropriately spaced. Museums were inviting the public to view collections which were not always notable for authenticity or originality, and bands of freshly scrubbed school children were being led through the galleries. Libraries, night schools, and lecture courses—always numerous in a country which panted for learning—were multiplying. The women, God bless them, were founding clubs devoted to reading, lectures, and discussions, and these women's clubs in their own inimitable manner were to become powerful factors in American acculturation.

2 *The Farmer in the Ditch*

There is ample evidence that business rulers regarded themselves as foresighted and benevolent in so far as natural economic laws would permit, and their opinion was rather largely shared by the middle class at least until the turn of the century. Farmers and laborers, however, were pretty generally convinced that business had instituted a double standard of morality—one for itself and one for them. When they protested to the businessman that the effect was to turn them into exploited dependents, he answered simply that if there was any villain it was the "law" of supply and demand.

And yet, as critics did not fail to point out, he was daily violating that law with such bland assurance that one could only judge that it was not intended to apply to him. He expected government favors in the forms of

tariffs, handouts of public lands, and police protection as a natural right; but any move to protect the farmer or the laborer and to raise his income or working conditions was denounced as a violation of the Constitution and of all American traditions. He organized trusts and monopolies to regulate prices and markets; but labor unions and farmers' alliances were subversive, and he demanded that the courts treat them as such.

Business property was sacred, and its right to multiply itself freely must be protected by the full might of the law—but the laborer's property in wages and the farmer's in prices were protected only by the "law" of supply and demand: the one must submit to being squeezed by profit takers and immigrant competition and the other by depressed prices and deliberately manufactured credit stringencies. Finally, the courts and the legislatures were regarded by the businessman as his perquisites, his because he knew how they should be used. Let the farmer and the laborer keep their noses out of economic matters of which they knew nothing; and if they must have a political outlet, it should be confined to torchlight processions, to voting for a pre-selected slate, and to twisting the lion's tail.

While capital's rulers cannot be cleared of having used their control of bank credits, tariffs, and transportation to squeeze agriculture and labor between high costs and low incomes, they were by no means to blame for all the shadows in the panorama. Many of the current conditions were the outcome of inherited methods and prejudices or of circumstances which the accused did not create, but of which they sometimes took advantage. Fundamental to the situation was the traditional Jeffersonianism of the American people, which caused farmers and laborers to help create their situation by their headlong individualism.

There was considerable to be said for the accusation that they were violating the "law" of supply and demand. Farmers expanded heedlessly into new territories and glutted the market with cotton, wheat, and meat which there was not purchasing power to absorb. The labor supply was increasing by leaps and bounds as farm boys poured into the cities and millions of immigrants flooded through the portals. Laborers failed to protect their common interests by uniting to form an economic and political pressure group which might have bettered their conditions in the democratic manner. Farmers and laborers in their turn were advocating a double standard of morality in their own favor. They expected to be protected in their runaway individualism from the far more effective and efficient "rugged" individualism of entrepreneurs.

The American agricultural revolution that occurred about the time of the Civil War was so far-reaching in its effects that one commentator has said that it was the most significant economic event of the nineteenth

U.S. agricultural revolution and the world

century, comparable only to the price revolution wrought by American gold and silver in the sixteenth century. Whether or not the statement is an exaggeration, American farm surpluses profoundly disturbed the traditional European economic balances and contributed appreciably to the coming of the present era of conflict. In addition, American technical methods found their way to the farms of Canada, Australia, the Argentine, and



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A typical cartoon of the Agrarian Crusade. The farmer's "I pay for all" shows the persistence of American Physiocratic ideas.

even of Europe, and this movement served to disturb the balance further and presently to undercut American prices.

Here we shall deal with six vital aspects which concerned the whole agricultural scene, but primarily the West. They are (1) mechanization, (2) overexpansion, (3) destruction of the land, (4) agricultural science and education, (5) the tie-up with industry, transportation, and finance,

and (6) the social aspects. The details of the Southern farm picture and the political and legal curative measures undertaken by farmers and other dissidents will be dealt with later.

The machines which made the American agricultural revolution have been noted in an earlier chapter. The delay in their appearance may be explained by several facts. The farmer was a conservative and accepted new things slowly; capital and invention found manufactures a more fruitful and manageable field than agriculture; and Eastern and Southern farms were not easily adaptable to the first clumsy machines. The agricultural revolution was nevertheless the legitimate outcome of the great technological revolution then under way. A contemporary observer noted that American agricultural success was due to cheap land, good soil, and mechanization—not to “systematic organization and efficient farm management.”

**Mechaniza-
tion and
its effects**


At any rate, the effect was to turn farming from all but complete self-sufficiency to all but complete commercialization. The farmer, like the factory worker, became a specialist. The demand which caused this change also came from the Industrial Revolution, which had built great cities filled with specialized workers who no longer had the time, the opportunity, or the skill to grow their own food. The demand for food staples pushed wheat farming out on the Great Plains, dotted the semiarid wastes with beef cattle, and spread the corn belt from Ohio to South Dakota by perfecting the corn-hog cycle. By the 1890's Western mechanization had gone so far that one wheat farmer could do the work of eighteen antebellum wheat farmers—and the ratio was to continue to spread.

The fact that for a decade after the Civil War wheat averaged well over a dollar a bushel made it the inevitable reliance of the pioneer farmer with a low capital investment. The price deflation which began with the Panic of 1873 and finally reached 49 cents in 1894 only convinced the frantic wheat farmer that he must plow more land and sow more grain. The current wet cycle which lasted until the middle 1880's made the normally semiarid High Plains attractive to wheat farmers, and they purchased railroad lands at rather high prices and spread over the land like locusts, driving the cattlemen before them. The railroads, most of them, were anxious to sell farming land not only because they could get high prices but because settlers would want lumber and equipment hauled in and grain hauled out.

**Overexpan-
sion: the
farm sur-
plus**

The result (when added to the wheat from Canada, Australia, and the Argentine) was a glutted world market and further price depression. Then came the drought and the locusts to devour the crops, and thousands of farmers abandoned the land which they had struggled to conquer and became tenants farther east or moved to the cities. Nevertheless, the plow never ceased breaking new land, perhaps the less desirable areas between the older settlements, and

**Wheat
surplus**



crop surpluses continued to climb. Between 1860 and 1910 American farm acreage doubled (to 900 million), while corn and cotton production tripled and wheat quadrupled. During the decade after the Civil War the twenty per cent of the American wheat crop that was exported dominated the world market; after 1900 there was a drop of about five per cent, but the total amount was outdistanced by the newer wheat countries. Between 1875 and 1890 the so-called bonanza wheat farms poured wheat into a market that was already sufficiently depressed.

Overexpansion, of course, was not confined to cotton and wheat but appeared in nearly every farm product. The case of the corn-hog cycle was then and has remained since very much to the point. The corn belt had come to rely on the corn-hog ratio: that is, the number of bushels of corn that could be bought with a hundred-weight of hog. The belief was that a bushel of corn would grow ten pounds of pork; hence, if pork sold at \$5 per hundredweight and corn at fifty cents (a ratio of ten), the farmer would break even. If pork rose above the ratio, the farmer would raise more hogs; if it fell below, he would sell corn. Since eventually either extreme would be counteracted by the "law" of supply and demand, there was a tendency for the corn-hog cycle to run four to six years from peak to peak; modern hogs mature faster and reduce the duration of the cycle. At any rate, there were alternate surpluses of corn and hogs with consequent risk to the farmer, and the surpluses and losses became greater as corn-hog farming expanded.


The railroads were instrumental in opening up the citrus and garden-truck areas of Florida, Texas, and California. After 1902 the Federal government began reclaiming millions of acres of desert land by expensive irrigation projects. However valid the claim that they are essential for specialized crops, the fact remains that large parts of them have been used to grow more cotton and wheat. In the South and West beet sugar was entering into competition with cane, though the Havemeyer interests managed to keep up their retail prices. The ease with which cattlemen could take over grazing rights on the public domain (added to Eastern production) led to the overproduction of beef by the late 1870's. The result was a long battle between packers and the Western cattlemen's organizations. As a final blow to the American farmer, Europe's economic nationalists succeeded in imposing trade blocks and tariffs on foreign food—chiefly American—in an effort to increase their self-sufficiency and to hamper the growing power of the United States.

Other
surpluses

The farmer's heedless rush to skim the cream from his enterprise accelerated the destruction of the land—a state which had long been traditional and sometimes unavoidable. This destruction took various forms: robbery of soil richness by concentration on staple crops without permitting restoration through rest or rotation; leaching of lighter soils by rain; and erosion by wind or water. Eastern erosion resulted largely from the water run-off due to deforestation and from unwise plowing. The light soils of the South suffered greatly from all three forms of destruction. Many are the tales of how rain running from the eaves of mansion houses started gullies which finally swallowed house, barns and slave quarters, and finally the plantation. The great gulches of Stewart County in the western part of Georgia have been wryly called the most magnificent scenic wonders east of the Grand Canyon.

Destruc-
tion of the
land

In the West deforestation, overgrazing, and dry farming in semiarid regions have removed the protective covering and given floods and winds their chance. The Dust Bowl is the semiarid country west of the 100th meridian. Farming, even dry farming, can be carried on there during wet cycles, but the coming of dry cycles turns it into a desert. In the late 1880's and again in the middle 1930's vast clouds of dust ruined great areas of farmland and caused the exodus of hundreds of thousands of Plains farmers; such scenes do not need to be repeated if most of the Dust Bowl is restored to grazing lands and the remainder scientifically cultivated. Erosion has, it is said, ruined or almost ruined in this country an area about equal to the original Thirteen States east of the watershed of the Appalachian Mountains. One of the most significant developments of modern science is the promise of restoring much of that area to fruitfulness even where the topsoil has been washed away.



This tragic waste rose not only from ignorance and slothfulness but from what was widely regarded as necessity. Cotton, wheat, and corn were raised on newer and richer lands so inexpensively that the farmer on many old lands simply could not compete. Sometimes he managed to exist and even prosper by turning to dairying, poultry, fruit, and truck gardening. Sometimes he kept the old pattern but robbed the soil ruthlessly until it would yield no more, then moved west or to the city. Vast areas of the Eastern states, especially in New England, thus lay abandoned until gentleman farmers and European peasants began to take them over. The nineteenth century was an era of falling agricultural prices (except for the Civil War inflation), and the harried farmer saw no cure but to skim the cream and pass on; scientific and intensive farming of old land was ordinarily regarded as unrealistic both because of the expense and because greater production could be obtained more cheaply by stripping new land.

Of course, there was also the fact that the farmer has traditionally been the most stubbornly conservative and individualistic element in the country. The new was usually regarded with intense suspicion and was usually rejected without a fair hearing. The American pioneers who boasted that in a lifetime they wore out three farms and three wives only set the pattern. The story is told of an elderly farmer who was running his farm in a notably inefficient and slatternly manner, but who received very coldly the suggestions of a county agricultural agent. Said he: "I've run through

two farms and almost run through this one. Young man, there ain't nothing you can tell me about farming."

The foregoing paragraph will serve also to explain why scientific agriculture was tardy in appearing. Some forward steps had been made in both North and South, but the Civil War had for a generation almost arrested progress in the South. The Federal government had dedicated the public lands to agricultural overexpansion and the exploitation of timber and minerals. On the other hand, limited but gradually growing efforts were made to promote scientific agriculture. The Department of Agriculture was created in 1862 and in 1889 was under Cleveland given Cabinet rank. The department devoted itself to the serious study of plant and animal diseases, to experiments with new varieties and breeds and with soil conservation, and to educational work. Inspections and quarantines were introduced. Experiment stations and farms were opened in every state. Forage and ensilage crops were promoted; new crops were brought in, as kaffir corn and soybeans; better breeds of stock raised the quantity and quality of beef, pork, and wool; plant and animal diseases and insects (except the boll weevil and a few others) were conquered or held in check, sometimes by introducing hardier varieties of plants and animals.

**Scientific
agriculture**

Probably the most remarkable development of all was the rise of the Minneapolis flour-milling industry, based on spring wheat which had been regarded as too hard for milling. In 1871 Edmond La Croix developed the New Process, and in 1878 Cadwallader C. Washburn substituted chilled-iron rollers for the traditional millstones. These inventions made spring wheat a commercial success and led American and Canadian biologists to develop and introduce new varieties which could be grown as far north as the Peace River in northern Alberta. The introduction of hard winter wheat (especially of Turkey Red, brought from the Crimea by immigrant Mennonites) led to the rise of Kansas City as a milling center.

**Spread of
wheat cul-
ture**

Most of the states eventually followed the Federal example by setting up departments of agriculture, though they were slow to adopt inspection laws and their educational activities lagged. One thing they did do, however, was set up systems of county agents whose function was to advise and educate farmers. The Morrill Act of 1862, it will be remembered, had given land subsidies to state-controlled agricultural and mechanical colleges. These "land-grant colleges" have reached sixty-nine in number, for some states split the subsidy between two institutions, sometimes between white and Negro schools. Agricultural courses, reports, pamphlets, and magazines were multiplying, but on the whole the task of carrying scientific

**Agricul-
tural edu-
cation:
dollar-
matching**

education directly to the farmer—and of convincing him—was not being effectively accomplished.

We may, however, anticipate by stating that after 1890 agrarian unrest led to some acceleration of educational work, while in 1914 the Smith-Lever Act (supplemented by others) provided Federal appropriations to be used by state agricultural colleges in demonstration and advisory work among farmers, chiefly through strengthening the county agents and offering short courses in slack seasons. These grants-in-aid were dependent upon the states granting equal amounts. The method has since been extended to other fields and has received the name "dollar-matching." It was, after all, merely a substitute for the land subsidies which the Federal government had long been in the habit of granting to the states.

The fact that until after World War I land was increasing in price tended to conceal the fact that agriculture was operating at a loss. The farmer bore on his shoulders an immense load of debt which could in the long run be supported only by robbing the soil or letting his buildings deteriorate or his taxes go unpaid. Farm land sold at speculative prices partly because its first owners were speculators who wrung every possible dollar out of the purchaser; partly because the horde of newcomers bid against each other; partly because Eastern money lenders regarded Western farms as good risks and in order to keep interest rates high actually urged farmers to expand rather than pay off.

Railroads, towns, and public services were vastly overexpanded until the decade of drought which began in 1887 emptied the western parts of Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas; even the central and eastern parts barely managed to hang on. But the very peril of his situation forced the farmer to reduce costs by further mechanization, perhaps by using the combined reaper and thresher which came out about this time, and so tied him more tightly than ever to the wheels of finance capitalism. And the increase in production only helped to depress further the selling price of grain. True, the cost of farm machinery was coming down, but not as much as the price of wheat.

The farmer bought in a protected home market and sold in a low world market. That is, the prices of his fertilizer, his lumber, his machinery, his clothing, his fencing were set by trusts which, when necessary, were protected by the tariff against foreign competition; wheat prices, on the other hand, were set at Liverpool, and the competition of new foreign fields entered into the calculation of the Liverpool price. Beef and pork were also in surplus, and their prices were set by world conditions; most cotton came from the American South, but here again the price reflected world judgment of the price which conditions would warrant. Industrialists ap-

preciated that the low world price of food was as good as a wage raise to labor and therefore refused to consider effective means of protecting the American farmer. The demand for a protective tariff on farm products was actually silly, for there was ordinarily an American surplus of practically everything.

There were other aspects to the farmer's difficulties. After the first flush of enthusiasm, he began to realize that the railroad was not the good Samaritan he had thought. The railroads controlled the elevators and warehouses, fixed the prices of storage, and arbitrarily graded the farmer's grain to suit themselves. Even when a railroad was honestly administered, the situation was no great help to the farmer, for usually the road had to make up for past financial abuses or for rate wars in other parts of the system, and this reimbursement had to come from freight revenues. Though freight rates were declining during the generation after the Civil War, they still were a third higher in the South and a half higher in the West than they were in the East.

Since the farmer had to absorb the middleman's percentage and the freight rates to the collecting point (Chicago for most important products), there were times when so little was left that it scarcely paid to ship. At a time when corn was selling at a dollar in New York, the farmers of Kansas were finding it cheaper to burn their corn for fuel than to sell it and buy coal. Add to all this the usuries of banks and money lenders, whose rates often ran as high as twenty per cent, and the fact that the interest went back East instead of remaining to build up the community. A Nebraska editor complained that his state raised three crops: corn, freight rates, and interest on debts. The corn was raised by the farmer, while the railroads and the bankers "farmed the farmer."

The farmer was quite obviously the victim of the falling prices of farm products and of costs that, to him at least, seemed out of proportion. Of course, the only effective way to meet the problem within the then-current understanding of *laissez faire* was for the farmer to reduce his production to the point where prices would rise, while a tariff was invoked to keep out cheap foreign food. But this was clearly impossible; such an arrangement would have been met by a storm of public recrimination—and in case of any such arrangement each farmer would have planted all he could in order to profit by his neighbors' gullibility. The farmer had the psychology of the individualist; he believed in his right to produce as much as he could, dignified that as a mission to feed the hungry, and insisted that a way must be found to sell his entire product at a profit. Anything else was not to his interest and was therefore a clear violation of the divine will.

Accordingly he adopted the natural course of minimizing his own mis-

Freight
rates and
credit

No practi-
cal solution

takes and blaming bankers, railroads, and trusts. The Chicago Pit and the Minneapolis Exchange performed legitimate and essential functions in absorbing grain and equalizing prices for farmer and miller, but what the farmer saw and resented was the frenzied raids by which speculators attempted to "corner" the supply of grain and drive its price to unreasonable heights—actions which did the farmer no good since he got only what he was offered. And as mortgage principals and interest and tenancy mounted, the farmers' wrath mounted with them. These were practical problems which, on the whole, continued to get worse from 1880 to 1933 and were relieved only temporarily by the periods of national prosperity around 1900 and during World War I. As nearly as we can tell, the number of mortgages on farms held by their owners doubled; tenancy also doubled, making almost half the farmers of the nation tenants in 1932; and the farm share of the national income descended from thirty per cent in 1860 to eleven per cent in 1932.

Whatever the morality of the process used in attaining the result, the farmer's surplus had furnished the only available means of exchange for the vast quantities of European capital needed to fight the Civil War and to industrialize the country, and to pay the interest on borrowed capital. But this was no comfort to the farmer. He only answered that of course that was true—everybody with a lick of sense knew that all wealth came out of the soil. What he wanted was a bigger share of the wealth he produced. What had happened (said he) was that the bankers had seized his produce for their own purposes and loaded him with debts in exchange. Such was the basis of the agrarian revolt which assumed menacing proportions in the 1890's.

The Western farmer's resentment, at least during the pioneer years, was all the greater because he was living an existence whose bleakness was in sad contrast to the conditions from which he had come. European immigrants had lived in villages, and Americans in fairly thick settlements. In both cases farms had been much smaller than the acreage necessary to make a profitable farm on the Plains. The result was often that people encouraged to gregariousness by their early lives were now set down on the boundless Plains in crude sod houses or little wooden frame boxes at intervals which might barely permit a man to see his neighbor's house at the bounds of the horizon. Every possible excuse was seized for community contacts: Fourth of July picnics, the rare visits of ministers, the occasional trips to the distant town in a springless wagon to buy supplies. Distances were so great and poverty so general that there could be few schools, churches, and towns—few ministers, doctors, dentists, libraries, and "opera houses."

Weather conditions enforced isolation much of the year, what with

blizzards in the winter and mud in the spring and autumn. There were no hard or graveled roads (perhaps not even graded roads), no automobiles to telescope the miles, no telephones to permit neighborly chats and to call the doctor in case of emergency, no radios to lend a spurious sense of participation in the world's affairs, not even a rural mail carrier. Books were few, and the weekly edition of the *New York Tribune* might be the only source of world news. Men became taciturn, and children became awkward and shy and perhaps grew up as semibarbarians. The loneliness bore hardest on the women, and farm wives sometimes went crazy with the strain. It is no wonder that we find women active in the agrarian crusade which opened with the 1890's, persuading their menfolk to move to town, or encouraging their children to go off to the city to make a better life for themselves.

An obvious way to seek to ameliorate the hard social and economic lot of the farmer was through organization. It is perhaps illustrative of the farmer's individualism that the initiative came not from the farm but from a government clerk. Oliver H. Kelley (1826-1913), a clerk in the Department of Agriculture who had seen the misery of the South and West, founded in 1867 a farmers' secret fraternal organization which he called the Patrons of Husbandry, but which has been usually known as the Grange from the name of the local lodges, or granges. Membership was not confined to farmers, but anyone interested in agriculture was invited to join; the result was a mixed lot of dirt farmers, gentleman farmers, small-town professional men and merchants, and even a considerable number of the hated middlemen. Though the Grange was founded as a social organization intended to bring cheer into the lives of farmers and their wives, it quickly began to stress cultural and educational programs and to promote diversification of crops.

By the time the Panic of 1873 began the Grange had become established in all but four states, and the hard times boomed its membership. Though it was not intended to be political, the Grange afforded a natural focus for political action, and Grange influence on issues and elections grew. Farmers' protest parties rose within the states, under the name of Anti-Monopoly or Reform parties, and exercised considerable political power between 1873 and 1876. Though the Anti-Monopoly parties disappeared after 1876, the Indiana and Illinois parties founded the longer-lived Greenback Party (1876). Though it was built around advocacy of inflation, it sought wider support by its advocacy of woman suffrage, a graduated income tax, monopoly and railroad regulation, and social-welfare legislation.

Meanwhile the Grange was making a strong effort to organize co-operative stores, warehouses, elevators, and creameries, and it even went into the business of manufacturing various items of farm equipment. Un-

**The
Granger
Movement**

**Political
protests**

Grange fortunately most of the co-operative and manufacturing
ascendancy enterprises failed because of the inexperience of the man-
and decline agers and undercutting by established businesses. As a
 matter of fact, its Northeastern granges had fallen into the control of
 commission merchants who not only opposed the co-operative activities of



Culver Service

The Grange comes to the rescue and prods the sleeping or indifferent into action.

the organization but reflected their section's reluctance to lower railroad rates in South and West. As a result, the Grange began to lose the allegiance of farmers, and the partial revival of farm prosperity around 1880 helped to sap its strength. Thereafter it confined itself pretty well to its social mission. Nevertheless, it had served important purposes, even beyond social and intellectual stimulation. Farmers had gained business experience and learned to appreciate some of the difficulties of retailers and middlemen; on the other hand, businessmen had learned that if they expected to remain in business they should seek the goodwill of the farmer.

The antimonopoly program of the Grange found greatest vent in the so-called Granger States: Wisconsin, Illinois, Minnesota, and Iowa. The period of the 1870's was one of bitter competition among the railroads, and

the shipper paid the penalty. Nevertheless the railroads, hiding behind the Dartmouth College Case, maintained that it was a private fight, and that neither public nor courts had any right to tamper with their rates and policies. The Granger States, however, passed the Granger Laws, which sought to regulate railroad and warehouse rates and sometimes established regulatory commissions.

The
Granger
Cases

The railroads carried their protests into the Federal courts and in March 1877 the Supreme Court passed on a series of lawsuits known as the Granger Cases. In the decision on *Munn v. Illinois*, Chief Justice M. R. Waite approved the right of the state to exercise its police power to regulate public utilities. When, said he, "one devoted his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created." Actually the laws were so poorly drawn that they had to be repealed and substitutes passed, but the principle of public regulation was firmly established. During the next decade the personnel of the Supreme Court became more conservative, and in 1886 (in the *Wabash Case*) it took advantage of the interstate nature of railroad traffic to limit state control over rate regulation. It was evident that abuses would have to be attacked on an interstate basis—which meant Federal legislation.

Meanwhile the hard times of the 1880's had caused a resurgence of agrarian unrest and the rise of a welter of farmers' organizations, this time frankly aimed at political action though they did not neglect social and co-operative activities of the Grange pattern. Though state alliances were autonomous, they were gathered into two loose federations, the Northwestern and the Southern. In addition there was a Colored Farmers' Alliance in the South. Organizer and chief promoter of the Northwestern Alliance was Milton George, editor of a Chicago farm journal. The driving power behind the Southern Alliance was C. W. Macune. By 1891 the Alliances had swept into power in most of the South and in several Western states, and with the aid of the newly-admitted Omnibus States controlled a delegation which held the balance of power in Congress. The organization by the Northwestern Alliance of the People's or Populist Party in 1892 proved in the end to be disastrous to both wings, for the Southern farmers not only had some divergent economic interests but were reluctant to cause a split in the Democratic Party and presumably thus pave the way to Negro political control of the South.

The Farm-
ers' Alliance
Movement

3 *The Ordeal of Labor*

The most striking feature of any overview of the history of American labor up to 1933 is the relative futility of its efforts to win equality with

Relative
futility
of labor's
efforts to
rise

capital. The reasons may for convenience be grouped under three headings: (1) the hostility of public opinion, which sided with capital and courts; (2) labor's split with agriculture; and (3) its inability to choose a reasonable program and to inculcate discipline in its own ranks.

Public
hostility

On the whole, the public accepted the businessman's imposition of a double standard of morality, one standard for property (especially Big Property) and the other for the farmer and the laborer. The public was so mesmerized by the idea of American opportunity that it had no patience with any element which refused unquestioning allegiance to laissez faire and rugged individualism. That the actual facts of the situation differed materially from the concept failed to blunt popular acceptance. And, in truth, so many poor boys were amassing wealth that there can be no question that the world had never before seen such equality of opportunity. What then was more natural than to sympathize with those who would maintain the *status quo* by holding labor laws unconstitutional and labor unions in restraint of trade, and by fighting them with lockouts, blacklists, ironclad oaths, injunctions, militia, and regular troops?

Laborer
versus
farmer

It is worth noticing that no American liberal movement has ever succeeded unless it has won the support of both labor and agriculture. Such support was essentially given in 1800, in 1828, in 1860, and in 1932; the revolt of 1896 lost because it failed to convince labor. The farmer, himself a small capitalist, had in his American Physiocratic arrogance long regarded labor as only less a parasite than the capitalistic monopolist. The laborer retorted that value should depend upon the cost of the labor spent in producing it—the "labor theory of value," suggested by Adam Smith, not Karl Marx. Naturally, the laborer was willing to class the farmer as a laborer, but as a laborer who was always trying to act like a capitalist—as, of course, he actually was.

Their interests, at least superficially, did not jibe. The farmer wanted high prices for his produce—which meant high food and textile costs; the laborer wanted high wages—which meant high costs in lumber, fertilizer, transportation, machinery, textiles, flour, and dressed pork. The laborer rather inclined to accept the high-tariff argument; the farmer opposed it. What both typically failed to see was that they had a common interest in bridling runaway economic power, in protecting the American standard of living, and in preserving the democratic way of evolution by successive compromises.

The chaos within the ranks of labor was almost as appalling as that in agriculture. The mythus of laissez faire and rugged individualism died hard in the laborer, for there was in each man a lingering hope that he or

his son could become a capitalist. In general he feared socialism lest it spoil his chance (or his son's) and rejected its class divisions lest by accepting them he help to make them come true. In fact, labor was far from being a class, for it was continually having to assimilate farm boys with their individualist traditions and immigrants who were tainted by radical ideologies but were willing to undercut Americans by accepting starvation wages and who were not easily absorbed into labor unions—nor wanted there. Indeed, natives and foreigners feared and sometimes hated each other, and the various brands of foreigners had their own national and social conflicts.

Laborers' lack of common aims

Courts and employers threw a multitude of legal and discriminatory obstacles in the way of unions, and the members of the unions engaged in deplorable procedural and jurisdictional squabbles and fought each other for power and pelf. Under the circumstances it is scarcely remarkable that labor could not form a consistent program nor impose discipline. It was torn among "one big union," industrial (vertical) unions, and craft (horizontal) unions; the acceptance or rejection of labor-saving inventions; whether to work with capitalism or socialism; and whether to deal on a nonpolitical basis with industry or aim at democratically winning control of the government.

The foregoing explain in part why labor filled the rôle of the colonial to the imperial capitalist. But there were also other reasons, which rose from the characteristics of the new industrial order. First, labor profited relatively less by the machine than did capital. Under the circumstances this was probably unavoidable. The machine was an expensive, fixed capital charge which could not be reduced; therefore necessary economies and adjustments had to be made by labor. The machine's savings in hours went largely to capital; the laborer rarely received much more as a machine operator than as a handicraft worker (though eventually his standard of living rose as wages rose and some prices dropped). The machine had little use for skilled labor but preferred semiskilled or green hands. Technological unemployment mounted; and though younger men were eventually absorbed as production multiplied, the older skilled men might have to be content with a garden patch or jobs as night watchmen. Finally, the machine's efficiency resulted in overproduction and brought intervals of unemployment until consumption caught up.

Machine profits labor less than capital

The corporation may have been a legal person, as was asserted by the Supreme Court under the Fourteenth Amendment, but its critics complained that it had neither a body to be kicked nor a soul to be damned. In the old days of small enterprise the worker knew the owner personally, perhaps had grown up with him and still called him by his first name. When he did not like wages or

The impersonal corporation

conditions, he could remonstrate with some chance of getting what he wanted. In those days factories had been well scattered, and workers lived on farmlets which could furnish food in case of unemployment. Now the individual could not reach the real owners of a corporation, only a foreman with limited authority; even union stewards were at a disadvantage.

Corporations could afford long periods of idleness and could hire guards, strikebreakers, and high-priced legal talent. Now that coal had clustered factories around cities, the worker had lost his measure of self-sufficiency. Even when the worker lived in a village, it was likely to be a feudal possession of the corporation. Homes, stores, schools, churches, public utilities, and police were owned by the corporation; the worker lived there by sufferance, and perhaps his words were spied upon, his mail examined, his visitors checked, public meetings prohibited or rigidly supervised, and his political actions prescribed.

Lastly, the recent rise of industry and transportation to national stature had brought labor into the national eye. Many labor issues could no longer be localized but by their very nature became national in scope.

Labor now a national cynosure This situation brought in government and public opinion, which under the circumstances were likely to be hostile. Moreover, labor was at least temporarily weakened by the existence of a vast national transportation network. Industry could transport strikebreakers or bring needed goods from centers unaffected by labor trouble. If local labor proved "unreasonable," cheap labor could be brought from a distance, even from Europe. Or the equipment of entire factories could be carried on the railroad's magic carpet to cheap-labor areas, as actually happened with much of New England's cotton-textile industry.

Labor had failed to profit by the Civil War boom proportionately to capital. The agitation for an eight-hour day which got under way in the 1860's was well understood as a movement for higher pay; however, it

Wages and conditions met little success until after World War I, and indeed certain steel workers remained on a twelve-hour day and seven-day week until 1923. Though prices of some manufactured articles were coming down, the general cost of living was going up faster than wages. Smug gentlemen in clubs and pulpits blamed this on the laborer's demand for lavish living. Of course, a dollar a day was "not enough to support a man and five children if a man insists on smoking and drinking beer," admitted Henry Ward Beecher, "but the man who cannot live on bread and water is not fit to live."

In the generation before World War I the common laborer ordinarily earned no more than ten dollars a week, and the skilled man less than twenty—that is, when they had work. Women rarely got as much as a dollar a day, while city sweatshop workers were pitifully underpaid.

Safety precautions and safety laws were fairly general by the end of the period, though not always rigorously enforced. More progressive states regulated hours and conditions of work for women and limited child labor. Accident compensation was rather general in the North, though smart corporation lawyers sometimes got their clients out of paying it. Pensions existed but were still a rarity, and even some companies which boasted of their generosity were not above firing a worker a few weeks before he became eligible for retirement on pension.

Before taking up the story of labor organization it might be well to say a little about the introduction of European radicalism. Neither violence nor socialism were historically strangers to the American scene as solutions of economic problems, but the welter of radical ideologies brought in by European immigrants introduced many new elements. In 1848 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels published the *Communist Manifesto*, a call to the workers of the world to unite—they had nothing to lose but their chains. Marx then proceeded to elaborate his doctrines in a long, boring book called *Capital*. What he set forth was communism, a name now appropriated by the revolutionary Marxists while socialism has been reserved for milder Marxists and those who believe that socialism will come through evolution. Marx preached economic determinism, which, speaking strictly, means that economic conditions will inexorably bring about certain results. He also taught class conflict, an inevitable revolution, and the eventual coming of a perfect, classless society in which there will be no conflicts and no political state, and when history will cease to be made—which is about the best thing that can be said for Marxism.

Socialism, of course, was much older than Marx, but he attracted many socialists to his standard, perhaps for lack of a more reasonable ideology. English socialists tended to hold aloof and, under the guidance of such men as Bernard Shaw, to bring socialism by gradual evolution. American socialists like Eugene Debs and Norman Thomas have been of the same pattern. Most Continental socialists pussyfooted by saying that the revolution was so far away that capitalists did not need to worry about it.

A vigorous minority, including Lenin, Trotsky, and Stalin, seized actively upon a facet of Marx's doctrine of economic determinism: that there was a moment in economic development when men could influence its course. They intended to take advantage of it, and they did, in 1917. They became the party we now call Communist, but which to tell the truth is no longer even socialist but has simply made Russia the private property of a gang of Russian nationalist imperialists. Socialists expected that "come the revolution," national governments would be captured, and eventually a world state would take their place during the years of trans-

formation. Marx and his friends founded the First International Workingmen's Association in 1864, but growing differences of opinion were brought to a head by the fall of the Paris Commune in 1871, and the First International broke up.

Meanwhile anarchism had been rising to attention first through the efforts of William Godwin and later of Proudhon. There were so many anarchistic ideas that it is almost hopeless to sort them out, but we may with crossed fingers risk the statement that anarchists held extreme ideas of the rights and dignity of the individual, deplored and sometimes denied the necessity of government but usually sought to organize the world into small independent geographical areas, each of which would be a social democracy and would trade as it pleased with other areas. Anarchists are usually harmless, idealistic dreamers like Leo Tolstoy. However, another brand of anarchist, inspired by Bakunin, met in Pittsburgh in 1883, issued the "Pittsburgh Proclamation" (regarded as the classic statement of revolutionary anarchistic doctrine), and organized the Black International under the leadership of a German emigré named Johann Most. The intention was to throw enough bombs to force society to adopt their plans.

Marxists countered by the Second International (1889), which failed when the socialists went with their nations on the outbreak of World War I. Then came the Third, or Red International (1919), organized by the Soviets under Lenin. In addition there were the syndicalists, who proposed that the trade unions destroy all national governments and themselves own and manage industries. There were, of course, other radicals, but we may get by without mentioning them. In our generation the communists have pretty well absorbed other radicals, and Russia uses them as spearheads to seize and make satellites of other countries. It is curious to note, however, that when communists take over a country they execute the very men who aided them to power; they are merely getting rid of the socialists, anarchists, syndicalists, and thorough Marxist communists who might object to bowing to Russian national imperialism.

Most of the above ideologies found adherents in America, mostly German or Polish in origin, always few in number but invariably vigorous and vocal. They became active in the labor movement, indeed so prominent that conservatives insisted that they ran it. They did not, but then it is always comforting to one's nationalistic ego to claim that radical ideas, violence, and disorder invariably come from abroad. The radicals quarreled interminably among themselves, and betrayed and stabbed each other in the back. Considering their expenditure of energy, wind, and printer's ink, it is remarkable that they have influenced American labor history as little as they have. Radi-

cals invariably take themselves seriously, but there is something ineffably amusing—to the outsider—in their jargon, which finds split-hair meanings in such terms as cosmopolitanism, deviationism, white chauvinism, and Titoism.

Socialism's political activities in the United States were carried on by numerous societies and workingmen's parties. The most important, the Socialist Labor Party, emerged in 1877 and was to lead a rough existence of two decades. Its membership was ninety per cent foreign-born, chiefly German, and was split by obscure quarrels over creeds and policies. It sought to limit membership to the thoroughly indoctrinated and never polled over 82,000 votes. It suffered under attacks by anarchists and conservatives who confused it with revolutionary groups. Its educational work, however, was fairly successful, and natives came to outnumber the foreign-born on its rolls. The only prominent figure emerging from these disputes was a Dutch Jew of Curaçao, Daniel De Leon, who in his extremism was a forerunner of Lenin. In the end De Leon split the American socialist movement irretrievably, though in 1901 the moderates united to form the Socialist Party.

Early
socialism

We as a nation glorify success and so miss the inspiration of many a tragic struggle for human rights which a more mature country like France would recognize as epics. Men like Weaver, Altgeld, and Debs are likely to be passed over with a bare mention in our history books because, forsooth, they failed in their immediate aims. We are rightly expected to admire the great entrepreneurs because they built vast material power; it is no less just to admire their opponents who helped to keep the flame of liberty alive.

Value of
the left

Even the fuzzy thinkers of the extreme left had their value. Take Emma Goldman (1869–1940), the sibyl of anarchist terrorists—born in Russia, coming up through New York sweatshops, free living, free loving, with a peculiar power to sway audiences; a lifelong opponent of Marxism, yet naïvely expecting an anarchist heaven in Bolshevik Russia. Even she had value, if we would only have seen it. Said Floyd Dell in 1912: "She has a legitimate social function—that of holding before our eyes the ideals of freedom. She is licensed to taunt us with our moral cowardice, to plant in our souls the nettles of remorse at having acquiesced so tamely in the brutal artifice of present-day society."

Organized labor in America has taken many forms, most of which will be illustrated as our story unfolds. The National Labor Union, founded in 1866 under the guidance of the earnest and self-sacrificing William H. Sylvis, attempted to spread some of the benefits of war-born prosperity. It was a peculiarly amorphous creation, for it included craft unions, farmers' societies, woman's suffrage leagues, and other reform groups too numerous to mention. Its program

National
Labor
Union

was scarcely less amorphous, for it sought to hold together its numerous divergent interests. The influence of indigenous American socialism and of the current English trade-union movement was shown, however, by the prominence it gave to both producers' and consumers' co-operatives as a step toward the solution of economic problems.

The death of Sylvis from overwork was a fatal blow to the N.L.U., for there was no one left to force it to hew to the line. In the end, though it reached a claimed membership of 600,000, it went into politics and broke up when its core of craft unions refused to follow it. Nevertheless, it left some accomplishments behind: it got the Federal government to adopt the eight-hour day for its employees and to repeal the Contract Labor Law of 1864, by which employers had contracted for laborers in Europe and financed their immigration.

The hard times of the 1870's led to widespread labor strife. In the anthracite region the Ancient Order of Hibernians became the focus of a terrorist gang known as the Molly Maguires. We know now that much of the trouble was caused by operators' *agents provocateurs* in order to afford an excuse for crushing unionism. The decision of the railroads in 1877 to cut wages led in July to strikes and riots all across the country, and Pittsburgh was in the hands of a mob for days. Federal troops were freely used in railroad centers, and by the end of the month order had been restored. The newspapers, however, had generally ignored the real grievances of the railroad men and interpreted the strikes as an attempt at revolution after the pattern of the Paris Commune of 1871. The public, aware for the first time that labor trouble was a national problem, backed the terrified business community in an aggressive campaign to stamp out unionism. Of thirty national labor unions perhaps half a dozen survived.

Labor had learned from the railroad strikes that it had power, but that its power must be organized and disciplined. In 1869 a secret order called the Noble Order of the Knights of Labor had been founded among the garment cutters of Philadelphia with Uriah S. Stephens as its moving spirit. During the 1870's the Knights expanded into all the industrial states and built up centralized organizational and combat techniques which showed some familiarity with the First International. The great day of the Knights of Labor began with the ascendance of Terence V. Powderly, who was actually more of a reformer than a labor leader. In the midst of renewed labor strife in the 1880's the Knights began to win strikes and for the first time forced recognition by a business enterprise of national scope—Jay Gould's railroad system. The effect of the apparent victory was overwhelming, as membership began to leap toward 700,000. Propaganda began to take hold for the eight-hour



FIRST ANNUAL PICNIC OF THE KNIGHTS OF LABOR MORE FUN FOR THE SPECTATORS THAN FOR THE PERFORMERS

New York Public Library

The first Labor Day, observed in 1882, was treated sympathetically and strikingly by various cartoonists. *Puck* printed the comment shown here, in which Jay Gould, William H. Vanderbilt, Russell Sage, and other capitalists view with amusement a workman's attempt to climb a greased pole to win food for his family.

day, child-labor legislation, and settlement of labor disputes by arbitration; and Congress passed a series of Chinese Exclusion Acts.

Though business was forced to treat labor with more respect, its funda-

mental hostility remained unabated. Unfortunately circumstances soon gave it a chance for a renewed campaign of aggression. A number of strikes

Haymarket Riot, 1886 were under way in Chicago when on 4 May 1886 a meeting was called in Haymarket Square to protest against murders by the police. The meeting had just broken up when a phalanx of police appeared on the scene. Someone threw a bomb and killed seven police and injured sixty-seven; the police fired into the crowd and killed four. The identity of the bomb thrower was never made known to the public, but newspapers and police deliberately whipped the public into a frenzy of fear and vengeance.

There is a strong likelihood that the real culprit was allowed to escape because he could not be connected with the leaders of the Black International, which it had been decided was to be smashed. At any rate, eight anarchist leaders (all but one foreign-born) were arrested and railroaded through a trial. Though there was no evidence to connect them with the bombing, they had certainly incited to violence. In the end, one was sentenced to prison and seven to death; of the latter, four were executed, one committed suicide, and two had their sentences commuted to life imprisonment. The tactics, though severe, effectually broke the back of the American section of the Black International.

Though organized labor had in no way been connected with the riot or the meeting after which it occurred, it bore the brunt of public disapproval. The ungainly Knights of Labor suffered most, for it lost control of its poorly indoctrinated membership. Wildcat strikes called to force Powderly's hand were crushed by employers on every side, and Gould dislodged the Knights from his railroad system. The Chicago strikes were lost. Powderly had realized that labor could not sustain a general conflict and had sought to head it off; now the membership, resentful of his "pusillanimity," began to melt away or turn to the new craft unions. Powderly was ousted, and the new régime vainly sought political remedies. An influx of socialists, anarchists, toughs, and political manipulators completed its destruction except for a few locals which continued to exist as social clubs.

Labor racketeering, far from being a modern development, began its rise soon after the Civil War. The favorite fields were small-scale local enterprises such as restaurants, trucking, cleaning and dyeing, and those in which time meant money, such as the building trades and the handling of perishable foods. The first racketeers were union agents, or "walking delegates," who managed to get a throttle hold on their locals. At first they decamped with union funds, but this action was killing the goose that laid the golden eggs. Presently they developed a technique for shaking down businessmen by threatening strikes, or for stated sums offered to call their men off from rival business-

Labor racketeering

men's jobs. A close tie-in thus developed between businessmen and labor leaders, and since politicians controlled courts and city councils they inevitably became the third member of a guilty triumvirate.

The wars between unions and businessmen were fought between husky workingmen on one side and on the other thugs specially hired and licensed as detectives. Eventually labor racketeers also hired thugs; when just before World War I the latter saw their chance and seized control of many of the local unions, labor racketeering reached its flower. It was to contribute squads of bully boys to the vice rings of prohibition days. Racketeering rarely went above the level of the union locals, though it is thoroughly clear that international officers winked at it because they needed the votes controlled by the local bosses.

The strength of the Knights of Labor had been based not on its reformism but on its brilliant though momentary success in enforcing wage and hour demands. The federation of craft unions founded in 1881, which in 1886 took the name American Federation of Labor (AFL), was quite coldly and realistically based on a campaign for better wages, hours, and conditions of labor, and refused to turn aside to promote co-operatives, currency re-
Rise of the
American
Federation
of Labor
 form, land-reform leagues, and woman suffrage, or to join political parties. It accepted capitalism and agreed that the details of management and profit and loss were the function of business; its own function was to insist that it receive some of the profits in the form of wages and that it suffer none of the losses in the form of wage cuts. The AFL has always been a confused mass of local and state councils and assemblies, craft unions, and a few industrial unions. There has never been any effective central control, nor has it ever been able to prevent procedural and jurisdictional deadlocks among its members. Such power as the federation possesses has been wielded by an executive council.

With the exception of a single year, Samuel Gompers remained president of the AFL from 1886 until his death. Physically unprepossessing, he was a man of brilliant mental and administrative attainments; and to his long ascendancy the American labor movement doubtless
Samuel
Gompers
(1850-
1924)
 owed its very ability to stay alive. He had been brought up as a cigar maker among Germans and Hungarians who hired men to read aloud abstruse philosophical and economic articles and books while they worked, and who were notorious for their quarrels and divisions on fine ideological points.

Gompers, disgusted by disunity, led a small group of rebels who turned the International Cigar Makers' Union into a model of efficiency and mutual aid, which was copied by other unions. Nothing was more natural than that he should become the leader who brought the opportunistic cigar makers, carpenters, typographers, iron molders, tailors, and others—all

together twenty-five labor groups—into the federation. Gompers himself was a friendly, earthly man who never lost his love for cigars, beer gardens, and music halls. He was a hard worker, never too busy to speak, who patiently overcame the deficiency which had once given him the name of Stuttering Sam. Though in his old age he unctuously enjoyed associating with public figures, he remained undeviatingly honest and loyal to his mission.

The American Federation of Labor was slowly gaining headway when the hard times of the 1890's hit it with stunning force. One of its affiliates, the Amalgamated Association of Iron, Steel and Tin Workers, was strong in the Pittsburgh steel mills, though its membership was composed of the more skilled and highly paid native-born men and excluded the foreign-born rank-and-file workers. Nevertheless, when in July 1892 the bitterly antilabor H. C. Frick cut the wages of the Amalgamated members at the Homestead works, the "Hunkies"—though they had nothing to gain—stood by them. Frick decided to fight it out; Carnegie, who boasted of his labor sympathies, ran out and left his beloved workers to take the gaff. When Pinkerton detectives came up the river from Pittsburgh in barges and tried to land at the works, the strikers forced them to surrender under promise of safe conduct, but the enraged townspeople forced them to run the gantlet to the railroad station. A week later militia restored order and brought in "scabs."

Public sympathy had at first been with the strikers but as usual was alienated by strife. Then on the 23rd a Polish anarchist named Alexander Berkman, prompted by Emma Goldman, badly wounded Frick in an attempt on his life. The Amalgamated members, appalled and defeated, crawled to Frick, and most of them gained reinstatement at the cost of selling out the "Hunkies." Unionism was broken in the steel industry until the 1930's. Nevertheless, the Homestead Strike had marked the passing of spontaneous risings and of reformist leadership and the entry of strongly organized union leadership.

The blind vengeance exacted by Illinois on men innocent of overt connection with the Haymarket bombing had left a bad taste in the mouth of the electorate, and it took the opportunity in 1892, a Democratic year, to elect its first Democratic governor since the Civil War. This was John Peter Altgeld, born in Germany but brought up in Ohio. After a period as a tramp and common laborer, Altgeld studied law and began by shrewd and sometimes shady means to amass a fortune. In 1875 he moved to Chicago and, though he was uncouth and bitter and mastered English only by perseverance, he rose in the law and finally became a judge. He had been early convinced that justice in this country was stacked against the poor and had published a little treatise which plainly said so. Soon after he took the office

of governor, Altgeld, after careful examination of the evidence, pardoned the three surviving Haymarket anarchists on the grounds that they had been unjustly convicted. The country was shocked—perhaps because of its sense of guilt—and a drumfire of vituperation descended upon him which never slackened until the day of his death.

Nevertheless he drew political strength from such opposition. Fighting a desperate, uphill battle, he gave Illinois a remarkable program of penal, educational, and charitable reform which firmly established him with American laborers and farmers as a man to be trusted. He based his appeal on clear and pungent facts, such as the charge that the dogs of Illinois paid more taxes than the streetcar companies. In 1896 he would probably have received the presidential nomination had it not been for his foreign birth; as it was, he ran for governor and, though defeated, ran ahead of the presidential ticket. Because of his early death Altgeld played no part in the great battle of progressivism which he had helped to initiate, and his memory was overshadowed by other names until recent years. Vachel Lindsay,* the poet of populism, sings this immortal requiem:

Sleep softly, . . . eagle forgotten, . . . under the stone,
Time has its way with you there and the clay has its own.
Sleep on, O brave-hearted, O wise man, that kindled the flame—
To live in mankind is far more than to live in a name,
To live in mankind, far, far more . . . than to live in a name.

The battle that had been lost in Homestead was continued in Chicago, then as always a center of intense labor unrest and police brutality. The Pullman Company (actually controlled by Marshall Field, the merchant prince) had built a town for its employees; but, though externally a pleasant place and widely advertised as a model of industrial benevolence, it was actually lacking in conveniences and was used by the company as an instrument of social control and for draining the workers' wages. In 1893 a young Indiana railroader named Eugene V. Debs had organized the American Railway Union and had included in it several locals of Pullman Company employees. When in 1894 Pullman business began to pick up, the employees asked for a restoration of wage cuts, a reduction of rents, and arbitration of differences. They were turned down flat, and Debs backed them by ordering his union to refuse to handle Pullman sleeping cars. The railroads, under the leadership of the General Managers' Association, promptly countered by firing any man who obeyed, whereupon the entire train crew would quit. By the end of June railroad traffic in the Middle West was seriously affected.

**The Pull-
man Strike,
July 1894**

*Vachel Lindsay, *Collected Poems*, "The Eagle That Is Forgotten," copyright 1925 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

The Managers' Association now ordered its Canadian strikebreakers to put mail cars and Pullman cars together. When the latter were cut out by the strikers, the managers claimed that United States mail service had been interrupted and appealed to President Cleveland. Attorney-General Richard Olney, the strong man of the second Cleveland administration, authorized the railroads to hire and pay 3400 Federal deputy marshals. Rioting followed, and some property was destroyed by *agents provocateurs*. The object of the local authorities was not to preserve order but to break the strike and the American Railway Union with it. Accordingly they had deliberately avoided asking the hated Altgeld to furnish militia but had concentrated on getting Federal troops, even though the degree of violence thus far could not warrant the move. Cleveland nevertheless acceded (was he misinformed by Olney?) and sent in 200 regulars despite Altgeld's bitter protest; clearly the governor of Illinois was regarded as an anarchist and a revolutionary.

Federal interference only made the struggle more embittered and wider spread. A new wave of violence broke out, and presently Chicago was the scene of looting and destruction perhaps even worse than that in Pittsburgh in 1877. By now Altgeld had sent in militia, which of course had to oppose the rioters, whatever the governor's presumed sympathies. Clashes between railroad strikers and Federal troops were occurring as far away as San Francisco. It was a simple matter for the newspapers to play up the whole scene as a revolutionary crisis, so the public was actually relieved when Olney obtained a blanket injunction against any and all interference with movement of trains and all actions in sympathy with the strike.

The desperate Debs appealed to Gompers for help, but the latter refused to aid an industrial union. Hundreds of strikers were jailed, and the strike irretrievably broken. Debs himself was among those indicted. His defense was conducted by Clarence Darrow, a lawyer who was soon to become nationally known as a great liberal. Nevertheless Debs was convicted and sentenced to prison.

That sentence was a mistake. For the first time Debs had leisure to read, and he emerged from prison a convinced socialist. Thereafter labor organization took a secondary place in his life, and he devoted himself to founding and building up the Socialist Party and became its perennial candidate for the presidency. The son of Alsatian immigrants, Eugene Victor Debs was born in Terre Haute and made it his lifelong home. Though Debs's opposition to craft unions made him suspect by the labor movement, he was widely honored for his earnestness and sincerity. His opposition to

Eugene
Victor
Debs
(1855-
1926)

American entry into World War I led at length to a term of imprisonment during which he made his fifth run for the presidency and drew 900,000 votes.

Long, lean, with bald head and kindly eyes, Debs, though fired with evangelistic zeal, was a prophet more respected than followed. Captivated crowds turned out to hear him during his campaigns, cheered encouragingly, then went to the polls to vote for the old parties. Essentially a simple and impulsive man, he took an extreme view of the evils of capitalism and overrated his favorite panacea. And yet he did much to publicize numerous reform measures which the Socialist Party included as planks in its platform, even though the planks themselves might not be socialistic, and which reappeared in the 1930's as parts of the New Deal program.

The Federal government had not hesitated to cast its weight against the labor movement; it remained for a new century to usher in a new kind of President, who would cast its weight on the side of labor. This was done by Theodore Roosevelt in the Anthracite Strike of 1902. The United Mine Workers (UMW), founded in 1890, had been practically broken as the result of a strike in 1894 but made an amazing comeback in a bituminous strike in 1897. One of the leaders of this revival, the brilliant young John Mitchell, was made national president. He moved into the anthracite fields and for the first time welded the immigrant workers of a score of nationalities into a bloc and led them to victory. At the time the anthracite fields were dominated by the Reading Railroad, a Morgan property, which categorically refused to ameliorate the truly pitiable condition of the miners and was met by a five-months strike. Mitchell became the object of national abuse, and President Baer of the Reading contributed to the paean this oft-quoted gem: "The rights and interests of the laboring man will be protected and cared for—not by the labor agitators, but by the Christian men to whom God in his infinite wisdom has given the control of the property interests of the country."

This time the newspapers were more moderate and truthful than they had been in the past, and both Morgan and Roosevelt became aware of a rising public demand for a reasonable settlement. Roosevelt first made sure that Morgan would counsel the Reading to yield, then demanded arbitration as an alternative to occupation of the fields by Federal troops—this time to protect labor. An arbitral commission was appointed, but Roosevelt managed to get a representative of labor on it only by disguising him as an "eminent sociologist." After extended hearings the commission granted the eight-hour day, a ten-per-cent wage raise, and a grievance board, though it refused union recognition.

**Anthracite
Strike,
1902**

**Arbitration
at TR's in-
sistence**

The union victory was only partial, and the struggle was to be renewed in later years. The significance of the episode, however, lay in the precedent it afforded of Federal interference, not to break labor under the guise of preserving order but to promote the public welfare by insuring a reasonable degree of justice. Roosevelt was sharply criticized, but President Wilson later expanded on the precedent. Mitchell lost his office in 1908, but not before he had set the United Mine Workers on a firm foundation.

The defeat of Debs in the Pullman Strike broke up his American Railway Union and turned the railroad-labor field over to the craft unions which were organized as Brotherhoods, nearly a score of them all together.

The Railway Brotherhoods The aristocrats among the Brotherhoods were the Locomotive Engineers, the Firemen, the Conductors, and the Trainmen. The various Brotherhoods never affiliated with each other or with the AFL. In 1916 they took advantage of the prewar crisis to demand a number of concessions, and the Federal government surrendered. Later on the Railway Labor Act of 1926 provided for arbitration and compulsory strike delays, and for twenty years the Brotherhoods were to be regarded as the best-disciplined and most reasonable of the labor family.

Lastly we should mention the Industrial Workers of the World, known variously as the IWW or the Wobblies. The organization rose originally out of the terrible strikes in 1904 in the gold fields of Cripple Creek, Colorado. It advocated "one big industrial union" and claimed to be socialistic, though it would seem to have resembled syndicalism more closely. It rejected political action and arbitration and advocated strikes, sabotage, and continuous violence. Its members were the migratory workers who had sprung up to service the mines, orchards, and wheat fields of the West, and who had few ties to either the job or the family to make them feel a sense of responsibility. Traveling from job to job, carrying a few belongings in a bed roll—hence the name "bindle stiff"—the men of the IWW became the most picturesque figures of the West and the only authentic revolutionaries in the American labor movement. Even the conservative AFL was forced to play along with the demands of a labor movement whose class-consciousness had been partially aroused by the IWW.

Wobbly songs of defiance set to tunes of popular evangelical hymns rang out over the fields and hills in words which would have been well understood by the Puritan Levellers of Cromwell's time. Take this chorus from "The Preacher and the Slave:"

You will eat, by and by
In that glorious land above the sky;
Work and pray, live on hay,
You'll get pie in the sky when you die.

Or take the old song still sung at drinking parties by inebriates who have no knowledge of its origin:

O! I like my boss,
 He's a good friend of mine,
 And that's why I'm starving
 Out on the picket-line!
 Hallelujah! I'm a bum!
 Hallelujah! Bum again!
 Hallelujah! Give us a hand-out
 To revive us again!

While the movement was far too individualistic for us to say that it depended on one leader, William Dudley Haywood, known to the world as "Big Bill," was certainly its ascendant figure. When former Governor Steunenberg of Idaho was assassinated, Haywood was ac-
 cused of complicity, kidnaped from Denver, put on trial—
 and triumphantly acquitted. Big Bill was always ready to
 help wherever cannery workers, packers, lumberjacks, har-
 vest hands, longshoremen, window cleaners, or practically anyone was on
 strike. The reckless Wobblies gloried in jail sentences, and waves of "free
 speech" agitation broke out in which no sooner would one set of illegal
 street speakers be sent to prison than another would step up to take its
 place.

**Big Bill
 Haywood
 (1869–
 1928)**

Though the West was its peculiar stamping ground, the movement invaded the Eastern textile industry, whose conditions made it a fertile field for labor revolt. Haywood's direction of the dramatic battle at Lawrence, Massachusetts in 1912 was an amazing feat of general-
 ship in welding together workers of rival nationalities; but,
 though the strike was technically victorious, the workers'
 gains were canceled by the speed-up. Later strikes, such as the one at
 Paterson, New Jersey, were dismal failures. The IWW became an active
 opponent and saboteur of World War I, and its members (along with many
 innocents) were thrust into rude concentration camps for long periods or
 seized by vigilante mobs and whipped, tarred-and-feathered, or lynched.
 Between state and Federal action, the IWW was all but stamped out dur-
 ing the war; at least it has ceased to be a problem, though some of its
 more steadfast members engineered a short revival in the 1920's, then
 passed over to the Communist Party. Haywood jumped bail in 1921 and
 went to Russia, where he died of paralysis.

**Collapse of
 the IWW**

Colorado was no stranger to industrial strife. The labor troubles in the gold fields in 1893–94 had attained such momentum that they became known as the Cripple Creek War. The miners had the advantage, but

The Trini-
dad Coal
Strike,
1913-14

further trouble in 1903-4 resulted in a victory for the operators. The climax of prewar labor troubles and the final proof of the inability of the labor movement to solve its own problems was the bloody thirteen-months strike of the United Mine Workers in 1913 and 1914 in the Colorado coal fields around Trinidad. To cut a long story short, the Colorado militia attacked and burned a tent colony of the strikers at Ludlow, and a score of men, women, and children were shot or burned. The outraged workers flew to arms, and open warfare was waged in the canyons of Colorado.

John D. Rockefeller, as majority stockholder of the Colorado Fuel and Iron Company, the most important coal company, came in for bitter criticism on the part of aroused public opinion. When President Wilson intervened and proposed arbitration, the companies refused and smothered the strike so successfully that the United Mine Workers were forced to call it off. Rockefeller now called in William Lyon Mackenzie King, former Canadian Minister of Labor and later long-time premier, to form a plan of "friendly co-operation." His work resulted in the formation of a company union and began the rise of that favorite managerial device for controlling labor.

The labor history of the last twenty years of the nineteenth century shows about 24,000 strikes, only one third of which were successful and at least half of which were total defeats; there is no reason to suppose that the record up to 1917 was any better. Nevertheless, the labor movement had forced its way from amorphous reformism to an integrated, though normally frustrated, movement. It had found a few great leaders, and more were being trained. The Federal government, from being unalterably antilabor, had begun to exercise more impartiality. The courts, as first-class funeral corteges carried more judges to their last rest, began to find satisfactory reasons for making exceptions or for reversing precedents. Public opinion, though not yet pro-labor, was changing—perhaps because the factory and mining population was rising. The states had succeeded in putting into effect numerous laws which affected hours, wages, compensation, and inspection codes for the better. All in all, the laborer's standard of living was distinctly on the upgrade.

Why all these improvements when the actual accomplishments of union protest, as we have seen, were so generally discouraging? Actually the oppression of labor was relative rather than absolute. The American laborer had a high ideal of freedom and welfare, and his tendency was to compare his condition with what he thought it *ought* to be rather than with comparable European trades (as his employer exhorted him to do). The American laborer remained

Its de-
termined
pessimism

unconvinced that he was receiving a fair share of the good things being wrested with his help from the richest stock of resources in the world.

We can bring out additional reasons for the rising standard of living. Though unions won few dramatic victories and most of those were at least in part euchred out from under them, the continual pressure from the unions, especially the AFL unions and the Railway Brotherhoods, which remained fairly "respectable" and "co-operative," resulted in improvements here and there which made a great difference when considered cumulatively. Corporations could afford concessions because little of their resources went to support huge military and naval establishments, as in Europe. The growing efficiency of the factory system, already passing into full-blown mass production, was cheapening goods and increasing the number of semi-skilled workers, who traditionally were better paid than the unskilled. Under the circumstances there was a shortage of intelligent workers, but even the marginal workers often shared in the improvement. By no means least was the influence of the political and social Progressive movement in both states and nation, which marshaled liberal elements on the side of labor and forced politicians to throw to the workingman a succession of sops well soaked in the gravy of our advancing economic prosperity.

Why the
standard
of living
rose

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Chapter XXXVI

BUILDING THE NEW SOUTH

1 *The Southern Satrapy*

THE reconstruction era was closed by a tacit compromise which yielded to the South control of its social and racial policies in exchange for its surrender of economic controls. In effect the South reconciled itself to a colonial status which exists to this very day. When the South sought to lift itself by its bootstraps through industrializa-
tion, it found that the effort only fastened the status about it more tightly because the North controlled its credit and its transportation. Control, however, was not solely a matter of economic pressure. Northern politicians sometimes flouted the wishes of their capitalistic supporters and sought votes by waving the bloody shirt before Northern voters. A favorite device was to threaten to fasten Federal controls upon Southern election machinery, ostensibly for the protection of the Negro franchise. The result was that the South was perpetually kept on the defensive.

Southern
colonialism

During the period immediately after the Civil War, Northern economic interests expanded chiefly in the North and West and were content to preserve the South as a supplier of cheap cotton and a limited market for manufactured goods. The price of cotton was beaten down, and the railroads took *carte blanche* to levy discriminatory rates, which drained off any profits which might remain to the cotton grower and the retailer. The first result was to increase the natural stagnation which followed the desperate drainage of the war. Most cities recovered slowly, the mansions of the planters decayed, and thousands of men never recovered their health or initiative. New towns, new factories, and new houses were jerry-built and loaded with debts all but impossible to repay. Though the cotton crop had by 1879 become larger than ever, it exploited the soil even more drastically

Stagnation
during
reconstruc-
tion

than in the old days. It is no wonder that through the 1870's there was a rising tide of hatred for the Yankee and the Negro, the putative authors of Southern misery.

The great planters had hoped to continue operating their plantations by the gang system as in slavery days, with the sole difference that the freedmen would receive wages. Negroes, however, regarded the method as too much like slavery and usually refused to co-operate. The result was the growth of sharecropping, intended at first as a temporary adjustment. Plantations were divided into one-man farms, each operated independently by a freedman and his family, or presently by white farmers. The planter furnished a cabin, a mule, some rude equipment, and limited credit with the neighborhood storekeeper; indeed, where possible, the planter set up his own store. Since the planter was taking the risk, he was entitled to dictate what crop should be planted. Usually he selected cotton, since it was most reliable, best suited to unskilled labor, and most likely to yield a good cash return.

In the tobacco areas, sharecroppers (usually whites) raised tobacco, food, and forage crops. When the cotton or tobacco crop was marketed the planter kept a share, usually one third to one half. The crop-lien was another form of adjustment to the hard realities of the agricultural situation. This meant that the tenant or the small-farm owner contracted with the storekeeper for his supplies, giving in return a lien upon his crop. In this way the farmer was in theory able to raise what he pleased, though even here the storekeeper's suggestions must frequently have had the force of orders.

The price of cotton declined after the Civil War from twenty-four cents in 1866 to five cents in 1898. (Thereafter it began slowly to rise.) The decrease was due to deflation, to the growing competition of Egypt and India, and to the fact that the Southerner saw no cure for his decreasing income save to grow more cotton. Freedmen were notoriously slack and improvident, neglected their crops, and when by rare good luck they made a little profit proceeded at once to blow it in rather than to save it for the next year's expenses. Declining cotton prices left them at the end of most years with debts which had to be carried over to the next year, and presently they were so deeply in debt as to lose all hope of ever getting out.

Many of those who owned land lost it and became sharecroppers. Tenants and sharecroppers had little stimulus to improve their land, and the planter-owners did not have the capital to do it. The result was that long before 1900 the old plantation areas had been pretty well given over to an agricultural system based on soil exploitation and on peonage—that is, the croppers were bound to their land by debt. The law did not permit

them to move without the consent of the creditor or unless some miracle enabled them to pay their debts.

Under the circumstances the storekeeper or "furnishing merchant" came to replace the planter as the local magnate, or perhaps the planter had become the storekeeper. He was the local political and economic boss and was feared, served, and relied upon. Usually his books were not open to the examination of the sharecropper, who could not have understood them anyhow; so, if he wished, he stood in an excellent position to cheat his dependents. He did not ordinarily charge interest, but marked up prices from forty to one hundred per cent, sold the crop where he pleased, and gave the farmer what he pleased. Actually the storekeeper was no less in peril than the cropper, for he also was caught by deflation. He paid to the wholesalers and local bank interest rates which ran as high as twenty per cent, while that bank, unable to draw deposits from the naked countryside, had to borrow at exorbitant rates credit which was originally manufactured in New York and Chicago.

**The
storekeeper**

Drought, flood, boll weevils, crop failures, and neglect by croppers were continual threats to the storekeeper's credit. Once his credit was ruined, he might never be able to recover and might be forced to take up sharecropping. There was no conspiracy on the part of storekeepers against the farmers, as was often charged. They were simply fighting a grim and ruthless battle for survival. The few who became rich were the lucky ones or the more hard-hearted, intelligent, and energetic. Kindness was an economic handicap: such men were doomed to failure or at best to living on a standard little better than that of their dependents.

Cotton and tobacco remained the great staples of the South up to World War I, but necessity changed other aspects of the agricultural picture. New lands in Arkansas, Texas, and eventually Oklahoma, where cotton could be grown more cheaply than farther east, attracted great numbers of farmers and Negro workers and added to the Old South's costs by forcing it to use fertilizer. Tobacco took over much of the piedmonts of the Carolinas, Virginia, Kentucky, and Tennessee, and cigar leaf was grown as far north as Connecticut and Wisconsin. The Southeast specialized in bright or flue-cured leaf which was particularly suited to cigaret manufacture, while Kentucky grew chiefly burley, best suited for pipe and plug tobacco. The type grown in each area depended largely upon the soil. Rice culture was gradually abandoned in South Carolina and Georgia and moved to Texas and Louisiana; sugar continued to be produced in the delta region of the latter state.

Staples

In the early 1890's the cotton boll weevil moved from Mexico into Texas and by 1923 had worked its way to the Georgia Sea Islands, destroying as much as an estimated 2,200,000 bales of cotton a year. In some ways

Diversification the boll weevil was a blessing in disguise, for it helped to promote diversification; Enterprise, Alabama erected a statue of the salutary insect. Tobacco appeared in many old cotton fields; pecans, English walnuts, and peaches were planted; citrus fruits, berries, and vegetables were grown in Florida and Texas; and apples in Virginia and Arkansas. Truck gardening sprang up around the cities, and forage crops increased with the increase of dairy herds. The Border States continued the movement toward general farming which had begun before the Civil War. Though the South boasted of its industrial progress, eighty per cent of those gainfully employed as late as World War I were in agriculture. Advancement was made in agricultural education and in the use of scientific methods, though the most sensational progress had to wait until the time of the New Deal.

The palladium of Southernism was the supremacy of the white man, but the economic collapse of numbers of the aristocracy and the yeomanry gave the ruling class cause for alarm. Wherever possible, white *esprit de corps* caused the ruling class to install whites as sharecroppers; ordinarily they did better work than Negroes and even were able to raise more cotton per acre than had most antebellum planters. The fact was, though, that the white population was increasing at such an alarming rate that it could not be long before white men must compete with black. Worse yet, suppose that the white worker should make common cause with the black and pull down the scaffolding of cotton and white supremacy which supported the canvas on which the whole Southern scene was painted?

If a practical instance was needed, it was found in Virginia. There, from 1879 to 1883 the Readjuster Party under a man of yeoman origin, General William Mahone, ruled with the support of Republicans and Negroes and frankly readjusted the social and economic structure of the state to favor the farming masses. The economic crisis was further demonstrated by the rate at which common whites were moving to the West, while the young men who should be the future leaders of the South were showing a widespread tendency to seek the greater opportunities of Northern cities or Western mines and ranches.

The Old South had been formed on the aristo-agrarian ideal only because cotton made it applicable. Actually a strong element had always favored industrialism, including even the great Calhoun, until South Carolina pointed out the error of his way. Many of those who lived close to the coal, iron ore, limestone, timber, and water power of the Appalachians had been restive under planter dominance, and in their hearts some of them must have welcomed the defeat of the Confederacy as clearing the way for industrial exploitation of their resources. They had waited confidently for a flood of

Persistence of Southern industrial enterprise

Northern capital, but outside of railroads and banking only dribblets here and there found their way into the Chattanooga and Birmingham iron and steel mills, or into an occasional cotton factory. Nevertheless, Southern entrepreneurs persisted and by slow and patient work had by 1880 rebuilt their manufactures to about the place they had occupied in 1860. These men now found their opportunity in the approaching social crisis. If the North would not help it, let the South help itself.

The answer as presently worked out by the leaders and adopted by the newspapers of the South laid chief emphasis upon education and industrialization. Both were intended principally to benefit whites, though there were grace notes here and there for Negroes. In the early 1880's the movement spread through the South with all the fervor of a crusade; in Salisbury, North Carolina the citizens heeded the exhortation of an evangelist: "Next to the grace of God, what Salisbury needs is a cotton mill!" High priest of the movement was the young editor of the *Atlanta Constitution*, Henry W. Grady (1850-89), son of a yeoman from the red hills of Georgia. His speech "The New South" delivered in New York City not only served as a guidon but aroused the North to a sympathetic comprehension of the Southern desire for rehabilitation. The movement for the first time gave the South something to substitute for the self-consuming interest in the Lost Cause. The younger generation had spent its most impressionable years amidst the terrors of war and reconstruction and was often more resentful than its elders. Now it was being aroused to new interests and new possibilities, as the rehabilitation movement spread its evangelical zeal across the South.

The success of the rehabilitation movement was sensational. Cotton-textile manufactures, the most notably successful field, was built up in the piedmont area almost solely on Southern resources. Actually, as Northerners pointed out, the South had no right to expect success in that line. Its capital was scraped up from housewives' egg money and farmers' mortgages, and was reinforced by tax exemptions and old warehouses traded in for stock. All together, it was barely sufficient to buy cast-off machinery from Northern mills. The atmosphere was not suitable for spinning brittle cotton threads, there were no expert managers and machinists, and labor was clumsy and irresponsible. Moreover, railroad rates were weighted so as to carry raw cotton to the North at cheap rates, but to carry Southern manufactures northward only at prohibitive rates.

All this was true, but there was one positive factor: labor, unlike that of New England, was dirt cheap and docile to an almost disgraceful extent. In the end this proved decisive. From 1880 to 1900 cotton factories in the South jumped from 161 to 401; spindles from 540,000 to 4,200,000; and

**The reha-
bilitation
movement**

**Southern
cotton
manufac-
tures**

operatives from about 16,000 to almost 100,000. By 1900 the South had eaten into the New England monopoly so seriously that cotton industries were beginning to be shipped south, leaving New England's intransigent laborers stranded.

Alongside the new cotton mills there sprang up unincorporated mill villages, ordinarily composed of slab cottages and with a modicum of churches, schools, and other public services furnished by the mill lords.

Mill
villages

There was little of the tyrannical in the lords' intentions, though they rigidly preserved control of the police and did not scruple to exert a degree of political pressure. These controls did not arise from cynicism; rather, they were attempts to transfer to a new scene the traditional paternalism of the aristo-agrarian ideal. To be realistic about it, the mill workers had little sense of responsibility, saved little or nothing for the future, and acquired skills slowly. Drawn mostly from surrounding yeoman and poor-white families and to some extent from more distant mountaineers, the workers found the contrast between the ennui of the corn patch and the life of the mill village almost magical. However dingy the surroundings might be or however long the working hours, there was the bustle of the machinery, the never-ceasing wonder of running water and of electricity, and the joys of convenient stores, ready-made clothing, pool-room loafing, and of picnics at which the great men and their families would mingle with the workers in easy camaraderie.

True, wages were so low that the entire family had to work, and they were paid in company-store credit slips more often than in cash. Hours were long, but there were periods when work was slack. The workers, of course, were conscious that they were socially despised, but they had little direct contact with the middle-class families of the growing cities near by who might have made clear the gulf between. Moreover, they, even more than the middle class, hugged to themselves the consciousness of being white men and found surcease for their inferiority in despising the black man. On the whole, they were content and save for minor rebellions here and there remained so until after World War I.

The success of cotton manufactures co-operated with other factors to stimulate other lines of production. Cotton-seed oil mills furnished lard and butter substitutes, cattle feed, and fertilizers. Capital was made available for lumbering, and presently furniture, carriages, coffins, and other wood products were being made. Durham and Winston-Salem specialized in cigarets, Richmond and Tampa in cigars, and Louisville in other tobacco products. Birmingham found a way to lick the problem of the high phosphorus content of its iron ore and burgeoned into the Pittsburgh of the South. No place in the country possessed Birmingham's juxtaposition of iron ore, coking coal,

Cotton
stimulates
other man-
ufactures

limestone, and cheap labor, but rivals managed to stay alive in Tennessee and Virginia.

Water power was turned into electric power as countless lakes appeared along the streams of the South. At the same time, coal mining flourished, and West Virginia's coal warranted the formation of two important railroads: the Chesapeake and Ohio, and the Norfolk and Western. Before long the petroleum and the chemical industries were to awaken the Southwest. The South now could boast of its own economic monarchs, textile and tobacco kings, and—unique Southern contribution—a Coca-Cola king with his capital in Atlanta.

Though in 1900 agriculture was still the chief occupation of the South and its chief industries were based on agricultural products, industrialization had begun for the first time to build cities which did not depend primarily on commerce or the planters' social season. Richmond, Charleston, Mobile, and New Orleans grew with the reviving South, but more remarkable were those cities like Winston-Salem, Atlanta, Birmingham, Houston, and Dallas. Though they would have rated as no better than third-class cities in the North, they were indicative of the material and social progress which was remaking the South. Most significant of all was the rise of a middle class, that harbinger of progress, and its fostering of public schools, universities, public utilities, good government, and a rising standard of living.

**Urbaniza-
tion**

During the two decades before World War I the South's industrial economy was growing, though not in proportion to that of the nation as a whole. Particularly notable was the way in which the trickle of Yankee capital had increased to a stream. Steel had joined railroads as members of Wall Street combines. Coal, petroleum, gas, and chemicals were making many Southerners wealthy, but Northern banking control was apparent. A part of the old textile mills had passed into Northern hands, and new ventures in cotton goods and later in silk and rayon were Northern. Tobacco, paper, copper, and electric power were deeply infiltrated. The result was that the South imported more than it exported and made up the difference by robbing its soil and selling its enterprises to Northerners. Strangely enough, Northern labor's increased demands were forcing capital—or at least encouraging it—to make up the difference in its profits by squeezing the South even harder.

**Northern
imperial-
ism**

The South had its economic kings, but most of them were limited in their sway by Northern banks and holding companies, while more of them were mere satraps exercising royal power by license of a distant monarch. Southern managers sat at the center of webs of power, but theirs were not personal domains; at any moment they might be replaced by other men more efficient or more servile. Nor was dependence upon the North solely financial, for a notable feature of the South's colonialism was its inability

to renew its material sinews. It lacked not only factories which made engines and industrial equipment but machines which made machine tools. Worst portent for the future was the low productivity of the worker.

2 *The Garrison South*

The Civil War and reconstruction solidified the South's traditional conservatism, convinced it of the rectitude of the aristo-agrarian ideal, and made white supremacy the standard around which all loyal Southerners must rally. The necessary economic surrender of 1877 made its leaders more than ever determined to protect the citadel of white supremacy by imbuing their people with the psychology of a closely disciplined, beleaguered garrison. They made internal politics a means of enforcing that discipline, and external politics a continuation of Calhoun's search for a veto on the nation in any policy that affected Southern interests.

Under the circumstances the voters of the South naturally selected as their leaders the planter aristocracy which had led them in war. These men took their ideas from the ante-bellum South and typified Southern opposition to even the more progressive aspects of the reconstruction governments. For these reasons they were named Bourbons because, like the French Bourbon kings, "they never learned and never forgot." Actually this was not quite fair. They scaled down the reconstruction debts to reasonable amounts, paid the interest promptly, moderated railroad rates, appropriated what they could to education, and gave the states rigidly honest and economical administrations.

On the other hand, they promoted peonage by their lien laws and blandly entrenched themselves in office as though it was their natural right—as they undoubtedly believed. Paternalism on their part was natural, for it was only carrying the aristo-agrarian ideal into practice, but if it was practiced on the part of the Federal government they regarded it as a horrible Hamiltonian heresy. They advocated a low tariff (at least on the hustings) and jeered at the merit system in civil service. They were devoted to white supremacy and by one means and another kept the Negro from voting except when they controlled his vote. The result was that the Republican Party in the South was reduced to impotence and survived only because it was fed on Federal patronage.

When they appeared in Congress the Bourbons were known as the "Confederate brigadiers," but they were singularly pacific when compared to their ante-bellum predecessors. They knew the weakness of their position, whether or not their constituents did. Demagogic Republican politicians regarded them as fair meat and taunted them with being representatives of a shotgun civilization. The brigadiers, in fact, depended upon their *quasi* allies, the capitalists,

for defense and therefore kept their bargain to protect Northern investments in the South. Bedeviled as they were on one side by their resentful constituents and on the other by Northern demagogues, and seeing their beloved South subjected to alien interests, they must have found it difficult to hold their peace.

They saw from the first that the North had won because of its overwhelming material might, and they sought to build up similar strength in the South. Honest manual labor was now presented in a different light. It was—they said—the white man of the South more than the Negro who had been freed by the Civil War. It is true that the leading Bourbons re-established their fortunes with the aid of their Northern contacts and in the 1880's emerged not only as political dictators of the South but as managers or lawyers of Northern enterprise in the South. Still, they may have been right. It is difficult, in looking back, to see how the task of building the New South could have been handled better, for the common Southerner was still averse to being reconstructed and Northern Republican politicians were no help.

The Bourbons never tired of inviting Northern capitalists to locate industries in the South; they were in effect, as Simkins says, a new generation of economic scalawags beckoning to economic carpetbaggers. They promoted education, industrialization, and diversification of crops, and they rejoiced when their policies blossomed into the Rehabilitation Movement. And yet there was something naïve about the program. Not for a moment did either Grady or the Bourbon leaders intend to do more than give Southernism the power to survive. They believed so thoroughly in cotton, in aristo-agrarianism, and in white supremacy that they could not conceive of scientific truth as having any other basis; they failed to see that the acceptance of material progress might displace cotton and that education might free the mind and spirit and lead to a liberalization of race relations and of paternalism.

Rehabilitation's
concealed
menace

The propaganda for reconciliation with the North which accompanied the Rehabilitation Movement was to die-hard Southerners a tip-off to its ultimate results. As early as 1874 L. Q. C. Lamar of Mississippi had delivered in the Senate a memorial address in honor of Charles Sumner and had closed an impassioned plea for reconciliation with the moving words: "My countrymen! know one another, and you will love one another." A few years later, in 1880, a young Virginian named Woodrow Wilson could cry, "*Because I love the South, I rejoice in the failure of the Confederacy.*"

Reconciliation

Such men felt that the passing of slavery had freed the South from a moral and economic incubus, but they saw their program as merely a revolution in tactics to preserve the traditional aristo-agrarian values. "The South's fight," they proclaimed, "must be made within the frame-

work of the nation." If any accolade was needed it came when a year before his death the venerable President Davis, long the leader of irreconcilability, reversed his position and solemnly addressed his section:

The past is dead; let it bury its dead, its hopes, and its aspirations; before you lies the future, a future of golden promise, a future of expanding national glory, before which all the world shall stand amazed. Let me beseech you to lay aside all rancor, all bitter sectional feeling, and to make your places in the ranks of those who will bring about a consummation devoutly to be wished—a reunited country.

It is often claimed that the generation after the Civil War saw the supplanting of the aristocracy by the rising poor whites. This claim is quite inaccurate. Of course, some of the old aristocracy who could not meet the test retreated from reality and decayed in their decaying mansions or wormed their way by favor of Bourbon friends into some minor public office. Others fought for survival as landlords and storekeepers, keeping in their relations with their tenants as much as possible of the old spirit of noblesse oblige. Others moved into town and seriously took up engineering, retailing, law, brokerage, banking, or politics. It must be remembered that the aristocratic ideal of the South had never been realized, but that a strong element of vigorous Cotton Snobs remained to be absorbed. Such men would not be easily cast down but would take up the struggle again.

Lastly, it must be admitted that industry afforded many opportunities for young men of yeoman stock, though even these yeomen will upon examination be found to have been distant relatives of some of the ruling class, to have been the sons of comrades in arms, or to have been brought to favorable attention by some means. The ruling class which was now emerging was strongly based upon the old legitimate aristocracy with reinforcements from the Cotton Snobs, the yeomanry, and even a few poor whites. As before the war, the ruling class took little interest in intellectual pursuits and led in concealing its sins behind an aristo-puritan code of manners

The industrialization of the South warranted that it would have its phase of the rising agrarian revolt against capitalistic controls in the 1890's. One should never forget that Jefferson and Jackson were Southern-ers, and that despite the reactionary earmarks of the doctrine of white supremacy there has always been a strong liberal current in the South. Its pragmatic Jeffersonianism, indeed, has contributed more to American political method than has the transcendental reformism of New England. The Southern agrarian revolt, though it was often led by ambitious men who resented the way in which the

Bourbons had sewed up political jobs, was basically a revival of Jacksonianism. It was directed against railroads and banks and the middleman in cotton and tobacco so far as he represented financial interests, especially from the North. Its backbone was composed of yeoman farmers, and for the most part the mill workers and the poor whites stayed by the Bourbons, along with a considerable part of the yeomen. The general deflation of the post-Civil War period had, as we have seen, hit the Southern farmer hard. He was unable to see any cure except more production, which naturally made the situation worse. In his extremity he began to strike out against the agents of finance capitalism and found a rallying center in the new Farmers' Alliance organizations which had swept northward and eastward from Texas.

The populist movement as the legitimate descendant of Jacksonianism drew its leaders largely from the people. Every Southern state had its leader, but the best-known were Leonidas L. Polk of North Carolina, Benjamin R. Tillman of South Carolina, and Tom Watson of Georgia. Tillman may be taken as both outstanding and typical. Scion of a notably contentious yeoman family, Tillman tried to make a go of farming but failed repeatedly. Tired, as he said, of falling into bankruptcy, he resolved to seek political remedies and despite his uncouth appearance and unlovely disposition was an immediate success. In 1890 he led the South Carolina wing of the yeoman revolt which overturned the Bourbons in every Southern state except Alabama.

**"Pitch-
fork Ben"
Tillman
(1847-
1918)**

As governor, Tillman directed the rewriting of the state constitution. The predominantly Negro and great planter coastal area was shorn of its undue weight in legislative representation, and its planters, whose political power was based on their control of the Negro vote, lost out when the Negroes were disfranchised by literacy and property tests. The tax basis was equalized. Public schools were strengthened, and industrial and teachers' colleges were founded. The railroad commission was given power to fix rates. State stores were established to exercise the monopoly of liquor sales. The primary was introduced as an instrument of the Democratic Party and white policy.

It was a ruthless campaign, and Tillman did not hesitate to cast into the political junk heap a popular hero like General Wade Hampton, leader of the Red Shirts of reconstruction days. With his reform movement under way, Tillman moved into the Senate and became a virulent enemy of Cleveland; his nickname of "Pitchfork Ben" originated in a free-silver speech in which he exhorted his constituents, "Send me to Washington and I'll stick my pitchfork into his old ribs."

Tillman was shrewd enough to see that political success in the South

must be based upon unswerving support of the Democratic Party, because the existence of a second party might well give the Negro an opportunity to hold the balance. Inept Northern Republican politicians had helped to convince the South of this fact by their Force Bill of 1890, which threatened to turn the supervision of elections over to Federal officials. When the agrarian leaders in the other states went over to the Populist Party in 1892, the electorates refused to be divided and defeated them. Tillman rode out the crisis as a Democrat. North Carolina Populists made an alliance with the Republicans and in 1894 took over the state; but when numerous offices were won by Negroes, the electorate rebelled and in 1898 threw the coalition out of power.

Southern populism foundered on the shoals of race conflict and left few furrows in the sea. The orotund Bourbons came back, though now they were forced to adopt the undignified and demagogic electioneering tactics of the populists. Rebels like Tillman held on by discarding their revolutionism and accepting the Bourbon alliance with Northern capital. Tom Watson based his hold on frank incitement of the masses to antipathy against Negroes, Catholics, Jews, and bankers. The electorate, pretty well contented with rising farm prices after 1900 and indifferent to ideas, came to judge candidates by the show they put on and by the way in which they catered to popular prejudices—particularly negrophobia, Southern romanticism, and a superficial populism.

The interesting result was the rise of a new generation of gallus-snapping, toadying Bourbons who might or might not accept in their hearts the validity of what came out of their mouths. Such were "Cole" Blease, the roistering boss of South Carolina; Jeff Davis, the cynical rouser of Arkansas rabbles; James K. Vardaman of Mississippi, whose campaign chariot was a lumber wagon drawn by many yokes of white oxen; and Tom-Tom Heflin, who beat the drums of race prejudice in Alabama. Unfortunately few were the Southern statesmen of high caliber, though no record should fail to include Hoke Smith of Georgia, a moderate reformer as governor and Senator; John Sharp Williams of Mississippi, Oscar Underwood of Alabama, and Carter Glass of Virginia, all of them constructive Jeffersonians and outstanding parliamentarians.

The Southern garrison had won its struggle for the preservation of internal discipline. Meanwhile the battle for the veto on national actions had been progressing on a wider front. This battle for a veto, to which Southern Calhoun devoted his life and which led to secession and war, demand for continues with unabated vigor a century after his death and a veto plays its part in nearly every political issue. Its motivations are the same as with Calhoun: the protection of white supremacy and of the South's economic interests. The Bourbons accepted the Peace of 1877

because they had to; actually neither they nor their successors intended to submit to permanent economic domination by the North, and they have sought diligently to use their political power to break its hold.

The forms taken by the Southern veto are by now familiar. Even before the Civil War the Democratic Party had accepted the Two-thirds Rule in its presidential nominating conventions. This practice meant that after the war the presidential candidate would always be a Northerner but must be satisfactory to the South. The abandonment of the rule in 1936 seemed at first to indicate the healing of old wounds, but it has since led to renewed strife.

The Two-thirds Rule

The Two-thirds Rule was not the South's only weapon. Its solid allegiance to the Democratic Party meant less reliable states could wield power and furnish candidates in crucial elections, but it also meant that after the election was won the South came into its own. Its Senators and Congressmen were returned with humdrum regularity and so amassed the seniority which made them chairmen of committees and big wheels in the party organization. Each Democratic President learned that to get his program passed, he must win the support of Southern legislators. If he did not, the result was an informal but none the less effective alliance with the Republicans to thwart his program. The tactic could be worked at times even when the Republican Party had a narrow majority in Congress.

The Solid South

With these weapons at its disposal the South has usually been able to enforce its veto. Democratic presidential aspirants (until 1948) have had to be assured of its favor. It has blocked or watered down legislation which it feels attacks its interests, such as election-control bills, antilynching bills, and fair-employment bills. It has been able to fill its basket with Federal plums and to bring in Federally-supported war industries on terms which promote Southern industrialization without seriously violating its concepts of race relations. Hereafter we will meet examples of the political power of the South at nearly every turn.

Its political power

The Bourbons had found their strongest opponents among defiantly unreconstructed Southerners especially in the rural areas, who insisted that the old aristo-agrarian order must be preserved in its pristine purity at any cost. President Davis led this school until his last months, and enthusiastic romantics joined him in creating the Southern mythus of "the time that never was." The contented Negro, the plantation hoe-down, the mint julep, the lavish hunt breakfast, the scholar-planter, the code of chivalry, indeed the whole tradition of lavender and old lace was built up by representing the unusual as the universal condition. The United Confederate Veterans and (from 1894) the

The Southern mythus

United Daughters of the Confederacy became propagandists and were joined by such Southern writers as Thomas Nelson Page, Thomas Dixon, and Stark Young.

The whole South joined zealously in the holy game, turned every Cotton Snob into an aristo-agrarian, and refurbished its genealogies and where necessary invented them.

The South (says Cash, himself a Southerner) was, of course, being continually driven more and more on the defensive. The need to justify itself in the eyes of the world and in its own and to assert its pride as against the Yankee was more imperative now than it had ever been before. Moreover, there was naturally a great aversion on the part of the individuals who made up the master class to surrender the glory which had been theirs under the *ancien régime*. And like many another people come upon evil days, the South in its entirety was filled with an immense regret and nostalgia; yearned backward toward its past with passionate longing. And so it happened that, while the actuality of aristocracy was drawing away toward the limbo of aborted and unrealized things, the claim of its possession as an achieved and essentially indefeasible heritage, so far from being abated, was reasserted with a kind of frenzied intensity. It was in this period that the legend of the Old South finally emerged and fully took on the form in which we know it today. With the ante-bellum world removed to the realm of retrospect, the shackles of reality, as so often happens in such cases, fell away from it altogether. Perpetually suspended in the great haze of memory, it hung, as it were, poised, somewhere between earth and sky, colossal, shining, and incomparably lovely—a Cloud-Cuckoo-Land wherein . . . life would move always in stately and noble measure through scenery out of Watteau.*

The strength of Northern imperialism was rooted in the psychological colonialism of Southerners. Basically this was no different from the sentimentalities, the prejudices, the credulities, and the sympathies which laid The all Americans open to self-defeat through some form of exploitation. The American paradox is a perpetual puzzle to foreigners; the Southern paradox is a perpetual puzzle to other Americans, and sometimes to Southerners themselves. There was a never-ending clash between Southern individualism and the discipline inculcated by generations of living in a garrison besieged by race and sectional conflicts. Hedonism and puritanism strove for mastery: on one side the appreciation of leisure and its pursuits, of good manners, good conversation, and good whisky; on the other, prohibition of alcoholic liquor in ten states, social conformity as lip service to the aristo-agrarian ideal, political conformity as a defense of white supremacy, and religious con-

* Wilbur J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (1941), 124. Copyright by Alfred A. Knopf, Inc.

formity to a fervent fundamentalist creed as a bulwark against the infiltration of modern ideas.

The Southern mythus flowered in all its romantic glory in the midst of an economy notable for its hard-headedness in both its industrial and its agricultural aspects. Even in the North the Southern mythus gave a Dixie accent social distinction, and romantic plays about the South were resoundingly successful on Broadway. On the other hand, the North viewed with a certain horror—that might be called hypocritical in the light of some of its own excesses—the lowering of the “threshold of violence” in the South. Race conflict led to the sadistic custom of Negro lynching (ostensibly to protect Southern womanhood), which reached its crescendo in the 1890’s. Anglo-Saxon ideals and civil liberties were emotional guidons to Southerners, but Southerners interpreted the denial of civil liberties to the Negro as the very substance of morality. Long contemplation of the glory of the War for Southern Independence and a deep consciousness of race superiority had made the white South the center of American chauvinism and had loosened the hold of the concept of isolation from foreign affairs.

For the first time an authentic school of Southern writers appeared, notably the poet Sidney Lanier and the Atlanta folklorist Joel Chandler Harris, author of the Uncle Remus stories; and though the South may not have read them, it was justly proud of them. On the other hand, its defensiveness made it unable to stand self-criticism, and it drove from its shelter a group of gifted sons who should have contributed mightily to its self-realization. Chief of these was George W. Cable, whose stories of his native Louisiana so ruthlessly laid bare the truth that he had to seek refuge in the North. The result was confusion and paradox. Southerners—said Cash (page 235)—could “boast within the limits of a day both of having been born ‘in a log cabin,’ and of being the scions of the Great Red Kings of Ireland—of having sometime been a cotton-mill hand, with the implication that they were entirely self-made, and of having had the first gentleman of the county for their (quite legitimate) fathers!”

**Southern
writers**

3 *The Negro in the New South*

The ante-bellum belief in the biological inferiority of Negroes was reinforced by postwar fears of Negro equality. The doctrine of evolution, though unpopular among Southerners, was cited as evidence, and the Negro was jeeringly called “the missing link.” When the army mental tests made during World War I showed that Negro recruits ranked 10.37 years in mental age as against the white

**Problem of
race
equality**

13.08, the fact was welcomed as additional proof of the Southern contention. Reputable scientists, however, have never accepted such "proofs" and attribute the mental and cultural differences to environment—and their position has been supported by Negro progress. How long it will take Negroes to reach an economic and psychological status which will enable them to overcome their inferiority complex is a matter for the future.

Post-bellum years showed discouragingly few improvements in Negro conditions. Indeed, conditions seemed to deteriorate in those aspects of personal cleanliness, sanitation, and home care over which white owners had once had supervision. If possible, the Negroes' ignorance and superstition deepened as contacts with whites became rarer. Disease and crimes of violence increased at an appalling rate until blacks furnished one third of the nation's criminals. Negroes had dominated in numbers engaged in skilled trades in the South before the war; white competition now thrust them down into unskilled labor or agriculture. Even in the latter field, out of Negroes living on farms, less than one in fourteen lived on his own property.

The miserable conditions of Negroes during the postreconstruction era led many of them to seek relief in migration to Kansas, which was portrayed to them as an earthly paradise. Thousands made good there as farmers; and, though thousands of others failed, the westward movement continued, chiefly to Arkansas and Texas. Frederick Douglass warned against this flight. "The exodus the colored people want," said he, "is the exodus from ignorance, vice, and lack of thrift." Some white attempts had been made to improve Negro conditions, notably by training teachers and mechanics at Hampton Institute, Virginia. From this school came the greatest leader of the Negro race during these years of transformation.

Booker T. Washington (1856–1915), a mulatto born in slavery on a Virginia plantation, was at an early age infected with the passion for an education. In 1881 with the backing of a philanthropic Southerner, Washington started the little Negro school at Tuskegee, Alabama which through his executive and money-raising ability was to develop into the best-known of Southern Negro schools. Washington himself was a speaker greatly in demand at Negro and white gatherings, and he was thus able to give a powerful impetus to the advancement of his race. A thoroughgoing realist, Washington advised his people against utopias. "Cast down your buckets where you are," he exhorted them. He believed that it was impossible for the Negro suddenly to attain equal rights; a long period of apprenticeship and adaptation must come first, and this must be approached not through the white man's classical education but through mechanical and agricultural education. "The opportunity to earn a dollar in a factory just now is

worth infinitely more than the opportunity to spend a dollar in an opera house."

Perhaps the light emphasis on the *just now* was intended to deceive; at any rate, Northern humanitarians and Southern white upper-class advocates of "parallel civilizations" understood that he was counseling patience in inferiority, and so were ready to help him. There certainly was less objection to Negro cultivation of self-help and self-improvement, if it was not directed at social equality. "In all things that are purely social," he said on one occasion, holding up his hand, "we shall be as separate as the fingers, yet one as the hand in all things essential to mutual progress."

Washington's realistic approach was bitterly denounced as "Uncle Tomism" by a group of Negro leaders, chiefly Northern mulattoes, led by W. E. Burghardt Du Bois (b. 1868) of Massachusetts, a brilliant scholar and historian of his people. He denied the validity of Washington's vocational approach on the ground that only the usual classical education could provide the "Talented Tenth" necessary to lead Negro advance. He demanded immediate equality in all respects and supported his stand in a long series of powerful books. Both leaders sought the same object; they differed in method. Washington's method was open to the accusation that it would fritter away the Negro's strength in limited and eventually futile gains; Du Bois, on the other hand, was attempting the impossible. But what was true about 1910 is not necessarily true today. Most Negroes who take any attitude now seem to be convinced that it is time to put the advice of Du Bois into effect, and this is in essence the program of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (founded 1909) and of the movement for Fair Employment Practices Acts.

**Du Bois
and im-
mediacy**

We must not lose sight of the fact that though the most spectacular financial gifts to Negro advance have come from the North, Southern whites have contributed more consistently and in the long run more solidly, though they have scrupulously—and under the circumstances quite realistically—refrained from encouraging any assault on the color line. Such whites have usually belonged to the "upper" classes, but they have exercised a definite influence in preventing violence, improving race relations, exposing injustice, improving educational facilities, and organizing, financing, and administering Negro welfare programs. The result has been a reversal of post-Civil War deterioration and a real advance by the Negro in economic and cultural standing. We shall return eventually to this subject.

**Role of
Southern
whites**

The most stinging badge of Negro inferiority was the denial to him of civil rights by the so-called Civil Rights Cases of 1883. By these the Supreme Court denied that it was the business of the Federal government to

Jim Crow laws guarantee to the Negro equal use of public hotels, theaters, and transport, or to protect him against intimidation; such matters lay within the province of the state. This was in effect the abandonment of the Negro to the tender mercies of those most interested in denying his equality. Such prohibitions had always been enforced by white opinion and action, but with the Fourteenth Amendment thus officially out of the way, the South proceeded to enact a body of legislation, called Jim Crow laws, which assigned to the Negro special seats on streetcars, special cars on railroads, and prohibited his use of white hotels, restaurants, and theaters.

The return of Southern white control to the South and the elimination of most Negro voting by bull-doing tactics did not immediately result in laws disfranchising the Negroes. This came when the agrarian revolt showed the danger that Negroes might yet hold the balance of power, and with the encouragement offered by the Civil Rights Cases. South Carolina had already put into effect its "Eight-box Law," which made the depositing of ballots so complicated that an illiterate could not hope to fathom the process. In 1890 Mississippi instituted a test which called for the ability to read and explain any clause of the state constitution. South Carolina used the so-called Grandfather Clause, which limited the franchise to such males or their descendants as could fulfill the suffrage requirements in effect in 1867; other states found the idea fruitful. Oklahoma finally made the method so rigid that in 1915 the Supreme Court threw it out in the case of *Quinn and Beal v. U.S.* By this time poll taxes and literacy tests had been developed to such subtle heights that the Grandfather Clause was not needed.

Whether Southern courts were disposed to deny equal justice to Negroes has been disputed, but there can be no doubt that the white populace resorted to terrorism to keep Negroes "in their places." Judge Lynch has always been a popular American jurist, but of the 4672 victims of lynching between 1882 and 1936 three fourths were Negroes, obviously not all of them in the South. Yet the scourge, the rope, the shotgun, or the conflagration became Southern weapons for preserving white supremacy. The claim that lynchings usually followed on rape or attempted rape has been convincingly denied; perhaps a fourth of lynchings fell in that category. Arson and attempted murder of white men were frequent excuses for lynchings, but many a Negro met death because of some seemingly trivial offense or simply because he tried to rise out of his caste or was not properly humble before whites.

Lynchings occurred most frequently in rural areas where the races were most evenly divided and came most into competition. There seems to have been more tolerance in cities, Border States, and areas where one race

was greatly in the majority. Lynchings were largely the work of the more ignorant white class. Sometimes they snatched their victims from jails and hanged them in the public squares before hundreds of morbidly curious and approving spectators. More responsible Southerners long inveighed against lynching, and there has indeed been a great drop in its use. At the same time there has been a tendency in the white-controlled courts to mete out swift and drastic sentences against prisoners who have incurred the hostility of the community.

By about 1900 the old agrarian tradition and the rising industrial interests of the South had worked out a *modus vivendi* which suited them fairly well and which was to survive deep into the new century. Southern Negroes had little choice but to accept their assigned role, whatever secret protests they may have harbored. The rural areas, especially the cotton, rice, and sugar-cane regions, relied largely on Negro labor. The factories, with some exceptions in tobacco, preferred white labor. Negroes were disfranchised by methods previously noted, and wherever possible they were confined to menial work by methods not always free from violence. They could hold land, but on the whole it was not wise to show too many marks of expertness, prosperity, or self-respect. In the cities Negroes received less pay for the same jobs than white artisans, but the threat of Negro competition was useful in hampering unionization and holding white wages down. Technically the South still held to state rights, but there was a growing readiness to accept Federal gifts if there were no strings attached and if they were not intended to benefit the Negro.

*Modus
vivendi*

Rural and city interests had their clashes, but these were fought out in the white primaries, and when the general election came the interests showed a solid front. After all, they had one common meeting ground: white supremacy. In a general sense, the ruling class succeeded in its original objective of preventing white and black workers from uniting, and the policy of race division suited Northern investors very well. It was not the first nor the last time that local conditions had lent themselves to the illustration of the motto "Divide and rule."

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Chapter XXXVII

THE GILDED AGE

1 *The Gospel of Wealth*

WHEN Mark Twain and Charles Dudley Warner looked around them in the first feverish years of the postwar triumph of industrialism, they saw the economic oppression and moral depression beneath its glitter and called it the Gilded Age. The Panic of 1873 seemed to them (at the time) to put an end to the vain show, but our longer view warrants us in giving the name to the entire period between the Civil War and World War I. The Gilded Age was the great day of the middle class, with all the virtues and vices implied by that idea. It was an age in which materialism reigned, in which art and religion kowtowed to wealth, in which size was a synonym for significance, and the sentimentality of the ante-bellum years was frozen into a popular appreciation of mediocrity and superficiality.

Character
of the
Gilded Age

Too many elements of society united in a conspiracy to hide the ugly and the unpleasant behind dignified façades or, if that was impossible, by ignoring it or by agreeing upon self-complimentary myths. That this head-in-sand policy was not altogether successful is shown by one thing not ordinarily recognized about this period: it was the seminal season of all that has come since in art, architecture, literature, politics, and social growth, as well as economics.

We have examined at some length the economic evolution of the Gilded Age. We shall turn now to the other aspects. This chapter will be devoted to social and cultural matters, less to furnish a detailed portrait than to show the American's façade of self-assurance in mediocrity and his search for a new and firmer footing. The spectacle of the American shifting hesitantly between smugness on one side and, on the other, the uneasy feeling that there was something better if he could only find it, is fraught with

the humor and the tender pathos that we see in the efforts of the adolescent to act like an adult. The "plain people"—those without intellectual or social pretensions—were conscious of the flux that was occurring in the nation and yet on the whole regarded the future with confidence and accepted the rhythm of the present as something satisfying akin to a divine order. Henry Seidel Canby, a most perceptive analyst of the society of the 1890's, has this to say:*

I believe that there were values in that period called the nineties and scandalously misdescribed in current films and novels, which were as worthy (greatness aside) as any cultural period has ever developed, and which are now lost, perhaps irrevocably. . . . But I believe also that no one . . . can fail to see in looking back the seeds of dissolution, the shame, the animated corpses of belief, the diseases of culture, which were also coexistent with this pausing time in our American history, when there was such real content, and such a complacent yet enviable and sometimes splendid trust in the future; when . . . for the last time in living memory everyone knew exactly what it meant to be an American.

Deism and Unitarianism had weakened the eighteenth-century belief that God not only created the universe but intervened in natural and human affairs by means of miracles and words of counsel to those who waited in prayer for divine guidance. Nevertheless, the great mass of the population retained a belief in supernaturalism, whether firmly or uneasily, and it was possible for a historian like George Bancroft to attribute the course of American history to the guidance of the divine hand without exciting open ridicule. The battle between supernaturalism and science had been under way for generations, and the pious among intellectuals yielded only grudgingly to clear demonstrations that the heavenly bodies had not always moved with the mechanical rigidity posited by Newton; that the earth had undergone vast changes impossible to cram into the six thousand years presumed to have passed since creation; and that plants and animals could be classified in a scale of increasing complexity so minutely that, as Buffon and Lamarck suggested, it looked as though each form had evolved from the one below.

It was evident that the old concept of a rigid universe fixed to the last detail by divine fiat had to give way before the fact of flexibility. This change was accomplished, to the satisfaction of at least some minds, by a threefold reinterpretation which assumed to reconcile supernaturalism with scientific facts. First, it was held that God had a "design" for the universe which man was only now beginning to understand through these newly-uncovered evidences. Second, the doctrine of "secondary causes" held

* From *The Age of Confidence*, copyright 1934 by Henry Seidel Canby, and reprinted by permission of Rinehart & Company, Inc., Publishers. Page 6.

that God had created the universe and set in motion certain laws which had resulted in evolutionary changes. Third, the carrying-out of these evolutionary changes were but new evidences that God is immanent—that is, an indwelling, guiding force—in all Creation. This last idea, incidentally, tended to weaken the Unitarian and transcendental belief that God had implanted certain knowledge in man and left him to work out his own salvation. The total result, however, as many orthodox believers objected, was seriously to limit supernaturalism in favor of naturalism.

This reconciliation had been largely worked out in Europe and consequently was open to suspicion on the part of many Americans. But the importation by no means stopped there. German, English, and French scholars had used the newly-garnered knowledge of science, archaeology, philology, and comparative religion to point out the confusions, inconsistencies, and errors in the Bible;

The Higher Criticism

to deny the authenticity of the miracles; and to show the common characteristics borne by Christianity and other religions. The result was to tear down the mantle of literal, word-for-word inspiration which had hitherto covered the Bible and reduce the Book to history and literature.

These scholars, the so-called "higher critics," had a tremendous effect in the United States as their work began to convince many American Bible students. Nor was science ready to cease its impact. In 1851 Lord Kelvin championed the principle of "conservation of energy" and the "second law of thermodynamics," which held that energy, though indestructible, was being dissipated in space and that the solar system would eventually become cold and lifeless matter. If energy and matter were thus unalterably subject to natural laws and our planet was doomed to perish, where was the room for a supernatural God, for the human soul, and for man as the crux of God's design?

This new phase of the struggle between orthodoxy and science had scarcely gotten under way before Darwinism struck it the most stunning blow of all. Organic evolution had been widely accepted, but savants had been pretty much at a loss to explain how one species developed into a more complex species. Then in 1859 Charles Darwin published his *Origin of Species*, which propounded the theory of natural selection as an explanation. This suggestion, worked out in parallel by Darwin and Alfred R. Wallace, has now been amended, but its effect on the nineteenth century was tremendous.

Darwinism

Man had not been created but had evolved from the brute and was himself an animal, though the highest one. Man had not fallen, but had risen. As for evolution as the result of design, it was cast overboard in favor of change through adaptations, mutations, and struggles which gave every evidence of chance. Worst of all, it knocked the props from under the *a priori* method of finding truth by reasoning from

Its impact

pleasant basic assumptions and insisted upon reasoning from unpleasant facts—in other words, inductive reasoning knocked out deductive.

The result was that just when the economic world was entering upon a stage of upheaval and men needed a sense of security, Darwinism took from them the age-old comfort of trust in a loving and watchful Providence and confronted them with an impersonal universe which coldly ordained the survival of the fittest. On the other hand, for the first time scholars felt that evolution was demonstrable and could be used as a premise for further thought. As we shall see, the theory has affected virtually every aspect of modern life and is in no small part the impetus for all modern thought. It is worth noting, also, that the emphasis by Karl Marx on the class struggle apparently dovetailed neatly into Darwinism's theory of the struggle for survival.

Darwinism's triumph in the United States was delayed by the Civil War, but soon thereafter it was put to use, under the name of Social Darwinism, to explain and justify the methods of the Great Entrepreneurs and the Finance Capitalists. One might think that Darwinism's emphasis on the struggle for survival would have made pessimists; probably it often did, yet more often it strengthened optimism because it preached progress. The great interpreter of Social Darwinism was the English philosopher-engineer Herbert Spencer, whose influence in America was so enormous that he has been called an Apostle to the Americans. His many volumes covered all cosmic phenomena and were heralded in America by John Fiske, the Harvard historian, and by Edward L. Youmans, the founder of *Popular Science Monthly*.

Though Spencer was regarded by philosophers as superficial and by scientists as half-educated, he was able to apply Darwin's theory and scientific data so glibly to the social scene that it fascinated and delighted American economic conservatives, who knew exactly what they wanted. Spencer, in fact, had published his *Social Statics* in 1851, eight years before Darwin's epochal *Origin of Species*, but the new light only confirmed the old. He preached a cosmic "equilibration of mechanism," which justified laissez faire, and applied to society the biological idea of the survival of the fittest. Of course, he saw this as a struggle among individuals, and so intense was his view that he was in effect a philosophical anarchist. Human relations must be governed by natural law, and the state must confine itself to the function of an occasional umpire. He violently opposed the forcible burdening of the superior (the successful) for the support of the inferior (the unsuccessful)—an obvious discouragement of reform.

State regulation of industry was therefore bad and the graduated income tax unjust, decisions which the courts presently rubber-stamped. State support of hospitals, schools, roads, and fire departments was bad;

they should either be supported on a basis of private charity or thrown into the pot, where entrepreneurs could struggle to make a profit by administering them. Oppression of labor fulfilled the grand purpose of the cosmos by weeding out the unfit, and the man about to fall into a pauper's grave could comfort himself with the consciousness that he was in tune with natural law. The sugar-coating on the bitter pill was that evolution could "end only in the establishment of the greatest perfection and the most complete happiness." That great day, fortunately, was just around the corner, a great comfort to American optimists. There was even a word of encouragement for the pious in Spencer's assurance that science and religion were reconcilable and that the veneration of the Unknowable—God—could never be displaced.

Spencer was now in the position of giving the approval of Nature and morals to the changes which would have taken place in Western Civilization in any case. Of course, he did not invent racism and imperialism and he was technically a pacifist, but Social Darwinism was a definite encouragement to the men who launched the world imperialist race. Just as definite was Spencer's encouragement to those who sought to arrest American society at the *status quo* in order to free their hands to promote material progress and to amass property. His doctrines seemed to fall into line with American experience and to justify so many things we wished to do. In effect it stripped from the Protestant Ethic many of its inconvenient admonitions and left intact the practical aids to material aggrandizement. William Lawrence, a proper Bostonian and Episcopal bishop, proclaimed that "in the long run, it is only to the man of morality that wealth comes. . . . Godliness is in league with riches." Ergo, anyone who was rich was honest. It was Geneva's Calvin come to life again.

Approval
of wealth

American businessmen fell into the arms of Social Darwinism with hosannas of joy, only to find that several academic economists were already there. Most prominent of them was William Graham Sumner, then professor at Yale but a former Episcopal clergyman and the comrade and protégé of William C. Whitney. Sour-faced, truculent, tough as whang-leather, and apparently without humane feelings, Sumner was far from being anyone's ideal of a man of God. Though prodigiously learned, he was a confirmed skeptic. He used to say that he "never discarded beliefs deliberately. I left them in the drawer, and, after a while, when I opened it, there was nothing there at all." In this convenient way he apparently managed to dispose of his faith in God and man alike, but the fascinated undergraduates continued to flock to his lectures.

William
Graham
Sumner
(1840–
1910)

A devotee of economics, sociology, and anthropology, Sumner was all along an economic determinist and an enemy of ethics. "This is a world,"

he proclaimed, "in which the rule is 'Root, hog, or die,' and it is also a world in which the longest pole knocks down the most per-
 His life
 an epic of
 pessimism
 simmons." Self-interest does and should rule, and there should be no chains on enterprise—nor any aids such as the protective tariff. The only law was that of the survival of the fittest; liberty lay solely in the right to struggle. Democracy was futile, and inequality the order of Nature; plutocrats (the haves) and the masses (the have-nots) were destined to pull society down in their struggle. He favored Big Business but not its abuses, and the Republican alumni of Yale were perpetually after his scalp.

Above all, he was actuated by an intense sense of moral responsibility and diligently sought to promote the only palliative he could imagine: sound education. Especially was he concerned about the decent, hard-working common citizen, "The Forgotten Man," a term to become famous in 1932. Nevertheless, he strove with no hope, as was set forth in *Folkways*, a work with which even the optimist must reckon in his view of society. It portrayed social evolution as the work of determinist forces and gave a disturbing forecast of the twentieth century, in which the increasing power of the state exercised for the supposed welfare of the masses would result in war and disaster. He hoped that he would die in time to avoid seeing them. He did.

It must not be thought that Social Darwinism made brutal misanthropists of the Great Entrepreneurs and the Finance Capitalists. They were, by and large, too simple-minded for that; it was only an intellectual like
 The pathos
 of success
 W. G. Sumner who became a misanthropist. "Bet-you-a-million" Gates was one of the boys, joyously betting a thousand dollars that one raindrop would beat another one down a pane of glass. Carnegie was a hail-fellow-well-met who nursed the ambition of becoming the literary spokesman of the gospel of wealth and succeeded with the help of his secretaries. Even "Jupiter" Morgan used to go to his church on slow afternoons and sing hymns to the accompaniment of his favorite organist. They had few resources within themselves.

Late in the century an epidemic swept their ranks—an epidemic of art collecting; they seem to have taken up the game not only as a form of ostentation and sound investment but also as the result of vague esthetic gropings. At any rate, there was a demand for art experts, most of whom told the tycoons what they wanted to hear, though there did emerge a few sound critics such as Bernard Berenson, who led the movement for the re-appreciation of the art of the Italian Renaissance. Not many of the wealthy learned much about art, but they collected like mad. Few cities of today are without art museums which contain the good and bad evidences of this craze. Charles Francis Adams II summed up the tycoons of the *fin de siècle*. "I have known, and known tolerably well, a good many

'successful' men—'big' financially—men famous during the last half century; and a less interesting crowd I do not care to encounter. . . . Not one that I have ever known would I care to meet again, either in this world or the next."

The funneling of most Americans' energies into material channels was natural. The problem of conquering a continent was a material one, and it needed material methods and undivided attention. Action was glorified because action was necessary, and the man who produced the most in goods or bank credit was the acknowledged leader. In the true Calvinist tradition prosperity became the proof of righteousness, and education, art, literature, politics, and the church played soft accompaniments to the role of the inspired millionaire, as Van Wyck Brooks named him. The rich man had no rival but blandly accepted his position as conferred by divine right.

The
inspired
millionaire

Still, he was a likable rascal! Brooks has pointed out that the English man of wealth, however self-satisfied, still lived in a sort of underworld apart from the aristocracy and the intelligentsia, who constituted the cream of society. But in America the best brains and blood went into business and occupied the center of the stage. The American businessman was "a gay, sprightly, childlike being, moved and movable, the player of a game, a sportsman essentially, though with a frequently dim perception of the rules." He was the inspired millionaire, the envy of all those on the lower rungs of the ladder. If this description does not seem to apply, it is because this generation no longer knows the ways in which the Gateses, Morgans, and Carnegies disported in their leisure moments or the deadly practical jokes which they played on each other in the rivalry of the market place.

The campaign to preserve the economic *status quo* found one of its outlets in an attempt to preserve proper moral attitudes—which, of course, must approve the *status quo*. This campaign, though quite unintegrated, managed to penetrate every nook and cranny of American life. Wealth naturally took an important part in the movement, but it was not the only initiating and controlling factor. True enough, churches, educational institutions, missions, and charities were subtly influenced where necessary, but probably not often. Lecturers, writers, courts, and press stanchly and courageously said what they believed, a matter which was not difficult since the American people and their economic, social, and cultural leaders were enthusiastically Spencerian. The Salvation Army, introduced from England, was accused by radicals of touting to the rich and of fighting discontent with earthly rewards by offering heavenly rewards. The Young Men's Christian Association, also a British importation, devoted itself to ethical teaching, night schools, and physical culture. It would be a mistake to label as conscious hypo-

The gospel
of wealth

crites either the overlords or the ministers of the gospel of wealth. Says Ralph Gabriel:*

Its basic emphasis was upon the responsibility of the individual, confronting the hard uncertainty of life. The gospel of wealth explained the meaning of life with a metaphor that called life a testing period in which those selected for distinction must unite character with ability, and magnanimity with power. It was the philosophy which lay behind the private charity for which the Americans of the Gilded Age became justly famous. It was an effort to carry the idealism and the moral code of Christianity and the democratic faith into a rapidly developing capitalism. The gospel of wealth sought to harmonize competitive acquisitiveness with the fundamental moral law.

It must be remembered that the depressions and labor troubles of the era did not destroy Americans' optimistic faith in the democratic way or in the future. Capitalists, indeed, began to assert that the brutal economic struggle bred leaders who because of their economic power could and would do more for the masses than corrupt political leaders. To reach this desirable end, they demanded that the state give them tariffs and cheap raw materials and that it hedge in property rights with sympathetic courts and favorable currency and banking laws. Beyond these functions the state must leave wealth alone to work out its destiny of making America the paradise on earth that Eden had once been. By and large, Americans deferred to the rich man as leader. He had proved his expertness in making money, the most important of human pursuits; therefore he could speak with authority on all subjects. No one else could hope to be accepted as so expert in problems involving the social, economic, religious, political, and even artistic aspects of life as the man with a million dollars.

The effect of the rising dominance of industrial wealth was the culminating proof of the Calvinist axiom that God prospers the righteous. Poverty was due to vice, laziness, thriftlessness, or occasionally to bad fortune. By far the most of the country's rich men were paragons of piety. Rockefeller was a leading Baptist layman, and Morgan was beyond doubt the leading Episcopal layman. Morgan's will reads in its religious fealty like a document out of sixteenth-century England. There was nothing of the cynic in Rockefeller when he testified on his method of building up Standard Oil: "It was right between me and my God." Again he stated: "I believe the power to make money is a gift of God. . . . It is my duty to make money and still more money, and to use the money I make for the good of my fellow man ac-

* Ralph Henry Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought*, copyright 1940, The Ronald Press Company. Pages 153-54.

according to the dictates of my conscience." James J. Hill, technically a Protestant, once donated a million dollars to a Catholic theological seminary and defended the action as necessary to ensure that immigrants were properly educated in "their social view, their political action, their moral status."

It would be wrong to accuse the churches of having been bought; they did not need to be purchased, for they saw eye to eye with their benefactors. But they did need support. Russell Conwell built the 3000-seat Baptist Temple in Philadelphia, the largest Protestant church in the country, and packed it every Sunday because he believed in and preached the morality current among rich and poor. Frederick T. Gates, another minister, became Rockefeller's mentor in distributing 500 million dollars. There is a story that a minister who asked a tycoon for a donation to a worthy cause was answered, "I am not of your church." "That does not matter," replied the minister, "your money is orthodox."

Church approval of wealth

Pious men saw the hand of God working when great gifts poured in to worthy enterprises. When Rockefeller's initial gift of \$600,000 for founding the University of Chicago was announced to the convention of the Baptist Educational Society, a witness recounts that there was "a perfect bedlam of applause, shouts, and waving of handkerchiefs. One of the godly men present sprang to his feet, exclaiming, 'God has kept Chicago for us! I wonder at His patience!'" Without direction the audience rose and sang the Doxology. Before long public opinion, which had been critical of the oil trust, began to turn, and it was pointed out that it was an enterprise begun and carried on by Christian men.

Universities were not always controlled by wealthy donors, but there certainly were instances when professors were dismissed for preaching doctrines hostile to "property." Administrators could not have been ignorant of the connection with the spigot that controlled the cash. The students at Syracuse University sang a touching appeal to John Archbold, Rockefeller's associate:

Influence on universities

We have a Standard Oil pipe running up to John Crouse Hall,
And a gusher in the stadium will be flowing full next fall.
We need the money, Mr. Archbold,
We need it right away.

Another aspect of university life which served the cause of property (whether or not so intended) was intercollegiate sports. European university students have been notorious for their leadership of radical causes; Anglo-Saxon students have taken out their energy in playing, or the scarcely less vigorous pastime of watching, games. In a curiously inverted fashion this has served as well as riots at barricades to prepare the Ameri-

can for war. Certainly football-consciousness has been a significant mental and psychological preparation for successful military duty.

It was not necessary as yet to inspect school texts to see that they set forth the proper principles, and copybooks to see that they set forth the proper maxims; those who prepared the material were glad to do it free of charge, for the old morality of thrift and integrity which they favored was the very same which business rather flatteringly ascribed to itself. Perhaps even more effective were the "Alger books," stories by Horatio Alger (1834-99), a warm-hearted Unitarian minister who lived among the street gamins of New York. His numerous books usually dealt with poor boys who made good through hard work, honesty, and thrift; and, though highly sentimental, they were read with avidity by a generation of boys who were not as blasé as are their grandsons. On a more adult level there were the lectures of Robert G. Ingersoll, who actually saw atheism as a step toward the realization of traditional morals and the amassing of wealth.

Elbert Hubbard wrote *A Message to Garcia* and saw 40 million copies distributed. The reader of this sermonette will learn that the older generation, which complains of the softness of modern youth, was in its turn denounced as incapable of independent action. George Horace Lorimer (1868-1937), long-time editor of that capitalistic inner sanctum *The Saturday Evening Post*, allowed that "there're just as many chances for a fellow as ever, but they're a little gun shy." His *Letters from a Self-Made Merchant to His Son* (1904) is still good for many a chuckle and packs into its shrewd wisdom the mythus of the capitalistic system.

The high priest of the gospel of wealth, however, was Russell H. Conwell, the Baptist minister who was the perennial flower of Chautauqua. He specialized in one lecture, *Acres of Diamonds*, which he delivered 6000 times and with the proceeds of which he founded Temple University because of his sincere belief that education paved the road to success. He was the real founder of the American success story which still haunts our magazines and which is indubitably true, whether or not he was correct in his claim that out of 4500 millionaires in the United States 3900 began as poor boys. His cry "I say, Get rich, get rich!" rang into the ears of receptive audiences and became the marching order of the gospel of wealth.

But Conwell had a further word of advice. There was no use going abroad to look for diamonds; they lay in the opportunities abundantly available at one's own front door. The attainment of wealth was a social duty, and of course wealth should be spent in a Christian way. "We ought to get rich if we can by honorable and Christian methods, and those are the only methods that sweep us quickly toward the goal of riches." Thickening evidence of economic oppression never penetrated Conwell's armor. His

philosophy, of course, was blatantly materialistic, but it was in line with public opinion—and won the orator a million dollars.

The worship of success gave rise naturally to a study of the means of attaining success. As psychology had evolved, the swarm of fakirs on its fringes had multiplied. The 1890's saw the introduction of personal magnetism, mental control, and other psychological emanations which were soon to give birth to the high-pressure salesman and the public-relations counsel. Advertising had been growing ever since the war and had been an important element in the inception and success of the yellow press, as well as furnishing the money for the artistic improvement of highbrow magazines. As early as 1876 Bret Harte could satirize the outdoor advertiser:

Adver-
tising

One Sabbath morn, as heavenward
White Mountain tourists slowly spurred,
On every rock, to their dismay,
They read the legend all the way—

SAPOLIO.

Americans had always been slogan-conscious, and advertisers knew it. The public was now confronted everywhere with arresting statements: "It Floats," "Children Cry for It," "You Press the Button; We Do the Rest," and finally by such commands as "Watch the Fords Go By."

Self-censorship was a natural development in a society which desired no changes save material ones. There remained, however, the Puritan belief that sex was somehow shameful, sinful, and, unless it was strictly controlled, destructive of moral and social order and economic enterprise. The prime mover in the postwar campaign against obscene books and pictures, lotteries, gambling houses, patent medicines, and fake advertisers was Anthony Comstock (1844–1915), a Connecticut Yankee who found his happy hunting ground in New York. As secretary of the Society for the Suppression of Vice he conscientiously prosecuted all the preferred kinds of vice, but it is difficult to avoid the impression that he got the biggest bang out of suppressing sex. He spearheaded the movement which tightened up postal laws and customs regulations against books and pictures which did not meet his rigid standards.

"Com-
stockery"

Comstock persecuted not only actual or claimed obscenity but anyone who expressed ideas which he considered morally corrupting. He inspired the organization of the famous Watch and Ward Society (1876), which still keeps watch and ward over Boston's books, plays, and moral behavior. In this case Boston's native Puritanism is reinforced by the powerful aid of the Catholic Church, which has found a solid foundation among Boston's Irish. Comstock's animus was often clearly personal, as in

the case when he prosecuted the producer of one of Shaw's plays because the playwright had coined the word "comstockery."

It is quite clear that Spencer had nothing to do with the origin of the American stereotype of rugged individualism. Jefferson had drawn it from American life but saw it exemplified in the self-reliance of the farmers more than in cutthroat competition among them. Adam Smith had propounded competition, and the classical economists had given it its soulless sheen in the concept of the Economic Man, moved only by economic considerations. Hamilton and the Careys, still under the influence of the Enlightenment, were not inclined to go as far, though they promoted corporate privileges and government protection. It was Spencer's task to add the approval of natural law, thus changing the Economic Man to the Universal Man and enabling the American stereotype to stand forth in all its perfection. Since then, regardless of consistency in details, Americans have sworn by it. The result has been one of the most amazing rationalizations in history. Observe the transformation.

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Its trans- formation from indi- vidualism to mo- nopoly	neat a justification to discard, so the rationale was carried over even though Spencer himself declined in repute. Monopolies rose naturally out of free competition; therefore they could not be rejected by rugged individualists. The monopoly simply stepped into the place of the individual, and the courts recognized the substitution by declaring the corporation a legal person. Americans accepted natural law but determined to help it along. As Cochran and Miller put it :*

American economists sympathetic to industrial business simultaneously could be high tariff men and sternly antiunion; they could boost government patents, subsidies, bounties, loans, while contending in the same breath that free competition was the life of trade. They could approve tax remissions to encourage new businesses while opposing as destructive interference with the operation of "natural economic laws" factory acts regulating conditions of labor. . . . Thus free competition became the keystone of the triumphal arch of American business philosophy, while monopolistic tendencies were ignored; science and mechanization became the grand avenues of progress while patent pools and social regimentation were obscured; thrift remained the first commandment in the decalogue of the new business society though conspicuous consumption was its sign of grace.

* Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller, *The Age of Enterprise*, 121, 123, copyright 1942 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

When Wilson began to regulate corporate privileges by his New Freedom, Spencer, though knocked into a cocked hat by Pragmatism, was appealed to as the ultimate authority on the evils of government encroachment. Charles W. Eliot, President of Harvard, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, and Nicholas Murray ("Miraculous") Butler, President of Columbia—three of the most ponderous intellects in America—called as with one voice on Spencer to save them. Even Spencer's opponents were so subtly influenced that in many cases they found themselves willy-nilly on his side. They were fascinated by natural law. "Adopt all the cunning devices that social science has invented," said one of them, "and you cannot be sure that direct or indirect help of the poor does not undermine their self-respect and weaken their independence." This is still the majority American view in the upper and middle classes and is given at least lip-service by labor. It was the basis upon which the challenge to the New Deal was rallied in the 1930's, and there is no indication that it has yet run its course.

Its per-
sistence

American symbolism, as Ralph Gabriel calls it, had been expressed in the Declaration of Independence, in Fourth-of-July and Memorial Day orations, and in the cult of Washington worship. These were now supplemented by the Lincoln cult and by a new resurgence of reverence for the Constitution. Now the Constitution has function and value as a brake on hasty and ill-considered action and as a cogent argument for conservatives. The Gilded Age, however, saw it as the arcanum of property and awarded it a divine origin, an expression of absolute eternal values regardless of popular will. "Oh Marvellous Constitution," cried an orator. "Magic Parchment! Transforming Word! Maker, Monitor, Guardian of Mankind! Thou hast gathered to thy impartial bosom the peoples of the earth, Columbia, and called them equal. . . . I would fight for every line in the Constitution as I would fight for every star in the flag."*

Symbolism
of the Con-
stitution

We said that the Gilded Age was the seminal season of the reforms which have come in our own age. It is no less true that it gave us or passed on to us the false standards and neurotic frustrations which we are striving to overcome. Let us turn again to Henry Seidel Canby:†

Result of
gospel of
wealth

Creative wildness, that longed to shape and invent, to make life richer or better balanced, more vivid, less perfunctory, was regarded as eccentricity or weakness. A few such eccentrics were fortunate in discovering that they could create in the production of goods or the management of men; their energy found an outlet in the expanding industrialism of the age and

* See Ralph Henry Gabriel, *The Course of American Democratic Thought*, 396-413.

† From *The Age of Confidence*, copyright 1934 by Henry Seidel Canby, and reprinted by permission of Rinehart & Company, Inc., Publishers. Pages 242-46.

flowed into it. The vitality of the others was dammed up, diverted, or turned inward to grow sour and stagnant. . . . We acquired a neurosis which was to be like a familiar disease in American life for the next decades. . . . Science escaped because it was new, seemed practical, and did not arouse the suspicion of the business mind until later, when it was too late to suppress it. Our escapists to science were lucky for no one jeered at them. Business could use science. Not so with the arts. Literature, music, painting, philosophy, and the fine art of conversation, all need a supporting society. Nature is wasteful here as elsewhere and requires a thousand potential talents for every first-class achievement. . . . Those who aspired to the arts in . . . America generally, suffered from an infantile paralysis contracted in their youth under the dominance of business, from which they are only now beginning to recover. . . . Henceforth this generation, formed in the nineties, would be diffident in everything not in accord with the mores of a business community. They would read, but not too much, go to concerts, but not too often, support ideas, but not too passionately, be amateurs in many things but professionals in none except money-making, and often not in that. This is what happened to the young in the age of confidence who soared or flapped instead of taking to the nest to lay a golden egg.

2 *The Cult of Respectability*

European adventurers, explorers, businessmen, and noblemen—object matri-money—who took the boat for the United States in 1909 carried with them a little red guide book written by an unsung German humorist named Baedeker. “Throughout almost the whole country,” they read with a sense of happy relief, “traveling is now as safe as in the most civilized parts of Europe, and the carrying of arms unnecessary.” But their contacts with the *genus Americanus* both in Europe and in its native lair never failed to fill them with a sense of bewilderment, which could not always be concealed under an air of assumed superiority. Europeans, if Henry James wrote truly, looked upon Americans with much the same fascinated repulsion as one might look upon his own suddenly withered hand.

America was a wilderness of contradictions. A democracy under plutocratic controls. Descendants of first settlers indulging in snobbery toward the descendants of those who came to their settlement a few years later. A society which looked down on cultured German and Slav professors and musicians if fortune had ordained that they must labor for a living, yet was eternally apologizing to British visitors for the national crudity. A people which derided the land of their ancestors yet imported its music, its art, its literature, and its dancing masters and strove to mold its taste to the European model and to build up a new aristocracy which should reign over the masses as European nobles reigned over their peasants. It

seems reasonable that many of the new entrepreneurs saw what the snobs among the newly-rich were doing and refused to connive at setting up a new order which violated their instincts.

The old aristocracy of which Washington was the finest flower had placed emphasis upon character. It is clear that men like the Adamses, Jefferson, Robert E. Lee, and Abraham Lincoln (to name only a few) were men of character, and their sense of duty was shared by mil-
lions of men and women unknown to history. Various factors, including the reaction from war and the effects of the long battle against the wilderness, were in danger of making slickness and love for power more prominent as American traits than the sense of ordered responsibility—of devotion to duty—which we call character. The task of subduing this wildness, of making character a part of the American grain, was an absorbing interest of the Gilded Age.

The man of character

The new entrepreneurs who objected to the snobs' program, which aimed at transplanting the European social order, found the Cult of Respectability more to their taste. They could become "good providers" for their families, go to church, contribute to charity, commit their sins in privacy or in discreet company, and keep within the letter of the law, even seeing to it that special privileges were granted by kept politicians with all due formality. Gentility was diligently cultivated; men became "gentlemen," and women "ladies"; even the working classes assumed the titles.

Cult of Respectability

Reliability was the watchword of the new order. It was, in effect, the principal aspect of the cult and, as such, tended to confuse respectability with character; the danger in this was that respectability without character is likely to produce a rascal or a stuffed shirt. It was the old mediocrity of the Jacksonian period endowed with dynamic force. Still, it was in the spirit of the English motto, "Manners makyth man." Its attempt to implant a respect for the humdrum virtues was a healthy sign and a necessary step to the building of both culture and social-conscious wealth. It was also necessary in preparing the nation for the responsibilities which were to descend upon it in the twentieth century.

Appearance, manners, and behavior became second only to sound financial standing. The book of etiquette was more diligently read than the family Bible. Bearded patresfamilias comported themselves with a painful dignity, which they flattered themselves was quiet elegance. Women were models of prim decorum and presumably were helpless without proper male escort. The sight of a mouse was the signal for a faint into the arms of the flattered swain or for a graceful ascent to a chair—not forgetting to show a pretty ankle in the process. Little girls were taught to model themselves on their mamas, and little boys in their Fauntleroy suits were reproved for unseemly noise. Gold watches, Malacca sticks, neat clothing

of good quality, punctuality, reserve without coldness, and refinement without artiness were the marks of the devotee of the cult of respectability.

Predictability was prized. One moved week after week on the same unvarying round; he sat in the same pew of Sundays, ate with the same relatives of holidays, went to the same resort of summers, lived in the same house and sat in the same chair during his entire adult life. Unpleasant social facts were ignored or glossed over and probably were not mentioned in the presence of women or children. Genteelism afflicted literary and artistic circles; even the magazines ignored all but the most respectable subjects unless they wished to point a moral.

The home was still the center of middle-class family life, and parents did not hold with too much "gadding about" by their offspring. The white-collar class and some workers lived in frame houses in the suburbs and

The home strove earnestly to meet the payments, for the ownership of property was the badge of respectability. The better-to-do lived in houses with numerous gables, bay windows, cupolas, and porches, all liberally bestrewn with jigsaw scrollwork. Inside they were visible catalogues of the disordered American mind: the uncompromisingly lumbering piano; the horsehair sofa and inevitable Morris chair; the profusion of antimacassars on chair backs to absorb hair oil; the lace curtains and glass-bead portieres; the marble-topped table; the inscribed seashell from Atlantic City; the china dog used as a doorstop; the bookcase with its unread classics, its *Ben Hur*, and *In His Steps*, and Ridpath's massive *Popular History of the United States*; and the bridal corsage carefully waxed and covered with a glass dome—all flickering in the unnatural glow of gaslights. These houses were built for big families, multiple servants, many guests, and numerous parties and holiday gatherings.

The half-century of the Gilded Age saw a gradual edging away from the standards of President Grant and Queen Victoria. Houses were smaller because servants were scarcer and there were fewer children and visitors.

Changes Improved plumbing and heating made bathrooms and furnaces available in most middle-class urban homes. The parlor disappeared and was replaced by the living room. Grand Rapids furniture was simpler and more tasteful. Heavy meals gave way to light ones with more vegetables, salads, and fruits, partly because canning and refrigeration made out-of-season foods available but also because there was less heavy manual work performed by laboring men. Packaged and canned foods and baker's bread came in, milk inspection and pure food laws improved the quality, and kitchen gadgets further simplified the housewife's culinary problems.

Foreign dishes were added as immigrant influence spread, until today the American family can (if it chooses) have the widest variety of foods

and dishes enjoyed by any nation. To the Continental taste, however, the American menu still lacks zest, and the omnipresent ketchup is regarded as an insult to gourmets; as one Frenchman exclaimed: "Mon Dieu! A country with two hundred religions and only one sauce!" Candy, sodas, ice cream, and chewing gum became regular articles of consumption. Chewing tobacco and snuff gradually fell out of use by respectable gentlemen, and even cigars and pipes were frequently replaced by cigarets, despite their "dudishness" and the current opinion that they were more harmful than other forms of tobacco, hence the term "coffin-nails."

President Garfield once remarked that there are two parts to the human struggle: the fight to get leisure, then the problem of what to do with the leisure when we get it. American leisure, like our daily living, is hurried and harried. Centuries ago a Frenchman observed that Englishmen took their pleasures sadly; the same phenomenon is visible in a modern American theater or night club.

Leisure occupations

Nevertheless, though the Gilded Age seemed fevered to contemporaries, it seems leisurely to us. There was time for the manufacture of one's own pleasure and less dependence on mass entertainment than there is now.

But the change was under way. Before the Civil War the nation had been participating in sports of personal prowess such as wrestling, boxing, and racing. Team sports now entered: sculling, baseball, basketball, and football. Baseball began to take on commercial and professional status, but the others long remained primarily the interests of schools and colleges. Though both games depended on personal prowess, tennis and golf became excuses for social gatherings. The old-fashioned big-wheel bone-crusher bicycle was suitable only for a circus acrobat, but the introduction in 1877 of the "safety" bicycle made it possible for ordinary people to enjoy bicycling. Clubs were formed, and on pleasant Sundays rural areas were invaded by picnic parties on bicycles, and the farmers' horses were scared by the sight of women astride the machines engaged in unladylike exertions. By 1900 there were ten million bicycles in use, and manufacturers and bicycle clubs were promoting a good-roads movement.

This was the heyday of the lodge; in the last two decades of the old century about 500 fraternal orders were founded, most of them offering death benefits but also affording an outlet for the boyish desire to have a secret with the fellows and to dress up in funny clothes and parade. In the cities lodges outnumbered the churches. The outstanding order was, of course, the Freemasons, and there followed closely such orders as the Redmen, Woodmen, Knights of Pythias, and Independent Order of Odd Fellows. Then there was a whole menagerie of zoological societies: Owls, Elks, Eagles, Moose, and the Concatenated Order of Hoo-Hoo. Greek-letter fraternities gave college students similar grounds for feeling distinctive. Fraternal organizations

Fraternal organizations

have declined in number and in significance but they are still meeting the need of the lower-case citizen for the consciousness of being one of the boys and of enjoying the titles and prestige for which there is a deep human yearning.

"I am among other things," said a degree-draped Elgin, Illinois photographer, "a Noble of the Shrine, a member of the Council of Royal and Select Masters of the York Rite, a Sublime Prince of the Royal Secret, a Knight of the East and West, a Knight of the Brazen Serpent, and a Knight of the Sword. Sometimes when I go home late at night crooked and my wife raises hell, I tell her that's what I am too."*

Americans of the Gilded Age accelerated the tempo of their three traditional quests: for wealth, for respectability, and for culture. We have seen that many of them succeeded in the first. The quest for respectability had led to the creation of the first American aristocracy soon after 1700—the same which, in the North at least, was largely displaced by the Revolution. The Southern planting aristocracy and the Northern merchant aristocracy had fallen before the march of industry, and the industrialist was now trying to set up a third aristocracy. It was not easy, for the passing of primogeniture and entail had destroyed the continuity of male social traditions and distinctions. Moreover, the common American was now better informed, more articulate, and more skeptical of the validity of social distinctions. An even greater handicap lay in the fact that social progress was laying bare the hypocrisy of the old order and was foredooming any attempt to revive it. As a result, the "society" which the industrialist founded was plutocratic rather than aristocratic, gilded rather than golden, snobbish rather than sound; and it could not exist without pretending that the world was still in the stage where lords and peasants were legitimate social phenomena.

The change of base was evident in most urban centers and even, as we have seen, in the South, though of course there was no social prejudice against the scion of an "old" family who managed to get rich. The mercantile families made their stand in every Northern coastal city, but their usual fate was defeat or absorption. The most obvious exception was Boston, which rejoiced in an aristocracy of "breeding" which had come down from colonial days; actually its founders had been smugglers, privateersmen, or patriotic counterjumpers who had rooked their Tory masters, or merchants who had moved in from Essex County, but they were men of courage and ability. Now the great day of Boston was past. The once-boundless energy and fecundity of the Bostonian probably stemmed from some secret Puritan spring, as that of the lemming is said to come from lichens, but it no longer led him west-

* *Time*, 25 July 1949: 14.

ward to plunge into the boundless seas of the China trade or of transcendentalism.

Boston's aristocracy was "closed" in the 1870's, and its fortunes impounded in the famous "spendthrift trusts" intended to prevent their dissipation. Only those who got in before the door slammed were "proper" Bostonians; others, even though backed by generations of resident ancestors, were not Bostonians. The resemblance to the Athenian citizenry, which never admitted foreigners, is evident. "Breeding" alone could not insure social status; as someone has said, money can't get you in, but the lack of it can get you out in a hurry. The usual signs of decadence multiplied as initiative and daring gave way to stodgy conservatism. The "proper" Bostonians banded together to preserve the old traditions; there was even a Society-of-Those-Still-Living-in-the-House-They-Were-Born-In! Personal and family eccentricities were permitted in moderation, especially to maiden aunts, and community service was loyally supported, but these exceptions only made the bounds of conformity more tolerable. The superficial sentimentality of the élite was shown by the popularity of antivivisectionism as an issue. Charles Francis Adams II awarded Boston society this biting accolade: "I have summered it and wintered it, tried it drunk and tried it sober; and, drunk or sober, there is nothing in it—save Boston." The Adams family, however, had always dissented from the Boston pattern and had been rewarded with a puzzled and grudging respect.

**Cold-roast
Boston**

The American public has always been amused by "The Hub" and its "codfish aristocracy," and stories and jingles about them have become a part of our folklore. No American's education is complete without a knowledge of that string of jingles perpetrated by those rare birds, Bostonians with a sense of humor.

And this is good old Boston,
The home of the bean and the cod,
Where the Lowells talk to the Cabots,
And the Cabots talk only to God.

As progress would have it, Irish and Jews flooded Boston and presently a court permitted a man named Kabotznik to take the name Cabot. This was too good to resist, and shortly there appeared an anonymous amendment.

And this is good old Boston,
The home of the bean and the cod,
Where the Lowells have no one to talk to
'Cause the Cabots talk Yiddish, by God!

There was a tendency in the midst of such repartee to overlook the serious fact that the Boston aristocracy held the reins of power with the

tenacity of desperation. The social and economic ascendance of the inside Boston's families was around 1900 strikingly similar to that of the conserva- English aristocracy before the Budget of 1909, and it was tism accompanied by the manipulation of special privileges through purchased politicians which would have been called cynical in any other city. Justice Louis Brandeis may have recognized this fact when he described a certain President of Harvard as the symbol of men "blinded by privilege, who have no evil purpose, and many of whom have distinct public spirit, but whose environment—or innate narrowness—has obscured all vision and sympathy with the masses."

Boston was unique. Other cities offered a cruder and more flexible contrast and naïvely tried to make the "cult of conspicuous consumption" substitute for Boston's monopoly of "culture." New York, though it had some characteristics of its own, will have to serve as the type. The old Tory landed aristocracy of New York had ridden out the Revolution in fair shape only to lose its political power to the Clintons and Martin Van Buren. Nevertheless it kept its social ascendancy, preserving curious anachronisms something like those of Boston. The novels of Edith Wharton depict social campaigns hinging on nuances incomprehensible to us. But in the post-bellum period the newer families whose wealth was based on city real estate took over, leaving such Tory scions as were unreconciled to die on the vine.

The reigning potentate of the new day was Mrs. William B. Astor. Her ballroom (it was explained) would hold only four hundred guests, so those whom she chose came to be known as the Four Hundred. Her grand vizier was one Ward McAllister (1827–95), a Georgian who Mrs. Astor's had made a fortune in the California gold rush (not as a reign miner) and then had invaded the social scene of New York. Newport, his base of operations, was in large part the creation of his skill as a social diplomat. For years the parvenu Vanderbilts were excluded from the Four Hundred, but in 1883 Mrs. W. K. Vanderbilt planned a fancy-dress ball which for elaborateness outdid anything New York had ever seen. The Astors were not invited, and society palpitated at the prospect of the queen being dethroned. Mrs. Astor cut the knot by calling on Mrs. Vanderbilt, and an alliance was formed which ruled until the eve of the jazz age. The business of elevating the American social tone and furnishing craning material for the necks of the *hoi polloi* not only was serious business but it was strenuous. "We society women," said one martyr to the cause, "simply drop down in harness."

The summer colony at Newport and the brownstone mansions of upper Fifth Avenue in New York were the centers of the cult of conspicuous consumption. Interiors of European chateaux were gutted to furnish richly



From the Depths

William Balfour Ker, from "Life"

A cartoonist's portrayal of the rising popular resentment against the cult of conspicuous consumption

the mansions of New York, and sometimes the chateaux themselves were removed stone by stone to the New World. Carriages and servants multiplied along with gold furniture and gold plate, and as the *nouveau riche* miner inhaled his soup a private orchestra politely covered the noise. Entire hotels were hired for social functions, and the guests found pearls in their oysters and lit their cigars with dollar bills. Sojourns in Paris, Rome, Egypt, and the European bathing towns became *au fait*; sometimes the rich man took

**Cult of
conspicu-
ous con-
sumption**

the entire deck of a steamship for himself and friends, or perhaps he bought a yacht. Connecticut, Long Island, and California were dotted with country homes, and Florida's pleasure palaces began to rise from swamps and sands. Rumors circulated that not all social functions were respectable, and occasional credible witnesses described sexual and bacchanalian orgies which might have been modeled on those of Rome.

Delmonico's Restaurant catered only to the élite, admitted no others, was the favored scene of posh debuts, and was regarded as in a class by itself, though Sherry's panted close behind. Peacock Alley at the Waldorf saw nightly parades of millionaires and of women with "brilliant and varicolored dresses, their glittering jewels, their air of sprightly and reckless extravagance." Gold plate and orchids came in, along with cotillions blazing with jewels and costly favors. New York became the scene of a frantic struggle by social climbers to get "in," and though money could not remove the plebeian taint it served to perfume the surroundings satisfactorily. There were always sponsors who, for a sum, would shepherd the ambitious through the breakers of social secretaries and tilted noses into the quiet haven of the *Social Register*.

The gentlemen's club came into its own, and even that uniquely American institution, the country club, where with the rise of golf the prosperous could on a Sunday morning indulge in a genteel form of returning to the soil. Private yachts, racing yachts, racing stables, strings of polo ponies, and hunt clubs began their rise. The manufacture of family trees and coats of arms became a lucrative racket. English and French accents, clothes, and manners were aped, and cartoonists found them a rich field for satire. More significant was the evidence that the rich were in some measure washing their hands of their responsibility to improve the communities which had made them wealthy.

Newly-rich families sought titles of nobility for their daughters, perhaps because they felt insecure and recognized the value of a good trademark. Soon down-at-heels nobles from all European countries were making safari to prospect for American gold. The first well-known international marriage of this period was that in 1874 of Jennie Jerome, daughter of a New York broker and sportsman, to Randolph Churchill, an English politician and scion of the impecunious House of Marlborough; the fruit of this marriage was Winston Churchill. The Dukes of Marlborough were later refinanced by a series of marriages with American heiresses. The cachet of a title and the presumed superiority of Europeans as lovers enabled many a bogus nobleman to cash in before American papas learned to be as hard-headed with prospective sons-in-law as with prospective business partners. In 1909 an informed guess had it that 500 American women had married titled foreigners.

Conspicuous consumption, while carried to the superlative in America, was a feature at this same time of Europe; on both continents it bred resentments which fostered radical movements. Certainly resentment was evident as early as the Railroad Strikes of 1877. *Life*, then a humorous magazine with rudiments of social conscience, satirized the contrasts in the social scene. The "yellow press" went further. It played up the rivalries among hostesses, described cotillions and costumes (sparing no gilt paint), and hinted at the scandalous orgies of the rich. Among the more innocent diversions were a banquet to dogs and a banquet served in a hotel ballroom but eaten on horseback.

**Growing
resentment**

Popular resentment at some of these extravagances rose so high that the perpetrators felt compelled to exile themselves to Europe. Perceptive men among the wealthy deplored the flaunting of waste and warned of its social and political effects, but it did not die down until World War I brought in high taxes and a new social consciousness. In a real sense there was ostentatious waste because rich men's tastes were those of the class from which they had sprung: simple, garish, untrained, and finding pleasure in a kind of juvenile display of superiority.

3 *In Quest of Culture*

That the Gilded Age was not a phenomenon peculiar to the United States was shown by the three great American "Fairs" of the period. The Centennial Exposition of 1876 held in Philadelphia emphasized America's richness in machinery and poverty in art, but a visitor tagged the whole Fair as a "rich exposition of international mediocrity." The American public learned the lesson which contemporary Europe taught, that "a work of art must first impress by size alone, must then reveal the most polished manufacture. It must stab the eye with its novelty, enlist one's pity, or stir one's sexual curiosity. And whether it took the form of a picture or a chair, a statue or a stove, it must be a prevarication, a torturing of materials up to their limit of endurance."*

**The great
Fairs**

The World's Columbian Exposition held at Chicago in 1893, ostensibly to celebrate Columbus's voyage into the unknown, was rather a celebration of modern civilization's insistence on clinging to the shores of the familiar. "The White City" was a vast expanse of buildings of numbing classical, Renaissance, and Beaux-Arts variations repeated with chilling faithfulness in "reflecting pools." Smooth, opulent plaster sculptures, the erotic Streets of Cairo, gaudy bunting, gracefully unimaginative frescoes, tenor gondoliers, and "folk" restaurants strove to give pleasure. Once

* Oliver W. Larkin, *Art and Life in America* (1949), 242.

again the United States excelled in machinery, and Europe sent its art, sweet or heavy.

The Fair of 1893 gave an impetus to the classic in public buildings and sculptures which has not yet died away, and to frescoes the deadly sameness which was until recently the norm in museums, libraries, and post offices. That the third time is not always a charm was shown in the Louisiana Purchase Exposition of 1904 in St. Louis, where the pattern was repeated with the Beaux-Arts form of classicism prevailing. The architecture was notable for its superior confusion, and machinery reigned supreme as usual.

That the United States should tamely accept the European dictates of taste in the arts was proof of its pathetic desire for culture. The European cachet was essential; until after World War I Americans who wished to


Cultural imports become opera singers not only had to train abroad but found it useful to Italianize their names. Paris modes set the styles for women's dress. Public taste in books frequently waited on the British verdict; this fact was evidenced even in the cases of such ultra-American writers as Whitman and Henry George. It was no wonder that, while Europe sent us many useful teachers, there were even more charlatans who mastered the amazing gymnastic trick of simultaneously kicking us in the teeth and putting their hands in our hip pockets; they found rich pickings from the Met's Diamond Horseshoe to Hollywood.

This American masochism was not new, but never had it offered such rich rewards to the torchbearer from the older civilizations. Native spiritualism took on new strength with the importation of Hindu theosophic ideas. Christian Science appropriated and Americanized some of the same ideas and sowed them widely among women of the middle class who craved release from nervous disorders. American artists and writers did not ordinarily see the usability of native themes and were sometimes apologetic when they did. "Better fifty words on Europe," remarked one, "than a sonnet on Broadway."

The quest for the more esoteric forms of culture was more the function of the female than the male, for many men knew their limitations and were willing to slave at their businesses to provide the impedimenta of culture and luxury for their womenfolk. Frequently the arrangement gave foreigners the impression of female dominance, but more likely a man was content to be let out of obeisance to culture while he found pleasure in his obeisance to Mammon. Women have taken a place in the advancement of culture which has been denied to them in most countries. It is no accident that France, most cultured of nations, is personified as a woman. Says Dixon Wecter:*

* Dixon Wecter, *The Saga of American Society*, 289. Copyright 1937 by Charles Scribner's Sons.

Society is feminine in that it ranks strategy above directness, and grace above strength; moreover woman—custodian of the cultural as well as the physical germ-plasm—has an instinctive appreciation of the codes, barriers, patterns, and traditions which the formation of social classes creates. In fact the ultimate aims glimpsed through the mechanisms of society—



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The nominating committee recommends that we re-elect all of the present officers, as we still have on hand a very large quantity of stationery with their names on it.

Helen Hokinson's wryly humorous cartoons probed the efforts of women's clubs to promote culture.

the achievement of leisure without boredom, the sheltering of a fastidious minority behind walls of economic and social security, and the preservation of caste through marriage—usually appeal more strongly to woman the great conservative than to her husband.

Europeans, it is claimed, regard the American woman as too utterly charming, but she dominates her man so completely that they would not consider marrying one—except, of course, for money. Historically there has been an American tendency to place women on pedestals, especially in new communities where they are few in number, but it may be that this has resulted in partnership with the male rather than in dominance. The social freedom enjoyed by women has always seemed large to foreigners, but, curiously enough, as the legal disabilities were removed from women in the period after the Civil War there was a growth of the institution of chaperonage, which treated women as clinging vines.

Emancipation of women

Chaperonage and much of the old deference have disappeared, how-

ever, as the clinging vine has changed to a Rambler. Women began attending college in increasing numbers and were presently welcomed on a co-educational basis. Woman suffrage became the absorbing interest of a militant minority which braved male guffaws to parade in the cities and to picket the White House. Wendell Phillips stated the male dilemma succinctly: "Either woman is like man—and if she is, then a ballot based on brains belongs to her as well as to him; or she is different, and then man does not know how to vote for her as well as she herself does."

Women's new-found expertness at self-help belied the social pretense of helplessness. Women of the poorer classes had always gone out to domestic service or worked in factories; growing industrialism now provided more light-labor jobs and introduced women to typing, clerk-
Self-help ing, selling, bookkeeping, telegraphy, and telephone exchanges. Nursing, librarianship, and other professions were increasingly opened. Emancipation made divorce fairly easy by 1890, though it was not exactly respectable for another generation; the accusation was made that women were less stable, but perhaps it would have been closer to the truth to say that they refused to suffer in patience as their mothers had. Pioneer women had dipped snuff or smoked pipes, but the use of tobacco by women fell out of use in the Victorian era. Its use was now regarded as a sign of prostitution, and great was the scandal when "Princess Alice" Roosevelt smoked cigarets in public. The convention did not pass until the late 1920's. As for American children, generations of observers assure us that they always had been brats, and there seemed no inclination to amend the judgment in the Gilded Age—or for that matter at any time since then.

The ante-bellum period had seen an increase in the popularization of knowledge, but that paled beside the post-bellum increase. The phenomenon, however, was broader than it was deep. Cheap books and night
The Chau- schools were readily available. From a Methodist camp-
tauqua ground on Lake Chautauqua (New York) came the Chau-
movement tauqua movement, which offered to rural communities every summer a series of lectures and entertainments given in tents. Winter courses were offered as well in village churches and town "opera houses." Travel talks with stereoptican slides, Swiss bell-ringers, Negro spiritual singers, and inspirational and entertaining lectures composed the most of the Chautauqua offerings. William James, Bill Nye, William Jennings Bryan, and Mark Twain appeared at one time or another under the auspices of the movement or its imitators. In 1924 the movement was claimed to be reaching 35 million people in 12,000 towns.

The assembly ground on Lake Chautauqua remained the fount of inspiration, and there all summer long religion, education, entertainment, and relaxation mingled in a strange olla-podrida. The Chautauqua movement was peculiarly suited to the stuffed-shirt optimism of the Gilded Age. And yet even there William James felt sure that there was in the souls

of the participants "some inner stress, some vital virtue not found wanting when required." The Chautauqua movement represented all problems as within human competence by simply ignoring those which were not. The devil had lost his menace; and smugness, placidity, and optimism were in the ascendant. The new prissiness was well indicated by Chautauqua's most vigorous physical exertion, the so-called Chautauqua Salute, which consisted in waving handkerchiefs. Still, it was encouraging to note that Americans now carried handkerchiefs.

Newspapers are often deplored because they feed prejudice, sentimentality, and superficiality. Certainly this catering was true of the so-called yellow press, which took its name from a comic strip called the "Yellow Kid" that was run by the New York *World* of Joseph Pulitzer. Yellow journalism was distinguished by sensationalism in reporting the news and by high-pressure methods in building circulation. Its first practitioner was James Gordon Bennett of the New York *Herald*; one of his stunts (1869) was to send a Welsh reporter named Henry M. Stanley to find Livingstone in Central Africa. A new master was added to the field when, in 1895, a young Californian named William Randolph Hearst (1863-1951) bought the New York *Morning Journal* and began a slugging match with the *World*. It was Hearst's proud—but not altogether accurate—boast that he precipitated the Spanish-American War as a circulation stunt. Hearst's pretense to liberalism barely concealed his proto-fascistic claws.

News-
papers

Hearst was interested in power; his contemporary, Frank Munsey (1854-1925), was more interested in dollars and frankly exploited and wrecked many a dignified organ in the newspaper and magazine world. Hearst and Munsey ran newspaper chains. As well known, but much better balanced in methods and opinions, was another run by a family led by James E. Scripps and now the Scripps-Howard chain. Leader of the new day in the field of solid accomplishment was the New York *Times*, revamped by Adolph S. Ochs and still the world's leading newspaper.

This was the time of the rise of the sports section and the Sunday supplement and of the passing of personal journalism as exemplified by the names of Greeley, Bryant, Dana, and Godkin, which had been household words. Editorials became anonymous, though their place was soon to be taken by the columnist, an editorial commentator but not a policy-maker. Well-known among the early columnists were Finley Peter Dunne ("Mr. Dooley") and Eugene Field, now chiefly remembered for his poem "Little Boy Blue." Foreigners were inclined to deprecate the American press. "The whole character of the nation is there," wrote Blouet, "spirit of enterprise, liveliness, childishness, inquisitiveness, deep interest in everything that is human, fun and humor, indiscretion, love of gossip, brightness."

Magazines entered upon an era of unpredecended popularity. Most of

them were obviously tailored for "family" reading. To the modern taste the stories lacked punch, the poetry lacked insight, and the articles avoided plain speaking on unpleasant subjects. Still, they were interesting and informative to that generation. New printing processes made it possible for them to include profuse illustrations, many of them of a high order. Some of the old reliables were still in existence—the *Atlantic Monthly*, *Harper's*, the *Nation*—and were joined by a swarm of others, many of which were to find rich pickings in the muckraker era. The United States, indeed, became a nation of magazine readers, browsing all the way from "pulp" to "slicks." The two that outranged the field, however, were the publications of the Curtis and Bok families of Philadelphia, *The Ladies' Home Journal* and *The Saturday Evening Post*. Both epitomized the middle class in its great day, stressing the humdrum virtues and providing an easy education in the accepted versions of culture, social proprieties, and political mores.

It is only fair to point out that newspapers not only served to broaden the information of the masses but often, by their crusades, were positive aids to civic betterment. In the long run, the American newspaper can be more proud than ashamed of its record. The American press was even then matched in no other country for its coverage and accuracy. One reason for this position was the rise of the great press associations (led as early as 1848 by the Associated Press) which post correspondents at strategic places all over the world and spare no expense in their effort to get the news.

The press associations have also led the battle for freedom of the press, and in 1931 the Supreme Court in the case of *Near v. Minnesota* asserted that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the states from shackling the press. The whole issue, however, is greatly affected by the libel laws which have been interpreted rather rigidly in some states, loosely in others. Public opinion and public peril, rather than Constitutional guarantees, seem to be the decisive factors. There is some truth in Chesterton's contrast between the gagged press of the eighteenth century, when a newspaper could say: "The Prince of Wales is a profligate and a liar" and now, when it can say: "The Prince of Wales is a model family man."

The growth of cities made it possible to increase the number of years during which the child was exposed to public-school education, and toward the close of the period the school bus began to lead to the consolidation and betterment of country schools. Unfortunately the poverty-stricken South lagged far behind the rest of the nation, though it found this fact a happy reason for failure to educate Negroes properly. Teachers everywhere were underpaid and the turnover was immense, but progress was made. New buildings sprang up all over the land, improved methods were introduced, the curriculum was enriched, and free texts were provided.

Though there was some criticism of "frills" and "crazes" in education, the schools on the whole did a good job in reducing illiteracy and acclimating immigrant children. Public high schools began to replace local private academies, and businessmen began to prefer to hire high-school graduates as clerks. At the same time business "colleges" multiplied until no small city was without one. If it is possible to hold that culture must be broad before it can be deep, then American education was on the right track. Already, as James Bryce noted in 1888, "the average of knowledge is higher, the habit of reading and thinking more generally diffused, than in any other country."

There was a certain promise in the remodeling of American universities which followed upon the foundation in 1876 of the Johns Hopkins University as a graduate school under the guidance of Daniel Coit Gilman. American universities, particularly the graduate schools, were in many respects frank copies of the German **Universities** university. The basis of their courses was found in lectures and research seminars. Libraries and laboratories were for the first time put into general use. Faculty members were drawn from men who had proved themselves able and willing to advance the frontiers of knowledge and to stimulate student interest. Harvard pioneered by allowing the student a wide selection of electives in place of the prescribed classical course. The summer school came out of Chautauqua and met the needs of ambitious teachers.

There were obvious shortcomings, such as the tendency of the university to become a bureaucracy of administrators rather than an association of teachers and scholars. Overspecialization led to the substitution in scholarly thinking of thoroughness for insight and to overcaution in making choices. Form and style were neglected, though not a sort of mathematical organization. Worst of all was the tendency to multiply courses, and the building-up of pseudo-scientific proofs for points of view, once they were chosen. These defects were to become increasingly evident after World War I and all but destructive with the crush of students which flocked into the universities after World War II.

The nation was in the happy situation of being able to spare young people from production and service in order to give them a chance to broaden their education. There was also the advantage that education of all classes in the public schools weakened class-consciousness. On the other hand, critics justly pointed out that **Mass education** American education from bottom to top shared certain defects. In Europe, beyond the lower schools, the student was selected for education because he was considered capable and worthy of learning the cultural heritage, of appreciating and improving on it, and of handing it on to others. In the United States education was the democratic right of the individual and was intended for his own satisfaction and advancement.

Since everyone was entitled—and up to a certain age forced—to go to school, the public schools and presently the colleges invented mass education on the lines of mass production. There was increasing confusion between training, in the case of learning a trade, and education in the sense of indoctrination in the traditional arts and social values. The curriculum was “a rope of sand” formed with the intention of informing rather than teaching to think. A rigidly standardized and regimented credit system ruled with its bells, books, examinations, and courses cut and dried so as to offer the least obstruction to the attainment of a diploma or a degree. The aims were to teach social and professional skills (laudable in themselves), while the intellectual aim was touted but rarely honored in practice—there wasn’t time! The average teacher himself, however sincere he may have been, was a mediocre product of the same mill without intellectual depth to see its failures.

During the Gilded Age the drama was usually an arid desert. American plays were unbelievably bad, and the drama had to be stiffened by European importations for which not much more could be said. The basis for the growth of good theater, however, was laid in the building-up of the “road” by Augustin Daly, Charles Fro-
 The theater man, and Daniel Froman. Though there were outstanding actors, even Shakespeare was ruined by the current tendency to overact. This same tendency, however, was an advantage to melodrama. The simple, black-and-white view of life found expression—and betrayed the American’s basic lack of sophistication. Heroes and heroines were good and pure. Villains wore top hats and mustaches; they hissed and gloated, and judged their success by the degree of enthusiasm with which the audience pelted them.

Uncle Tom’s Cabin was a perennial favorite, and there were so many companies that finally they had to advertise two Toms who would give a pugilistic exhibition between the acts. The acting was atrocious; one critic after observing the show reported that “the dogs were poorly supported.” The variety show grew so smutty that it fell into disrepute, but B. F. Keith cleaned it up, changed its name to vaudeville, and gave it a new lease on life which lasted until the 1920’s.

The United States has contributed only two original forms of theater: the minstrel show and burlesque. The ante-bellum minstrel show continued to flourish through the 1880’s and then disappeared. Burlesque, whose contribution to art was the female disrobing act known as the “strip tease,” began its rise in the generation after the Civil War; it has now vanished as an “art” except for a few aging “ecdysiasts.” The touring circus with its clowns, acrobats, trained animals, and menagerie had been made famous by Barnum before the war. It now flourished as never before, with at least forty companies on tour at once. Its tinsel hokum exactly

suited the genius of the Gilded Age; these more modern times demand a more sophisticated hokum, and the circus has been relegated to school children. Its smaller competitor, the carnival, still finds enough suckers in small towns to enable it to persist in a rather precarious existence.

Before the Civil War popular music (with some exceptions) had partaken of the current Gothic sentimentality and was devoted chiefly to romantic tear-jerking by laying stress on graves and loved ones far from home. After the war it was still sentimental but devoted to a type of yearning more likely to be requited; the rage con-

Music

tinues, fortified by new skills in jungle rhythms and innuendo. Musical comedy existed in the Civil War era, but it did not become respectable until Gilbert and Sullivan's *Pinafore* appeared in 1878. Presently Reginald De Koven and Victor Herbert added their mite to European composers to make it a permanent field of entertainment.

Grand opera rose slowly in New York, partly handicapped by the Astors' snobbish requirement of full dress for the audience; eventually (1849) the *hoi polloi*, probably assisted by frustrated music lovers, tried to burn down the Astor Place Opera House, and in the rioting the militia killed a score of the mob. In 1854 grand opera took on permanent life in the Academy of Music, but in 1883 the parvenu Vanderbilt clique built the Metropolitan as a protest against the exclusive Academy. In later years grand opera found some support in Chicago and San Francisco, but it has thus far failed to strike permanent root as an American institution. Rather more successful have been the symphony orchestras, led in 1877 by the New York Philharmonic, which find a more or less secure lodgment in the hearts and purses of all large American cities.

American art saw the usual quarrel between ideal and substance: whether the artist should portray a figure or scene as it appears to the introspective mind and the questing spirit, or as it appears to the eye. The latter school had the advantage, though there were

**Artistic
conformists**

rebels who will receive attention when we consider the new currents which presently began to flow through American life. The dominant school of art produced a group of respectable and popularly accepted painters of nature who sold their canvases of Western canyons by the square foot; of smooth and finished portrait painters, especially the suave, opulent, and superficial John Singer Sargent; and a number of delightful genre painters who caught the American in a moment of action. Among the latter was George Caleb Bingham, a Missourian who set down for posterity the moods of Western boatmen and small townsmen, and Currier and Ives, whose quaint lithographs were the products of a team of artists.

Among the sculptors John Rogers, a New Englander, told clear and simple stories in his small bronzes which found their way into hundreds

of thousands of homes. Daniel Chester French, another New Englander, just as pleasing though less topical than Rogers, shared popular approval as sculptor with Lorado Taft of Chicago. But all deferred to Augustus St. Gaudens, whose well-mannered, flowing, and somewhat sentimental style may have come from his Franco-Irish ancestry but was the basis of his undisputed position as American *chef d'école*. Smoothly sentimental and respectable as art was, Henry Adams was probably within the truth when he commented that its chief characteristic was its sexlessness. Sex was used for sentiment, never for force—and “society regarded this victory over sex as its greatest triumph.”

The *fin de siècle* years were the heyday of American magazine illustration, as one can see by leafing through old copies of *Century*, *Scribner's*, and *Harper's*. The Civil War era had seen the illustrative woodcuts of *Harper's* and *Leslie's* weeklies, and the later crusading cartoons of Thomas Nast. New processes of reproducing pictures were developed, particularly the photogravure, the half-tone, and the etching. Edwin Austin Abbey of Philadelphia, best-remembered for his gorgeous but severely metrical paintings of King Arthur's Court and of Shakespearian scenes, contributed pen-and-ink drawings. Joseph Pennell, also of Philadelphia, got his start in the magazines and went on to magnificent etchings of industrial scenes and medieval ruins. Howard Pyle, of Delaware, was an illustrator still known by his historical photo-engravings and his pirate scenes. Equally popular was Frederic Remington, a rural New Yorker who punched cows, then became an illustrator and painter of Western scenes while they could still be sketched from life. Charles Dana Gibson, of Massachusetts, was soon to become famous for the smooth, elegant, icy, pedestaled goddess known as the “Gibson girl,” who was to give a name to the era around the turn of the century.

The American home was a potpourri in which, amongst various architectural toads and snakes, the dregs of Queen Anne were the most conspicuous. The mansions of the rich, after recovering from the horrible excesses of the President Grant era, settled down to the chateaux of the New Englander Richard M. Hunt and to divers Renaissance and Italianate models which infested Newport and the area of upper Fifth Avenue. The Chicago Fair was but the principal example of the new co-operative work among landscape designers, architects, and artists which was put to use in grandiloquent state capitol buildings holding pretty-pretty statues and anemic murals; in the Boston Public Library, which like contemporary Boston could be relied on to be “perfectly serious and nonexperimental”; and in that climactic oration, the Library of Congress (1897).

Magazine
illustration

Architec-
ture: right
wing

Much of the effectiveness of Chicago's Fair was due to the sensible planning of the landscape architect Frederick Law Olmstead, the designer of New York's Central Park; but the architecture was dictated by the high priests McKim, Mead, and White—the union of Pennsylvania, New England, and New York. The austere Charles F. McKim gave distinction; William R. Mead gave balance; and Stanford White gave urbanity, fluency, and social contacts, finally winding up as the victim of a socialite playboy in a shooting scrape over a chorus girl. They led the team which purified the old l'Enfant plan of Washington and gave it, along with much of its beauty of classic design and leafy vistas, the killing distances which have only been made negotiable by the coming of the automobile. Theirs was the conception of the Library of Congress and of the Lincoln Memorial, a classic temple designed by Henry Bacon and enshrining French's idealized *Lincoln*. McKim left his monument also in Rome, where the American Academy (1905) guaranteed that American students would persevere in his taste for the classical and the Renaissance.

As we shall note later, a school of left-wing architects was struggling to design new expressions; one of them, of course, was the skyscraper. Even more powerful, however, was the movement toward revising the traditional, hoping to find therein some assuagement for the fevers of American life. Ralph Adams Cram, a New Englander, rebelled against “McKim, White, and Gold.” “He shared,” says Larkin, “Bergson's belief that man's effort to shape life by his intellect is bound to fail, since his creative powers transcend his reasoning. . . . One need look for no great architecture . . . until art ceased to serve the world and went back to serving God.” He sought a “Gothic Restoration” and found fulfillment in his splendid fortresses at West Point and a series of magnificent churches, especially the Cathedral of St. John the Divine. The style was adapted to education in his Princeton quadrangle and set a widely followed precedent, from which at length emerged the Cathedral of Learning and the attendant buildings around its knees at the University of Pittsburgh.

No less important has been the revival of the style often called “Georgian” or “Colonial,” which has always had proponents ready to defend it as best-suited to the Eastern United States. The Rockefeller restoration of Williamsburg with the accompanying additions to William and Mary College gave the style a fillip which extended it to many other campuses and to public buildings and offices so situated as to enjoy space and trees around them.

Turning now to the writers of America, we see that though the older generation survived into the Gilded Age it had little to say. Melville, always distrustful of democracy, gave over crusading for moral victory and

Silence of older writers retired defeated to brood in the "living tomb" of the New York Customs House, where he could watch the ineffable "Chet" Arthur at his nefarious trade. Emerson kept his faith, but his goings and comings were no longer news. After *Democratic Vistas*, half-warning, half-reaffirmation of faith, Whitman retired to Camden; seers were no longer in style. The men and women who entered the Gilded Age as youths occasionally had their fling, then sought safety in acquiescence, in silence, or in flight. Those who continued to write produced innocuous tales on local subjects, the élite world, historical themes (as Lew Wallace's *Ben Hur*), and romantic Never-Never lands like *Graustark*. The poets who wrote for the magazines were even more inane. "What a fine thing it is," said a critic looking about him at the turn of the century, "that practically all our writers have been and are gentlemen, men of honor, breeding and charm!"

There was William Dean Howells, born in Ohio, whose riding out of the West to take the associate editorship of the *Atlantic Monthly* showed that the literary crown was slipping from the head of Boston. An expert technician and little more, Howells long escaped his milieu by indulging in sentimental optimism lest by criticism he only make things worse. Even *The Rise of Silas Lapham* (1885), his best novel, is the petty tragedy of the rise and fall of a capitalist and shows no feeling stronger than sympathy. His utopian novel *A Traveler from Altruria* (1894) is at best a reflection of good wishes.

Yet Howells found America a sufficient field and honestly portrayed it in the round. He has been called a realist, and perhaps he was when compared to the average; certainly he was sensitive to the new and protesting currents of the 1890's. He was stirred to indignation by such episodes as the Pullman Strike and, looking closely at the American scene, painted unforgettable vignettes such as this:

I looked and saw a splendid pageantry
Of beautiful women and of lordly men,
Taking their pleasure in a flowery plain,
Where poppies and the red anemone,
And many another leaf of cramoisy,
Flickered about their feet . . .

I looked again, and saw that flowery space
Stirring, as if alive, beneath the tread
That rested now upon an old man's head,
And now upon a baby's gasping face,
Or mother's bosom, or the rounded grace
Of a girl's throat; and what had seemed the red
Of flowers was blood, in gouts and gushes shed

From hearts that broke under that frolic pace,
 And now and then from out the dreadful floor
 An arm or brow was lifted from the rest,
 As if to strike in madness, or implore
 For mercy. . . .*

Samuel Langhorne Clemens, known as Mark Twain, experienced life as a barefoot boy in Hannibal, Missouri; graduated to steamboat piloting; then fled the Civil War and became a journalist in mining Nevada. He struck precious metals in paying quantities, but only with his pen, and left to tour the Mediterranean and then to settle in Eastern cities, become the most popular after-dinner speaker in the country, and hobnob proudly with the Great Entrepreneurs. He was at his best as a humorous speaker, for there his picturesque and smiling presence took the barbs from the arrows which he launched at society and made the hearer a co-conspirator in pleasant little gibes which, read later in cold print, were less humor than savage satire. He was thus variously interpreted as a mighty champion wielding the sword of satire in defense of justice and humanity or as a small boy scribbling unconventionalities.

**Mark
Twain**
(1835–
1910)

Perhaps we shall never know his true story. Apparently one side of his nature reveled in the Great Barbecue around him, while another was tormented by its misery and injustice. He portrayed democracy's courage and seaminess and gave vent to joyous frontier humor and (privately) to pessimistic contempt for "the damned human race." So he worshiped money and a completely conventional wife—while he attacked the injustices which were doomed anyhow. Even this he did by returning to his boyhood in *Adventures of Huckleberry Finn* (1885) and to the Middle Ages in *Personal Recollections of Joan of Arc* (1896) and *A Connecticut Yankee at King Arthur's Court* (1889). In his presentation of Europe's art Twain was, it has been said, using "brickbats on stained glass"; and the American public, worshiping Europe yet infuriated at its own inferiority, howled with glee. It was too late now to turn (if he ever really wished to), for the scalpel was blunted, and Twain was tagged as a funny man with nothing serious to say. And so he continued to speak in public and write trifles for publication while he poured out his bitterness and despair in works which were to appear posthumously.

It is curiously significant that though the early part of the Gilded Age yielded a spate of rhyme it left only one poet of value, and at that one who had labored unknown to the world. Emily Dickinson, disappointed in a love affair, became shy and gnomelike—in truth, a little pixillated—and during thirty years as the willing prisoner of her family circle scarcely ventured beyond her father's

**Emily
Dickinson**
(1830–86)

* William Dean Howells, "Society," in *Harper's Magazine*, March 1895.

Amherst house and garden. Her life was not wrecked but given to work, to poetry, to introspection, and to correspondence with her few friends. "I am small," she wrote, "like the wren; and my hair is bold, like the chestnut burr; and my eyes, like the sherry in the glass that the guest leaves." Secluded though she was, the din of the world penetrated her quiet room. The strife of doctrines made no sense to her. "How do most people live without thoughts?" she asked, and, turning aside to her God of Nature, she lived a life of quietly intense exaltation, finding unrivaled imagery in the microcosm of her home and garden. But while her eye was microscopic, says Van Wyck Brooks, "her imagination dwelt with mysteries and grandeurs . . . for all she missed she made up in intensity. Where others merely glowed, she was incandescent."

More tragic even than the elfin Emily were those writers who failed of fulfillment. Bret Harte (1836-1902) struck pay dirt with his short stories and poems while working on California newspapers and editing *Some* the *Overland Monthly*. Eventually he went abroad as a consul and ended his career in London as a hack writer, *short-story* notonously repeating his California gold-camp formulas. Ambrose Bierce (1842-?1914), a native of Ohio, big, blond, boisterous veteran of the Union Army, spent five carefree years in London; fought, drank, and wenched his way through a long California journalistic crusade against the power of the Pacific Associates; then, ill and disgusted, rode into Mexico, where he died (it is said) before a firing squad. His fierce aggressiveness and rugged lack of sentiment survive in a few good tales which exploit the morbid, the ironic, and the cruel, with a "cracker" at the end; for the most part he was silent.

Lafcadio Hearn (1850-1904), born of a strange blend of Irish, English, Greek, Gypsy, and Arab, was educated by Jesuits in England. At the age of nineteen, undersized, with one eye blind and the other abnormally large and inflamed from overstudy, he fled Europe and began a strange career of privation and protest in America, earning his way as a reporter and writer of jewel-like tales. Finally, after stays in New Orleans and the West Indies, he sought the idyllic life of Japan. There he felt at peace for the first time and became a successful professor of English literature; then he began to see under the beauty and unity of that society the implacable social controls which had always pursued him. But when he sought to return to America, he found that he was a prisoner.

Stephen Crane (1871-1900), son of a New Jersey minister, rose to fame with his realistic story of Civil War combat, *The Red Badge of Courage* (1893), and followed it by *Maggie: A Girl of the Streets*, previously written but too grim for publishers. Thirsting for "life," he went as war correspondent to Greece and Cuba, then fled to England for a brief space of fevered living while tuberculosis dragged him down. Richard Harding Davis (1864-1916), born in Philadelphia, war correspondent and adven-

ture-story writer, deserves to be remembered only as the beau ideal of American "sophisticated" mediocrity both in his person and his work. More worthy was his contemporary William Sydney Porter (1862-1910), a North Carolinian tramp, jail-bird, and journalist who as "O. Henry" contributed in his short stories unforgettable pictures of the *hoi polloi* that Davis ignored.

The list of American expatriate artists and writers could be extended indefinitely, but their presiding genius must always be Henry James. The talented James family, one of the most inexhaustible studies in American history, is notable for the two brothers: Henry, who fled, and William, who stayed to do his bit. When Henry decided to become an expatriate, his brother pled with him. "Europe," he said, "has been made what it is by men staying in their homes and fighting stubbornly generation after generation for all the beauty, comfort, order that they have got—we must abide and do the same. . . . A man always pays in one way or another for expatriation, for detachment from his plain, primary heritage." Perhaps Henry would have been smothered had he stayed; at any rate, he settled into the literary life of London to write the "Mandarin" novels which bear his name.

Henry
James
(1843–
1916)

Presently he became almost morbidly fascinated by Americans as social phenomena, particularly in contact with the old civilization of Europe: their "absolute and incredible lack of culture." Most notable is his portrait of the direct and self-confident Christopher Newman in *The American* (1877), who falls in love with a Parisian noble lady. Though she returns his love, the relationship can only end in driving her to a nunnery. James's Americans knew defeat in their contacts with the older civilization, but somehow they always emerged the victors—greater in spiritual stature but no less American.

Could he have been portraying his own history as he would have wished it to happen? He became the dean of literary London and, in his dissection of the inner mind, the inspiration of a whole school of British and French novelists; yet when the romance palled and he sought renewal of strength in America after an absence of almost thirty years, the new America seemed more horrible than the old one, and he fled back to England. He had been defeated in every respect in America, where it was well known that Americans won material victories and suffered spiritual disaster; yet when his American characters suffered defeat in Europe, they seemed to have an inner strength and resilience which he lacked.

It was in 1899 that Hamlin Garland visited James at Rye, and in the course of their conversation the expatriate fixed a somber eye on his guest and made this remarkable confession:

If I were to live my life over again I would be an American. I would steep myself in America, I would know no other land. I would study its beautiful

side. The mixture of Europe and America which you see in me has proved disastrous. It has made of me a man who is neither American nor European. I have lost touch with my own people and I live here alone. . . . I shall never return to the United States, but I wish I could.*

There was a saying at the turn of the century that the United States imported art and exported artists. It was tragically true that in their zeal to copy European good form in art, Americans were unable to recognize the artistic pioneers in their midst; such artists took what commissions they could get here or moved to Europe where there were more rebels to make them welcome. Young artists, of course, could expect recognition only after a term of study in Paris, Munich, or Rome (and here the word "artist" applies not only to painters, but to sculptors, architects, writers, and musicians). The popularity of the European flavor in American art, fiction, poetry, and historical writing must have betokened a desire to escape from the present and the real.

Such absorption bred in them a nostalgia which gilded even the lamp posts of Paris and made it impossible for them to distinguish between the good and the mediocre—let alone to appreciate the promise of their own country. Tradition was poorly understood but none the less revered; there is the instance of a dean of women in an American university who quite naïvely "started new traditions." Like Henry James, who gathered "a golden-ripe crop of English impressions" as soon as he crossed the threshold of his inn, the American exile found stimulus in an environment which the natives regarded as depressing or accepted as routine. He wistfully endowed its trifling mannerisms with an aura of leisure, charm, and grace, without sensing that underneath ran a current of brutality as cynical—more so—than that in the United States, and without the American promise. If only America could have these mannered traditions! It was William Dean Howells who answered with gentle irony that perhaps it was as well that we had no sovereign, no court, no aristocracy, no clergy, no church, no country gentlemen, palaces, nor manor houses—we have simply the whole of human life left!

The Gilded Age rang with the clash and din of the change-over from agriculture to industry, from the culture of the few to the culture of the many. There was in the potential intelligentsia little faith in the future, little determination to put their shoulders to the wheel of national destiny. Their superficial optimism evaporated in the uproar. With the exceptions of the hardy souls whom we shall take up later, they fled in distaste or alarm, some into a sullen silence; some into the arms of the brute they feared; some to Europe, hoping thereby to turn charm into power, to nurse the flicker of

* Hamlin Garland, *Roadside Meetings*, copyright 1930 by Hamlin Garland and used with the permission of The Macmillan Company. Page 461.

aspiration into the flame of genius. They hated competition, probably because they felt they could not win, and they suspected democracy because (in the current milieu) it called for competition.

Even the sincerest artist was prompted to flight by the feeling that he could never set down in writing or in paint or carve in stone that sprawling giant, America, with all its turmoil, confusion, and contradictions. They failed to see the age-old connection between conquest of physical problems and intellectual and esthetic growth. "We're the disinherited of art," cried Henry James of the American expatriates and failed to see that Europe also was striving, even more bitterly, to disinherit its pioneers. Expatriates mistook for freedom the European weariness which sometimes merely shrugged at their experiments.

It was the architect Louis Sullivan who laid his finger on the malaise of the expatriate when he issued his war cry: "Form follows function." Forms *had* followed functions in the past, and those forms had become fixed in modern minds as the *sine-qua-non* of the good life. Without disparaging traditions, for it is clear that new cultural forms must build on old ones, it must be observed that esthetes of the Gilded Age failed to realize that the New World (the New World of time rather than of geography) demanded new forms to accompany new functions. The Machine Age was upon us with its inexorable demand for new forms in art and life. The esthetes hated the machine less for what it did to the masses than for what it did to the old forms of art which they had imbedded in their subconscious as unalterable.

Their
malaise

The Great Refusal of the United States to take its place in the world during the first half of the twentieth century may be laid at the door of its once-potential intelligentsia. The American public distrusted them and their ideas and confused them with the "corrupt" world from which the pioneer ancestors had fled. Under the paint of the Gilded Age, Americans could not help feeling that the man with a worth-while idea did not give up until his last breath was gone. The expatriates had been false to their stubborn Puritan heritage, which demanded that a man go through fire and rack for what he believed.

Their
effort

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Chapter XXXVIII

THE RISING POLITICAL PROTEST

1 *The Courts and the Rights of Property*

WE HAVE seen how sooner or later deep-seated social and economic problems in a democracy will rise to the political sphere for popular adjudication. After Big Business took over from the Radicals in the Grant Era, the professional politicians of the two political patronage machines had sought diligently to prevent the entry to the political scene of what many dissidents regarded as vital issues. Rising farmer and labor discontent was evidenced by third parties and the increasing popularity of the free-silver panacea, and business threw its support first to one old party then to the other in its search for security. The demand for protection against the "invisible government" led many of the states to pass regulatory laws and to set up regulatory commissions. Such steps brought some encouraging results, and the Granger Cases seemed to open up a considerable field for state action. However, railroad and industrial combinations were set up under the laws of states which favored their activities, and, since so much of their business was interstate, it soon became evident that it was not possible for state laws seriously to affect them.

Vital issues
enter
politics

When in 1886 in the *Wabash Case* the Supreme Court took advantage of the interstate nature of railroad traffic to limit state control over rate regulations, it spurred a demand for Federal legislation. Congress was fain to heed the demand, for the old public approval of laissez faire was gradually being displaced by a willingness to accept Federal regulation of what were being more and more denounced as economic abuses. Even the railroads themselves went along with the movement, for they were mindful of the advantage of public ap-

Interstate
Commerce
Act, 1887

proval and of the opportunity to shape the inevitable legislation to a harmless mold. The result was the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. It prohibited the usual rate discriminations, pools, rebates, and long-and-short-haul abuses and insisted that rates must be "reasonable and just"—though it failed to define the term. It established the Interstate Commerce Commission (the ICC), the first of the long series of independent administrative agencies which now make the Federal government so cumbersome. Cleveland appointed a capable and vigorous commission, and the nation settled back confidently to await reform.

The ICC was supposed to carry infractions of the law to the courts, and they promptly made it understood that the commission's powers were innocuous. In the *Maximum Freight Rate Case* (1897) the Court sheared

the ICC of its presumed power to modify rates and forbade it to seek judicial aid in such cases. It then proceeded in the *Alabama Midland Case* to nullify for all effective purposes its function of judging the railroads' practices in the long-and-short haul. Of the sixteen cases carried to the Supreme Court by 1905 fifteen were lost, and the railroads defied with impunity the lesser decisions which the commission won. The rate-making power was definitely denied to it in 1897, and the decision only reinforced the growing opinion that the commission was a "useless body for all practical purposes."

Attorney-General Olney was able to point out as early as 1892 to the opponents of the act that in its emasculated form it would satisfy the popular clamor at the same time that supervision was almost entirely nominal. With conservative appointments to the commission, it would in time become a barrier between the railroads and the people. "The part of wisdom is not to destroy the Commission, but to utilize it."*

The Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, presumably aimed at monopolies, went through a similar period of frustration. Indeed, the intention of passing a reform law to thwart reform was even more evident. On its face, it made a misdemeanor of monopoly or any attempt to monopolize and declared illegal "every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." Now the English common law had long sought to discourage *unreasonable* restraints of trade and monopolies which infringed on the public interests. The Sherman Law not only failed to make exceptions but failed to clarify the meaning of its terminology. Enforcement was to be by court decision of cases initiated by aggrieved parties, by district attorneys, or by the Attorney-General.

Action was successful in only thirteen of the forty cases involving the

* *Olney Papers*, cited in Matthew Josephson, *The Politicos* (1938), 526.

Sherman Law and brought into the courts through 1901. Federal law officers moved sluggishly, bringing in only eighteen cases, and Cleveland's Attorney-General, Richard Olney, a Boston corporation lawyer, deliberately threw away the case of *U.S. v. E. C. Knight* (1895) by basing his brief on irrelevant grounds when he appeared before the Supreme Court. The issue hinged upon the acquisition of four competing concerns in Philadelphia by the American Sugar Refining Company, which gave the Havemeyers a ninety-eight-per-cent control of the Eastern refining industry. Olney maintained that the *purchase* constituted restraint of interstate commerce but adduced no evidence on its purposes or practices. Under the circumstances the Court was obliged to admit that the purchase was intrastate and perfectly legal.

Early history of its enforcement

Actually, the Supreme Court was willing to do its share when issues permitted. In the *Trans-Missouri Freight Association Case* (1897) railroads were brought under the act, and in the *Addyston Pipe Case* (1899) it dissolved a pool of cast-iron-pipe manufacturers who were engaging in interstate commerce. Nevertheless, such judicial discouragements to consolidation were so studiously ignored by Federal law-enforcement officers that finance capitalists were encouraged to enter upon their heyday. By 1904 John Moody in his *The Truth about the Trusts* claimed that there were 318 manufacturing trusts with a total capital of \$7 billion, about forty per cent of the manufacturing capital of the United States.

One result of the act, perhaps not unforeseen by insiders, was that the words "or otherwise" included labor unions. Here attorney-generals and judges found an issue in which they were interested and proceeded to initiate a hearty campaign for the limitation of those conspirators in restraint of trade. For this slightly amazing development, let us turn to the history of the Supreme Court's long campaign to limit state efforts to regulate corporations and to protect labor. During the period under consideration the courts quite generally deserved the label of being antilabor. In the light of Mr. Dooley's famous dictum that the Supreme Court follows the election returns, their stand is no cause for wonder. Basically the courts reflected, or rather lagged a little behind, the evolution of public opinion. They shared the widespread fear of socialism and rather generally searched for means of invalidating labor legislation. Since state legislators had sometimes been thoughtful enough to draw up their bills in vague and sloppy terms, the judges' search was frequently crowned with success.

Campaign to limit state powers

The most fruitful source of power against the states' corporation and labor legislation turned out to be the Fourteenth Amendment. Its terminology should be recalled here.

New use of the Fourteenth Amend- ment	No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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Though lawyers had asserted that the word *person* included corporations, which were *legal persons*, the Supreme Court had refused to approve the interpretation both in the Slaughterhouse Cases of 1872 and the Granger Cases of 1877. In 1882 Roscoe Conkling, one of the framers of the amendment, testified before a more conservative Supreme Court that the intent of the framers was to include corporations in the due-process-of-law clause. The decisions of the following year began to show that the Court had accepted the interpretation that the amendment protected corporations; whether it was because of Conkling's testimony is a moot point. At any rate, the doctrine of substantive due process now climaxed a rise which had begun during the controversy between Southern planters and Northern capitalists.

The police power	It had long been supposed that, save for Federal employees and obvious involvement of conditions of interstate commerce, the field of labor relations lay with the states. The states claimed that under their police power they had a right to regulate corporations, public utilities, and the wages and conditions of labor. Police power as defined by Chief Justice Shaw of Massachusetts is "the power vested in the Constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes, and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the Commonwealth and the subjects thereof." True, state courts had at first nobly defended the right of a railroad to charge such rates as it chose, or of a workman to sell his labor for such a sum as he chose; but when popular demand resulted in some effective state legislation, business cried out for protection. The Supreme Court complied by using the Fourteenth Amendment to limit the states' exercise of police power whenever it interfered with property rights.
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Limiting state rail- road com- missions	The first steps were directed against the populist states by stripping their railroad commissions of their rate-making powers, begun as noted above in the <i>Wabash Case</i> of 1886. The movement continued in the <i>Minnesota Rate Case</i> of 1889 and in <i>Smith v. Ames</i> in 1898; the latter clearly asserted the right of the Federal courts to adjudge rates, and it laid down the difficult doctrine that rates must be sufficient to make a fair return upon the cost of replacement of the railroad's property as well as carrying its debts and paying dividends. Through it all the Court carefully avoided any attempt
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to indicate the point at which protection of the public welfare passed over the line and became confiscation.

The power of the states to regulate wages and conditions of labor was easily limited on the same grounds, though the Supreme Court rather cleverly limited it under color of protecting the Constitutional rights of labor. Thus in *Lochner v. New York* (1905) it threw out a ten-hour law for bakers on the plea that it denied the baker's right to contract to sell his labor on whatever terms he chose. As a result, the Supreme Court was portrayed with deserved sarcasm as the upholder of the God-given right of a three-year-old tenement girl to contract to make artificial flowers for as little as she pleased.

Applica-
tions to
labor laws

Minimum wage laws, at first opposed by unions on the ground that wages would rise no higher than the minimum stated, were passed by fifteen states but were unexpectedly thrown out in 1923 in the District of Columbia case of *Adkins v. Children's Hospital* and remained out until the New Deal became entrenched in the Supreme Court. Laws governing safety conditions, accident compensation, fire and sanitary inspection, pensions—all have had to be ground out slowly by the mills of the legislative and judicial gods.

But even the Supreme Court learned. Even in its laissez-faire days it was inclined to permit state legislation regulating hours in hazardous occupations (Arizona mines) and hours for women and children. In 1917 it broke precedent by permitting Oregon to enforce a ten-hour law for all factory workers. Congress was mindful of rising protest against using child labor, and twice it tried to do something about it. The Keating law of 1916 prohibiting the passage in interstate commerce of articles made by child labor was thrown out in the case of *Hammer v. Dagenhart* (1918), and an attempt in 1919 to tax such articles was disallowed in the case of *Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Company* (1922). Attempts to get a Constitutional amendment approved by the states did not succeed, but the Supreme Court has since that permitted some limitations.

Exceptions


The courts did not limit themselves to hampering labor legislation but developed interpretations which enabled them to limit or forbid actions by labor unions or individuals. The common-law interpretation of the strike as a conspiracy in restraint of trade had been weakened in Massachusetts by Chief Justice Shaw's decision in 1842 that labor unions and the strike were legal. Other states yielded slowly, until it became evident that the injunction was a more expeditious and thorough weapon against labor. An injunction is a court order requiring a party to do or refrain from doing certain acts; violation of the order entails trial and punishment, not for doing the acts (which may be perfectly lawful) but for contempt of court.

The in-
junction

The use of the injunction in labor disputes had begun as early as 1877

in judicial attempts to remedy the lack of legislation against strikes, picketing, and boycotts. But it was the ubiquitous Olney who put the injunction on a firm foundation when, hinging his argument on the Interstate Commerce Act and the Sherman Antitrust Act (both based on Federal control of interstate commerce), he carried the Debs injunction case to the Supreme Court under the claim that those acts prohibited collusion among and monopoly by labor unions.

Olney's
argument



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The Boss: "Now, children, all together, three cheers for the Supreme Court."

Art Young's comment upon the Supreme Court's rejection in 1918 of the Keating Child Labor Act

Traditionally the injunction had been used to protect real property, but the Court now obliged by declaring that business expectancy of sales and of labor service were properties and were entitled to protection.

Strikes, picketings, and boycotts were legal, and no damages could be recovered for losses due to their exercise, nor at that time could injunctions be issued under *law* to protect these properties in expectancy. The Court now got around this by approving injunctions issued under *equity* on the ground that strikes, picketing, and boycotts constitute malicious conspiracy to injure such properties. It was in this way that the rarely used injunction suddenly came into such frequent use on the initiative of corporations that its critics have bitterly denounced government by injunc-

tion. The situation was not remedied until the Norris-La Guardia Act of 1932, and labor is still trying to prevent its use on government initiative.

A long list of interpretive decisions followed. In 1906 in the case of the *Buck Stove and Range Co. v. the American Federation of Labor* the publication of unfair lists was prohibited as a kind of boycott, and Gompers and Mitchell were sentenced to prison though they did not serve. In the *Danbury Hatters' Case*, which ran from 1902 to 1912, a hat company sued 197 members of the United Hatters' Union for triple damages of \$250,000 because of boycott, and in the end it took over the members' homes and bank accounts. In the case of the *United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Co.* (1922) it was decided that unincorporated labor unions could be sued for violation of the Sherman Act. On the other hand, employers successfully upheld their right to use the blacklist and the lockout, and to force employees to take the ironclad oath or sign the yellow-dog contract not to join unions. After a long and bloody strike in the West Virginia coal fields in 1906, the companies had forced the workers to sign yellow-dog contracts. When the U.M.W. tried to unionize West Virginia in order to protect their bargaining power in other unionized fields, the organization was successfully prosecuted in the *Hitchman Case* (1917), and the yellow-dog contract was supported.

Later decisions on labor practices

It would be caviling to deny that the Supreme Court was convinced that its reasons were soundly Constitutional, even when it reversed itself. Nevertheless, critics found an increasing tendency on the part of the Court to judge expedience as well as Constitutionality—a tendency which, carried to its logical conclusion, effectively makes the Supreme Court a third legislative chamber. By the twentieth century a state had been reached where few laws could go into effect until they had traveled the long road through the courts and received the imprimatur of the Supreme Court.

Supreme Court a third chamber

2 *The Ordeal of Grover Cleveland*

In previous chapters we gave some attention to the rise of third parties in the agricultural areas and to the rise of the fallacy of free silver. By 1890 it was clear that there was danger of the renewal of the old alliance between West and South, an alliance which would inevitably break up the pleasant little conspiracy between some of the leaders of the old patronage-based parties to preserve the *status quo*. The movement, before it was taken over by free silver, was reformist in the authentic Jacksonian tradition of opposition not only to Big Property but to government favors to Big Property. It therefore demanded an expanded currency, a low tariff, government control of rail-

The Populist movement

roads, the initiative and referendum, the direct election of Senators, enforcement of the rights of labor, the imposition of an income tax, and the break-up of monopolies.

But the movement also asked for direct government help. It desired to put into effect a "subtreasury plan" by which the farmer could deposit his grain and cotton in Federal warehouses and borrow up to eighty per cent of their value in specially issued Treasury notes. The organization of the People's Party, usually known as the Populists, in 1891 brought together Weaver's old Greenback Party and a number of Farmers' Alliances. Its nomination of Weaver and espousal of free silver in the campaign of 1892 paved the way for an agreement with the Democrats by which it carried twenty-two electoral votes and elected a solid little delegation of Senators and Representatives.

The Populist movement sprang from the grass roots, and as such it had its native leaders. True, Southern rebels hesitated to leave the Democratic Party, and most preferred to take a chance on seizing control of it. Tom Watson of Georgia, however, led a farmers' exodus to the Populists which was soundly punished in the elections of 1892. This was to have its effect on the events of 1896. James Baird Weaver (1833-1912) of Iowa, a crusader of balance and experience, would have been distinguished in any political party. "Sockless" Jerry Simpson of Kansas—who wore socks—was a power in Congressional debates. Mary Elizabeth Lease, also of Kansas, was a brilliant and cultured lawyer who shocked the nation by her advice to farmers "to raise less corn and more *hell*." Ignatius Donnelly, the "Sage of Nininger," harangued Minnesotans with Irish brilliance and wrote a series of curious pseudo-scientific books which enjoyed great popularity among the half-learned. But Donnelly was filled with crusading zeal. His opening paragraph to the Populist Platform of 1892 was a battle call potent in its day.

We meet in the midst of a nation brought to the verge of moral, political, and material ruin. Corruption dominates the ballot-box, the legislature, the Congress, and touches even the ermine of the bench. The people are demoralized. . . . The newspapers are largely subsidized or muzzled; public opinion silenced; business prostrated; our homes covered with mortgages; labor impoverished; and the land concentrating in the hands of the capitalists. The urban workmen are denied the right of organization for self-protection; imported pauperized labor beats down their wages; a hireling standing army, unrecognized by our laws, is established to shoot them down, and they are rapidly degenerating into European conditions. The fruits of the toil of millions are boldly stolen to build up colossal fortunes for a few, unprecedented in the history of mankind; and the possessors of

these, in turn, despise the republic and endanger liberty. From the same prolific womb of governmental injustice we breed the two great classes of tramps and millionaires.*

If there had been any substance to Cleveland's hope that he could tame the "wild jackasses" of agrarian revolt, it was weakened by Eastern distrust of the Democratic-Populist entente and was dissipated by the Panic of 1893. There is reason to believe that Cleveland's victory in 1892 had been a mandate of the voters against the McKinley Tariff, pension extravagance, halfhearted enforcement of civil-service reform, and the Republican failure to make the Sherman Antitrust Act and the Sherman Silver Purchase Act stronger. Labor troubles and agrarian deflations must also have played their parts. Cleveland was not the man to spearhead agrarian and labor protest. We have already seen him in action against the Pullman Strike. We shall now follow his further actions in the economic and political spheres which were, despite his earnest effort, united into one overwhelming problem.

**Cleveland
rejects the
popular
mandate**

Cleveland's first problem concerned the Treasury's gold reserve. As the Federal surplus turned into a deficit, the business community marked the failure of its faith by mounting gold withdrawals until by Cleveland's accession the Treasury gold reserve was barely above the "safety point" of \$100,000,000. In April the reserve dropped below the magic line. Then in May the Panic of 1893 hit the stock market. Money was unobtainable, and around five hundred banks failed. It is claimed that eventually there were 15,000 business failures and four million men were out of work, while one quarter of the railroads' capitalization passed into the hands of receivers. Grain and cotton prices plummeted to such depths that the farmer could not afford to pay the freight to market.

**Financial
crisis**

The deflation which had bred the Farmers' Alliances and the Populist movement now in retrospect seemed like prosperous times. European stringency, it will be remembered, had played a part in the origin of the panic, and the hard times were now world-wide. Cleveland, however, did not see the crisis as any concern of the government except in so far as it was his duty to maintain a sound, gold-based currency. In this respect he was not out of step with his times. We have seen that even the agrarian rebels often laid their troubles to a deflated currency rather than to economic imbalances.

Cleveland agreed with the financial community in attributing the crisis to the way in which the Sherman Silver Purchase Act had strained the gold

* Edward Stanwood, *History of the Presidency* (2 v., 1912), 1: 509.

reserve by flooding the country with new currency which had to be re-
 deemed in gold. The first thing to do, therefore, was to repeal
Repeal of the act. A special session of Congress was convened (August
Sherman 1893), and repeal was forced through by a brutal use of the
Silver Pur- patronage club which the Cleveland of the first term would
chase Act have regarded as unconstitutional interference by one department of gov-
 ernment in the affairs of another. The anguished cries of Western and
 Southern silverites was sweet music to Wall Street—and the death knell
 of Cleveland's political career. There was now a "Crime of '93" to add to
 the "Crime of '73."

Wall Street paid flattering tribute to Cleveland's courage but did not
 stop its run on gold. By the end of 1893 the reserve was down to \$68
 million, and Cleveland's Secretary of the Treasury in January 1894 sought
The Mor- to replenish it by selling five-per-cent bonds (payable in
gan bond "coin") for gold to the amount of \$58 million. Since the
issue Treasury would still redeem all currency in gold (and cur-
 rency turned in for gold had to be put back in circulation), it was a simple
 matter for bond purchasers to draw from the Treasury the gold which they
 then turned around and sold to the Treasury at a nice profit: the so-called
 "Endless Chain."

A second gold loan in 1894, though the "Endless Chain" was not obvi-
 ously resorted to, quickly disappeared from the Treasury. Silverites in-
 sisted that if gold failed, the government should resort to silver payments;
 so they mulishly blocked Congressional efforts to alter parity between the
 two metals. Finally in February 1895 Cleveland, in desperation, made an
 agreement with Morgan and Belmont to take a \$62 million four-per-cent
 gold bond issue at 104.5; one half of the gold was to be brought from
 abroad, and the purchasers were to use their influence to stop gold with-
 drawals from the Treasury. Morgan and Belmont promptly disposed of
 the bonds at 112.25 and took in a profit variously estimated at from five
 to sixteen million dollars, but actually for the American half of the syndi-
 cate about a million and a half.*

The immediate effect, however, was to restore business confidence and
 reduce the run on the Treasury. Later on, the syndicate was put to con-
 siderable trouble and loss to prevent a renewal of the outward flow of gold.

The effects Morgan was represented then, and has been ever since, as
 ruthlessly forcing Cleveland to meet his terms or see the
 country forced off the gold standard. The truth is that Morgan had much
 to lose if the gold standard was abandoned, and there is every evidence
 that he regarded himself as the country's savior and as having earned his

* Frederick L. Allen, *The Great Pierpont Morgan* (1949), 123–24, shows that the profit made by the American half of the syndicate was only about five per cent, of which the House of Morgan received less than \$250,000.

perquisites. Actually, if the country had any savior, it was Cleveland. Against the majority sentiment of his own party he had refused to permit the sudden inflation which would have resulted from a shift to silver as a monetary base—it would have brought in a fifty-cent dollar—and in so doing he saved the country from economic troubles which can only be



Leon Barritt, from Rep. Nat. Com.

The free trade bird built its nest in every chimney.

This caustic comment of 1904 was inspired by Cleveland's work in getting the tariff lowered by eight per cent.

guessed at. He also drove another nail in his political coffin. The Republicans, while approving the action, abated none of their ungrateful insistence that he was a radical.

The Silver Purchase Act had been repealed by a coalition of Eastern Democrats and Republicans with the aid of votes dragooned by the administration from the rest of the country. The Eastern coalition now turned on the administration's tariff bill, which contemplated reductions, and when it emerged from the scrimmage as the Wilson-Gorman Tariff (August 1894) it put into effect protective rates of about forty per cent, only about eight per cent less than the McKinley Tariff. Cleveland ranted at "party perfidy and party dishonor" but let the bill become law without his signature. No one was satisfied; Populists accused him of protectionism, and high-tariff men asserted that insufficient protection would prolong the depression. An in-

Wilson-
Gorman
Tariff, 1894

come tax of two per cent on incomes of more than \$4000 had been passed to make up an anticipated deficit. This measure, a Populist policy bitterly opposed by business, was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in 1895. The decision only added to Populist ire.

Meanwhile troubles had been mounting on the labor front as men to the number of two to three million were out of work. Hitherto panics had resulted in the practical disappearance of unions; this time the unions fought back bitterly against wage cuts, and perhaps as many as 750,000 men were on strike at one time or another. The Cripple Creek War in the Colorado gold fields was followed by the Pullman Strike in Chicago; the latter spread to the railroads, and, as we have seen, Olney used Federal troops not only in Chicago but at other points to suppress the strikers. Distress was increasing among the unemployed. Jacob S. Coxey (1854–1951), a well-to-do businessman of Massillon, Ohio proposed a scheme of Federal road-building as work relief, to be financed by the emission of \$500 million in legal-tender notes. An added feature called for local public works financed by legal tender issued on the security of local bonds.

The advocates of these measures, calling themselves Common-wealers, now planned to have "armies" of unemployed march on Washington from all parts of the Union to present a "living petition" to Congress. Several of these "armies" actually reached Washington during the summer of 1894, while others in the Far West commandeered trains to carry them eastward. Olney met the threat with marshals and regular troops and broke up the bands. Doubtless there were, as claimed, many tramps and riffraff among the marchers, but there were also many unemployed who were embittered by their treatment. Coxey's own "army" of 500 men reached Washington and on 1 May advanced, through applauding crowds larger than most inauguration turnouts, to the Capitol plaza to present its petition. At the Pennsylvania Avenue entrance to the Capitol grounds it was met by a phalanx of foot and mounted police. A number of the petitioners and on-lookers were trampled or beaten up, and Coxey was arrested for walking on the grass—where the police had driven him!

By the time of the 1894 Congressional elections fearful conservatives felt that the country was on the verge of revolution. Not only had labor broken all precedents by its prolonged strikes, but agrarian protest was mounting to the fevered state of a crusade. If the two should ever unite! The farmers, always eager for excuses to meet, gathered in the schoolhouses in winter and in the picnic groves in summer and after singing Populist songs such as *Good-bye, My Party, Good-bye* exhorted each other to stand fast in the faith.

The upheaval that took place . . . can hardly be diagnosed as a political campaign. It was a religious revival, a crusade, a pentecost of politics in

which a tongue of flame sat upon every man, and each spoke as the spirit gave him utterance. . . . The farmers, the country merchants, the cattle-herders, they of the long chin-whiskers, and they of the broad-brimmed hats and heavy boots, had also heard the word and could preach the gospel of Populism. The dragon's teeth were sprouting in every nook and corner of the state. Women with skins tanned to parchment by the hot winds, with bony hands of toil and clad in faded calico, could talk in meeting, and could talk right straight to the point.*

The unfortunate part of the Populist movement was that much of the crusading zeal sprang from allegiance to the panacea of free silver. Perhaps this allegiance was natural, for in crises the simple-minded usually turn to panaceas. In this case a speciously simple little book called *Coin's Financial School*, written by William H. Harvey and published in 1894, became the guidebook to the New *Coin's
Financial
School* Jerusalem. It purported to be composed of diagrams, cartoons, and questions and answers used in Coin's lectures to well-known financiers in Chicago, and it was suited to the understanding and prejudices of his rural readers. The inequality between the prices the farmer received for his produce and the prices he had to pay for his supplies was explained as the result of the contraction of the currency. This contraction, brought about by the cessation of silver coinage, was the effect of a conspiracy between British and American financiers who would thus be able to take over and govern a distressed economy and reduce farmers and laborers to helotry. The cure was equally simple: resume free and unlimited coinage of silver dollars at the old value of sixteen ounces of silver to one of gold.

The campaign for "the people's money" was not solely drummed up by the embattled farmers. Behind it was a wing of Wall Street composed of the great owners and speculators in Western mines, especially silver. Among these men were the Montana copper kings and the Colorado and Nevada silver kings; heir to one of the latter was William Randolph Hearst, currently a New York newspaper publisher. Their partners and allies included a galaxy of Western Senators led by the venerable Henry M. Teller of Colorado. Silver had declined until the amount of silver in a dollar was worth about fifty cents; remonetization, it was hoped, would raise it at least as high as the legal rate of one hundred cents. The advantage to silver owners was obvious, and they poured hundreds of thousands of dollars into propaganda, both printed and spoken. One favorite tool was the American Bimetallic League, and its favorite orator was a young Nebraska lawyer and politician named William Jennings Bryan.

So great was the appeal of the free-silver panacea and so subtle the propaganda of the silver capitalists that the free-silver movement leaped the bounds of the Populist Party and became popular in both the old

* Elizabeth N. Barr, "The Populist Uprising," in *Standard History of Kansas and Kansans* (1918), 2: 1115, quoted in J. D. Hicks, *The Populist Revolt* (1931), 159.

Election
of 1894

parties. The result was that, with the silverites divided, the elections of 1894 were concerned with the economic situation and the personality of Cleveland. The Populists usually refused to fuse with either old party and in so doing sapped the Democratic strength except in the South. The Republicans carried the Senate comfortably, the House overwhelmingly, and most of the Northern and Western state governments. Southern Democrats demonstrated the rigidity of the one-party system by soundly trouncing Populist seceders. Nevertheless the Populist vote had been greatly increased, and the party looked forward to victory in 1896.

3 *The Campaign of 1896*

Neither of the old parties cared to emphasize the money question in the coming presidential campaign, but the free-silver issue was running away with the show. Populism was basically a reform movement, but reformism could not compete with the appeal of free silver's simple cure-all, which was rapidly becoming the one issue which could invoke the enthusiasm of the rank and file. H. D. Lloyd bitterly protested: "The Free Silver movement is a fake. Free Silver is the cow-bird of the Reform movement. It waited until the nest had been built by the sacrifices and labor of others, and then it laid its eggs in it, pushing out the others which lie smashed on the ground." To change metaphors, not only was the free-silver tail wagging the Populist dog, but the Democratic dog also was sprouting a powerful free-silver tail, and there was a perceptible free-silver Western expansion on the Republican dog.

Gold bugs of all persuasions were panic-stricken, and they rallied in a desperate fight to preserve the Republican Party as their last political bulwark. In vain did Cleveland seek to arrest the Democratic defection and distract the national attention. He even went so far as to pick a quarrel with Great Britain over the boundary between British Guiana and Venezuela; the electorate cheered, but when Britain yielded it turned back to the free-silver mirror. By the spring of 1896 Democrats were openly holding their noses at mention of his name. Before the battle was over, Cleveland, Whitney, Olney, and the rest of the core of Gold Democrats were acting as Republican ammunition passers.

It was the good fortune of the Republicans that they had as leader one of the half-dozen outstanding political strategists of American history. This was Marcus (Mark) Alonzo Hanna, a Cleveland iron and traction magnate who had gotten into politics originally to protect his financial investments. Short, squat, ruthless, and cynically corrupt in politics, he yet had saving graces. Hearty and rudely frank, he admired courage and self-reliance even in

Mark
Hanna
(1837-
1904)

the laboring man. He hated the hypocrisy of his capitalistic allies and warned them that their tyranny would not protect them in the long run but would breed hatred on the part of the workers and eventual retribution. His own labor policies were usually enlightened, and he was not disposed to punish his workmen for organizing and going after what they wanted.

Yet he was no reformer; like other believers in the "trickle down" theory, he saw social welfare as connected with and derived from business



Opper, from the New York Journal American
Nurse Hanna looks on while Willie McKinley says, "Papa doesn't kill them; he merely skins them and lets them grow more skins, and then he skins them again."

welfare, and he was perfectly willing to use the government to promote business. Hanna learned politics the hard way, during the 1880's, and emerged as a peerless fund raiser ("fat-frier") and manipulator of blocks of votes. His attempt to boom John Sherman for the presidency in 1888 failed partly because of the defection of Governor Joseph B. Foraker of Cincinnati, leader of Ohio's Old Guard faction, an episode which began a feud that lasted as long as Hanna lived.

Nevertheless, Hanna's taste of President-making had given him a glimpse of the meaning of power. He turned now to William McKinley, the lachrymose author of the McKinley Tariff, McKinley had served

William McKinley (1843–1901) creditably in the Union Army and emerged as a major. As a lawyer he was a defender of labor, and he never lost his interest in the laboring man. Presently he gravitated to politics. Conscious of his limitations, he resolved to become expert in at least one field, and the political importance of the iron industry in his Mahoning Valley bailiwick suggested the tariff. Physically he was not very large, but he concentrated on dignity and organ tones, and as years added flesh he became (to his admirers) the portrait of a Roman statesman.

A real lover of humanity but somewhat naïve and dull, McKinley left the dirty side of politics to others, while he declaimed that the welfare of the workingman was bound up with the protective tariff and high-cost goods. Perhaps he believed in his theory. Anyhow, shortly before his death he seems to have developed doubts, and in his last speech he plumped for a reciprocal tariff policy. Everyone knew that he diligently attended church, read the Bible to his invalid wife, and would always hide his cigar when his picture was taken lest he help to corrupt American youth. He had the art, says one commentator, "of throwing a moral gloss over policies which were dubious, if not actually immoral, and this he did with a sort of self-deceiving sincerity."* In a day which cottoned to morality this was a definite advantage, and even the cynical and realistic Mark Hanna was hornswoggled.

When in 1890 McKinley lost his Congressional seat as the result of a Democratic gerrymander, Hanna seized the opportunity to make him governor of Ohio. Meanwhile McKinley had endorsed about \$130,000 in notes for an old friend, and when the friend went broke McKinley was saved only by the contributions of Hanna and other ironmasters. McKinley never knew precisely who contributed, but Hanna's campaign to advance his friend Bill as the messiah who could save the high tariff was doing nicely. The contributors must have regarded their gifts as on the same plane with those they then made to buy McKinley into a second term as governor. By now the campaign of 1896 was looming. The two friends spent the winter of 1894–95 in Thomasville, Georgia, where McKinley by his charm and moral ascendance and Hanna by no less cogent influences bound the Southern Republican politicians to the McKinley cause. The McKinley boom had now become, as it was called, a "steamroller"—in those days an awesome machine. Posters hailing "McKinley: The Advance Agent of Prosperity" blossomed in city and country.

Hanna had outmaneuvered the Old Guard bosses, including Platt and Quay, much to their admiration. It only remained for them to demand their price: adherence to the gold standard and the usual patronage spoils.

* William R. Thayer, *Life and Letters of John Hay* (1915), 2:136.

When Hanna laid their terms before McKinley, the latter—one can see him wrapping his toga about him—answered: “Mark, there are some things that come too high. If I were to accept the nomination on those terms it would be worth nothing to me, and less to the people.” The story did McKinley no harm, while Hanna saw to it that the bosses did not go away mad. McKinley had always hedged on the silver issue, and Hanna now cannily waited to be “forced” to come out for gold. Lukewarm silverites were not offended, while the gold bugs had nowhere else to go. McKinley won the nomination easily and was given Garret A. Hobart of New Jersey as running mate.

When the Democratic convention met in Chicago, it proceeded to put Whitney and his gold bugs in their place and to repudiate Cleveland, who by now was regarded as the open tool of the “invisible government.” The convention listened sullenly to speaker after speaker plead for gold, but its heart belonged to silver. Altgeld could have had the nomination easily had he been eligible, but he had been born in Prussia and had arrived in the United States at the age of three months. The other outstanding aspirants were too old or too rich.

Bryan's
Cross of
Gold
speech

Then, at the close of the day a tall, strikingly handsome young man rose to address the convention—William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska. In a voice that filled the hall yet was musical almost to being bell-like, and with the skill of a finished orator, Bryan held the rebellious convention in the hollow of his hand and played upon its prejudices and emotions. Drawing almost every paragraph from speeches which he had trumpeted for years to prairie audiences, he called upon eternal principles; he did obeisance to the pioneer log cabin and the little red schoolhouse; he struck the Physiocratic note that land was the source of all wealth; he assured the farmer and the shopkeeper that they were as much businessmen as though they gambled in Wall Street.

Rising to his climax, he reminded his hearers how capital had disregarded their entreaties and mocked at their calamities. “We beg no longer,” he cried, “we entreat no more; we petition no more.” Then—drawing himself up and flinging out his fist—“We defy them!” The crowd surged to its feet with a spontaneous yell. The decision had been made, but he presently went on to re-emphasize the old charge that the opposition to free silver was the result of a conspiracy between Wall Street and England, the hereditary enemy. The struggle was thus transmuted into patriotic terms and, even more, into terms of world-wide humanitarianism. “You shall not,” he ended, “press down upon the brow of labor this crown of thorns, you shall not crucify mankind upon a cross of gold.”

The next day the orator savored his reward when he was nominated upon the fifth ballot. The “stampede” was neither unexpected nor un-



New York Press

The man who pulls the strings—the mine owner

This cartoon and the one on the facing page were directed against the free-silver issue of 1896.

planned. Bryan himself had long sought this end. Born in 1860 in Illinois of Virginia yeoman stock, he began the practice of law in Jacksonville but soon moved to Lincoln, Nebraska. An orator from his college days, he now discovered that he could move an audience as he chose; so he gladly gave up law and launched into politics. During two terms in Congress (1891–95) he was so violently pro-silver that the Cleveland forces denied him the Senate seat which he tried to win in 1894. As a “wild jackass” out of a job but rather in the public eye, he turned to the Chautauqua platform to earn a living, then presently became a paid lecturer for the Bimetallic League. Of course he knew who paid his fees, but he seems to have been convinced that victory for the silver capitalists would also be a victory for the people.

Bryan was not a deep thinker—else why his naïve faith in free silver as a panacea? He was not a radical; he steered clear of Populist reformism and never supported its demands for Federal paternalistic legislation. He

was not even by temperament a liberal, as witness his later evangelical campaigns to limit personal freedom, notably in the use of alcohol and the teaching of evolution. True, he was pious, incorruptible, possessed no personal vices, and was a champion of honest democratic government. The secret of his power lay in his ability to identify himself with the thinking of the people and to make himself the symbol of their desires: "The Great Commoner."

His
character

In retrospect it is hard to picture him as an honest tribune of the people, though of course he was that simply because he did not possess the intellectual ability to be anything but their mirror. Reasoned leadership was not in his power. There was brutal truth in Foraker's comment that like the Platte River he was "six inches deep and six miles wide at the mouth." On the other hand (now that the bugaboo of the gold standard is laid), it is difficult to see how he could have as President been an effective menace to Wall Street, for he had little use for Federal regulation of business. The silver capitalists knew their man and reckoned wisely when they planned the "stampede."



New York Press

A suggestion for the 53-cent dollar

Meanwhile, what of the Populists? Their more perceptive leaders realized that Bryan had doomed their program by stealing their silver issue and rejecting their reforms. "We put him to school," said Ignatius Donnelly, "and he wound up stealing the schoolbooks." When the Populists met at St. Louis they approved Bryan, though they sought to get him to ditch Arthur Sewell, his vice-presidential candidate, and take Tom Watson as a Populist running mate. Bryan curtly declined, but Watson confused the electorate by remaining in the running. Though the Populist Party put up candidates until 1904, it was really slaughtered by Bryan in 1896. Still, perhaps it would have died anyhow. It could not have converted the South, for the Democratic Party was entrenched there by sentiment, by Bourbon leadership, and by fear of giving Negro voters the chance to hold the balance of power. Without the South the Populists could not have united the agrarians as a basis for the conquest of the national government.

Death of
the Popu-
list Party

The Boy Orator of the Platte—he was only thirty-six—now threw himself into one of the most impassioned crusades in American history. He

literally *was* the crusade. Hitherto most presidential candidates had remained sedately at home while batteries of politicians did their campaigning. Bryan deliberately kicked over the precedent, traveled 18,000 miles, even invading the South, and talked to an estimated 4,800,000 people. The summer merged into autumn, and the national temperature mounted as Bryan trumpeted his message: "The people have a right to make their own mistakes." It was quite in the Jacksonian tradition, but conservatives shrieked of socialism, class conflict, and tumbrils rolling toward an American guillotine. The fear and the fever were indeed out of all proportion to the facts. Vachel Lindsay, a lad in Springfield, never forgot his glimpse of the crusading Bryan and years later wrote his soul-stirring chant:

Bryan's
crusade



I brag and chant of Bryan, Bryan, Bryan,
Candidate for president who sketched a silver Zion. . . .
In a coat like a deacon, in a black Stetson hat
He scourged the elephant plutocrats
With barbed wire from the Platte.*

Mark Hanna kept his head. He did not believe that a revolution was on the way, but he did believe that the gold standard must be preserved. Some Western Republicans under Senator Teller had bolted to the free-silver camp; but though the Gold Democrats put a ticket into the race, it was obvious that they were working to assure a Republican victory. Hanna amazed old-line slipshod politicians by the businesslike smoothness with which his steam roller operated. Bankers and industrialists were shaken down for sums that before the campaign was over probably reached \$10 million. McKinley was touted as the bringer of the "full Dinner Pail" in literature in many languages intended to catch foreign-born voters.

Hanna's
campaign

McKinley himself remained on his front porch in Canton, rocking and fanning through the heat of summer, delivered carefully prepared little speeches to bands of pilgrims who came from afar, then excused himself and went upstairs to read the Bible to his invalid wife. When Bryan seemed forging ahead, Hanna knew exactly what to do. Banks made loans with gold-payment clauses; orders placed with manufacturers were placed with the understanding that they would be canceled if Bryan was elected. Debtors were told that extension depended on the results of the election. On one hand, grain prices rose just before the election, and, on the other, workmen were warned that if McKinley lost the election on Tuesday the factory whistles would not blow on Wednesday. Nor did Hanna's hench-



* Vachel Lindsay, *Collected Poems*, "Bryan, Bryan, Bryan," copyright 1925 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.



J. W. CLEMENT CO. BUFFALO, N. Y.

THE BRYAN COUNTRY, 1896

By states (above) and counties (below)

 McKinley, Republican: 271 electoral, 7,035,000 popular votes	 Bryan, Democrat: 176 electoral, 6,468,000 popular votes
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Adapted from C. O. Paulin, *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States*, 1912, Copyright 1912.

men neglect the customary distribution of gold pieces among "voting cattle" nor fail to assure a tight hold on polling machinery.

But it seems fair to say that the issue was not decided solely by corruption or by pressure on labor. The essential point was that the Republicans convinced the great middle class that if free silver came in their property would be confiscated. Not since Jackson had the Narrow Republican debtor classes been so clearly arrayed against Big Property, victory with Little Property split between them as it saw its interests. "The Battle of the Standards" resulted in a decisive defeat for silver, 271 to 176. The popular vote, however, ran only 7,000,000 against 6,500,000, and it is estimated that a change of 14,000 votes in half a dozen states—some of which went Republican by a few hundred votes—would have wrought a Bryan victory. One significant fact was noted by the observing: Illinois, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota, the old Granger States, had not remained true to the agrarian revolt. The Old Northwest, now the Middle West, was going over to industry.

What was the significance of the campaign of 1896? The fact that free silver took the place of vital issues may seem to argue that its importance has been overrated. On the other hand Tom Johnson, reform mayor of Cleveland, wrote in 1911 that it was the first great protest Signifi- of the American people against monopoly—the first great cance of 1896 "struggle of the masses in our country against the privileged classes. It was not free silver that frightened the plutocrat leaders. What they feared then, what they fear now, is free men."* Certainly it was a victory for Big Property, as Morgan and the rest of the Wall Street stock waterers soon began to prove, and a defeat for the dirt farmers. Jefferson and Jackson had sought to seize the central government in order to weaken it; now their heirs had been thwarted in an attempt to seize the central government in order to force it to give positive aid to the Jeffersonian ideal of small property.

Pinkos claim that the Populist movement was an American form of the familiar European peasant revolt; that may have been true, if by American peasants they refer to farmers. Men like Altgeld and H. D. Lloyd had hoped to use populism as the basis for a great reformist party of farmers and laborers. Bryan, as unerringly as though he had been hired to do it, crushed that hope, stamped out the Populist Party, and turned the country over to Wall Street—by the simple device of dramatizing a quack remedy. It is significant that from its foundation onward the Republican Party had drawn a minority vote in every presidential election; 1896 gave it a majority for the first time.

The weakness of free silver lay not in its promise of inflation (perhaps an expansion of currency would have been beneficial) but in its cruelty

* Tom L. Johnson, *My Story* (1911), 109.

false promise to bring the New Jerusalem. Actually gold-currency expansion was already under way and was soon to be accelerated as the cyanide process came into use in gold mining and new gold strikes were made in the Klondike and elsewhere. New industrial demands for silver, especially for photographic film, boosted the price of silver—though silver miners have never long given over their yowls for government support and since 1933 have received it in scandalous measure. Lastly, the rise of grain prices just before the election of 1896 became a fairly steady progress and introduced a quarter-century of relatively good times for the farmer. The drought cycle ended in the West; crops failed in the rest of the world; growing urban population ate more food; and wars contributed their share to the American farmer's prosperity.

Return of
prosperity

The Republicans quite naturally took advantage of the return of prosperity to strengthen the claim that Republican rule brought prosperity. The news in the domestic sphere during McKinley's administration was the tremendous expansion of industrial corporations, a movement which was accelerated by the short Spanish-American War and the "glorious" victory that closed it. The Dingley Tariff of 1897 encouraged the good work by raising rates higher than they had ever been before. The primary purpose was now quite frankly protection, and revenue was secondary. So thorough was the protection that steel rails sold for more in the United States than the same rails brought in England after allowing for freight and a profit.

At the end of his term Cleveland quietly retired to Princeton and there lived out his remaining span of eleven years. He was convinced, probably rightly, that he was the best-hated man in America and so thrust himself upon public attention as little as possible. Fortunately he lived to see some relaxation of this antipathy as both extremes came to recognize the real value of his contributions. There has been a tendency to lose sight of the fact that the Republican victory of 1896 and the economic boom which followed might well have been impossible but for Cleveland. It was his stubborn battle against the "wild asses" of populism which prevented them from taking over the government before 1896 and instituting a régime of inflation and regulation of business which, to say the least, would have been premature and probably would have been irreversible if not downright disastrous.

The great-
ness of
Cleveland

The old familiar phenomenon of the crushing of the moderate mean between the extremes forced Cleveland to the right and has made his second administration remembered as more conservative than liberal. Nevertheless, he remained a liberal in the classical economic sense, an individualist rather than a centralizer, a reformer rather than a progressive. In other words, he represented the best and most liberal elements of his time, not

only in his cleansing of Federal administration but in his insistence upon honestly competitive private enterprise with a minimum of government interference. Changes were to be made only after careful examination and cautious experimentation. If Cleveland fell too much under the influence of Olney in dealing with the Pullman Strike and with the trusts, it should be remembered to his credit that Attorney-General Judson Harmon later vigorously reversed the error.

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Chapter XXXIX

THE RESURGENCE OF IMPERIALISM

1 *Propaganda for Empire*

THE century from 1815 to 1914 was a period of peace and progress such as had not been known since the palmy days of Rome. There were, of course, many reasons for this happy state of affairs, but most important was the world balance of power maintained largely by the mild ascendancy of Great Britain in international councils, the economic strength of her bankers, her manufacturers, and her traders, and the rule of her navy over the paths of commerce. Hence this period is called the *Pax Britannica*—the British Peace.

*Pax Bri-
tannica*

British rule had its faults, but in retrospect its virtues shine brighter. Where the Union Jack flew, there were trade and good order, there were schools and local assemblies of the people, there were missionaries and technicians bringing the arts of Western Civilization. Britain's power was based (among other things) upon her realistic acceptance of the commercial standard of success which, after the first years, promoted the welfare of both rulers and ruled; upon a certain flexibility, which made it possible to meet special situations with special measures; and upon "a sense of the limits of power," which meant that those who struggled for self-rule would sooner or later be accepted as equals and partners. Here were the blessed reasons why the British Empire was self-liquidating, why its rule was doomed from the day its flag was run up an alien pole.

The British economic empire was even more important than its political empire. The Union Jack did not wave over the vast stretches of China and South America, but they were nevertheless British to all intents and purposes and at the same time fairly free to experiment with revolutions, war lords, and constitutions. The United States was also a part of this empire, led by loose financial strings which were not severed until World War I. Even the Dutch and French

**British
economic
empire**

empires were strongly influenced by the financial enterprise of the British.

Imperialism, says William L. Langer,* is "the rule or control, political or economic, direct or indirect, of one state, nation or people over similar groups—or perhaps one might better say the disposition, urge or striving to establish such rule or control." Actually imperialism is not confined to capitalist countries: the Soviet Union (leaving aside the question of whether it is socialistic) is the most ruthless imperialism since Rome.

What is imperialism?

Imperialism, after all, is merely nationalism projected beyond the national border. Nationalism is the community of basic ways and beliefs within a political entity. It carries with it a worship of those ways and, oftentimes, a belief in the nation's mission to rule over lesser peoples, or at least to give them the benefit of superior culture and institutions. The nation is not necessarily the creation of blood, but of history, geography, ideas, and usually culture and language. Nationalism finds expression in several ways: ideologies, the cultural, political, and institutional beliefs and way of life—of which democracy is one; militarism, by which everything is subordinated to the military search for strength; navalism, in which the navy is the weapon of might; irredentism, the propaganda for the recovery of "lost" provinces; and, of course, the active thrust of imperialism.

Nationalism and imperialism

Soon after 1870 it became evident that a resurgence of imperialism was under way. Nationalism was making strides with the unification of Germany and Italy and the stirring of national consciousness among the Slavic peoples. The kings and nobles of Europe had seen how the Industrial Revolution and rising democracy had destroyed the old political order in England and France, and how the logical result of their influence would be to break down economic and eventually political barriers between nations.

Neo-mercantilism

The counterattack is seen most clearly in Germany. The junkers sought there to bind the Industrial Revolution and the rising bourgeois to their own interests. They succeeded. The internationalizing influence of the Industrial Revolution was thwarted by restoring a modern version of mercantilism, that is, making it dependent on government favors such as tariffs and trade blocks and by using its strength primarily to build up military power rather than to raise the standard of living. Popular discontent was allayed by measures of state socialism. A subtle propaganda was begun about the mystic ties of blood and *Volk*. Then presently the search for power began to take on imperialist color as the Pan-German movement attempted to unite all Germans politically and sought to bolster economic power and prestige by acquiring overseas colonies.

The rise of neo-mercantilism was fostered by a series of economic

* William L. Langer, *Diplomacy of Imperialism* (2 v., 1925) 1: 67.

changes which stemmed primarily from technological development. Manufactures were now much less expensive, especially the textiles and metals desired by less advanced areas. The revolution in transportation and communication had also cheapened the processes of collection and transportation so much that colonies could afford European goods, and European workers could afford colonial goods. Business became more efficient and began to pile up surpluses of goods and capital. Now we know that in such a case the pressure can be relieved by raising wages, reducing interest rates, developing new processes and industries which will employ more men, or by investing abroad. All of these relief valves found some favor, but the last most of all; the difference between three-per-cent income on French railway bonds and ten to twenty-per-cent on Indo-Chinese railway bonds was a persuasive argument. Investors demanded overseas investments for their surplus capital, then demanded political control in order to protect it and to exclude foreign competitors. Industrialists with surpluses made similar demands.

**Economic
changes**

Another economic change that became evident to the observing after 1870 was the decline in Britain's proportion of world manufacture and commerce. In 1870 Britain made one third of the world's goods; by 1900 it made one fifth. In the same period the United States jumped from a quarter to a third. In 1870 Britain controlled about 22 per cent of the world's trade; in 1913 this had fallen to 15 per cent. Great Britain was clearly losing out to younger and more vigorous rivals and was being forced to live more and more off its fat—that is, existing investments. It was not mere desire to maintain prestige that led to its participation in the resurgence of imperialism after 1870; it was dire necessity. By 1890 British statesmen began to feel that the Empire was like an old stag that lives in continual danger of being pulled down by wolves. The logical step, then, was to look around for friends. We shall return later to this search.

**Relative
decline of
Britain**

Imperialism was impelled to action not by the nation as a whole but by certain interests which obtained an "effective majority" and utilized the collective power of the nation despite some compromises made to satisfy dissidents. It is the fashion to blame business altogether for imperialism; this indictment is too sweeping, for certain business interests were among its most inveterate enemies. Wisconsin dairymen and Southern cotton-seed-oil men would naturally oppose the acquisition of copra for making margarine and soap. Louisiana sugar growers opposed the acquisition of new sugar sources in Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico. Both interests would support Philippine independence.

**Dynamics
of imperi-
alism; busi-
ness**

However, business supporters of imperialism would include importers and exporters, and importers and users of colonial raw materials. Shipping

interests would welcome enterprises likely to furnish cargo and would demand coaling stations, naval bases, subsidized immigration, and sometimes protection from foreign shipping. Bankers would be involved in all of the above interests and would prosper with them, and would therefore naturally do everything possible to promote them.

The pressure of nonbusiness interests, however, was probably just as effective. Explorers and adventurers were always calling the attention of governments and businessmen to golden opportunities. Military and naval men took pride in their conquests and did everything to justify them and to retain and defend them. Diplomatic and colonial officials naturally defended their profession of manipulating or governing "backward" races. Politicians advanced their own interests by promoting the public dither which the cable enabled the penny press to make over colonial affairs. Then there were the missionaries. Their very promotion of order enabled white traders and other exploiters to make entry, bringing with them the vices and contentions of Christendom. In desperation the missionaries then sought annexation to the countries of their origin in order to impose restrictions on vicious whites.

Propaganda for empire was usually based upon certain dynamic ideas. The appeal to national honor and prestige at times made the home taxpayers consent to wage war to seize colonies or to support vigorous action in defense of compatriots' lives and property. There was fear of aggression, to which the natural response was the aggressive defense: the seizure of naval bases, coaling stations, and colonies as posts for defending trade routes by ensuring naval supremacy. The American demand for control of the Caribbean and for the digging of the Panama Canal was more for strategic than economic reasons. Then there were the arguments that an industrial nation must control colonies for their trade and raw materials and as outlets for surplus population. Actually, trade and emigrants stubbornly go where they please, while overseas raw materials are utterly useless without absolute command of the ocean highways.

The most popular defense of imperialism, however, was "aggressive altruism." Imperialism was exploitative and therefore inconsistent with Christian morality, which had made great progress during the nineteenth century; so it was necessary to find good moral reasons whenever it was proposed to do something immoral. Kipling made the point in 1899 when he admonished the United States to retain the Philippines:

Take up the White Man's Burden—
Send forth the best ye breed—
Go bind your sons to exile

To serve your captive's need;
 To wait in heavy harness,
 On fluttered folk and wild—
 Your new-caught sullen peoples,
 Half-devil and half-child.

Hence we had in Britain and the United States the White Man's Burden, in France the *mission civilisatrice*, and in Germany the mission to spread *Kultur*. It was the use of "brutal force to impose on unwilling peoples the blessings" of one's own civilization: the willingness to fight other civilized nations on behalf of the imposition of one's own superior civilization.

How stand the balance sheets of imperialism, now that its heyday is past? Critics have almost invariably judged colonial administration not by the historic norm but by the *best* Christian standards. By and large, Western imperialism has governed less harshly than the old native régimes; moreover, whether or not for altruistic reasons, it has sought to raise the local sanitary, technical, and educational standards. On the whole it has succeeded, and the proof, paradoxically, lies in the ability of the rebels against imperialism to use the arguments, the ideals, and the methods of the West against their Western rulers. Actually this is why the West has yielded—it recognizes its spiritual kinship with those who take their own part. After all, good government is no substitute for self-government, and the peoples of the colonial world are demanding and receiving the right to work out their own institutions. But the stamp of Western Civilization has been placed irrevocably upon Africa and Asia, whatever compromises they may adopt in the end. Nowhere does history show such tremendous cultural changes (progress, perhaps) in such a short time and with such relatively small expenditure in blood and human misery.

Balance
sheets of
imperi-
alism

The old imperialism of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries was primarily aimed at building up trade and acquiring settlement colonies. That of the nineteenth century, especially after 1870, was aimed primarily at the exploitation of native resources and man power. Not only did the United States begin its imperialistic adventure later than other powers, but it was not pushed by any dire necessity to obtain raw materials or to dispose of surplus goods and capital. It was animated by the *hope* of trade, by the desire for prestige, by a sense of moral responsibility, and most of all by strategy. Its imperialism was more like the earlier phase than the latter; indeed, when it began its great adventure, it was still heavily in debt to Europe and had less than half a billion dollars invested abroad—and two thirds of that in Canada and Mexico.

Nature of
American
imperi-
alism

American ideology presented a clash between the democratic doctrine of equality and the heritage of a people who had been accustomed to regard

Indians and Negroes as inferiors. Thus it did not need the rising racism of Europe to implant the concept of a master race in America, but many Americans welcomed the "scientific" demonstration of the master-race theory. This demonstration stemmed from two sources: the idea of natural selection as expressed in Social Darwinism; and the racism of Gobineau and Houston Stewart Chamberlain, brought back from Germany by American graduate students. The first was most likely to take the form of an Anglo-Saxon mythus; the second expanded the master race to include the Teutons, whose purest representatives were found in Germany but who (it was claimed) had carried their blood and their genius for mastery to surrounding nations. Popularizers in the United States did not always clearly distinguish between the two ideas, but Anglo-Saxonism was the stronger because it was reinforced by a common language and by long familiarity with English literature and institutions. The publicists of expansion may have had their private quarrels with British snobbery, but in other things they were Anglophile.

The first prominent American to adopt Anglo-Saxonism was John Fiske, Harvard historian and popularizer of the theory of evolution and Social Darwinism. He taught that industrialism would win over barbaric militancy, that Anglo-Saxons would multiply and spread over the world (comprising four fifths of the human race!) carrying industry, order, and democracy. Meanwhile, at Johns Hopkins, the German-trained historian Herbert Baxter Adams was presiding over a seminar which found the origin of democracy and the Anglo-Saxon genius for self-government in the primitive village institutions of the German tribes. Among his students were Woodrow Wilson, Frederick Jackson Turner, Albert Shaw, Thorstein Veblen, Richard T. Ely, and J. Franklin Jameson, all to become formative influences in American scholarly or public life—though they did not all accept his extreme views. At Columbia another German-trained man, John W. Burgess, was laying the foundations of political science. Of Tennessee slave-owning Unionist stock, Burgess taught that Teutons possessed superior mental and political gifts. Among those who sat under his tutelage were Theodore Roosevelt, strenuous advocate of Anglo-Saxon superiority, and William A. Dunning, who sponsored the negrophobe view of reconstruction.

Anglo-Saxonism found champions among a group of influential publicists: Albert Shaw, editor of the *Review of Reviews* from 1891 to 1937; Whitelaw Reid, a power in the Republican Party and editor of Greeley's old *Tribune*; James H. Bridge, former secretary to Carnegie and then editor of California's *Overland Monthly*; and Murat Halstead, editor, prolific hack writer, and political critic. In 1885 there appeared *Our Country: Its Possible Future and Its Present*

Crisis by the Rev. Josiah Strong. Intended to raise money for missions, the book received enormous public attention because it contained a chapter on "The Anglo-Saxon and the World's Future," which proclaimed this race as its brother's keeper. With their "unequaled energy" and "peculiarly aggressive traits" the Anglo-Saxons were destined to inundate the world, carrying with them superior civil and religious institutions—provided they were not first devitalized by tobacco and alcohol.

The world [said Strong] will enter upon a new state of its history—the *final competition of races for which the Anglo-Saxon is being schooled*. If I do not read amiss, this powerful race will move down upon Mexico, down upon Central and South America, out upon the islands of the sea, over upon Africa and beyond. And can anyone doubt that the result of this competition of races will be the "survival of the fittest"?

Closely associated with the survival-of-the-fittest doctrine was a group of men who saw in the decline of Anglo-Saxon militancy the opportunity of the "dark races," especially of the yellow. There was some difference of opinion as to whether the menace would come from China or Japan, but Jack London solved the difficulty by warning that Japan might find a way to control and use the immense capacities of China for the conquest of the world. A picturesque prophet of the Yellow Peril was the Californian, General Homer Lea, who despite the handicap of being a hunchback became an adjutant to Sun Yat-sen and a significant figure in the Chinese Revolution. His principal books were *The Valor of Ignorance* (1909), a warning that Japan intended to invade the United States, and *The Day of the Saxon* (1912), which foretold the destruction of the British Empire by Germany and the Orient. The Yellow Peril propaganda was strengthened by Japan's victory over Russia and dignified by Theodore Roosevelt's support. After World War I it received a new lease on life in the racist writings of Madison Grant and Lothrop Stoddard.

The Yellow Peril

The outstanding advocate of American expansion was Alfred Thayer Mahan. Though born at West Point in an army family, Mahan chose the navy and graduated in 1859 from Annapolis. During his last year he violated one of the unwritten rules of the academy, and not only was he put into Coventry but his later career was palpably hampered by hidebound fellow officers. After service in the Civil War, he had a routine career until 1886, when he went to lecture at the Naval War College at Newport. The publication in 1890 of his *Influence of Sea Power Upon History* launched him into a new career as the historian and protagonist of sea power; before the decade was out, he was to add a powerful impetus to the navalism already growing up not only in the United States but in Japan, Germany, Britain, France, and

Alfred T.
Mahan
(1840–
1914)

Italy. His influence upon expansionist sentiment was marked, and he became a power with its political advocates such as Roosevelt and Lodge. Thus catapulted into prominence and able to do more politically for the big-navy crowd in the service than it could for itself, he was grudgingly utilized, but retired in 1896. During the Spanish-American War he served on the strategy board and was later promoted to rear admiral, retired.

Mahan's thesis was that sea power had been the chief factor in making and breaking nations and empires, and he drew chiefly upon England for proof. The significance of sea power was that it fostered and protected commerce; hence a navy, merchant marine, bases, and coal-
 His ing stations were essentials of national greatness. In 1890
 program the United States was lacking in all of these, and Mahan demanded that it supply the realistic basis for its destined expansion. Not only must it build up the navy and merchant marine, but it must dig an isthmian canal and acquire bases and colonies in the Caribbean and the Pacific. He believed that the United States and Britain were agents of the divine will, and that they must prepare for the coming struggle with the Yellow Peril.

Despite this pious obeisance to Providence, Mahan approached his problems in a notably realistic manner, basing his recommendations upon power rather than sentiment. He recognized that England's naval power rose from the facts that it was an island, rich in coal and timber, and situated so as to block the Atlantic entrances to France and Germany. His disciples in Germany ignored these factors and confidently counted on beating England at its own game; actually, the United States and Japan more nearly met the requirements of the Mahan strategic concept. While he analyzed correctly the reasons for the rise of England, there is wide argument that Mahan's glorification of sea power has not stood the test of time as a historical generalization. Not only have commentators pointed out historical inaccuracies in his thesis, but geopolitical extremists have tried to show that the land mass of Eurasia cannot be dominated by sea power. Certainly the growth of the land-sea-air team (not to mention push-button warfare) has put a different face on the power picture.

Whatever history's decision may be on the validity of Mahan's thesis, the fact remains that it had tremendous effect upon succeeding thought and action. Propaganda for an isthmian canal and for the annexation of Cuba
 and Hawaii was stepped up; and there was talk that, while
 Republi- Cuba was being taken from decadent Spain, the Philippines
 cans adopt expansion might as well be taken also as a foothold in the Far East. The effect upon politicians was notable. His ideas were adopted by a group of Republican Senators, including Henry Teller of Colorado, Orville Platt of Connecticut, William E. Chandler of New Hampshire, William P. Frye of Maine, and above all Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. A young

Indiana politician named Albert Beveridge was gaining national attention by his word-pictures of American destiny.

Not least was Theodore Roosevelt. Expansion suited his gospel of the strenuous life and his opinion that war was a beneficial stimulant of the national glands, so he poured out articles and reviews urging America to seek a place in the sun. Before long, as Assistant Secretary of the Navy, he was going to be in a situation where he could do something about it. These men, all Republicans, and most of them alarmed by the populist movement, not only favored expansion for its own sake but expected to make it a counter to the swelling chorus of radical and popular protest. That it had possibilities was shown by the fact that the Trans-Mississippi Congress held in 1897 at Salt Lake City to promote Western interests passed a resolution favoring an isthmian canal and the annexation of Hawaii. The president of the congress was none other than the populist idol, William Jennings Bryan.

In the light of the usual accusations that businessmen lead in imperialism, it is interesting to note that in the United States they violently opposed it, at least up to May 1898. It was the scholars, the publicists, the strategists, and the politicians who espoused it. They (especially Mahan and Beveridge) sometimes spoke of the commercial advantages of imperialism, but when it came down to actual argument they stressed the White Man's Burden and the historic American mission to spread democracy. Even Anglo-Saxonism, though it had certainly helped to form their attitudes, was not primarily invoked. The New Manifest Destiny, it was claimed, had about it a certain fatefulness which could be resisted successfully neither by the aggressors nor by their victims. America, they said, had an "inevitable destiny" to expand and bring light to the world, then quite without humor beat the alarum lest we come short of that destiny. In the Calvinist tradition that the elect must strive to fulfill the will of God, they devoted themselves unstintingly to helping "destiny" fulfill itself.

Lending a
hand to
destiny

2 *Inevitable Destiny*

Popular prejudices and emotions have during most of our history combined with the cheese-paring propensities of Congress to prevent the formation of a mature and well-reasoned foreign policy. It is therefore to the President that one must look for such unity and consistency as our foreign policy can boast. On the whole, the executive branch of the government has not done so badly. It has sought (1) to round out the national territory, and (2) to make the country strategically secure.

Monroe
Doctrine:
no annexation

It was to the Executive's endeavor to attain these objectives that we

owe the evolution of the Monroe Doctrine. The first statement of the doctrine was simply to the effect that European powers should not annex territory in the Western Hemisphere, and we in turn would keep out of European affairs. Polk made a point of restating the Monroe Doctrine in 1845 and added that the United States would not permit the balance-of-power principle to be transferred to North America.

European defiance of the Monroe Doctrine was not confined to our times of crisis, but such times were peculiarly favorable to intervention. Thus, during our Mexican War crisis, Britain and France invaded the

Europe's
trespasses Plata River countries but found General Rosas too tough for them. It was at this time that the United States signed the Bidlack Treaty with Colombia, then New Granada, a treaty which guaranteed to preserve order, freedom of transit, and Colombian sovereignty over the Isthmus of Panama. British officials in Central America had found the time opportune to extend their footholds in Honduras and Nicaragua, and the threat of national disruption in 1850 weakened Clayton's hand in negotiating the unsatisfactory Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, which put any isthmian canal under joint control but did not dislodge Britain from Central America. The Civil War crisis gave Spain the chance to venture into Peru and Santo Domingo and opened the way to the Mexican adventure of Napoleon III. Latin America wanted a Northern victory not simply because slavery would be abolished, but also because the United States would be freed to deal with such intruders.

As early as 1811 Congress had expressed itself as opposed to the transfer of Spanish possessions to a European power. Cuba was desired by both Britain and France, and successive Presidents watched closely to see that it did not slip away from Spain. When in 1848 Yucatán seemed about to pass to England or Spain, Polk vigorously enunciated what we may call the Polk Corollary: that the United States would take possession of the province itself, if necessary, to forestall the transfer. In 1869 Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, through Grant, definitely asserted that European colonies were no longer to be "regarded as subject to transfer from one European power to another." However, a few years later Secretary of State William M. Evarts tolerated the transfer from Sweden to France of St. Bartholomew, an island which Sweden had vainly tried to sell or even donate to the United States.

When in 1881 Ferdinand de Lesseps began to dig a canal at Panama, Secretary of State Blaine feared that the French government might hold such control of the corporation as to give it actual control of the canal. It was not until 1912 that the Senate by resolution approved the so-called Lodge Corollary, which laid down the principle that the United States would view with "grave concern" the occupation by a foreign corporation of "any harbor or other place" which might be used by a foreign govern-

ment to "threaten the communications or the safety of the United States."

It had long since become clear that an effective control of American territory might be gained by a European power under color of enforcing treaty or fiscal engagements. Hence the hesitant entry of the "no coercion" interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine. As early as 1871 Fish discouraged a proposed joint action by a number of powers to coerce revolution-torn Venezuela. The effect was destroyed, however, by the way in which later Secretaries of State ignored single and joint punitive actions against a number of Caribbean States, notably Nicaragua on three occasions and Haiti on seven.

**No
coercion**

European statesmen looked with contempt and some alarm upon the expanding interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine. Their argument followed five lines. (1) The Monroe Doctrine of 1823 had been coined to meet a particular situation; that situation was long past, ergo the Doctrine was dead. (2) The Monroe Doctrine was purely unilateral with absolutely no standing in international law and with no official acceptance by any second nation. (3)

**Europe re-
sents the
Monroe
Doctrine**

The so-called Doctrine was based upon the fallacious Doctrine of the Two Spheres—that different interests and institutions flourished on the two sides of the Atlantic. This, it was vigorously asserted, was contrary to the spirit of the times, which was to draw nations together rather than to separate them. (4) The Monroe Doctrine was a violation of the well-known right of nations to choose their own courses of action; this affected the sovereignty of the European powers and was no less a potential threat to the sovereignty of the American nations. (5) The Monroe Doctrine was never twice the same; it was being constantly stretched to cover any desired policy—such as an isthmian canal owned and operated by the United States despite the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Nevertheless, the more Europe challenged the Monroe Doctrine, the more real became its shape, and the more convinced Americans were of its utility and validity.

Blaine was primarily a journalist and politician, and he relied on showmanship rather than a study of the nuances of diplomacy, which is sometimes wryly defined as the art of letting the other fellow have your way. Still, he was, even in point of accomplishment, the outstanding Secretary of State between Fish and Hay. During his short incumbency under Garfield, elongated Chile was fight-

**Blaine and
Chile**

ing the Pacific War by which it took Antofagasta from Bolivia and Tacna, Arica, and Tarapacá from Peru—and further elongated itself. Unfortunately Blaine handled relations ineptly and won the enmity of Chile. When he came back into office under Harrison in 1889, he further bungled affairs during a Chilean revolution. In 1891 a Chilean mob attacked some American bluejackets from the U.S.S. *Baltimore* on shore leave in Valparaíso, and killed two. Chile was called to account but procrastinated and

vapored, while its foreign minister made a public attack upon President Harrison's character. The United States ominously began to prepare its navy for war, but presently Chile backed down, apologized, and paid an indemnity. In this case it seems to have been Blaine who restrained Harrison's impetuosity. Actually the navy was in no condition to fight a war, even with Chile.

Blaine had gone out of office before he could put into effect his dream of instituting a Pan-American system, but the idea took hold. In the last year of Cleveland's first term, Congress called an inter-American conference—just in time for Blaine's return. Blaine's intention was to make the United States rather than Great Britain (and sometimes France) arbiter among the American nations and to open Latin America to the investments and the manufactures of the United States. He desired not only to establish a system of arbitration but to set up a customs union, to adopt common customs regulations, weights, measures, patents, and copyrights, and a common silver trade coin.

After a six-weeks tour of the United States, the delegates of eighteen American states convened (1889) at Washington, as the First International American Conference, to consider an elaborate agenda. On most items the Latin delegates were polite but noncommittal; it was evident that the seeds of suspicion sowed in the 1820's had sprung up and were flourishing vigorously. European nations, also, keenly aware of Blaine's purposes, did not hesitate to build in the capitals of the Latin-American nations "a back-fire of opposition" to the steps toward a better understanding that were being made at Washington. In the end the conference probably advanced the cause of arbitration somewhat, but its most visible accomplishment was the establishment in Washington of a permanent Bureau of the American Republics, known since 1910 as the Pan-American Union. In 1907 it was housed in a building donated by Andrew Carnegie, one of the delegates to the first conference.

The "spirited diplomacy" of "Jingo Jim" Blaine was significant of something more than his penchant for self-dramatization. After Hamilton Fish left office under Grant, the State Department had become little more than a political appendage; the period has been called the nadir of American diplomacy. Even Blaine's antics in 1881 met with ridicule from a nation which was absorbed in domestic development. The situation was different in 1889; there was a growing interest in what was going on among the imperialist powers, and Americans were beginning to talk about something called Inevitable Destiny. Bemis has pointed out the coincidence of the passing of the frontier, the creation of the first embassies to Europe, the holding of the first Pan-American Conference, and the launching of the first battleship of the new navy, the *Maine*.

In looking back to the generation after the Civil War, one is struck by the smug and bullheaded insistence against all evidence that the United States could "lick all creation." The truth is, Congress was starving the armed services. Except for one Democratic call for their reduction, the party platforms ignored them until 1884. The army was useful only for fighting Indians—and at that was poorly armed and equipped and was commanded by men who stayed in it because they either loved the life or could not do better elsewhere. In 1874 the *Army and Navy Journal* called the navy a "heterogenous collection of naval trash." During the War of the Pacific (1879–84), when an American admiral undertook to give some advice, the Chilean Navy threatened to sink his fleet—and it could have done so, plus anything else the United States could send. Actually in 1880 the United States had less than a hundred "sea-going vessels" of all classes, and many of them were tied up at docks with rotted planking and boilers perforated with rust.

**The armed
services**

The situation was so very embarrassing that finally in 1881 Secretary William H. Hunt made bold to set up a planning board without authorization. Congress made a few gingerly appropriations, in 1882, which were to be spent in American shipyards and which resulted in the technical flub of the so-called White Squadron. A new start was made in 1885 under Whitney, this time a sound one. The Naval War College was set up at Newport, the old smooth-bore cannons were replaced by rifles, and in 1887 Bethlehem Steel began erecting an armor-plate plant. By 1895 the American Navy, while still small, was modern and efficient. The instrument of Inevitable Destiny was ready to hand.

Meanwhile Inevitable Destiny had been trying out its wings in the Pacific. In this area there had grown up several more or less vaguely defined spheres of interest, in each of which the traders and perhaps the missionaries of a European nation enjoyed the advantage. Hawaii, for example, was an American sphere. The resurgence of European imperialism caused the powers to begin snapping up the Pacific islands along with other desirable parts of the world.

**Dispute
over Samoa**

Samoa's strategic position at the crossroads of the South Pacific had long attracted the attention of American naval officers, but they had failed in repeated attempts to get Congress to annex the islands. By 1880 German traders had captured the major part of the trade; the British share was relatively small, and the American share minuscule. In 1878, however, the Senate had agreed to take the excellent harbor of Pago Pago (pronounced Pango Pango) on the island of Tutuila as a coaling station. Germany and Britain acquired treaty rights in the islands, with Germany taking over the chief port of Apia, on Upolu Island. The consuls of the three powers, unchecked by the restraining power of home opinion,


straightway intrigued for native support and precipitated a complicated civil war. A conference in Washington failed to solve anything; Germany insisted upon annexing the islands and was supported by Britain, which had been compensated elsewhere, but Cleveland was determined to maintain Samoan autonomy.

Germany now undertook to force the inhabitants to its will and shelled some native villages. Warships were rushed to Apia, until there were present in the harbor three German, three American, and one British ves-

**First Crisis,
1889**

sel. American opinion, aroused at last, was ready to go to war to protect lives and property in Samoa. Suddenly on 16

March 1889 a hurricane swooped down on Apia and sank or beached all the warships except the Britisher, which managed to pull out



From the New York World


Extreme isolationists regarded any arrangement with Britain and Germany as a violation of Jefferson's sacred injunction.

to sea. The disaster sobered all the contestants, and at Berlin they agreed upon a three-power protectorate.

The plan was far from satisfactory and was widely attacked as an "entangling alliance" contrary to the presumed wishes of the Founding Fathers. However, Congress would neither pull out nor divide the islands.

Affairs rocked along until in 1899 another crisis cropped up, and Britain and the United States, now in cahoots, shelled Apia as a lesson to the natives and whatever Germans might be in range. However, with the change of atmosphere brought by the Spanish-American War, a solution became possible. In 1899 the United

**Crisis of
1899: par-
tition**



States took Tutuila, and Germany took the western islands—only to lose them to New Zealand in 1919.

We have seen how, previous to the Civil War, the United States defended the independence of Hawaii for its strategic value. Though Congress refused to annex Hawaii, it did not object to the picking-up of outlying Jarvis, Baker, Howland, Johnston, Midway, and other islands. In 1875 Hawaii obtained a reciprocity treaty by which it was agreed that sugar could enter the United States free of duty; for its part, Hawaii agreed not to alienate or lease territory to foreign powers. The treaty was renewed in 1887, and with it went the lease of Pearl Harbor as a naval base. With the sugar market thus assured, sugar growers had imported great numbers of Chinese and Japanese laborers. When the McKinley Tariff of 1890 put sugar on the free list, thus opening the country to Cuban sugar, the Hawaiian planters staggered under the competition. When Hawaiian whites began to agitate for annexation, it was freely asserted in the United States that their object was to obtain the two-cent bounty which the McKinley Tariff had awarded to domestic sugar growers.

**American
interest in
Hawaii**

This was not the basic reason; actually, some of the Hawaiian sugar growers were opposed to annexation because the American contract labor laws would stop their importation of Oriental labor. A more potent reason lay in the Hawaiian whites' fear of "Mongolization" and in the rising strength of the Hawaiian nativist movement, which found a champion in the new queen, Liliuokalani. It must be acknowledged that the native monarchs had been capricious, wasteful, and corrupt and were panting for a restoration of their ancient

**Hawaiian
Revolution,
1893**

autocratic power. The whites were justly fearful, for they had gotten control by hook or crook of two thirds of the taxable real estate of the islands. It is arguable whether this was hard on the common natives, for they had possessed few rights even before the coming of the whites. At any rate the queen rallied the natives with the slogan "Hawaii for the Hawaiians" and announced a new constitution which would lodge practically all power in her hands.

The Americans immediately organized a revolutionary Committee of Safety and called upon the American minister for recognition and support. The minister, John L. Stevens, who had been given wide discretionary powers by the Secretary of State, promptly accorded recognition, 17 January 1893, and landed 150 sailors and marines from the U.S.S. *Boston*, presumably to protect American life and property but actually to intimidate the queen. Within two weeks Stevens announced that Hawaii had become an American protectorate. Already a revolutionary commission was on its way to Washington, and on 15 February Harrison laid a treaty of annexation before the Senate.

The Senate saw no reason to break its leisurely pace, so when Cleveland came back into the presidency the treaty was still under consideration. Cleveland, no believer in Inevitable Destiny, promptly withdrew it and sent a special envoy to the islands to do right by the queen. The commissioner sent the guard back to its ship and hauled down the flag. He offered to restore the queen if she would grant an amnesty to the rebels, but she furiously asserted her determination to have their property and their heads. By this time the rebels were well-organized and able to prevent the queen from restoring her power. They proclaimed the Republic of Hawaii, 3 July 1894, with Sanford B. Dole as president. The new government financed an elaborate propaganda in the United States in favor of annexation, but there the matter rested for the time being.

Let us turn back now to the Latin-American front, the area in which have originated so many of the significant decisions of American diplomacy. It is a curious fact that Cleveland, though contemptuous of Inevitable Destiny, twice brought the nation to the brink of war in his endeavors to uphold American rights and dignity. The first instance was the Samoan crisis; the second was the dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain in 1895. The discovery of gold in the interior jungle of Guiana brought to a head the claim of both to the mouth of the Orinoco and a great stretch of the interior. The question of ownership was complicated by a long series of vaguely couched treaties and claims, and each party naturally claimed everything it could. The burden of evidence, however, seemed to be on the side of the British claims.

Venezuela, aware that arbiters tend to split the difference, felt that it had something to gain by submitting the question to arbitration. When Britain refused arbitration, Venezuela appealed to the United States for its good offices. Washington interceded, but the British still declined. There the matter rested until 1895, when Venezuelan propaganda persuaded Congress to pass a resolution urging arbitration. At this point Cleveland took up the matter, probably swayed by several considerations. The Democratic Party was the traditional home of Anglophobia and of the "professional Irishman." Its Western free-silver wing was denouncing Cleveland as the servant of British gold interests, and perhaps he hoped to divert Western attention from radical issues. It is possible also that he hoped to leave office with a record sweetened by a vigorous and popular stand against the hereditary enemy.


Richard Olney, now Cleveland's Secretary of State, drafted a note to London (dated 20 July 1895) which gave a strained interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, sometimes known as the Olney Corollary. He asserted the right of the United States to intervene because, if Britain made good its claim, it would be an extension of European dominion and therefore a violation of Monroe's No Trespass dictum. His presentation of the meaning of the Monroe Doctrine was faulty, and his analysis of the merits of the boundary dispute was pro-Venezuelan. He demanded a yes-or-no answer from Britain as to whether she would submit to arbitration and included a blustering statement that "the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition."

Olney's intervention

Lord Salisbury, British prime minister and foreign minister, was busy on many fronts and saw no reason to hurry. After more than four months his answer was delivered. Couched in a tone of "civil indifference with just a touch of boredom," it calmly corrected Olney's history and answered his question with a decisive "No." Thus put in his proper place, Cleveland had the choice of accepting the reproof or of bulling ahead. He chose the latter and in a message to Congress demanded arbitration and asked for an appropriation to finance a commission of inquiry. The message was couched in sharp language because, as Olney said later, England regarded the United States as "so completely a negligible quantity that it was believed . . . only words the equivalent of blows would be really effective."

Congress and public accepted Cleveland's message and its implication of war with jingoistic enthusiasm. On the other hand, ministers, educators, and bankers refused to go along and after a few days succeeded in making their voices heard. On the other side of the Atlantic the British public, hitherto little concerned with the Venezuelan controversy, regarded it as no cause for war, espe-

Salisbury backs down



cially a war against a nation with which it was daily becoming more conscious of kinship and common interests. The British government, shocked into an awareness of the seriousness of the situation, hesitated to back down. But the odds were against it. There was little doubt but that it could win a naval war and devastate American coastal cities at will, but its merchant marine and its investments in the United States would suffer, and it would probably lose Canada.

Greatest deterrent of all was the European situation, for Great Britain stood in "splendid isolation" without allies and without powerful friends. France, disputing with Britain over the Sudan, was hostile. Just at this moment (January 1896) the British friction with the Boers of South Africa became acute, when Leander Starr Jameson led a raid into the Transvaal in an attempt to seize the government. President Kruger of the Transvaal trapped and captured Jameson, and Kaiser Wilhelm II sent him a telegram congratulating him on his victory "without appealing to

the help of friendly powers." The offer of German aid to Kruger was too plain to be misunderstood.

It was clear to Salisbury that he could not afford war with the United States; so he swallowed his pride and gave in. Early in 1897 Britain and Venezuela signed a treaty agreeing to arbitrate the ownership of areas which had been occupied less than fifty years, thus saving the main British contentions. Venezuela objected, but Olney insisted upon its acceptance. Late in 1899 the arbitral board awarded to Britain most of its claims but gave the mouth of the Orinoco to Venezuela. The settlement was essentially the same as the one Britain had repeatedly offered to make in previous years.

Conclusion

The Venezuela crisis of 1895 should probably be taken as marking the emergence of the United States as a world power. Certainly it marked the beginning of British recognition that the Western Hemisphere was the primary responsibility of the United States. From that time Britain began a slow process of liquidating its historical American hegemony, which was in the end to leave the United States in the paramount economic and military positions. In 1823 the two countries had tacitly acknowledged that fundamentally neither was a menace to the other; now, after a long history of bickering and recrimination, they had evolved to a position where they could acknowledge common interests if not actual partnership. Thereafter the United States led in the Western Hemisphere and showed more willingness to follow the British lead in the Eastern. On the other hand, Olney's vaporings about American sovereignty, after an initial period of enthusiasm, had afforded one more peg on which to hang Latin-American suspicion of the aggressive intentions of the United States. Not less, the episode stirred up a considerable degree of public interest in the issues being touted by the advocates of Inevitable Destiny and accelerated the trend toward expansion and engagement in foreign broils.

Significance

3 *The Approach to War with Spain*

We have seen that the colonial revolts of the early nineteenth century stripped Spain of all of its American empire except Cuba and Puerto Rico. Cuba, "the pearl of the Antilles," was rich in sugar and tobacco and was coveted by France and Britain, while the United States was convinced that Cuba would eventually by mere force of gravitation drop into the American Union. As a result the island remained with Spain, largely because no two of the three powers would let the other have it. Cuba's people were a mixed lot: a wealthy Creole planting class dwelling largely in the pest hole of Havana beside thousands of slum-dwelling whites and mulattoes; poor whites in the mountainous areas;

Cuba

and black slaves (freed in 1886) on the sugar plantations. Then there was the official class, largely Spanish-born. It infested the island like locusts and exhibited the worst features of the inefficiency and corruption which had always plagued Spain and its empire, but which became unbelievably degraded as Spain itself fell into chaos in the nineteenth century.

There was, of course, unrest among native Cubans, but plotters found little support among the people and sought refuge in the surrounding countries, especially the United States. When rebellion broke out in 1868, the rebels differed in their aims: some wanted independence, some home rule, and others wanted annexation to the United States. There was, however, a general agreement on the need of sweeping reforms: loosening of Spain's mercantile restrictions, the granting of civil liberties, the abolition of slavery, and the renovation of the incredibly corrupt and oppressive administration of the Spanish officials.

The rebellion was prosecuted with great cruelty on both sides and was ended only by the exhaustion of the Cubans and the promise of amnesty and reform by the Spanish. The United States had skated perilously close to war when in 1873 the Spanish shot fifty-three of the crew and passengers of the captured gun-runner *Virginius*. However, Fish realized the malodorous character of the *Virginius* and after some bickering settled for a Spanish indemnity to the families of the executed Americans.

After the restoration of peace Spain tolerated the free entry of foreign capital into Cuba, and within the next fifteen years or so about \$50 million of American money found lodgment, \$30 million in sugar. British investments were far more important. An executive agreement of 1884 provided a considerable measure of trade reciprocity, and the McKinley Tariff of 1890 admitted Cuban and Puerto Rican raw sugar duty-free. As a result, trade with Cuba boomed until it approached \$100 million a year, and Cuban sugar investors looked forward to a long era of prosperity. It began to seem that eventually Cuban problems would be settled on the basis of self-rule under the Spanish crown.

Spain, long torn by revolution, was now under an infant king and a queen-regent, and its cabinets were weak and corrupt. The idea of independence was cherished chiefly in the Cuban settlements in the United States. Their prospects looked up with the discontent brought by the depression of the 1890's, and they blossomed when in 1894 the Wilson-Gorman Tariff restored the duty on sugar and knocked out reciprocity. The result was the collapse of a never too secure Cuban economy, which, added to Spanish delays in effecting the reforms promised in 1878, led to the renewal of revolt.

The revolution was led (until his early death) by the fiery young poet José Martí. Unfortunately the Hispanic penchant for atrocities again

found free scope; moreover, the *insurrectos* began to devastate the island in a deliberate attempt to force the Spanish withdrawal. American property was the favorite object of Cuban action, either to force American intervention or to wring from the owners protection money which could be used to finance the revolution. Actually American investors had been hard hit by the end of reciprocity, but, far from wishing Cuban independence, they preferred to rock along with the antiquated Spanish régime. As before, gun-runners and filibusterers operated from the United States; and, though the government managed to block or capture about two thirds of their enterprises, the Spanish refused to be satisfied with anything less than complete stoppage.

Revolt of
1895

In 1896 the Spanish commander, General Weyler, cooped up the non-combatants of the disaffected regions in barbed wire *reconcentrado* camps while he hunted down the rebels. Slack sanitary precautions, added to the scarcity of food, led to the outbreak of pests and the death of swarms of civilians. Public criticism swelled in the United States, and Congress, despite Cleveland's protest, resolved that belligerent rights should be granted to the rebels. Anti-American riots flared in Spain, and the Youngstown (Ohio) Chamber of Commerce retaliated by voting a boycott of the Spanish onion. When Cleveland offered to mediate, the Spanish government rejected his good offices and began to organize a European diplomatic front to block American intervention.

Cuban propaganda was even more powerful than before in the United States and found important outlets in the new yellow press, especially Joseph Pulitzer's *New York World* and William Randolph Hearst's *New York Journal*. These two, deadly rivals, spared no expense and no deviation from the truth to beat each other's circulation. The actual atrocities were bad enough, but the yellow press manufactured worse ones with faked pictures and sex angles. The Spanish, mindful of Chicago pork packers who did a big business in Europe, called Americans "pig stickers," and the yellow press dubbed the Spanish commander "Butcher Weyler." The yellow press sedulously concealed the Cuban share of the current atrocities and played up Spanish cruelty—a view to which the American public was already disposed because of its long belief in the Black Legend. When Hearst sent the artist Frederic Remington to Cuba to provide sensational pictures, the artist cabled back that everything was quiet and there was no prospect of war. The story goes that Hearst wired him the crisp injunction, "You furnish the pictures and I'll furnish the war." Hearst later boasted that he had made the Spanish-American War as a circulation stunt; probably he exaggerated his power, though scarcely his intent.

The yellow
press

While Republicans doubtless hoped that their *Cuba Libre* slogan (to which they gave frank expression in their 1896 platform) would offset

Western populism, the most rabid phase of the propaganda followed the campaign of 1896. Politicians and the yellow press were desperately pumping air into Inevitable Destiny to keep it alive. **Growing crisis** The fact was that Weyler was getting results, and the insurrection was so nearly lost that in the autumn of 1897, when a new liberal cabinet came into control of the Spanish government, it risked replacing Weyler and softening its Cuban policy.


Loyalists in Havana rioted against the change of policy and threatened the American consulate. Consul-General Fitzhugh Lee had earlier asked that a naval force be kept available at Key West to be rushed in to protect American lives and property in case of necessity, and now (January 1898) Washington ordered the battleship *Maine* to Havana on a "courtesy" call. But the situation was not ticklish enough to suit Hearst. On 9 February he published a private letter written by De Lôme, the Spanish minister in Washington, and stolen in Havana by Cubans. In this letter McKinley was called "weak and a bidder for the admiration of the crowd." The yellow press, never restrained in its comments on McKinley's weak policy, now found it useful to come to his rescue and De Lôme quickly resigned before a diplomatic issue could be made. Even Assistant Secretary of the Navy Roosevelt was scandalized, though he himself once expressed the opinion that McKinley had no more backbone than a chocolate éclair.

This was the moment for which the expansionists had long waited, and they bent every energy to keep the national anger focused on Cuba while they conspired to snatch an empire out of the melee which they hoped **The large policy of 1898** would soon begin. It was no secret that they expected to get Cuba and probably Puerto Rico and the Philippines out of Spain if war came, and to utilize the wave of expansionist sentiment to add Hawaii and an American-owned isthmian canal. Lodge, the leader of the Congressional expansionists, got together with Roosevelt to plan practical measures. Secretary of the Navy John D. Long was a calm man who was doing a fair job of administration, but to his active young subordinate he seemed to be possessed of the "slows." At any rate, Roosevelt did everything he could to push the navy toward a war footing. He found a way to select, as commander of the Asiatic fleet, George Dewey, who was anxious to wind up a humdrum career with some memorable action.

On 31 January Lodge wrote to a friend that "there may be an explosion any day in Cuba which would settle a great many things." He must have been amazed by the accuracy of his prophecy. On the night of 15 **Sinking of the *Maine*, 15 Feb. 1898** February while lying quietly at anchor in Havana Harbor, the *Maine* was sunk by an explosion, with the loss of 260 officers and men. The explosion of wrath that followed in the United States was in the end even more destructive, and the nation waited impatiently for the report of the court of inquiry which was

convened immediately. The only question it could hope to answer was whether the explosion was external or internal.

No report was needed to convince the unthinking part of the public and the yellow press. The loudest opinion was that it was a Spanish attempt to put Americans in their place; little heed was given to the realistic view that the Spaniards would have been foolish to get into war with the



ANOTHER OLD WOMAN TRIES TO SWEEP BACK THE SEA.

Davenport, from the New York Journal American

Davenport (1898) was rather overcomplimentary to McKinley's efforts to prevent war with Spain.

United States. The minority of those who held to the external-explosion theory saw it as a desperate effort by the despairing Cuban rebels to bring the United States to their rescue. War was the fond desire of the expansionists, but it was generally opposed by business, which pointed out how it would dislocate industry and finance and destroy the confidence which was growing after the long depression.

Roosevelt, hampered by the phlegmatic Long, chafed under his impulses to action. Then on 25 February Long went home to relax and left TR in the office as Acting Secretary of the Navy. Lodge looked in and found Roosevelt in a fever of activity, ordering ammunition, redistributing ships, and "sending messages to Congress for immediate legislation authorizing the enlistment of an unlimited number of seamen." Between them they cooked up a cable to Dewey at Hong Kong, ordering him to fill his bunkers with coal and in case of war "see that the Spanish squadron does not leave the Asiatic coast, and then offensive operations in Philippine Islands."

Roosevelt
prepares
for war

Two weeks later Congress unanimously provided \$50 million for war

preparations. The total effect was to raise the hopes of the Cuban rebels and convince Spain that American official protestations of peaceful intentions were insincere. The proof seemed to be added when on

The *Maine* report

28 March the *Maine* court of inquiry (consisting of naval officers, who may be accused of having a vested interest in war) reported that the ship had been sunk by a submarine mine. When the ship was raised in 1911 and examined by experts, they found evidences of both external and internal explosions. Nobody knows the truth—or if they do they have not proclaimed it.

But the slogan "Remember the Maine!" had already done its deadly work. McKinley, it is certain, did not want war and was anxious to find a peaceful way out of what was coming to look like an impasse. Late in

The Spanish dilemma

March he instructed the American minister in Madrid, Stewart L. Woodford, to ask Spain to (1) grant an armistice to the insurgents until 1 October, and (2) do away with the *reconcentrado* system. The weak Spanish government was in a dilemma: on one hand, it risked war with the United States; on the other hand, Spanish public opinion opposed concessions and threatened revolution if they were made. The Madrid cabinet was fully awake to the situation and was ready to pull out of Cuba if it could prepare public opinion for the step. After several days of stalling it yielded to McKinley's requests, though it made some minor face-saving conditions.

It was now McKinley who was in a dilemma as he put the finishing touches to a message to Congress on the Cuban situation. The *Maine* report had swung many doubters to the side of war. Bryan was stumping the

McKinley's dilemma

country for *Cuba Libre*. Congressmen, urged on by the public, and on their own account not averse to a few thrills, were ready for war, with each party vying to prove that it was most willing to strike a blow for Christian morals and human freedom. Recalcitrant Congressmen let it be known that the power to declare war lay with Congress, and if McKinley did not go along they would go without him. Confronted by a similar threat in 1896, Cleveland had stoutly answered that he was commander in chief and he would not mobilize the army. But McKinley was no Cleveland. He had a vision of being repudiated by his party in 1900 and of Bryan winning on a platform of "Free Cuba" and "Free Silver."

Now on 11 April, with the Spanish capitulation before him, McKinley added to his message the note that it had been received. "This fact, with every other pertinent consideration, will, I am sure, have your just and

McKinley asks for war

careful attention in the solemn deliberations upon which you are about to enter. If this measure attains a successful result, then our aspirations as a Christian, peace-loving people will be realized. If it fails, it will be only another justification for our contem-

plated action." The peace minority of Congress bitterly opposed a war declaration, and the debate was accompanied by threats, flying missiles, and fist fights.

Finally on 19 April a joint resolution was passed which was certain to lead to war: (1) Cuba was declared free; (2) the withdrawal of Spain was demanded; (3) force was authorized to effect the desired ends; and (4) all intention to annex Cuba was disclaimed. The last proviso was adopted at the suggestion of Senator Teller to placate the anti-expansionists. McKinley now gave Spain until noon of the 23rd to agree to evacuate Cuba. The Madrid cabinet, though thoroughly conscious of its own military weakness, had no alternative but to accept war; so it sent no reply. On the 25th Congress declared that a state of war existed as of the 21st.

War, 21
April 1898

It is difficult to assess properly the justification of the war. Certainly there existed no grievances in international law which could excuse it. The humanitarian grounds were ridiculed by critics on the basis that American history offered plenty of parallels to Cuban oppression; if it had not already, it soon would when the *reconcentrado* system was applied to the Philippines. McKinley, had he been a strong leader, might conceivably have won his ends by diplomatic means, for, given a little time and a face-saving formula, Spain would have yielded all he asked. Unfortunately the American public had the taste of blood in its mouth and wanted war. Undoubtedly the war had a considerable psychological impetus. The United States of the 1890's scarcely less than the ante-bellum South was mesmerized by the sentimental, chivalric glow of Scott's novels. Young men had listened to their elders' tales of the Civil War, and bedazzled by its supposed glamor they wanted a war of their own.

What
caused
the war?

Such emotions clearly supplemented the propaganda which exhorted the United States to expand, to take a strong line among the nations. Young America, confidently feeling its biceps, wished to measure itself against a champion; remember that Spain was then regarded as far from being a pushover.

"We're a gr-reat people," said Mr. Hennessy, earnestly.

"We ar-re," said Mr. Dooley. "We ar-re that. An' th' best iv it is, we know we ar-re."

The urge to keep in step with the world meant that we also, like the great powers, should have a White Man's Burden—even if only a little one about the size and shape of Cuba. On the other hand, the Cuban crisis arose in the first place because of Spain's tyranny and ineptitude; and even when the Spanish cabinet was taken over by high-minded liberals, the domestic situation would not permit them to clean up the mess—especially if it meant yielding to pressure from the despised American "pig stickers."

The cabinet knew better, but the Spanish people confidently expected to win the test of strength with the Western upstarts.

The above should not divert our attention from the fact that there were strategic and idealistic reasons for the war. The American mission had always envisioned the United States as the champion of justice; hitherto circumstances had induced a policy of what we
Strategy and ideals: fondly called isolation, but now that we were strong it
No-Op-pression Principle seemed only natural that we should do more than merely preach about justice. Many men, like Bryan, who opposed expansion were sincerely convinced that we had a humanitarian duty to the Cubans. If Bryan opposed annexation, it was not because he hesitated to carry the blessings of democracy and evangelical Christianity to the ends of the earth; rather, it was because he felt he would be aiding the trusts to find new fields to exploit and would thus add to their power at home. By this time, also, the Monroe Doctrine had come to represent the American conviction that we must dominate the Caribbean. Now, of course, the Monroe Doctrine had little if anything to do with the Cuban crisis; the action taken really added another interpretation, the "No-Oppression Principle." It was, in a clumsy and rather destructive way, an attempt to promote security by ousting a foreign rival and doing away with one more occasion for friction.

At the outbreak of war the United States possessed an army of 28,000 men, poorly trained, poorly equipped, and commanded at the top by Civil War relicts. There was no general staff in the modern sense nor was there
Comparison of land forces until 1903, and there was a woeful ignorance of logistics and amphibious warfare. During the active phase of the war about 210,000 men (estimates differ widely) were recruited and mostly organized as state volunteers on the Civil War pattern. Of the army only about 45,000 left the country; most of them spent their service in make-shift Southern camps fighting malaria, typhoid, and food poisoning from such odorous provisions as "embalmed beef."

Among the U.S. Volunteers were three cavalry regiments, one of which, recruited from cowboys and ivy leaguers, became known as the Rough Riders—though it fought on foot. Set up partly to make a place for Theodore Roosevelt, the regiment was technically commanded by Leonard Wood, an army medico who laid aside the scalpel for the saber and was to emerge as America's first great proconsul. A principal handicap to army effort was the administration of the Secretary of War, who lacked the requisite boldness and imagination to cut red tape and get results. As a result the fighting men in the tropics wore winter woollens, were short of shelter and medicines, and gave away their positions by the pall of smoke rising from their black gunpowder. In addition to the American army

forces which presently appeared in Cuba, there should be listed about 15,000 revolutionists, useful in many ways but of uncertain battle utility.

The Spanish army in the colonies had to fight the war with the forces already at its disposal. There were about 200,000 in Cuba, about 50,000 in the Philippines, and about 10,000 in Puerto Rico. No one can impeach the courage of the Spanish soldier, but he was poorly led, poorly equipped, and suffered from tropical disease, malnutrition, and poor morale. He did, however, have the advantage of combat experience. General Ramón Blanco was commander in Cuba.

Since the freeing of Cuba was the technical objective of the war, strategy dictated active aid to the Cuban rebels, which would mean the landing of supplies and probably of military forces, and an active naval blockade to prevent the reinforcing or munitioning of the Spanish army. Thus the Spanish would be forced to try to break the blockade by naval means, so that the outcome of the war would depend primarily on naval supremacy. In naval strength the United States enjoyed a superiority that was to prove overwhelming, not only in number of fighting units but in armor, fire power, training, and battle efficiency. A simplified listing of the forces of the two powers follows:

**Naval
comparison**

	<i>United States</i>	<i>Spain</i>
Battleships	5	2
Cruisers	13	6
Unprotected cruisers and gunboats	20	12
Monitors	6	0
Torpedo boats	8	10
Torpedo-boat destroyers	0	7

Current naval opinion gave the edge to the Spanish on the ground that American personnel was inferior and that the slow battleships could not hamper Spain's swift cruisers. The Navy Department of the United States moved energetically to increase its auxiliary fleet, and its 15,000 personnel was about doubled. The Spanish Navy, with about 14,000 men, found difficulty in recruiting useful personnel to man the considerable auxiliary fleet which it took over.

4 *The Spanish-American War*

On the first of May, six days after Congress "accepted" war, Commodore Dewey sailed boldly into Manila harbor and blew the antiquated Spanish Philippine fleet out of the water. With four cruisers and two gun-

Battle of Manila Bay, 1 May 1898 boats he had run past the forts at Corregidor the night before. The Spanish fleet of six small cruisers (scarcely any of them equal to the least of Dewey's) and four lesser craft lay at anchor under the guns of Cavite, barely visible in the morning haze. Dewey, his golf cap in striking contrast to his white uniform, stood on the bridge of the *Olympia* as the American fleet steamed back and forth firing at the Spaniards. Dewey's dissatisfaction with the marksmanship of his gunners was tempered only by the ineffectiveness of the Spanish fire, for most of their guns could not reach him.

A report of ammunition shortage caused Dewey to withdraw; the withdrawal was covered as "time out for breakfast." As the smoke cleared, it was seen that the American fire had been more effective than had been supposed; and when a check found more ammunition, the fleet went back to finish the job. Admiral Montojo had known very well that he was doomed and had fought only from a sense of duty. By noon every Spanish ship had been sunk or taken, and the guns of Cavite silenced; the proud reign of Spain in the Orient was broken. The only American death had been one man from heatstroke on the noncombatant dispatch boat; 170 Spaniards had perished.


The victory in Manila Bay came promptly on the heels of the declaration of war. It became known on 7 May when the irrepressible Roosevelt, just commissioned a lieutenant colonel and on the verge of leaving the Navy Department, jumped the official gun and spilled the news to the waiting reporters. The nation was electrified by the ease of the victory, and the lick-all-creation spirit was amusingly expressed in some lines of doggerel by Eugene Ware:

Jubilation in the U.S. Navy Department, jumped the official gun and spilled the news to the waiting reporters. The nation was electrified by the ease of the victory, and the lick-all-creation spirit was amusingly expressed in some lines of doggerel by Eugene Ware:

Oh, dewy was the morning
Upon the first of May,
And Dewey was the Admiral,
Down in Manila Bay.
And dewy were the Regent's eyes
Them orbs of royal blue,
And dew we feel discouraged?
I dew not think we dew.

Dewey had destroyed the Spanish fleet, but his only foothold was at Cavite. For three ticklish months the situation remained in doubt while he blockaded the bay and waited for troops to arrive from the United States. Short of ammunition and supplies as he was and in peril from Spanish torpedoes, not to mention the danger of tropical diseases, Dewey was under a great strain. Meanwhile the warships of neutral nations gathered to watch over the interests of their nationals, among them a fleet of three British ships

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under Captain Edward Chichester and five German ships under Admiral Otto von Diederichs.

Germany had been dickering for the purchase of the Philippines, but this transfer was not favored by the British, who already had reason to fear German ambitions in the Far East. As a consequence the attitude of Captain Chichester toward Dewey was markedly friendly, while that of Von Diederichs, though perhaps not intended to be hostile, was certainly clumsy. Dewey took the size of the German fleet (which outgunned him) as a discourtesy and a threat, and minor incidents culminated at one point in a choleric inquiry as to whether the Germans wanted war. The stories told of German threats and British offers of support are not true, and there was no danger of war. Nevertheless, the American public took them at face value, and they had some effect in stimulating the growing suspicion of Germany.

One move of Dewey's was to have serious results. Before he left for Manila he had been in touch with some of the leaders of a recent unsuccessful revolution in Luzon. Dewey now brought in Emilio Aguinaldo, the titular leader of that revolt, and furnished arms for his re-organized insurgent army. By the beginning of July the in-
 surgents were investing Manila, and the Spanish were living in dread of what would happen when they stormed the city. It would seem that the Philippine insurrections had been carried on with much the same disregard for life, limb, and courtesy as those in Cuba. Aguinaldo, of course, had wanted no more from the Americans than aid in driving out the Spanish, setting up an independent government, and maintaining it against outside powers such as Germany and Japan; he would carry the ball from there on. His claim that he had made this clear to the American

**Fall of
 Manila**


consul with whom he first talked may be correct, but his assertion that the American agreed was probably a misunderstanding—or perhaps merely Oriental deviousness.

At any rate, General Wesley Merritt, commander of the expeditionary force, was slated to become governor-general. The force of 13,000 arrived in three batches: 30 June, 17 July, and 31 July; the first convoy paused at Guam to annex the island, put it under the care of an American resident, and then moved on. Aguinaldo made his declaration of independence on 18 June and announced himself as dictator-president. The dispatching of American troops seemed to him quite unnecessary, and his attitude became stiffer as additional convoys arrived. By now the Spaniards had begun to look upon the Americans as saviors, for the latter had insisted on moving forward and taking over the Filipino trenches. On the 13th of August, after a token exchange of artillery fire to save Spanish honor, the city was surrendered and occupied. The prearranged plans were somewhat bungled by the enthusiastic attempts of the Filipinos to make a battle out of the occasion. Within six months the Spaniards were to have the satisfaction of seeing their conquerors engaged in fighting a full dress "insurrection" and repeating many of the same mistakes for which Americans had criticized them.

At the beginning of the war the Spanish battle fleet assembled in the Cape Verde Islands and prepared to sail under Admiral Pascual Cervera. American coast defenses were deplorably antiquated, and it was clear that

Atlantic naval events the Spanish fleet could wreak havoc in any city it chose to strike. The public failed utterly to grasp Mahan's dictum that the mission of a battle fleet is not to guard cities but to seek out and destroy the enemy fleet. The result was a panic-stricken demand from the more emotional papers and Congressmen of each of the Atlantic cities from Maine to Texas that (since the Spanish would obviously attack them) the American battle fleet be drawn up in a protective semicircle before them. The naval board of strategy confidently expected the Spanish fleet to go to the Antilles—as it did—but had to satisfy political demands. Consequently it sent the heaviest modern units to Key West under command of Rear Admiral William T. Sampson; the remainder was utilized to form a "Mosquito Fleet" based on Hampton Roads under Commodore Winfield S. Schley, and a patrol fleet based on Northern ports.

As soon as it was learned that Cervera had sailed, Schley moved around the western end of Cuba while Sampson patrolled the northern coast of the Antilles. Cervera may have planned a raid on American cities, but, blocked from the north as he was, he put into Santiago on the southern coast of Cuba near the eastern end of the island. Schley arrived on 26 May and was soon joined by Sampson, who took command. Cervera was effectively blockaded in the bottle-shaped harbor of Santiago. An attempt to close the



under Captain Edward Chichester and five German ships under Admiral Otto von Diederichs.

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**Fall of
Manila**

Santiago, so its commander, General Linares, had available only 6500 men, and these low in supplies and morale. However, the men were armed with magazine rifles using smokeless powder, and the defenses were well held by blockhouses and barbed wire. As it was, the 13,000 attacking troops, floundering through the jungle and utterly unprepared to meet the heat and the mental strain, might easily have been thrown back to the beach by a determined attack.

Linares, however, contented himself with delaying actions. Skirmishes won by the Americans at Las Guásimas (26 June), El Caney and San Juan (1 July) enabled artillery to be emplaced on the hills overlooking Santiago. Nevertheless, Shafter was so disheartened by the punishment he had taken and so fearful of disease and the approaching rain and hurricane season that he telegraphed Washington that he considered withdrawing to a stronger position; at the same time he sent a flag of truce to General Toral, who had succeeded Linares, with a demand for surrender. Wood had become acting brigade commander during the fighting, and Lt. Col. Roosevelt succeeded to the command of the Rough Riders. Now, after charging up a San Juan hill against Spanish Mausers, he saw the seriousness of the situation. "We are," he wrote Lodge on the 2nd, "within measurable distance of a terrible military disaster."

But the next morning the complexion of the whole situation suddenly changed. Cervera was ordered to attempt escape, and about nine o'clock on the morning of 3 July his four cruisers picked their way past the sunken Naval *Merrimac*. Sampson was ashore in conference with Shafter and got back only in time for the final shots, so that Schley battle of Santiago, was actually in command. The battle for credit later rivaled 3 July 1898 the original conflict. As it was, nothing went according to plan. The swift Spanish cruisers had to stand to sea to pass a reef before they could turn westward along the coast, and the converging American ships ran a serious danger of running into their own crossfire. Then, as the Spanish turned west, the slow American battleships fell behind, while the fast cruisers had no time to couple their forward engines and therefore operated on half power.

While the American battle line was unsnarling the threatened collision, the Spanish might have gotten away had it not been that their wooden decks had been set on fire, and the ships were soon roaring furnaces. Presently the American fleet was able to range along a parallel line and pot the Spanish vessels like sitting ducks; by two o'clock the last victim had gone down or been beached. One American was killed to perhaps 400 Spaniards. "My bugles," said a Spanish captain, "were the last echo of those which history tells us were sounded in the taking of Granada; it was the signal that the history of four centuries of greatness was ended."

Shafter, aware of his own weakness and dreading to charge the re-

maining defenses of the city, requested Sampson to use the navy. The admiral indignantly refused, giving mines and batteries as an excuse. An amusing altercation ensued and was carried as high as McKinley. Later it was found that the mines were few in number, while the batteries were made up principally of eighteenth-century muzzle-loaders, while one bore "the disconcerting date of 1668." However, Toral was short of food and ammunition and entered into negotiations which led to surrender on the 17th.

Surrender
of Santiago

The surrender was just in time. The rains had set in, malaria and yellow fever had appeared, and soon the army was a vast hospital. After some bickering Shafter persuaded the War Department to order the army back to the States. Before the word was announced the general officers of the army, led by TR, had sent to the newspapers a "Round Robin" demanding the same thing—a court-martial offense if there ever was one. But they escaped unscathed, and for TR it was the foundation of the legend that he had saved the army. A few days later he was at Montauk Point angling for the governorship of New York and writing *The Rough Riders* or, as Mr. Dooley called it, *Alone in Cubia*. Roosevelt had found his summer vacation profitable, for he had been breveted colonel and brigadier general. It wasn't much of a war, he noted rather pathetically, but it was the best one we had.

The naval battle of Santiago had promptly been followed by rumors that Spain was about to sue for peace. As a matter of fact her plea was on the way by 26 July, but there were a number of delays and when McKinley received the message he and the Cabinet embarked on a leisurely voyage down the Potomac to consider it. The fact was that the ease with which the war was being won had swung many opposing business interests over to the policy of expansion. Regret was freely expressed over the adoption of Teller's self-denying ordinance, and it was supposed that Spain would surrender in an attempt to save Puerto Rico and the as yet unoccupied Philippines. Already the surge of expansionism had led Congress to annex Hawaii by joint resolution (approved 7 July) on the ground that it would be needed for the prosecution of the Philippine war.

Threats of
peace

Some time before this Spain had scraped together a third squadron and sent it under the command of Admiral Camara through the Mediterranean toward the Philippines. Hearst, who had covered the naval battle at Santiago from a dispatch boat and who regarded the war as a private circulation stunt, ordered his European representative to sink blockships in the Suez Canal; fortunately the recall of the Spanish fleet made that action unnecessary. Success was also beginning to affect McKinley. A few months before the war he had deplored the thought of forcible annexation, for "that by our code of morality would be criminal aggression." Now he

was not so sure. During the war, he said, "We must keep all we get; when the war is over, we must keep what we want."

Fortunately for the expansionists, Teller's resolution did not cover Puerto Rico. The collection of an expeditionary force was now frantically hastened. The commander, General Nelson A. Miles, had gone to Santiago in hope of obtaining some of Shafter's troops, but their situation was so bad that he was forced to do without them. On the 25th of July he began landing on the southern shore of the island. Mr. Dooley, polishing the top of his bar, feigned pity for "thim br-rave la-ads facin' death be suffication in bokays an' dyin' iv waltzin' with th' pretty girls iv Porther Ricky." Miles's original plan had called for a landing on the north shore near San Juan, but it would seem that he now planned a triumphal march across the island which would effectively exclude the navy from sharing the credit. The Puertorriqueños received the Americans with enthusiasm. There were a few skirmishes to lend tang to the triumphal march, but on 13 August the news of peace stayed a threatened battle and led to the quiet occupation of the island.

Discussion over the terms of the peace protocol occupied weeks, and the protocol was not signed until 12 August. By its terms hostilities were to cease; Spain was to give up Cuba; Puerto Rico and an island in the Marianas (Guam was eventually selected) were to go to the United States; and the Americans were to hold Manila until the disposition of the Philippines was decided. The peace conference was to open in Paris on 1 October, and McKinley appointed a commission of five members. Secretary of State William R. Day resigned to become its chairman, and it included three Senators (one a Democratic anti-expansionist) and the expansionist Whitelaw Reid, editor of the *New York Tribune*. This "splendid little war," as John Hay called it, took about 700 American lives in combat and about 5800 from other causes; the money cost ran close to \$450 million. More lives and cash were to be expended in the Philippines.

The principal question now was that of what to do with the Philippines. The average American had never heard of them, and McKinley himself admitted that he could not have placed them within 2000 miles of their locality. But expansionist sentiment was now booming; and businessmen bethought themselves that with the powers marking out spheres in the Far East, the United States would be cut out of this presumably rich market unless it found a political foothold. There was the exact rub, and opponents of the "invisible government" did not fail to point out that annexation would in the end strengthen business interests at home.

The nations of Europe had been notably cool and correct toward the United States during the war. Only in England did government and people show sympathy, and so clear was this attitude that the Spanish queen-

regent complained that Britain was unneutral. Great Britain now quietly encouraged the United States to annex the islands, partly because she was anxious to keep them out of the hands of Germany, partly because she hoped thus to obtain American support for her policy of open trade (the Open Door) in the Far East. Of course, the Philippines might be given independence, but they were ill-prepared for it and there might still be trouble among the powers who would have to intervene to maintain order.

There were other complications. Moralistic Americans felt that they had a "duty" toward the islands which would not permit either Spanish misrule or native misrule, and which dictated an attempt to educate them, teach them free institutions, and raise their living standards. Churchmen were particularly vocal on this point. Opponents were no less convinced that forcible annexation of the Philippines (or of Puerto Rico) was a violation of the spirit of the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, that it would vitiate freedom at home, that it would be a burden and expense (as it was), that it would lead to foreign entanglements (as it did), and that the moral argument was hypocritical because self-government and free institutions could not grow in the same soil as bananas.

McKinley was nothing if not moral, and he wrestled with the problem of how to reconcile the material and the moral. Some time later he quite naïvely told a delegation of churchmen how he did it.

I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night. And one night late it came to me this way—I don't know how it was, but it came:

**McKinley
finds the
moral so-
lution**

(1) That we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; [*national honor theme*]

(2) That we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; [*economic nationalism*]

(3) That we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule worse than Spain's was; [*racial superiority*]

(4) That there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. [*Altruism, the "white man's burden" and missionary zeal. The Filipinos, by the way, were already Christians, Roman Catholics, with the exception of a small number of Mohammedan tribesmen.*]

And then I went to bed, and went to sleep, and slept soundly.*

*Charles Sumner Olcott, *Life of William McKinley*, copyright 1916 by Houghton Mifflin Company. This excerpt was quoted by Parker T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (1927), 394–95. The italics are Professor Moon's comments.

When the peace commissioners met at Paris, Spain's problem was to get good-enough terms of peace to forestall revolution at home, and its representatives haggled and procrastinated in what was truly pathetic fashion for a nation once so great. They tried to get the United States to annex Cuba and assume the \$400 million debt incurred in the attempt to subdue it; thus the United States would be forced to free Cuba and presumably keep the debt. The try did not work. When it came to the Philippines, the Spanish were able to demonstrate that they were not conquered territory; even Manila had not been taken until a few hours after the signing of the protocol. In the end Spain reluctantly agreed to cede the islands for a payment of \$20 million.

The whole question had now to be fought out in the Senate, where a two-thirds vote was needed for approval. Bryan, who had served as a colonel of Nebraska volunteers, now came to Washington and persuaded several Democratic Senators to vote approval in order to put an official end to the war and annex the Philippines, thus clearing the way for the freeing of both the Philippines and Cuba.* It seems that the beginning of the Philippine Insurrection on 4 February may have persuaded two doubtful but patriotically touchy Senators to vote approval of the treaty on the 6th. The score then stood 57 to 27—one vote to spare.


Some days later, by Vice-President Hobart's casting vote, the Senate rejected a resolution favoring Philippine independence. The treaty, of course, was not adopted on the clear-cut issue of Philippine annexation; had such a vote been possible, it is quite likely that it would have been defeated. As it was, the Senate adopted the McEnery Resolution, which apparently repudiated permanent annexation. At least it promised that "in due time" the United States would "make such disposition of said islands as will best promote the interests of the United States and the inhabitants of said islands." Exchange of ratifications of the treaty by the United States and Spain was on 11 April 1899.

"An' so th' war is over?" asked Mr. Hennessy.

"On'y part iv it," said Mr. Dooley. "Th' part that ye see in th' pitcher pa-apers is over, but th' tax collector will continyoo his part iv th' war with relentless fury. Cav'lry charges are not th' on'y wans in a rale war."

During the senatorial fight over the treaty there sprang up a group of Anti-Imperialist Leagues which finally found a common organization in

* It was long claimed that Bryan hoped thus to keep the issue of imperialism alive, so that he could campaign against it in 1900. Merle Curti, *Bryan and World Peace* (1931), 128, insists that his object was to free Cuba and the Philippines and clear the way to make free silver the issue once more. Democratic Senators, however, accused him of harboring the more crass motive.



October 1899. Its membership read like a roster of American intellectual and reformist leaders: such men as David Starr Jordan, president of Stanford University, and James, Sumner, Twain, Howells, William Vaughn Moody, Schurz, Pingree, Godkin, C. F. Adams, Jane Addams, and others. Bryan and Cleveland each headed the list of their prominent followers in the Democratic Party, while among the Republicans were Sherman, Hoar, and Pettigrew, old-timers who saw a connection between antislavery and anti-imperialism. Business offered a few prominent names headed by Carnegie.

The league devoted itself zealously to propaganda through press, pamphlets, and public meetings and found the atrocities connected with the current Philippine War a fruitful source of protest—and exaggeration. One of their most potent arguments was that nonassimilable peoples should not be annexed; and even the expansionists seem to have agreed, for they presently turned to a policy of setting up protectorates rather than annexing. Nevertheless, the league was unable and most of its leaders were unwilling to turn the anti-imperialist movement into a third-party crusade. It was probably only realistic, for the public was not at the moment in a self-abnegating mood and, indeed, was basking in the pleasant consciousness of being a world power and of helping to tote the White Man's Burden. Anti-imperialist orators received little attention; the people preferred to watch the troops marching off to embark for the Philippines while the bands gave them a rousing send-off to the tune of *There'll Be a Hot Time in the Old Town Tonight*.

There was no question of McKinley's renomination in 1900, and as

running mate—no pun intended—he was given the frenetic Roosevelt, now governor of New York. Boss Platt, who expected the pupils of his “Sunday School” to be meekly obedient, was irritated by Roosevelt’s occasional cautious gestures toward independence and even more by his tongue-in-cheek acquiescence. Platt’s conservative clients were worried also and in the end sought relief from their old-man-of-the-sea by kicking him upstairs to the vice-presidency.

Anti-imperialists had suspected Bryan’s sincerity because of his action in supporting the Peace of Paris; but when upon his renomination he made anti-imperialism and free silver the great issues of the campaign, the

Campaign of 1900 Anti-Imperialist League endorsed him. Other issues complicated the balloting; certainly free silver must have drawn many pro-imperialist voters to Bryan or alienated anti-imperialists from him. “Gold men” probably supported McKinley or remained silent, while others chose him as the lesser of two great evils. Said one voter: “It is a choice between evils, and I am going to shut my eyes, hold my nose, vote, go home and disinfect myself.”

The result was a defeat for Bryan even worse than that of 1896: he took only 155 electoral votes against 292 for McKinley and Roosevelt, and 6.4 million popular votes against 7.2 million. Six months after his second inauguration McKinley went to the Buffalo Exposition and made a speech which showed that he was changing his mind on the protective tariff. A few moments afterward the bullet of an anarchist named Leon Czolgosz struck him down, and eight days later on 14 September the beloved McKinley passed away.

While it is arguable whether the campaign of 1900 was a clean-cut victory for imperialism, there was a rather common feeling that the issue had been settled; the United States was caught in the web—witness the

Significance of the Spanish-American War Philippine War—and could not get out. Though the anti-imperialist plank thereafter appeared regularly in the Democratic platform, it was never again to become a prominent issue. The Anti-Imperialist League broke up, and only the Boston unit remained alive to carry a feeble protest down to 1920. It may be doubted whether in the long run a nation as convinced of its own rectitude and mission, and as economically powerful as the United States, could have stayed out of world affairs even if it had not annexed a foot of overseas territory. Indeed, it is conceivable that the encroachments of foreign powers on those very territories might have led to much the same entanglements.

As it was, the outcome of the Spanish-American War in less than one year dramatically introduced the United States as a world power and gave it two specific responsibilities which led inevitably to the rôle it was to play in coming generations. (1) The expansion of American strategic and

economic interests to the Philippines brought us into vital contact with imperial Europe and Japan; the effect in the long run was to place our Western frontier on the China coast. (2) The expansion of our strategic and economic interests into the Caribbean made another vital contact with imperial Europe (especially Germany), which was edging toward a strong position in Latin America; the effect in the long run was to place our Eastern frontier on the Rhine. These assumptions of responsibility, unfortunately, were not understood by the people at large nor even by Congress, and the Executive was left to handle them as best he could without their comprehension or support. Therein lies much of the reason for the ridiculous inconsistencies and the repeated and resounding failures of American foreign policy between that time and this.

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GENERAL: The resurgence of European imperialism is best covered in Parker T. Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics* (1926). The ideological aspects of the New Manifest Destiny are best treated in Albert K. Weinberg, *Manifest Destiny* (1935). See also appropriate chapters in Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1898* (1936), and Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought, 1860-1915* (1944).

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GENERAL: Alice F. Tyler, *Foreign Policy of James G. Blaine* (1927); George R. Dulebohn, *Principles of Foreign Policy under the Cleveland Administrations* (1941); see also Nevins, *Cleveland*. On the Chilean troubles see William R. Sherman, *Diplomatic and Commercial Relations of the U.S. and Chile, 1820-1914* (1926).

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trine: 1867-1907 (1937); handy summary and extension is his *Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine* (1941). More inclusive is Samuel F. Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States: An Historical Interpretation* (1943).

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GENERAL: Standard work on the Spanish-American War is French E. Chadwick, *Relations of the U.S. and Spain* in two parts: *Diplomacy* (1911) and *The Spanish-American War* (2 v., 1911). Shorter, brighter, and quite deprecatory is Walter L. Millis, *The Martial Spirit* (1931). For the *Virginus* episode see Nevins's *Hamilton Fish*. For activities of the yellow press see Marcus M. Wilkerson, *Public Opinion and the Spanish-American War* (1932). On the incidents after the Battle of Manila Bay see George Dewey, *Autobiography* (1913); and Thomas A. Bailey, "Dewey and the Germans at Manila Bay," in *American Historical Review*, 45: 59-81 (Oct. 1939). On the reaction against annexations see Fred H. Harrington, "The Anti-Imperialist Movement in the U.S., 1898-1900," in *Mississippi Valley Historical Review*, 22: 211-30 (1935).

PART V

"Faith is the complement of the American ideal."

No man is good enough, said Lincoln, to rule any other man. Jealousy of power is of the essence of the American spirit, and drawn from its historic birth; it may slumber long, but it slumbers light; and today the land is full of its mutterings. . . .

America's title to glory among the nations is her service to human liberty. I can bear that we should fail, relatively, in art and letters, have little sense of beauty or skill in man's highest wisdom, philosophic thought, or in his highest faculty, imagination; but I cannot bear that we should fail in justice. . . .

We all need faith, however we may strive to be rationalistic, agnostic, and to move only on the sure ground of ascertained truth. Without faith we are without horizons, a line of march, something ahead. All great rallying cries are in the future. Faith is beyond us—our better part; it is the complement of the American ideal, its atmosphere and heavenly sustenance. The faith of one age is the fact of the next; and how differently it looks! The fact seems as if it had always been. . . .

It is impossible to lead life without taking risks. . . . The willingness to take risks is our grasp of faith. Risk is a part of God's game, alike for men and nations. . . . Death is not the worst of life. Defeat is not the worst of failures. Not to have tried is the true failure.

—George Edward Woodbury, "Wendell Phillips, the Faith of an American"
(1911) in *The Heart of Man and Other Papers* (1920), 299–323.

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THE PRAGMATIC CHALLENGE

1890-1929

THE UNITED STATES HAD NO SOONER ENTERED UPON THE era of economic and political concentration than deep-seated tendencies in American life rose to the surface to combat the new order and force modifications upon it. This was Progressivism, by Populism out of Pragmatism. Its leaders were the crusading realists whom by now we should recognize as typical of the American scene. Lincoln Steffens, the demon muckraker, confronted the ruthless reformer U'ren of Oregon with the accusation that he had made bargains with the devil to get his support. Like Moses he had broken the covenants of the Lord, and though he might see the Promised Land he would not be permitted to enter it.

"You may have saved the people of Oregon," urged Steffens, "but haven't you lost your own soul? Won't you go to hell?"

U'ren considered for a moment, then raised his clear gaze. "Well," he answered, "I would *go* to hell for the people of Oregon!"* Sometimes it is the duty of the democratic leader to suffer damnation that the people may live.

The pragmatic revolt, which arose out of American dualism, challenged the new order of selfish nationalism and isolation by seeking either to break up the "monopolies" or to subject them to strict regulation—it never quite decided which. Toward imperialism it was also ambivalent, first finding a mission to assume the White Man's Burden, then turning it into a new and altruistic phase of the old mission to spread democracy, this time by means of war and world organization. It was Pragmatism's search for a method of reform which would not scuttle the middle class—for a compromise between ethics and the Gospel of Wealth.

The American people now discovered to their dismay that Progressivism challenged not only the roots but the very pleasant fruits of nationalism. When their venture into World War I ended in disillusionment, they reacted to a more narrow and intolerant nativism and nationalism than

* Lincoln Steffens, *The Upbuilders* (1909), 326.

even that of Andrew Jackson. This was the period of Normalcy, when Progressivism and altruism were in disgrace. The "common man"—really the middle class was meant—had failed to bring the New Jerusalem; now let the businessman and the engineer take over. Normalcy was on the surface a return to the Gospel of Wealth, but actually it was a desperate effort to forestall reform by proving that the businessman and engineer could bring the utopia which Progressivism had sought; it may prove to have been the swan song of the middle class. At any rate, it collapsed into Abnormalcy, and the pragmatic search now frankly undertook the reforms of the New Deal.

In the change-over to Progressivism we will find a parallel with what was going on in the world as a whole. The Progressive movement was merely the American phase of a world-wide liberal movement which was illustrated by the rise of labor in Scandinavia and Switzerland, of socialism in Germany and France, of the Liberal program of social welfare in England, and even by the liberal nationalism of Sun Yat-sen in China. As in the United States, it called forth a reaction against it, and in a sense this was a cause of the coming of World War I. Perhaps there was a hesitancy and lack of conviction in the new liberalism—unlike the grand old days of the democratic surge—which encouraged the forces of reaction to risk battle against it. Perhaps the courage of reactionism lay merely in the relative economic decline of Britain and the decay of the *Pax Britannica*. At any rate, the United States did not make its power felt in sufficient time to forefend world disaster.

Chapter XL

THE CLIMATE OF PROGRESSIVISM

1 *Progressivism and the Pragmatic Method*

THE Gilded Age was covered with a coating of respectability and of comforting assurance that what made wealth was moral. It was the so-called Progressive Era which tore aside the veil of pleasant conspiracy and tried to reveal the true state of the nation. This era lasted in its political phase from about 1900 to about 1916, but actually thinkers had begun generations before to build up the backlog of intellectual, artistic, social, and economic protest which found expression in the transformation of American thought and life which is still under way. As has been pointed out before, this was the seminal season of all that has come since in art, architecture, literature, politics, and social growth, as well as economics. The principal field of our attention in this chapter, therefore, will extend from the Civil War to 1917.

The Progressive Era

By a progressive we mean one who, as Allan Nevins puts it, favors the gradual introduction of wholly new processes of government intended to achieve novel aims. As such he is distinct from the mere reformer of the Cleveland type, who seeks—again in Nevins's words—to purify the existing processes of government in order to effect more completely its traditional aims.

The problems that confronted the Progressive Era were all the greater because the industrial beneficiaries of the Civil War had advanced slowly in their political and economic ideas while American social and material conditions had entered on an epoch of unprecedented change. We have already glimpsed some of the problems which confronted the Progressive Era. There was the problem of the city with its teeming masses and noisome physical conditions, the first in dire need of social engineering, and the latter of sanitary and civil engineering. There was the too-frequent breakdown of personal and

Its problems

political honesty which arose from the transition from one epoch to another, from the old life of comparative leisure to the new one of haste and ruthless competition, and to the confusions incident upon shifts from country to city and from the farm to the factory. There was the problem of the concentration of economic power with its potential ability to tyrannize over the bodies and the minds of men. There was the influx of European mechanics and peasants bewildered by a strange language and no less by strange customs and institutions; the task of acclimating them to the American way was one which too frequently could not be done in less than three generations.

Lastly there was the task of overcoming cultural crudity and the crass materialism which feared or distrusted good manners, good taste, and clear thinking on public problems, lest they weaken the pillars which supported the old structure of popular prejudices and plutocratic privileges. Progressivism's attitude toward the Cult of Respectability was ambivalent. It approved the cult's steadying and refining influence but distrusted its glorification of mediocrity and its acceptance of imposed standards. The result, unfortunately, was to breed a certain amount of confusion and to cause a decline in allegiance to standards. Progressivism, as we shall see, had its standards. The trouble was that they were not fixed but required far more judgment and perception to live up to than the conveniently cut-and-dried standards of the Cult of Respectability. In order to explain this problem, we must delve rather deeply into the nature of Pragmatism.

The conquest of America by Spencer was scarcely under way before men were rising here and there to disagree. Social Darwinism, they pointed out, did not express the real American spirit because its determinism left out of reckoning our traditional assumption of an ethical goal toward the realization of which we as a people were of our own choice bending our steps. Instead of strengthening American individualism, Social Darwinism was actually beating down the individual—denying to him any freedom of choice except to cast himself under the crushing wheels of the Spencerian Juggernaut. The Jeffersonian tradition of self-reliance was one thing; cutthroat competition was another thing, even though the cutthroat must be self-reliant.

Critics then proceeded to show that Spencer had misinterpreted (or rather wrested) Darwin's meaning. Social Darwinists ignored the fact of mutual aid, common within species in the animal kingdom. Darwin had thought of struggle as occurring between man and his environment, not among men, while to him the "fittest" were the ones best adapted to survive under existing conditions. This interpretation could mean that the lower classes (deplored as the least fit) might by their ability to live off the fruits of "property" prove themselves the fittest to survive. Finally, Spencerians

thought of struggle ending in the death of the "unfit"; actually it does not operate that way in human society. The "unfit" may be submerged, but most of them live—and breed faster than ever.

As early as 1867 William T. Harris had founded his *Journal of Speculative Philosophy* and was gathering around him the St. Louis School as agents of protest. In Cambridge, Chauncey Wright and Charles S. Peirce were beating out the ideas which in misunderstood and misapplied form were to give rise to Pragmatism. One of their associates was William James, brother of the novelist Henry James and lifelong Harvard professor, first as bi-

William
James
(1842–
1910)

ologist, then psychologist, and finally as philosopher. Unlike his brother, he reveled in the challenge of raw, tough-minded America and felt that despite its plutocratic abuses (the worship of "the bitch goddess success"), it held more promise for the human race than venal and effete Europe. He believed that man is by instinct a fighting animal, but he sought to utilize this pugnacity in socially useful ways by finding in concerted constructive efforts a "moral equivalent of war."

James, like most Americans, was an optimist, a believer in progress; yet as an intelligent thinker he could not accept progress as inevitable. Society could advance or deteriorate: accident, community decisions, and the acts of individual leaders would all enter into the equation and decide the outcome. He accepted science as a tool, but not as a Spencerian master. Ideas were meant to be put into action. Truth must be tested by experience, and if there was any Absolute—final, perfect Truth—it was unknowable. This was all to the good, for if society was governed by natural laws there was no freedom for humanity to strive to better itself.

The rise of
Pragma-
tism

The implications of James's Pragmatism could be, and often were, interpreted as conservative. It remained for his heir, John Dewey, to make its social evolutionary method clear. Dewey, who preferred the term Instrumentalism to Pragmatism, placed his ineradicable mark upon educational theories and practices and spread them over much of the world. Born in Vermont and carrying all his life the marks of the rural American, he yet rose early to prominence as a pragmatic philosopher at the University of Chicago, from which he moved to Columbia in 1904. The key of his method is that ideas are useful only if they aid in solving problems; the greatest hindrances to social good are the prejudices, slogans, and myths which bar our road to control over our moral and social environment and allow natural science to outdistance social science. Dewey emphasized the learner rather than the subject taught; preached the value of learning by doing—hence the blossoming of laboratories and vocational training; and sought to instill the ability to examine, evaluate, and judge ideas and facts.

Instrumen-
talism:
John
Dewey
(b. 1859)

European and American idealists, intending no compliment, have called Dewey's philosophy characteristically American, as it certainly is. Most of its challengers distrust it because of its championship of the democratic

Dewey's critics process; they fear it because it prefers science and experiment to intuitive absolutes. Some liberals, as well, have criticized its readiness to take half a loaf rather than none and have rejected Dewey's belief that war may sometimes be a more efficient use of social energy than submission. The democratic method of utilizing pressure groups, they point out, lends itself to the abuse of democracy by selfish interests, which are never absent in any society. They can and do show that Dewey's own Instrumentalism has been used by industrialists to oppose high schools and colleges as "Bolshevistic" and to substitute vocational education, even though he vigorously opposed such misuse of his teachings by special interests.

The American, as we have frequently pointed out, is dualistic—torn between good and evil, the ideal and the material. Hence to the materialist, the material consequence indicates truth; to the idealist, the idealistic

American dualism consequence indicates truth. Transcendentalists had believed that truth could be known, that good and evil were clearly separated, recognizable, and unchangeable. The theory of evolution had introduced the belief that everything is in process of change, and it suggested that morals and laws are in each generation the product of social consciousness. Pragmatism, like Anglo-Saxon behavior and institutions, refuses to choose between alternatives, but straddles.

It is not our purpose here to enter into the philosophical concept of Pragmatism. Our interest is in its social and economic meaning and effect. Pragmatists have split hairs, stumbled, bumbled, and changed their minds

What is Pragmatism? as they groped for definitions, but in the end they have pretty well agreed on the social meaning of their doctrine. With its eyes firmly fixed on the facts of any proposed solution to social problems, it asks three questions: (1) Will it work? (2) Will it have a good effect on society? (3) If the effect is not completely desirable, what compromise shall we draw between the two in order to keep as much as possible of practical program and social good?

Now this is hard doctrine for those who demand certainty. Even the Pragmatist is puzzled over exactly what constitutes good, and he has some royal tussles with his fellows over what should be done. He always ends, however, by attacking confusion bit by bit rather than by sweeping generalizations. The method of democracy is his method of change, because it enables—nay, obliges—the individual to share in determining the policy and destiny of his group.

Pragmatism is a social and cultural expression of the artistic vernacu-

lar. Its rise marked the reassertion of the democratic spirit in American thought, and its critics, many of them, attacked it because down underneath they were too pessimistic or determinist to accept democracy's process of experimentation. They wanted immediate certainty. Pragmatism, said they, is a way of doing without a philosophy (which may be true), while the idealists accused it of judging everything by its cash value. Pragmatism's recognition of facts has frequently been wrongly interpreted by both idealists and materialists as cheerful acquiescence in materialism. Thoughtless materialists who welcomed Pragmatism to their ranks did not have wit to see its social implications. They set a style, for to this day it is a popular delusion that Pragmatism asks only the one question (Will it work?) and accepts the solution regardless of consequences.

Its enemies

Trace all philosophical and religious structures to their foundations, and we find that they are built deductively on certain assumed axioms or dogmas, such as the Marxists' belief in economic determinism, or Descartes' assumption that "I think, therefore I am." Their comfort lies in their certainty that they have the applicable-on-earth part of the Absolute (eternal Truth), and that since they know good from evil there can be no compromise and everyone must meet their standards. A clear case is the Christian's belief in his creed. Faith, in the beautiful words of St. Paul, "is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." It is the impregnable ground for action, and confidence comes when "we walk by faith, not by sight."

**The uses
of faith**

When Pragmatism's democratic method is traced to its source, it also is found to be based on an axiom: faith in human dignity and freedom. Now Christianity also believes in the concept of human dignity and individual responsibility; so in daily life Pragmatism is reconcilable with Christian ethics. The Pragmatist, however, does not know eternal Truth, and he therefore cannot try to apply it. He preserves flexibility in order to meet unexpected crises. He operates inductively, feeling his way by successive compromises and referring constantly to experience, to the existing social context, and to the ideal of human welfare toward which he strives. He believes that we must preserve and reconcile the rival sovereignties and moral values of the individual on one hand and of society on the other, as positive aids toward a higher moral order. The pragmatic democrat thus espouses a process rather than an absolute; but if he sees the continuance of that process jeopardized, he will fight as fiercely as any convinced believer in the Absolute.

**The prag-
matic
democrat**

One more word about Pragmatism. The above outline undoubtedly oversimplifies the actual situation, but it has been necessary to avoid metaphysical subtleties. Of course even the most rigid idealists made compro-

Pragmatism's antiquity mises in their daily living, and the most confirmed Absolutists have always understood perfectly well that they could not know all that was in the mind of God. As Pragmatism evolved during the Progressive Era it merely gave intellectual respectability to an approach which is as old as humanity and which appears wherever formative civilizations have material problems to overcome. Nevertheless, its method has been more common among the so-called Anglo-Saxon peoples than among others. Pragmatism was in the American air, and its manifestations did not always wait for William James or John Dewey to give it official utterance. American conquerors of the wilderness had judged programs and actions by their consequences, and it was natural that many teachers, thinkers, and reformers should do likewise.

2 *The Vernacular versus the Cultivated Tradition*

When we examined the intellectual and artistic life of the Gilded Age, several references were made to the rebels of the period—not those weaklings who fled to Europe but those who remained to fight. Their groping for a pattern of belief and conduct was due to the early phases of a dilemma which was not to become clearly apparent until our own century. This dilemma concerned the growing conflict between the American *vernacular* and the European *cultivated tradition*. European art was rooted in its traditional civilization, which had developed with more or less symmetry from classical times to the Industrial Revolution. The American vernacular, on the other hand, to quote one of the ablest students of the subject, is the folk art “of the first people in history who, disinherited of a great cultural tradition, found themselves living under democratic institutions in an expanding machine economy.” * This definition does not include such inherited “folk art” as that of the Pennsylvania Dutch, in so far as it sought symbolism or prettiness.

Pragmatism was the expression in politics, society, and intellect of what the vernacular was in art. Hitherto the prestige of the cultivated tradition had drawn American artists to Europe, and many of them had stayed there because there was not enough sand in their souls to face life in the sprawling, formless, noisy country of their birth. As a result, the vernacular had been relegated to the common craftsmen and to a few rebel artists, architects, and engineers. They had the vision of something new in the world, a civilization built upon service to and appreciation by the people; and in pursuance of this dream they were trying to grasp the way to utilize the material resources of America and to express its values in new artistic forms.

* John A. Kouwenhoven, *Made in America* (1948), 15.

The political institutions of the United States were based on democracy, but many of its social institutions were based on distrust of the people. The inexorable pressure of democracy was shaping a machine culture to exploit our resources in the service of the masses; the inexorable pressure of the American inferiority complex was calling for the absorption *in toto* of the European cultivated tradition. The conflict which grew out of these clashing pressures not only pained artists but confused the public. Nevertheless, generations of simple American mechanics refused to feel inferior but asserted that function should govern form. They deplored European "art" and "beauty" as mere artificial prettiness but never realized that they themselves had found the nub of art and beauty in their vernacular. This fact is evident to anyone who examines the simple architecture of the ante-bellum period such as the Shaker barn or the Cape Cod cottage, or the common artifacts such as furniture and tools—for example, the ax, a light, utilitarian, and graceful descendant of the European's unwieldy broadax.

American
pressures

The American vernacular influence sprang from the masses and has persisted despite the determined effort of the top crust to bastardize it by putting Corinthian pillars on steam engines and coruscating their framework with pomegranates and arabesques. Europe feared the machine and wished to hide and prettify it. The American vernacular wished to strip away unnecessary bulk, weight, and ornamentation in order to simplify and cheapen it, and to increase efficiency. The difference in approach was fundamental. Europe wished to preserve the old, which itself had once been functional but was now outmoded by new techniques, because the old represented the ascendancy of an age-old élite. The American instinctively realized that if the machine was to serve *all* the people it must not be subjected to the old artistic forms.

Social sig-
nificance
of the
conflict

The American was short-cutting European evolution and entering the era of mass production; the same struggle went on in Europe, but the European was more firmly rooted in the past. Thus, about 1870, Americans used a cast-steel plow which weighed forty pounds, while the British clung to a wrought-iron plow (intended to do the same work) which weighed two hundred fifty pounds. Even though the ornamental lines and coruscations of the European tradition were then sadly afflicting American machines, the most impressive exhibit at the Centennial Exhibition of 1876 was the enormous, starkly functional Corliss steam engine. Even Europeans recognized its artistic quality. The *London Times*, little inclined to praise things American, noted that "the American mechanizes as an old Greek sculptured, as the Venetian painted."

Horatio Greenough, a sculptor, was one of the first to recognize the

clash which was beginning even in his day. We, said he, found our institutions on hope; Europeans on the past. "We hoist the sail and are seasick; they anchor and dance." The struggle between native and

The battle

alien forms afflicted not only art, mechanics, and literature but politics, for the Civil War was in a way an aspect of this conflict. The cultivated tradition refused to adapt itself to the vernacular, and the result was for a long time the sterilization of both on the American scene: drab cities dotted with pompous classical monuments. Even the vernacular builder was too often affected (where his patron could afford it) and broke his vernacular plane surfaces with the horrible jigsaw lacework sometimes called Carpenter-Gothic.

The battle was under way when in 1898 George S. Morison, builder of famous bridges, published *The New Epoch as Developed by the Manufacture of Power*. Power, he said, would mold a new civilization and a new ethics, destroying the old in so far as necessary to the development of the new era. He saw the spread of education to all the world, but there would be danger in the transition epoch when the half-educated masses "do not know enough to recognize their limitations, but know too much to follow loyally the direction of better qualified leaders."

The above is not meant to imply that we must cast the old aside or sneer at the traditions of the race; but if we wish to reach fulfillment we must not allow them to confine us too strictly. Rather, we must select from

Legitimate place of tradition them building stones to insert at proper places into the new structure. America is building a new phase of Western Civilization which will mold the old traditions to the new machine age and will give a better life to the common man. Perhaps it is only natural that we should be torn between our nostalgia for the old and our faith in our power to create the new.

It is sometimes difficult for the layman to understand that it is the artist who is the vanguard of new phases of civilization. This fact was shown during the Gilded Age, when a group of rebel artists began to work

Artistic nonconformists toward impressionism, partly inspired by Paris, partly by Oriental art, and partly self-taught. The dreamily sentimental Hudson River School gave way reluctantly to the deeper insight of George Inness, while marine subjects found advocates in that son of whaling New Bedford, the fiercely questing Albert Ryder, and the spacious Bostonian, Winslow Homer, who found his happier medium in water colors. Even beyond these was Thomas Eakins of Philadelphia, who in painting for himself was painting for a coming generation.

Then there was John La Farge, born in New York of French stock, a muralist and stained-glass designer of unusual body and depth, who found late inspiration in Tahiti and Japan. A lifelong exile in London and Paris

was the egocentric James Abbott McNeill Whistler (1834–1903), a New Englander who chose London and Paris as his haunts and whose bold utilization of Japanese techniques was one of the inspirations of the French impressionists. Sculptors also were striving for more than mere smoothness, as was shown by the *Dying Centaur* of William Rimmer and the vigorous and homely realism of John Q. A. Ward, an Ohioan who conducted a lifelong battle against “dropping into a conceited security.”

Impressionism was too vague for some of the rebels in the arts. Hamlin Garland, in what he called veritism, defended “the man whose version of what life might be gave him the power to write of it as it is, with sad severity.” Artists under Robert Henri adopted veritism to the portrayal of sordid urban life. Continually in touch with the postimpressionists of Europe, they also experimented with cubism, futurism, and synchromism. They left behind them a puzzled and angry public, but (despite some exhibitionists in their ranks) they were striving honestly to break through the classical and naturalistic shell which seemed to them to be stifling the rebirth of art as an expression of life and spirit. At the same time, Alfred Stieglitz began to show in his work that photography is an art form capable of a “terrible truthfulness.”

**Postimpres-
sionists**

Next to artists there usually come a choice few of novelists and poets. The Hamlin Garland (1860–1940) mentioned above was a novelist, a native of Wisconsin. He emerged in the 1890's to present the bleak life of the pioneer West and the fervor of the agrarian crusade, and to fight for new expressions in American art—and then to sink back into the arms of respectability. Jack London (1876–1916), “Prince of the Oyster Pirates” of San Francisco Bay, seaman, hobo, and gold miner in the Klondike rush, began in 1898 to publish impassioned novels of the underdog's struggle for existence. But he could never decide between sympathy for the downtrodden and acquiescence in the belief in the survival of the fittest; so, when success came his way, he settled down in the Valley of the Moon to drown in alcohol the “white logic” of an empty, futile existence.

**Realistic
novelists**

More persistent was craggy Theodore Dreiser, an Indianan, whose shaggy, amorphous power became evident in the early 1900's with studies of tycoons and social outcasts. Frank Norris, born in Chicago, portrayed the exploitation of the wheat farmer in *The Octopus* (1901), which was directed against the railroads, and in *The Pit* (1903), against the Chicago wheat speculators. Upton Sinclair, a zealot from the Free State of Maryland, began a long crusading career with *The Jungle* (1906), based on the filth and oppression of the Chicago packing houses. Winston Churchill, a St. Louisan transferred to New Hampshire, portrayed state politics in a series of once-famous novels.

Not all poets could escape to the respectable confines of the slick magazines, nor wished to. William Vaughn Moody, another of the mounting roll of Indiana realists, was in both poetry and drama concerned with the

spirit of the age and the problem of human adjustment.
Questing Edgar Lee Masters at the beginning of a long literary career
poets wrote his *Spoon River Anthology* (1915), a stark counting

of the dead in a country cemetery and of the life they had once led. These two were adopted Chicagoans. Even more influential was Edwin Arlington Robinson (1869–1935), who came out of a decayed Maine town to New York like the “ice-age returned,” and became the poet of irony, of pity, of failure. He let in the hard, cold light of skepticism and cleared out the smug world of magazine verse with its romantic concealments and made way for candor, integrity, and clear values.

Still, it was not the intention of the poets of the Progressive Era to destroy; rather, they sought to understand the intricacies of history and social evolution and on this understanding to build a better world. It is to the poets rather than the novelists that we must go to find the true insight (as distinguished from mere indignation) into the meaning of American life. Most of them were, after all is said and done, optimists: God is good and His will is law, hence these changes cannot help but be for the best and what is not for the best will come out in the divine wash.

Meanwhile an architectural revolution had been wrought by new materials and a host of new utilities which required a maze of pipes and conduits. Associated with McKim in designing the World's Fair were a number
Skyscrapers of Chicagoans who were to exercise a far more vital influence on American architecture, for out of their daring and imagination were to come the skyscraper and the modern style. That the new day of iron construction was not solely American was shown by London's Crystal Palace and Paris's Eiffel Tower. But for the most part it was the proud development of Chicago.

Henry Hobson Richardson, a Louisiana sophisticate in origin, was known for his Romanesque churches, libraries, and courthouses, less an expression of love for the medieval than of his delight in the strength and reliability of brick and stone. His influence carried over when Daniel Burnham and John W. Root, utilizing cast or wrought iron and elevators, began the development of the skyscraper in Chicago. Presently William L. Jenney in the same city did away with masonry supports and put the weight of the floors on iron columns in his Home Insurance Company Building (1884). The use of structural steel now freed the designer from his limitations and enabled him to soar. The “super-skyscraper” was introduced in 1913 by Cass Gilbert with his 792-foot Woolworth Building in New York City.

Louis Sullivan (1856–1924), a bitter and cantankerous Bostonian of Irish and Swiss lineage, who was established in Chicago, found in the sky-

scraper the "emotional synthesis of practical conditions." His guiding rule came to him one day in the quiet of the Vatican's Sistine Chapel when Michelangelo seemed to be audibly saying, "Form follows function." Sullivan looked on architecture as a social manifestation and read in it the social state of mind. His functionalism, cool and intelligent without bleakness, whether in skyscrapers or dwellings, was in striking contrast to the garrulousness of the average American architect, then and since, which seems to betray a confusion in values.

Architec-
ture: Sulli-
van and
Wright

Some of his pupils failed to comprehend his method and produced bleakness, but the greatest of them, Frank Lloyd Wright (b. 1869), a product of rural Wisconsin, may yet be the harbinger of a new day. Building on the simplicity of Jefferson and rooting his creations in the earth, the rocks, and the trees, Wright proposed an architecture worthy of self-reliant democracy, which could learn principles from the past but not forms. Taking from the Orient or from any other source, Wright read, wrote, and spoke as he designed, and by 1910 he had marshaled his ideas for unity, sincerity, simplicity, and repose. "As for the future," said he, "the work shall grow more truly simple . . . more fluent . . . more organic . . . for only so can architecture be worthy of its high rank as a fine art." Sullivan, ignored by important clients, found solace in a series of small banks, "jewels on the shoddy main streets of the prairie towns." Wright, however, was never without clients, and before long his ideas inspired a new school of the modern in Europe—a school whose hangers-on he soon repudiated.

3 *The Pragmatic Role of the Corporation*

Nineteenth-century men lived in an economy of scarcity, in which it was believed that supply could not overtake demand. The interests of the producer and of society seemed irreconcilable; an industry was sure it must seek monopoly in order to keep from being wrecked by competitors, but society felt it must prevent monopoly in order to keep from being milked. Now we live in an economy made by mass production, in which the supply is prospectively unlimited, but demand is limited only by effective purchasing power. For the first time maximum profit can be obtained by maximum production at minimum cost—exactly what society has always wanted. We have not worked out all the details, but the broad outline of the future is clear. Mass production can introduce an economy of plenty, a state which up to our own time only utopian dreamers dared to contemplate.

Mass pro-
duction rec-
onciles pro-
ducer and
consumer

A thoughtful view of mass production will show that there is far more to it than careful technical blueprinting and management. It is even more basically a social effort. Now the success of a social effort depends upon the

Secret of the American know-how co-operation of the participating individuals. It is perhaps true that machines and many aspects of scientific management could have been developed without the inspiration of democracy. Nevertheless, the ultimate secret of the American know-how lies not in machines nor in scientific management nor even in financial and corporation organization. Basically it depends upon the fostering of the spirit of freedom, co-operation, and *esprit de corps* on the part of workers, engineers, management, and capital. This condition may bring an upstanding demand for high wages and miscellaneous benefits (often enforced by strikes), but this demand is only a realization of Taylor's original concept that mass production could be successful only if the workers shared in pride and effort.

Progressivism's transformation of democracy aided in achieving the desired result not only by forcing the corporations into line but by creating a new atmosphere, in which labor could strive for its rights with more hope of success. Only in so far as this democratization has been achieved can American mass production be said to have succeeded. This idea is something which foreigners usually can not or will not understand, and it must be admitted that many Americans have fallen short in realization, even Henry Ford himself. On the other hand, it must be recognized that industrial democracy exercised without a proper sense of responsibility and self-restraint on the part of the workers will lead to what we now call "featherbedding" and eventually to break-down. The purpose of mass production is to raise production, and only then can it raise wages. In the production process it relies chiefly on semiskilled workers, but this is possible only because its preparatory stage utilizes an ever-growing number of skilled men—tool, die, and pattern makers, engineers, chemists, and psychologists.

Experience has shown that the corporation is the most practical agent in working this modern miracle of technical, financial, and social co-operation; and the corporation is useful whether the economy is capitalistic, **The corporation a planned society** socialistic, or totalitarian. The more vigorously theorists and politicians have denounced the corporation, the more it has flourished. Today we deserve no special credit for realizing what the Progressives of 1900 often denied: the big corporation is here to stay. Internally the corporation is like a planned society. It brings together the factors of production—land, labor, and capital—and adds a fourth, the manager, who makes the whole greater than the sum of its parts.

Before World War I the corporation had taken on pretty much the color which is familiar to us today. As in an army, no one man is indispensable. Frederick Taylor recognized the new nature of business when in 1911 he

stated that "no great man can (with the old system of personal management) hope to compete with a number of ordinary men who have been properly organized so as efficiently to co-operate." Specialization within the organization was already well under way: specialization in the various phases of manufacture, sales, maintenance, construction, research, purchasing, finance, and labor relations. Industrial and personnel engineers were trying to learn the art of co-ordinating all these activities.

The great corporations had their own politics, their own internal diplomacy, their own bureaucracies and hierarchies of power. They had their own court conflicts and court scandals, their own hereditary offices and strategic marriages, their own ministerial cabinets composed of men brought up occasionally from the ranks and their own pensioners who played polo or sailed yachts, held balls and horse shows while great corporate machines ground out profits or consumed capital.*

Mass production has given the corporation a significance which it could not otherwise have enjoyed. This fact was just as true in those businesses which could not or did not adopt mass-production methods in full. Those countries which put their industries under state control have found that the corporation meets their need for an operational instrument. This has proved to be so satisfactory—for instance, in the Scandinavian countries—that the theory of socialism has begun to shift away from government ownership of the means of production to government *control* of private producers. Expropriation of production is to be limited to basic industries, and not all socialists agree even to that, for it imposes a burden of debt on the state.

Can private control meet society's demands?

The present trend of socialism, then, is to retain the private profit system under government controls. In the light of this re-definition the New Deal can certainly be accused of promoting socialism. The problem in our country is whether private corporations can manage Big Business to society's welfare, or at least to its satisfaction. Thus far the issue remains undecided, and private control remains on probation. In spite of certain inconsistencies in the situation, even the New Deal was willing to preserve private control—but in producing units rather than in holding units.

If private control of the corporation is to survive, it must meet on three levels the test which any institution must undergo.† It must (1) be func-

* Thomas C. Cochran and William Miller, *The Age of Enterprise*, 308, copyright 1942 by The Macmillan Company and used with their permission.

† Much of what follows is based upon Peter F. Drucker, *Big Business: A Study of the Political Problems of American Capitalism* (1947).

tionally integrated, that is, have the organization to produce, the leadership to advance, the flexibility to meet new conditions, and the ability to assess realistically how well it is performing its functions; (2) be able to mold its internal policies and relations so as to fulfill society's beliefs and promises; and (3) square its own purpose for existence, the making of profits, with society's view of its purpose for existence, the supplying of cheap goods or services. These three problems must be solved interdependently, for they are equal in importance to survival; failure in any one means death.

Corporations have on the whole successfully met the first test. They have learned that efficiency is best promoted if the organization is neither too big nor too small; hence the halt in the movement toward the unification of steel and of automobile manufacture. This limit still enables them to afford research and pioneering, to take long-term interests into account, and, by amassing adequate reserves and shifting orders among plants, to avoid undue retrenchments and promote company and social stability. Intelligent decentralization within the corporation has promoted flexibility, brought out new leadership, and made more positions for able men.

Corporations have not failed on the second test as dismally as is often claimed. Management has earnestly sought "within the framework imposed by external financial control" to ease the social and psychological problems raised by mass production. Modern economy probably offers a poorer chance to become independent than there was a hundred years ago, but the chances of rising to foreman or into the managerial class would seem to be greater than ever—in spite of a common public belief in the contrary. Nevertheless the belief, however ill-founded, is having clear political effects, chief of which may be mentioned the long tenure of the Democratic Party.

There is a common complaint that assembly-line work is monotonous, and so it is, though perhaps not so monotonous as the weeding of onions or the ululations of vocal training. The assembly line, however, employs only part of the men in a factory, nor is it an essential feature of all mass production. Anyhow, there is a tendency among fickle moderns to resent continuous and arduous effort; we forget that monotony is the price not only of security but of knowledge.

Compared with those in other countries, American labor-management relations are remarkably successful—in fact, even cordial. Nevertheless many weighty problems remain to be solved. Workmen complain that advancement is capricious, or that it is based on formal academic and technical training and there is little chance to develop latent abilities. It is demonstrable that the managers often fail to give the worker an understanding of the significance of his

part in the production process. Instances are told of how morale problems in wartime airplane factories were cured by bringing in finished bombers with crews to show the worker exactly what he had accomplished.

The corporation, moreover, has failed to raise the workingman's social dignity and status. The result of corporation policies has been that labor unions have copied capital's old tactics and have found their mission in purely negative opposition to any force in business, society, or government which threatens their "rights" and have made the situation worse by their featherbedding, jurisdictional strife, and the initiation fee and other rackets. Under the circumstances it is no wonder that labor unions have also failed to win dignity and status for their members. There is good reason to believe that responsible managers and labor leaders would more frequently find common ground for agreement if it were not for the pressure of capital on one side and radical agitators on the other.

The third test brings up the problem of balancing the corporation's need for profits against society's need for cheap goods. The human desire for achievement, prestige, and power finds many outlets, of which the profit motive is only one. It is used in our society, which demands material results, as the best way to "co-ordinate individual drives into social purpose and action." Even the U.S.S.R. uses economic incentives and rewards more widely than does capitalism; true enough, it rejects private profit, but it brazenly pumps out of its official monopoly trusts greater profits than capitalistic corporations would dare to demand.

**Production
monopoly
self-
defeating**

It is begging the question to blame corporate shortcomings solely on greed, for underneath all these evidences of failure lies the inability of both the public and the corporation itself to see the true nature of the problem and its solution. The original type of monopoly lay in control of production and the market—as in the case of Carnegie's threatened throttle hold on the steel market. Actually such a monopoly will in the end be self-defeating, for there is endless interchangeability of materials, processes, and finished goods. Even in the automobile market no one corporation could get tight control, for second-hand cars would be competing with new ones.

Finance capital, however, began to evolve a new type of monopoly, which is based on access to the factors of production: land, labor, capital, management. Land, in our context raw materials such as cotton, wheat, coal, and metals, has been boosted in price by artificial market rigging by individuals and a benevolent government, or limited in quantity by the latter. Labor not only has helped to run prices up by wage demands but has blackjacked producer and public by its featherbedding and jurisdictional quarrels. Capital has organized cartels, dictated interest rates, given or

**Blocking
access to
the factors
of produc-
tion**

withheld money, and influenced the labor policies of its debtors. Managerial skill and knowledge have been controlled by patent pools which have frequently killed healthful competition. None of these monopolies can be touched by consumer action because consumers do not work together.

In a very real sense the political struggles which we must presently recount missed the point actually at issue. The Progressive was one who applied liberal reformist ideas to the American scene but with the additional faith that he was helping out progress through evolution. Jefferson and Jackson had believed in progress but hardly in evolutionary terms; they had more of a feeling that they were peeling away unhealthy excrescences and *returning* to the conditions of a purer age. The atavistic survival of this concept split the Progressive movement into two wings, and the Atomists and Regulationists began to walk warily in each other's presence. The Atomists, who wished to break up the "monopolies"—actually they meant any large corporation—and force the pieces to compete, were (the Regulationists insisted) trying to thwart the economic law which dictated the continual cheapening of goods through the savings of concentration and mass production; continued tampering with the course of nature would bring economic breakdown and chaos. On the other hand, the Regulationists (the Atomists insisted) were building a new Leviathan which must be either the superstate controlling business or superbusiness controlling the state.

As perceptive Progressives became fully conscious of their apparent dilemma, the realization angered and embittered some of them. Instead of a glorious sweep straight on to the gates of Paradise, they saw the road fork before them and disaster waiting on both forks. History, instead of being progressive, seemed to be cyclical. Atomism led to economic trouble and brought breakdown or revolution; Regulationism led to what we now call fascism. Apparently we were headed for destruction, either on the horn of dictatorship or on the horn of economic breakdown.

It was not given to that generation to know that the interests of producer and of society could be reconciled, that mass production could make maximum profit obtainable by maximum production at minimum cost to society. There will be struggles and pitfalls as we seek to perfect the method, but we know the road we must take. It is to the eternal credit of Henry Ford that he saw this condition, even though as through a glass darkly.

4 *Pragmatism and Social Progress*

Pragmatism had always been present, even during the heyday of transcendentalism, but after the Civil War it rose to the surface and became the instrument of a new age of experimental search for answers to Ameri-

can problems. That it exercised such a vital influence at this juncture was probably due less to its newness than to the formalization of its method in a way which could win the acceptance of the new generation and could direct and inspire it in its battle for betterment. We shall now see how, despite many human failures, this new realization remolded every aspect of American society and furnished the impetus which bids fair to remold the world.

Pragmatism a remolding force

The chief efforts of the rebels against Social Darwinism were not only to show that human culture is evolutionary, but that it is influenced by human action. The background for the coming revolt was laid in anthropology and sociology by the work of Morgan and Ward. Lewis Henry Morgan, attorney for the Iroquois remnants in New York, after long study of their customs, institutions, and traditions, published his *Ancient Society* (1877), which set forth certain purported laws of social progress. Lester Frank Ward began in *Dynamic Sociology* (1883) the vigorous fight against Spencerian determinism that gave American sociologists and social workers their will to reform. He pointed out the clash between America's laissez-faire theories and its actual practices and boldly called upon the government to intervene to promote a planned society. His object was not to enforce equality but to equalize opportunity and give individual merit a chance.

Anthropology and sociology

The Pragmatic revolt was also directed against the coldly impersonal economics of the English classical school. Simon N. Patten (1852-1922) of the University of Pennsylvania criticized the persistent belief in the economy of scarcity. He found adherents among young men who had studied economics in Germany and brought back in their baggage the nationalist ideas of Friedrich List, who had learned from Mathew Carey. In 1885 Patten met with a number of his unorthodox companions at Saratoga and formed the American Economic Association. A moving spirit was Richard T. Ely, who was for more than half a century to be a leader in his field. A committee of which he was a member scandalized the old guard by asserting that economics should be based, not on speculation (as it always had been), but on historical and statistical studies and by calling upon government to take part in the promotion of national power and welfare.

The new economics

Thorstein Veblen, son of Norwegian immigrants, was to become the flaming evangel of the new economics. His was an alien mind which viewed American society critically and ironically, and he spent his life circulating from one university to another, unpopular despite his undeniable brilliance and depending upon his writings to spread his ideas. Veblen examined the process of cultural accumulations which had shaped society and had formed a hard shell over it. In his best-known book, *The Theory of the Leisure Class* (1899),

Thorstein Veblen (1857-1929)

he tore down the painted scenery which he said enabled the wealthy to pose as the creators and supporters of civilization and exposed their alleged contempt for productive labor, their conspicuous consumption, and their social and economic parasitism. He blamed depressions on finance capital (rather than industry) because it is concerned with profits more than production and distribution. To him production and distribution were the important social factors—and for this reason the engineer, not the banker, should govern industry.

Americans had a traditional dislike for the man who “engrossed” land and held it until the labor of others on neighboring tracts raised its value. This dislike was easily transferred to the industrialist, who monopolized machinery and production, and to the finance capitalist, who monopolized money. Nevertheless, American Rural and urban democracy agrarian leaders had usually shared Jefferson’s distrust of the city “mobocracy” because it was often subject to the employers of labor and was torn by emotional strains. They sought to place political control in the hands of the more self-reliant and stable rural landowners. But the rise of the city after the Civil War made it evident that for its own preservation democracy must educate the city worker and enlist him on the proper side. The Democratic Party as early as the time of George Clinton had undertaken to do this, but it had never succeeded in making anything more permanent than an uneasy alliance between its rural and urban wings.

It was the role of Henry George to make an important contribution toward educating the city worker as to his dependence upon natural resources. Born into a poor family of Philadelphia, George had traveled widely as sailor and gold seeker before he settled in California as a printer and editor. There he saw that in two decades California had telescoped human progress from wilderness to civilization, and he was further struck by the heart-rending contrast between great wealth and deep poverty existing in the midst of what was generally accepted as the world’s most progressive era. In 1879 he published *Progress and Poverty*, which set forth his theory of the cause and cure and which launched him upon a career as lecturer and reformer.

The cause of poverty as Henry George saw it was engrossment of the land (by which he meant natural resources) in city and country by owners who did not live on it and use it. The cure was to let land be owned only by those who lived on it and used it. Taxation of anything but land was an unjust penalty laid on production. Let us therefore lay a Single Tax of one hundred per cent on all income from rents, which would confiscate all “unearned increments” and would, except in form, bring national ownership of tenements and great estates without attacking capitalism as such. His panacea was doubtless naïve and impracticable—Marx called it “the capitalists’ last ditch”—but

it offered a simple and concrete program to a society which badly needed it. The Single Tax doctrine had some effect on the tax structure in Canada and Australia, and some American cities assess land higher than buildings. But more important, it had a vital part in awakening and shaping social protest.

Henry George was a utopian without knowing it and helped to give an impetus to a rash of utopian writers. Best-known of them was Edward Bellamy, whose romance, *Looking Backward* (1888), told of the society of the year 2000 A.D. After a period of severe readjustment Americans had entered upon a socialistic era when the docile machine fed their wants and after twenty years of public service left men free to enjoy a cultivated leisure. The attractive picture took hold of all classes, and something under 200 "Nationalist" clubs devoted themselves to preaching the idea. No practical experiments seem to have come out of this utopian movement, but it swelled populist and socialist ranks and upon its subsidence added another layer to the sediment of opinion which was building up toward the New Deal.

Utopianism

Not unrelated to utopianism, but more practical in its program, was the Social Gospel movement. It was an attempt on the part of the Protestant ministry to find Christian solutions to social problems by putting the Church into contact with the working classes and ameliorating some of the appalling social and moral conditions which were plainly the outcome of industrialism; from this it was only a step to attacking the root of the evil. As time went on, the leaders became increasingly hospitable to municipal ownership of public utilities and to government regulation of corporations, thus helping to pave the way for Progressivism.

The Social Gospel

Unfortunately the Social Gospel proved inadequate for current needs. It failed to win the workers for several reasons: it talked down; it failed to understand the immediacy of labor's problems and recommended patience more than action; and Church opposition to labor unions was still general despite Social Gospeler exceptions. The movement was accused of being more enthusiastic than thorough, more vague and sentimental in its program than practical. Certainly it was overoptimistic, and it interpreted every forward surge as the decisive victory of the war.

Its inadequacy

Some of its leaders turned aside in disgust to Christian socialism or to outright socialism. On the other hand, the Social Gospel shattered the basis in religious dogmas of conservative ideas and opened the way for the liberalization of Protestant Christianity's social ideals. The material welfare of society was now acknowledged to be as much within the province of the Church as spiritual welfare. No less significant was its preparation for the Progressive political movement, which found much of its aid and comfort in the churches.

The Social Gospel's acceptance of Darwinism and the Higher Criticism helped to widen a division which had already begun in the churches. Denominations and congregations were rent asunder by conflicts between Modernists and fundamentalists. Modernists accepted the theory of evolution and the Higher Criticism; fundamentalists stayed by the Bible as the literal revealed word of God and by the old theology with its assertion of divine creation, atonement, salvation from sin, and final destruction of the world by divine wrath.

One result of the struggle has been that churches have lost much of their religious character and have turned to promoting reform and to encouraging members to live an ethical life among modern industrial conditions. Church control of the personal life of the membership has relaxed greatly, and the minister himself has become part lecturer, part promoter, and part business manager. There are many who accuse the Protestant churches of flagging in their zeal for human welfare. Nevertheless, the Federal Council of Churches, founded in 1908, has continually made itself obnoxious in some quarters by its insistence upon the Social Gospel. Its most famous utterance (1919) outlined a program which might have been clipped from a socialist platform except that it did not recommend public ownership of the means of production.

The Roman Catholic Church rejects Pragmatism and clings to a divinely revealed Absolute, but in its daily contacts with frail humanity it compassionately and quite without cynicism uses methods which an American would call pragmatic. The Church, it has been said, does not desire rule by Catholic or ecclesiastical politicians, but it desires the triumph of Catholic principles of morality and social justice. While it is governed by a hierarchy and displays unparalleled richness in vestments, ceremonies, and architecture, it has always promoted a social system suited to the masses. The social system of the Middle Ages, which closely approached the Catholic ideal, was overthrown by the modern age. The Church salvaged what it could from the wreck, particularly the sanctity of the family as the basic social unit, and has looked with distrust upon the development of ruthless capitalism, the class struggle, and nationalism.

The Roman Catholic Church was too weak to make its collective attitude felt during the economic collapse of the 1890's, but its proposed program had already been given form. This is found in the Encyclical (1891) *Rerum Novarum* (*On the Condition of the Working Classes*) of His Holiness Pope Leo XIII. The encyclical, which denounced Marxism and the class struggle, urged the formation of a Catholic labor movement which would work for the betterment of the existing social order. The effect was soon evidenced by the rise of powerful Christian Democratic parties on the European continent.

American Catholics proposed a positive legislative program of social and economic amelioration and dealt with wages, conditions of labor, housing, sanitation, co-operatives, child labor, and land colonization.

This program was reinforced in 1931 by the Encyclical *Quadragesimo Anno* (*On Reconstructing the Social Order*) of His Holiness Pope Pius XI. It is interesting to note the claim that this encyclical was influenced by the American Catholic economics teacher and writer Msgr. John A. Ryan. Certainly as early as 1906 Msgr. Ryan was proclaiming some of the doctrines which later found expression in the New Deal. His greatest concern in those early years was with the problem of the distribution of the products of labor, and his suggestions were set forth in his cogent *Distributive Justice* (1916).

The traditional Christian concept had been that charity is given for the sake of the giver. Lord and Lady Bountiful moved with self-righteous smugness among hordes of poor people, whose condition reflected their own laziness and vice. Since poverty was the result of willful sin, it was possible for charity to relieve only the consequences; the causes could be cured only by salvation from sin, a mission to which numerous sincere Christians devoted their lives. The rising tide of social protest now began to result in claims that poverty and crime were caused more often by social conditions than by willful sin; the cure was to remedy the conditions rather than to distribute Christmas turkeys. A new type of social worker arose, one who relieved present distress but at the same time sought to use every device of propaganda to awaken society to its duty to cure the causes of poverty and crime.

Crusaders in the cause of the underprivileged were legion, and they included most of the pragmatic thinkers of the era. Jacob Riis, a Danish immigrant, devoted his life to an effort to improve housing conditions in the slums of the cities. Jane Addams and her associates opened Hull House in the slums of Chicago, a social-settlement project modeled on British precedents and intended to aid, amuse, and instruct the underprivileged. Other settlement houses followed, usually supported by wealthy individuals. Boys' and girls' clubs were founded to help combat juvenile crime by finding work and play for the idle hands which the devil traditionally finds so pleasing. Work projects for the destitute, medical clinics for the indigent, and day nurseries for the children of working mothers became common in the cities.

The movement was begun for the consolidation of charities in each community into one organization, or at least into one organization for each type of problem, as family assistance, child welfare, old-age assistance, etc. The result was the development of the social-work profession, whose members were trained in the efficient but sympathetic performance of their function. Case records were kept of each transaction, central filing systems

Lord and
Lady
Bountiful

Rise of
social work

were established, and financing of the various agencies in one community-chest campaign became more common. Wherever possible, stress was laid upon helping the client to help himself. Though the new outlook and the new methods began their rise in the generation after the Civil War, they made slow progress among the businessmen and socialites who had traditionally supported charity. The sweeping change was not to come until the crisis which rose with the depression of the 1930's.

The state of American society was forcefully called to public attention in the early 1900's by a group of writers whom Theodore Roosevelt impatiently dubbed muckrakers. True, there had been voices raised before

The muckrakers this, notably that of Henry D. Lloyd, whose intemperate *Wealth Against Commonwealth* (1894) had been directed against the Standard Oil. The great day of the movement, however, came when it was taken up by certain popular magazines, notably *McClure's*, *Collier's*, and *Cosmopolitan*. Of course their principal target was corporation practices, but they also exposed the white-slave trade, child labor, the adulteration of food and drugs, and numerous other abuses.


The most significant effect of the muckrakers, however, sprang from their demonstration that social and economic abuses and political corruption were almost invariably connected. The public was appalled by the

Political effects evidence that it was respected community leaders who bought and paid for special privileges: either franchises and contracts which were under the control of politicians, or protection by the politicians from competitors and racketeers. The fact that many otherwise high-minded businessmen were convinced that such tactics were the only alternative to ruin did little to excuse them in the public mind. Some of the muckrakers were convinced that if businessmen had not originally sought special privileges and protection, neither political corruption nor the prospect of ruin would have ensued. At any rate the exposure of the situation furnished Progressives with issues which they felt could be solved by concrete political action.

Each of the muckrakers deserves separate study, but we can do no more than mention one of them who remains of permanent interest, not so much for the literary value of his writing as for his insight into the American

Steffens analyzes corruption soul. This was Lincoln Steffens (1866-1936), born into an affluent California family, who early developed the inquiring attitude which made his entire life a search for principles—or, lacking them, reasons. As a reporter in New York he came into contact with Pierpont Morgan, Tammany Boss Richard Croker, and that perspiring young politician Theodore Roosevelt. He launched the muckraking movement on its great phase when he wrote *The Shame of the Cities* (1904), a study of the role played by business in corrupting politics.

He found that reform movements which threw out politicians to put in



Rube Goldberg. Copyright King Features Syndicate, Inc.

Professor Butts chokes on a prune pit and coughs up an idea for an automatic typewriter eraser. Ring for office boy (A), who comes running in and stumbling over feet of window cleaner (B). He grabs for hat-rack (C) to save himself. Hat-rack falls against books (D), which drop on ruler (E), causing pen (F) to fly up and puncture balloon (G), which explodes with a loud report. Trained monkey (H) mistakes report for gun that is the signal to begin his vaudeville act and he starts pedalling like mad. The rubber tire (I) passes over paper (J) and erases mistake made by sleepy stenographer who is too tired to do it herself because she had such a long walk home from an automobile ride the night before. It is advisable to have your office over a garage so you can get quick service in case of a puncture.

Rube Goldberg satirizes industrial civilization.

a "businessman's government" often put in men who were worse because they were confused, cynical, or self-seeking. The fact was that "some of our laws run counter to the forces of nature, to the economic pressure of business." Monopolies might or might not be wrong, but they were inevitable because they were economic necessities. The businessmen who were corrupting politics were not intentionally corruptors but might even be high-minded. Steffens's cure for hypocrisy was—more hypocrisy. Since businessmen could not operate without controlling government, "make it impossible for them to be crooks and not know it. We have, we Americans, quite enough honesty now. What we need is integrity, intellectual honesty."

Social comment was not limited to editorials, books, and magazine articles which would be read only by the relative few. Cartoonists had traditionally traded in abuse, as may be seen by reference to the cartoons directed against Jackson and Lincoln. They now discovered that a fly swatter is sometimes a more efficient instrument than a meat ax, and they began to utilize a brand of humor and understatement which was often more persuasive than abuse. Not that moral indignation was lacking, for such left-wing cartoons as those of Art Young carried unmistakable messages.

Popular
critical
media

Humorists of the ante-bellum era had largely been political commentators. Now such men as David R. Locke ("Petroleum V. Nasby"), Bill Nye, and Mark Twain indulged in social comment after carefully removing the sting from their whips. More pungent was Finley Peter Dunne, whose "Mr. Dooley" column, devoted to the shrewd and sometimes biting social and political analyses of a Chicago Irish bartender, laid bare many an item of the American mythus. The new comic strip sometimes served the same purpose; the absurd mechanical contraptions of Rube Goldberg were implicit comments on the baffling complexities of modern life.

Soon after 1900 there began to rise a new form of social comment, the moving picture. The "shorts" of Mack Sennett and Charlie Chaplin were far more than slapstick, for they also laid bare many an inconsistency in

The moving picture American thought and mores. Sennett sardonically pointed out the inconsistencies between American principles and practices, and through his Keystone cops, bathing beauties, fat millionaires, and custard pies poked fun at national ideals of wealth, romance, efficiency, and law enforcement. Chaplin created the frayed elegance of the little tramp with sad pants and cropped, fastidious mustache. Though this creation was an ironical comment on a cockeyed civilization, it may also help to explain why the American public could not at first take Hitler seriously.

The rise of the pragmatic spirit led to increased public censure of the origins and disposal of the fortunes of the Great Entrepreneurs. These men believed that their tremendous development of national wealth was sufficient justification for their own wealth. Nevertheless, they grew restive as they became increasingly aware of public antipathy, and they began to counter with gifts to worthy objects. One millionaire after another warned his fellows—and took his own advice—that the amassing of "wealth without purpose must be stopped, or the public would stop it." Carnegie besought his fellow Pittsburgh millionaires not to die "without leaving behind them some evidence of love and gratitude for the city in which they made their fortunes." Here and there misanthropists denied the sincerity of the new reformism and harked back to Roman aristocrats who imported shiploads of Egyptian wheat to feed the mob and stave off revolution while they sought out and destroyed the leaders. Actually benevolence is an old American habit, so common that we seldom take much credit for it—or are given much.

Regardless of the motives, these gifts wrought enormous public benefit in a day when custom did not permit government to take much interest in scientific and social advancement. They have even, perhaps, enriched the lives of all Americans in ways which government gifts could never have done. By 1910 the outpouring of money into public-spirited enterprises had reached an amazing magni-

The benevolence of wealth

tude. Foundations, institutes, universities, and medical centers multiplied across the nation. Rockefeller disposed of about 500 millions, chiefly for education, research, and medical service, and Carnegie put 350 millions into his libraries, research institutions, and other benevolences. The once antipathetic names of Sage, Guggenheim, Duke, Huntington, Rosenwald, Mellon, Frick, Kresge, and Bok took on a new sheen in the public mind, and this even served to cover those millionaires who took no interest in such activities.

The management of these enormous gifts has opened up a new field of administration and has, incidentally, changed the ownership of the stock (though not always the control) of some of America's greatest corporations. It would not be unfair to say that many of these be-quests were made in the hope that they would make more

The effects

secure the owners' hold on the remaining millions. It is certainly conceivable that the hope was realized on a short-term basis; yet these gifts sowed the seeds of the millionaires' downfall. Research has raised the standard of life and health, and education has bred shrewd and intelligent leaders of the masses who have given direction to the movement for expropriation by taxation or wage raises. Lastly, and perhaps most significant of all, the millionaire himself has changed—or at least his grandson has. There is a new spirit of responsibility and sympathy among many men of wealth which gives them the attitude and standards of the steward of a trust fund.

We had occasion in a previous chapter to show how law had come to be regarded as the expression of natural moral law; law was not *made*, it was found. It was the task of Justice Holmes to overturn this attitude in his treatise *The Common Law* (1881) and show how law had been molded to the changing needs of an evolving society, in other words was an "organic" growth. The Constitution was not the ultimate and absolute truth; it had resulted from centuries of growth, and the growth had continued since 1787. Its nature was determined by facts; the United States, originally a congeries of states, had now by one means or another evolved into a nation in which the Federal government was supreme.

Concept of
organic
law

Oliver Wendell Holmes, son of the poet of the same name, was a maverick Boston Brahmin who was salted by native wit, toughened by war, tutored by profound study and long contact with the pragmatic questioners at Harvard, and trained by years on the Massachusetts bench. He went to the Supreme Court in 1902, and his tall figure, drooping cavalry mustaches, and pungent witticisms remained familiar parts of the Washington scene until his death, though he retired from the Court at the age of ninety-one. During his long service Holmes championed the evolutionary view of law against a conservative majority and became a figure revered alike by friend and foe. An early friend of William James and the Pragmatists, he had a

Justice
Holmes
(1841–
1935)

speculative turn of mind which made him delight in "twisting the tail of the cosmos," and perhaps out of such experiences came his sense "of the limited validity of legal principles"—that the "law has not been logic; it has been experience."

He has with some accuracy been described as a conservative with sensible ideas, not primarily interested in social reform, but with a keen appreciation of what was possible. No American has more clearly or wisely expressed the pragmatic conscience. "Life is action, the use of one's powers," said he. "As to use them to their height is our joy and duty, so it is the one end that justifies itself. Life is a roar of bargain and battle; but in the very heart of it there rises a mystic spiritual tone that gives meaning to the whole, and transmutes the dull details into romance. Man is born a predestined idealist, for he is born to act. To act is to affirm the worth of an end, and to persist in affirming the worth of an end is to make an ideal."

Legal
realism Holmes's demand that the Federal government take up Jefferson's battle for the rights of the little man and adapt his principles to an industrial society rallied around him a group of brilliant younger men. Best-known of these were Roscoe Pound, Dean of the Harvard Law School; Louis Brandeis, a notable champion of social legislation; and Benjamin Cardozo. The last two eventually rose to the Supreme bench. The new school of legal realism was willing to keep capitalism but insisted that it be regulated for the protection of the people. Yet, having been reared under Anglo-Saxon institutions, the reformers had to find excuses in the old Constitution—else they would be promoting revolution, not evolution. They found their reasons, as Anglo-Saxons always do. They took over for their own purposes the conservatives' own instruments—the interstate-commerce clause, the elastic clause, and the Fourteenth Amendment—and gaily proceeded to demand that conservative decisions be reversed. These decisions were reversed, but that is a later story.

Historians We turn now to a few of the galaxy of great historians who lived and worked in the Progressive Era. There was at the time an air of expectancy in the profession, a confidence that any day someone would appear with the key to history, a statement that would make the laws of history as clearly understood as those of chemistry. John Bach McMaster, a Princeton engineer, began to write the social history of the American people. Frederick Jackson Turner pointed out the rôles of the frontier and of sectionalism in American history. Moses Coit Tyler, professor of literature, revolutionized the approach to the study of the American Revolution by studying facts rather than the mythus. James Harvey Robinson of Columbia University not only applied evolution to all historical

development; he went further and called historical writing "a pragmatic weapon for explaining the present and controlling the future of man," a view which he called the New History.

Charles Austin Beard, also of Columbia, though he did not, like Robinson, accept Marx's determinism, found economic determinism in the writing of James Madison, and in two epoch-making monographs studied the economic factors in the origins of the Constitution and of Jeffersonian democracy. Robinson and Beard set a new fashion of looking for causes and of bringing into historical study and writing the social, economic, scientific, and cultural strands hitherto omitted by the historians of dynastic fortunes.

**Charles A.
Beard**
(1874–
1948)

Beard's interpretation (as Commager points out) was as moral or amoral as any political or religious interpretation, but it carried connotations of guilt to a generation which was being shocked daily by the revelations of the muckrakers. Man's view of history, said Beard, was clearly subjective; scientific precision could not be attained. Beard had arrived at a barricade beyond which it was not wise (he felt) to venture; even if the laws of history could be found, they would imprison mankind in its own fate and destroy the healthful illusion that men could change their fate. Advocates of the New History, though often accused of being pessimistic determinists, were (in their early days, at least) pragmatic optimists and awaited the future with serenity. Beard summed up his philosophy of history to a friend one day during a walk in the woods: "The bees fertilize the flowers that they rob."

There can, however, be no doubt about the pessimism of the fourth generation of the Adams family, for the four sons of Charles Francis Adams, Civil War ambassador to London, were untouched by the optimism of the Progressives. The eldest, John Quincy II (1833–94), without the Adams asperity but with all its conscience, found a political career but no hope of success with the Democratic Party. Charles Francis II (1835–1915) spent his life in business and hated every minute of it, yet became a reformer who put Massachusetts in the forefront of railroad regulation; he also found time to write several historical works of permanent value. Brooks (1848–1927), the youngest, in his *Law of Civilization and Decay* (1895) sought for the basic law of history and found it in an oscillation between barbarism (showing martial, imaginative, and artistic qualities) and centralization (showing commercial, mechanical, and materialistic qualities). Brooks's conclusions began the speculations of his elder brother Henry (1838–1918) on the role of energy in human history. Henry had instituted the first seminar in history at Harvard, then had gone on to write with rare insight on the early history of the United States. He was, however, despite his ironic skepticism a

**The Adams
brothers**

raconteur, diner-outer, inveterate traveler, and dilettante in all the arts, who found a rare zest in living. He was, as someone put it, the only man in America who could sit on a fence and watch himself go by.

His search for the key to history as an exact science led him upon long travels into the realms of history, science, and theology, and on the way he expressed his suspicion of democracy in *The Degradation of the Democratic Dogma*. His *Education of Henry Adams* (1906) is a tour-de-force in the philosophy of history and the chronicle of a search which always ran into the second law of thermodynamics—a blind alley, which denied the truth of human progress because sometime available energy would have been dissipated into the outer universe and would no longer sustain life. (The “cheery” universe which, according to Hoyle and Lyttleton perpetually renews its energy, was as yet unheard of; in any case, its cosmic optimism bodes destruction rather than survival for the earth.) The result of Adams’s work was to remove the search for the law and meaning of history from the social, economic, and political realm to that of mathematical physics; no historian has yet arisen—at least in the United States—with the necessary training to follow through, nor have historians themselves gone far beyond the status of chroniclers.

Intellectually Adams found no escape from his blind alley, so he turned to a study of medieval history; finally in *Mont-Saint-Michel and Chartres* (1904) the skeptical Bostonian gave over the search and bent his proud head in obeisance to faith. There we must leave him, humbled and despairing, bowing before the Virgin of Chartres and asking the meaning of human tradition and the spirit of reverence.

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
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Chapter XLI

THE PROGRESSIVE POLITICAL BATTLE



1 *The Roosevelt Progressive Era*

THE Populist reform movement, as Henry Demarest Lloyd said, had been pushed from the nest by the cowbird of free silver and lay smashed upon the ground. But neither the forces which had given it life nor the **Populism and Progressivism** leaders who had fostered it were dead. For something less than a decade the struggle was carried on primarily in the states and cities, and it gradually became apparent that the movement was developing a labor and middle-class as well as an agrarian basis. The traditional Jeffersonian agrarian was perforce learning to get along with the urban masses as they sought for ways to adapt democracy—designed for an agrarian economy—to an industrial civilization.

The Progressives adopted, perfected, and in large part put into effect the Populist program, and in addition, as might have been expected, they laid more stress on labor legislation and industrial controls. In the political **Progressive program** sphere they worked for the direct primary, initiative, referendum, recall, Australian (secret) ballot, the short ballot, woman suffrage, popular election of Senators, corrupt-practices acts, and publicity for campaign expenses. Not only did they seek to overthrow local and state machines (sometimes substituting their own), but they vigorously renovated the legislative machinery in city councils and state legislatures. They promoted the rise of the city manager, the city commission, and the use of technical experts in government.

In the economic sphere they sought to break up monopolies and force the pieces to compete. They set up commissions to regulate the practices and rates of railroads and public utilities. They worked for fish, game, and timber conservation and promoted practical programs for the better

use of farmlands. They legislated minimum wages and hours, workmen's compensation, factory safety and sanitation codes, and protection for female and child workers. They agitated for and confidently looked forward to a Federal income-tax amendment, postal savings, parcel post, currency reform, and tariff reform.

Though they were predominantly Atomist in their philosophy, they made certain other steps toward the service or welfare state by their agitation for reform of old-age assistance and other aspects of social care; laws for the inspection of foods, drugs, and dairies; laws to foster public health and sanitation and to control diseases; and a mushrooming interest not only in improving the quality of education but of expanding its coverage in the high school, college, and technical fields.

No city or state was without its would-be reformers—sometimes practical idealists, sometimes disgruntled politicians or business elements seeking to overthrow the old régime, sometimes aspiring young men ready to seize any entree to power and pelf. The idealists might sweep an election and then blow the chance because of their ignorance, gullibility, or hardheadedness. Even the more realistic reformers had their troubles, and no city or state was permanently reformed, though many were permanently improved. The Progressive movement bore certain resemblances to the Jacksonian movement. Most of its leaders thought in the traditional terms of restoring Atomism, that is, enforcing business competition. Just as evident was the willingness of its leaders to use every political weapon, even the most ruthless. They traded, they logrolled, they bribed with money and patronage, they allied with rebel elements of the bossism they sought to overthrow, they built inexorable machines, vindictively punished their foes, and sold out their friends for a percentage of reform.

**Progressive
leaders**

Meanwhile, what of Bryan? Always honest and progressive according to his light, he championed most of the reforms which did not involve too much centralization; on one notable occasion he proposed Federal ownership of railroads but quickly dropped the idea. Such power as he wielded was based on habit and sentiment, for he never built up a political machine. He must have sensed that he was happier as a foot-loose crusader in conventions, campaigns, and on the Chautauqua platform than he would have been as a responsible officeholder. At any rate, he refused to run for any office lower than President, a fact which suggests that he was not willing to undertake the grueling, long-term work of serious reform. Quite clearly he loved his rôle as champion of lost causes and was more anxious to put up a dramatic battle than to win. With no false pride about him and tolerant of those who abused him personally, he yet showed an increasing tendency to be Dutch uncle to the party leaders—admonishing this one against the evils of

**Bryan
and Pro-
gressivism**

strong drink, chiding that one who accepted Tammany or Wall Street support, and shedding an aura of Protestant fundamentalism over the deliberations of the party.

Among the urban reformers none was more prominent or in the long run more successful than Tom Loftin Johnson. Born of good though impoverished Kentucky stock, Tom Johnson rose rapidly in steel manufacture and traction reorganization. He was already wealthy though still under thirty when a train butcher threw a copy of Henry George's *Social Problems* on his lap. He read, saw a great light, and was instantly converted to single tax and reform; soon he was giving of his time and money, and his home became a center of the reform movement. Though he was a Democrat and did not neglect to build a machine, he did not find all good in that party.

In 1901 he was elected mayor of Cleveland, a place which he held until 1910. He gave Cleveland what was probably the finest and cheapest street-railway service in the nation, led a movement to give Ohio's cities more control over their own affairs, advocated municipal ownership of utilities, and zealously renovated and administered Cleveland's affairs.

Yet Johnson regarded such things as side issues. He never lost sight of his belief that taxation lay at the root of social and economic and political evils, but he saw that the situation could be remedied only gradually, as the people were educated to accept reform; as Solon had put it, a ruler should attempt no more good than the people can bear. He therefore moved a large tent from place to place in the city, invited the citizens in, and patiently undertook to educate them. The result was to place reform upon a sound basis of competence, and Cleveland has become probably the most progressive and civic-conscious of American cities.

Among the leaders of state and national caliber Bryan was too much the foot-loose crusader and the foe of centralization to receive the whole-hearted allegiance of Progressives. Peter Altgeld died in 1902, but there were many to succeed him. William E. Borah of Idaho was to sit in the Senate for a generation and to become as much a representative institution of his state as baking potatoes. Hiram Johnson of California rose from fighting district attorney to governor and Senator and organized a machine which eventually became as rigid and reactionary, though not as corrupt, as the one it displaced. William S. U'ren of Oregon, of Cornish stock, made the secret ballot and the initiative, referendum, and recall standing operating procedure throughout the West. George W. Norris of Nebraska led the reform forces not only in his own state but in Congress. William Allen White, editor of the *Emporia (Kansas) Gazette*, wrote in 1896 an antipopulist editorial, "What's the Matter with Kansas," which brought him into the public eye. His objection, however, was not to reasoned reform but to free silver and other

Tom L.
Johnson
(1854-
1911)

State
leaders

extremist doctrines, and he was in time to become a Progressive champion.

Robert ("Battling Bob") Marion La Follette stands head and shoulders above the ruck. Born of farmer folk and educated in law at the University of Wisconsin, he presently turned up in Congress. No maverick, he was fairly loyal to the Republican Party leaders until the Democratic sweep of 1890 displaced him and started him to hunting for what was wrong with the party. He found his answer in the party's subservience to corporation interests, and the cure in the Populist program, not including silver. With the aid of like-minded men he now began a ten-year battle for control of the party and the state. As a result, La Follette was inaugurated as governor in 1901, though it was 1905 before he could get a legislature favorable to his program—known then as the "Wisconsin Idea."

Robert M.
La Follette
(1855–
1925)

The triumph of the "Wisconsin Idea" may be considered as marking Progressivism's coming of age. La Follette himself went on to the Senate, determined to put similar principles into effect in the Federal government. In fifteen stormy years he had built a machine which was to hold the state in a tight grip for forty years, twenty of them under the leadership of his sons. His support was basically rural and populist, but a considerable element of his strength lay in the way in which he joined the methods of politics to the expert social engineering advice freely given by the faculty of the state university. In the Middle West state universities are powerful influences, and at this time Wisconsin boasted a remarkable group of men: Ely, Commons, Van Hise, and Turner being only a few of them.

Conquest
of Wis-
consin

But one must not underrate La Follette himself. Though he was accused of being unduly ambitious, egotistic, and vindictive, he was a realist, "a dictator dictating democracy." Though a small man—

Five feet he soars into the zenith and
Six inches farther soars his fretful hair

—he was a giant in charm, oratorical ability, and qualities of leadership. More than that, he had patience, a gift for detail, extraordinary organizing ability, and an unquenchable passion for democracy and the public welfare.

The Progressive Era saw the rise of the "scholar in politics" for the first time since the heyday of John Quincy Adams. Wilson and Roosevelt were the most obvious examples, but there were others. John Hay had served as one of Lincoln's secretaries and had then gone on to a diplomatic career, in which we shall meet him again. Rather like him, but with a greater taste for the rough-and-tumble of politics and with a more authentic aristocratic background was Henry Cabot Lodge (1850–1924) of Massachusetts, great-grandson of the spark plug of the Essex Junto. For a time he successfully mingled historical

The scholar
in politics

writing and reform politics, but in 1884 he came to the parting of the ways; he gagged at Blaine but swallowed him, and thereafter rose rapidly to mastery over the Massachusetts Republican machine and became Senator in 1893. Albert J. Beveridge (1862–1927), Indiana Progressive Republican, became Senator in 1899, just in time to join the imperialist throng. Today he is best remembered for his biographies of Marshall and Lincoln. In his own time he was renowned for his oratory; said Mr. Dooley, “ye could waltz to it.”

When in September 1901 the bullet of Czolgosz put a period to McKinley's life, it also put a period to an era of American history. The man who succeeded to the presidency was a vigorous youth of forty-three, a man who welcomed the action promised by the country's recent entry upon imperial expansion and who held a concept of executive initiative which had found predecessors in Jackson and Lincoln but which was to become the rule in the more complex twentieth century.

Theodore Roosevelt was the scion of an aristocratic and well-to-do New York family, while his mother sprang from a no less distinguished Georgia family. He spent four years at Harvard, read a little law at Columbia, then, resolved to belong to the ruling class (as he put it to his protesting family), got into the distasteful and ungentlemanly business of politics. Probably a lifelong friendship with Henry Cabot Lodge shaped his interests both in politics and in historical writing.

In the legislature at Albany he won some notoriety for his foppishness and his reformism, but in 1884 he was forced to support Blaine in order to save his party bacon. In 1886 the Republicans, outflanked by the liberal Abram Hewitt and the radical single taxpayer Henry George, gave TR the mayoralty nomination. As expected, he made a rattling good campaign but ran third. In 1889 he won the appointment by Harrison to the Civil Service Commission, which he kept into Cleveland's second term. Then came two years as New York City police commissioner under a reform administration. He tackled the job with his usual zest and was portrayed as Haroun-al-Roosevelt going at night about the streets of his modern Bagdad.

Lodge already had his eye on his friend for the presidency and wished to get him back to Washington, and Platt wished just as ardently to get him out of New York; between them they got him appointed as McKinley's Assistant Secretary of the Navy. We have seen the part that he played in promoting and fighting the war with Spain, and how he rose to the governorship of New York and was kicked upstairs to the vice-presidency.

During the period of his rise Roosevelt was not merely busy. He worked hard, and not only at politics; for one thing, he needed money. Few men in public life have possessed such diverse and at the same time intense

interests. He acquired a partnership in two Dakota ranches, went on long hunting trips, and wrote books on history as well as numerous reviews, essays, articles, and more or less ambitious works on hunting and natural history, at both of which he regarded himself as an expert. He read with extraordinary facility and absorbed ideas quickly. But Roosevelt was no bookworm. He cultivated Lodge and Hay and Henry Adams and studied the art of politics. He educated his natural talent for showmanship and made it the foundation of his career. In everything he did he managed to focus the glaring light of public attention on himself. His elder daughter, "Princess Alice," once remarked that he had to be the bride at every wedding and the corpse at every funeral.

The strenuous life

Platt, Hanna, Quay and Company were dismayed when the maverick became President and girded themselves for battle. They were not disappointed, though they must have been greatly bewildered by what actually happened. Ignorant of economics and business as a college boy, TR yet plunged into battle with giant corporations, learning as he went, determined to prove that the government—which included TR—was bigger than the trusts. The bronco buster and the teddy bear became familiar figures. TR romped with his four small sons and walked the fat off generals and statesmen. He kept his "Tennis Cabinet" busy loping after lost balls. He argued, he tusseled, he hated, he gurgled with laughter—but always he was bursting with energy and ozone. He called newspapermen liars so frequently that finally his victims organized an "Ananias Club"—but adored him because he made news. He went everywhere, speaking brusquely and decisively in the high voice which occasionally broke in a squeak, squinted through his pince-nez spectacles, waggled his drooping mustache, thrust out his jaw, bared his clenched teeth, and cried "*Dee-lighted!*"

TR as President

He had a flair for pungent phrases—"square deal," "the strenuous life," "muckrakers," "the Big Stick," "malefactors of great wealth." He loved company, from poets to pugilists. As President he engaged in loud and undignified disputes with editors, reviewers, "nature fakirs," and foreign dictators, and sat in Jovian judgment on any issue that happened to intrigue him. He swung the Big Stick in Latin America, snatched Casablanca from the mailed fist of Germany, and rapped the knuckles of Japan at the Portsmouth Conference. He was a never-ending source of entertainment and delight to the public. Well did a visiting Englishman remark that among American natural phenomena Teddy Roosevelt ranked next to Niagara Falls!

The usual explanation for Roosevelt's hyperactivity has it that as a puny infant and a scrawny lad afflicted by asthma and poor vision (the left eye eventually became blind), he was involved in a bitter fight for

What made Teddy run? survival and self-expression. When he found that other boys his own age could hold him helpless, he went in for boxing and other athletic pursuits; from these the transition was easy to ranching and hunting and presently to a preoccupation with action of all kinds. The result was that he overcompensated; he became pugnacious and dominating; a perpetual adolescent given to effervescent enthusiasms and overbearing judgments; and, himself neither tall nor husky, an indiscriminating admirer of strong men and strong actions, and eventually of war, racism, and imperialism. The basic fact was, as Pringle shows, that all of his life he gave indications of repressed fear by constantly and unnecessarily tackling obstacles to prove to himself that he was not afraid.

It has become the fashion to explain the meteoric Roosevelt as basically the expression of the middle classes. He entertained them, true, but even more important he enabled them to reconcile ostensible reform with expediency. In the light of the evidence of corruption and oppression, the Puritan conscience insisted that something should be done. On the other hand, the existing situation (and one's own hope of getting rich) was just too pleasant to be sacrificed. The middle class had profited enormously by the Republican régime, and it sensed that real reform would mean its replacement by the common man. Roosevelt showed it how to enjoy the glow of engaging in a great moral crusade without changing too much. The moral rationalization became his stock in trade, as it must with any Anglo-Saxon politician who expects popular backing. "My problems," said he, "are moral problems, and my teaching has been plain morality." And the man who would deal with the people in moral terms, as Roosevelt well knew, must be the disciple of their conventionalism. Under all his hustle and bustle Roosevelt was just that. He was, as Hofstadter puts it, "a muscular and combative Polonius" spouting old saws and avuncular advice.

So far, so good. What has not generally been recognized is that Roosevelt sometimes sought substitutes for action because he saw what many others instinctively recognized without putting into words: that the country was facing a dilemma, and that the choice of either horn might lead to destruction. This dilemma refers to the looming struggle between Atomism and Regulation. Roosevelt was well aware that not all great business combinations were monopolies, and he wished to regulate the former and, where necessary, forbid the latter. The Atomists, however, made no distinction and sought to break up both. They represented, as TR said, "a form of sincere rural toryism." Roosevelt's belief that the great corporation was here to stay and his preference for regulation were seized upon by Atomists like La Follette as bases for accusing him of being in favor of Big Business. Roosevelt, therefore, in the

Roosevelt's dilemma



W. A. Rogers, Harper's Weekly

Rogers in 1904 portrayed as an exception what, in fact, was fairly frequent—each party had some Wall Street backing.

true Anglo-Saxon tradition avoided the issue when necessary and took refuge in sound and fury.

McKinley had taken on the half-senile John Sherman as Secretary of State in order to open a senatorial position for Mark Hanna. Nevertheless, Hanna did not rule the President; McKinley had a high concept of duty, and he kindly but firmly put Hanna in his place. When Roosevelt succeeded to the presidency, he announced that he would carry on with McKinley's policies, and on the whole that is what he did during the rest of the term. For the most part he left the Old Guard undisturbed: Spooner, Aldrich, Platt, Lodge, and Allison in the Senate, and Speaker Joseph G. Cannon, now czar of the House. True,

TR's first
adminis-
tration

he indulged in some patronage quarrels with Senators and appointed to the Supreme Court that suspiciously unconventional Boston Brahmin, Oliver Wendell Holmes. He fought for Cuban reciprocity and instituted the Northern Securities suit; but, as Hanna honestly pointed out to his fellow Senators, McKinley would have had to do the same things. He set up a commission to improve and beautify Washington, "took" Panama (as he later put it), and exercised the power of the Federal government in putting an end to the Anthracite Coal Strike of 1902.

Roosevelt was the first "accidental" President to succeed himself. The Republican Old Guard did not care for him, and in 1904 a lukewarm convention unanimously gave him the nomination only because his popular strength was apparent. Charles W. Fairbanks, an Indiana conservative, was selected as running mate. The Democrats shelved Bryan for the nonce and put up Judge Alton B. Parker of New York, who ran a conventional and ineffective race. The result of the election was victory for Roosevelt, 336 to 140, with 7.6 million popular votes against 5.1 million. Roosevelt took every Northern and Western state and swung Missouri into the Republican column for the first time. In the first flush of victory TR announced that he considered this his second term and would not seek another. Roosevelt could now be himself; moreover, Progressives were appearing in Congress in increasing numbers, and, however much they might disagree with him in approach, they were ready to support many of his actions.

We have spoken of Roosevelt's awareness of his dilemma in dealing with the great trusts. Though he favored Regulationism, such Progressives as La Follette had made Atomism more expedient politically and were demanding the enforcement of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Roosevelt was willing to crack down on actual monopolies where they were operating against the public interest, but he favored a cautious and reasonable approach to the problem. Some of his uncertainty crept into his first message to Congress in 1901, and Mr. Dooley caustically offered an analysis. "Th' thrusts, says he, are heejous monstheres built up by th' inlightened intherprise of th' men that have done so much to advance progress in our beloved counthrey, he says. On wan hand I wud stamp thim undher fut: on th' other hand not so fast."

Nevertheless it was politically necessary to do something about the trusts, so TR directed Attorney-General Philander C. Knox to institute proceedings against Northern Securities. We saw in our examination of railroad imperialism how the *Northern Securities Case* was a technical triumph for the government. Roosevelt hailed it as a successful effort to hold the monopolists "to accountability before the law." He never forgave Holmes for dissenting from the decision on the ground that the Northern Securities Company did not necessarily restrain competition and that

Campaign
of 1904

"Trust
busting"

breaking it up would not guarantee competition. Perhaps the President was angry because Holmes clung stubbornly to the more logical Regulationist point of view—which only pointed up TR's own inconsistency.

Roosevelt's trust-busting program received more popular support during his second term because of the revelations of the muckrakers, the insurance scandals of 1905, and the disclosures that followed the Panic of 1907. During his administrations Roosevelt instituted a total of forty-four antitrust proceedings. In several cases trusts were broken up, but results, to say the least, were discouraging. There was a baffling tendency for the pieces to find ways of co-operating. It is true that fewer trusts were now being formed, but that situation was probably because most of the important combinations had been made. As early as 1904 there were 318 large industrial combinations with a combined capitalization in excess of \$7 billion. They controlled more than two fifths of the manufacturing capital of the country and affected about four fifths of the important industries.

**Failure
of trust
busting**

Roosevelt was in despair, but Congress, in so far as it would approve any antitrust policy, was stubbornly Atomistic. Probably public opinion was not yet ready for drastic action, and Congressmen realized the fact. On the other hand, some Congressmen may have favored Atomism because it would have been more futile; at any rate, they made certain by refusing sufficient funds for enforcement—though, truly, a really serious effort would have been prohibitively expensive. Congress was willing, however, to grant funds for a limited trust-busting campaign. Roosevelt also managed in 1903 to have a Bureau of Corporations set up in the new Department of Commerce and Labor to study the situation, and it was able to gather information which was later used to great effect.

Since he obviously could not check every corporation transaction, TR finally made a distinction between "good" and "bad" trusts. The latter had been caught in attempts to build real monopolies or to gouge the consumer; the former behaved themselves, or at least had not been caught in misbehavior. The distinction was appropriated by the Supreme Court in 1911 in its "rule of reason." That TR's heart was not in trust busting was shown by his confession at the close of his administration: "I have let up in every case where I have had any possible excuse for so doing."

Roosevelt showed in other ways his penchant for executive action. To the intervention in the Anthracite Coal Strike he added support of a workmen's compensation law for government employees and factory inspection and child-labor laws for the District of Columbia. He recommended other measures to Congress, and that body imposed a workmen's compensation law on railroads. He did not, however, join Beveridge's crusade for a national child-labor law. By

**The square
deal**

the term "square deal" Roosevelt intended to express his concept of justice toward and the dignity of the citizen, the family, labor, and industry; but the phrase was rather generally applied to his labor policy. On the whole, he differed little from the prevailing opinion of his time toward labor, and for this reason organized labor always remained cool toward him.

The rebate abuse had become so bad that even the railroads were anxious to abolish it and in 1903 supported the Elkins Act, "a truce of the principals to abolish piracy." Some success was met in enforcing it, but

Hepburn Act, 1906 stronger legislation was necessary. Finally in 1906, after a great deal of wrangling, Congress passed the Hepburn Act.

The Interstate Commerce Commission was given the power to set rates, subject to the railroads' appeal to the courts; it was also given control of terminal and storage facilities, express companies, and pipe lines. In 1910 telephone and telegraph lines were added. There were other improvements, not least of which was the imposition of a uniform system of bookkeeping. However, the act was so clearly a compromise that Progressives like La Follette were sorely disappointed and blamed TR for being so willing to compromise that he was in effect pouring out the baby with the bath.

The muckrakers had demonstrated that food was often diseased and adulterated, while chemicals and dyes were so freely used as preservatives and for other purposes as to constitute a menace to health. Dr. Harvey W.

Food and drug laws Wiley, Chief Chemist of the Department of Agriculture, forcibly called the situation to Roosevelt's attention in 1905.

Federal inspection of exported meat had begun in the 1880's, and in 1906 it was extended to all meat entering into interstate commerce. In the same year a Pure Food and Drug Act began a cautious supervision of prepared foods and medicines. Manufacturers fought vigorously for the old rule of *caveat emptor* and succeeded in blocking the attempt to prohibit false advertising; false claims on the labels were prohibited, but the Supreme Court obligingly held that curative claims were not included. An amendment of 1912 declared false and fraudulent claims to be illegal.

Roosevelt's intelligent interest in all outdoors led him inevitably into a crusade to conserve natural resources from exploitation, not only by the great corporations but by the little man as well. He took advantage of ex-

TR's champion-ship of conservation isting laws to withdraw some 235 million acres of mineral and forest lands from public entry and place them in reserves.

He obtained legislation authorizing the placing of the forest reserves under the Department of Agriculture, where the Bureau of Forestry, created in 1901 out of the old Division of Forestry, was being efficiently managed by Gifford Pinchot. Pinchot became in effect TR's chief of staff for conservation problems and, it is said, saw more of the President than any other executive official.

Creates a nation-wide movement and administration which would best promote the public interest. Meanwhile he stimulated interest by public statements and by holding conferences and setting up study commissions. He failed to get Congress to provide for the retention of mineral lands (this was done in 1920); but as the result of his efforts it provided that mineral, timber, and agricultural lands should be separately disposed of, and it also set up a Bureau of Mines which was intended to study mineral resources.

The conservation movement was at first bitterly opposed by most timber, mining, hydroelectric, and ranching interests. The Western popular point of view was that resources held in reserve either by corporations or Federal government should be opened to immediate exploitation in order to hasten the building-up of the region. Many interests were willing to compromise, however, by locking up all forest lands under Federal protection and thus force private holders to feed their timber into the market.

Corporations which already "had theirs" agreed because they thought their holdings would appreciate in value. On the whole, the West has been the most inveterate enemy of conservation and when reminded that its resources should be saved for future generations cynically inquires: "What has posterity done for us?" However, the entry of the Federal government into land reclamation and irrigation has served to split the Western opposition to conservation.

Roosevelt managed partially to placate Westerners by the repeal of the Forest Lieu Act of 1897 and by the opening of suitable forest-land tracts to agricultural homesteading and to grazing leases. Cattle and sheep graziers, however, resented the limitations placed upon their ranges and numbers of stock, and the anticonservationists finally passed in 1907 a bill which provided that no forest reserve should be set up in the Northwest save by direct act of Congress. Roosevelt promptly set up twenty-one new forest reserves, then signed the bill. He effectively antagonized the West—on that point, at least—and left to his successor a problem to which we shall soon refer. Nevertheless, he had given conservation a much-needed start.

2 *Taft and Armageddon*

As Roosevelt's second term drew to a close, it became evident that the Old Guard would like to replace him with one of its own number. Roosevelt may have had ambitions for a future return to the presidency, but for the present he sincerely wished to retire. There was, however, a real probability that the Republican convention, certain to be under Progressive control, would draft him to run. To block such a movement Roosevelt began to look about for someone whom

he could promote in his stead. The most obvious aspirant was La Follette, but he was an Atomist and as such unacceptable to right-wing Progressives. Charles Evans Hughes had gone on from his insurance investigation to the governorship of New York, in which he had been so rigidly upright and impartial that he had antagonized both politicians and public. Ablest of Roosevelt's Cabinet members was Elihu Root, who, in charge first of the War Department and then of State, had done an excellent job of adjusting the United States to the imperialist age. But—he had come up as lawyer first for Boss Tweed, then for Whitney and Ryan in their traction deals. Decidedly he was not the man.

In the end Roosevelt pitched upon William Howard Taft, his Secretary of War. Taft was scion of a prominent and wealthy Cincinnati family and had gone into politics with his eye set upon the Supreme Court. He reached it eventually, but only after four unhappy years as President. After holding a number of judicial and legal appointments he had, first as commissioner to the Philippines and then as governor-general, been one of America's first proconsuls. He made a good record, then came home to succeed Root as Secretary of War. At this time he was a huge (326 lbs.), chuckling, beef-steak-for-breakfast man, who must have inspired the saying "Everybody loves a fat man."

**William
Howard
Taft
(1857–
1930)**

Taft had no desire for the presidency, but his wife and relatives were ambitious, and because he had a high sense of duty they finally convinced him to accept TR's proffered support. His availability was undoubted, for his judicial background won the confidence of the conservative East while Roosevelt's backing won the confidence of the Progressive West. Taft was easily nominated, and the nation was plastered with posters bearing his smiling countenance and the confident label "Our Next President." He was. Bryan ran against him on an antitrust platform scarcely different from Taft's own. After a tame campaign Taft won 321 to 162; the popular vote stood 7.7 million to 6.4 million. Taft carried James S. ("Sunny Jim") Sherman of New York in with him as Vice-President.

Roosevelt now took the opportunity to plan a big-game hunting trip in East Africa and only tarried to see his friend safely installed in the presidency—as "chair-warmer," his enemies said as they lifted their glasses to wish luck to the lions. TR had supposed with good reason that Taft was a Progressive, but he had forgotten to reckon on two things: Taft's judicial temperament and his belief that Congress, not the President, should lead in policies. TR's boat was scarcely over the horizon when Taft was in trouble with his Progressive advisers. There had been a great deal of campaign talk about "The tariff, mother of trusts," and both parties had promised revision. Taft now called Congress, and the Republican majority delivered

**Taft and
the Payne-
Aldrich
Tariff,
1909**



Permission of Mrs. Helen Turner Johnson

TR glares while Taft pleads for tariff reduction and Senator Aldrich says, "Aw, hang the consumer!"

the promised revision—upward! Taft boggled at the resultant Payne-Aldrich Tariff (1909) but signed it. That action was bad enough and was interpreted as contrary to his promises, but he then gave the tariff the oblique compliment of defending it as the best the party had ever adopted, a defense which outraged La Follette and Company.

Taft next proceeded to get embroiled in the controversy over conservation. Richard A. Ballinger, Secretary of the Interior, was a Westerner and sympathized with his section's attitude toward conservation. When he re-
 Ballinger- opened to private enterprise some water-power sites and
 Pinchot Alaska coal lands which Roosevelt and Pinchot had with-
 controversy drawn, Pinchot smelled corruption and made such serious charges that Taft (after due investigation convinced him of Ballinger's innocence) fired Pinchot. He believed, perhaps rightly, that Pinchot was using the issue as a political weapon to promote a "back from Elba" movement to make TR President again in 1912.

Taft's mistake lay in not firing Ballinger also, for presently Congressional investigation revealed that Ballinger had had previous official and legal relations with claimants to the Alaska coal lands. The relation may not have been corrupt, but it was certainly shady. Ballinger resigned in 1911, but the damage had been done. The clamant Progressives refused to be convinced that Taft was a conservationist. Pinchot, whose pride had

suffered severely, made a special trip to meet Roosevelt in Italy and presumably urged his partisan view of the controversy.

On the whole, Taft's record was soundly conservationist. One of his actions was to withdraw oil and gas lands from entry and ask Congress for power to make permanent reserves. In the Withdrawal Act of 1910 Congress granted the request and provided that he could so hold them until Congress itself legislated otherwise. Taft took advantage of the law and withdrew practically all mineral lands; two valuable petroleum reserves were set up at Elk Hills, California. In addition Congress made provision for the protection of watersheds and water-power sites and began to purchase forest lands in the East. The West, of course, protested vigorously and was scarcely placated by the Mandell Act of 1909, which opened coal lands to agriculture on condition that the coal remain government property, and which cleared the way for the expansion of dry farming. The Progressives were now in the peculiar situation of being allied with the great corporations in favor of conservation.

Taft a conservationist

Meanwhile the Progressives, long critical of the absolute sway of the Speaker over the House of Representatives, made the discovery that they could get Democratic help to override the Old Guard. Led by Norris of Nebraska, a group of Republican insurgents in March 1910 began a parliamentary battle to trim Speaker Joseph G. Cannon's powers. The struggle was long and bitter, and brilliantly conducted on both sides. In the end the insurgents took away the Speaker's tacit power to decide whether certain bills could be presented and lodged it in the Rules Committee (where it had technically belonged), which was enlarged and made elective by the House, and from which the Speaker was excluded.

Insurgents overthrow power of the Speaker

The next House, controlled by the Democrats, continued the revolution by taking away the Speaker's power to appoint committees and making them elective. The effect was to destroy party discipline in the House and decrease legislative efficiency because now members were in large part freed of party pressure. Eventually the majority floor leader and whip became leaders in place of the Speaker; it is arguable as to whether the last state was worse than the first.

With the Old Guard thus limited in its power to thwart progressive measures, the Progressives now undertook, with the aid of liberal Democrats, to crowd their program through the legislative hopper. They established a parcel-post system and postal savings in the Post Office Department; provided for publicity of campaign expenditures; and divided the Department of Commerce and Labor into two departments. They had already supported the Sixteenth (Income Tax) Amendment, which was to be approved by the states and

Progressive legislation

go into effect in 1913; and were in 1912 to send to the states the Seventeenth Amendment, for the direct election of Senators, which also went into effect in 1913. The Mann-Elkins Act of 1910 transferred control of telephone and telegraph facilities to the ICC but was not supported by the Progressives on the ground that it was too weak. Another feature of Progressive action was a concerted assault of vilification, both in press and



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"The common people" show rising resentment against the trusts during the Taft era.

Congress, upon the more "standpat" members of the Old Guard. "Battling Bob" La Follette's campaign against Aldrich, leader of the Senate, was vicious and effective and in the end helped to force his retirement.

Taft had loyally supported much of the above legislation. He had gone farther and, as is frequently pointed out, instituted ninety antitrust suits during his four years as contrasted to Roosevelt's forty-four in seven years.

Trust suits: Suits begun against the Standard Oil Company and the American Tobacco Company by Roosevelt were pressed by Taft. As a result the two were broken up; and when they saw the outcome of these suits, some other trusts agreed to dissolve. It was during these suits that the Supreme Court adopted (1911) its famous Rule of Reason. The Sherman Antitrust Act was so poorly drawn that it did not make economic sense and was in addition probably unconstitutional.

The Court therefore decided that the prohibition of "all combinations in restraint of trade" should mean "all *unreasonable* combinations in restraint of trade."

The actual effects of the antitrust suits were limited, for quiet agreements to divide territory and carry out common policies were still possible. Public realization of this possibility led to challenge of Taft's sincerity, but the fact remains that he had enforced the law as it existed. In the process he had begun a suit against the U.S. Steel Corporation, using as a basis Big Steel's absorption of the Tennessee Coal and Iron Company during the Panic of 1907. This absorption, it will be remembered, had been carried out with Roosevelt's solemn pledge of immunity. Though the suit later broke down, Roosevelt was certain to interpret it as personal treachery on the part of the man he had placed in the presidency.

However well-meaning Taft may have been, the fact was that he was politically inept as well as unlucky. The Progressives had the bit in their teeth and demanded that the executive driver go their way, a demand which was not only in violation of Taft's judicial temperament but would have forced him to take sides among ambitious Progressive leaders. The result was that he was bitterly denounced as a reactionary and was accused of carrying out Roosevelt's policies "on a stretcher." Taft was more and more driven to take council with and seek support from "standpatters," and that policy reacted against him. He was, said his critics, "a large body surrounded by men who know exactly what they want."


Growing
criticism
of Taft

Poor Billy Taft never managed to fit comfortably into the presidential chair nor to feel that it was really his. "When I hear someone say Mr. President," he confessed ruefully, "I look around expecting to see Roosevelt, and when I read in the headlines . . . that the President and Senator Aldrich and Speaker Cannon have had a conference, my first thought is, 'I wonder what they talked about.'"

When the Democrats captured the House in 1910 matters went from bad to worse. Congress tantalized him with tariff-revision bills which he felt obliged to veto; his favorite policy of reciprocity with Canada was vetoed in Canada largely because he and others failed to conceal its imperialist claws; and Secretary of State Knox's "dollar diplomacy," however realistic it may have been, gave an additional handle to anti-imperialists and to partisan critics.

It was evident even during Taft's first year that the public missed Roosevelt's showmanship, and one may suppose that part of the hostility toward Taft rose from his deficiency as an entertainer. The humorists caught the point. A cartoonist portrayed "the common people" as a small boy waiting on the pier for TR's return, while *Life* (then a humorous magazine) plaintively cried:

Return
of TR



Permission of Mrs. Helen Turner Johnson

"The common people" waiting anxiously for the return of their hero, TR

Teddy, come home and blow your horn,
The sheep's in the meadow, the cow's in the corn.
The boy you left to 'tend the sheep
Is under the haystack fast asleep.

In March 1910 TR emerged from East Africa after having killed enough game to allay even his urge for dominance and having (or at least so he thought) added much to scientific knowledge. There then followed a leisurely tour during which he dramatically flouted the pope, advised the crowned heads of Europe how to run their business, and attended the funeral of Edward VII in London. The public shivered in delighted anticipation when he landed at New York amidst the éclat of whistles, a naval parade, and a march up Broadway, but he quietly settled down at Sagamore Hill, his home on Oyster Bay, Long Island to study the situation.

During his retirement Roosevelt read Herbert Croly's *Promise of American Life* and thought deeply upon the Progressive program. As a result he came up with a program to which he now blandly committed the Republican Party on speaking tours through West and South, and which in a speech at Osawatimie, Kansas he named the New Nationalism. Essentially he sought to adapt agrarian liberalism to the new régime of urban industry by using the Hamiltonian

**The New
National-
ism**

centralized government to advance Neo-Jeffersonian Progressivism; he repeated his stand for regulation of corporations, conservation of natural resources, and for reform in general.

The enthusiastic response of the public cannot now conceal the fact that his speech was basically a reiteration, clarification, and expansion of what he had always wanted but had never been able to implement politically. While his program did not appeal to the populist farm belt of the West, it went along under the guidance of a host of second-line leaders like William Allen White of Kansas. They were attracted by TR's hope of balancing industry and agriculture, an action which they felt was the only way of preserving the farmers' independence.

In January 1911 a group of Progressives met at La Follette's house in Washington and formed the National Progressive Republican League as an instrument to capture the party for Progressivism and the presidential nomination for La Follette. The latter claimed to his dying day that Roosevelt pledged himself to his support; actually, **TR bumps La Follette** up to late in 1911 Roosevelt, convinced that the Republicans would be defeated, sought to have Taft renominated. Out of the standpat debacle he thought that there might be a chance of turning the party toward Progressivism. But continual solicitation had its effect; even a wing of Wall Street, led by George W. Perkins and Frank Vanderlip, disgusted by Taft's antitrust suits, were attracted by an article TR wrote on Regulation as an alternative to Atomism and offered their support.

Perhaps it was Taft's suit against Big Steel that decided Roosevelt. Most of the Progressives, even though they may have been supporting La Follette, did not consider him a winner and were awaiting a chance to jump on the Roosevelt bandwagon. Their chance came in February 1912, when La Follette appeared to address the Publishers' Association in Philadelphia. He had been working without surcease and was further weakened by a siege of ptomaine poisoning and by anxiety over the serious illness of one of his daughters. Suddenly in the midst of the address he threw down his script and launched into a bitter denunciation of publishers as creatures of Wall Street. This tirade went on for almost two hours and then began to become incoherent and maudlin. Finally La Follette sank into his chair and buried his head in his arms. A few days later he was his old self, but this temporary breakdown was Roosevelt's opportunity. A carefully staged demand that he announce his candidacy appeared at the end of February in a letter signed by seven Progressive governors. TR promptly announced: "My hat is in the ring."

The lines were drawn. Lodge, Root, and Knox, long regarded as Roosevelt Janizaries, were now more loyal to their status as Old Guardsmen and were joined by Hughes, Stimson, and Nicholas Longworth, TR's own son-

The Old Guard in-law. Among first-line Progressive Senators only Beveridge was to stay with him to the bitter end. Taft's Old Guard nominates protectors had not been idle but had gained a firm control of Taft the Southern Republican delegations in his behalf. They then took over delegations wherever they were selected by state conventions, though TR usually won wherever they were elected by primary. When the convention met at Chicago in June, the Old Guard wrapped the railing about the speaker's stand with barbed wire under the decorative bunting, evidently in fear of a Progressive attempt to seize the convention organization by force. But the Old Guard had the majority and controlled the committee on credentials. The Roosevelt forces tried to unseat enough Taft delegates to give themselves the majority, but Chairman Elihu Root ruled that contested delegations seated by the committee could vote on all contests except their own. Taft was easily nominated on the first ballot.

TR, on the scene to direct his delegates, raised a cry of theft and then bolted from the party. The seceders were promptly dubbed "Bull Moose" from one of TR's sayings that he felt as strong as a bull moose. A Roosevelt convention met (also in Chicago) in August with George W. Perkins, "oiled and curled like an Assyrian bull," very conspicuously in charge of the preliminaries. Amidst enthusiastic turmoil the convention proceeded to adopt the name Progressive Party, to swallow the New Nationalism as its platform, to nominate its hero for the presidency, and to select Hiram Johnson of California as running mate.

Nothing like the evangelical zeal of this convention had ever been seen. It took literally Roosevelt's exhortation, "We stand at Armageddon and we battle for the Lord," and it sang *Onward, Christian Soldiers* with rapt devotion. The delegates then scattered to beat the bushes for votes, carrying with them the emotional fervor which TR knew so well how to arouse. It is impossible to explain fully the craze that swept the nation; as William Allen White put it, "Roosevelt bit me, and I went mad."

It is difficult in retrospect to find any political sense in TR's actions—unless, indeed, he had bitten himself and gone mad. Actually his bolt only encouraged the Democratic belief that they could win with a liberal candidate. There was no real difference in the platforms of the two old parties; and, since Taft was certainly going to be defeated in any case, Roosevelt would have easily won the nomination in 1916. He could have had no hope of winning in 1912, whatever hope he might have had of building up a strong progressive party which would eventually take first place from one of the old parties. Even the last hope was pretty much a delusion. For one thing, four years gave neither time nor means (patronage, to be explicit) to build up the local organizations on which national victories must be based. For

another thing, such liberalism as American history boasted was a proprietary medicine the patent on which was held by the Democratic Party, and which was brought out when that party chose to do so.

The Democratic prospects for victory were so good that a long list of aspirants to nomination laid their claims before the convention at Baltimore in July. It would be a mistake to say that the convention was dominantly progressive; rather, a considerable part of its membership was cynically ready to court victory by putting up a progressive candidate. Sixteen years had wrought a sad change in the once magnificent Bryan, and yet (because of the two-thirds rule) the habit of his ascendance over liberals gave him in effect a deciding vote in the selection of the candidate.


Democrats
nominate
Wilson

The three leading contenders were Representative Oscar Underwood of Alabama, Speaker of the House Champ Clark of Missouri, and Governor Woodrow Wilson of New Jersey; and there was in addition a list of favorite sons put forward for trading purposes. When the balloting began, Champ Clark seemed on the way to the necessary two thirds; but when on the tenth ballot Tammany swung to his support, the Bryan forces turned to Governor Wilson. With Bryan aid, Wilson's astute managers made their arrangements among the favorite sons; and on the forty-sixth ballot Wilson won. Thomas R. Marshall, Governor of Indiana, was selected as running mate; he is now chiefly remembered as author of the plaint that "what the country needs is a good five-cent cigar."

No campaign since 1896 had offered such drama. Roosevelt called upon the nation to rally at Armageddon and march against the forces of evil led by his old friend Big Bill Taft. The President replied as best he could, but he was no match for "Teeth-a-dore." Wilson had been a college professor and president of Princeton; Roosevelt viewed him with all the contempt of the man of action for the scholar, and he lampooned him as pallid and doctrinaire. For his part, Wilson went calmly ahead hewing out a program which he called the New Freedom and which bore a strange resemblance to Roosevelt's Progressivism, except that it was more Atomist than Regulationist. Most of the Progressive Senators refused to leave the Republican Party (whence came their loaves and fishes) though three, including La Follette, supported Wilson.

Armaged-
don: 1912

It is a curious comment on the common view that Wall Street is united for evil that it was split three ways during this campaign. Wall Street's basic problem was to head off the Atomistic La Follette. Perkins became TR's manager, and he and other wealthy men, especially Frank Munsey, the conservative publisher, financed the campaign in the hope that Regulation would at least permit the great corporations to live. Another wing of Wall Street chose Wilson as its lesser evil, and Wilson was hard set to



ELECTION OF 1912

531 ELECTORAL VOTES



TAFT—Republican: 8 electoral, 3,484,000 popular votes

WILSON—Democrat: 435 electoral, 6,280,000 popular votes

ROOSEVELT—Progressive: 88 electoral, 4,126,000 popular votes

J. W. CLEMENT CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.

avoid the appearance of being controlled by the "interests." Poor Taft, who now made no bones of his conservatism, had antagonized Wall Street by his enthusiastic prosecutions and consequently had the least support from the realistic captains of finance; he depended chiefly upon the Old Guardsmen, who clung to him because they expected defeat to give them control of a party purged of reformism.

The only casualty in the Battle of Armageddon was Roosevelt. When he visited Milwaukee on 14 October, a man who had gone loco on the subject of third terms put a bullet in his lung. Delighted to show his stamina,

Election
of 1912

TR finished his speech before he consented to collapse. When the smoke of battle cleared, Wilson, to no one's surprise, was found to be victor. The morning report showed that Wilson

had 435 electoral votes (6.3 million popular votes, 40 states); Roosevelt 88 (4.1 million votes, 6 states); and Taft 8 (3.5 million votes, 2 states). Debs, with 900,000 votes, afforded the only surprise. Congress went Democratic, thus giving a Democratic President a sympathetic legislature for the first time since 1856; Cleveland's Democratic Congress in 1892 could hardly be called sympathetic. Only one Progressive governor and a dozen Congressmen were elected, and the ticket for such officials trailed far behind the vote for TR. Just as much to the point, the Republican Party was now the property of standpatters and was essentially to retain its conservative color at least into the 1950's.

This was Roosevelt's last appearance in the dramatic role which the public loved so well. In 1913-14 he made a long and dangerous trek through the forests of Brazil and emerged so permanently weakened by tropical disease that it was henceforth an effort for him to exude the old ozone. As his interest in the European war rose and his antipathy for Wilson's peace-at-any-price policies rose with it, he felt justified in letting the Bull Moose Party collapse. In 1917 he humbled himself and asked Wilson for an army command but was coldly refused for reasons which are readily understandable. He turned to laying his lines to bid for the Republican nomination in 1920; but in January 1919 he died, essentially succumbing to the "strenuous life" which he had so ardently preached and practiced. When Lodge rose in the Senate and in choking voice announced, "Greatheart has gone," both friend and foe recognized the justice of the phrase. No American since Lincoln had seized such firm hold on the imagination of the people. That the Roosevelt name had magic was shown even before his death by the way in which a young relative was building a political career upon it and was eventually to out-shine the original.

The magic
name

TR's significance lay in two things: his popularization and redirection of progressive issues, and the start that he gave to the conservation of natural resources. That he actually accomplished little may be attributed in part to his own doubt and hesitancy, but perhaps even more to the political situation: he had to keep East and West together, and he would have been helpless without the aid of some of the more tolerant members of the Old Guard and even some of the more susceptible Democrats. "A lot iv us," confessed Mr. Dooley, "likes Tiddy Rosenfelt that wudden't iver be suspected iv votin' f'r him."

The great-
ness of TR

TR was clearly alarmed by the lawless ways of some members of the plutocracy and the growing desire of resentful labor to get something for nothing—two ends of the same game. The Republican Party had built its strength on the rising power of Big Business in days when the people approved of that growth. Roosevelt saw that the people were changing their attitude, and he warned the party and Wall Street that if they expected to remain in power they must yield to the rising popular demand. So keenly did Roosevelt blame Wall Street for the situation that it is said that at the Gridiron Dinner in 1907 at which Morgan was present, TR during an exposition of his policies shook his fist in the Magnifico's face and shouted, "If you don't let us do this, those who come after us will rise and bring you to ruin." He and his advice were rejected, and conservatism enjoyed a few more years of untrammelled power. But in the end the resurgent Democratic Party under TR's great kinsman mounted the wave of popular protest and rode to victory.

Progressives like La Follette were able to make reforms in many states, but they lacked the dramatic appeal and the political skill to charm the

new generation of urban sophisticates, whose support was necessary to win national attention. Roosevelt knew how to do it. The left-wing Progressives, moreover, failed to see that the great corporation was necessary to American power and to the American standard of living. They were not hampered by idealistic scruples in their political maneuvers, but their ideals beclouded their view of their objective; essentially their Atomism was an attempt to return to the golden age of the past which, like most golden ages, had never existed. Roosevelt was not the first to recognize this fact, but it is to his credit that he actively tried to do something about the matter by offering something which he firmly believed was better: Regulation. Atomism, he asserted, was rural toryism and would inevitably have been destructive; Regulation at least offered a chance of healthfully controlling evolution. How well it has been used is, of course, another matter. At any rate, what we now know as the First New Deal was built upon the bequest that he left to the American people.

3 *The Wilson Progressive Era*

The passing of the Roosevelt Progressive Era ushered in the few brief years of what might be called the Wilson Progressive Era. The distinction between the two eras is startling in almost every respect, and to a great extent these differences flowed not only from political conditions and popular pressures but from the sharply contrasting personalities of the two men. Roosevelt was the adventurous pragmatist who welcomed the challenge of the future and went forth to meet it and work out a *modus vivendi*. Wilson was the transcendentalist who made obeisance to evolution but basically believed that all worthwhile values had been found. His mission was to pare off the excrescences of special privilege which had grown upon the body politic and restore equality of opportunity and something akin to the old competitive order. In a real sense, he was a traditionalist who looked to the past for guidance. The effect upon the domestic and international scenes was to be profound.

Thomas Woodrow Wilson was born in Staunton, Virginia and brought up in the war-torn states of Georgia and the two Carolinas. His parents on both sides were of recently immigrated Scotch and Scotch-Irish stock, and his two grandfathers were men of standing in Ohio. His father, a Presbyterian minister, espoused the cause of the South, helped to organize the Southern Presbyterian Church, and served as a Confederate chaplain. Young "Tommy" graduated from Princeton in 1879 and then, dreaming of a political career, took up law at the University of Virginia. After a year spent in Atlanta, waiting vainly for clients, he took down his shingle with relief and began graduate study at newly-founded Johns Hopkins. Equipped with a Ph.D.

and a young Southern wife who was to be a significant formative influence in his life, he began a teaching career which led through several colleges before he settled in 1890 at Princeton as professor of jurisprudence and political economy.

He rated himself as a Cleveland Democrat, glorified Big Business, belabored labor, and ignored the farmer. He became a popular classroom lecturer and developed a national reputation as an after-dinner speaker to highbrow audiences. His usual precarious health suffered from worry, and at times he experienced nervous trouble. Tall, auburn-haired, with mouth too wide and face too long-chinned to be handsome, pince-nez glasses enhancing an ascetic expression and giving a frosty glint to eyes which could and did twinkle, he was a distinguished figure; but his reputation for wit and sociability was at times marred by signs of aloof vanity—or was it intellectual isolation or merely shyness? At any rate, in 1902 he became president of Princeton and undertook a renovation which boosted even higher his stock as an educator. His position made him a leader of the élite, and before long he was being mentioned here and there as a presidential possibility.

**Rising
leadership**

He loved words for their beauty as well as their meaning, and his ideas came out clear, cool, and crystalline, sometimes clothed in a false vitality. Though he believed in the power of intellect to move the world, moral principles were nevertheless everything and he lived in doubt, uncertainty, and torture of soul until the principle was found in any problem. His approach, whether or not he recognized it, was pragmatic, but once he had found the moral basis—or rationalization, if you wish—he was possessed of a most unpragmatic certainty. Nothing, literally nothing, could change his mind because, forsooth, he had the Absolute in his grasp. This is why Boss Smith called him a “Presbyterian priest,” why he could with no sense of either naïvety or hypocrisy call upon “the conscience of the world.”

**His
Calvinism**

His zeal made him regard political opponents as personal enemies and made him cast off friends who doubted his infallibility. It led, of course, to belief in leadership by an élite—the Calvinist “elect.” It led him to turn opinions into principles quite unnecessarily and, since principles cannot be compromised, to block the road to political accommodations. It had the advantage of carrying conviction because his “call to duty” was obviously clear, calm, and sincere; on the other hand, though the stress upon the moral was a decisive urge to action, his slighting of selfish and material motives left out the sound bases so necessary to sustained exertion. As Steffens said, he had not sinned enough to understand sinners. The tragic consequences were seen in the moral crusade of World War I and the quick popular revulsion from idealism. Worst of all, he never learned that in real life there are times when a democratic leader must violate his conscience

and compromise even on the most cherished principle: when he must accept damnation for the good of the people.

Those who have made a close study of Wilson find the key to his character and many of his actions in his urge to power. Doubtless it arose not only from the natural desire for immortality but also from his passion for order and his desire to pass from instruction of immature
His ambition minds to the implementation of his knowledge, his theories, and his goodwill. But he lacked the common touch; as someone put it, he loved humanity but did not like people. He had a power to sway people in the mass that he did not have over them as individuals; even this power may have been due to popular revulsion from the histrionics of the Roosevelt era. Certainly he was no showman and had no ability to dramatize except intellectually. He asked for love, but would not surrender himself, that is, his "principles." He could not brook intellectual equals, at least in his official life, and broke with those who were and surrounded himself with inferiors.

It was Wilson's character which was to lead at one and the same time to his downfall at Princeton and to his rise in the political world. He believed that the primary business of a university is to stimulate and train
Loses favor at Princeton intellectual processes. To do so, he planned to democratize the institution by doing away with the select eating clubs and introducing a Quadrangle Plan, which would set up a system of colleges combining the social and intellectual life of the undergraduates under preceptors whose business would be "to teach the relation of things." The essence of the cultured mind, he believed, is its capacity for relating knowledge. He planned also to make the graduate school a closely connected part of the whole, the center which would focus the intellectual life of the institution and stimulate undergraduate thinking. For various reasons both plans met with bitter opposition, and the controversy degenerated into a factional fight in which Wilson lost decisively.

At that moment fate stepped in. The New Jersey Democratic machine had long been out of office and had become lean and scrawny; unless it could get its feet in the feed trough very soon, it would probably fade away.
Runs for governor of New Jersey One of Wilson's friends was George Harvey, editor of *Harper's Weekly* and in such close contact with Wall Street interests that he was sometimes called "Morgan's messenger boy." He had proposed Wilson for the presidency as early as 1906 as a respectable counter to Bryan and had him show his paces at a luncheon attended by the Democratic wing of Wall Street.

Harvey now suggested to Boss Jim Smith that Wilson as candidate for governor would be certain to lend an air of respectability and soundness to the party in its battle with the Republicans, who were verging on progressivism. Smith had left the Senate under a cloud and was desperately anx-

ious to get back in. Wilson did not jump at the chance, nor did he take it until Smith agreed to withdraw publicly from the Senate race; for his part Wilson agreed not to try to displace the Democratic machine but insisted that it must support "such policies as would re-establish the reputation of the State and the credit of the Democratic Party." At any rate, Smith fired up his steam roller and forced the nomination of his choice despite progressive outcries.

One thing was clear, and, whether consciously or not, Wilson must have been influenced by it. The progressive wave in the country was reaching a crest, but its success depended upon "sound" Eastern leadership because the Western leaders were too radical to attract Eastern vot- **Conversion**
ers. If he won the governorship of New Jersey as a progres- **to progres-**
sive, he would for geographical reasons immediately become **sivism**
a prospect for the Democratic presidential nomination—with a chance of winning, since the Republicans already gave signs of splitting wide open. Wilson plumped for progressive measures, convinced the electorate of the sincerity of his conversion, and on 17 January 1911 became governor of New Jersey. But already he was regarding the position as a training school for the presidency. Already Harvey was organizing a corps of backers.

Boss Smith, who thought he was dealing with a political tyro, had chuckled at Wilson's conversion to progressivism and laid his plans to return to the Senate despite his promise. Wilson realized that if he permitted Smith to get away with this scheme he would lose all the progressive support which was rallying to him. Suddenly he **His**
upset Smith's apple cart by announcing his support of the **reforms**
nonentity who had won the popular vote in the preferential primary. Smith, accusing his late protégé of ingratitude, turned and fought ferociously against Wilson's program, but the governor put through his campaign promises and enacted a direct primary, a corrupt-practices act, an employers' liability act, and a public-utilities act. Before leaving the governorship he also put through the "Seven Sisters" bills, which limited corporations so thoroughly that they removed their allegiance to Delaware. The tax loss was serious, and eventually New Jersey restored the inducements.

Nevertheless, New Jersey had served Woodrow Wilson's ambition handsomely. His standing as a progressive was firmly established, and progressives from all over the country came to study the institutions of the model progressive state. U'ren of Oregon dropped by and to Wilson's own amazement converted him to the initiative, referendum, and recall. The aloof Princetonian began to study and appreciate the Wisconsin Idea. Then in the spring of 1911 he went on a speaking tour of the West and evoked gratifying enthusiasm. His speeches, however, alarmed his Wall Street backers, who accused him of "Bryanizing," and it was rumored that the Mighty Morgan was beginning to huff and puff. At the same time sup-

porters were attracted, especially Newton D. Baker, Tom Johnson's heir in Cleveland, and Josephus Daniels, North Carolina editor and political power. They were not sufficient, however, to conceal the growing tendency of the states to join the boom of the straddling Champ Clark or cannily hunt up favorite sons who could be used for convention bargaining.

Most important accession of all was Edward Mandell House of Texas. Backed by inherited wealth, House had entered Texas politics as a youth, not to seek office but to seek power. He found it as the power behind the gubernatorial chair for a number of years; then his faction fell out of office. House had always been more or less a progressive, and in 1911 he began to write a novel, *Philip Dru, Administrator*, which was published in 1912 under a pseudonym. The novel was thin and poorly written, but it set forth in startling detail the reforms later adopted by Wilson.

Just how much Wilson's ideas were expressed in the novel or House's ideas in the New Freedom may never be known. At any rate, it was while he was engaged in this task that House invaded the East, for not only was he well-aware of the rising tide of protest but he foresaw that the next President would come from the East, and he proposed to have a hand in his making. Finally he pitched upon Wilson; they met and within weeks were bosom friends, a relationship which it is not certain that Wilson ever held with any other man.

House was a silent, wispy little man, self-effacing yet pervasive and possessed of subtlety and power. Wilson's prospects had apparently been lagging, but they picked up as soon as House took hold. Harvey's taint of Wall Street was doing no good, and on House's advice Wilson found a way of dismissing him. House knew that the key to the nomination was Bryan, so he lost no time in laying siege to the Commoner—and to his influential wife. Though Clark and Underwood did far better in the state primaries, Wilson had the edge with Bryan and this proved decisive. With Bryan's support in the convention Wilson deadlocked Champ Clark, and shrewd bargaining and the pressure of the progressive Democratic press did the rest.

In his Princeton days Wilson had sought a cure for the evils of finance capitalism not by trust busting but by espousing moral regeneration of its leaders by "pitiless publicity" and legal action. It was the individual who would be punished, not the corporation—the driver, not the machine. Herein probably lay Wilson's first appeal to the Wall Street crowd, for they believed that his ideas would thwart radicalism but prove ineffective in action; after all, the courts were on their side.

With Wilson's awakening, however, he recalled his lessons in British economic liberalism with its faith in competition. Moreover, the sap began

to stir in his Jeffersonian roots, and he cast about for ways to defend the middle class—the modern version of Jefferson's small property. These as well as political expediency forbade the aping of Roosevelt's Regulationism, and he modified his past preachments about Atomism trying to force a return to the eighteenth century. After all, by now Hamiltonian centralization had triumphed to the extent that the issue of whether or not government should interfere in business had dropped from the political scene; even Taft had interfered.

Wilson sought to hold a position between TR's Regulationism and Brandeis's extreme view that mere bigness was bad. He took a firm stand in favor of enforced competition—"a body of laws which will look after the men who are on the make"—and he opposed the corporations "growing big by methods which unrighteously crushed those who were smaller." He denied that the death of competition would increase efficiency, but he was ready to admit that bigness might have been gained by intelligence and efficiency. "We mean," said he, "to make little business big, and all business honest, instead of striving to make Big Business little, and yet letting it remain dishonest." He agreed that the corporation was the inevitable form of business enterprise and that it was impossible to return to the old order of individual competition. Whether or not Wilson foresaw and favored the growth of rival giants in each industrial field may be open to argument, but it is probably fair to say that he implied this growth. Government action has helped it along, but perhaps it was in the cards anyway.

But modifies its
extremism

Wilson had defined his New Freedom as a movement to "purify and humanize every process of our common life." Government now had a positive function "to cheer and inspirit our people with the sure prospects of social justice and due reward, with the vision of the open gates of opportunity for all." His inaugural address was a clear, calm call to duty that came with soothing coolness after the fevers of the Roosevelt era.

The New
Freedom

This is not a day of triumph; it is a day of dedication. Here muster, not the forces of party, but the forces of humanity. Men's hearts wait upon us; men's lives hang in the balance; men's hopes call upon us to say what we will do. Who shall live up to the great trust? Who dares fail to try? I summon all honest men, all patriotic, all forward-looking men, to my side. God helping me, I will not fail them, if they will but counsel and sustain me!

The inaugural address also outlined a program of reform legislation, the principal items of which were a lower tariff, renovation of the banking system, a strong antimonopoly act, and agricultural aid.

As leader of a party which had been out of power for sixteen years and had since 1858 controlled both the Executive and the two Houses of Congress at the same time for only two years, Wilson was confronted with serious problems. For one thing, there was a dearth of Democratic administrative experience, and yet he managed to scrape together a Cabinet which compared favorably to any Republican Cabinet. Bryan rated the State Department, and though he annoyed sticklers by serving grape juice at official dinners and paying his expenses by haunting the Chautauqua circuits, he nevertheless served with a degree of common sense if not exactly distinction.

William G. McAdoo, a Georgia-born lawyer and financial promoter, was made Secretary of the Treasury; eventually he married one of Wilson's daughters. Josephus Daniels became Secretary of the Navy and filled the position of Assistant Secretary with Franklin D. Roosevelt, a distant cousin of the mighty Teddy who had first sanctified the position. Albert S. Burleson, experienced Texas politician and protégé of House, became Postmaster-General. One clear outcome of the Democratic victory was that for the first time since the Civil War the South was firmly in the Federal saddle; it filled a large proportion of administrative positions, and its Congressional veterans took over the chairmanships of committees.

Fully as important was the preparation for political action, since the Wilson high command was determined to push through its reforms before the impetus of victory was lost. Since there was no time to renovate the party organization (that is, to oust the conservatives and fill their places with progressives), Wilson resolved to use it as it was, requiring only loyalty to his program. The eventual effect was to arrest reform and ensure the return of the party to its normal conservatism, but at the moment the policy was effective.

Wilson, dreading the pressure of office seekers and lobbyists, retired to study his reforms and gladly left the details of patronage to House. The Texan, quietly enjoying his role of power behind the throne, accepted the assignment and was ably assisted by Burleson. They wielded the patronage weapon to force balky Bourbons into line in support of what was probably the most ambitious and effective legislative program since Hamilton's famous program of the 1790's. House had another role, that of liaison between Wilson and the bankers, for under the circumstances Wilson could not afford to give the public the impression that he was listening to Wall Street advice. Wilson and House, however, made it a point to placate the Baltimore contenders, especially Champ Clark, still Speaker of the House, and Oscar Underwood, Democratic leader in the House.

A month after the inauguration Congress met in special session, and Wilson, breaking a long precedent, appeared before the body to read his message in person and to drop his program into the legislative hopper.

This action was, of course, the logical result of his belief that the President, like the British prime minister, should initiate and guide legislation. The first item was tariff reduction, for he held that a high tariff was an unfair competitive practice on the international stage. Underwood and his Ways and Means Committee had been hard at work on a tariff bill since the November election and now proposed the most drastic reductions since the Civil War, bringing down the Payne-Aldrich average of thirty-seven per cent by about ten per cent. To make up any deficit, a modest graduated income tax was placed on incomes above \$3000. After six months of wrangling the new rates went into effect, but World War I unfortunately canceled most of the good results that were expected to follow.

**Under-
wood Tar-
iff, 1913**


Meanwhile Congress was wrestling with the problem of banking and currency reform. The Aldrich-Vreeland Emergency Currency Law of May 1908 had been passed to ease the Bankers' Panic by temporarily permitting banks to issue currency on commercial paper and non-Federal public bonds. A National Monetary Commission was also created to investigate the whole money and banking problem. Conservatives denied the existence of the "money trust," but they admitted that the whole system needed overhauling, particularly to provide a larger basis for currency expansion than Federal bonds. Clashing interests concentrated on the House Banking and Currency Committee, of which Carter Glass of Virginia was chairman. Exactly who had the most to do with hewing out the final measure was long hotly disputed, but certainly it yielded to Bryan's demand that the new system must in its top echelon, at least, be exclusively administered by Federal appointees, and that the right of banks to issue currency must be withdrawn and lodged solely in the Federal government.

**Banking
and
currency
reform**

The Glass-Owen or Federal Reserve Act, which finally emerged from the melee, satisfied neither extreme, but it became law in December 1913. Twelve regional Federal Reserve Banks were established with funds contributed by member banks; national banks were required to become members and others could. The Federal Reserve Banks did not engage in banking but served as bankers' banks, issuing Federal Reserve notes backed by a forty-per-cent gold reserve (held in government hands) and commercial paper presented as security by borrowing banks. In this way local banks could meet seasonal demands for cash by borrowing at a reasonable rate from their Federal Reserve Bank.

**Federal
Reserve
System**

The entire system was controlled by a Federal Reserve Board composed of the Secretary and the Comptroller of the Treasury and six others appointed by the President with the consent of the Senate. The central board exercised extensive powers over member banks, but its chief control lay in



its ability to set the rediscount rate at which member banks could borrow currency. The regional Reserve Banks were governed by nine-man boards, six elected by the member banks and three appointed by the central board. Though eventually about eighty per cent of the banking resources of the nation were held by member banks, the number of nonmember banks was double the number of members, and the boards held no control over them. The policies of the Federal Reserve Board itself, of course, depended largely upon the type of board members appointed by the President.

As soon as the Glass-Owen Bill was out of the way, Congress took up the trust problem with the object of preventing the formation of monopolies and breaking up those that might already exist. Legislation took the forms of the Federal Trade Commission Act and the Clayton Antitrust Act. The first set up the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), composed of five members appointed for seven years each. It exercised the power of collecting information, investigating corporation activities, and issuing "cease and desist" orders to corporations and persons engaged in unfair methods of competition. Such orders were, however, subject to review by the courts.

The Clayton Antitrust Act strengthened the Sherman Act by forbidding price discrimination and the binding of purchasers or leasees by exclusive contracts—such as the manufacturer of a mimeographing machine stipu-

lating that only his stencil paper would be used by the purchaser of the machine. Restrictions were laid upon the purchase of each others' stock by competing concerns; upon the rights of directors to serve in more than one bank possessing more than \$5 million in resources; and upon the rights of directors to serve in more than one competing corporation with resources over one million dollars. Violations were declared illegal and subject to penalty without proof as to whether or not actual monopoly was involved, and corporation officers were made personally liable.

**Clayton
Antitrust
Act, 1914**

The act also asserted that "the labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce." Labor unions and farmers' organizations were specifically exempted from the operation of the act. The right of labor to strike, boycott, and peacefully picket was guaranteed, and injunctions in labor disputes were to be granted only to prevent "irreparable injury to property."

The Clayton Act was intended to implement the Atomist policy as seen by Wilson, and the Department of Justice used it to break up the International Harvester Company and the Corn Products Refining Company; it failed to dissolve Big Steel, however, for that corporation was able to show that it was not a monopoly. During Wilson's régime the FTC issued 379 "cease and desist" orders. The confusion and haste of war, however, led the government to wink at violations, and in 1918 the Webb-Pomerene Export Act relaxed the antitrust laws to permit a certain amount of combination among exporters. The restoration of the Republican Party after the war led to sweeping administrative and judicial changes which ruthlessly destroyed the spirit of the antitrust acts, even when the letter remained intact.

**Enforce-
ment**

The fourth item of the Wilsonian program concerned agriculture. Secretary David F. Houston of Texas led in an unprecedented expansion of Federal interest in agriculture. The Smith-Lever (or Agricultural Extension) Act of 1914 provided Federal grants-in-aid to the states which, with like sums provided by the states—"dollar matching,"—were used to reorganize and expand the system of county agents, whose function was to advise farmers and publicize scientific methods. The Smith-Hughes Act of 1917 extended vocational education on a similar base. The Federal Highway Act of 1916 granted aid to state construction of rural roads. The Warehouse Act of 1916 essentially set up the Populist subtreasury scheme by providing warehouses where farmers might deposit their staples and use the receipts as collateral for bank loans. Provisions were also made for grading staple crops and supervising trade in them.

**Agricul-
tural aid:
dollar
matching**

Meanwhile the Department of Agriculture greatly expanded its research activities in all phases of agricultural endeavor. When it became

evident that the Federal Reserve could not directly aid in solving the farmers' financial problems, the Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916 was passed to set up a Federal Farm Loan Board and twelve Federal Farm Loan Banks, financed by bond sales and authorized to loan money to co-operative loan associations, which in turn took mortgages from farmers who wished to borrow.

The American Federation of Labor had supported Wilson in 1912, and labor reaped its reward in several installments. One was contained in the labor provisions of the Clayton Antitrust Act. The La Follette Seamen's

Labor legislation Act of 1915 initiated a much-needed supervision of labor and living conditions in the American merchant marine. Ship-owners complained bitterly that as a result they could not compete with foreign shipping; there was merit in their claim, but at least it was a forward step in coastwise shipping, in which Americans did not need to fear foreign competition.

An act of 1913 established a Board of Mediation and Conciliation with jurisdiction over railroad labor disputes. When in 1916 the Railway Brotherhoods took advantage of the circumstances connected with the looming war crisis to demand an eight-hour day, administration pressure was used to pass the Adamson Act, which granted practically all that was asked. The act was bitterly and perhaps justly criticized on economic and Constitutional grounds but was upheld by the Supreme Court in *Wilson v. New* in 1917. On the other hand, two attempts to forbid child labor were blocked by the Court.

Before Wilson came into office he expressed his opposition to the indiscriminate locking-away of resources and proposed to make them accessible to all on the same terms. The nervous West welcomed his appointment of Franklin K. Lane, a Canadian-born Californian, as Secretary of the Interior. Wilson made a number of withdrawals of public lands, including the Teapot Dome naval-oil reserve in Wyoming, but in 1920 he approved acts opening certain mineral, petroleum, and grazing lands to lease, with most of the proceeds to be divided between the Reclamation Fund and the states in which the leases lay.

The states had long contended that water-power sites belonged to them and were at their disposal, but in 1916 the Supreme Court denied this claim in the case of *U.S. v. Utah Power and Light Company*. The decision cleared

Federal Water Power Commission the way for the passage in 1920, after many years of wrangling, of the Federal Water Power Act. It set up a Federal Water Power Commission comprised of the Secretaries of War, Interior, and Agriculture. The commission was authorized to license private corporations to utilize water-power sites on public lands and navigable streams; it could set the

terms of contract, but such contracts were limited to fifty years. For the moment the West was fairly well satisfied.

It will be noticed that most of the Wilson reform legislation was passed before 1915. It was not the outbreak of World War I which slowed down reform legislation, nor was it because Wilson's plans had been fulfilled; actually he had plans for other reforms and for liberalizing the personnel of government. The fact was that by 1915 the conservatives in the party, having gotten their patronage, could now afford opposition and could conspire with their Republican fellow conservatives. Wilson barely managed to put Brandeis across as an appointee to the Supreme Court, and he had to drop many of his proposed personnel changes. The liberal accomplishments of his last years were few; among the exceptions were the Federal Water Power Act and the Nineteenth, or Woman Suffrage, Amendment, which was passed by Congress in 1919 and with the approval of the states went into effect in time for the elections of 1920.

Another reason for the slowing-down of the New Freedom was undoubtedly the President's personal despondence that followed upon the death of Mrs. Wilson in August 1914. As one of the few to whom Wilson had surrendered his full affection, the loss of her comfort and support was a severe blow. It was not until his marriage in December 1915 with Mrs. Edith Bolling Galt, an attractive widowed socialite, that he recovered his morale. By then foreign affairs had replaced domestic issues on the center of the stage. The second Mrs. Wilson was destined to play a uniquely powerful role before her husband left office.

As we shall see in good time, Wilson's competitive philosophy was extended to his conduct of foreign affairs. The nation, after all, was but a larger competitive unit; and, while it should live and let live, it should never lose its competitive identity in an international political and economic monopoly. In terms of British economic liberalism, Wilson believed that if free trade, freedom of the seas, and equal access to raw materials could be guaranteed, the result would be the end of wars. He saw international relations as a "handsome rivalry," a "rivalry in which there is no dislike, this rivalry in which there is nothing but the hope of a common elevation in great enterprises which we can undertake in common." This belief led him to refuse to clap an embargo on shipments to the warring powers of Europe and to deny the right of the powers to interfere with American trade. It led both to his espousal of the self-determination of nations and to his refusal to recognize governments which seized power by force.

It was this belief in reasoned and limited co-operation among competitors which led him to enter war against predatory Germany. Even the League of Nations, while reflecting in its formation many conflicting pres-

The New
Freedom
slows down

Atomism
in foreign
policy

League of Nations a sort of FTC sures, accepted his concept of national competition. It was in effect a sort of super-Federal Trade Commission, which should express the "organized moral force of the world." Wilson may or may not have seen that the very success of capitalism was preparing for its transformation into another economic form. At any rate, his antitrust policy was defending the passing small competitor from being crushed less by the big competitor than by historical forces, which gave a chance (if properly handled) of bringing higher material, social, and cultural standards to all mankind. In the same way the League of Nations approved and imposed a passing economic and political order which was probably not in keeping with the spirit of evolution.

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CONSERVATION: See particularly the early chapters of E. Louise Peffer, *The Closing of the Public Domain: Disposal and Reservation Policies, 1900-50* (1951).

Taft and Armageddon

LIVES AND TIMES: See Henry F. Pringle's excellent *Life and Times of William Howard Taft* (2 v., 1939) and Archibald W. Butt, *Taft and Roosevelt* (2 v., 1930). Note also Kenneth W. Hechler, *Insurgency: Personalities and Policies of the Taft Era* (1940), and George E. Mowry's invaluable *Theodore Roosevelt and the Progressive Movement* (1946); less objective but more sprightly is Matthew Josephson, *The President Makers* (1940). On the Ballinger-Pinchot controversy see Alpheus T. Mason, *Bureaucracy Convicts Itself* (1941); it may or may not be the last word. Interesting and significant are Champ Clark, *My Quarter Century of American Politics* (1921); and Blair Bolles, *Tyrant from Illinois: Uncle Joe Cannon's Experiment with Personal Power* (1951).

The Wilson Progressive Era

WILSON: The principal biography of Wilson is Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters* (8 v., 1927-39). Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Road to the White House* (1947) begins another biography, and a third is promised by Charles Seymour. Probably the best short biography is H. C. F. Bell, *Woodrow Wilson and the People* (1945). James Kerney, *The Political Education of Woodrow Wilson* (1926); Harley Notter, *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* (1937); and William Diamond, *The Economic Thought of Woodrow Wilson* (1943) are all outstanding on their subjects. The writings of Page, Daniels, Lane, Houston, and McAdoo are useful, as is Charles Seymour, ed., *The Intimate Papers of Colonel House* (4 v., 1926-28). Best general study of the period is in the first volume of Frederick L. Paxson, *American Democracy and the World War* (3 v., 1936-48). The papers of President Wilson are in the Library of Congress, but some of them appear in *Public Papers* (6 v., 1925-27) edited by R. S. Baker and W. E. Dodd.

Chapter XLII

PROBLEMS OF AMERICAN EMPIRE

1 *Caribbean Empire*

THE interests of the United States in Latin America were primarily strategic and to some extent psychological, though economic interests presently began to increase. Nevertheless many American reformers, due partly to partisanship, partly to sheer sentimentalism, insisted that Caribbean policy was basically economic imperialism. Their claim was an effective anti-American propaganda weapon in the hands of jealous European diplomats and investors and of nativist Latin-American agitators. There was, perhaps, some basis for psychological fear, for the pervasive effects of the example of American prosperity and of its restless, driving energy were already beginning to be felt all over the hemisphere—and for that matter all over the world.

The Teller Amendment had prevented the annexation of Cuba, but the island could not be evacuated immediately at the end of the war. There was a task of rehabilitation which it was presumed the Cubans would have difficulty in accomplishing. Consequently the island was divided into military districts, each with an American commander and a body of troops and with a growing corps of experts. General John R. Brooke (1838–1926) was military governor. The Spanish army was shipped out, the Cuban army disbanded (with bonus provided by Uncle Sam), relief extended to the civil population, and reorganization begun of courts, schools, police, finances, and local governments. Brooke was a capable administrator but perhaps overinfluenced by his Cuban “secretaries” and somewhat lacking in imagination.

His successor, Leonard Wood (1860–1927), now a major general, was a vigorous young man of 39, a human dynamo like Roosevelt (for whom he bore great admiration), and was possessed of intense ambition, absolute

convictions, and sweeping reformism. As a young medico out of Harvard he had served for years on the Indian frontier as an army surgeon, then as Mrs. McKinley's physician he had become a White House intimate; Wood was the joint choice of McKinley and of his new Secretary of War, Elihu Root.

**Wood as
military
governor**

Wood ruled with a strong hand. He continued the reorganizations begun by Brooke—or, rather, sometimes changed their direction—in a conscious effort to introduce Anglo-Saxon efficiency. His hope was that he could so sell American ways to Cubans that they would voluntarily ask for admission to the Union. Yellow fever, long a scourge of the tropics, had been so deadly in Havana that the city was considered to be the focal point of the disease. As a medico himself, Wood promoted the work of an army medical group under Dr. Walter Reed. In 1900, at the cost of the lives of several volunteers, this group laid the blame for yellow fever on the *Stegomyia* mosquito. Havana had already been cleaned up; but now, as it was cleared of mosquitoes, the yellow-fever deaths dropped from 1282 in 1896 to 18 in 1901.

The Cuban revolutionists had rather generally favored an American protectorate, but now the constitutional convention proposed a simple declaration that the two countries "should eternally maintain ties of the most intimate and fraternal friendship." This was not enough for Washington, which was mindful of strategic security and that some way must be found to abate an unsanitary nuisance. Senator Orville Platt of Connecticut now attached as a rider to an army-appropriations bill a series of eight specifications prepared by Secretary of War Root, which were to become known as the Platt Amendment. Briefly, these provided that Cuba should not impair its independence by agreement with any foreign power; debts were to be strictly limited by income; sanitation was to be guarded; and coaling and naval bases (eventually only Guantánamo Bay) were to be leased. Most important of all was the right of the United States "to intervene for the preservation of Cuban independence [*and*] the maintenance of a government adequate for the protection of life, property, and individual liberty." Finally in June 1901 the convention yielded, and on 20 May 1902 the independence of Cuba was proclaimed and Estrada Palma took the oath as president.

**Platt
Amend-
ment**

Unfortunately the Cubans manifested a lamentable preference for American intervention to reasonable domestic compromise. Affairs promptly fell into a snarl, and by 1906 a revolution had begun. Secretary of War Taft visited the island and reluctantly agreed to intervention. Charles E. Magoon, provisional governor, waged a vigorous and intelligent campaign to restore order and efficiency but could not avoid some scandals brought on by Cuban and American political pressures. His rule ended early in 1909.

**Interven-
tions**



From the Minneapolis Tribune

Governor Wood begins his duties.

For a contrasting view of American occupation actions after the Spanish-American War, see the facing page.

The improvement was only temporary. Cuba followed the Hispanic pattern of rule by *caudillos* or *caciques* rather than democracy. Brief military interventions occurred in 1912 and 1917, and in 1921 General Enoch Crowder came in as a mediator and stayed for seven years. Open force was not used, though of course the threat was never absent. In 1924 Gerardo Machado became president and began laying the foundations of a dictatorship which was claimed to be the tool of American corporations, especially the National City Bank.

An unfortunate aspect of Cuba's situation has been its dependence upon the American sugar market, and its political conditions have often reflected the condition of the American economy. In 1903 after a bitter Congressional struggle TR had won a considerable degree of reciprocity for Cuban sugar and tobacco. The step was well meant, and Cubans themselves regarded it as desperately essential; but it is possible that a greater measure of sugar competition would have improved Cuba's economic health by forcing it to diversify its agriculture and build up its industries.

Economic
depend-
ence on
U.S.



William H. Walker, from "Life"

Liberty: "Stop this bloody work, Sam. He is the one who is fighting for me."

A protest view of the Philippine War

We turn now to Puerto Rico. The island, the easternmost of the Greater Antilles, is roughly quadrilateral in shape, about thirty-five by one hundred miles in its dimensions, and with an area of 3400 square miles. The interior is rugged, and on the whole the island is not suitable to the sugar monoculture which has taken it over. The inhabitants are chiefly rural, and there is a large admixture of Negro blood though two thirds of them claim to be white. During its first centuries the island was merely another Spanish colony, but with the legalization of trade with the world its economic condition began to improve. Sugar, tobacco, and coffee were the economic bases; but they did not furnish a good living for the inhabitants, who existed in abject poverty and bred at an astounding rate.

**Puerto
Rico**

In May 1900 the Foraker Organic Act set up a civil government consisting of a governor and an eleven-man executive council appointed by the President, and an elective House of Delegates. The executive council served as the governor's council and as an upper legislative chamber. Free trade with the United States was instituted the next year, and customs duties collected in the island were to be expended by its legislature. It was not until the Organic Act of 1917 (the

U.S. rule

Jones Act) that Puerto Ricans were made American citizens and legislative power was lodged in a senate and house of representatives, though a final veto rested with the President, and Congress retained the right (never exercised) to disallow any act. The Puerto Rican administration was under the War Department until 1934, when it was transferred to the Department of the Interior. In 1948 the governorship was made an elective office.

In the early days the House of Delegates frequently blocked the passage of the budget unless the governor granted certain demands, and it was only the governor's power to re-enact the previous budget that kept government

Politics from breaking down. Thoughtful Americans noted the striking

resemblance between the Puerto Rican situation and that in the Thirteen Colonies before the Revolution. Eventually several parties grew up. The most important one, the Nationalist Party, demanded independence, but its strength lay in its nuisance value as a refuge for the protest vote rather than in any real desire for the hazardous status of independence. The island's problems were so acute that it could not afford to place itself outside the American tariff barrier; and, even if there had been free trade, it would have missed the considerable amounts of relief money which came its way from time to time.

The American régime found Puerto Rico practically devoid of roads, posts, schools, and public-welfare institutions and ridden by poverty and an astounding array of diseases. The island now boasts excellent systems

American accom- of communications and postal service; a fairly good educational system—schools are never *adequate* anywhere—which

plishments lays stress on vocational training but unfortunately teaches English to people who cannot conceivably have any use for it; hospitals and other public-welfare institutions; and an over-all decrease in disease, though the rate is still very high. Sugar, tobacco, and fruit production have multiplied. Industries have grown, and new ones have been added; unfortunately they have been largely of the sweat-shop variety, though for a long time they seemed to underprivileged Puerto Ricans like a great improvement over the old days.

Unfortunately tariff protection and a criminally negligent administration of the land laws enabled sugar monoculture to take over the island, largely displacing food crops. It is demonstrable that under present meth-

Puerto Rican ills ods sugar requires large outlays of capital and is most economically produced in large holdings, but the trouble with absentee capitalists is that they spend their profits abroad

and return to the island only a modicum in wages, which are concentrated over a few months. And yet it would be a mistake to cast the entire blame on the wicked Yankee corporations. The island élite welcomed them and gave every facility—for a cut of the "sugar." In addition, the coastal shipping law confines shipping to American ships and raises the cost of imports.

Food is outrageously expensive, and few Puerto Ricans are well-nourished.

Most fundamental cause of the island's misery, however, is the relentless multiplication of population, which began under the Spanish and has jumped the island's inhabitants from 1 million in 1900 to 2.25 million in 1950. Puerto Ricans' awareness of their social and economic plight was sharpened by their new outlook, and they quickly developed a tendency to blame the United States for their ills. In a very real sense this country was to blame, for its sanitary reforms promoted a yet more vigorous acceleration of the birth rate and brought a decline in the death rate. The fact is that the island cannot possibly furnish a good standard of living for its inhabitants. Birth control is out of the question for both social and religious reasons; diversification of crops can at best be a palliative; mass emigration is unlikely (and would only delay the day of reckoning); and the island's resources are not sufficient for thorough industrialization. Even the most intelligent political and economic reforms cannot afford a solution without a drop in the birth rate.

Anyone familiar with imperial history knows that improvements are rarely appreciated by the beneficiaries, however much they may be enjoyed. Improvements only open colonial eyes to possibilities they never before realized and lead to clamor for yet more benefits, usually without any sense of responsibility for self-help. Puerto Rico, until recently, was no exception. Critics of American rule, who have been far more common than eulogizers, have apparently expected the United States to turn the island into a laboratory demonstration of what unlimited goodwill and a bottomless purse can do, regardless of how much it violates the laws of economics and social psychology. But one must offset the above good word by the accusation that the United States, at least until the 1930's, did not give vigorous attention to the problems of Puerto Rico.

**Pro and
con of
moral re-
sponsibility**

The root of the failure to do better lay in the American's superficial assumption that the imposition of democratic institutions would automatically bring prosperity and happiness. Along with this belief went the contradictory reliance on private initiative and tariff protection which, however they may have boomed the economy of the continent, were not suited to the economy or the social psychology of Puerto Rico. The American belief that economic growth must somewhat precede spiritual growth, else the latter will have no sound foundation, seems inverted to the Hispanic mind; anyhow, American administration has not applied its method consistently enough to attain the degree of success which would convince Hispanic doubters.

The American failure is illustrated by the so-called Insular Cases, brought before the Supreme Court from 1901 to 1922, which established a peculiarly illogical colonial system. It was decided that there are two kinds

Insular Cases of possessions: incorporated and unincorporated. The former (Alaska and Hawaii) are presumably destined for statehood and are entitled to the guarantees of the Federal Constitution. The latter (Puerto Rico; the Philippines, later granted independence; Samoa; etc.) are not destined for statehood and are not entitled by right to Constitutional guarantees. That is, "the Constitution does not follow the flag." However, unincorporated territories are entitled to certain "fundamental" Constitutional rights as contrasted to "formal" or "procedural" rights. Fundamental rights include the guarantee against deprivation of life, liberty, and property without due process of law; jury trial and uniform tariff rates are formal. Actually the Supreme Court was hedging, trying to draw principles from the acts of Congress. A century and a quarter after the Revolution the United States had set up a colonial régime with provisions strikingly like those which had led to its own rebellion!

Propaganda for imperial expansion had laid stress upon the strategic necessity of an American-owned and -operated isthmian canal, and the lesson had been dramatically illustrated in 1898 by the frantic 69-day dash of the U.S.S. *Oregon* from San Francisco, through the Strait of Magellan, and up to Key West to join Sampson's battle fleet. At that, the time was not much better than the records hung up by the old clipper ships. The canal project, however, was hampered by the old Clayton-Bulwer Treaty of 1850, which provided that control of a canal must be shared with Britain, that it must be undefended, and that it must be so thoroughly neutralized that it would be open even to the enemies of the United States in time of war. John Hay, who became Secretary of State in 1898, undertook to have these strictures lifted and was aided by the fact that Britain was at the moment engaged in the Boer War and confronted by a hostile Europe. Accordingly, in November 1901, the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty yielded on every point except for equality of tolls and the "general principle" of neutralization; fortification was tacitly approved by omitting reference to the subject.

The next problem was to choose between the Nicaragua and the Panama route. An engineering commission appointed by McKinley reported in favor of Nicaragua, for even though that route would be somewhat longer it did not present the backbone of hills present in Panama. Moreover, to dig in Panama it was necessary to acquire the old De Lesseps franchise and the consent of Colombia to the transfer. The De Lesseps enterprise had been reorganized in France as the New Panama Canal Company and held physical assets worth about \$40 million in the Panama Railroad, in prior excavations, in plans, roads, buildings, and machinery. By means not yet understood a group (apparently dominated by Morgan interests) had become entrenched in the New Company and proposed to sell the franchise and assets

to the United States government, the only possible purchaser, for \$109 million. As soon as the engineers had reported, the group quickly lowered its price to \$40 million, which made such a reduction in cost that both Roosevelt and the engineers were now ready to recommend the Panama route.

The Spooner Bill authorized the President to pay the New Panama Canal Company \$40 million for its assets and to acquire from Colombia a right of way across the Isthmus of Panama, but if it could not be obtained "within a reasonable time and upon reasonable terms" he was to turn to Nicaragua. This authorization was made in June 1902. It took Hay seven months to extract an agreement from Colombia, the Hay-Herrán Treaty, and that was rejected by the Colombian senate, which intended to hold the matter in abeyance until the De Lesseps franchise expired in October 1904. Colombia would then have been able to take over the assets of the Panama Company and collect the \$40 million for itself.

**Colombia
stalls**


TR was indignant and proceeded in a rich Rooseveltian vocabulary to express his opinion of the "corrupt pithecoïd community" which thus dared to "bar one of the future highways of civilization." Philippe Bunau-Varilla, a Frenchman active in the Panama venture from the days of De Lesseps, began to pull wires in Panama, and some rumors of impending revolution reached Washington. Colombia had once been a confederation from which the component states had the constitutional right to secede. Panama had twice exercised this right and had twice returned, and had never been reconciled to the forcible setting-up of a centralized republic. Of course, the Bidlack Treaty was directed at outside powers, chiefly Britain, and Colombia had never dreamed that it might be directed against her. Bunau-Varilla did. He called on Roosevelt and Hay, and, though they did not encourage him, their failure to discourage him was a sort of encouragement.

**Panama
Revolution
of 1903**

At any rate TR ordered warships to be held within striking distance of both coasts, and Bunau-Varilla cabled that the cruiser *Nashville* would reach Colón on 2 November 1903. The day after the cruiser arrived the revolt began. The *Nashville* landed marines and bluejackets and denied the use of the railroad to incoming Colombian troops. On the 4th, the Republic of Panama was proclaimed and was immediately recognized. On the 18th Bunau-Varilla, as the representative of the new republic, signed the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty, which gave the United States a perpetual lease to a zone ten miles wide for \$10 million down and \$250,000 per annum.

Roosevelt made the rather vainglorious statement in 1911: "I took the Canal Zone and let Congress debate." The claim may be open to question, but the whole episode bred domestic criticism and was regarded abroad as

Making restitution to Colombia an illustration of American hypocrisy. Nevertheless, the American conscience was cankered, and there was a strong movement to make restitution to Colombia. However, as long as TR lived he was able to forestall any disposition to agree to Colombia's plea that the grievance be submitted to arbitration. It was not until after the discovery of oil in Colombia that Colombian pride was salved with \$25 million in gold, and American petroleum entrepreneurs received the benefit.



The actual work of planning and constructing the canal bogged down for at least two years but progressed rapidly after the army engineers assumed control in April 1907, with Colonel George W. Goethals in charge.

Construction of the canal As a necessary preliminary, the Canal Zone was cleaned up in order to eliminate yellow fever and, so far as possible, other diseases. The Panama Canal as built possessed three sets of locks and traversed an artificial lake. The cost of \$375 million was double the estimated cost. Though the canal was opened to traffic in 1914 after ten years of work, it was not actually completed until 1920, and of course many expensive alterations have been made since.

The Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty of 1903, which gave the United States almost blanket authority to intervene in Panama, met bitter criticism in that country, which contended that American authority covered only sani-

tation and defense and could exercise no political controls. **Hull-Alfaro Treaty, 1939**
 In 1939 the Hull-Alfaro Treaty canceled the objectionable controls but left to the United States the administration of sanitary affairs and the right to act for the defense of the canal, though except in dire emergency only after consultation with Panama.

The creation of Cuba and Panama as separate states raised to nine the number of Caribbean countries exclusive of the larger nations of Mexico, Colombia, and Venezuela. The inhabitants of the island republics are white, mulatto, and Negro, though Haiti is almost altogether black. The Central American countries are largely Indian and mestizo, with Costa Rica mostly white. Race prejudice is played down, and the people who speak Spanish regard themselves as Spanish in culture, whatever their origin. **Caribbean republics**

The Caribbean states have always been agricultural, and they are not likely to change much. Their great weakness lies in their dependence on one crop, or at the most two or three. Thus, sugar dominates the islands except Haiti, which prefers coffee; tobacco, cacao, and cotton give some variety. Central America depends largely on coffee and bananas. It is clear that this condition makes Caribbean prosperity contingent upon outside countries, especially the United States, which even before World War I was taking half of the Caribbean produce and now takes around three quarters. The danger lies not only in the dependence of these countries on the United States but in the ease with which they and other tropical countries can glut the market. The result is that the Caribbean states have been anxious to obtain a guaranteed part of the American market and since 1933 have done so, though the difficulties are by no means ironed out. **Economic situation**

Since property is not widely held, the necessary economic basis for democracy has not existed except, significantly, in Costa Rica, the most democratic of them all. This condition does not mean that the Caribbean states have not longed for democracy. On the contrary they have, as is shown by the democratic character of their constitutions and by the continual lip service which even the most dominating *caudillos* have paid to democracy. Nor have the other bases of democracy flourished. When one considers that even today the total income of the nine Caribbean states barely reaches one per cent of that of the United States (and one third of that is in Cuba), the effect upon governmental budgets, education, welfare, and internal development becomes apparent. The habit of saving has never become deeply implanted in the Caribbean; and even when it has been implanted, the tendency is to put the money into land. **Economics and democracy**

As a result, internal development has come largely through foreign in-

vestments or government borrowing. Historically the Caribbean ruling classes were divided into factions which chiefly represented regional or family alliances. When one faction came to power, the leaders of the other hid out, or perhaps went abroad, preferably to Paris or the Riviera, until fortune turned the tables.

Financial
abuses

Caudillos usually regarded their countries as private property and took anything they needed or coveted, either for themselves or for their followers. When *caudillos* borrowed from foreign bankers in the name of their government, the money was cached away against coming exile, or spent on the army, luxuries, statues in their own honor, or occasionally public works such as a Toonerville trolley line. Financiers knew very well what became of the money, but they received such enormous profits that they could afford to take a chance on having their own governments enforce final repayment. The sum of the situation was that the banks were draining away the economic life of the state without ensuring any adequate return—and few patriots were willing to accept the excuse that it was the *caudillo*, not the bankers, who was to blame.

Foreign corporations invested in railways, mines, and banana plantations, but the effect (at least for some time) was not particularly beneficial to the “banana republics” in which they operated. They frequently imported Jamaican Negro labor; evaded welfare responsibilities; exploited the soil for a few years, then moved on and left it to the tropical rains; and sought special legal privileges and tax exemptions. When they did not get what they wanted from the existing government, they found it comparatively cheap to finance a revolution by the opposition. The Caribbean heritage held that justice was a salable commodity owned by the *caudillo*; if the foreigner wished to do business, he must buy justice in addition to his physical properties, and if he refused he would soon find that rivals could easily crowd him out.

It is apparent that there would always be a danger of foreign intervention in the affairs of the Caribbean republics with a consequent threat to the strategic security of the United States. The Roosevelt administration

Second
Venezuelan
Crisis,
1902–03

became poignantly aware of the danger because of the Second Venezuelan Crisis of 1902–03, and out of this emerged Big Stick Diplomacy. The term came from a favorite saying of TR, “Speak softly and carry a big stick.” At this time

Venezuela fell into trouble with the bankers of about ten nations, and Germany, Britain, and Italy sent naval forces to blockade the Venezuelan coast and dictate terms of settlement. When the Germans bombarded a Venezuelan fort and town, American public opinion was outraged.

Fortunately Castro, the *caudillo*, now agreed to arbitration, and Roosevelt brought pressure upon the intervening powers to win their acceptance. Britain and Germany yielded, but they asserted that as they had forced

Venezuelan submission they should enjoy a prior claim over the nonintervening powers. The contention was submitted to the Hague Tribunal and early in 1904 was adjudged valid.

The Hague decision was an obvious encouragement to the use of force in the future. Roosevelt tried to counter by espousing the view (based on the "Drago Doctrine") that European powers must not intervene until all the resources of arbitration had been exhausted. When the Dominican Republic defaulted and European armed intervention appeared imminent, the American public clamored against permitting it. Thereupon the representatives of the powers involved informed TR that, if he was not going to permit intervention, he must in justice assume the responsibility himself of seeing that European nationals and their financial interests were protected. To cut an involved story short, Roosevelt arranged (1905) to install an American customs collector in the Dominican Republic whose duty was to administer finances and pay a certain proportion to the creditors, both European and American.

Roosevelt Corollary

This action was in effect a corollary to the No-Coercion principle of the Monroe Doctrine and as such has become known as the Roosevelt Corollary. TR has been criticized for not leaving alien investors to shift for themselves, taking care only to see that their governments did not intervene. However desirable this idea may have been, it was impracticable. International morality had not yet reached the stage where creditor nations would have surrendered their "right" to intervene. That his fears on the ground of strategy may have been justified appears from the bitter opposition of the German and French press to his action. Conversely, the press of Latin America did not seem at the time to view the situation with alarm.

Meanwhile a threatening situation had developed in Central America, which was perpetually torn by wars and revolutions. In that area the dictator of Nicaragua had blocked Root's well-meant attempts to promote arbitration and international solidarity by setting up a Central American Court of International Justice. In 1909 Taft came into office and appointed as Secretary of State, Philander Chase Knox (1853-1921), a corporation lawyer of Pittsburgh who had won his spurs as TR's trust-busting Attorney-General.

Dollar Diplomacy

Knox was the real author of Dollar Diplomacy, a handy alliteration with shady undertones which is used to characterize the Taft foreign policy. Taft defined it as an attempt to "respond to modern ideas of commercial intercourse" by substituting dollars for bullets and extending "all proper support to every legitimate and beneficial American enterprise abroad." To do Taft and Knox justice, it should be noted that they were seeking to supplant the old system by which diplomatic policy had been forced to follow the lead of private investors; that is, clean up the messes they made. The intention now was to have the State Department set the

lead, thus seeking to limit private investors to such actions as the department might be willing to back.

A new government had recently seized power in Nicaragua, and Knox proceeded to put Dollar Diplomacy into practical use. He refused to recognize the new régime until it had paid off the country's old debts with new money provided by American bankers, thus forestalling the chance of foreign intervention. Next he placed the customs under an American collector, intending thus to put the larger part of the finances beyond the reach of the Nicaraguan government and so remove the incentive for revolution.

Knox had used the threat of armed intervention to get his way. Now the defeated party, strengthened by popular resentment against the United States, rallied and threatened the new president; at the request of the latter, marines were landed in 1912 and occupied the interior cities after some bloodshed. There they remained until 1933 (except for an overly optimistic withdrawal in 1925), shoring up the "constitutional" government, collecting customs, supervising elections, and training a constabulary. It cannot be said that the occupation was a resounding success; perhaps it failed because it was not more rigorous. One positive result was the purchase for \$3 million of the right to dig a canal, and the leasing of sites for naval bases on Great Corn and Little Corn Islands on the Caribbean side and on Fonseca Bay on the Pacific side.

It is very doubtful that the Nicaraguan situation warranted Knox's cavalier policy, and indeed the Senate refused to approve treaties regularizing his tactics or to extend financial receiverships to Guatemala and Honduras. Nevertheless, he managed to persuade Haiti, Wall Street opposes Dollar Diplomacy Honduras, and the Dominican Republic to refund their debts with American money. However inept Knox may have been, it is scarcely fair to assert that he was a tool of any Wall Street plot to get control of the Caribbean. Bankers acceded reluctantly to his requests for cash, and it is notable that his interventions were in countries in which American investments were smallest. Indeed, Bemis is willing to say that the more capital a New World country receives from American bankers, the less likely is intervention. Critics may say that in such case financial domination makes intervention unnecessary. We do not need to settle the argument.

By and large Wilson handled foreign affairs himself and sometimes made announcements without the advice or knowledge of the State Department. Secretary of State Bryan was allowed to play with his "cooling-off" treaties between swigs of grape juice and sallies on the Bryan's "cooling-off" treaties Chautauqua circuit, and in the end he negotiated about thirty of them. They provided that all questions, even those involving national honor, should be submitted to permanent commissions

and that resort to arms should not be made until at least a year after a report was rendered.

Up to this time the standing policy of the United States had been to recognize *de facto* governments, regardless of the crimes which had aided their rise. This policy, initiated by Jefferson in the earliest days of the Republic, had stood the test of time. Wilson altered the historic policy sharply. "It is a very perilous thing," he declared, "to determine the foreign policy of a nation in the terms of material interest." He felt that the United States had a moral duty to look after the morals of its neighbors; that is, to serve as a "big brother." At any rate, he could not recognize "government by murder." Though in the search for strategic security both in the Caribbean and in Mexico he was driven to use force, there can be no doubt that Wilson regarded his policy as Moral Diplomacy, the carrying of salvation to those who sat in darkness. "I am going to teach the South American republics to elect good men!" he confided to a visitor in November 1913.

Wilson's
Moral
Diplomacy

Whatever his goodwill, Wilson engaged in a series of interventions which illustrated the accusation of the *New York Times* that he made Taft's Dollar Diplomacy look like "ten-cent diplomacy." So often did the papers print the refrain, "The marines have landed and have the situation well in hand," that it became a sort of slogan. When in 1915 an infuriated mob dragged President Sam of Haiti out of his palace and hacked him to pieces, the marines landed and set up a protectorate. The marines stayed until 1934, and in 1918 fought a sizable little war (the Caco Revolt) which failed to attract much attention in the midst of larger events. In 1916 the Dominican Republic became a protectorate, again at the muzzles of marine rifles; the marines stayed until 1924.

Wilson's in-
terventions

Wilson's moralistic thinking found expression in his determination not to permit revolutions in the Caribbean states—the so-called Wilson Corollary. The obvious purpose, of course, was to prevent the growth of chaotic conditions which might lead to European intervention, but then there was also Wilson's Calvinistic flair for accepting moral responsibility. He showed no comprehension of the hard fact that revolution afforded literally the only way to clean house in a "banana republic," and that by prohibiting revolution he was freezing the *caudillos* in the saddle and shutting off any hope of self-improvement. However much the *caudillos* complained for publication, they were secretly thankful for the Wilson Corollary. There was, however, a third motive for Wilson's interventions: the fear that Germany might manage to set up a submarine base in either Haiti or the Dominican Republic.

Wilson
Corollary

The same fear lay at the back of the intimation made to Denmark in 1916 by Secretary Robert Lansing that it would be advisable to sell the

Virgin Islands lest we be forced to seize them if Germany occupied Denmark. The latter yielded with pardonable ill-grace, and the Purchase of Virgin Islands, 1917 transfer was made in 1917 for a price of \$25 million after due approval by a plebescite in the islands. The Virgin Islands, located about forty miles east of Puerto Rico, comprise the major islands of St. Thomas, St. Croix, and St. John, and about fifty lesser rocks and islets. The population of about 20,000 was all but wholly Negro, though Danish in language and laws. Actually the islands were then and have since remained a poorhouse, barely eking out a living by growing sugar. The only considerable asset was the harbor of St. Thomas, which offers a far better anchorage and site for a naval base than anything else possessed by the United States in the West Indies.

The two decades after the Spanish-American War had apparently set a pattern of American imperial domination in the Caribbean. Cuba, Panama, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Nicaragua were openly protectorates, and all of the Central American republics had felt the weight of Dollar Diplomacy or unwillingly entertained marines. And yet, if these were protectorates, they certainly did not follow the European pattern. Their protection was limited in duration, their armies could not be drafted to fight the suzerain's wars, and they were left to carry on their own foreign relations even though the American minister might occasionally drop hints. Even in domestic affairs, control was generally confined to the fiscal machinery and to supervision of elections.


The entry of Wall Street (often rather reluctant) came as the result of the earnest and rather unimaginative desire of the American supervisors to elevate the standard of living, health, and government. The change was not psychologically healthy for the native and probably not economically healthy. Still, the wealth of the United States and its producing and marketing efficiency have proved to be a greater menace to Latin-American cultural and economic integrity than have any political encroachments.

As it turned out, the era of political and fiscal protectorates was ephemeral and passed away as the overwhelming power of the United States made it useless for European states to seek a foothold and as the Caribbean republics themselves became more orderly. The outcome of American colonial experimentation should have been foreseen by anyone who noted the refusal of Congress to regularize political empire by setting up a colonial secretary. Today the protectorates have been liquidated, the Philippines are independent, Puerto Rico will be as soon as it can stand on its own feet, and Hawaii and Alaska are about to become states. Such empire as survives is based on common strategy and economic responsibility.

THE UNITED STATES IN THE CARIBBEAN

— U. S. possessions
 ▨ U. S. protectorates

Statute Miles
 0 100 200 300



2 *Wilson and Mexico*

Mexico offered a problem different from and greater than the "banana republics." It was not simply because the boundary between Mexico and the United States is coterminous for about 2000 miles; it was also because Mexico a different problem its greater size and population made its turbulence a greater problem, and because its richer resources were a greater temptation to American capital. The smaller countries might be pushed into line by that handy bill-collecting agency, the marines, and forced to toe that line by a treaty of protection because their strength was small and their allegiance was to a tribal *caudillo* rather than to a national ideal. Mexico had its *caudillos*, but it also had a national consciousness—and it was too big to be pushed around by a handful of marines. Therefore it had to be handled by different methods.

After the passing of Juárez the government fell into the hands of Porfirio Díaz, who ruled with a rod of iron from 1876 to 1911. His key policy was the introduction of foreign capital, chiefly American. By Spanish law, riches under the earth had belonged to the Crown; by Indian custom, they belonged to the community. The basic intention of both was to serve public welfare, but Díaz adopted a mining code which enabled foreign purchasers of land to exploit the minerals. No doubt he thought that by scattering mineral resources to foreign syndicates he was making the country rich and self-sufficient. Foreign investments, it was claimed, controlled half the developed wealth of the country. The figures may or may not be accurate, but about 1910 American investments in Mexico were supposed to amount to about a billion dollars.

But Mexican prosperity was superficial. The profits were being taken out of the country, or, rather, never were brought in. Technical work was done by foreigners who stayed for a term of years, lived lavishly at small expense, then left to enjoy the surplus which they had banked at home. Few Mexicans were trained in industrial skills; most of them remained underpaid and overworked common laborers. In much of Mexico (not all) the Indian and mestizo peasants, shorn of their land and plunged into debt, became peons, often little better than slaves. Only one element of Mexico was positively benefited by the new order: the aristocracy and the more prosperous townsmen, chiefly the new middle class of Mexico City.

Underneath all this Mexico was seething with discontent, for there still were men who remembered the vision of Juárez. Díaz had risen to power by playing factions against each other, but lately he had gone too

far and turned even the landholders and the professional classes against him. More than that, he had antagonized American investors and the American government. He had invited Lord Cowdray in as an offset to Doheny and Standard Oil. Then he had refused (quite wisely) to lease Magdalena Bay in Lower California to the United States but rubbed it in by allowing hints that he was thinking of leasing it to Japan. Whether or not as a result of this situation, the nascent revolutionists under Francisco Madero were allowed to do their plotting north of the Rio Grande and to find money for arms purchases in diverse places, some of it probably from Doheny and the Standard Oil Company, as was shown later by a Senate inquiry.

**Rising
discontent**

Then in 1910 came the revolution. The beef-eating *vaqueros* of the North swept down upon Mexico City, led among others by Pancho Villa, a former bandit who was to become the stormy petrel of Mexican revolution. Díaz resigned and departed for Europe (May 1911) while the triumphant Madero took control. Madero turned out to be an utter incompetent who had no idea of what was wrong with Mexico. Revolutions broke out on all sides, and foreign diplomats and foreign business managers, disgusted by the chaos, turned against the régime.

**Came the
revolution**

None of them, however, was as unneutral as the American ambassador, Henry Lane Wilson, who wielded great influence because of the Mexican fear of American intervention. In February 1913 fighting broke out in the streets of the capital city, and Wilson, in consultation with the heads of the rebel factions, agreed to the award of power to the mestizo General Victoriano Huerta. Madero was liquidated. Upon the outbreak of the Madero revolution Taft had rushed 20,000 troops to the border, and though he made it abundantly clear that the United States was not averse to a change in the Mexican government he refused to intervene.

Wilson's Moral Diplomacy actually originated in the Mexican crisis. He promptly refused to recognize Huerta, sent Henry Lane Wilson packing, and decided upon nonrecognition—what he called “watchful waiting.” His hope was that it would encourage the masses to arise and overthrow the oppressor. Certainly it had the effect of encouraging hundreds of petty revolutionary bands and delaying the restoration of order. Nevertheless, it soon became evident that Huerta would be able to rock along with the recognition of other nations and that American investments might even stand in danger. There were frequent reports of Americans being shot in Mexico, and the worst of it was that the reports were true. Huerta seemed to thrive on American opposition and was by way of becoming a Latin-American hero.

Wilson now tried another way of skinning the cat. In 1912 Congress

had disregarded the equal-tolls proviso of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty and exempted American coastwise shipping from the payment of tolls for passing through the Panama Canal. The exemption was based upon a delicate point which may or may not have been valid, but at any rate Britain protested and Wilson traded the tolls act for British withdrawal of support from Huerta.

Wilson now demanded Huerta's resignation, and when the latter hung on he raised his arms embargo (February 1914) so as to permit guns to reach Pancho Villa and Venustiano Carranza, the principal northern rebels.

Canal tolls trade Suddenly the impasse turned into a crisis. On 9 April 1914 some sailors from the American blockading fleet were loading a small boat at Tampico when a Mexican junior officer arrested them. They were quickly released, but the fat was in the fire. Admiral Henry T. Mayo, already irked by a series of incidents, now demanded a formal apology and disavowal, and a twenty-one gun salute to the American flag.

Huerta was willing to "deplore," but he refused to give the salute without a gun-for-gun return. Then early on the morning of the 21st Wilson received word that a German ship was about to land arms at Vera Cruz. Orders were flashed to Mayo, and he immediately bombarded and occupied Vera Cruz. The struggle lasted for two days, and 8 marines and 126 Mexicans were killed. A week later a brigade of regular army troops landed under command of General Frederick Funston.

The occupation of Vera Cruz merely forced Wilson out of the frying pan into the fire, for Huerta still held out, and full-dress intervention seemed to be the only possible recourse. Fortunately for all concerned, Argentina, Brazil, and Chile (the ABC countries) offered to mediate. A conference held at Niagara Falls, Canada began in May but could offer no better suggestion than that all Mexican factions unite in support of a provisional government. Fortunately the interval had allowed emotions to cool, and meanwhile American backing had strengthened the revolutionary opposition to Huerta. Presently he fled into exile, and on 23 November 1914 American forces were withdrawn from Vera Cruz.

The action demonstrated that Wilson had meant what he had said in a speech at Mobile, that "the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." Also it reinforced the good impression made among thoughtful Latin-Americans by his acceptance of ABC mediation. For lack of a better policy Wilson now consulted half a dozen Latin-American powers and with their concurrence recognized Carranza in October 1915. Carranza was thus able to clinch his hold on Mexico City.

Pancho Villa had split with Carranza and was now pursuing ambitions of his own. The recognition of Carranza and the denial of arms to him

aroused Villa's ire, and he planned revenge. He slaughtered 18 American engineers at Santa Isabel, and on 9 March 1916 raided Columbus, New Mexico and killed 17 Americans. Congress was dead set on intervention, and Wilson yielded despite the menacing nature of relations with Europe. With Carranza's grudging consent General John Pershing was sent across the border with 12,000 regulars with orders to take Villa, while 150,000 soft and poorly equipped militiamen were drawn up to protect the border. Villa, slipping through Pershing's fingers, crossed into Texas on 6 May and killed five troopers. Though Pershing had an all but impossible task in a hostile country, he actually missed taking Villa only by a hair. Pershing, refused the use of the railroads by Carranza, made slow progress toward Chihuahua, continually plagued by Villistas and by the necessity for observing all Mexican rights. A skirmish with Carranzistas at Parral was followed by a detached action at Carrizal (21 June) and an American defeat with the loss of 45 men killed, wounded, and captured.

Pershing in
Chihuahua,
15 March
1916—
5 Feb. 1917

Carranza was perfectly aware that the United States was slipping closer to involvement in World War I, and the sad state of the American Army had been revealed to a jeering world by the mobilization on the border. He was not, therefore, disposed to be pacific, especially with Mexico clamoring for him to kick the gringos out. A series of futile conferences now followed, and when no guarantees could be obtained Wilson simply withdrew the troops—followed by the sneers of Latin America. This action was immediately after the break with Germany.

Carranza
wins over
Moral
Diplomacy

In order to win election Carranza had to champion the constitution of 1917, a utopian document which met the demands of the extreme reformers. It provided for radical land reforms, for the rights of laborer and peasant, and for a remarkable program of educational, social, and economic welfare which, if carried out, would have instituted state socialism. Church property was nationalized, and the nonreligious activities of the Church severely limited.

Constitu-
tion of
1917: Arti-
cle 27

Of most interest to foreigners, however, was Article 27, which nationalized land, waters, and subsoil wealth. This was not technically very different from the old situation, except that petroleum had formerly been subject to private ownership. It was now provided that petroleum lands must be surrendered and fifty-year leases taken. New foreign enterprises were rigidly restricted. New foreign petroleum leases were practically prohibited by an impossible proviso, and other new foreign enterprises were subjected to rigid national controls.

Carranza, a conservative and a nativist, had no intention of abiding by the constitution except for its antiforeign provisos. He embarked upon a campaign of cynical antiforeignism and antiliberalism which in 1920

reaped its reward when the Sonorans revolted under one-armed Alvaro Obregón and paraded down the Pacific coast. Carranza fled and was shot while he was asleep in an Indian hut.

There had been a great deal of friction between Mexico and the United States over the meaning of Article 27, and the latter refused to recognize Obregón until it was assured (it thought) that the expropriating article would not be made retroactive. The problem was to arise again. Nevertheless, the chaotic phase of the Mexican revolution ended with the entry of Obregón. Thereafter there were campaigns and *coups d'état*, and the revolution was sold out repeatedly, but the crisis had been passed. Mexico was on the way to a better day.

All Latin-American states have in varying degrees been plagued by internal political and economic conflicts, and in consequence, though they needed foreign capital for development, most of them have been ordinarily regarded as poor risks. Their very weakness and dependence have reinforced their Hispanic pride and made them jealous of the appearance of national sovereignty and insistent upon the absolute equality of all nations, big or little. This insistence found expression in the writings of the Argentine jurist, Carlos Calvo, and resulted in the "Calvo clause," inserted in most contracts made by Latin-American governments with foreigners that the latter shall have no right of appeal from the courts of the contracting government.

There were, of course, two sides to the argument. Foreigners distrusted the kind of justice dealt out by some Latin-American courts and were prone to egg their chancelleries into abuses of the right of intervention. Latin-Americans showed their doubts about their own courts by their refusal to submit their decisions to arbitration. Candor compels also the admission that here and there some Latin-American politicians deliberately planned to use such immunity to lay abusive taxes and conditions on foreigners or even to expropriate their property. Workers also were likely to adopt the arguments of European and American radicals that, since they were being exploited by capital, they had a right to seize it and convert it to public uses.

Though Wilson engaged in more armed interventions than either Theodore Roosevelt or Taft, he managed to escape some of the onus which was attached in Latin America to the other two. This public attitude was certainly due in part to his Mobile self-denying ordinance, but perhaps more to his ready acceptance of ABC mediation in the Vera Cruz crisis. Beyond these, however, his Moral Diplomacy had appealed to some Latin-American idealists who saw that he was earnestly striving to promote peace and to pave the way for the improvement of the Mexican masses. An integral part of Wilson's Moral Diplomacy was his changed attitude toward the *desirability* of in-

Latin-
American
insistence
on nonin-
tervention

U.S. edges
toward
noninter-
vention

tervention. Roosevelt and Taft had accepted international law's approval of the legality of intervention and even stretched it in their search for strategic security. Wilson also was concerned with strategic security, but he was not convinced that intervention was the best way to insure it. His misfortune lay in the pressure of crises for which there seemed literally to be no other answer.

Wilson's attempts to reconcile morality and strategic security were more or less unsuccessful, but they were nevertheless the real beginning of what Bemis calls the Doctrine of Nonintervention. With the apparent passing of the European menace in the 1920's, the way was open for the American renunciation of the right of intervention; so thorough was this renunciation that today few people know that a legal right of intervention once existed in international law and that it owed its demise to the New World. The United States had contributed to this from the first, for the Monroe Doctrine was originally a denial of the right, and later American interventions were usually limited actions which for security reasons sought to forestall European intervention.

The Latin-American delegates to Blaine's First International Conference of American States were politely suspicious of the motives of the United States, yet the conference method clearly gave promise of improving hemispheric relations. Other conferences followed: the **Pan-American conferences** Second at Mexico City in 1901; the Third at Rio de Janeiro in 1906; the Fourth at Buenos Aires in 1910; and the Fifth at Santiago, Chile in 1923. Meanwhile the custom had arisen of holding special conferences for the discussion of specialized subjects, such as finances, trade, transportation, sanitation, intercultural relations, etc. Though it must be admitted that at no conference during this period was there ever a relaxation of the first attitude of suspicion, the slowly accumulating backlog of practical agreements on numberless points of common interest gradually drew the nations together. Not the least accomplishment was the growth of a network of arbitration agreements which during the last generation have all but eliminated international war in the Western Hemisphere. It is a fact that Latin America has done more than Europe to introduce and formalize arbitration.

3 *Empire in the Pacific*

The surge of expansionism which accompanied the Spanish-American War brought the Hawaiian Islands into American possession. This archipelago, 6454 square miles in area and located about 2100 miles from San Francisco at the closest point, consists of eight large islands and numerous reefs and islets which together extend across almost thirty degrees of longitude. The larger islands are volcanic in origin and Hawaii, the largest, has two active volcanoes. The

**Hawaiian
Islands**

and found those islands a source of cheap and plentiful labor until Philippine independence. Of the Asiatics only the Japanese customarily imported brides; so they have most clearly retained their cultural and national integrity. The bachelors among the others either returned to the homeland or took wives from other immigrant elements or from among the Hawaiians. As a result the present population of about 500,000 is about twenty-three per cent white, thirty-seven per cent Japanese, twelve per cent Filipino, seven per cent Chinese, perhaps two per cent Hawaiian, and most of the remainder mixed.

It would be a mistake to point to Hawaii as having solved the problem of race rivalry. The Japanese, the most disposed to preserve their own culture through separate schools and strict family controls, long were the object of jealousy—an end promoted also by their superior spirit of enterprise. The whites of American and British stock composed the upper and middle economic classes and looked down upon the rest, though frequent marriages were made with the native Hawaiians; the accusation was made that such marriages were a method of acquiring land. On the other hand, the missionaries (but not always their descendants) preached race equality; the Hawaiian natives set an example of tolerance; and the public-school system, modeled on that of the United States, was a great amalgamator. The growth of race mixture has also tended to break down antipathies.

**Race
rivalries**

Hawaiians were used to hard work, but not to the persistent and monotonous grind of the sugar-cane and pineapple fields; moreover, their culture had no use for work for its own sake nor for amassing an unnecessary surplus. They believed in enjoying the present and in sharing with their neighbors rather than engaging in economic competition. As a result the Hawaiians soon fell behind the newcomers; and their happy-go-lucky ways, poor diet, and a subtle sense of defeatism made them prey to the new diseases which swept the islands. The original inhabitants, however, have contributed at least a superficial romance to the culture of the islands though, truth to tell, some of the most prized institutions (such as the ukulele and the dress called the holokau) were later importations. Probably Hawaiians also imparted the sense of beauty which led to the introduction of hundreds of varieties of flowering trees and shrubs and has made the parks and suburbs of Honolulu glorious in every month of the year.

**Passing of
the Ha-
waiians**

The enclosure of the Hawaiian Islands within the American tariff walls completed the economic evolution already begun by the new white lords of the soil. Sugar entered a long era of prosperity, which would probably be ended if the tariff were lifted. Pineapple culture was extended until an all but complete control of the commercial product was gained. Both industries owed much not only to the initiative of the entrepreneurs and to the expensive experimentation

**The Big
Five**

and disease control which they undertook but also to cheap labor. Hawaiian entrepreneurs built up their enterprises from profits, and their business alliance, known as the Big Five, had tight hold of the archipelago's finances, transport, agricultural staples, and industries.

The Big Five consistently fought statehood in the 1920's because it felt that the people of the islands, if given a greater measure of self-rule, would institute the expensive social and economic changes common on the mainland. There was thus bitter strife between the Big Five and its allies on one side and, on the other, the majority of the people led by reformers and not a few designing politicians. The islands not only owed their prosperity to a few great corporations but lay at their mercy. Probably nowhere on the mainland was there less opportunity for the small, independent entrepreneur.

This situation did not mean, however, that the Big Five took full advantage of its power to destroy. While it could justly be accused of not having done everything possible, it nevertheless went to considerable expense to provide good housing in the workers' villages, medical attention, good schools, and good leisure-time facilities. The Communist-inspired labor troubles since World War II have probably found less basis in economic hardship than in the Soviet desire to obtain a stronghold upon this important American mid-Pacific naval and communications base.

On the other hand, its critics asserted that the Big Five boosted shipping rates so inordinately high as to raise perceptibly the cost of living and consequently bear hard on the workers, while its financial power and shipping monopoly were used to exclude unwanted truck gardening, poultry farming, and petty manufacturing enterprises which would reduce the carrying business of its Matson Line. The quasi-monopoly of the Big Five over the economic life of the islands was to be broken in the 1930's by the entry of new private enterprises from the mainland and by the boom in employment by the naval and military defenses.

During the generation after the annexation Hawaii was so fortunate as to have a humdrum history. Even less interesting was the record of the American Samoas and of Guam. The latter island is about 206 square miles in area and has about 22,000 Chamorro inhabitants of mixed Spanish, Filipino, and Malay blood. Soon after the acquisition of Guam all the rest of the vast stretch of Spanish islands between the Hawaiians and the Philippines (the Marshalls, the Carolines, and the Marianas) were sold to Germany. After World War I they fell to Japan and were sealed against the world while they were being fortified in preparation for war. So confident were the Japanese of their mastery of the western Pacific that they were able to intimidate the United States into leaving Guam practically undefended.

The Philippine Islands, the northernmost group of the East Indies, is

composed of about 7100 islands which have an area of some 115,000 square miles, about the same as the area of the British Isles or of Arizona. Luzon, the largest island (40,000 sq. mi.), is about 200 miles from Formosa and less than 400 miles from the China coast, but the islands as a whole run parallel with Indo-China rather than China. Mindanao is the largest island in the south and remains largely undeveloped, while the Visayas are a dozen or so smaller islands between Luzon and Mindanao. The Philippines have considerable resources of iron ore, noncoking coal, some petroleum, and lead, copper, and gold, as well as minor metals and also a great deal of water power. They are capable of growing almost anything that can be produced in the tropics, thus far chiefly sugar cane, tobacco, rice, hemp, and copra. Timber exists in vast quantities, cattle flourish on the uplands, and fisheries can be developed. The islands comprise, indeed, one of the richest undeveloped areas of the world.

**Philippine
Islands**

The people of the islands seem at first glance to consist of many rival elements, and it is true that eighty-odd languages and dialects are spoken. Yet aside from 80,000 primitive Negritos and the later Spanish and Chinese immigrants, the Filipinos are basically of Malay stock with, in some areas, a touch of Mongoloid. Actually three ethnic stocks seem to be taking over the islands: the Ilokanos of northwestern Luzon, the Tagalogs of central Luzon, and the Visayans of the Visayan Islands. They comprise over half of the 20,000,000 Filipinos. About ninety per cent of the Filipinos in 1898 were Christians; the rest were pagans and Mohammedans, the latter including the wild Moros of Mindanao and the Sulu Archipelago. There were at the time about 7,000,000 people in the islands.

**The
Filipinos**

The Philippines fell to Spain as a consequence of the voyage of Magellan. For three centuries the islands were a prey to the same well-intentioned misgovernment as the rest of the empire. The social system which grew up under the Spanish régime was one of great estates owned by wealthy landlords and worked by suppressed peasants called *taos*. The peasants in the various parts of the islands were separated by diverse languages, institutions, and traditional rivalries; the landlords were united by common economic and political interests and by a common language, Spanish. The ground was thus laid for a system which deliberately kept the peasants in ignorance and poverty.


**Social
system**

Filipinos had yielded only grudgingly to Spanish authority, and through the centuries there were a number of bloody revolts. In 1834 the Philippines were opened to trade, and a number of foreign traders settled at Manila with the result that the islands began slowly to build up economically. Liberal ideas filtered in, and Philippine demands for autonomy found a leader in the 1880's in the

**Filipino
revolt**

THE PHILIPPINES UNDER U. S. RULE

Statute Miles
0 50 100 150 200



great José Rizal. When late in 1896 he was executed by the Spanish, an impulse was given to the so-called Katapunin movement, which demanded independence and which already, under the leadership of Emilio Aguinaldo, had begun a revolt. By the end of 1897 the revolution had failed, and Aguinaldo went into exile.

Even before Dewey sailed into Manila Bay revolution was again under way in the provinces; and, as soon as Dewey had brought Aguinaldo in, the rebel lines tightened about Manila. When in August the city capitulated, General Merritt could not afford to loose Aguinaldo's enraged men on the unfortunate populace, nor in the light of the current diplomatic uncertainty could he afford to let Aguinaldo consolidate rebel claims by holding the capital city. As it was, Spanish authority had ceased to exist everywhere else in the islands and Aguinaldo's resentment against American interference grew. He was willing and anxious to obtain American sponsorship and protection against the outside powers which were desirous of taking over the islands, but he insisted that he alone should exercise internal control.

Origin of the Philip- pine War

While the negotiations in Paris dragged on, the two armies faced each other, the Americans in Manila looking out and the Filipinos looking in. When the Treaty of Paris was signed with its proviso for annexation of the Philippines, General Elwell S. Otis, now in command of the American forces, made it clear that the United States would exercise sovereignty even though it intended to give the Filipinos a considerable degree of self-government. On the night of 4 February 1899 a skirmish on the outskirts of the city developed into a battle. Aguinaldo promptly issued a formal declaration of war. The Philippine "Insurrection" had begun.

The annexation of the Philippines precipitated the United States into the affairs of the Orient by placing its western strategic frontier on the China coast. The vast Asiatic trade which expansionists anticipated and which was their excuse for annexation never developed, and instead the islands quickly became strategic and financial liabilities and the subject of domestic and international dissension. On the other hand, if the United States had refused annexation and had pulled out, it is quite likely that Germany would have attempted to purchase the islands, an outcome which neither Britain nor Japan was willing to countenance, and which would have led to an acute international crisis. Certainly the power of Spain in the islands was doomed in any case by the American victory, for it could not have maintained its control against the insurgents.

American dilemma

The most embarrassing feature of the American dilemma was that by Dewey's victory it had put itself into a position of moral responsibility. The Filipinos could demand American protection against Spain, Britain, Germany, and Japan—which meant responsibility without control. To this

the United States obviously could not agree. Conflicting interests in the United States were pulling and hauling on President and Congress so vigorously that the United States was unwilling to take positive action. As a result the country allowed itself to drift into a situation where war with the Filipinos had to be accepted or an ignominious retreat made.

The outbreak of the Philippine War found about 21,000 United States troops on the ground, and Congress authorized the temporary increase of the regular army to 65,000 and the enrollment of 35,000 U.S. volunteers.

Philippine War, 4 Feb. 1899–4 July 1902 Even before the arrival of reinforcements, the American lines were extended into the country around Manila and expeditions were sent to occupy some of the Visayan cities. Short of supplies and men and with his army plagued by fever, it was not until September 1899 that Otis was able to attack Aguinaldo's stronghold in the plain of central Luzon.

By the middle of 1900 the Philippine army in all parts of the islands had been broken up, and Aguinaldo went into hiding to direct a new phase of guerrilla warfare. In March 1901 Colonel Frederick Funston learned of Aguinaldo's hideout and by a desperate ruse succeeded in capturing him. Thereafter much of the resistance collapsed, though occasional guerrilla raids continued for another year. It was not until 4 July 1902 that Roosevelt was able to announce the pacification of the islands and to issue an amnesty. The Moros of Mindanao and the Sulu Islands remained troublesome even after that, and it was in the incessant Moro warfare that Pershing first won renown. General Arthur MacArthur was in command from May 1900 until July 1901, when he was succeeded by General Adna R. Chaffee.

The Philippine War, though usually listed as a mere "insurrection," was nevertheless one of the most desperate and costly foreign conflicts fought by the United States up to that time. In three years of combat 120,000 men had been committed, with 7000 casualties in some 2800 separate actions. About 1000 men were killed in action or died of wounds, while 3100 died of other causes, chiefly disease. The total cost ran to \$170,000,000—with the later addition of a billion dollars paid out in pensions.

The unfortunate racism of the American convinced him that he was fighting natives who, of course, because they were dark-skinned possessed few if any rights, especially if encountered in battle. The war entailed arduous and dangerous duty, and the glamor soon wore off. One colored trooper expressed his disgust in the immortal phrase, "Dishyer White Man's Burden ain't what it's cracked up to be." A cynical note crept into the famous marching song of the Philippine War, sung to the tune of *Tramp, Tramp, Tramp*. Note that American soldiers were armed with Krag-Jorgensen rifles.

Damn, damn, damn the Filipino,
 Pock-marked khakiac ladrone;
 Underneath the starry flag
 Civilize him with a Krag,
 And return us to our own beloved home.

Sweeps were organized in the various islands to destroy crops and farmsteads and to kill off or capture the able-bodied men. In several areas the Spanish *reconcentrado* system was adopted as a means of separating the well-disposed from the insurgents and of protecting and feeding the former. Those who remained outside in disaffected districts ran the risk of being shot on sight.

The
 Philippine
 atrocities

It was estimated that 600,000 perished on Luzon, one sixth of the population. Undoubtedly many more succumbed to famine and disease than to bullets and bayonets, and it must also be noted that Filipino insurgents and bandits were enthusiastic plunderers and destroyers. They used every device of brutality and treachery in their prosecution of the war not only against Americans but against Filipinos who met their displeasure. Torture of prisoners to extract information was also practiced by Americans in hundreds of cases, especially by the notorious "water cure"—pouring water into a man until he yielded or burst. It may be added that newspapermen and individual soldiers kept up a chorus of complaint, but despite all the efforts of the anti-imperialists in Congress there is no record of any torturer receiving more than a slap on the wrist, though a number were tried and convicted.

The Philippine War sorely tried the American soul; as Bryan put it, "Destiny is not as manifest as it was a few weeks ago." It was in February 1899 that Kipling published his poem "The White Man's Burden," intended primarily to spur Americans into accepting their Philippine responsibility as a duty as well as altruism—as a means of morally strengthening the bearer. At least it offered no hope of succeeding in any civilizing mission. We must take up the burden of government and civilization even though it would be easier to give the subjects freedom.

Destiny be-
 comes less
 manifest

Take up the White Man's burden—
 Ye dare not stoop to less—
 Nor call too loud on Freedom
 To cloak your weariness.

The matter-of-fact Senator Lodge, however, saw no reason why philanthropy and five per cent should not go hand in hand. "The nation which seeks to escape from the burden," said he, "also loses the benefit." The campaign of 1900 apparently confirmed the past policy of imperial drift without giving it encouragement for the future.

Meanwhile McKinley had set up a Philippine Commission in Manila as early as March 1899 to reassure the Filipinos and make recommendations about the future government. In June 1900 William Howard Taft arrived with a second commission, which was to serve as a legislature under General MacArthur. The general, who had a profound belief in white supremacy and in the bayonet as a civilizing agent, received this "interference" with the complaint that it was "an injection into an otherwise normal situation," a strange way of describing war, to say the least. Nevertheless, in July of the following year Taft became civil governor under Congressional authorization, with the commissioners serving as legislature and heads of departments. Taft proved to be a capable governor and soon succeeded in returning municipal and provincial governments to civil authority. In 1902 Congress passed a Provisional Organic Act, which provided that the commission should serve as an upper legislative chamber while an elected general assembly should serve as the lower. The scheme was put into effect in 1907 after several delays.

In spite of his bulk Taft traveled widely, not only to get to know the people but to get them to know him. On one occasion, after a siege of illness, he made the trip to the highland city of Baguio for a rest cure and on arrival telegraphed his superior, Secretary of War Root, that he had stood the horseback trip well. Root's reply was the laconic query, "How is horse?" On the whole, Taft was popular with the Filipinos but intensely unpopular with the military and with the carpetbaggers and adventurers who had flocked into Manila eagerly anticipating an easy path to wealth. Their methods were not calculated to win friendship, and Taft, tartly pointing out that the merchant should not insult the only possible customers, tried to get them to treat the "little brown brothers" more correctly. The principal effect was to inspire the ditty:

He may be a brother of William H. Taft,
But he ain't no brother of mine.

Many of the Spanish and mestizo office holders, businessmen, and landlords feared the raging populism of the peasants and co-operated with the Americans as also, it should be noted, did some of the peasants. It was the wealthy class which organized the first political party, the *Federalistas*, which sugar-coated an appeal for submission by launching a campaign for statehood. As the "insurrectos" laid down their arms they formed a second party, the *Nacionalistas*, devoted to continuing the struggle for independence by political means. The *Nacionalistas* were in control of the assembly from the time it convened, and Speaker Sergio Osmeña, a young Visayan mestizo lawyer, quickly became the ruler of Filipino hearts.

The effect of the American occupation was to exert a pressure which

welded the Filipinos as never before and bred a common consciousness of their Spanish-Malayan culture, their nationalism, and unfortunately their authoritarian ideology. The American administration hesitated to interfere in politics (at least at the local level), and Filipino politicians consequently found it easy to control elections in their pursuit of prestige, power, and pelf. They built up a type of boss rule called *caciquismo*, based on force and corruption. Actually there was only one political issue: independence.

Philippine
politics

Since the leaders of the majority *Nacionalistas* were barred from executive office, they naturally made an attempt to control the commission and to dictate the choice of its Filipino members. Though most of the legislators were ready to leave the hard detail work to the Speaker and to the American secretaries of the commission, they nevertheless showed parliamentary adroitness and considerable organizational stability. Of course, it must be realized that they were working with an administration which was in effect trying to prepare them for self-government. Some observers have commented that the responsible leaders would probably have been glad to accept a dominion status, but that nationalist feeling made such action impossible.

With the entry of Woodrow Wilson into the presidency, the policy of cautious guidance was abandoned. He promptly named a majority of *Nacionalistas* to the commission and sent out as governor (1913-21) a New York lawyer named Francis Burton Harrison, who had been hand-picked by the Philippine delegate to Congress, the dynamic young Tagalog mestizo Manuel Quezon. There had grown up in the islands a tight little corps of American bureaucrats who enjoyed a degree of prestige and luxury which would have been impossible on similar incomes in the States. Harrison promptly proceeded to substitute Filipinos for Americans in the civil service, wherever technicalities permitted, and welcomed legislation which the American colony direly prophesied would bring chaos.

The Harrison
régime

Meanwhile, in Washington, Quezon was pushing the Jones Bill (the Organic Act of 1916), which abolished the commission and established a senate and house of representatives with a governor general appointed by the President—but all still under the jurisdiction of the Secretary of War. Quezon returned home and became the first president of the new senate; thereafter by a brilliant succession of moves (which would scarcely bear moral scrutiny) he rapidly came to displace Osmeña in popular esteem. Harrison in effect introduced a parliamentary form of government by setting up a council of state (composed of the presidents of the legislative houses and the Filipino heads of departments) to which he virtually surrendered his powers of decision.

Self-gov-
ernment
begins

But Wilson passed on, and Harding came in. The Old Guard, swayed by the remnants of the imperial spirit and resentful of Harrison's Filipini-

zation program, sent out that old-time proconsul, General Leonard Wood, to put a stop to it. He promptly abolished the council of state, used the veto power drastically, and sought to repair the American civil-service bureaucracy. He was aided in his work by a split between Quezon and Osmeña. In the end Quezon emerged in command of the reunited *Nacionalistas*, and the party turned on General Wood. Though Wood's successors were milder, a battle had been joined which was to last until the entry of the New Deal resolved the conflict in favor of the Filipinos.

During the generation of American rule the Filipinos approached an understanding of the Western political method. Along with this went a conscious American effort to prepare Filipinos for administrative and technical responsibilities. A public-school system was built from scratch with particular attention to vocational education and to the English language. In time English not only gave a window upon the modern world but afforded the easiest means of communication among Filipinos and served mightily to unite them against the common enemy: the Americans. The rate of Filipino literacy, for whatever that may be worth, became one of the highest among people outside the main orbit of Western civilization.

A system of justice was erected by combining Spanish civil law and English common law. Public utilities grew as if by magic—roads, bridges, railways, water works, electrical projects, port installations. The standard of living shot up, and with it the standards of health and diet were improved: the scourge of epidemic diseases was licked; the average height of the Filipino was raised from four feet eleven inches to five-feet-four. The success of the American program was witnessed by the intelligent way in which the Filipinos strove to prove their fitness for self-government and used every political weapon to force its concession.

Probably in the long run the American occupation benefited the Filipino more than it did the United States. Indeed, it proved to be a drain on the American Treasury. However, it was by no means an unmixed blessing to the Filipino, for he was subject to various unhealthy economic policies. American capital hesitated to enter the Philippines because of the McEnery Resolution, which was a half promise of independence; that capital which did enter always felt itself on the defensive. The result was an unfortunate accent on quick profits and a self-defensive racism—the “Manila mind”—which fought against Filipino demands for equal treatment. Allied to this demand for quick results was Congress's imposition of free trade between the Philippines and the United States, a move which was fought by the Philippine assembly lest it delay independence.

The result foreseen by the assembly came to pass. A quick prosperity

ensued in sugar, copra, tobacco, and hemp, but they were dependent on free entry to the American market. The latter absorbed about four fifths of the Philippines' exports and sent back about two thirds of the Philippines' imports. It was evident that, when independence came, the American tariff wall might so hamper Philippine exports that the islands would be plunged into economic crisis. By no means all the new exploiting was done by Americans, however. Actually the chief economic beneficiaries of the new order were Spaniards and mestizos who had prospered under the old régime and who now found their wealth fantastically increased. Independence was to make very clear the effect of this economic imbalance.

To the deleterious effects of free trade and hasty capital we must add the American failure to tackle the land problem with adequate zeal and intelligence. The typical peasant was a sharecropper, tenant, or laborer, the denizen of a rural slum, and he was exploited by absentee landlords and presentee money lenders and political *caciques* supported by the tyranny of the Philippine Constabulary. The rise in the standard of living benefited the *tao* least; inflated prices hampered him further and made him more conscious of his difference from the wealthy Spanish and mestizo class. Religious fanatics and designing charlatans found their opportunity in this discontent and after 1917 led a series of wild local rebellions which were ruthlessly suppressed by Constabulary and army. *Caciques* found it easy to win popular support by blaming conditions on the Americans, or on rival *caciques*, and painted pictures of the paradise that would be brought in by independence.

Failure
to solve
the land
problem

If the American régime was culpable in any respect, it was in its failure to solve the land problem in a country where a little determined government planning and expenditure could have opened millions of fertile acres to settlement. The fundamental fact is that Filipino politicians would have opposed it both because it would have undercut their arguments for independence and because they themselves were benefiting by the economic situation as it existed. As for the *tao*, he needed not only economic freedom but the education and the skill to use it and keep it. The traditional resort to sporadic violence was no permanent solution, but it became a pattern which has persisted. The landlords are now the real rulers of the republic. The question which as yet has received no optimistic answer is whether they will develop what they have lacked: a responsible public spirit and a sense of the limits of power.

4 *The Open Door*


The traditional Far Eastern policy of the United States had been to co-operate with other powers in working out Oriental trade and diplomatic problems, but on the whole to oppose annexations, to support the sover-

Traditional Far Eastern policy eighty of Far Eastern nations, and to ask for the adoption of equal treatment of all comers in trade. This traditional policy had arisen from the State Department's awareness that public opinion would not back the general use of force, but a virtue had been made of necessity and the argument of American disinterest was used to obtain favorable trade pacts.

A generation had brought great changes in the Far Eastern scene. A mistaken idea of the wealth of China had led the resurgent imperial powers to enter a race for the control of Chinese ports and surrounding spheres of influence. Renascent Japan had tested its newly developed muscles by defeating China and annexing Formosa and seizing virtual control of Korea. Russia had taken the Liaotung Peninsula (Port Arthur) and claimed hegemony in Manchuria; Germany had seized Kiaochau Bay and asserted pre-eminence in Shantung; and Britain and France had each taken over an additional port. Now the United States had Manila, the "crossroads of the East," and hoped to use it as a base for cutting in on the trade of the Orient.

Imperial rivalry John Hay (1838-1905), who became Secretary of State in 1898, had mingled a diplomatic and literary career. Thoroughly imbued with upper-class distrust of democracy (as shown in his novel *The Breadwinners*), he was too honest—or arrogant—to go on the hustings and depended on appointive offices, one of which was a brief tour at the Court of St. James's. Hay not only was a cynic and an esthete but possessed of charm, versatility, and subtlety. He strongly approved of expansion and was convinced that the country must take a strong hand in international affairs if it expected to survive, but he was also well aware that the isolationist tide would soon flow in and that nothing could then persuade the American people to go to war for the objectives which he wished to attain. He therefore deliberately resolved to use the American penchant for a noisy and rather terrifying emotionalism for all it was worth—to bluff magnificently on a pair of deuces.

John Hay resolves to bluff Great Britain had the highest economic stake in the Far East and, as we have seen, welcomed the American acquisition of the Philippines as a counter to her rivals, especially Germany. She even dreamed that the American imperial surge might carry the nation to the point of willingness to enter an Anglo-American alliance. Twice (March 1898 and January 1899) a cautious approach was made by proposing joint action to promote equal commercial opportunities for all nations in China, a policy already known as the Open Door. Both times the suggestion had to be turned down as unlikely to receive public approval; certainly the arch-isolationist and Anglophobe Midwest and the professional Irishmen of the cities would have made short work of any such proposal. The idea of the Open Door was not the sole property of the



IMPERIALISM IN THE FAR EAST

Showing the ports and colonies of the great powers around 1900

diplomats; it was popular with missionaries, traders, and would-be traders, who were raising a clamor for its adoption. British policy makers now saw that the powers were determined to expand their stakes in China and saw that they must do likewise. The Open Door seemed to be fading from British official consciousness.

It so happened that at this time a Britisher named Alfred E. Hoppisley, an Old China Hand as a member of the Chinese Customs Service, was traveling in the United States. The customs service, though its foreign staff included many Britishers, was irked by Britain's change of mood; it may be that Hoppisley desired to bring pressure on Britain. Nothing was more natural than that Hoppisley should call on his old friend William W. Rockhill, now Far Eastern adviser to Hay, but also an Old China Hand. They talked much about the Open Door; finally Hoppisley wrote a memorandum of his ideas, and Rockhill made a few changes and submitted them to Hay and McKinley. The latter two, apparently ignorant that British sentiment was changing, gave their approval. Formal notes were drafted and sent to the American representatives in London, Berlin, Paris, Rome, St. Petersburg, and Tokyo for presentation to the governments to which they were accredited. The substance of the American request was that the powers agree within their leaseholds and spheres of influence to treat each other's nationals equally, and to respect the Chinese tariff and permit Chinese collection of customs.

This was not, it must be admitted, asking very much, but its reception by the powers was cool; perhaps they planned to exclude each other. As Bailey suggests, it put the powers in an awkward position; it was like asking all persons in a room who are not thieves to stand up. Italy, which had no sphere, was the only one to approve; Russia rejected it politely, and all the others hedged. Even Britain felt that its Chinese holdings were in a special class, which made them more colonies than spheres. A less resourceful diplomat would have been stymied, but not Hay. On 20 March 1900 he calmly announced that the consent of the powers had been "final and definitive," and none of the thieves but Japan had the courage to call attention to himself by denying it. At any rate, the United States was now ranged alongside Britain as a champion of the Open Door. Not an Irishman cheeped.

That same year circumstances gave Hay an opportunity to try to push the door open another inch. The Chinese government, shaken by its unexpected defeat by Japan, had undertaken to strengthen itself by a series of reforms. These were not well received even by many officials nor by the Empress Dowager, presumed head of the nation. A movement began to expel foreigners and all their works and ideas with them, a movement that centered in a secret society

Hay buys
the Open
Door

Hay an-
nounces its
acceptance
by the
powers

The Boxer
Uprising,
1900

miscalled Boxers and that was secretly encouraged by the Empress. Then in May 1900 the Boxers rose in parts of northern China, killed scores of foreigners, and besieged the foreign colony in Tientsin and the foreign legations in Peking.

The powers promptly rushed troops to the scene, among them a contingent of 2500 American troops sent from the Philippines under General Chaffee. By 4 August both Tientsin and Peking had been relieved. A year later China signed the Boxer Protocol by which she agreed to punish the guilty and pay an indemnity of a third of a billion dollars. The American share, \$24.5 million, was judged to be far too high and \$18.1 million were returned. China later decided to use part of this money to educate Chinese students in the United States.

Hay had been justified in supposing that the powers would use the occasion to force further concessions from China. He therefore took occasion on 3 July to let the powers know why the United States was joining the expedition—basically to “preserve Chinese territorial and administrative entity.” Hay thus extended the meaning of the Open Door to include a guarantee of Chinese territorial integrity from future encroachment.

Hay's
failure to
push the
door open
farther

Doubtless the Open Door could have been maintained by an Anglo-American alliance, but Britain's interests were in peril and there was not time to wait for the United States to grow up. The next year Hay was surprised to learn of the signing of an Anglo-Japanese Alliance (January 1902) by which each recognized the special interests of the other and agreed to come to the aid of the other if it was attacked by more than one power in the Far East.

This was almost, but not quite, the end of Hay's Far Eastern diplomacy. Russian encroachments on Manchuria and Korea led in February 1904 to a surprise attack by Japan on Port Arthur. Hay met the launching of the Russo-Japanese War with a call upon the combatants to respect Chinese neutrality and administrative entity outside the battle area, a call probably prompted more by suspicion of Russia than of Japan. They responded noncommittally, but Hay promptly announced their acceptance.

Results
of Hay's
policies

Hay, ill and discouraged, now gladly allowed the dynamic TR to take more of the burden of foreign relations; he died 1 July 1905. His Open Door Policy was clearly a failure in the terms in which he had conceived it, and it illustrates all too clearly the American tendency to rely on moral preachments in diplomacy rather than operating on realistic grounds. The Founding Fathers, whatever their shortcomings, did not make that mistake. That is why they rank among the diplomatic great.

It has been claimed that Hay's action prevented the partition of China; no judgment can be made here. Certainly he launched the policy which was

to become the center of our Far Eastern course and was to lead at last to the Pacific war. We have also seen how he brought the oldest American diplomatic ambition to fruition by giving Britain the last push out of the Western Hemisphere. Strange to say, British statesmen always regarded him as their firmest American friend—and they were right.

By the middle of 1905 Russia was plainly losing, but Japan was exhausted and almost bankrupt and stood in fear of losing a second round if Russia got her wind back. Americans had always regarded Japan as a protégé (remember Perry) and were vocally pro-Japanese; so it was only natural for Japan to turn to TR to bail her out. It so happened that Russia was embarrassed by a gathering revolution while her ally, France, was getting into a North African tangle with Germany. She therefore agreed to enter peace negotiations, and representatives met at Portsmouth, New Hampshire from 10 August to 5 September, with Roosevelt as mediator.

Japan demanded Russia's rights in Korea and Manchuria, the island of Sakhalin, and a thumping cash indemnity. The Russians had no intention of paying the bill for a war they had not started and said so. Aware of the power of American public opinion, they had been busily disabusing it of the impression that Japan had been an innocent champion of righteousness attacked by a cynical bully. Before the Japanese knew what was going on, they had been convicted of being enemies of the Open Door. Negotiations were apparently on the verge of breaking down when TR moved in and persuaded Japan to give up the indemnity and be satisfied with the Korean and part of the Manchurian concessions and half of Sakhalin. On this basis the treaty was signed.

Japan had obligingly blocked Russian expansion, and TR was willing to see Japanese strength shored up in order to preserve the Far Eastern balance of power. In a real sense Roosevelt had saved Britain's ally for her and perhaps saved Britain's Far Eastern economic stake. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance was extended and changed to cover the world and obligate entry into war when either was attacked by *one* enemy. Britain was now able to begin the rapprochement with France and Russia which was to develop into the alliance of World War I. One of Roosevelt's fears was that Japan had aggressive designs on the Philippines. Since he could not block Japanese policy in Korea, he proposed to get something in return. Accordingly in July 1905 Taft, now Secretary of War, broke a Philippine trip by a stopover in Japan and signed the Taft-Katsura Memorandum. By this executive agreement the United States recognized Japanese suzerainty in Korea in exchange for a promise not to encroach on the Philippines. Japan promptly assumed control of Korean foreign relations—and proceeded to pour Japanese immigrants into Mindanao.

At Japanese initiative the Root-Takahira Agreement was made (30 November 1908) by an exchange of notes. Both powers agreed to maintain the *status quo* in the Pacific; respect each other's possessions; uphold the Open Door; and uphold by pacific means the "independence and integrity of China." China was naturally rather irked at thus being made the subject of an agreement without her approval, and it may be that Japan acted to forestall a Chinese plan to make a similar agreement with the United States in an attempt to thwart Japanese aggression in Manchuria. Certainly the agreement recognized Japan's economic ascendance in that province.

Root-Takahira Agreement, 1908

We have noted that the Burlingame Treaty of 1868 recognized the mutual right of Chinese and Americans to emigrate to each other's countries. By the 1870's white unemployment led to riots in San Francisco in which a score of Chinese were killed, and presently a treaty was negotiated with China by which the emigration of laborers was restricted. Congress passed a Chinese Exclusion Act in 1882, but labor troubles became even worse and resulted in the murder of further scores of Chinese. A long diplomatic argument followed, ended in 1894 by an agreement to prohibit absolutely the entry of Chinese laborers for ten years. Nevertheless many were smuggled in, the dispute flared up anew, and China refused to renew the agreement in 1904.

Chinese exclusion


Congress, however, kept its legislation, and Chinese protest was expressed by a boycott of American goods (1905), the first against any foreign power. Fortunately the return of the Boxer indemnity and other evidences of American goodwill healed the breach, at least for the time being. Meanwhile the Chinese already here had found difficulty in making a place in the economy. Forced out of labor, farming, lumbering, and fishing, they finally found lodgment in shopkeeping, small manufacturing, and some service occupations, chiefly in the "Chinatowns" of the cities. In 1880 there had been around 375,000 Chinese in the United States, but by 1930 they had dwindled to 75,000 of whom 30,000 were American-born.

Chinese exclusion had become a fixed policy by 1894, but Japanese were still free to enter. As their numbers grew they also incurred the opposition of white labor, and this was reinforced by the opposition of merchants and professional men as the ambitious and capable Japanese sought to rise into the middle class. Then the growing list of victories over the Russians made the Japanese cocky and made race-conscious Americans itch to "put them in their place." The demand for a Japanese exclusion act snowballed in the West and found some comfort elsewhere as it became clear that Japan had no respect for the Open Door, and as war correspondents returned from the Far East with tales of mistreatment by Japanese officials.

Origins of antipathy to Japanese

When San Francisco was shaken by earthquake in April 1906 and then

ravaged by fire, Japan made generous contributions for relief. Nevertheless hoodlums entered upon a series of riotous acts against Japanese, doubtless stimulated by a politically ambitious newspaper owner. Americans were soon convinced that Japanese remained loyal to the mikado—as was not unlikely, in view of the American antipathy to them. Then in October 1906 the San Francisco school board capped the climax by providing that all Japanese children (93 in number) must be segregated in a separate school.



Donahy, permission Cleveland Plain Dealer

Get out o' there, ye foolish boy.

Japan protested promptly and vigorously, but the uncomfortable fact was that under our Federal system Roosevelt had no way of bringing pressure on the authorities of either California or San Francisco. It was only after vast effort that the San Francisco Board of Education agreed to rescind its order if TR would find a way to end Japanese immigration. He then turned to Japan and negotiated the so-called Gentlemen's Agreement of 1907, by which Japan agreed to forbid the emigration of laborers to the mainland if the United States would not pass an exclusion act. A later codicil, sometimes called the "Ladies' Agreement," permitted Japanese bachelors already in the United States to import brides, who because they were selected from an array of photographs were called "picture brides."

The result was that the Japanese both in Hawaii and on the mainland increased rapidly, until now there are about 175,000 in Hawaii and 127,000 on the mainland. Emigration to Hawaii was by Japanese action put under the limitations of the Gentlemen's Agreement, and in 1920 Japan took cognizance of the growing protest against "picture brides" by refusing passports to them. It should be noted in favor of the Japanese government that it behaved with remarkable moderation; it may be doubted if TR

would have been so moderate had Americans been mobbed in Tokyo as Japanese were in California. "The real yellow peril of this period," says Bailey sapiently, "was not from the Japanese but from the yellow newspapers." The yellow press always seems to be in favor of war and economy.

California was by no means satisfied with the Gentlemen's Agreement. Fresh riots broke out, and TR had to intervene vigorously with the governor to prevent the passage of legislation restricting Japanese ownership of land. "The infernal fools . . ." wrote TR to his son, "insult the Japanese recklessly and in the event of war it will be the Nation as a whole which will pay the consequences." One of Roosevelt's pet peeves was that Western Congressmen were doing all they could to stir up trouble with Japan yet were indifferent to his efforts to build up the navy. Mr. Dooley, holding forth from behind his bar on Archer Avenue, was just as explicit. "A subjick race," said he, "is on'y funny whin it's raaly subjick. About three years ago I stopped laughin' at Jap'nese jokes. Ye have to feel supeeryor to laugh an' I'm gettin' over that feelin'."

In 1913 California prohibited Japanese ownership of land and restricted leases, and it kept the law despite Wilson's protests. In 1920 the law was extended to prohibit leases. As it turned out, the prohibitions were in accord with treaty agreements; it was the obvious discrimination against Japanese to which Tokyo objected. Sometimes Japanese managed to get around the laws by using white owners as fronts or buying land in the name of Japanese children born in this country.

Land and
naturalization
problems

United States naturalization laws had from the first confined the privilege of naturalization to "free white persons," but in 1870 it was extended to Africans and persons of African descent. The Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 had specifically denied Chinese the privilege of naturalization, but in the case of Wong Kim Ark (1897) the Supreme Court decided that birth in the United States gave the right to citizenship regardless of race or descent. On the other hand, in the Ozawa Case (1922) Japanese-born applicants were excluded from naturalization on the ground that they were not "white persons," a term "meant to indicate only a person of what is popularly known as the Caucasian race." When a Hindu applied for naturalization on the ground that he was a Caucasian, the Court turned him down because Hindus were not included among Caucasians as "popularly" defined.

TR's flourishing of the Big Stick may not have been high-class diplomacy, but it got a certain modicum of results; Taft's flourishing of the dollar was to mark a new diplomatic low. Though the Root-Takahira Agreement accepted Japanese economic penetration of Manchuria, the concession was opposed by Willard Straight, the brilliant young Acting Chief of the State Department's Division of Far Eastern Affairs. Straight convinced Taft and Knox that the

Dollar
Diplomacy

cure was "to force American capital by diplomatic pressure into a region of the world where it would not go of its own accord." Just at this time a consortium of European bankers was being formed to finance the Hukuang Railroad. Knox proceeded to inspire the formation of a Wall Street syndicate headed by J. P. Morgan, and then shoehorned it into the consortium by bringing pressure on the Chinese Prince Regent not to sign the agreement until the American terms were met.

Knox's next venture was to propose that another consortium of American and European bankers advance the money to China to buy the two great Manchurian railways from Russia and Japan. His purpose, of course, was to block Japanese expansion, which he regarded as a threat to the Open Door. As it was, he drove Russia and Japan into a closer relationship—in which China was the chief loser, and which made the Wall Street bankers feel like fools and gave American jingoes another gong to beat. Wilson tartly refused to back any further financial ventures in China, and the bankers pulled out with a sigh of relief.

By this time Japan's natural worship of strength had been re-inforced by her hard knocks in the school of diplomatic experience. She had observed that Western ideals and actions were frequently divergent and had

The
Twenty-
One De-
mands,
1915

come to look upon the powers as completely cynical. More than this, the Japanese were thoroughly aware that they were regarded by whites as an inferior race, and the nation burned to prove its superiority by winning a place of unchallenged dominance in the Orient, if not actually in the world. Up to

this time Japan's continental interests had been confined to the north, and even there had been subject to Russian menace and American harassment.

Japan now decided to get a firm foothold farther south. World War I gave it the opportunity, as the ally of Britain, to seize Kiaochau and the Pacific islands from Germany. It also took advantage of the powers' concentration on Europe to make the so-called Twenty-One Demands on China (January 1915). If carried out, they would in substance have turned China into a protectorate, turned over to Japan such economic controls as the latter desired, and slammed the Open Door in the face of the West.

The European powers made the best of the situation by secret agreements to permit Japan to control the Shantung Peninsula. Secretary of State Bryan responded (13 March 1915) that "the United States frankly

China recognizes that territorial contiguity creates special relations whittles between Japan and these districts"—apparently a retreat them down from the Open Door. The Chinese government stalled by yielding the most innocuous of the demands while she whittled down the others. Then in May the State Department, spurred by outraged editorial opinion, categorically asserted that it would not recognize the abrogation

of its treaty rights in China; actually this was nothing more than a caveat that the issue might later be reopened, as it was in 1932. Since Japan had cautiously expressed the stronger items as "desires" rather than demands, she now let the golden opportunity slip.

Japan had been worried by the contradiction in Bryan's two notes and by the way in which the American ambassador in Peking had helped the Chinese Foreign Office invent ways to get around the Twenty-One Demands. When in the middle of 1917 Japan was trying to get China into the war, Wilson tried to get it to stay out and attempt to solve its domestic problems. Japan was plainly miffed by this denial of its practical suzerainty over China. Moreover, to Japan's alarm, Wilson had picked up the discarded scraps of Dollar Diplomacy and was proposing that Wall Street aid Chinese development. Japan now determined to jockey the United States into recognizing her "paramount interests" in China and sent Baron Ishii across the Pacific in the summer of 1917.

Lansing-
Ishii Agree-
ment, 1917

Ishii let it be known that Germany was trying to buy Japan out of the war—such a purchase might have had serious results for the Allies—but Wilson and his then Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, refused to be browbeaten. They insisted that Chinese sovereignty must be recognized along with the Open Door's equality of trade rights. In those days diplomats had not developed quite the modern *sang-froid* toward letting negotiations fail, and they therefore resorted to ambiguity. In a public exchange of notes, 2 November 1917, Japan apparently accepted the American contentions (actually a mere repetition of former commitments) while the United States recognized that "territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous." Lansing wished to bind the two governments not to "take advantage of the present conditions to seek special rights or privileges in China which would abridge the rights of the subjects or citizens of other friendly states." Ishii objected to making this statement public; so it was included as a secret clause.

Actually, the "studied ambiguity" of the public note enabled each side to claim a victory and deny that it had yielded anything. Lansing insisted that by "special interests" he referred to economic interests, yet the fact remains that in diplomatic language the phrase has the clear meaning of acknowledging Japan's *political* as well as economic priority in China. Perhaps he quibbled, conscious that he had to temporize to keep Japan in the war, possibly even to keep her from going over to the other side. At any rate, the problem of the Open Door was given new life as in 1918, even before the end of the war, Wilson prepared to challenge in earnest the expansion of Japan.

Its sig-
nificance

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Chapter XLIII

THE APPROACH TO WORLD WAR I

1 *Anglo-American Rapprochement*

IT IS evident that by 1900 a strong rapprochement was under way between Britain and the United States. Crises had occurred over the Fenian troubles, the Alabama Claims, and the Venezuelan boundary, but at the same time there was a growth of imponderable forces which made for peace. For a hundred years the traditional military and diplomatic enemy had been England; now, as the United States began to emerge from isolation, it became increasingly conscious that other powers posed greater threats and that in truth it had many interests in common with England. The two countries shared the same language, the same literature, the same basic institutions and psychology, and even to a considerable extent the same blood. For different reasons they had developed similar attitudes toward many problems in Latin America and the Far East.

As the proportionate power of Britain began to decline, observers were struck by the renewed stirring of the old authoritarian spirit which had been held down but never scotched by the *Pax Britannica*. There was, of course, much talk of master races, of economic and political destinies, and of "haves" and "have-nots." The truth was that Europe had now recovered from the Napoleonic Wars and, armed with the weapons of the new technology, was ready to renew the old conflict between developing democracy and authority. That the contestants on each side wore the mask of nationalism and had their own quarrels which sometimes resulted in inconsistent and even suicidal behavior does not gainsay the existence or the nature of the fundamental conflict.

Great Britain, conscious of its power, had long held itself in "splendid

isolation" in order to be able to administer the *Pax Britannica* as it saw fit. During the 1890's, however, the empire was facing problems and rivals which it could no longer meet alone. Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy were drawing together into a Triple Alliance. In this exigency Britain was ready to sacrifice some of its imperial gains in order to win allies. Either Germany, Britain's principal rival, proved unapproachable or its price was too high. The United States, smugly (though falsely) conscious of security behind its ocean moats, would not abandon its traditional policy of "no entangling alliances." In the end Britain formed an alliance with Japan, and the Triple Entente (understanding) with France and with Russia, the ally of France. The Entente was clearly aimed at security from German expansionism.


British statesmen were well aware of the shaky nature of their new structure of alliances and understandings. Also they were aware of the emergence of a new trans-Atlantic power and of the growing (though far from clear) sentiment of identity of character and interests among the peoples of Britain and the United States. Apparently it was the First Venezuelan Crisis which drove these lessons home to British statesmen and which introduced the basic policy that American goodwill must be encouraged before everything else.

Britain cultivates U.S. goodwill

Thereafter in her secret negotiations with other powers Britain repeatedly made the reservation that nothing should obligate her to take sides against the United States. When the continental powers unanimously took the side of Spain in 1898 Britain made her disapproval clear, urged the United States to annex the Philippines, and stood ready in case of emergency to back the United States against Germany. That Britain was retreating from its old hegemony in the Western Hemisphere was shown by its surrender to the United States on the Venezuelan and isthmian canal issues, by its reduction of its naval forces, and finally by its sacrifices of Canadian interests to the cause of American goodwill.

The part that Canada played in Anglo-American rapprochement requires explanation. There are two Canadas, one French- and one English-speaking. From French-Canada's first years its clergy had been dominant, a curious parallel to New England. But their evolution was not the same. The Canadian clergy was Ultramontane—that is, believed in the supremacy of Pope and Church over King and State—and after a long struggle the great Bishop Laval had his way. When in 1763 France abandoned its 65,000 loyal subjects in Canada to the British (boasting that it had played a fine trick on the latter), French-Canadians turned their backs on France. From that time onward French-Canadians constituted a nation, French in blood and language and Catholic in religion, stubbornly wedded to the puritan and authoritarian ideals of the seventeenth century and fearful of the progress which they saw in the rest of the world. Their only outside loyalty was to

The French-Canadian nation



the Vatican; democracy they accepted not from conviction but as a political weapon to be wielded against Britain, Anglo-Canada, and the United States in defense of their exclusiveness.

Anglo-Canada was a mixture of British, American, and European continental elements. The long political and economic ascendance of the United Empire Loyalist refugees from New England gave it an anti-American tinge and strengthened the ties of sentiment with Britain. Anglo-Canada's cautious progressivism seemed like break-neck radicalism to French-Canada, but it served to build up the country economically and has given it rank today among second-class powers. Though there is such a thing as French-Canadian culture, it has few ties with the external world. On the other hand, Anglo-Canada's culture is borrowed from Britain and the United States. Those of her sons and daughters who might build up a native culture tend to take their contributions south of the border.

Anglo-Canada

The freedom of Canada from drastic social upheavals and armed conflict has helped to give it a stereotyped and judgmental image of Americans as boastful, grasping, dishonest, lawless, poor sports, hysterical, and lacking in persistence. The view, of course, is altered in favor of individuals, but it is an instructive contrast to Americans' flattering view of themselves. Canadians bear a well-deserved reputation for stability, responsibility, calm and cautious conservatism, and for possessing energy and initiative without going to the extreme which causes stomach ulcers. Elections are honest, rackets do not flourish, labor troubles are arbitrated, and the banks are reliable.

Canadian character

And well do Canadians know it! Almost universally they preen themselves on their moral superiority to Americans. "We are also, it is to be feared," says Robert Davies, "lacking in humor. We have been to America as Scotland is to England, or as Scandinavia to Europe—the dour, worthy, crafty men of the north who fear the joyous arts and demand of the magnificent creatures that they shall be respectable and improving."* Indeed, there is more of a flavor of Scotland in Anglo-Canada than there is of England.

On the other hand, Canadians have exhibited some of the same psychopathic traits and abuses of power as the "Excited States" but in more subtle and sometimes milder forms, which tend to conceal their existence. There is a form of racism, but it is milder because there are fewer Negroes and the Indians long ago ceased to be a menace to the frontier. Canada is less democratic than the United States, and at the same time its politicians are less demagogic. It bears patiently an ascendancy of wealth that would have sent American populists into revolution. The law acts with exemplary swiftness and impartiality—on unimportant offenders. There

* *New York Times Book Review*, 19 March 1950: 30.

is, on the whole, a more or less unconscious conspiracy to conceal unpleasant facts and to find the origin of all evil south of the border.

Canadians have always complained about the way in which Americans have more or less taken them for granted. American schools pay little attention to Canada, and as a result Americans know more about Europe than about their neighbor to the North. Yet Americans have shown a lively interest in Canada's opportunities. This has resulted in the export of both population and capital—conversely in the import of population and raw materials. American settlers were an important element in all of the provinces except Quebec. The most significant American movement in this century was to the free lands of the prairie provinces, where in 1921 almost a quarter of a million Americans were living. In the East, Canadians were moving into the American industrial cities, especially Detroit, Buffalo, and Boston and other New England centers, and by 1920 they probably totaled over a million. A large percentage of these were French-Canadians employed in the New England textile mills.

The interchange of populations was encouraged by the fact that the two nations were growing into a single economy despite the operation of a long tariff war and the opposite attractions of New York and London financiers. The railroads and steamship lines of the two countries were linked, and Canadian railways penetrated deep into the United States. The Panama Canal was as significant an asset to Canadian trade as to that of the United States. Canada had to depend upon the United States for coal, oil, cotton, machinery, and steel, but the United States drew heavily upon Canada for copper, nickel, aluminum, asbestos, hard wheat, and wood products, especially newsprint.

By 1926 American investments in Canada (\$3.2 billion) had passed British (\$2.6 billion), and American manufacturers had firmly established mass-production methods in numerous Canadian branch factories. At the same time Canadians had poured three quarters of a billion dollars into investments in America. Britain had long been the most important customer of the United States, but at this time Canada gave signs of pulling ahead. Indeed, Canada had long imported more from the United States than it sent back.

Canadian nationalism is essentially an artificial growth fostered by resentment against and fear of both Britain and the United States. American annexationism rose more from a sense of common destiny and geographical completion than from arrogance or covetousness, but it was nonetheless irritating and frightening. The Canadian-French were distrustful of "atheistic" America, and the Anglo-Canadian élite naturally hated the land of their fathers. Every stir in the United States was interpreted as a menace by some

Canadian element and increased its anti-Americanism. When Americans were indifferent, their attitude was interpreted as an insult; but when Americans noted that Canada's British allegiance menaced American neutrality in case of European war, Canadians called it unwarranted interference with their freedom of action. All the time they were resentfully aware that independence was impossible without the tolerance and protection of the United States—"dat ole debbil" Monroe Doctrine again.

Because they were hostages for Britain's pliability to American demands, Canadians distrusted Britain; on the other hand, they had never hesitated to slug her into making concessions by threats of joining the American Union. Indeed, the existence of the possibility of losing Canada was never far from the minds of British statesmen, and it held real terror for them as long as they needed the country as a base for the maintenance of their traditional ascendancy in the Western Hemisphere. The result was a long political evolution in which Britain yielded power after power in its attempt to keep Canada in the family. The granting of similar powers to Britain's other white-settlement colonies led to the formation by the beginning of this century of the loose congeries of states known as the British Commonwealth of Nations.


In 1866 the United States had shown its pique at Great Britain by denouncing the Elgin-Marcy Treaty (1854) with its arrangements for reciprocal trade and fishing rights. The result was considerable hardship to Canadian business and a not unnatural attempt to retaliate by seizing American fishing vessels caught inshore. When the Bayard-Chamberlain Treaty of 1888 led to a hope of agreement, the matter was dragged into politics by Republicans and Irishmen. The treaty failed in the Senate, and the episode probably played a share in Cleveland's defeat that year. It was not until 1910 that the fisheries dispute was settled by a compromise proposed by the Hague Tribunal. A permanent commission was also set up to settle disputes as they arose.

**Fisheries
problem**

The acquisition of Alaska had given the United States fisheries which rivaled those of Newfoundland, and in addition great sealing grounds, chief of which was the tiny Pribilof Islands area in the center of Bering Sea. When the United States let a monopoly of sealing rights to the Alaska Commercial Company, foreign sealers (largely Canadian and Russian) began to slaughter the animals at sea—"pelagic" sealing. The result was that seals of both sexes were destroyed along with unborn pups, and numerous pups left to starve on shore. The herd soon showed an alarming decrease.

**Alaska
sealing
problem**

To stop this practice American revenue cutters, egged on by the Alaska Company, began to seize pelagic sealing vessels, and, though Bayard warned him against it, Cleveland justified it on the ground that the Bering



Sea was a *mare clausum*, that is, a closed sea completely subject to American jurisdiction. This declaration was a notable violation of the old American doctrine of freedom of the seas. Finally the matter was submitted to arbitration (1893) with the result that the United States lost every contention. In consequence the triumphant Canadian and Russian sealers continued the slaughter and were presently joined by Japanese. By 1911 the once magnificent herd was on the verge of extinction. Only then did the interested nations agree by the North Pacific Sealing Convention to forbid pelagic sealing, and then only upon annual payment of a percentage of the land kill.

Up to the time of the Klondike gold rush of 1896 there had been no great need to settle the boundary between the Alaska panhandle and Canada. Now, however, the control of a water approach to the Klondike became important, and Canada moved to have the boundary drawn on that basis. The coast of the panhandle is an intricate maze of islands and fiords; so it was easy to put different interpretations on the Anglo-Russian boundary treaty of 1825. The Canadian contention was that the boundary lay thirty miles inland from the surf line, which meant that the boundary would jump from headland to headland of the mainland coast line. On the other hand, Americans contended that the boundary was thirty miles inland from the coast of the

mainland. There was also doubt as to the true identity of the Portland Canal (or channel), the southern boundary. The Canadian claim was nicely calculated to give it the desired seaports and to leave the United States with a collection of islands and disconnected headlands.

All attempts to settle the dispute broke down as the result of Canadian and American intransigence. Finally late in 1903 an Alaska Boundary Tribunal met in London; it was composed of three Americans, two Canadians, and Lord Alverstone, Chief Justice of England. Actually the United States had the best case on every point except perhaps the identity of the Portland Canal. On that issue Alverstone voted to divide the islands



Adapted from C. O. Paullin, *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States*, 1932, Carnegie Institution of Washington.

at the mouth, a political rather than judicial decision according to Canadian opinion. Alverstone supported the American contention as to the main boundary, and thus the United States won most of its claims, four to two.

The award has come to be recognized as just even in Canada; it was the manner more than the act that was irritating. At the moment Ca-

nadians felt that Alverstone had deliberately traded their interests for American goodwill. The result was a surge of Canadian nationalism directed chiefly against Great Britain and the growth of an opinion that Canada must obtain control of its foreign relations. So clear was this conviction that when Britain offered Canada a share in shaping imperial policies in exchange for substantial contributions to the British navy, Sir Wilfred Laurier, Canadian premier, refused; eventually he decided to build a Canadian navy instead. This attitude was like manna to the isolationists of Quebec, and presently another incident gave a fillip to Canadian nationalism.

In 1911 Taft worked out a tariff reciprocity agreement with Laurier which was heartily welcomed by many elements in both business communities. Unfortunately it was received by many American expansionists as a step toward annexation. This interpretation was the theme of the notoriously tactless and sensational Hearst press, and Speaker Champ Clark announced: "I hope to see the day when the American flag will float over every square foot of the British North American possessions clear to the North Pole." Even Taft put his foot in his mouth (a not unusual feat despite his bulk) by submitting the agreement to Congress with the statement that Canada had come "to the parting of the ways." Congress accepted the proposed tariff amendments, but Canada's conservative opposition precipitated a general election, which it carried with the slogan: "No truck or trade with the Yankees!"

From that time onward both Canadian political parties were incorrigibly nationalist, but, even more, they had to play up to Quebec's isolationism. The result has been that Canada has suffered from a form of the same dilemma as the United States. Having gotten control of its own foreign relations, what should it do? It feared being dragged into imperial and world problems, either through its sentimental attachment to Britain or by agreeing to decisions of the British Commonwealth of Nations. Not only would its isolationists object to such involvements, but the United States might resent having to protect a near neighbor which was sallying forth on knightly errands without asking its protector's leave. Since it was dependent upon the British and American navies for defense, Canada's best interest lay in accord between the two nations, yet it was hampered there by Quebec's hostility to both. The result, as we shall see in good time, was that in the 1920's and 1930's Britain drifted toward co-operation with fascism and antagonized the United States, but Canada did not utilize its voice in imperial councils to stop the drift and promote Anglo-American accord.

Anglo-American rapprochement was visible to all the world, but it was a particular worry to Wilhelm II, Kaiser of a Germany which was on

the make. Wilhelm, who fancied himself as a wire-puller, bombarded the State Department and the American ministers in Berlin with rumors of the anti-American intrigues going on in the chancelleries of the world, many of them involving England. It was clear that he was trying to drive a wedge between England and the United States. Roosevelt, a favorite object of Wilhelm's rumor barrage, was not greatly impressed, but the Kaiser seems to have felt that he had won an ally if not a stooge.

**Growing
American
hostility to
Germany**

Actually, as the possibility of Anglo-American conflict became more and more unthinkable, the possibility of a clash with Germany began to take its place in public prints and official conferences. When in 1901 Germany doubled its already extensive naval program, TR was disposed to regard it as directed at the United States as well as Britain. The value of the British navy to the United States was now so apparent to the General Board of the American Navy that in 1906 the board, presided over by Admiral Dewey, proposed to abandon the American traditional policy of freedom of the seas! It intended to clear the way for the British to hamper the German carrying trade in case of war, thus safeguarding the larger liberties of mankind.

There was as yet no sound reason for quarrel between Germany and the United States, but popular attitudes are not always soundly based. Editorial and magazine writers remembered the Samoan controversy and Dewey's trouble with Von Diederichs at Manila. German public opinion had been anti-American during the Spanish-American War and anti-British during the Boer War. The British improved their position by promptly pulling back from the Second Venezuelan Crisis in 1903 when TR remonstrated, but rumors circulated (doubtless built up by the overdramatic TR) that Germany had accepted arbitration only as the result of a Rooseveltian ultimatum. Germans had never hesitated to make known their contempt for the Monroe Doctrine, and Bismarck had called it "an extraordinary piece of insolence."

**Popular
reasons**

This attitude was important in the light of the emerging strategic fact that any attack upon the United States would probably take the form of an attempt to cut its vital Caribbean communications; such an attempt would logically have to be staged from the Bulge of Brazil, and that immediately made the defense of Brazil a matter of primary importance to the United States. Germany was officially mum, but its publicists were not. Indeed, they boasted that scores of thousands of Germans were being poured into Brazil with the deliberate intent of preparing to seize that country as the base for the erection of a vast new German empire in the Western Hemisphere. These boasts, along with an accumulation of minor irritations—chiefly trade and tariff discriminations—were building up slowly but surely a burden of American antipathy toward Germany.

During these years crises increased in frequency and intensity, each of them seeming only by a miracle to escape devolving into a general war. The International Peace Conferences held at The Hague in 1899 and 1907

The Moroccan Crisis were splendid pageants but did nothing to ensure peace, though a Permanent Court of International Arbitration was created and was housed at The Hague in a "Peace Palace" donated by Andrew Carnegie. Morocco, rich in resources and unappropriated, was coveted by both France and Germany. The latter hoped to obtain Casablanca and to build a naval base which would have free access to the Atlantic, an access which was, from the continent, blocked to the German fleet by the British Isles and the British Home Fleet.

When in 1905 France made a move to get control of Morocco, the Kaiser took advantage of Russia's preoccupation with Japan to ask Roosevelt to call a meeting of the powers interested in North Africa. His plea, of course, was that TR should help to preserve the Open Door in Morocco against France. TR hesitated to meddle, but there was a chance that he might prevent war, and American treaty rights in the country afforded an excuse for participation.

Algeciras Conference, 1906 The conference met in January 1906 at Algeciras, Spain. Roosevelt took a course which in essentials agreed with British and French wishes. He boasted that "while I was most suave and pleasant with the Emperor, yet when it became necessary at the end I stood him on his head with great decision." Then he added, "Where I have taken part of the kernel from him, I have been anxious that he should have all the shell possible, and have that shell painted any way he wished." However exaggerated this Rooseveltian gasconade may have been, it does seem that he decided that the French threat to the Moroccan Open Door was secondary to Germany's and that he forced the Kaiser's hand by threatening to publish their correspondence. At any rate, administration of Moroccan ports was turned over to France and Spain. The former took an early opportunity to move into the country in full force; Spain received the consolation of a small strip across from Gibraltar. The Senate ratified the Algeciras Treaty but stipulated that it was not to involve the United States in European problems. The truth was that Roosevelt had transgressed the traditional canon of American isolation from Europe, just as Hay had strengthened the traditional policy of American co-operation in the Far East. Hay and Roosevelt saw what the American public and Congress did not: that our frontiers were now on the Rhine and the China coast.

While the zestful TR was amusing the American populace with circuses—the bread was to be furnished later by a younger relative—the world was basking (as Marquis Childs puts it) in a golden glow of empire

which only the perceptive few recognized as its sunset. Henry Adams was one of the handful of Americans who possessed no optimistic illusions. In the midst of the Spanish-American War he took a look at the statistics of the British Board of Trade and wrote to his brother, Brooks:

**The
tumbling
of empire**

This year at last settles the fact that British industry is quite ruined and that its decline has at last become a debacle. France is, if possible, worse off. Germany has become a mere province of Russia. The world has entered on a new phase of most far-reaching revolution, and our only danger is lest the ruins of the old empire should tumble too quickly on America.*

2 *The American Approach to World War I*

The marvel in retrospect is not that World War I came but that it was delayed so long. Yet no one really wanted a showdown, and the Great Powers of Europe split into two armed camps to maintain an uneasy balance of power. The decline of Spain and Turkey had left a power vacuum in the Mediterranean which each of the Great Powers desired to fill and which made it a center of contention. Britain and France had fought for it in the Napoleonic Wars and then had joined to block Russia's approach in the 1850's and again in the 1870's.


**The Medi-
terranean
power
vacuum**

Joint control by Britain and France afforded the most practical method of defending their colonial life line, which led through the Mediterranean and the Suez Canal to India, Indo-China, and China, the centers of British and French colonial power. Russia's ambitions in the Mediterranean clashed with Germany's Drive to the East and promised eventually to cut across the British and French life line. Britain and France faced a dilemma but solved it by deciding to ally with the most distant menace against the closer one. Let us anticipate by noting that the same strategic factors entered into the line-up of powers during World War II and may yet play a part in World War III.

Austria-Hungary regarded Serbia as a menace because it desired to detach southern Slavs from the empire and build a Greater Serbia, or Yugoslavia. On 28 June 1914 Serbian nationalists assassinated the heir to the Austrian throne because he would have countered their dream by giving the South Slavs a chance to become partners in the empire. Austria-Hungary resolved to scotch the Serb menace and got Germany's backing in case Russia should interfere on behalf of its Slavic relatives—as it did. There followed weeks of frantic efforts to localize the war or to submit the case to The Hague Tribunal.

**Occasion
for World
War I**

* Quoted in Marquis Childs's "Evaluation" in Brooks Adams, *America's Economic Supremacy* (1947 ed.), 12-13.



One may say that war came in the end because both sides carried their bluffs too far.

On 1 August 1914 Germany moved, hoping to beat France quickly, then turn and crush Russia. Belgium had been neutralized by international agreement, but Germany callously crossed its border—calling the agreement “a scrap of paper”—planning to make Sedan the hinge of a gigantic door which would swing through Belgium and northern France and close on Paris. But the Belgian forts put up a stubborn delaying action, and Britain stopped blowing hot and cold and landed a small but decisive force in Belgium. At the First Battle of the Marne in September the Germans were stopped cold. Thereafter the combatants settled down to trench warfare, and despite bloody efforts no important changes occurred until the spring of 1918. On the eastern front armies surged back and forth in a holocaust of destruction, but no decision emerged. Turkey joined the Central Powers in 1914 and Bulgaria the next

**Stalemate
1914–18**

year, and the other Balkan States were not permitted by either side to remain aloof. Italy, weaned away by semisecret promises of territorial compensation, joined the Entente Allies in 1915. These events extended the area of conflict, but they had no decisive effect. As late as the winter of 1916–17 the war seemed destined to continue as a stalemate—as indeed it did for another year.

The outbreak of World War I was received in the United States with a sense of unreality which was quickly followed by relief that it could not affect us across three thousand miles of ocean. Nevertheless, a third of the ninety-odd millions of the population was composed of people born in the countries which eventually became belligerent or whose sympathies were enlisted in some way because one or both parents had been born there. Wilson met the outbreak of war with the customary proclamation of neutrality and supplemented it with a further appeal for Americans to be “impartial in thought as well as in action.”

**American
reaction**

On the whole, American sympathies were swayed to the Allied side by numerous factors. There was, of course, the affinity with Britain in blood, language, culture, and institutions. There was the supposed debt of gratitude owed to France for its role in winning American independence; the result was the enlistment of thousands of Americans in the French army, the formation of the Lafayette Escadrille, and the poet's throbbing prayer:

Forget us, God, if we forget
The sacred sword of Lafayette.

Another solvent of American opinion was the growing antipathy for Germany. Indeed, American sympathy was so clearly pro-Ally that immigrant elements who supported Germany were known contemptuously as “hyphenated Americans.”

As the war progressed it became apparent that Britain was reaping the harvest sprung from the seeds so patiently sowed from the time of the First Venezuelan Crisis. Britain knew American psychology and competently plucked the right chords to render a smooth performance. It soon became evident that American well-wishers were putting a moral value on British survival as the bulwark not only of Western culture but of human freedom, dignity, and even decency. British propagandists—and French, as well—caught on at once and portrayed their fight as a battle against not only the barbarizing forces of German “Kultur” but the cynical authoritarianism of the Kaiser and the junkers. Doubtless the Allies would have soon grasped the point, but it was American comment that actually furnished the lead. There was one thing wrong with it: Russia was perhaps even more authoritarian than


**British
propa-
ganda**

Germany. It was easy to embarrass pro-Ally apologists by suggesting that if they were fighting for democracy they had found a strangely unsympathetic bedfellow.

On the other hand not only was German propaganda grounded in abysmal ignorance of American psychology, but it utilized sound and fury rather than tact, and its major efforts were spoiled by ill-timed acts. The Inept German propaganda invasion of Belgium and the "scrap of paper" episode were to the simple-minded and the prejudiced clear proof that Germany had begun the war. The destruction of the fine old library at Louvain and the supposed atrocities in Belgium (not that there were none, for they happen in any war) were proofs of barbarism that the Germans could not surmount. German saboteurs were caught while operating against American factories, and this sabotage seemed to give the lie to Germany's claims of its good intentions. When Germans fulminated against America's acts as unneutral and threatened reprisals, the impression was spread that Germany intended to invade the United States after disposing of the European unpleasantness. Through it all, moreover, there ran the threat to the Monroe Doctrine which had been inherent for years in the utterances of German statesmen and publicists.

As during the Napoleonic Wars, the United States found itself plagued by the problem of how to win observance of its rights as a neutral. But this time Wilson, who knew something of American history, was determined that we would not be dragged into war on the wrong side. Neutrality as affected by the Allies Candor compels the admission that for thirty-two months he was condemned to wrangle with Great Britain over American rights, while differences with Germany were mainly confined to a few months in 1915 and again in 1917. No sooner did the war begin than Britain took full advantage of her naval superiority and her geographical position to block all avenues of German supply. The hope was to handicap seriously the German military effort and eventually starve its people. Practically everything that entered into commerce was declared to be contraband on the ground that it was essential to modern warfare.

On the plea that submarines made it dangerous to search neutral vessels at sea, Britain now escorted them into port where they could be searched at leisure—or merely left to swing idly at anchor for months. The accusation was made that the practice was intended to give an advantage to British competitors; certainly it was curious how the British official trade corporations in Holland and Scandinavia could export to Germany metals, coal, oil products, tea, cocoa, cotton—indeed, all sorts of products, even those originating in the United States, in which neutral exporters were not allowed to deal. Provisions



McCutcheon, permission the Chicago Tribune

McCutcheon's satirical view of Uncle Sam's attempts to do business with both sides without antagonizing either

for governing neutral shipping were purposely left vague so that changes in interpretations might be made. The North Sea was declared a belligerent area and heavily mined. Lastly, the British censored every scrap of neutral mail bound for Germany or its neighbors.

The United States, the most powerful neutral and the one with the largest commerce, squawked the loudest. The British Foreign Office was well aware of the weakness of its position and therefore delayed its replies to protests and then filled them with clouds of verbiage intended to cause further delays. Robert Lansing, Bryan's counselor, consciously played along with the policy of procrastination. Walter Hines Page, Ambassador to St. James's, was so "co-operative" with Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Minister, that his record is cleared of betrayal of his country only by the fact that America eventually joined the Allies.

**British
policy of
delay**

If the British had any fears that they might get into real trouble with

the United States, they were set at rest when (15 October 1914) Wilson through Lansing (while Bryan was out of town) cabled Page to let Grey know that "this government feels that it fully understands and appreciates the British position [*concerning the blockade*] and is not disposed to place obstacles in the way." The British would have been guilty of crass stupidity—they were not—if they had not realized that Wilson was tipping them off that his protests were largely for public effect, and that the most he would demand would be a reckoning after the war. Actually Wilson could have forced the British to back down merely by sending cruisers to convoy our merchant ships, as Sir Edward Grey later admitted.

Edward Mandell House had pulled the strings of Texas and of Washington; he now had a vision of Philip Dru administering world affairs. Wilson innocently consented to let him go abroad in 1914, 1915, and again in 1916, ostensibly to explore the avenues to peace. So it is that we catch glimpses of the gray little Texan slipping with ostentatious furtiveness from one capital to another; playing the rôle of man of mystery as he was wined and dined and consulted in corners; and prattling weightily to the great of peace conferences, grand alliances, and the disposal of nations and colonies without ever glimpsing the irony behind their smiles.

It was laughably easy for the British to take him over. Before he was through he was showing his most secret instructions and correspondence to the "artless" and sympathetic Sir Edward Grey—so refreshing a contrast to the usual sly and double-dealing European statesman! And how Sir Edward poured out his soul to the little gray American.

If I could feel (he wrote) that your people were sure to say, sooner or later, "though we have no concern with territorial changes between the belligerents themselves, who must settle things of that kind by themselves, there can be no peace till the cause of Belgium is fairly settled in the interest of public morals and future peace," I should be content.

A few months later House was in Berlin parroting Grey's line that the Germans were licked and might as well throw in the towel! It seems clear that Wilson had no idea that his alter ego had sacrificed for both of them their status as neutrals but supposed him to be working for a negotiated peace rather than an Allied victory. In a real sense the entire United States was being subjected to the same charming courtship, outwardly bathed in the subtle flattery of respect and understanding, inwardly as unyielding as iron.

The growth of identical economic interests with the Allies was only less marked than the feeling of psychological identity. When the war began the United States was descending into a period of depression which prom-

ised to rival the 1890's, but Allied purchases brought a sudden revival. The Allies were not as well supplied with munitions factories as Germany and found the American sources essential. Before the end of 1914 it became apparent that their enormous orders would eventually outrun their ability to pay and would have to be financed by borrowing in the United States. The House of Morgan was inevitably the chosen instrument for these transactions. Bryan, always suspicious of bankers, warned that loans to the Allies would give us so important a stake in Allied victory that it might lead to the end of neutrality. Wilson quietly overruled him in October 1914, and a year later withdrew all blocks to open sales of Allied bonds. Before we entered the war, American private bankers had loaned \$2.3 billion.

**Economic
entanglements with
the Allies**

It was not until actual shipments of munitions got under way in 1915 that the United States became engaged in serious difficulties with Germany. The latter could not deny that neutrals had a right to trade in munitions, but it pointed out that the British had arbitrarily changed the rules so as to cut off practically all trade with Germany; the United States had become in effect an Allied munitions factory. It was the duty of the United States (if it was sincerely neutral) to insist that the legitimate rules of trade be restored so that it could deal impartially with both sides, or if that failed—or it did not care to take the risk—it should embargo the shipment of supplies to both sides, a stipulation which meant in effect to the Allies. Wilson's somewhat specious answer was that an embargo would itself be an unneutral act, for it would automatically assure the triumph of Germany, which was much better supplied with munitions factories. As a matter of fact, six European countries had already embargoed munitions.

**Neutrality
as affected
by Ger-
many**

Germany now resolved to take drastic measures. At this time it had only twenty-one submarines fit for duty, not enough to rid the seas of Allied ships but perhaps enough to scare away the neutrals on whom the Allies depended for a large part of their shipping. Accordingly in February 1915 Germany announced the establishment of a submarine war zone which completely enclosed the British Isles and blocked the northern coast of France. Within this zone submarines would sink any ships, neutral or belligerent, without giving the traditional warning. This move was a logical step toward modern total war and has since become the universal practice; obviously a submarine which gave warning ran a serious risk of having its thin skin penetrated by a shot or of being run down.

**Submarine
warfare**

Germany had only taken a leaf from the British book and decided to make new rules to fit changed conditions, but British and Americans were horrified. If it was suicidal for a submarine to give warning, let the Germans avoid suicide by not using subs. When the Germans pointed out that

the same thing applied to the British argument against stopping and searching neutral ships at sea, it was answered that this was quite a different matter. When the Germans defended their war zone by answering that the British had turned the entire North Sea into a war zone, this also was held to be quite a different matter. The blockade was properly considerate of human life: unrestricted submarine warfare was cynical, brutal, and completely unjustifiable.

Germany's retort was that the blockade was far from considerate of human life: slow starvation was beginning in Germany as the result of the cynical, brutal, and completely unjustifiable blockade. Nevertheless, the State Department vigorously protested against the German action and warned that if American lives or ships were lost, Germany would be held to "strict accountability," a statement from which it was hard to back down.

Submarine warfare, initiated on 18 February 1915, struck Allied shipping hard at first. An American went down with the British passenger liner *Falaba* on 28 March, and three men were killed when the American *Lusitania* tanker *Gulflight* was damaged by a torpedo on 1 May. Bryan proposed to forbid Americans to travel on belligerent ships which carried munitions, but Wilson insisted that international law permitted it. On 7 May a submarine lurking off the coast of Ireland quite fortuitously sighted the liner *Lusitania* and sent it to the bottom with the loss of 1198 lives including 128 Americans.

The Allies assumed that the United States would promptly join them—honor could dictate nothing else—and Page and House encouraged the view. American indignation ran high, but there was little disposition to go to war. Nor did Wilson himself want war in spite of his sympathies. Moreover, he recognized that war would not win support except possibly in the Northeast, and he made a virtue of the situation. "There is such a thing," said he, "as a man being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right." The phrase "too proud to fight" was seized upon by advocates of war as an evidence of cowardice, especially by the violent TR.

Nevertheless, Wilson's protest of 13 May was peremptory in its demand that Germany back down. Germany raised technical and moral issues in reply, and Wilson (9 June) shot back an emphatic reiteration. Bryan resigned in protest (much to the joy of the Allies), and Lansing was put in his place. Whatever Bryan's shortcomings as a thinker, he emerges from this imbroglio as being one of the few Americans who was able to see both sides clearly, and he fought against the tanglefoot process by which the administration and the Allies were gradually drawing the United States toward war.



Permission the Chicago Daily News

At first Wilson opposed preparedness, and when he switched to its support he found many different ideas on how to go about it.

Germany's hope of frightening neutral commerce had proved delusory; she simply did not have enough submarines and had done herself great damage by tipping her hand thus early and warning the British to concentrate on the development of sub-chasers and scientific antisubmarine devices. On 19 August the British liner *Arabic* was sunk with the loss of two Americans. The revival of American indignation so alarmed Germany that on 1 September it agreed that "liners will not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without safety of the lives of noncombatants, provided that the liners do not try to escape or offer resistance." Ordinary merchantmen were not included in the pledge, but it was at least a partial victory for Wilson—as TR grudgingly admitted.

*Arabic and
Sussex
pledges*

When in May 1916 the unarmed Channel ship *Sussex* was damaged and a number of Americans wounded, Wilson promptly threatened to break off relations and extorted a reiteration known as the *Sussex* pledge. Germany added that the pledge was given with the understanding that Wilson would force Britain to modify its blockade; Wilson ignored the proviso.

The sinking of the *Lusitania* must be recognized as a turning point in American opinion. The war was closer than had been thought; the "fright-

fulness" which had trampled Belgian babies could also reach Americans. Bookstores bloomed with polemics and with exciting novels based on the coming invasion of the United States after the European War. The movies joined in stirring up hatred of the Teuton by basing films on the invasion of the United States, or following the activities of villainous spies with square heads and bull necks. The Navy League saw a chance to boom a big navy; the National Security League plugged for preparedness all down the line under the aegis of that great proconsul, General Leonard Wood; and the League to Enforce Peace was founded to represent Allied victory as the only door to world peace. But there were dissidents, not all of them pro-German. A song entitled *I Didn't Raise My Boy to Be a Soldier* swept the country and found ironic parodies on the lips of the bellicose.

Hindsight makes it evident that 1915 was the logical time for entry into the war, for the added weight of America could have forced a decision before the strength of Europe was exhausted and the groundwork laid for Hitler and Stalin. Wilson seemed to be aware of this contingency, even though he was also aware that the nation was not ready for war. Early in 1916 he pled with Congressional leaders to agree to take a strong stand (which he freely acknowledged would lead to war) if Germany sank armed belligerent merchantmen with loss of American life. Such action, he argued, should conclude the European War by midsummer and would be "a great service to civilization." Congressmen were so wrought up that Wilson met with the House leaders Clark, Kitchin, and Flood early on the morning of 22 February in what came to be called the Sunrise Conference. He reiterated his stand, and the House leaders flatly rejected it.

It was evident that both sides had spent so much blood and treasure that they did not dare end the war without face-saving gains to present to their peoples. House was now authorized by Wilson to propose a peace conference and agreed to throw America's *moral* support to the cause of the Allies if Germany refused to co-operate. To the Allies this was no pledge at all, and they dropped the matter. The President was chagrined by the Allied flouting of his peace moves and irritated by their calm assurance that the ocean was their pond—especially the way in which British ships "hovered" off American ports, and the way in which they removed enemy subjects and military reservists from American ships, though usually in European waters.


Hitherto Wilson had deplored the rather widespread demand that the military forces be increased, but he now became convinced that America must have more military power to back its policy. When Congress proved reluctant, he made a speaking tour of the nation and marched in "pre-

paredness" parades. Congress finally agreed to increase the regular army and the National Guard (really an increase on paper) and voted \$1.5 billion for a "navy second to none." It also set up a training program for officers; a Shipping Board which founded an Emergency Fleet Corporation to create a merchant fleet; and a Council of National Defense to co-ordinate industries and defense measures. The active opponents of war joined with Wilson's political enemies to prove that the President was consciously leading the country to the edge of the abyss where he would be able to push it over.

The smoke of diplomatic and legislative battle did not conceal the fact that many Americans approved of Wilson's policy of substituting notes for bullets. A wildly enthusiastic Democratic national convention unanimously renominated him (along with Marshall) and endowed his candidacy with the slogan, "He kept us out of war." This Campaign of 1916 was accepted by the nation as a tacit pledge to continue to stay out of war. It was, to say the least, a remarkable stand for a man who a few months before had pled for a course that he admitted would lead to war. Wilson put on a masterly exhibition of carrying water on both shoulders; and, whatever the facts were about his convictions, he was supported by many advocates of all shades of action or inaction.

The Republicans, aware that the hyphenate vote would be strong, passed over the prowar TR and picked a candidate from the bench of the Supreme Court, the dignified, neatly bewhiskered, and mildly progressive Charles Evans Hughes. TR promptly led his Progressive Party back into the Republican fold and plugged for Hughes. The Republican candidate made a valiant effort also to carry water on both shoulders, but he lacked the agility of the more experienced Wilson; he failed to convince voters that he could take strong action without risking war and left the hyphenates of both sides with the fear that he proposed to act against their embattled relatives. On the other hand it could be and was maintained that Wilson had delivered peace with dignity, and even pro-Germans preferred peace to entering the war on the side of the Allies. When a professional Irishman telegraphed a protest against Wilson's pro-British policies, the President floored him with the reply: "I should feel deeply mortified to have you or anybody like you vote for me. Since you have access to many disloyal Americans and I have not, I will ask you to convey this message to them." Americans always enjoy a neat riposte, and this one skillfully pinioned Charles "Evasive" Hughes along with the Irishman. There were, of course, other issues in the campaign—Mexico, the tariff, the railroads—but the policy toward the European war certainly overshadowed them all.

By election day the two parties had so obfuscated the voters that it is likely the well-known middle group that swings elections cast their ballots



ELECTION OF 1916

531 ELECTORAL VOTES
 HUGHES—Republican: 254 electoral, 8,538,000 popular votes
 WILSON—Democrat: 277 electoral, 9,130,000 popular votes

J. W. CLEMENT CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.

more or less blindly in the desperate hope that their choice would give them what they wanted, whether peace or war. Hughes had let The elec- tion of 1916 him into antagonizing railroad labor by denouncing the Adamson Law. In the end he lost by exactly twelve electoral votes, which California could have given him.

It is claimed with some reason that Hughes lost California when in Long Beach his coaches deliberately failed to let him know that Hiram Johnson, Progressive-Republican boss of California, was staying in the same hotel. Johnson had been waiting for a friendly handshake and now apparently let it be known that he preferred Wilson. The outcome of the election was in doubt for three days, and the last state to swing to Wilson was California, by 3773 votes—where Johnson had won on the Republican senatorial ticket by almost 300,000 majority. Wilson won 277 to 254, with 266 necessary for election. The popular vote stood 9.13 million to 8.54 million. Congress remained Democratic, but the majority in the House was very narrow.

The election of 1916 was critical. War might have come in any case, but the idealism of Wilson was to play a role in American and world history into which Hughes and the Old Guard could never have fitted. Wilson now

revived the plans which he had been brewing earlier in the year, not only to end this war but to set up a "League to Enforce Peace" which should settle other disputes before they resulted in war. To do so, it was necessary to avoid the exhaustion of the combatants and, even more vitally, the bitterness brought by defeat. On 18 December he sent identical notes to the belligerents asking them to state their war aims. When they transmitted their terms in strictest confidence, Wilson saw that neither side could name concrete terms without disclosing that it fought for territory or economic or strategic advantage.

Wilson
plans for
peace


Wilson believed that there was a superior moral issue—that of the future peace and welfare of the world—which transcended national material interests and which could only be guaranteed by common action. He therefore refused to give up. On 22 January he appeared before the Senate and, speaking over the heads of statesmen "for the silent masses of mankind everywhere," laid down his cherished plan for a negotiated "peace without victory" and a League of Nations. An imposed peace, he warned prophetically, "would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last." Except by the most slavish pro-Ally elements, which included Lansing, House, and Page, the speech was received with enthusiasm in America. But the Allies read it with mortification and anger; it is even said that King George wept. By this time they were so firmly convinced that they were battling for morality that Wilson's proposal for a negotiated peace seemed to be a betrayal of principle.

"Peace
without
victory"

Germany was already convinced that nothing could be expected from Wilson and that her only hope lay in quickly beating the Allies to their knees. By now she was well supplied with up-to-date submarines and efficient crews, and she set 1 February as the date for the renewal of completely unrestricted submarine warfare. The plan was to starve England out before the British blockade starved out Germany. The High Command was ready to risk the entry of the United States into the war, but a victorious decision was anticipated before American power could make itself felt. As a sop to the United States, however, it was permitted to send one ship a week into Falmouth, provided it arrived on Sunday and left on Wednesday, carried no contraband, was painted with broad red and white stripes (barber-pole stripes, said resentful Americans), and flew a checkered flag.

Renewal of
submarine
warfare

In the light of the American threats which had extorted the *Sussex* pledge from Germany, Wilson could do no less than break diplomatic relations. This he announced on 3 February 1917 in a dramatic appearance



Steps to- ward war

before Congress, but he left the issue of war undecided, specifically asserting that it could come only if Germany committed overt acts. Events moved quickly during the next two months. The German announcement had so frightened neutral skip-pers (chiefly Americans and Scandinavians) that many of them had re-fused to put out from American ports; in consequence Allied munitions and supplies clogged the warehouses around New York, and loaded freight cars filled the sidings as far west as Pittsburgh. The threat to American prosperity and to the Allied war effort was obvious. When Congress re-fused to arm American merchantmen with antisubmarine guns, the step was taken under an old law of 1797.

On 1 March the public (through the courtesy of the British secret service) learned of the Zimmerman Note, in which the German foreign secretary proposed to Mexico that *if* war came it join with Japan in hos-tilities against the United States and recompense itself by annexing Ari-zona, New Mexico, and Texas. Finally came the overt acts for which the country was waiting, when on 12 March the unarmed American merchant-man *Algonquin* was sunk without warning, followed quickly by news of the sinking of three others. A few days later the Allies were relieved of the taint of autocracy when it was announced that the Russian Duma had

overthrown the czar and set up a liberal republic. All these events had a profound effect in crystallizing the opinions of hesitant Americans in favor of war.

On 2 April 1917 Wilson appeared before an extraordinary session of the newly-elected Congress. Pale and drawn from the nervous strain of making his momentous decision, he then read in solemn tones one of the great state papers of American history. War, he said, already existed by reason of the acts of the German government, and the United States had no honorable alternative but to accept the status of belligerent thus thrust upon it. Nevertheless, he drew a line between the German government and the German people and expressed sympathy and friendship for the latter. The war which it was now his duty to request was for the liberation of the German people as well as others.

**Declara-
tion of war,
6 April
1917**

The world must be made safe for democracy. Its peace must be planted upon the tested foundations of political liberty. We have no selfish ends to serve. We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall freely make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and the freedom of nations can make them.

Two days later the Senate approved a war resolution 82 to 6, and on the 6th the House concurred, 373 to 50. Among those who voted against the war were the veteran Progressives La Follette and Norris.

3 *Retrospect on the American Mission*

Historically the American mission had been to teach democracy by example. In 1898 an excursion had been made into the Caribbean to defend the concepts of justice and democracy and for one reason and another its sweep reached the Philippines. The intention of carrying a better way of life to the nations around the Caribbean was as inherent in the diplomacy of TR and Taft as the search for security. It found full expression in Wilson's Moral Diplomacy—as Walter Hines Page put it, shooting men into self-government.

**New phase
of the
American
mission**

The Spanish-American War carried with it a touch of the crusading spirit, but it soon died away. With the entry into World War I, Americans for the first time adopted the method of the crusade as a means of selling democratic concepts in Europe. Despite the twenty years of retreat after the war, Americans were to gain a new vision of what democracy means and how it must be defended. The old wall of aloof Pharisaism had been

breached, and thereafter the world's dictators had to reckon with the real likelihood that the United States would go abroad to defend and to spread its democratic way of life.

Why did the United States go to war in 1917? Historians usually divide between putting the responsibility on: (1) unrestricted submarine warfare, and (2) the consciousness of identity of ideological interests with the Allies. For the sake of completeness we can here add others: (3) the power of Allied, especially British, propaganda; (4) the necessity of forestalling the economic collapse that would come with Allied defeat; and, finally, (5) certain practical problems concerning the defense of the frontiers we had gained as a result of the Spanish-American War.

It is difficult to see why any one of the above should be awarded the palm. Certainly unrestricted submarine warfare furnished the occasion; if as some claim we would never have gone to war without it, then it must also be acknowledged as the cause. British propaganda was persistent and pervasive, but it owed its effectiveness to the recipient mood of the American people; the all but complete failure of German propaganda tends to demonstrate this fact. Entry was not forced by fear that the Allies were losing; the collapse of Italy and Russia was still in the future, and the current defeat of Rumania was not regarded as decisive. It is true that both Germany and the Allies were desperately uncertain as to whether they could hold out on the Western Front; but this doubt was unknown to the American people, and it came as a shock to Wilson when Allied missions informed him that they were in serious danger of losing the war.

We cannot, as is so often done, lightly dismiss the economic factors, yet it seems fair to say that the United States did not go to war to save the House of Morgan's investments. Nor would Wall Street have wished for such small stakes to have thrown good money after bad or risked the inevitable dislocations of war. Doubtless the Democrats were concerned with the effect of war prosperity on elections, but for that matter the Republicans were also. For the economic causes of American entry one must go deeper. Wall Street saw that a German victory would cause an immense dislocation of the existing pattern of finance, trade, and imperial interests, and a long period of readjustment which would breed further wars and financial perils; it is only natural that it should favor the British-dominated system with which it was allied and which it regarded as good for the world.

But there was more to the economic aspect. Whether rightly or not, the average American entrepreneur (and the would-be entrepreneur, which included almost everybody) felt that the American system of freedom of enterprise and opportunity was menaced by German authoritarianism. Scarcely anyone saw that Germany itself, once relieved of external pressures, might also adopt the American system.

Wilson saw the war as a crusade whose idealism was being sold out by the overly practical Allies. His mission was to point up the idealistic reasons for conflict and make the war a great step in the moral development of humanity. That is why, as we can read in his speeches, he sold the war to the people of the United States as a war for democratic and national honor, imbued the Allied peoples with the same spirit, and even sought to convince the people of the Central Powers. His case was bolstered by the German invasion of Belgium, a serious blunder because it did not succeed in its objective, which was the quick conquest of France. Actually the action was no more cynical than the Allied invasion of Greece in 1916 to get a base at Salonika, but Wilson was able to ignore this and the many Allied semisecret territorial bribes to Italy and others. Then in the nick of time came the Russian Revolution of March 1917 to relieve the Allies of the charge of supporting authoritarianism.

How Wilson sold the war

The over-all result was that Wilson succeeded in putting new life into the Allies; now their people were fighting not for lost territories or colonial or trade grabs but for the democratic, economic, and cultural rights of nations and individuals. The surge of enthusiasm that followed was a powerful factor in ending the four-year stalemate, in stopping the last despairing German thrust, and in winning the war in a triumphant four-months counterthrust.

—and insured the frustration of his ideals

On both the domestic and the world scenes the weakness of Wilson's method eventually counterbalanced its strength. People can and do act heroically under the stimulus of an ideal, but for the long pull they need the even more powerful belief that there are practical issues at stake—perhaps even survival. Let the struggle drag out and they become weary of doing good for its own sake; let the struggle end before the emotions have been purged and there is likely to follow an anticlimax of hatred, fear, and selfishness. When Wilson preached hatred of the governmental and social systems of the Central Powers, he unwittingly laid the basis for hatred of the *people* of the Central Powers. It was a human tendency to adopt the simple belief that all good was on one side and all evil on the other.

When Wilson underplayed (more frequently ignored) the practical reasons for American entry, he contributed to bringing on the postwar debacle. There were practical reasons, but most Americans were blissfully ignorant of them. It was absurd to speak of an invasion of the United States immediately after a German victory unless Germany had the aid of the British and French navies. The German navy was constructed for use *only* in the North Sea; the experts knew this fact, but they carefully avoided mentioning it. Nevertheless, a German victory would have been followed by a period of violent readjustment from which Germany would have snatched the mastery of the Atlantic. In the long run the United States, which had just suc-

Practical reasons for entering the war

ceeded in convincing Britain of the sanctity of the Monroe Doctrine, would have had the whole process to repeat with Germany. Just what would have happened is anyone's guess.

It seems clear, however, that we would have been isolated from any possible allies, for the defeated powers (after the fashion common among humanity) would have blamed their fall largely on us. On the other side of the world our plight would have been only less serious, for Japan, whose ties to the Allied cause were at best tenuous, would probably have seen its opportunity to seize the Philippines and consolidate control of the Orient. Thus bereft of allies and menaced on both sides, the United States would have been in an extremely perilous position—perhaps no more perilous than it is today, but our power and experience would have been less adequate to the crisis.

At the time, a considerable segment of American opinion believed that we could trust a victorious Germany to be reasonable. It was pointed out that other neutrals suffered far more from submarines than we did, yet

**Would
victorious
Germany
have been
reason-
able?** stayed out of the war; Norway, for example, lost 5000 sailors and half of its merchant fleet. It is likely that a German victory in 1914 or even in 1915 would not have had dire consequences for the United States or for the world. At that time the United States had not made its antipathy for Germany so insultingly clear, nor had long years of blood and frustration built up the hatreds which came later and which found expression in Germany's harsh terms to Rumania and Russia. Probably by 1917 the only realistic course for the United States was to enter the war, but the action was in itself a confession of the bankruptcy of reason and intelligence.

It is the custom to seek the origins of World War I in European rivalries and to absolve the United States of guilt. The matter should not be thus easily shrugged off, for the economic and ideological impact of the

**Problems
of U.S. re-
sponsibility
for World
War I** United States was already a powerful disruptive influence, though probably not decisive. Even more significant was the American illusion of isolation, which held that we had no share or responsibility for either starting or solving European quarrels, and which consequently ignored the gathering of the clouds of world conflict. For twenty years the world had hung on the edge of a terrible abyss before its hold loosened and it tumbled in.

Of course, our moral judgment on much of what transpired after the war began depends upon whether human rights were really at stake. Actually the problems of Europe in 1914 were probably not unsolvable, provided its statesmen had realized the terrible alternative

**Hindsight
on 1914** which faced them. It is true that Germany, dominated by hard-souled junkers and a mischievous Kaiser, had developed the cult of blood and iron and authority, but there was still a large proto-

democratic element struggling for the Teutonic soul, and it might conceivably have won had there been no World War I or had that war been brief. England must share responsibility for the coming of chaos because *its* unimaginative statesmen and bankers could not envision the logical next step to the *Pax Britannica*. France, as always, was motivated by fear, revenge, and love for glory; Austria was desperate with the fear of early dissolution; and Russia, blindly expansionist (or was it cynically?), thrust out tentacles toward the vital interests of half a dozen powers. But the keys were Britain, France, Germany, and the United States.

Britain, France, and Germany should have found a *modus vivendi* early in the century, but they did not. One more chance remained, even for a year or more after the outbreak of war: a vigorous American intervention with either the sword or the olive branch, or both, in favor of a negotiated peace. That intervention might have taken one or a combination of several forms: (1) an embargo on munitions; (2) the threat of naval action to force Allied adherence to the old laws of neutrality; (3) if necessary, the carrying of that threat into action; and (4) joining the Allies at the time of the *Lusitania* crisis, but firmly and intelligently exercising all its force for a negotiated peace.

What the
U.S. might
have done

These methods are suggested not in any certainty that the American people would have permitted their adoption but to illustrate the tragedy of American isolation and immaturity. There may have been times when the country would have supported the use of the navy to enforce neutral rights; at least Wilson might have bluffed, but apparently he was no poker player. The nation has never had a more pregnant opportunity to implement the American mission, nor botched it more thoroughly. Effective action, of course, would have had to be based upon a single-minded American determination to promote a negotiated peace in the style of the Congress of Vienna rather than a peace arrogantly dictated to a broken and humiliated foe. From the first the Allies were conscious that a negotiated peace was the American desire; and in the winter of 1915-16 Ambassador Gerard affirmed that Germany was ready for it, provided it was really negotiated and not a concealed demand for surrender. Probably this was the moment of decision.

Negotia-
tion the
only sal-
vation

The United States never had the right after that to call itself honestly neutral; of course, its departure from neutrality had already been strongly evidenced, though not enough to destroy its possible role of peacemaker. In dealing with the Allies it showed remarkably little disposition to either bluff or bargain. It frittered away useful precedents. It surrendered its bargaining points without receiving compensation. It reserved its rights but yielded in fact so frequently that the Allies came to rely upon that. Such weakness earned Allied contempt, as occasionally cropped out when

Unneu-
trality un-
dercuts
chances of
negotiation

they neglected properly to cushion their words or their moves. Lansing, Page, and House were willing Allied stooges; they did not abandon the idea of a negotiated peace, but they sold out its spirit by insisting that it must be negotiated on Allied terms. Under their influence and that of his own conscience, Wilson wavered and procrastinated, and his sense of political possibilities on the American scene contributed to his uncertainty.

On the other hand, every advantageous argument against Germany was fully developed, and Wilson never for a moment yielded his basic stand in support of American rights against German submarines. It was not amazing that the Germans were embittered and came to see that they were prejudged. If Wilson honestly wanted to work for a negotiated peace, and the evidence is that he did, he was destroying the ground essential to the structure by perpetually yielding in fact to the Allies even as he sharply called the Germans to order. The Allies in the end refused negotiation because they were confident they could put Wilson in their pocket; the Germans refused because they plainly saw that he was prejudiced.

4 *The Home Fires Burning*

When the United States entered the war not even House seems to have known what a desperate situation the Allies were in. Troubles were multiplying at the moment and threatening for the future. Finances were practically exhausted. Submarines were spreading havoc among Allied situation desperate Allied shipping. Weariness was breeding defeatism in France, Italy, and Russia. These were the things emphasized by a stream of missions from the Allied powers as they pled for help of all kinds, but particularly for men—men in millions. They had a desperate chance of holding out in 1917 but saw no possibility of reversing the tide without vast American reinforcements. The plea was driven home later in the year, when the Italian army all but melted away at Caporetto and the Bolshevik coup in November took Russia out of the war. Presently Rumania was to be knocked out, and Germany was to occupy the lush wheat fields of the Ukraine. Still, even at the best, the Allies did not expect the full weight of American production and man power to be felt for two years; 1919 was the anticipated year of victory.

The share of the United States in World War I did not strain its man power and resources as had the Civil War, but it was nevertheless a spectacular effort from every angle. The war itself fell into three phases: six months of planning, eight months of getting the plans under way, and five months of operations. As it turned out, the war was won with less than the planned effort, and itself proved to be less significant to the future than the decisions which came upon its heels. Nevertheless, the war effort afforded the nation a chance to flex its unused muscles and to discover that it could hold its own with any power in the world.

American leaders had anticipated that our contributions would be in furnishing financial, material, and naval aid, and that the American flag in France would wave over no more than a token army. It was realized, of course, that a larger army would be needed for miscellaneous chores, and plans were already being formed for drafting the necessary men. However, there was considerable opposition even in Congress to the Selective Service Act, and it was not passed until late in May. Local classification of registrants and selection of draftees were carried out by civilian draft boards. The first registration was of 9.5 million men aged 21 to 31 inclusive; later registrations took in all between 18 and 45, a grand total of over 24 million. In order to encourage enlistments and raise the morale of draftees, generous provisions were presently made by Congress for maintenance allowances to soldiers' dependents and for a program of War Risk Insurance that paid as high as \$10,000 in case of death.

**Selective
Service**

The navy and the marine corps did not need to resort to the draft, but the massive army—now under a new Secretary of War, Newton D. Baker, the Cleveland reformer—had to call for 2,800,000 men. Plans were made to raise one hundred divisions (each of 28,000 men), but only fifty-five were organized and of these forty-two reached France. As it turned out, divisions 1 through 20 were Regular Army, 26 through 42 National Guard, and 76 through 93 National Army. The original plan was to organize draftees into the so-called National Army, but continual transfers soon broke down all distinctions. The total strength of the American army (some soldiers were discharged before the end of the war) was 4,057,000, of which 2,086,000 served overseas; navy and marine corps accounted for 750,000 more—a grand total of 4,800,000. One of the most significant phases of the military program was the enormous expansion of the hitherto piddling little air corps of 55 out-of-date planes. Plans were made to train 20,000 pilots (plus mechanics) and to build close to 30,000 planes.

**Army or-
ganization
and
command**

The wise decision was made at the outset that this army should be organized on professional lines and placed under professional command. The result was that there were no political generals to spread entanglements across the road to victory. Pershing, a vigorous and competent professional, was given command in France, while the position of chief of staff was held successively by Hugh L. Scott, Tasker H. Bliss, and Peyton C. March.

As in all American wars, there was an acute lack of experienced staff planners and even of competent administrative and line-officer personnel. A number of Officers' Training Camps soon began to grind out thousands of second lieutenants, known widely as "shave-tails" and "ninety-day wonders." Probably they were at least better than the elected officers of the Civil War. A total of thirty-two canton-

Training

ments were built, each to hold 48,000 men, and (taking warning from the high death rate in makeshift camps during previous wars) they were elaborately equipped with barracks, modern plumbing, and hospitals. There was a common belief that Pershing, who was proud of his lean figure and military bearing, had imposed on the new army its painfully tight olive-drab uniform—blouse with choking stand-up collar, riding pants drawn down tightly below the knees, and wrap-around leggings.

Since it was essential that the new army be in France by the spring of 1918, there was obviously no time for the elaborate training given to European troops. Most of the troops received basic training in the States, then (when there was time) more intensive training in France

Casualties

either in quiet sectors or behind the lines. The result was that American battle deaths on land and sea were disproportionately high, a total of about 50,500 killed and about 182,000 wounded. Casualties, however, were practically confined to a period of five months in 1918, during which the Allied armies were on the offensive.

It was not in Congressional nature to permit the President to guide the war effort without interference; so, as rumors of inefficiency multiplied there was a movement in Congress to take control by means of a Committee on the Conduct of the War. When the Sixty-Fifth Congress reassembled in December 1917, a senatorial committee began to probe and did not find it difficult to uncover a vast amount of confusion in affairs of military supply and organization. The administration struck back by pointing out that the original confusion—if that was what it was—had already given way to a smoothly running apparatus. By the end of the winter Secretary Baker was able to testify that a spring freshet was already under way which could, as fast as shipping became available, pour 1.5 million men across the Atlantic. Congress was convinced and began to grind out legislation which gave Wilson war powers unprecedented in American history.


The war necessitated a vast co-operative effort within industry which was an almost direct reversal of the philosophy of the New Freedom. The government learned only after numerous disastrous experiments how to co-ordinate national man power and resources for war. At first it was hoped that a system of governmental and industrial advisory boards would be able to hew out policies, but the hope proved delusory and one by one the boards had to be transformed into dictatorial bodies. There eventually emerged six principal boards, which dealt with shipping, food, fuel, railroads, trade, and priorities. Their administrators constituted a sort of War Cabinet, which met with the President every week. Their power was based upon a number of legislative acts, which were capped in May 1918 by the Overman Act, which swept so many powers into the President's hands for the duration plus six months

Evolution of directing agencies

that a critic suggested the addition of a final clause: "If any power, Constitutional or not, has been inadvertently omitted from this bill, it is hereby granted in full."

The U.S. Shipping Board and its operating agency, the Emergency Fleet Corporation, were confronted by the necessity of providing a "bridge of ships" to France. Shipbuilding was not an important American industry, and shipyards had to be built from scratch. By the end of the war a monthly output of 140 ships had been attained, but the fact is that very few of the specially built ships were in use by the Armistice. The not inconsiderable American tonnage of 8.7 million was

Shipping



Donahy, permission Cleveland Plain Dealer

And, by ginger, he can play 'em all! But it keeps Uncle Sam busy these days.

The cartoonist views the Federal government's unprecedented control of economic activities during World War I.

scraped together largely by seizing German ships in American ports, purchase of neutral ships, and appropriation of all construction under way at the outset of the war. This was perhaps ten times the American tonnage engaged in foreign trade in 1914.

No less dramatic was the mobilization of food under the Lever Act of August 1917. Herbert Hoover, a mining engineer who had administered American private relief in Belgium, became food "czar" and gave the name "Hooverizing" to his program. Grain was withheld from distillers and brewers, and farmers were given a guarantee of \$2.00 a bushel minimum for wheat. The result was a vast expansion of agricultural effort as marginal farms and new land (chiefly on the Plains) were brought into production. Hoarders and profiteers not only were pun-

Food

ished but were pilloried as traitors. Victory gardens were promoted. Meatless and wheatless days were marked on the calendar. It was not found necessary, however, to resort to rationing cards, though there were rough approximations of rationing to food processors. Much of the Food Administration's effort was devoted to educating the people to the importance of eating lightly and saving scraps, and to inculcating the motto "Food will win the war." On the whole, Hoover's work met with signal success; foodstuffs sent to Europe amounted to three times the normal prewar exports.

The Fuel Administration, also authorized by the Lever Act, was headed by Harry A. Garfield, son of the President. Efforts were made to stimulate coal and oil production, and heatless and gasolineless days were ordained.

Fuel Rationing was not resorted to, but every device was used to rally public opinion in favor of self-denial. When all efforts failed and in January 1918 ships were unable to sail for lack of coal, all nonessential industries east of the Mississippi were closed for five days.

The fuel shortage, it was claimed, rose from the diversion of transportation facilities to hauling fuel for nonessential uses. The railroads had cooperated well in applying freight priorities and in expediting traffic, but there were inevitable delays in unloading and consequently
Railroads freight cars lay idle for long periods. Late in 1917 Wilson took over control of the railroads and waterways under authority of the Army Appropriation Act of 1916 and placed his son-in-law, William G. McAdoo, in control as Director General. While McAdoo's control was more that of a co-ordinator than a manager, it eliminated unnecessary services and resulted in the relief of congestion. Yet the railroads resented the step as unnecessary (as perhaps it was) and a reflection upon their patriotism. Before the end of the war administration of telephones, telegraphs, and cables was placed in the hands of the Postmaster-General.

The War Trade Board, headed by Vance McCormick and operating under the Espionage Act and the Trading-with-the-Enemy Act, exercised tight controls over exports and imports by a system of licenses. Goods regarded as nonessential or as likely to reach the enemy were
War Trade Board forbidden to leave the country, and the compliance of neutral shipping was forced by withholding coal. While the board did not go to the extremes to which the British had gone in regulating neutral commerce, it adopted the blacklisting of enemy-controlled enterprises. On the pleas that enemy-controlled corporations were hampering the war effort, A. Mitchell Palmer was appointed Alien Property Custodian with power to seize enemy-owned property and patents. By the end of the war Palmer was in control of assets worth \$500 million, and the later sale of these properties and patents to American industry at bargain rates became a national scandal.

Kingpin of the economic side of the war effort was the War Industries Board under the administration of Bernard ("Barney") M. Baruch, a suc-

cessful Wall Street promoter. The board dictated the allotment and uses of materials; assigned priorities in manufactures, in filling orders, and in transportation; supervised all Allied purchases; and with the consent of the President could fix prices. It could and did standardize products by limiting the number of shapes, colors, and sizes of numerous articles.

War Industries Board

This tremendous co-ordinated effort was just getting into stride when the war ended. Of course enormous quantities of fuel, food, clothing, machinery, trucks, and less complex forms of equipment were poured into Europe, along with vast stores of such types of munitions as had already been in process of manufacture for the Allies. The effect in many other lines was not so evident, as we have already seen in the case of ships. Motor makers pooled their efforts to design the Liberty airplane motor, but only about 32,000 were made and of these perhaps 200 reached the front. Vast plans were made for plane production; but though they resulted in the manufacture of thousands of trainers, only a few planes went overseas. Artillery and machine-gun production also lagged.

The results

Of course it was embarrassing to have to depend upon the hard-pressed Allies for many important items, yet it must not be supposed that American production fell down on the job. Even though the full weight of American industrial might was never felt at the front, the Germans well knew what it was that swung the balances against them; Baruch had become a name feared and admired in Germany.

American engineers applied themselves to licking production problems with notable success, thereby greatly advancing productive capacity and accuracy. Someone has said that the difference between the two great wars was that, in the first, parts were made with tolerances of one-thousandth of an inch; in the second, they had been reduced to one ten-thousandth of an inch. The amazingly accurate "Jo blocks" invented in Sweden and long used as precision gauges were supplemented by "Hoke blocks," which were even more accurate. Mass-production methods were applied to such unheard-of industries as shipbuilding, and Knudsen's "Eagle" submarine chasers were actually made on assembly lines. The United States emerged from the war not only with a plant undamaged by enemy action but with enormously expanded capacities based upon new machinery and vastly increased know-how.

Closely allied to the six great War Boards, but without their sweeping powers was the National War Labor Board under the co-chairmanship of William H. Taft and Frank P. Walsh, a labor lawyer of New York. Samuel Gompers was a zealous supporter of labor co-operation in the war effort. The war had removed many men from jobs, and the U.S. Employment Service was expanded to help those remaining to find the most useful places. At the same time a strong

Labor and the war

effort was made to induce women to enter industry. A War Labor Policies Board under Felix Frankfurter, Harvard law professor, helped to formulate labor policies in war industries. Though shortages and vastly increased currency issues led to high prices, wages shot up so fast that real wages were much higher than before the war. The government led the wage rise in its own shipyards and war plants, and its agencies clearly favored labor over industry.

Labor unions prospered and, as we shall see, dreamed of consolidating and continuing their power after the war. A thousand serious strikes and disputes came before Taft and Walsh for final adjudication; in a few cases Wilson had to seize plants or threaten workers with the cancellation of draft deferments. Most serious labor troubles were in the West, where the I.W.W. bitterly opposed the war as an instrument of imperialism and labor suppression. Government and state agents and private vigilantes moved in on the brotherhood and imprisoned or scattered its members. In a coppermine strike at Bisbee, Arizona 1100 strikers were unceremoniously dumped in the middle of the desert and left to shift for themselves.

Congress had scarcely declared war before it voted generous credits to the Allies and began to consider how money should be raised. There were advocates of a pay-as-you-go policy, but the procrastinators won out on the plea that unduly high taxes would discourage enterprise. Accordingly the decision was made to pass on two thirds of the cost to posterity, though, even as it was, Congress felt obliged to impose a horde of nuisance taxes, an excess-profits tax, and eventually set the graduated income tax (after generous exemptions) at 6 to 77 per cent. The popular pocket was tapped in four Liberty Loan drives and a fifth drive, the Victory Loan; these brought in \$21.5 billion. The war cost about \$22 billion directly, while \$10 billion were loaned to the Allies. The latter sum, of course, was largely spent in the United States.

It was evident at the time we entered the war that millions of citizens, especially in the West, were not enthusiastically behind the move. Isolationist sentiment was strong, a "limited liability" war was still being advocated, and many were still unwilling to fight even for their own rights. When the military services proposed the immediate imposition of a strict censorship, Wilson consulted with an experienced newspaper and publicity man named George Creel. Creel advised him that what was needed was not censorship but full information; the press could be relied upon to refrain from giving away military secrets! Wilson accepted the advice with relief and set up the Committee on Public Information with Creel as chairman.

Creel was not hampered by false modesty, and he quickly made himself the boss of CPI and undertook a dynamic and far-reaching program.



From "Life," 1918

Creel's propaganda laid emphasis upon the danger from the Kaiser and the German military masters.

He believed implicitly in the Wilsonian thesis of the idealistic objectives of the war, and he proceeded to sell this to the nation and the world. It was a publicity man's dream and a reflective man's nightmare. Periodicals, organizations, and individual citizens were deluged with propaganda handouts and "Red-White-and-Blue Books" full of arguments and vituperation. Artists, writers, professors, actors, and motion-picture producers were mobilized, indoctrinated, and sent forth to preach the gospel in their media. About 75,000 "Four-Minute Men" were sent before lodges, church congregations, conventions, motion-picture audiences—indeed, wherever groups were gathered—to stir up war enthusiasm, sell bonds, and urge compliance to food and fuel regulations. Presently Creel's CPI moved overseas with leaflets bearing translations of Wilson's addresses and shot them out of guns into the German lines or dropped them from airplanes.

There can be no doubt that Wilson had done the realistic thing in leading the nation into war, and because the people did not all see it that



By Stinson in the Dayton Daily News

This note, first struck during World War I, has sounded frequently since then.

way it was necessary to inform them. But Creel was preaching not only
 Spreading
 germs of
 hatred Wilsonian idealism but hate, and the reflex action was to
 bear tragic results. Wilson himself had considered this possi-
 bility before recommending a declaration of war. "Once lead
 this people into war," he said, "and they'll forget that there ever was such
 a thing as tolerance. To fight you must be brutal and ruthless, and the
 spirit of ruthless brutality will enter into every fiber of our national life,
 infecting Congress, the courts, the policemen on the beat, the man in the
 street."

But Creel had the publicity man's usual disregard of moral consequences when in pursuit of an object, and he undertook to sell an ideal by spreading germs of hatred. He leaned heavily on the thesis of Prussian militarism and German war guilt and scattered horror cartoons, though to his credit he did not make as much use of atrocity stories as the British did. The total result was that Wilson's policy fell between the two stools of idealism and hatred. The public reacted as might have been expected. Germans were sometimes ostracized and persecuted. Teaching German was frequently forbidden in the schools. German-language newspapers were closely watched and occasionally prosecuted. A number of socialist papers which criticized the war or its conduct were suppressed. Finally sauerkraut was renamed Liberty cabbage, and German measles became Liberty measles! Conformity to the popular will was demanded, and it was the rare person who dared to refuse.

An Espionage Act (June 1917) clothed the Attorney-General with authority to bring before the courts those accused of obstructing the war effort; at the same time the Postmaster-General was given wide powers to censor the mail. The Sabotage Act (April 1918) made it a Federal offense to sabotage public or private materials or activities intended to forward the war effort. In May 1918 the Sedition Act amended previous legislation to punish utterances which brought contempt or disrepute on the Constitution, the form of government, the flag, or the uniform, or which defended such utterances or were "attempts to obstruct" the prosecution of the war.

**Legislating
loyalty**

Former German sympathizers supported the war effort so zealously that the above laws operated most heavily upon socialists, syndicalists, and pacifists. There were many wild denunciations and arbitrary arrests, for the country was enmeshed in a spy scare and was intensely suspicious of anyone who did not strictly conform. Around 2000 persons were prosecuted under the Sedition Law, and a number of famous cases came before the Supreme Court in the post-Armistice period. Because of the peculiar fact that American participation in the war did not technically end until 1921, the laws remained in effect and were found more useful in prosecuting radicals than pro-Germans.

In looking back one is impressed by the cheerful and zealous co-operation of all elements in the war effort more than by their intolerance. The public had only a vague impression of the size of the task and embarked upon it with youthful enthusiasm and optimism. The Civil War was a dim memory, and the Spanish-American War had in popular estimation been short and glorious. This was a mechanized nation, but it had no conception of the role of the machine in warfare, nor did it catch more than a glimpse of the truth during its brief experience with World War I. The possibility of defeat was not enter-

**Public op-
timism: a
singing war**



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Having their fling

A caustic socialist criticism of World War I

tained for a moment, nor was there any really serious conviction that national existence was at stake; in any case, the public had imbibed Wilson's Calvinistic belief that right must prevail. The country never quite lost the feeling that it was playing a game whose significance was more moral than practical. It was a singing war, not only in the army but all over the nation. There was a spate of war songs, almost invariably humorous, as *K-K-K-Katy*, or cheerfully determined, as *Over There*. In addition a nostalgic military glamor was cast over sentimental ditties, such as *Smiles, There's a Long, Long Trail*, and *Keep the Home Fires Burning*.

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Chapter XLIV

WORLD WAR I: CRUSADE AND RETREAT

1 *The Great Crusade*

AMERICANS were proud of the fact that the United States had had no allies since the abrogation of the French Alliance in 1800 and had long since convinced themselves that this condition was true because they did not have the same carnal nature as the other nations and would not make democracy the tool of European materialism and imperialism. It was an interesting aspect of the American mythus which Wilson probably shared; at any rate, he knew better than to try to "ally" his country with the Allies. Instead, the United States technically became an "associated power," thereby making clear its refusal to bind itself to war or peace policies which might be forced upon it by the majority voice.

U.S. becomes an "associated power"

This action did not, however, eclipse the American belief that teamwork was essential if the job in hand was to be tackled efficiently. The winter of 1917-18 saw the first serious moves toward co-operation, and these were due not solely to American prodding but to Russian defection and to the Italian collapse at Caporetto. The road to co-operation was paved with difficulties of several sorts, but they were summed up in the fact that the British and French still distrusted each other and their military efforts were seldom co-ordinated: "when one attacked, the other usually stood still."

British and French rivalry

Each ally naturally sought to bind the United States to its own concept of strategy. They found American credits very welcome and used part of them to release their own resources for use in entrenching themselves for

Allied attitudes toward U.S. the postwar competitive battle—which would be waged against the United States as well as between themselves. It is difficult to avoid the impression that the Allies were one chiefly in their determination to force the gawky American “associate” to accept their decisions, and in pursuing this aim they decided to prevent the creation of a separate American army in France. In the face of Allied attitudes the patience of Wilson, Baker, Pershing, and House was monumental. Aided by the logic of the situation they managed to establish inter-allied controls of purchasing food, munitions, and ocean transport. The most difficult step was the erection (November 1917) of a Supreme War Council composed of both political and military representatives.

There was least friction in naval affairs, in which the British rightfully laid claim to pre-eminence. Wilson had brought into the secretaryship of the navy the personally estimable Josephus Daniels, a progressive editor from North Carolina. He had the curious idea—which Wilson shared—that naval readiness was unneutral and had therefore pointedly let the navy fall behind. This policy was aided if not actually abetted by a group of old-school admirals who did not want the even tenor of their ways disturbed. During the war the navy insisted on keeping the bulk of its force on patrol along the American coast and for months would send no more than a piddling quota of ships and personnel to Europe. As a matter of fact, submarines became active along the coast in the summer of 1918, laying mines (one of which sank a cruiser), and sinking ships, schooners, and fishing vessels.

The placidity of naval vested interests had long been ruffled by the activities of a certain William Sowden Sims, who had come up from Annapolis at the slow pace then universal in the service. Sims was possessed of a mental curiosity and a degree of independence not strictly in keeping with naval tradition. He criticized naval design, gunnery, organization, and the promotion system. **William S. Sims (1858–1936)** The naval War College at Newport, promoted by such forward-looking admirals as Mahan and bitterly opposed by the old “practical” school, was also a pet of Sims’s and it was there that he worked out many of the tactics which he later put to use. All together he managed to get himself thoroughly disliked by naval conservatives, but TR favored his ideas and succeeded in putting some of them across.

Sims’s relations with Daniels were never good, but he was appointed naval commander in Europe, probably at the intercession of Assistant Secretary Franklin D. Roosevelt and of the Chief of Naval Operations,

“Simsadus” Admiral William S. Benson, a fair-minded member of the old school. As a result Sims became “Simsadus”—Commander of the United States Naval Forces Operating in European Waters. He was pointedly kept under home control (unlike Pershing), and Daniels later

maintained that he was nothing but a liaison officer. Nevertheless, Sims commanded forty-five naval bases scattered from Murmansk to Greece. For a man who was famous for his lack of tact he got along remarkably well with Allied naval officials. He achieved success despite the department's tendency to withhold reinforcements, load him down with unsympathetic subordinate commanders, and overrule his decisions.

The United States Navy performed four chief functions during the war: (1) antisubmarine patrol; (2) convoy duty; (3) mine laying; and (4) participation in the blockade of Germany. The first American destroyers reported for duty at Queenstown, Ireland in May 1917. In addition to the usual naval vessels about 400 American subchasers eventually entered service, some even in the Mediterranean. From four to six battleships under Admiral Hugh Rodman were usually with the Grand Fleet in the North Sea on the dreary patrol which prevented the Germans from bursting forth and perhaps ending the war by naval action. In order to simplify the problem of the submarine, the American fleet laid a 240-mile barrage of mines from the Orkneys to Norway—in itself perhaps as grievous a breach of neutral rights as any of which Wilson had complained.

**Naval
mission**

For a number of reasons the British Admiralty had not instituted the convoy system, and as a result merchant ships were being sunk at an appalling rate. A convoy system was now initiated at Sims's insistence and with the aid of American vessels. By the spring of 1918 the submarine menace had been essentially licked, and the U-boats were less hunters than hunted. The tonnage sunk had been 640,000 per month from February through July 1917 and 300,000 per month from August through January; thereafter it was 200,000 per month. During the war 350 American convoys with 2123 ships and 1124 British convoys with 16,530 ships had traversed the Atlantic. The loss in troop transports was light. Only two British transports, loaded with American troops, and three American westbound and lightly loaded transports were lost; the total loss of men is usually reckoned at 733.

**Convoy
system**

John Joseph ("Black Jack") Pershing, commander of the American Expeditionary Forces in France, was one of the few American generals who had lately commanded a large body of troops in an active campaign. Born in Missouri and a graduate of West Point, Pershing had come up through service on the frontier and in Cuba and the Philippines to command of the spectacularly unsuccessful chase into Mexico after Villa. Lean, iron-jawed, and sternly military, Pershing had unlimited confidence in himself and the unswerving support of Wilson and Baker. Pershing was, however, to need every ounce of his self-confidence and of official backing.

**John J.
Pershing
(1860–
1948)**

With less than 290 men he landed in England on 7 June 1917 and after

a short stay moved on to Paris, where he established headquarters of the American Expeditionary Forces. Later in the month the first regiments of the 1st Division landed in France, and on the Fourth of July a few thousand Yanks marched through Paris. Pershing was not long in sizing up the situation and extorting from the reluctant Allies the promise of a sector on the Lorraine frontier far east of Paris which the French regarded as not likely to be chosen by the Germans




Permission Jacksonville Journal

World War I, to the cartoonists' amusement, introduced many Americans to European race and place names for the first time.

as a high road to Paris. The sector was to be supplied from Marseille and Bay of Biscay ports by railroads which passed south of the French nerve center of Paris.

Pershing saw immediately that the ports assigned to him would have to be dredged and equipped with new machinery, and the railroads would have to be practically rebuilt. His first call, therefore, was for technical troops and all sorts of equipment. In September he moved his headquarters to Chaumont and presently set up a Service of Supply headquarters at Tours, eventually under the able command of General James G. Harbord. Though the U.S. Army had set up a General Staff in 1903, it lacked both organization and experience. Pershing followed the French system and set up five sections: G-1, Administration; G-2, Intelligence; G-3, Operations; G-4, Coordination; and G-5, Training. For combat duty Pershing demanded that he be sent by 1 July 1918 a total of twenty-four divisions of 28,000 men—which, with the men in the rear echelon, would probably bring the total up to a million.

American troops were for the most part billeted in French villages or encamped in tent cities set down amidst the eternal rain and mud of France. From February 1918 there was an army newspaper, *The Stars and Stripes*. Trips to Paris and other cities were occasionally granted—and sometimes taken AWOL. The Red Cross specialized on medical and hospital care, but reading rooms, concerts, vaudeville, and singfests were provided by a variety of organizations.



The Y.M.C.A. sold candy and cigarets; the arrangement was much like the later PX, but there was current criticism that they were not given away as the Salvation Army gave away coffee and doughnuts. But the men were resourceful in such matters as getting acquainted with *vin rouge* and the mademoiselles. Soon the camps were ringing with a variety of improvised songs, among them:

Mademo'selle from Armentières; parlez-vous?
 Mademo'selle from Armentières; parlez-vous?
 Oh, the French they are a funny race,
 They swipe your francs and lie to your face.
 Hinkey Dinkey, parlez-vous.

This and a hundred unprintable additions expressed the ordinary American's opinion of the civilization he had come to save. It was, perhaps, quite unfair, but at least the Americans were as heartily criticized in return.

The Allies looked upon Pershing's elaborate preparations with suspicion, and the generals and politicians saw a threat to their intention of sifting Americans by companies, battalions, and regiments into their own brigades as reinforcements. Above all, they were determined that the American flag would not fly over a separate army. **Allies try to break up U.S. Army** The reason most frequently offered was that time would not permit the long training necessary if an American army was to be entrusted with a sector; less audible but no less evident was the Allied belief that American democracy had weakened the military capabilities of its citizens and that they would be of use only if stiffened by French and British. It was also a wound to the prestige of France to have operating on its soil a foreign army which it was planned would eventually outnumber the French army. Not far behind was yet a fourth reason: if Americans could be deprived of a sector, they would be less conscious of military accomplishment and so would offer less obstruction to the Allied aims at the peace table.

The attempt to prevent the organization of a separate American army failed to make headway against Pershing's iron determination. Nevertheless, it continued all winter; nor did the Allies lose hope until August 1918.

Pershing insists on an American army When they failed to break Pershing down by frontal attack, they tried trickery and false interpretation of agreements and finally carried their case to Wilson. The latter stood behind Pershing, indeed for obvious political reasons he could do nothing else. When these attempts all met with failure, the British announced that they had no ships available for the transport of American troops.

That Pershing was right—and not merely from the political and prestige angles—admits of no dispute. As he pointed out grimly, the Allies had forgotten how to fight in the open and until they got out of their trenches

they had no hope of winning the war. He did not propose to allow American troops to be convinced that the chief business of a soldier was to stand in trenches but rather insisted that they must be imbued with the spirit of the offensive. Moreover, if there was no American army, he would not have the weight to break the deadlock between the British and the French over command. He saw clearly that results could come only when all Allied efforts were co-ordinated under one command.

The first American units went into training around Chaumont, and in October 1917 they saw their first front-line service. The plan for careful training broke down when on 21 March 1918 the Germans, reinforced by troops released from the Russian front, launched their great peace offensive (*Friedensturm*). Their intention was to win the war before American strength could weight the balances.

**German
Frieden-
sturm**

German success scared the British and French into setting up Foch as co-ordinator of the new Executive War Board, and presently (14 April) as generalissimo. The German offensive had been opened by a push against the British on the Somme toward Amiens; and when this slowed down because the attackers outran their service of supply, a second push (in April) was begun in Flanders. To draw French strength from the north Ludendorff now attacked (27 May) in Champagne along the strong line of the Chemin des Dames; to his surprise the French crumbled, and the Germans took Soissons and advanced to Château-Thierry on the Marne, only thirty-seven miles from Paris. Foch had badly miscalculated, and the British did not hesitate to make him sweat for it.


Nevertheless the crisis at last drove the Allies together. The British had been heavily bled by the German offensive, and when Pershing agreed to let the troops the British brought over serve temporarily on their front, they miraculously found the ships they had denied having. At Allied insistence he agreed to give priority to infantry and machine gunners, and as a result tanks and artillery were late in coming and indeed in some cases never did get over. At the time Pershing had only five combat divisions, but he offered these to Foch. On the British front the 1st Division took the village of Cantigny on 29 May and held it stubbornly against seven German counterattacks. The action was not vital in any military sense, but it helped to convince the Allies that Americans could fight.

**U.S. troops
on the Brit-
ish front**

Meanwhile two divisions were rushed to the Marne, and the Seventh Machine Gun Battalion arrived at Château-Thierry on 31 May. This was the logical place for the Germans to cross the Marne, and it was therefore essential that the bridges be held against them. If there was any discernible crisis in the *Friedensturm*, this was it. The Germans failed to break through the American machine-gun barrage, and on 3 June the infantry arrived and the crisis passed.

**Château-
Thierry
bridges**

When on 3 June the right wing of the Germans crashed into the 2nd



Division on the Paris-Metz highway, they became aware that they no longer confronted only the weary French. In a long four weeks' struggle the German spearhead was stopped, the line was straightened, and the 2nd performed the grim task of clearing the enemy out of Belleau Woods. Since the censors had prohibited the naming of divisions but had failed to take a similar precaution in the case of marines, the nation was given the idea that the marines, brigaded with the 2nd Division, had saved Paris.

The Paris Road

Actually it was the spent French divisions that gallantly held by far the most of the line before the German drive, but it is nevertheless true that the Americans held the posts of greatest danger and honor. The losses suffered by the Americans were fantastic—1800 killed and 8000 wounded in the 2nd Division alone. These losses were partly because of American ignorance of battlefield precautions, but also due to their willingness to take the offensive. The most grudging critic had to admit that at least the Americans could fight.

Now that American troops had proved themselves, the Allies demanded floods of them, especially infantry and machine gunners, obviously because they could be swallowed up by British and French divisions and never disgorged. They panned Pershing's insistence that the services of supply must also be reinforced; here he was expressing the stress always laid on supply and preparation in American wars. Foch was all for the dramatic chessboard features of war; problems of movement and supply were likely to be left to improvisation. The French, in particular, demanded that America work a miracle on pain of being saddled with the crime against civilization of allowing France to fall. Possibly Creel's outrageously flamboyant publicity was partly responsible for the French impression that a miracle could easily be produced. Pershing might have claimed with some justice that the required miracle was actually being wrought, for Americans were arriving in France at the rate of 10,000 a day.

Allied bickering

On 15 July the Germans opened the Second Battle of the Marne in a desperate attempt to burst out of the Marne pocket toward Reims; three American divisions were among the troops that dashed this hope in a bloody three-day struggle. Foch now ordered a counter-attack. It opened southwest of Soissons on the 18th with Americans and Moroccans forming the spearhead. Within four days the drive passed south of Soissons, and the evacuation of the city became inevitable. The final German retreat was under way.

Second Marne to the Aisne, 15 July—4 Sept.

Meanwhile seven other American divisions had gathered near Château-Thierry, very much mixed with French troops, and on the 18th those in front moved from the Marne in conjunction with the Soissons offensive.

During the next seven weeks they fought their way northward against stubborn German resistance, pushing the enemy across the Ourcq and the Vesle to the Aisne. Most of this time was consumed at the Vesle, where the Germans made a stand while they dug in on the Aisne. Barred by swamps, barbed wire, and ruined villages filled with machine gunners and flame throwers, the American divisions vainly surged against the barrier in one of the most gallant battles of American history. It was not until the French drove back the enemy lines in the north (with the aid of the 32nd Division at Juvigny) that the Germans withdrew.

The crisis of June and July had scattered the American divisions widely and had delayed Pershing's plans for a separate army under the American flag. By the middle of July, however, he was moving to reassert control and St. Mihiel, 12-13 September was laying plans for the reduction of the St. Mihiel Salient east of the Meuse River. The American First Army under Pershing's own command, with fifteen divisions (not all participated in the battle) and a French colonial corps, was designated for the task. Since priority had been given to infantry and machine gunners the American army was low on artillery, tanks, and aircraft, and these had to be supplied by the British and French. This, the first Allied attack on an established German trench fortress, opened early on the morning of 12 September after the usual artillery barrage. The Germans had resolved to retreat rather than put up a stiff resistance, but they had no time to act. The salient fell within two days with the capture of 16,000 prisoners and 443 guns. The American loss was light.

With the Germans definitely in retreat, the Allies had planned on pressing their advantage during the remainder of 1918, though it was still supposed that the war would last into 1919. When plans were discussed late in August, it was evident that the Germans would soon be back on the Hindenburg Line, the take-off point for their spring drives, which they had had four years to fortify. A great attack all along the line was planned for the last week in September.

The reckless dash of the Americans when contrasted to the caution of the war-weary Allied troops had made them valued as spearheads of attack on particularly tough objectives. As a result Pershing had to find divisions to lead various Allied attacks. Two divisions were assigned to the French for use in the Champagne attack, specifically against the strong point of Blanc Mont, east of Reims. Two others went to the British for the Flanders assault on the Hindenburg Line; their objective was the tunnel of the Cambrai-St. Quentin Canal at Bellicourt, strongly fortified key to the Picardy sector. Two more were assigned to the mixed Belgian, British, and French army group in Belgium; their contribution was made in the assault on Cruyshauten Ridge and in the battle for Audenarde. In addition to these a regiment had been sent to Italy in July for the moral effect, and

5000 troops were shipped in September to the Archangel area to fight the Bolsheviks.

Crux of the Allied drive was a movement through and on both sides of the Argonne Forest to seize Sedan, the vital junction which controlled the railroads essential to German supply behind the entire northern part of the front. Pershing was to drive the difficult 35 miles to Sedan. On the right was the Meuse River, flowing between bluffs, and on the left was the all but impenetrable Argonne Forest with its swamps, thickets, and ravines. The eastern edge of the forest was on an escarpment above the little River Aire, between which and the Meuse lay perhaps twelve miles of fairly open but very rough country not only flanked by cliffs but rising all the way. Masked batteries and concrete pill boxes subjected the entire approach to German fire. There were three main defense lines, the strongest of them the Kriemhilde Line, a part of the Hindenburg Line. Behind the Kriemhilde the Meuse angled off to the northwest to Sedan.

**Scene of
Meuse-
Argonne
drive**

The jump-off for the battle of the Meuse-Argonne was from the old battlefields of Verdun on 26 September. Plans had been laid carefully by Col. George C. Marshall, Assistant Chief of Staff of the First Army. The battle does not lend itself to description as, for example, does Gettysburg. Amidst fog, smoke, and confused terrain it was always difficult to keep direction, so the picture of companies advancing neatly wing to wing must be abandoned. Before long, units were hopelessly entangled and the battle became countless little swirls of action, as platoons and companies sought to take German emplacements. Supply was a perpetual problem. To make it worse, German artillery got the range, surprise attacks burst out of the forest—and then it began to rain.

**Meuse-
Argonne,
First
Phase;
26–30
Sept.**

On the 30th the advance was stopped and the troops regrouped. The renewal of the attack on 4 October was directed at the Kriemhilde Line, but it had been reinforced and advancement was slow. On the 8th the line east of the Meuse began to advance and relieve the German pressure, and the French advance in Champagne also warned the Germans to withdraw. By the 10th the Americans were out of the woods and facing the Kriemhilde Line. On the 14th a concerted attack began on the Line, and the eastern end was breached. Here the Americans stuck for the remainder of October, though busily engaged in local actions. On the 12th the First Army was split and the Second Army created east of the Meuse; respectively in command were Hunter Liggett and Robert Lee Bullard.

**Second and
Third
Phases:
October**

On the last night of October the last phase of the battle was opened by a tremendous barrage, and the next morning the assault was begun all along the line. During the next days the American left outran the right



Adapted from C. O. Paullin, *Atlas of the Historical Geography of the United States*, 1932. Carnegie Institution of Washington.

Fourth Phase: 1–11 Nov. and faced into the bend of the Meuse near Sedan. The Germans were withdrawing and were able to preserve their line only at great cost. By the night of 6 November the line was broken, and the German High Command asked for an armistice. American divisions were about to enter Sedan when on the 7th they were ordered to hold up and to give the honor—the fruit of the battle of the Meuse-Argonne—to the French. The Armistice came four days later.

The battle of the Meuse-Argonne was up to that time America's

greatest battle. All together 26 divisions were committed to the operation, which with replacements and service troops amounted to 1,200,000. (In addition Pershing commanded 135,000 French troops.) There were about 117,000 casualties. The Americans took 26,000 prisoners, 874 cannon, 3000 machine guns, and vast quantities of matériel.

Early on the morning of 11 November 1918 the German emissaries signed the Armistice in a coach of Foch's private train in the Forest of Compiègne. The cease-fire order became effective at the eleventh hour of the eleventh day of the eleventh month. Two weeks later the French army marched into Alsace-Lorraine, and the British and Americans were approaching the lower Rhine. General Joseph T. Dickman with eight divisions of the newly-created Third Army constituted the American occupation forces, with headquarters in the castle of Ehrenbreitstein opposite Coblenz. This imposing force did not remain long, however, for during the summer of 1919 the Third Army was discontinued, the divisions withdrawn, and miscellaneous units totaling about 19,000 men were left as the "American Forces in Germany."

**Occupation
of Rhine-
land**

With the Armistice signed, it was impossible to convince either American civilians or soldiers that the war was not over—and, indeed, no one tried. The "I-wanna-go-home" spirit quickly emptied the home camps to make space for the thousands who were crowding to the docks in France chanting "Lafayette, we are still here." By the time the leaves budded in May, the most magnificent army in American history was just that: an army in history. And the treaty of peace was not yet signed! At the time of the Armistice there were 3,634,000 men in the army; a year later the number had dwindled to about 400,000. The National Defense Act of 1920 was to set the number at 280,000.

**Breaking
up the
army**

The raw, untrained American levies had fought with a dash and courage which made even skeptical Old World generals on both sides class them with shock troops. Here, in all likelihood, was one of the fruits of Wilsonian idealism. However, one must not lose sight of the fact that while in the autumn of 1918 the Americans pierced the German line at a vital point, the French and British attacks carried even heavier weight. American battle deaths, though unusually high for the duration of the time and the number of men involved, were far below the current sacrifices by the Allies. During the whole war the French lost 1,400,000 by battle deaths (more than the population of the recovered provinces of Alsace and Lorraine); the British 900,000; the Russians 1,700,000; the Germans 1,600,000; and the Austrians 800,000. American battle deaths totaled about 50,500; the exact figure is disputed. The total known battle dead in all armies was about 7,500,000, while there were almost three times as many wounded.

**Mortality
in World
War I**

Diseases were not serious on the Western front due to elaborate medi-

cal precautions and to frequent delousing of the soldiers, but typhus, bubonic plague, and other diseases swept off millions in the East. The "Spanish influenza" which came out of the Orient in late 1918 carried away millions; in the United States the loss among soldiers and civilians was estimated to have been as high as 500,000. All together, perhaps 40,000,000 people died before their times as a result of World War I.

2 *The Armistice and the Reds*

In order to place the Armistice and the peace conference in their proper setting it is necessary to turn now to certain political and extraneous military events. The liberal Russian Republic had been overthrown (November 1917) by the Bolsheviks under Lenin, and the latter had at Brest-Litovsk sacrificed Poland, the Baltic States, and the Ukraine to Germany in exchange for peace.

The defection of Russia struck a staggering blow at the already wavering Allies, and the rise of Bolshevism to power sent a shudder through capitalist societies. France was especially affected, for with growing defeatism there was supposed to be a danger of communist revolution; no Frenchman was unmindful of the Paris Commune of 1871. Lenin was now flooding the West with peace propaganda which he hoped would result in general revolution. In December 1917 Trotsky, Lenin's Minister for Foreign Affairs, found in the Russian archives copies of some of the semisecret Allied treaties for the distribution of territories and lost no time in publishing them.

The agitation aroused by Trotsky's disclosures made it evident that a countermove had to be made. Wilson seized the opportunity to summarize the peace terms which he had been enunciating from time to time. The result was the famous Fourteen Points, read before Congress on 8 January 1918. Here they are in abbreviated form.

- I Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at.
- II Freedom of the seas in war and peace.
- III Removal of economic barriers; freedom of trade.
- IV Reduction of national armaments.
- V Colonial claims to be settled with due regard to the interests of the claimants and of the inhabitants.
- VI Russia to be evacuated and to be welcomed into the society of nations.
- VII Belgium to be evacuated and restored.
- VIII France to be evacuated and to receive Alsace-Lorraine.
- IX Italian frontiers to be adjusted "along clearly recognizable lines of nationality."

- X The peoples of Austria-Hungary to be freed.
- XI Rumania, Montenegro, and Serbia to be restored, and the last to receive access to the sea.
- XII The peoples of the Ottoman Empire (including the Turks themselves) to be given self-government.
- XIII A free Poland containing all Poles *and* with access to the sea.
- XIV A League of Nations to guarantee "political independence and territorial integrity."

A fair examination of the complete text of the Fourteen Points and of the elucidations and afterthoughts added during the succeeding months will show that some were vague, some overprecise, and some contradictory. The harried and overworked Wilson talked too much, and in so doing introduced exceptions and contradictions which were later to be used as escape clauses. Even of the original Fourteen Points practically every one raised questions of definition or extent. How were boundaries to be set when a region was dotted with villages of rival peoples? Or when strategic and national boundaries were different? How could Serbia have access to the Adriatic when Italy claimed the coast? How could Poland have access to the Baltic when a belt of Germans lay between? It was inevitable that the discontented peoples of the nascent nations should assume that Wilson was speaking for all the Allies, and that each should expect him to put its interests and ambitions first.

Their
effects

Wilson had frequently stated that the war was not against the German people but against their militaristic masters. Actually the German people believed that they were fighting against a circle of wolves. They heartily backed the Kaiser and resented any implication that they were not. But when the tide began to run against the German army, it was not alone in its troubles, for its allies were tottering. Bulgaria surrendered on 30 September and Turkey on 30 October. Meanwhile Austria-Hungary was crumbling into its component parts; republics were being set up in Austria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, and parts of the empire were being taken over by Poland, Rumania, and Serbia. When Germany approached Wilson about an armistice, he implied that terms would be better if the Kaiser and his clique were kicked out.

Central
Powers
crumbling

Actually Germany was worse off in October than the Allies had suspected. As soon as the word spread that negotiations were under way, the will for war broke down among both the people and the armed forces. The army was reeling though as yet unbroken, but food was scarce and replacements were being drawn from fifteen-year-olds. The commanders, at least, knew that victory was impossible, while the next Allied push might bring collapse. When the fleet was ordered to put to sea, mutiny broke out (3 November) and a wave of

Chaos be-
gins in
Germany

revolutions followed. A German republic was proclaimed, and the Kaiser fled to Holland. The negotiations begun by the monarchy were completed by the republic.

Nevertheless, Germans failed to see that their army was beaten. They actually supposed that it had forced agreement to a negotiated peace and welcomed returning soldiers as conquering heroes. It was out of this misunderstanding that there arose the legend of a victory that had been lost by the stab in the back—the internal revolutions. Germany, it was claimed, was not beaten but was betrayed by traitors and by the Allies. As has frequently been pointed out, Germany was “beaten and *then* betrayed.”

When Wilson had reached an agreement with the Germans, he passed the terms on to the Allies without recommendations. Their principal objection was to the Fourteen Points as the basis of peace, and they only accepted them when House threatened that the United States would withdraw from the war. Nevertheless, Lloyd George refused to permit agreement to Point II, freedom of the seas, and France insisted that she must receive reparations for German devastations. With these exceptions the Armistice was granted.

The specific military terms of the Armistice naturally included the evacuation of occupied territories and the surrender of prisoners. The German armies were to retire behind the Rhine, and the Rhineland was to be occupied by Allied troops. The rights claimed under the treaties with Rumania and Russia were to be abandoned. It was agreed that the Allies would provision the German people “as shall be found necessary”; actually the blockade was continued, and probably many Germans starved as a result. The fleet was to be surrendered; presently the Germans themselves scuttled it at Scapa Flow. But the shrewdest move of all was the demand for the surrender of certain artillery and war matériel. Foch tailored this demand so skillfully that it was not harsh enough to force a continuance of the war but still disarmed the Germans as much as possible. Pershing protested that the terms were a breach of faith but was overruled. The Armistice was renewed three times, and each time the French took advantage of growing German chaos to force further disarmament until at the end the remaining German army was helpless.

The Allied acceptance of the Armistice was, in considerable part, dictated by fear that if the war continued communism would sweep out of the East and the armies would melt from the battlefields. At the time of the Red *coup d'état*, Vladivostok and the Arctic ports of Russia were piled high with supplies and munitions sent by the Allies on tick and intended for the prosecution of the war against Germany. The Reds claimed these supplies and fully intended to use them against the Whites who were fighting here and there for the

liberal republic or for the restoration of the czar. Lenin's willingness to yield practically everything that Germany demanded was based upon the hope that Germany and the Allies would further bleed each other, and upon the confidence that eventually a Red revolution in Germany would enable Russia to recover what it had surrendered.

As soon as the Allies became aware of Lenin's policy, they began to formulate opposition measures. In January 1918 British troops moved northward from Mesopotamia and, against Turkish, German, and Red opposition, clamped a hold upon the Trans-Caucasus and the petroleum fields of Baku. Curiously enough, it was Lenin who invited the "Anglo-French imperialist brigands" to northern Russia to prevent it from falling into German and Finnish hands, but the welcome did not last long when Germany forced him to choose between the two sides. In March Allied troops landed at Murmansk on the Arctic Ocean and eventually spread along the shores of the White Sea to Archangel and as far south as Lake Onega. Meanwhile the Japanese had moved into Vladivostok (April 1918), intending to fasten a strangle hold on eastern Siberia; in June the other Allies moved in.

**Allies move
against
Reds**

After the Armistice the Allies imposed an economic blockade on the Reds and planned to support White armies which would move from the periphery of Russia toward the Red center at Moscow. Allied fleets and troops appeared in the Black Sea; but they were not immune to the Red virus, and there was a mutiny in the French fleet. The Whites were amply armed and supplied, but they were divided and quarrelsome and could not unite on a dynamic program; moreover, the Red armies proved to be unexpectedly well-equipped and well-led. By summer of 1919 the grand plan of overthrowing the Reds had failed, and the Allies were writing off their losses. With these pressures gone, the Reds now undertook a drive to re-annex Poland, but in the summer of 1920 they were defeated at Warsaw by a Polish army equipped and advised by the French.

**Their
failure**

Wilson had hesitated to join in these sweeping plans. Point VI of the Fourteen Points had clearly expressed his over-all attitude in January 1918, and he never went back on it. In the light of later events it is worth quoting.




**Wilson and
Russia**

The evacuation of all Russian territory and such a settlement of all questions affecting Russia as will secure the best and freest co-operation of the other nations of the world in obtaining for her an unhampered and unembarrassed opportunity for the independent determination of her own political development and national policy and assure her of a sincere welcome into the society of free nations under institutions of her own choosing; and, more than a welcome, assistance also of every kind that she may need and may herself desire. The treatment accorded Russia by

ALLIED INTERVENTIONS IN RUSSIA

BRITISH ISLES

Statute Miles



her sister nations in the months to come will be the acid test of their good will, of their comprehension of her needs as distinguished from their own interests, and of their intelligent and unselfish sympathy.

When Wilson joined the Allies in their interventions, it was only to moderate their policies. He was successful; in all probability it was Wilson who prevented the British seizure of the White Sea area and the Japanese seizure of eastern Siberia.

The United States participated in both the White Sea and the Siberian occupation, and to explain its rôle we will examine their circumstances briefly. Troops landed at Archangel in September 1918, and eventually 5100 Americans were on this front under the command of General Wilds P. Richardson. Railway troops operated the Murmansk-Petrograd railroad. All together the American forces suffered 500 casualties in skirmishes with the Reds. France had strongly urged that the Archangel expedition be reinforced for a decisive drive on the centers of Red power, but Britain and the United States declined. The American troops were withdrawn in July 1919, and the British and French were out by November. Withdrawals from the Caucasus and the Ukraine had already been completed.

U.S. shares
in Arch-
angel ex-
pedition

The Allies had failed to overthrow the Reds in Russia proper, but they still hoped to hold Siberia as a base for a White comeback. During the war a number of Czechoslovak divisions had gone over to the Russians and had been reorganized as the Czechoslovak Legion. When the Legion refused to join the Reds, fighting broke out. The Czechs sought to escape across Siberia, and some of them reached Vladivostok as early as April 1918. Meanwhile the Allies had decided to use them as one of their interventionary forces, and the Legion, now under a French commander, seized the Trans-Siberian Railroad and allied with the British and Japanese to make the White, Admiral Kolchak, "Supreme Ruler" of Russia.

Czechoslo-
vaks in
Siberia

Wilson agreed to intervention in Siberia only to block its annexation by Japan and to give the Russians time to work out their own salvation. He could not, of course, announce his reasons, both because Japan was an associate and because public opinion favored action against the Reds. The general impression, therefore, was that the intention was to fight the Reds, to guard the munitions at Vladivostok, and to aid the Czech escape. Even the American commander, General William S. Graves, did not know the whole truth. He did know that he was not to take sides with any Russian party and was to preserve good order and keep the railways open.

U.S. mo-
tives in
Siberia

As a result Graves could scarcely avoid antagonizing all Russian factions, and the Allies resented his strict neutrality. Moreover, the State

Department desired to give active aid to Kolchak and eventually partially overrode Graves. Each ally was supposed to be limited to 10,000 troops, but the Japanese had poured in at least 70,000. Graves's problems Not only was Graves hampered by Japan's double-faced maneuvers, but his men were harried by Jap-inspired guerrillas. More than this, Japan was carrying fire and sword to the natives and creating resentments which were directed against all the Allies. To make Graves's situation worse, the newspapers at home raised a clamor against the expedition, though there was some support because of the popular misapprehension that it had been sent to fight the Reds.

By the spring of 1919 Kolchak had been defeated, and a year later the victorious Reds approached Vladivostok. Graves withdrew in April 1920, and the European Allies did not remain long. The Japs immediately tried to seize all of eastern Siberia, but by then Red power was too great for them and they were forced to evacuate in October 1922.

The Allies had sought to defeat the Reds without committing themselves to full military intervention. In supporting the Whites, who were largely made up of Cossacks and led by the tyrannical czarist officer class, they loosed on the country a reign of terror fully as brutal as that of the Bolsheviks themselves—and it had the added reason of foreign support for rousing patriotic hatred. It seems highly probable that the tactics of the Allies drove into the arms of Bolshevism the very elements which would otherwise have become its most intelligent and effective enemies. In spite of Wilson's idealism, American troops had been a part of this interference at Archangel. They had not interfered in Siberia, but they had forwarded arms to Kolchak, and the State Department had vigorously supported him; so in the long run they were bracketed with the Allies.

Communists were convinced that the United States had joined the capitalist "conspiracy" against them; no matter—they would believe it whatever the facts. The truth was that the United States had acted as a brake on Allied interference and had actually prevented the Japanese from annexing eastern Siberia until the Reds were strong enough to defend it. This was acknowledged by representatives of the Far Eastern Republic. When in 1933 Litvinoff complained to F. D. Roosevelt that the United States had done \$6 billion of damage to Siberia, the latter mockingly laid a counterclaim of \$44 billion for having saved one half of Siberia from Japan.

3 *Versailles*

As we have seen, Wilson had been driven from the trench of "peace without victory" to the trench of "peace with justice" enforced by a League of

Nations which would provide a focus for "collective security." He wished to destroy the traditional system of balance of power and substitute for it a reasoned program of common action; the Allies (particularly France) wished to destroy it by utterly stamping out the power of the opposition. Wilson's Fourteen Points had expressed his program for future peace based upon these fundamentals: (1) the self-determination of peoples; (2) disposition of German colonies in a manner which would best promote the welfare of the inhabitants; (3) imposition of reasonable reparations on Germany; (4) general disarmament; and (5) creation of a League of Nations to supervise the foregoing and to promote justice and collective security. This was a reasonable program, however vague it may have been in detail, but Wilson thought of it in terms of idealism and self-sacrifice and failed in his attempts to drive home the way in which it would protect the common interests of all peoples. As a result, some of the very policies which he advanced to promote peace eventually promoted war, as we shall see in good time.

**Wilson's
program**

Wilson approached the peace conference with a number of handicaps which would have discouraged any man who was not swayed by the unalterable conviction that right must win. The meeting was to be held in Paris, where the screech of the war-shattered French would be heard at its loudest and the skillful and cynical Premier Clemenceau would have to be the presiding officer. When the United States entered the war without stipulations, it threw away its last chance to work for a negotiated peace and to cut the heart out of the semi-secret division of spoils.

**Foreign
handicaps**

Moreover, hatred was now rampant among the Allied peoples, for they had failed to follow clearly Wilson's fine distinction between the rulers and the ruled in the Central Powers. Their demand was that Germany should be destroyed and forced to pay for the war—mutually exclusive objects. It was apparent that the Allies were self-righteous and vindictive and demanded a vindictive peace. The leaders were concerned with dividing the spoils and with concepts of security which could only breed new dangers. There was no attitude of give-and-take among victors and vanquished, as there had been at the Congress of Vienna, but a dictated peace was frankly planned. The difficulty would lie not in getting the losers to agree to the terms but in getting the victorious Allies to agree among themselves.

Wilson's handicaps in the domestic background were only a little less disheartening. When in October 1918 rumors of the possibility of a negotiated peace spread in the United States, they met a wrathful reception by a public which had come to expect the papers to carry some day pictures of the Kaiser swinging from a gibbet. The Republicans saw a political issue and quickly proclaimed themselves the original party of "unconditional surrender" dictated in Berlin;

**Election
of 1918**

certainly they wanted no diplomatic victory by a Democrat. After the declaration of war Wilson had announced that "politics is adjourned"; now on 25 October he asked for the election of a Democratic Congress as an indication of approval of his leadership and that the people wished him "to continue to be your unembarrassed spokesman at home and abroad." Whether Wilson's ill-advised appeal swung the election against him cannot be answered, but at any rate the Republicans carried the House 237 to 190 and took the Senate by two votes. The potent Senate Foreign Affairs Committee came under the chairmanship of Henry Cabot Lodge, who in 1916 had fought Wilson as a dangerous radical.

In the second place, Wilson failed to unify national sentiment by appointing a truly bipartisan peace commission. He could not appoint Lodge, and it would have been worse to appoint any other Senator; so the Senate went unrepresented, despite the veto which it could exercise over the finished treaty. Perhaps he should have selected Taft, Root, or Hughes, but he did not. The only Republican on the commission was Henry White, who was a respected career diplomat but far from exercising any power in the party councils. The other members were the naïve House, the legalistic Lansing, and as military expert, General Tasker H. Bliss. Wilson himself became chief of mission, a move which was bitterly opposed even by some of his friends.

It is certainly true that Wilson was unskilled in the game of diplomacy, nor was he temperamentally fitted to engage in it. But as we shall see, he met with astounding success. The truth was that he had captured the imagination of the world, and his prestige was such that Allied leaders feared he would be able to appeal over their heads to their peoples. Accordingly they made careful plans against him, even circulating an analysis of his weaknesses drawn up by an American lawyer, whose name should go down in eternal infamy. Clemenceau took advantage of the fact that the conference was to be held in Paris and tightened his hold on the press as a counter to Wilson's popularity. House, the weakest point in Wilson's armor, was flattered and cajoled and proved to be a far too pliant tool; he was ready to make assurances behind Wilson's back and sought diligently to mold the reports of the experts to his pro-French and pro-British views.

Above all, it was decided to take advantage of Wilson's determination to create a League of Nations by throwing out demands for trading purposes. In this way it was hoped to break down the more idealistic aspects of Wilson's program and to destroy the spirit, if not the letter, of the Fourteen Points. At the same time there was launched a campaign directed at the American conscience for the cancellation of war loans and the granting of additional sums for reconstruction, using the argument that, since the United States had hidden so long behind the Allied wall of

flesh and blood, the least it could do was to be generous with its money.

The Peace Conference held its first plenary session in Paris on 18 January 1919 and lasted until the signing of the Treaty of Versailles on 28 June. Twenty-seven victorious powers were represented, but the actual decisions rested upon the Supreme Council (the Big Ten), made up of members from the five principal powers: the United States (Wilson and Lansing), Great Britain (Lloyd George and Balfour), France (Clemenceau and Pichon), Italy (Orlando and Sonnino), and Japan (Saionji and Makino). The Central Powers and Russia were not represented. The various problems with which the conference dealt were examined simultaneously by a number of committees. Within the committees each national representative followed closely a policy laid down by his chief which was intended to dovetail over-all operations in such a way as to balance every concession by a gain at some other point.

**The Peace
Conference**

Plenary meetings were held in Paris in the Foreign Office on the Quai d'Orsay. The American headquarters were in the Hotel Crillon on the Place de la Concorde, and Wilson lived at 25 Rue de Monceau. Wilson was not in attendance from 15 February to 14 March, when he returned to the United States to wind up Congressional business, leaving House in actual control of the American mission. During and after the conference, terms for Germany's allies were being worked out, and they were imposed as completed: the Treaty of St. Germain on Austria (10 September 1919); Neuilly on Bulgaria (27 November 1919); Grand Trianon on Hungary (4 June 1920); and Sèvres on Turkey (20 August 1920).

The personalities of the leaders played a vital part in the decisions of the conference. Wilson found it difficult to shed the stiffness and sensitivity of the academic temperament, and he was further hampered by the consciousness that principles and human welfare were at stake. His enemies misinterpreted these manifestations purely as due to Calvinistic rigidity and smugness, but Henry White (originally no friend) was increasingly impressed by his dignity, distinction, and courage. Lloyd George was concerned with obtaining the lion's share of Germany's trade and colonies and with fulfilling as much as he could of his impossible promises to the electorate.

**Leaders'
person-
alities**

Clemenceau, a tigerish and cynical old man of seventy-seven, looked upon the other conferees and even his own colleagues with undisguised contempt and drove bargains with the vulgar single-mindedness of a fishwife. He acknowledged only one principle, French security, and quite sincerely regarded it as the one object that *every* nation should place first, because Western Civilization was impossible without French guidance. Clemenceau trusted no one, not even his own assistants, and he did not hesitate to call Wilson pro-German to his face; it is said that on one occa-



sion he attacked Wilson and tried to choke him. Orlando was a weak man who, however, had learned well what Bismarck called Italy's jackal policy, that is, getting in on others' kills by serving the stronger party in Europe's feuds, thus hoping to snatch rich spoils of carrion for itself.

The above generalizations will have to take the place of any attempt to follow the course of the Peace Conference even briefly. Wilson believed that the treaty and the League must be interwoven because it would be up to the League to enforce the peace. He was able at the League and outset to force the Allies to agree to the League in principle, mandates though of course they could and did still bargain on details. After a stiff battle over their disposition, the German colonies and Turkish tributaries were distributed under three classes of mandates. Class A chiefly included the Near Eastern Islamic nations which it was expected would quickly become independent. Class B included those, such as the African colonies, which would require an indefinite period of development under the control of the mandate power and the League; the mandate power must hold them open to equality of economic opportunity to the civilized world. Last was Class C, which permitted annexation in all but name with the single proviso that the mandatory power was to make an annual report to the League. The Pacific islands went to the British dominions and Japan, and the latter took over Germany's economic rights in China.

The settlement of the European aspects of the peace terms devolved chiefly upon the Big Four: Wilson, Lloyd George, Clemenceau, and Orlando. Nearly all of these aspects revolved around Clemenceau's stubborn battle for his concepts of French security. Alsace-Lorraine Problems of French security was transferred to France without argument, but when Clemenceau demanded the annexation of the German-populated but coal-rich Saar Basin, Wilson objected. Nevertheless, France was entitled to some return for mines destroyed by the Germans, and after a great deal of sparring the Saar was therefore placed under a League commission while the coal went to France. After fifteen years the people of the Saar were to vote upon whether they preferred to join France or Germany; as it turned out, they voted all but unanimously to go with the latter.

As Clemenceau saw it, the League of Nations could have only one significant mission, to constitute a grand alliance for the defense of France. When he failed to get Wilson and Lloyd George to make it a military league in which the world's armies would be subject to The Rhineland French call, he demanded that the Rhineland be set up as a buffer state under French control. It was not until Wilson threatened to leave the conference that Clemenceau yielded. In the end, the east bank of the Rhine was demilitarized and the French were permitted to occupy the Rhineland for fifteen years—and longer, if the mili-

EUROPE AFTER WORLD WAR I



tary alliance proposed by Wilson was not ratified by the Senate. It was not. In the long run Clemenceau paid with his political life for yielding.

France, more than any other power, was frightened by the triumph of Bolshevism in Russia and foresaw the danger of common action between defeated Germany and pariah Russia. To forestall this danger, France planned to thrust between them a "Cordon Sanitaire" composed of the succession states—Austria, Hungary, and the Balkan States if possible, Czechoslovakia certainly, but above all a strong Poland. When it was proposed to cut off East Prussia from the rest of Germany by creating a Polish corridor to the Baltic seaport of Danzig (which was German in blood and language), another deadlock ensued. Finally Clemenceau agreed to set up Danzig as a free city, with Poland in control of trade and foreign relations, though it was otherwise self-governing under a League commissioner. Upper Silesia, rich in coal, metals, and industries, was to vote on its disposition, with the result that the industrial east went to Poland while the agrarian west went to Germany.

Among the most disastrous decisions made by the conference were those on German war guilt and reparations. In order to satisfy the clamors of the Allied peoples, the famous "war guilt" clause (Article 231) was inserted in the treaty which Germany was forced to sign:

War guilt and reparations The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

Lloyd George and Clemenceau knew very well that it was impossible for Germany to pay the entire cost of the war, but they had stimulated the demand for political purposes and now had to do something about it. Wilson and the American mission denied the possibility of paying even civilian claims for German depredations and estimated that Germany might dig up a total of \$30 billion in gold and goods. *Capacity to pay*, asserted Wilson, should be the measure of reparations. Nevertheless, when Wilson took to bed with influenza, House, as usual mistaking appeasement for compromise, stepped calmly into Wilson's shoes and agreed to substitute *claims*.

It seems apparent that Wilson now began to withdraw his confidence from House, and his suspicions were strengthened by the Texan's share in the Fiume dispute. The secret Treaty of London by which Italy had been bribed to enter the war had given "Italia Irredenta" to the latter, including Trieste and the Dalmatian coast but not Fiume, which was to go to Serbia. When at the end of the war Serbia united its Slavic relatives into Yugoslavia, the result was to

Problem of Fiume The Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been subjected as a consequence of the war imposed upon them by the aggression of Germany and her allies.

form a power which menaced Italy's desired domination of the Adriatic. Yugoslavia's only feasible trade outlet to the Adriatic was Fiume, and Italy now demanded it in order to prevent its development by Yugoslavia.

House was ready to surrender it and had tampered with the objectivity of the experts' reports and even tried to send home the men who disagreed with him. Wilson, however, rejected House's recommendations and appealed directly to the Italian people. The Wilson glamor faded before the exigencies of *realpolitik*, and the appeal failed. Orlando bolted the conference in a rage and was absent from 23 April to 6 May. (Years of bickering between Italy and Yugoslavia were to follow, but in 1924 the port went to the former while the latter received Porto Barros in return.) House's actions during the Fiume crisis apparently put a period to the President's confidence, and they no more consulted in private. Rumors of a break between the two were based on fact, for after Paris they never met again.

The Germans squirmed, protested, and blustered at the terms, but they had no choice but to march up to the table in Versailles's Hall of Mirrors and sign. This was on 28 June 1919. It was long fashionable to say that Wilson, in his anxiety to save the League, was euchred out of the remainder of the Fourteen Points. This claim is exaggerated, to say the least, for he had managed to impose most of his colonial terms, to safeguard the integrity of much of Germany's territory, to win agreement to disarmament, to dictate self-determination for small nations, and to set up the machinery of collective security. It is true that Germany was stripped of colonies and lost much of its home territory, but it lost only a few Germans in the Danzig area. Even where Wilson had to yield ground, he should be credited with having prevented the Allies from going to the extremes they advocated.

On the other hand, Germany was forced to disarm on the reciprocal Allied agreement to do likewise; the Allies did not do so. It was ordered to pay an impossible indemnity, and the Allies thereby subjected themselves to a dilemma: if they kept Germany weak, it could not pay even a reasonable sum; if they made it strong enough to pay, it would be strong enough to refuse to pay—which is just what happened. Lastly, they forced an admission of war guilt; it was this as much as anything which set German faces away from reconciliation and toward revenge.

Wilson's self-determination of peoples would have been an excellent move in a calm world where disputes could be peaceably adjudicated and measures of economic co-operation could be worked out. As it was, it only Balkanized Europe by splitting up economic entities, like Austria-Hungary, and by leaving ethnic minorities in the wrong states. Even there it would seem that the boundaries of the succession states were as well drawn as could be done in view of strategic necessities, the hopeless jumble of

Wilson's
accom-
plishments

Mistakes of
Versailles

ethnic groups, and the ignorance of actual ethnic situations. The most serious oversight was the failure to set up a Danubian Confederation, which could have taken the economic place of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. As for Danzig, it presented an inescapable dilemma. With economic



John Knott, the Dallas News

An advocate of smashing Germany forecasts World War II.

rivalries and irredentism eating at the heart of Europe, it is no wonder that the period between 1918 and 1939 is known as the Long Armistice.

It has been claimed that the terms of the Treaty of Versailles ensured the coming of World War II. This claim

arose basically from the victors' refusal to enforce the treaty

dawning European recognition that Wilson had been right—it was easier to win victory than

peace. At any rate, Hitler took vigorous advantage of Allied uncertainty to denounce the treaty's terms as unjust and unenforcible, and to stir up

German discontent. But even after making due exceptions for the war-guilt clause and the absurd bill for reparations, it seems clear that the trouble was not that the treaty was unjust or unenforcible but that the victors refused to enforce it against the vanquished or to utilize the League as an instrument of collective security.

Such economic and ideological differences as there were among them were minor, at least in the light of later history, and would not have forbidden the formation of a common front. Nevertheless, they assumed that the authoritarian menace had been permanently scotched and promptly fell to quarreling over trade and spheres of influence. France backed Turkey, and Britain backed Greece for control of the Aegean Sea. The small succession countries were encouraged to cut each others' throats; and, worst of all, the victors bid for Germany's favor.

4 *The Great Betrayal*

The American people had followed the proceedings of the Paris conference with attention, and editors, politicians, and leaders of all sorts of organizations and elements were free with their comments, suggestions, and

criticisms. Even the severest critics of Wilson's actions admitted that a majority of the people were on his side and that he had a good chance to carry the treaty through the Republican Senate. Actually politics had never been adjourned, and the

Opposition to the treaty

Republican leadership now began to foster a purely partisan division. Even before his first return from Paris it had become evident that the politicians were dividing on party lines, with Woodrow Wilson rather than the League or the treaty as the issue.

Isolationists misquoted Washington's Farewell Address in trying to convince the nation that it could not afford co-operation with "them wicked furriners" either in the League or in a treaty of peace so largely concerned with European interests. They deliberately misrepresented the rather innocuous Covenant as providing for an effective surrender of national sovereignty. Many businessmen feared the League's effect on the protective tariff, and union men feared that it could veto the rising demand of labor for limiting immigration.

While these arguments were going on, a furor arose over who won the war, and many Americans who were certain that their magnificent shock troops had given the death blow to German hopes were honestly puzzled or angered by British and French propaganda aimed at minimizing the rôle played by the United States. More significant, they were ready to turn their backs on Europe as a passel of ingrates and hypocrites.

Last, and possibly in the long run most important, was the clamor of the hyphenates against both League and treaty. They argued that Article X of the Covenant by its authorization of force to prevent aggression was in effect freezing in place the territorial injustices of the peace treaty and, indeed, the *status quo* everywhere. Germans felt that the Fatherland had been given a dirty deal; Italians felt that Italy had been rooked out of Fiume; and Slavic peoples resented the boundaries assigned to their European relatives. Loudest of all was the angry outcry of the Irish that the League was a British scheme to annex American power in order to shore up the decaying empire, and for proof they pointed to the empire's six votes in the Assembly against America's one. Hyphenates were in effect aiming to subordinate American welfare to that of their native lands. This endeavor was particularly evident in the determination of the professional Irishmen to use their adopted country not merely to win Irish independence but to spite Britain at every turn.

The
hyphenates

Not all Republicans were opposed to the League. Taft, Root, Stimson, and Hughes were strongly for it, and at least a dozen Senators were mildly for it. Theodore Roosevelt, Wilson's most vicious critic, had died in January, but there were others to take his place. Among these was a group of Senators who were opposed to the League with or without reservations and who were known as Irreconcilables.

The Irrec-
oncilables

They varied slightly in number and personnel (14 or 15 Republicans and 3 Democrats), for there were two debates, one ending in November 1919 and the other in March 1920. The core of the Irreconcilables included that

leonine, congenital "againster," Borah of Idaho; the acid-tongued Brandegee of Connecticut; the former Secretary of State, Knox, who brought Pittsburgh dollars into the fight; Medill McCormick of the rabidly isolationist *Chicago Tribune*; and the Progressive stalwarts La Follette, Johnson, and Norris.

The term Irreconcilable has unjustifiably come to include a number of Senators who for political or other reasons leaned toward taking the League with strong reservations. One of these was Henry Cabot Lodge, the bluestocking from Massachusetts, the original "scholar in politics" and long-time friend of Theodore Roosevelt. A dapper, wispy man, with a sardonic squint above a gray Vandyke and cavalry moustachios, he was perpetually rushing from committee to committee, from meeting to meeting, and thrusting himself into all sorts of governmental affairs. Though he carried the prestige of parliamentary experience and solid political backing at home, his fellow Solons were frequently irked by his didacticism. One of them remarked dryly that Lodge was "like the soil of his native state—highly cultivated but very thin." The election of 1918 had given the Republicans a majority of two in the Senate, based on the narrow victory of Truman H. Newberry over Henry Ford in Michigan. Newberry was later forced out on the ground of excessive campaign expenditures. If Ford had won, the Democratic Vice-President would have possessed a casting vote, and the Democrats would have appointed the all-powerful chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

As it was, Lodge became chairman. He had favored a League at first, but when Wilson advocated it he switched to opposition. This switch may have been purely partisan in origin, but there is no doubt that Lodge not only regarded Wilson as a dangerous radical but bore toward him a peculiarly personal hatred. Moreover, Irish and Italian voters were powerful in Lodge's bailiwick, and he would probably have committed political suicide if he had come out for the League and the treaty. Lodge was too much the astute and compromising politician to receive the full trust of the rabid "Battalion of Death." Those craggy isolationists Borah and Johnson undertook to crack the whip over him; and on at least one occasion, when he showed signs of accepting a compromise, Borah called him into executive session and threatened to oust him from the majority leadership.

Lodge was well-aware that Wilson had the backing of a majority of the country, and he proposed to thwart it by Fabian tactics; in other words, to delay and confuse the issue so thoroughly that the people would become tired of it and turn to other interests. The whole scheme had been worked out in consultation with TR while the latter lay in what proved to be his death illness. If, as seemed likely, compromise reservations were proposed as the price of ap-



Permission the Chicago Daily News

proving the Covenant, he would quibble, hedge, perhaps accept them in the end—and then propose more and stronger ones. It is not certain whether he actually expected to defeat the League, but certainly he expected to weaken it and Wilson.

When the treaty was laid before the Senate on 10 July 1919, Lodge put his plans into effect. Weeks were consumed in reading the treaty word for word in committee; hearings were held in which scores of hostile witnesses were permitted to fulminate about practically anything in the world. When Lansing appeared before the committee, it was easy to read between the lines that he was at best lukewarm toward the League. When after two months of these antics the treaty had not emerged from committee, Wilson resorted to his favorite tactic of appealing to the country.

**Wilson's
appeal to
the nation**

The President's health had never been good, and now (at sixty-three) six years of constant crisis had left him pale, trembling, and exhausted. Against the urgent advice of physicians and friends he embarked on a swing around the country which lasted twenty-two days and during which he delivered thirty-six major addresses—not to mention numerous talks at whistle stops—and marched in a dozen parades. He met with such cordial response that the isolationist West and Middle West seemed to be going internationalist, and the Irreconcilables felt obliged to follow his trail to counter his effect. The climax of Wilson's tour came at Pueblo, where he spoke with tears in his eyes to an audience that gave him one ovation after another. The trip had weakened him cruelly, for he had to carry on simultaneously all the pressing domestic and foreign duties of the presidential office. As a result he lost some of his tactical judgment and made a number of accusations and admissions which were welcome meat to the Irreconcil-

able ax. Probably he slurred over the injustices of Versailles; certainly he laid his usual stress on responsibility and self-sacrifice rather than national interest. He was not pleading, he asserted, for he had confidence that the treaty would be approved. Rather, he was making a report to the nation and seeking inspiration from the plain people.

Then on the train east of Pueblo Wilson's overworked nervous system collapsed, and he was hurried back to Washington. A few days later (early October) his left side was struck by paralysis, and for over seven months he lived in seclusion. His mind remained clear, and he was able to attend to some business, but his wife and his physician, Admiral Cary T. Grayson, carefully selected what should be laid before him and screened him from contacts with Cabinet members and Congressmen. Rumors swept the nation that he had gone insane, and the efforts of Mrs. Wilson and Dr. Grayson to shield him were callously misrepresented. A Senate committee which obtained admission to the sick room was finally convinced that the rumors were untrue. Nevertheless, the public business was hampered. When Lansing convened the Cabinet to discuss policies (an entirely excusable procedure), Wilson curtly dismissed him. Doubtless Lansing had laid the groundwork for dismissal by his more or less tacit disagreement with his chief over the League.

Meanwhile the battle continued over the treaty, which by Wilson's own demands was so intertwined with the League that the League had to be set up to carry out the provisions of the treaty. British and French leaders were so desirous of American co-operation that they were even willing to accept the fourteen "Lodge" amendments intended to safeguard traditional American attitudes, such as the Monroe Doctrine, and to prevent the country from becoming involved in foreign entanglements. Wilson, unaware of or ignoring realities, and probably actuated by the pettishness of an invalid, directed Democratic Senators to oppose the amendments. Accordingly, when the vote on the treaty *cum* amendments was taken on 19 November, it failed of the necessary two thirds by 55 to 39, Democrats and Irreconcilables furnishing the nays.

Wilson had thus defeated the amendments at the cost of rejecting the League, but he had confidently banked upon a popular demand that the League be approved as organized. For a while, as the results of popular polls and the protests of national organizations rolled in, he seemed to be on the verge of success. The Senate took up the treaty again in February 1920, this time with a fifteenth amendment which demanded Irish independence. Wilson again urged rejection, but twenty-one Democrats realized that approval was impossible without amendments, and they joined the Republican majority in voting yea. Nevertheless, the score (19 March)



John Knott, *The Dallas News*

Harding's double talk on the League was intended to mean all things to all men.

stood 49 to 35—defeat by seven votes. The Lodge strategy of slaughter by amendment had won. The Irreconcilables congratulated themselves that they had saved the Republic by their battle and felt that they deserved well of their country.

Wilson now resolved to make the acceptance of the treaty the issue of the 1920 presidential campaign. The Republican convention was dominated by the Old Guard, which expected to cash in on its deliberate acceptance of defeat in 1912. It desired a President it could run, hence its suspicion of the great proconsul, General Wood, who was a military man used to giving orders. Consequently there was a deadlock between Wood and Governor Frank O. Lowden of Illinois. The result was that late one night in a "smoke-filled room" the leaders decided upon the eminently affable, available, and gullible junior Senator from Ohio, Warren Gamaliel Harding, editor of a newspaper in Marion in the western part of the state. As running mate, Governor Calvin Coolidge of Massachusetts was selected. The Democratic convention likewise passed

Conven-
tions of
1920

over the roster of prominent political leaders and selected another editor from western Ohio, Governor James M. Cox. For Vice-President they nominated Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin Delano Roosevelt of New York, a handsome, strapping young man with a magic name.

The official Democratic view was mildly pro-League, but Cox and Roosevelt campaigned zealously for the League. Republican strategists, on the other hand, sought to be all things to all men. The platform was a masterpiece of straddling, and so were the speeches of its candidates; indeed, the Irreconcilables championed Harding because he opposed the League, while Taft, Root and Company backed him because he supported the League. Harding was ready to placate idealists by advocating a pallid "Association of Nations" which they could rouge and stuff to their own taste, but, he declaimed mellifluously, "We will accept no responsibility except as our own conscience and judgment in each instance may determine."

**Campaign
of 1920**


The truth is that the campaign of 1920 was a languid affair. It is not even clear that it was a plebiscite on the League. Then and since, many have claimed that the League had less to do with the outcome than Prohibition, Irish independence, protest against the rising cost of living, and the twin waves of nativism and anti-Bolshevism which had the country in the grip of fear and made reform and Red radicalism seem of a piece.

But most of all, the Old Guard depended upon a shrewd judgment that the progressive cycle had been run, that the American people were tired of crusades, domestic and foreign. Harding had expressed this belief as early as May, when from a Boston platform he proclaimed that "America's present need is not heroics but healing; not nostrums but normalcy; not revolution but restoration . . . not surgery but serenity."

**Back to
normalcy**

By 1920 the people had been under a quarter-century of moral tension, a tension too great for their immaturity to support. They looked about them and saw the promises of the progressive leaders failing to materialize, but on the contrary saw prices shooting up with inflation, and war profiteers riding in limousines and living in mansions. They listened to the sly tales told by returning soldiers of the European civilization to which Americans had long looked for cultural guidance. Worst of all, Europe had turned Versailles into a struggle, not for peace or democracy, but for spoils, and had tried to shame the United States into underwriting their booty. It was too much for the unstable American psyche. There was a growing conviction that our moral ideals had been betrayed by a cynical Europe, and we in turn became cynical about any hope of international justice or co-operation.

The plain fact was that the nation had relapsed into normalcy as soon as the war was over (in certain respects even before that), and the election



ELECTION OF 1920

531 ELECTORAL VOTES
 HARDING—Republican: 404 electoral, 16,152,000 popular votes
 COX—Democrat: 127 electoral, 9,147,000 popular votes

J. W. CLEMENT CO. BUFFALO N. Y.

of 1920 only regularized the decision. Betting ran ten to one in favor of Harding. In the election the vote, swollen by the recent enfranchisement of women, stood 16 million to 9; in the electoral college it was 404 to 127. The Senate went Republican by 59 to 37, and the House 309 to 132. Tumulty, Wilson's secretary, spoke truly when he remarked that the election was not a landslide—it was an earthquake! But that had been expected. The only real surprise was that Debs, then serving a prison sentence for obstructing the war effort, polled 919,000 votes.

**Election
of 1920**

With scarcely a pause to celebrate its victory, the Old Guard turned to liquidating the adventure of World War I. A joint resolution on 2 July declared that hostilities were over, and during the next month treaties were signed with Germany, Austria, and Hungary. The League had been set up in January 1920 at Geneva; but though it invited the co-operation of the United States in its work for world health, labor, narcotics control, etc., the Department of State would not for some time even acknowledge its communications. Late in 1922 it became evident that France intended to seize the Ruhr for the double purpose of collecting reparations and blasting any chance of German industrial recovery. The result might or might not be war, but anyhow it threw the administration into a panic lest the United States once more

**Retreat
from
Europe**

become involved in Europe's broils. To scotch this danger, it was decided to order home the last 1000 men of the American Forces in Germany. On 29 January 1923 the flag of the United States was hauled down from over the castle of Ehrenbreitstein. The American retreat from Europe was complete.

Meanwhile the Old Guard had made good its retreat from Asia. We have seen how the United States had traditionally followed a stronger policy in Asia than in Europe, probably because of Asia's weakness and Wilson's strong policy in Asia had vacillated and yielded until the middle of 1918, when it suddenly took on a strength that dismayed Japan. Japan was perfectly aware of the purpose of Wilson's Siberian adventure, and she had carried this background of grievance to the peace conference. There she had received a further slap in the face when Wilson yielded to British Commonwealth objections to implementing his ideals of race equality. This grievance was scarcely assuaged by considerable territorial gains and by a hold on Shantung which gave every sign of tightening. Wilson countered in 1919 by reviving Taft's Dollar-Diplomacy scheme for shoehorning American money into Great-Power loans to the Chinese government. Japan agreed reluctantly (as also did Wall Street) and took the occasion to reserve its interests in Manchuria and Mongolia.

Worst of all was the developing naval race among Britain, the United States, and Japan, which the Japanese not unreasonably supposed was directed at them, while Americans not unreasonably supposed that the Japanese program was directed at them. Then came the inevitable British appeasement books, lectures, editorials, and mass meetings on both sides of the Pacific, and a great deal of loose talk about war. Under the circumstances Americans were bound to regard the Anglo-Japanese Alliance as a guarantee that Britain would be on the Japanese side in case of war. The British were still mindful of their basic policy of friendship with the United States and were actually now engaged in setting up the Irish Free State, not because Ireland could not be held but as a concession to American opinion. At the Imperial Conference of 1921 Canada forced the further concession that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance must be liquidated and a new *modus vivendi* found in the Pacific.

The Republican Party had prevented American entry into the League and was now saddled with finding solutions for the problems which the League might have solved. When Borah proposed a disarmament conference, the idea was widely welcomed; and Congress approved it by an almost unanimous vote. On 8 July 1921 Britain proposed that Harding call such a conference, and a proposal from Hughes passed it in transit; there is reason to suspect that the

British offered to defend the Atlantic rear in the case of a conflict between the United States and Japan. The British, with their usual eye on American Anglophobes, were quite willing to let Harding take the glory for the idea. Before the end of the month eight powers with Pacific interests had accepted an invitation to meet in Washington: Britain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Belgium, China, and Japan. Russia was not invited.

Japan had accepted reluctantly and had stipulated that her special interests (Shantung, Manchuria, Siberia, Yap, etc.) were not to be tampered with. Nevertheless, this was exactly what Hughes proposed to do. It was clear that Japan would back down only at the threat of force, but the European nations were sick of war, and the American nation would definitely not have supported a war to prop open the rapidly closing Open Door. Hughes thereupon proposed to free the American taxpayer and the American conscience by making the Open Door the responsibility of all the Pacific powers including Japan. Then, if Japan slammed shut the Open Door, she would be legally as well as morally wrong. If we lost face in the Orient, so would the rest of the Pacific powers.

The Washington Conference was the first important diplomatic meeting of the Great Powers to be held in the United States and marked the growing significance of that country. When the rather stuffy Hughes, with his whiskers neatly parted, rose to address the first session in Continental Hall he amazed everyone. Cutting through the usual cautious entanglements of protocol, he captured the imagination of his audience and of the outside world by proposing that the powers limit their *capital* ships (over 10,000 tons) to essentially what they had and take a ten-year holiday in building. Hughes had given away his trump card by which he might have forced concessions; nevertheless, it gave the conference momentum and drew the applause of the world, for whatever that was worth.

The Hughes plan (as it turned out) set up a ratio of 5:5:3:1.75:1.75 for Britain, the United States, Japan, France, and Italy respectively. The United States would sacrifice two practically completed battleships, and Japan one. For the most part the loss would be in old ships, ships on the ways (of which the United States would sacrifice thirteen), and blueprints. All of the powers were quite aware that they could not outbuild the United States. Great Britain, traditional ruler of the waves, accepted parity quietly. France considered that it had been rooked at Versailles by the Anglo-Saxon powers and yielded only under unmistakable home pressure.

Japan, the real object of Hughes's coup, fought hard against accepting less than parity with the largest navies and in the end yielded only when Britain and the United States joined with it in an agreement not to fortify

**Hughes
seeks a
door prop**

**Washing-
ton Confer-
ence, 12
Nov. 1921-
6 Feb.
1922**

**Five-Power
Naval Lim-
itation
Treaty**

further any possessions in the Pacific; the homelands of the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and Japan were naturally excepted, as well as Hawaii and the Malay States. Thus, while Japan sacrificed the right to unlimited naval construction and fortification, she acquired an impregnable naval superiority in the northwest Pacific which enabled her to guard her interests in Siberia and China and gave her the whip hand over the Philippines and British Hong Kong.

Efforts now passed to finding a substitute for the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. To persuade Japan to sacrifice her British ally, it was necessary to convince her that she would not be confronted by an Anglo-American alliance. The fortifications agreement was a partial answer, but the meat of the solution was a Four-Power Pact by which Britain, France, Japan, and the United States agreed to "respect" each others' rights in the Pacific, to settle disputes by conference, and in case of threat by a fifth power (Russia or China) to consult "fully and frankly" on how to meet it. In a sense this gave Japan three allies instead of one. This situation was what the Senate had in mind when it allowed the pact barely to scrape through, and then only with the pointed proviso that "there is no commitment to armed force, no alliance, no obligation to join in any defense."

China was quite properly miffed by what it regarded as a Great Power guarantee of Japan's rather highhanded seizures in Manchuria and Shantung. Senatorial and American popular opinion sympathized with China and forced Hughes to push the last item of his program through the conference despite the resentment of Japan and the protests of the weary Europeans who wanted to go home. He had the co-operation of the British, who, it will be remembered, had been more or less consistent supporters of the Open Door. The result was the Nine-Power Pact, by which the signers bound themselves to observe each others' trade rights in China and to respect the "sovereignty, the independence, and the territorial and administrative integrity of China."

Thus both the economic and political aspects of the Open Door were made the business of eight additional powers—including Japan. The ambiguous public part of the Lansing-Ishii Agreement was presently annulled by special agreement. Its secret clause became a part of the treaty when the powers agreed "to refrain from taking advantage of conditions in China in order to seek special rights or privileges which would abridge the rights of subjects or citizens of friendly states"; then came a significant addition—"and from countenancing action inimical to the security of those states." This was clearly a promise to Japan, the only signatory whose home security could possibly be menaced. In exchange for this and as further payment for receiving the keys to the northwest Pacific, Japan gave up Group V of its Twenty-One Demands of 1915, which had expressed the

"desires" which would have resulted in turning China into a protectorate and would practically have closed it to other nations.

In the immediate context the Washington Conference seemed to have a healthy effect. The Lansing-Ishii Agreement was nullified, and the worst of the Twenty-One Demands were withdrawn. In addition Japan evacuated Siberia and gave the United States cable rights on Yap. The naval race was abandoned, in so far as it included capital ships; on the other hand, there were no limits on submarines, aircraft carriers, and light cruisers; so the race merely shifted to them.

Retreat
from Asia

The Washington Conference is open to the serious charge (in the light of present knowledge, of course) that it *disarmed our friends and armed our foe*. That is, it reduced the naval ability of our only possible allies either to help us or to defend themselves. At the same time it made Japan supreme in the northwest Pacific; made hostages of the Philippines and Europe's ports in China; and cleared the way for Japan to renew her penetration of China—as she did. Only the willfully blind could hold that the Open Door had been saved, but this tenet was the official Republican line, and Hughes was touted as the greatest American statesman since John Quincy Adams.

At this time Wilson, still broken in health, was living quietly in a house on Washington's "S" Street, bitterly observing the destruction of his life's work. Only occasional echoes of his words appeared in the public prints when a loyal few gathered to wish him well on the anniversaries which had once seemed to mark the steps in human progress. Broken and disillusioned, his faith seemed lost, and he turned against the friends of his great day; House, even the devoted Tumulty, came no more. But on Armistice Day 1923 he appeared before his door and raised his voice with a feeble rekindling of the old fire. "I have seen fools resist Providence before," he said, "and I have seen their destruction, and it will come upon these again, utter destruction and contempt; that we shall prevail is as sure as that God reigns." Less than three months later he lay dead in the little house on "S" Street.

"We shall
prevail"

In a country manor above the majestic Hudson another paralytic, the wreck of a once magnificent man, crawled pitifully across the library floor and summoning every ounce of resolution drew himself up the stairway an inch at a time, more by desperate will than by strength. He was beginning the agonizing battle which was to make Wilson's words come true.

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Chapter XLV

THE REIGN OF NORMALCY

1 *The Old Guard Returns*

THE new President of the United States was Warren Gamaliel Harding. Born into an Ohio medico's family, he became the owner and editor of a Marion newspaper, whose business end was run competently by his shrewish, overly ostentatious wife. Warren Harding's mental gifts were small, but he possessed a striking and dignified presence. He was, moreover, kindly, genuine, a natural-born mixer, and a good fellow who enjoyed nothing better than a poker session with the boys. Among his friends was one Harry M. Daugherty, a small-time lawyer and politician. As Daugherty rose he pushed Harding ahead, to the lieutenant-governorship and to the Senate, and nursed the ambition to make him President. No less ardent in striving for this goal was the Senator's socially insecure wife. Harding was, in fact, that paragon of political availability, the man with firmly stand-pat ideas who was known to his fellow politicians as thoroughly manageable—"a putty man."

Warren G.
Harding
(1865-
1923)

What did President Harding mean by a return to normalcy? It was not long before the pattern became clear: (1) a return to isolation from international affairs, and (2) the return to an economic structure as nearly as possible like that which had existed in the time of McKinley. The first intention bears so directly upon the role that the United States has played in world affairs that we shall return to it later for detailed examination. We may note in passing, however, that the refusal to share in world responsibility was in itself an acceptance of whatever programs and consequences the world might work out without us; in its division of the forces of democracy it encouraged the efforts of would-be tyrants to plunge the world into a new age of barbarism. The second intention found expression in the deliberate administrative and judicial destruction of Wilson's reforms. The determination to return to

The mean-
ing and the
method of
normalcy

the good old times was unmistakable. As a perceptive observer commented at the time: "You cannot teach an Old Guard new tricks."

No more pitiable incompetent than Harding had ever occupied the President's chair, unless it was U. S. Grant. Harding was, as his backers had foreseen, pretty much the creature of his party. The Cabinet which he slated was remarkable for its extremes of competence and political availability. Charles Evans Hughes, as Secretary of State, was eminently able to accomplish the objectives laid out for him. Edwin Denby co-operated handsomely in scuttling the navy—and also in other projects with Albert B. Fall, Secretary of the Interior and former Senator from New Mexico. Herbert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce, had been rather generally acknowledged as the world's greatest engineer but had turned from engineering to administer war relief in Belgium, then had become U.S. Food Administrator. Now he planned to make the Department of Commerce a positive aid in raising the American standard of living.

We have had occasion to mention from time to time the development of the Mellon financial empire, centered on Pittsburgh. The empire began with years of shrewd dealing in real estate in the expanding city of Pittsburgh and presently entered the banking field. Though its parts were sometimes autonomously operated by various members of the family, it became evident to those in the know that the dominant figure was Andrew Mellon. In 1921 Mellon was well into his sixties, a wraithlike, silent, painfully shy man, who had been remarkably successful in avoiding publicity. He looked more like an art collector, as he was, than a subtle and ruthless master of capital who had built up a personal fortune presumed to be more than a billion dollars in coal, oil, steel, railroads, aluminum, and electrical equipment. Nerve center of the Mellon empire, however, was banking, and the system was able to force the great finance capitalists of New York to leave it to reign over its chosen territory. Only Big Steel had an appreciable share in the control of the rich Pittsburgh area.

Along with the rest of the financial community, Mellon felt that the Democrats had unnecessarily hampered the rights of business to self-government, pampered the workingman, and were now by their war-born income-tax rates destroying capital's incentive to produce. He had contributed largely to anti-League of Nations propaganda and the Republican campaign chest, and his bank had backed the party's credit. Now he was appointed to the Treasury, where he could speak with authority upon the will of the financial community in government fiscal policies.

The appointment of Daugherty to the attorney-generalship was no less in line with party policy, for it was his function to remodel the independ-

ent commissions and the Judiciary by "vetting" proposed appointees to find out whether they believed in the economic standards of normalcy. The result was that the color of the Judiciary, of the independent commissions, and of the Federal Reserve soon began to change, and the measures of the New Freedom developed hitherto unsuspected loopholes. But Daugherty also undertook another function for which the party had not bargained. A stooge rented a "Little Green House" on K Street and moved into it a group of malodorous hangers-on, soon to be known as the Ohio Gang. The place became the headquarters not only for nightly revels but for the transaction of shady deals involving the sale of government privileges.

**The
Ohio Gang**

The dominance of the Old Guard all through the 1920's makes it possible to consider the politico-economic policies of the era as a unit. It is true that Coolidge succeeded Harding in 1923, but that change made little difference. Probably no decade in American history was so little influenced by the Presidents in office. Republican economic ideas had plenty of scope to work their magic, for the war boom had collapsed in the last quarter of 1919 with the onset of the primary postwar depression. Doubtless among the factors which brought it on were the stoppage of government purchases and the end of government credits to Europe, but there had also been overspeculation in goods and farmlands. When consumers' purchasing power ran out, the bubble was pricked. It is said that 453,000 farmers lost their farms, and 100,000 businessmen went bankrupt. Prices fell by a third, and five million men were out of work by 1921.

**Depression
of 1920**

The depression lasted from early 1920 to late 1923, though marked improvement began in 1922. Except for slight recessions, the American economy then began a period of expansion in production and investment which was to continue until 1929. The Republican Party naturally attributed economic recovery to its program, though there were plenty of dissidents to claim that the country recovered in spite of the medicine. Republican policies were, by and large, the ones that might have been expected from conservatives who believed in the "shower-of-economic-grace" theory that only if business was aided (and not until then) would the wage earner be helped. The mission of aiding business became the fundamental concern of all Republican policy; and this concern by no means vanished with the end of the depression but remained to become a powerful impetus to the expansion which followed. Here let us follow through with these policies.

**Republican
economic
policy**

The fundamental operation in this program was the Old Guard's resolution to "administer" new meanings into existing antimonopoly legislation. The determination to appoint only reactionary judges became so clear

**Encourage-
ment of Big
Business** that even Congress sometimes found fault; it may have been in an attempt to counter this policy that Coolidge appointed Harlan Fiske Stone to the Supreme Court in 1925, a notable addition to liberal ranks. The personnel of the Interstate Commerce Commission was thoroughly overhauled in order to give the railroads virtual control. There was strife between the business wing which wanted competition and the one which wanted price-fixing by trade associations. The Supreme Court blew hot and cold and then finally in the case of the *Maple Flooring Manufacturers' Association* agreed that competitors could exchange statistical information. Government was definitely in a "co-operative" mood between 1921 and 1933, and business eagerly took advantage of this fact.

Another item in the Republican program was to introduce economy and businesslike methods into government expenditures. Hitherto there had been little attempt to relate government expenditure to income, but departments and interests had scrambled for what they could get Congress to appropriate. It had long been proposed that a **Bureau of
the Budget,
1921** Bureau of the Budget be set up under the Executive to prepare estimates and make recommendations, and this was finally accomplished in 1921. It was the duty of the President, through the Bureau of the Budget, to prepare estimates of receipts and expenditures and recommend changes in taxation, and submit the whole to Congress on the first day of each regular session. Congress, of course, retained the power to make changes either of its own accord or on application of the departments.

The move was salutary, of course, but not even the Old Guard could always have its own way. The American Legion now led a movement for a soldiers' bonus, which succeeded in 1924 after two presidential vetoes. Long before this legislation Congress had established the Veterans' Bureau (1921), which administered insurance, medical, and vocational-training programs on behalf of veterans, including elaborate hospitalization, compensation, and pension provisions. The American Legion was joined in its watch over veterans' interests by the Disabled American Veterans (1921) and by the previously formed United Spanish-War Veterans (1898) and the Veterans of Foreign Wars (1913).

High-tariff men had complained that the Underwood Tariff of 1913 had sold out the principle of American self-sufficiency. In 1921 an emergency tariff was passed, and the next year a full-dress overhauling of the tariff **Fordney-
McCumber
Tariff,
1922** was put into effect by the Fordney-McCumber Act. The bill was shaped during an orgy of lobbying and in the end gave to most interests the highest protection yet voted by any Congress. The intention of Congress was to lay duties which, added to the cost of foreign production, would prevent foreign goods from



Craig Fox in the Rochester Democrat and Chronicle

A timely but unheeded warning against stock inflation

selling in the United States for less than domestic manufactures. In order to maintain this equality, the Tariff Commission was directed to advise of changes in foreign costs, and the President was authorized to raise or lower tariff rates accordingly as much as fifty per cent. Harding and Coolidge took occasion to make thirty-two raises but lowered the rates only five times.

From the closing days of the war there had been a rather general agreement that there should be a lifting of the tax burden, but there was argument over how it should be done. Liberals wished to lighten the burden on the small-income group; on the other hand, Mellon insisted that the wealthy should be relieved so that they could build up industry and payrolls. He cogently demonstrated that income-tax payments by the wealthy were dropping as they invested their money in tax-exempt securities.

Tax revision frees speculative money

There the matter hung without material change until early 1926, when

Coolidge pushed through most aspects of Mellon's program. The Treasury made substantial tax refunds but still, to everyone's surprise, tax receipts did not drop, and in 1928 another cut was made after the Mellon pattern. Nevertheless, by 1930 Mellon was able to reduce the \$26.6 billion debt by more than \$10 billion. Economists had warned that the Mellon plan would free so much capital that in the search for investments stock-market prices would be inflated and there would be an increased tendency to rush into purely speculative ventures. They were right. By 1928 the Great Bull Market was off to a good start.

Another administration objective was to get the government out of its war-born competition with private enterprise. The railroads had been returned to their owners with compensation which many felt was outrageously large. Not all problems were as easily solved, and here **Get the U.S. out of business** and there war corporations rocked along into the time of the New Deal. One enterprise was the wartime project to erect dams on the Tennessee River at Muscle Shoals to make electric power to be used to make nitrate for munitions and fertilizer. After the war Harding stopped work on the project, but no satisfactory private offer was made to take it over. Henry Ford came within an ace of obtaining it on terms which Senator Norris represented as a contemptuously unconcealed attempt to milk the Treasury and use the proceeds to lay the South under tribute.

Norris was determined that the dams should be government-operated in the public welfare. The matter became a perennial issue between Norris on one hand and the three successive Republican Presidents on the other—and a perennial stalemate. The battle spread to include all Federally-owned power sites, and, as public interest rose, Norris was joined by other Senators and Congressmen in pushing for government development. Muscle Shoals remained the center of the struggle and in one dramatic Congressional action after another was kept under public ownership. The opening year of the New Deal saw the creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority.

The war had benefited labor in some ways. Wages were almost double what they had been in 1914, though their purchasing power was only slightly greater. The Wilson administration's National War Labor Board **The war and labor** had fostered collective bargaining and arbitration and had desired to hitch wages to the cost of living. Unions had attracted millions of new members and possessed overflowing treasuries; they were not, however, strong in mass-production industries, nor were the old-line leaders anxious to depart from their old "aristocratic" form of craft organization. Equally ominous was the resolve of industrial capitalists and managers to get out from under the wartime restriction upon their traditional ascendancy over labor. At the moment labor had a belief (which it soon lost) that the Red Revolution in Russia portended the dawn of a new day for labor.

The end of the war almost inevitably brought a wave of strikes, most of them unsuccessful. Wages, hours, and conditions entered into the argument, but it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that labor was basically seeking to consolidate its newly-won gains by thwarting the capitalistic intention to undermine them. Employers were not as hostile to wage increases as they were to unionization and collective bargaining and the threat to their right to run their own business. When the United Mine Workers threatened to bring the wheels of the national economy to a halt, President Wilson obtained an injunction which forced their young president, black-browed John L. Lewis, to call off the strike. The miners, however, refused to go back to work until their wage demands were met in part.

**The strikes
of 1919**

The core of the whole struggle was the steel strike, which paralyzed the industry from September 1919 to January 1920. The strife was carried on with utter disregard for fair play or even decency. Public opinion, already under the influence of the "Red scare," was bitterly antilabor. In the end the strike collapsed utterly and irretrievably, and the backbone of militant unionism was broken with it. Though there were other and even bloodier labor struggles during the 1920's, they were the result of desperation rather than hope. Unions were licked and did not recover until the advent of the New Deal.

These and the other sweeping victories of capital over labor all through the 1920's were fundamentally due to two factors: public fear of communism and the sturdy readiness of the courts to back the employers. Local courts were especially co-operative in their refusal to take cognizance of murder and other forms of violence (unless performed by laborers) or to fob it off with slap-on-the-wrist sentences. The Supreme Court itself, first under Taft and then under Hughes, joined in limiting the rights of labor. It was held that the existence of yellow-dog contracts could be used to prevent unionization. Child-labor laws were declared unconstitutional. The injunction was reinstated, despite the Clayton Act. Minimum-wage laws were thrown out, along with laws to protect buyers. Criminal syndicalist laws were upheld.

**Antilabor
bias of
the courts**

Reaction was definitely in the saddle during the 1920's, usually six to three—for the notation "Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone dissenting" came to be almost a trade-mark appended at the end of reactionary decisions. But it was in vain that these three warned the Court against allowing its economic prejudices to interfere with the plain meaning of the Constitution and with the public welfare. At least they kept the spark of protest alive.

American labor had always opposed unrestricted immigration but had never been able to make much headway against industrialists' desire to maintain a pool of cheap labor. Sentimentalists and hyphenated groups had

Demand for immigration restriction also devoted their political strength to keeping the "golden door" unbarred. The year 1920 gave every evidence that the flood of immigration was being renewed as Europeans sought to flee their war-torn and impoverished continent. Organized labor, despite its defeat, wielded considerable political power and continued to demand that drastic restrictions be imposed. Capital was also frightened by the radicalism supposed to be characteristic of the "new immigration"; and, while it found Slavs and Latins to be cheap and generally satisfactory labor, the depression seemed to indicate that the advantages of having a pool of cheap labor were offset by its discontent in hard times. There was, moreover, a slowly growing realization that cheap labor was really costly; that producers depended basically upon the market created by high wages.

Congress reflected the growing sentiment for restriction by a series of drastically restrictive laws. Finally in 1929 the total of permissible immigration was set (at about 150,000), and quotas were assigned to the various nationalities, presumably on the basis of the proportion they had furnished to the total population in 1920. One good feature was that would-be immigrants had to be examined abroad and approved for admission before they could sail. The quotas did not apply to Canada or Latin America; so it has been possible for members of those nations to enter. In many cases Europeans acquired Cuban or Canadian citizenship in order to facilitate entry. Eventually, however, restrictions were set up against laborers of Western Hemisphere nationalities on the ground that they might become public charges.

The total number of immigrants admitted has varied, but during the 1930's almost as many left the country as came in. A valid criticism lay in the fact that the series of laws, instead of giving quotas to Orientals and permitting the entry of a few hundred a year, needlessly insulted them by denying them permanent entry under all circumstances.

Harding had looked upon the presidency as a sinecure, the chief pleasure of which would be in appointing his friends to office—a strange misunderstanding for a man who had been in the Senate during most of Wilson's incumbency. At first Harding tried to continue to be one of the boys and indulged in frequent poker and drinking bouts, but he was subjected to such severe criticism that he began to taper off. Meanwhile he was discovering that if a President did not run his office, he would fall victim to the ambitions of those around him. Some knowledge of Daugherty's malodorous activities reached Harding early in 1923, but he blindly blamed the Attorney-General's hangers-on. Meanwhile La Follette had forced through the Senate a resolution to investigate the transfer of Federal petroleum reserves into private hands.

Rumors of scandal

Senator Thomas J. Walsh, a Montana Democrat, under this authorization began to gather evidence which threatened to incriminate three Cabinet Secretaries and the President.

The easy-going Harding, though ready to grant favors, was honest in so far as his rather dim and muddled standards dictated. The revelations of the way in which his appointees had corruptly betrayed his trust shocked him profoundly and further affected a state of health already undermined by hard work and dissipation. It seemed only a matter of time until the storm broke, and the President proposed to mend his national fences and at the same time seek relaxation in a swing across the country and up to Alaska. On his return to Seattle he was stricken with ptomaine poisoning. He was hurried to San Francisco for treatment but failed to rally. Pneumonia and apoplexy followed, and on 2 August 1923 he died. The nation, while under few illusions as to his capacity, had come to value his sincere efforts to minimize strife.

**Death of
Harding**

Harding's successor was Calvin Coolidge, son of a Vermont village merchant, who had begun the practice of law in Northampton, Massachusetts and had risen through every grade of public office from councilman to governor. In 1919 the police of Boston, failing to obtain remedies for their appallingly poor pay and conditions of service, organized a union and struck. Finally, when chaos seemed imminent, Coolidge called out the state guard and met Gompers's protest with the ringing declaration: "There is no right to strike against the public safety by anybody, anywhere, anytime." Whether he was responsible for breaking the strike is a moot issue, but his nomination for the vice-presidency followed.

**Calvin
Coolidge
(1872-
1933)**

His term as Vice-President was publicly colorless and privately boring. Then, early on the morning of 3 August 1923, while visiting his father in Plymouth, Vermont, he was awakened and told of Harding's death. He dressed, prayed, and descended to the dining room, where, by the light of two kerosene lamps, his father administered the oath of office as President of the United States. The incident caught the public fancy for the romantic and drew favorable attention. No announcement was made that the old man was not qualified to administer the oath and that it had to be repeated in Washington.

Calvin Coolidge was in nearly every respect except in his political bias the antithesis of Harding. He had a meager figure, wispy hair, sour visage, long, pointed nose, and pursed mouth, and his voice was something between a quack and a whine; he was moody, suspicious, taciturn to the point of being insulting, and when he did speak he uttered twaddling saws and inanities with an air of profundity.

**His
character**

Much of the explanation for these characteristics lay in the fact that his

physical vitality was low, and he had a cardiac complaint which further slowed him down and fostered a tendency to hypochondria. On the other hand, he had good points: he possessed the dry humor and common sense popularly presumed to be typical of the rural Vermonter; he was honest, industrious, fundamentally kindly, and definitely public-spirited.

Unfortunately his virtues were most in keeping with the limited responsibilities of local government; the day was long past (if it had ever existed) when the village selectman was equally capable of administering the presidency. Coolidge simply did not possess a broad view of public affairs nor the flexibility to acquire it. Neither his naturally conservative bias nor his sluggish physical condition disposed him to peer behind events or to ponder deeply over public policies other than those which violated his cheese-paring proclivities or his rather naïve confidence in *laissez faire*. While the nation entered upon the wildest spree in its history, the taciturn New Englander in the White House gave no evidence of believing either that it was breaking all the cracker-barrel councils of thrift and caution and fair play, which were his hereditary stock in trade, or that it was his duty to call attention to the course of moderation.

Coolidge was scarcely seated when the first of the Harding scandals broke. This involved the Director of the Veterans' Bureau, who was accused of reselling supplies and of making special arrangements with contractors; the culprit was sentenced to a sojourn in Leavenworth. Even more malodorous, however, were the revelations of the operations of the "Ohio Gang." A thriving business had been carried on in Federal protection of bootleggers and in the sale of permits to draw liquor from government warehouses. The Alien Property Custodian had returned certain alien property to its owners upon the payment of \$441,000 in Liberty Bonds. Part of these bonds had been sold by Daugherty's banker brother and the money placed in Daugherty's account, and the go-between had mysteriously committed suicide. Daugherty was tried, but in the end he was acquitted, largely because he had had the foresight to destroy the evidence.

The really big scandal concerned two naval oil reserves: one at Elk Hills, California, and one at Teapot Dome, Wyoming. There was danger that their oil would be drained by wells drilled close to their borders, and in 1920 Congress therefore authorized the Secretary of the Navy to take such steps for their protection as he deemed sufficient. It was possible either to drill "offset wells" or to lease the reserves on terms advantageous to the government. Secretary of the Interior Fall was an anticonservationist, and he had been backed for his position by prominent oil men. Harding was persuaded to transfer the oil reserves from Navy to Interior, a step to which the good-natured Denby

agreed. Fall then leased Elk Hills to the Pan-American Company of Edward L. Doheny and received the reward of a "loan" of \$100,000; Teapot Dome went to the Mammoth Oil Company of Harry F. Sinclair for another sum of \$250,000.


The Walsh inquiry brought these and other facts into the open, and the resulting court actions dragged out until 1929. Denby was acquitted of corruption but resigned. Fall was found guilty of receiving bribes from Doheny and Sinclair and sentenced to a year in prison. Doheny and Sinclair were paradoxically found innocent of bribery! Sinclair, however, had to spend a vacation in jail for contempt of the Senate and for having had the members of a jury shadowed. The two leases were eventually voided by court action, but much of the oil had meanwhile been drawn away by wells over their borders.

Coolidge obtained the Republican presidential nomination in 1924 without serious trouble, and Charles G. Dawes was made his running mate. The Democratic convention degenerated into a long deadlock between William G. McAdoo, Wilson's son-in-law and Secretary of the Treasury, and Alfred E. Smith, a Tammany scion who had acquired a reputation as a liberal during his rise to the governorship of New York. McAdoo, a Southerner, had the support of the dry, conservative South and of other rural Democrats; Smith, a Catholic, a Wet, and reputedly a liberal, had the support of the city machines. A week's deadlock ensued. Finally, on the 103rd ballot the convention swung to John W. Davis of West Virginia, a Morgan lawyer. This nomination was certain to alienate the West, and so the convention proceeded to "snatch defeat from the jaws of victory" by choosing as running mate Charles Bryan, governor of Nebraska and the brother of William Jennings Bryan.

Campaign
of 1924

There was no doubt that both parties were under conservative control, and liberal elements vigorously protested. Senator La Follette now made his last bid for the presidency. Teamed with Senator Burton K. Wheeler, Montana Democrat, he entered the field under the name Progressive and found backing by practically all liberal and radical elements, even Gompers and the American Federation of Labor. La Follette made a rousing campaign on a platform whose inherited Progressive planks were dovetailed with new pacifistic and isolationist planks. Davis received 136 electoral votes and 8,386,000 popular votes. The nation decided to "Keep Cool with Coolidge" and swept "Silent Cal" back into office with 382 electors and 15,725,000 popular votes. As it was, only half the qualified voters took the trouble to vote. The shocking-pink Progressive candidate carried only Wisconsin (13 electors), though he drew 4,826,000 votes and ran ahead of Davis in half of the states west of the Mississippi.

With the re-election of Coolidge it seemed to the country that it had entered a new era—"Coolidge Prosperity"—in which the old laws of finan-



ELECTION OF 1924

531 ELECTORAL VOTES
 COOLIDGE—Republican: 382 electoral, 15,725,000 popular votes
 DAVIS—Democrat: 136 electoral, 8,386,000 popular votes
 LA FOLLETTE—Progressive: 13 electoral, 4,826,000 popular votes

J. W. CLEMENT CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.

cial gravitation did not apply. The secret of permanent prosperity, the new Golconda, seemed to have been found at last, as from 1923 the stock market moved upward without important exceptions. Fortunes were made by the lucky few by a nod to a broker or a telephone call, while others, shouting the new national slogan, "Only saps work," haunted the stock exchanges and were rewarded with two cars in the garage of their imitation Tudor houses and with winter sojourns in the burgeoning Venetian wonderland then rising out of the mangrove swamps of Miami Beach. To the casual observer the crowded speak-easies, hotels, and resorts, the automobiles moving bumper to bumper on a million miles of new hard-top highway, all were evidences of unprecedented prosperity. And so they were. The industrial laboring class seemed to be moving *en masse* into the middle class, and it was freely prophesied that the time was not far away when poverty would be a thing of the past.

Hindsight, however, reveals to us that this surface prosperity was not only spotty—it actually directly benefited only about one third of the population and that part almost wholly in the cities. Coal mining, textile and shoe manufacturing, and agriculture were overexpanded, and their desperate attempts to make profits by increasing efficiency only threw more men out of work. While between 1923 and 1928 the index of wages rose from 100 to 112, speculative profits

rose to 410. The appearance of prosperity among the masses was partly delusory, pumped up by installment purchases of second-hand cars. During the period technological advances were continually lowering the number of man-hours necessary for each unit of production, but the slack was not all being taken up by substitute jobs—not by approximately a million jobs. The working force was gradually shrinking to the age group between twenty and forty.

The labor debacle of 1919 opened the way to making unionism the personal property of a class of conservative leaders who were most concerned with maintaining their snug berths. While capital used the open shop as a means of discriminating against union members and for blocking collective bargaining, it sometimes found advantage in granting concessions to conservative union leaders in order to forestall the rise of more militant leaders who might even go so far as to organize the mass-production industries. Company unions were fostered by employers where labor was determined to organize and were used to offset craft unions. Capital also carried on a continual campaign to educate public opinion against unions; when racketeers moved in on the unions, they afforded excellent anti-union arguments. The open shop was formally dubbed the American Plan, and its advocates wept for the pitiful slavery of union men. Let employers unite in a great crusade “to break the shackles that have been forged upon the wrists of those who labor”—so said the president of a philanthropical society called the National Association of Manufacturers.

**Decline of
independ-
ent unions**

Nevertheless, the 1920's were filled with desperate labor conflicts. Southern textile workers in a number of key centers rose in strikes which were almost revolutionary in their fury, and were repressed at times with equal brutality. The coal industry, faced with the competition of oil and electricity, sought to move its base to the nonunion fields of the South. Bitter strife ensued in both North and South, but the operators won. By 1932 Lewis and his UMW were so thoroughly beaten that there was a possibility that the union would vanish.

**Labor
conflicts**

The threat to the very existence of the labor movement was so clear that, as we have seen, even Gompers felt forced to lead the AFL into the Progressive Party in 1924. The failure of the movement was probably responsible for the quick demise of both Gompers and La Follette. Political radicalism had been ineffectual since the war and was to remain so. The communists and socialists split in 1919 and began a long career of mutual hatred. One peculiar feature of the communist movement in the 1920's and 1930's was the way in which its political and labor-union policies oscillated between independent action and “boring from within.” On the whole, the communists remained activists. Socialists, on the other hand, under Norman Thomas, Debs's

**Political
radicalism**

successor as perennial presidential candidate, devoted themselves largely to education. This had more effect in the long run than communist activism.

Agriculture had been passably well off from about 1897, and the demands of World War I had raised it to dizzy heights of prosperity. The depression of 1920 found the farmer heavily in debt for expensive land and equipment and with nothing to use for money. Wheat, for example, dropped from a high of \$2.33 in 1920 to 98¢ in 1929, and continued down to 32¢ in 1933. The coming of the farm tractor meant that 30 million acres were taken out of the production of forage crops and turned over to the production of food for humans. The result was to increase an already unwieldy surplus and further depress the farmer's selling prices. The same end was served by the introduction of improved seeds, as of hybrid corn, and improved strains of stock. Farm population was going down, but farm production was inexorably rising.

Meanwhile the national average of tenant farmers came uncomfortably close to half of the total number of farmers, as working owners lost their lands. Thousands of dispossessed families took to the road in rickety jalopies and followed the seasons in the fruit, vegetable, and canning areas. Their wages were pitifully inadequate, and they lived in the depths of ignorance and squalor.

The period since 1900 had seen the growth of a number of successful co-operative movements, chiefly in selling cotton, wheat, dairy products, nuts, and citrus fruits. The American Farm Bureau Federation sponsored such movements and presently became the spokesman for the more prosperous and conservative farmers. The co-operative movement inspired the revolt of wheat farmers in North Dakota, where in 1915 the Nonpartisan League turned out the state government and instituted a system of state-owned elevators, mills, packing plants, banks, insurance companies, and credit associations. In effect, a considerable measure of socialism was instituted in North Dakota. The movement quickly spread in more or less diluted form into neighboring states; and, though it soon fell through, it served as a practical instrument of transition between populism and socialism, and it left a permanent stamp upon the northern Plains states. Its principal political heir was the Farmer-Labor Party of Minnesota, which sporadically controlled the state during the 1920's and 1930's.

Farm demands found expression not only in such political movements but in the Congressional Farm Bloc, a loose alliance of Senators and Representatives from the agricultural states. The number of these states made the bloc especially important in the Senate, where it was frequently able to hold the balance of power and to force the Old Guard to trade for votes. Three cures were proposed:

**Farm
deflation**

**Agrarian
political
protest**

**The Farm
Bloc**

(1) The Equalization Fee. A Farm Marketing Board was to buy up farm surpluses and dump them in foreign markets at world prices, thus, it was claimed, causing domestic prices to rise. The export loss would be reimbursed by a tax on the total crop. This bill was twice passed by Congress as the McNary-Haugen Bill, and twice vetoed by Coolidge on the ground that it would merely depress world prices and domestic prices with them.

(2) The Export Debenture Scheme. Private exporters of the surplus would have their losses reimbursed by "debentures" receivable for customs duties, and these debentures could be sold to importers at a discount. Hoover scuttled the scheme.

(3) The Domestic Allotment Plan. Take a proportion of farm land out of production and reimburse the loss by a tax on the processing of agricultural products. This plan was tried by the New Deal.

The effects of the Farm Bloc's Congressional victories were destroyed by the staunch opposition of Coolidge and Hoover. With straight faces they exhorted the farmer to avoid government help like the plague; the exhortations would have been better received had not these Presidents been so eager to give "un-American" aid to industry and finance. A few mild credit provisions were approved, but they only delayed the foreclosures made inevitable by falling prices. Between 1927 and 1932 ten per cent of American farm property was foreclosed and sold at auction. The only relief was found when farmers adopted the old frontier custom of intimidating prospective bidders so that the farms would be knocked down in "penny auctions" to their original owners. In 1929, the peak year of prosperity, Northern and Western farmers received an average income of \$528; in the South, only \$186.

Republicans entered the presidential campaign of 1928 with confidence, even after Coolidge at his Black Hills vacation spot announced cryptically, "I do not choose to run." The wishful Hoover received the party nod and acquired as running mate the half-breed Crow Indian Senator Charles Curtis of Kansas. This time Al Smith walked away with the Democratic nomination and was given Senator Joseph T. Robinson of Arkansas as a running mate. Opposition to Smith was light, probably because it was clearly a Republican year. The platforms of the two parties were on most important issues almost interchangeable, once the screen of double-talk was penetrated. Both stood up for the protective tariff, Prohibition, isolation from foreign entanglements, and business prosperity, and neither was ready to do anything for the farmer.

The campaign, however, was far from cut-and-dried. Smith (1873-1944) was a colorful candidate who had come up through the Fulton Fish Market and Tammany Hall, had received little formal education, read

Farmers
driven to
desperation

Campaign
of 1928

The Happy Warrior

little more than the newspapers, spoke with the typical "East Side" accent, and possessed a buoyant, self-confident, wise-cracking dynamism which endeared him to the urban masses and made his "brown derby" a beloved symbol of a more free and easy order of life than the Old Guard was ready to espouse. Close observers of Smith pointed out that though he had a clear liberal record during his rise to power, he had lately begun to veer toward economic conservatism. It is not likely, however, that this criticism would have had much to do with the outcome even had the voters realized it, for they themselves were nothing if not conservative.

More vital were five other factors. Smith was a Catholic, a Wet, a city slicker, a Tammanyite, and the son of immigrants—and he hedged on none of these factors. All of them were handicaps in the South, and each of them

Unofficial issues

in certain other parts of the country. Without Hoover's approval, there was launched a whispering campaign to the effect that Smith intended to make the White House an annex to the Vatican. Smith lost no time in repudiating his party's dry plank; Hoover vaguely approved Prohibition as an "experiment, noble in motive"—thereby cinching the allegiance of the Drys. Many who would otherwise have accepted him shuddered when Smith's raucous, "uncultured" voice came over what he persistently called the "raddio," and they felt that the slums of New York were at last boiling up into national office. Smith's candidacy posed a dilemma to the dry, Protestant, rural South, and many voters solved it by staying away from the polls rather than vote Republican.

As it was, Smith carried in the South only Arkansas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia, and South Carolina. The Solid South was for the first time split wide open, though the wound was to be healed at least

The election

temporarily. In the North, Smith carried only the dominantly Catholic states of Massachusetts and Rhode Island, but careful studies have revealed that his Northern urban vote came to him not because he was a Catholic but because he was a Wet. All together, Smith received 87 electoral votes and 15 million popular votes, while Hoover romped home with 444 electors and 21.4 million popular votes.

Hoover began his reign under good omens, as he issued a long list of executive orders aimed at improving administration efficiency. Coolidge retired to Northampton to watch cynically the "Wonder Boy" from afar

Hoover's "honey-moon"

and to write at a dollar a word a daily column of "hard sense and soft soap" which included such shrewd Yankee observations as "when a great many people are unable to find work, unemployment results." The Democratic Party, it was rather generally agreed, was through on the national scene. Wiseacres, however, awarded it

ing the divorce courts, filling doctor's offices, and jamming asylums and jails. There was too much relaxation of self-discipline and family discipline; too much drinking, too much dancing, too much snobbishness and frantic racing to keep up with the Joneses, too much irresponsibility with its resultant flouting of conventional morals and community and church duties.

The basic lack of the period of the 1920's was faith in the American way. There had frequently been periods of disagreement, doubt, and uncertainty about the meaning of the American way, but never before this time had the people cynically rejected spiritual values and made their interpretations in such clearly materialistic terms. **Decline of faith in democracy** As St. Paul would have it, we sought the law of righteousness, not by faith, but by works. The effective majority of the people were convinced (whether rightly or not) that their material welfare was most important. The *status quo* gave them material prosperity or the chance to acquire it; hence any person or -ism which questioned the *status quo* was automatically an enemy.

Now democracy by its very definition questions things as they are and welcomes discussion of better ways of doing things; hence it also came to be regarded with suspicion and sometimes with hostility. We no longer trusted democracy to the full extent as the method to solve our problems, and lacking this faith we became hysterical whenever the *status quo* was questioned. The repressive spirit of the 1920's found dramatic illustration in a great surge of fear and intolerance, which took the form of unreasoned persecution of men who held radical and even liberal opinions; of attempts to censor and direct personal morals; and of a new wave of nativism which took Catholics, Jews, and Negroes as its victims.

In a very real sense the character of the 1920's was set by this nativist movement which rose out of the fears and hates of the war and which in one form or another penetrated to every corner of the American dwelling.

Withdrawal from the world Normalcy did not wait for Harding to name it or initiate it. In the midst of the war Prohibitionists sought to advance their cause by denouncing breweries as German-dominated, and employers tarred labor as unpatriotic and Russian-dominated. By 1919 the reaction was in full swing. Americans had looked into the abyss of world affairs and drawn back in alarm. Now they devoted themselves to building a wall warranted to isolate them from world responsibilities, interferences, and ideas. In their anxiety to shut out foreign ideas they restricted immigration, persecuted liberal and radical doctrines, and washed out the economic reforms of the Progressive Era. They sought to strengthen Americanism by tightening social, and where possible legal, restrictions on Negroes, Jews, and Catholics. Even Prohibition largely owed its triumph to the war and to the American resolve to turn the land

into an Eden of peace and prosperity, into which the serpent of foreign radicalism and irreligion could find no entry.

The strange thing is that despite our worship of material values we were quite unable to judge them soundly and realistically. What the United States really needed was an orderly world in which to trade its enormous production for the many foreign products it needed or could use. And yet the nation with one third the world's developed economic wealth deliberately walled itself off from the goods of the world. *Economic* imperialism was growing; yet at the very time that American investments were invading the world, the nation refused to safeguard them either by treaty or by military preparedness and was actually scuttling its navy, dismissing its army, and plumping for pacifism.

Lack of
realism

During the three years after the Bolshevik "October Revolution" the so-called Red scare gripped the United States. Rising out of the American antipathy to any system that menaced freedom of enterprise, it found fertile soil in the war hysteria and was egged on by men who had a reason for beating down labor. "Red" became a convenient designation not only for communists but for socialists, labor unions, conscientious objectors, and even progressives. Federal agencies used the sweeping powers granted by the Espionage Act of 1917 and the Sedition Act of 1918 to arrest and deport accused persons with a brutal disregard of civil rights. The wartime Attorney-General sent hundreds of persons to the penitentiary with the candid explanation that "free expression of opinion was dangerous to American institutions." It actually was judged criminal to advocate heavier taxation instead of borrowing, to state that conscription was unconstitutional though the Supreme Court had not yet held it valid, to urge that a referendum should have preceded our declaration of war, or to say that war was contrary to the teachings of Christ.

The Red
scare

The Supreme Court sometimes interposed a much-needed judicial calm between some of these offenders and the sentences imposed by district courts. The two most famous cases, however, confirmed sentences by lower courts. In *Schenck v. U.S.* (1919) Justice Holmes denied that the First Amendment guaranteed freedom of speech under all circumstances. He set the line at the point of "clear and present danger" to the continuance of the processes of government. In the case of *Abrams v. U.S.* (1919) Holmes dissented from the conviction of a radical for distributing pro-Russian leaflets, and uttered a vigorous defense of "free trade in ideas."

The
Supreme
Court and
civil rights

The Constitution's guarantees of civil rights are against Federal encroachments and do not affect the states. Thus there is no way of preventing state violations of civil liberties unless they clearly violate the

Limits on Federal protection Fourteenth Amendment. That amendment technically places under Federal jurisdiction violations of due process of law, but the Constitutional requirement that trials must be by jury means that where local opinion condones such violations no conviction can be obtained.

The principal weapon assumed in the 1920's by the Supreme Court for the defense of civil liberties against the states was the doctrine that the Federal Bill of Rights (the first Ten Amendments) applied to the states as well as the Federal government. This doctrine first appeared clearly in the case of *Gitlow v. New York* (1925). Benjamin Gitlow had been convicted of publishing a manifesto intended to incite revolution. The Court declared that the Fourteenth Amendment, in imposing upon the Federal government the defense of due process against state encroachments, intended to defend free speech and press as specified in the First Amendment. The New York law and Gitlow's conviction were upheld, but the wedge had been inserted under state rights. A series of decisions confirmed the doctrine, and *Powell v. Alabama* (1932), the *Scottsboro Case*, added the Sixth Amendment, at least in cases where capital punishment was involved. Thus there seems to be under way an evolution toward the doctrine that states must observe all the provisos of the Bill of Rights.

The Sedition Act was repealed in 1921, though the Espionage Act remained on the books. Somewhat similar legislation had been passed by many states, especially tailored to catch labor agitators and those who criticized the government. Eventually a majority of the states had these Criminal Syndicalist Laws, as they were called. Such legislation punishes the expression of opinion as bad in itself without regard to actual results, and leaves too much to the judgment of constables, judges, juries, policemen, and police magistrates. The results are sometimes absurd, such as making it illegal to display a red flag at the tail-end of a load of lumber, or to wear a red necktie.

There have been serious attempts in state and local governments to identify the promotion of conventional morals with the upholding of Americanism. There is scarcely room for wonder that confusion follows. **Enforcing Americanism** Laws segregating Negroes, censoring moving pictures, forbidding labor unions, and giving police absolute control of all attempts to hold protest meetings or to print or distribute leaflets expressing dissenting opinions, are defended as necessary to good morals and to patriotism.

The Georgia teachers' oath of 1935, for example, requires that the teacher swear that he "will refrain from directly or indirectly subscribing to or teaching any theory of government, of economics, or of social relations which is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of patriotism

and the high ideals of Americanism." On the face of it, any teacher should be glad to subscribe to such an oath; the catch is that interpretations differ from state to state as to the precise meaning of the fundamental principles and high ideals. Such oaths can be and have been used by local officials to force teachers to defend things as they are or to cut off discussion of both sides of certain problems, such as Prohibition, monopoly, isolation, race equality, labor unions, and civil liberties.

The hysterical phase of the Red scare subsided after 1920, but the fear remained and with it the prosecutions under the Criminal Syndicalist Laws. That the mere holding of radical opinions was popularly regarded as ground for conviction of crime seemed to be indicated by the famous *Sacco-Vanzetti Case*. Nicola Sacco (1891–1927), a shoe factory worker, and Bartolomeo Vanzetti (1888–1927), a fish peddler, were Italian immigrants and confessed anarchists, resident in the Boston area. In May 1920 they were picked up by police and accused of having participated in a pay-roll murder. A year later they were tried, convicted, and sentenced to death on evidence which to say the least was contradictory.

Sacco-Vanzetti Case

The case soon became a *cause célèbre*. The prosecutor, the judge, and the jury foreman were accused of having railroaded the two men simply because they were radicals—and the evidence does seem to bear out that charge. American liberals and civil-liberties defense organizations came to the rescue of the accused, raised money for their defense, and sought to arouse the public conscience in their behalf. Radicals lost no time in portraying the two accused men as symbols of the oppressed in the class struggle and proofs of the claim that capitalism could not afford justice to its enemies.

Its significance

Sacco and Vanzetti naturally came to regard themselves as martyrs, and their letters show that they also regarded themselves as symbols. In spite of everything, a new trial was refused; and the two men were executed on 23 August 1927. The day of execution was observed by radicals as a world day of mourning. That the case is a landmark in the struggle for justice, whatever the merits of its legal aspects, is shown by the rôle it has played in drama, poetry, and fiction.

Criminal Syndicalist Laws foreshadowed a widespread attempt by public and private agencies to regulate and direct those moral actions and opinions which have usually been considered matters for individual decision. Comstockery received new life with its censoring of reading material and moving pictures. Bryan led a campaign against the teaching of the theory of evolution in the public schools and was joined by religious Fundamentalists and by conservatives who feared evolution's claim that change was normal and necessary. The famous Scopes Trial (1925) for a violation of the Tennessee law against

Regulation of private morals

the teaching of evolution centered the world's attention on the absurdity of the situation, and the conviction was washed out on a technicality. The Ku Klux Klan, based on nativist and economic antipathies to Negroes, Jews, and Catholics, swept the nation in the early 1920's and gained enormous political power. Then, as the scandalous actions of its officials became known, the organization faded as rapidly as it had risen.

Prohibition was by far the most significant instance of the new order of moral regulation. After the subsidence of the pre-Civil War wave of



Clive Weed, from the "Evening World"

One view of prohibition

prohibition, the issue was kept alive by the Prohibition Party, the non-partisan Anti-Saloon League, and the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, which was especially active in educational work in the churches. These and other such organizations had their own approaches and objectives, but by 1916 thirteen states had been voted into the bone-dry column. Advantage was taken of wartime conditions to prohibit the use of grain in making beer or distilled liquors. This action was followed, ten days after the Armistice, by the War Prohibition Act, which legally dried up the nation for the duration.

On 16 January 1920 the Eighteenth Amendment went into effect. It prohibited "the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors

within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes." The Volstead Act outlawed all liquor containing more than one half of one per cent of alcohol.

**Eighteenth
Amend-
ment**

Unreasonable and oppressive laws and regulations are more likely to breed subterfuge than compliance. It is a curious fact that while the nation was embarked upon a desperate and unreasoned campaign to uphold the laws by cracking down on radicals and even liberals, it was even more zealously and universally breaking the Prohibition laws, state and Federal. The inconsistency amazed, amused, and disgusted foreigners, and strengthened the rather general impression

**Naïvety of
Prohibition
experiment**



Donald McKee, from "Life"

Another view of prohibition

that Americans were mad. To say the least, there was a touch of unreality about the American belief that a social problem could be solved by simple legislation and that poverty and crime would consequently disappear.

Many citizens regarded Prohibition as a gross infringement of personal liberties and, refusing to class it with other laws, considered themselves justified in breaking it whenever possible. Such men pointed out that democracy imposes upon the citizen the duty of working for the repeal of unjust laws and also the duty, if necessary, of deliberately refusing to obey them no matter what the penalty. On the other hand, of course, Prohibitionists asserted that the majesty of the law was tarnished when individuals took it upon themselves to decide which laws to obey.

The Eighteenth Amendment gave states concurrent power to enforce Prohibition, but state politicians after passing "little Volstead Acts" pretty

generally abandoned the touchy business to the Federal government. Enforcement was in the hands of the three thousand agents of the Prohibition Bureau, first under the Treasury then under Justice. Congress, resorting to the traditional way of giving an unwanted law the run-around, financially starved the Bureau so thoroughly that it would have been absurd to expect efficient enforcement—even if such a thing were possible with unlimited funds.

Under the circumstances, it is clear that many evils took their rise from or were strengthened by Prohibition. The place of the saloon was taken by speak-easies which ranged all the way from dingy back rooms to palatial establishments, but all tolerated by the police. The once-despised bootlegger who had dealt in illegal liquor now became a figure of political influence and economic power. Liquor was supplied by home manufacture, moonshiners, brewers who failed to denature their product, and by “rum-runners” in speedboats, who brought it across the Lakes from Canada or from foreign vessels lurking beyond the three-mile limit.

The situation was an open invitation to graft, and the Prohibition Bureau was never able to plug up the holes. With 50,000 cases annually crowding the dockets of the Federal courts, nine tenths of them had to be let off with a slight penalty in return for a plea of guilty. Criminal gangs in every city took over the liquor business and forced retailers to pay handsomely for “protection.” Rackets had long preyed on labor unions and on illegal enterprises such as prostitution and gambling, but now, financed by the profits of bootlegging, they invaded new fields.

There was no peace in a city until all the rackets had been forced under the control of one hand. Chicago was thus the scene of a long war in which about five hundred gunmen were killed, until in 1929 it came under the domination of Al Capone (1899–1947). Capone, a greasy, scar-faced Sicilian, clinched his rise to power with the famous St. Valentine’s Day Massacre of 1929, in which seven leaders of the rival Moran gang were lined up against a garage wall and machine-gunned by men in police uniforms. Capone not only controlled the rackets of Chicago but carried great weight in its politics and literally annexed the suburb of Cicero as his headquarters and stronghold. Racketeers were not dealing in peanuts; around 1930 the annual income of organized crime was variously estimated at from twelve to eighteen billion dollars. Even if the figure was greatly exaggerated, it was certainly several times the income of the national government and of America’s greatest corporations.

Actually organized crime was only a surface manifestation of the same canker which the muckrakers had exposed. The racket bosses were not, in the last analysis, their own masters, nor were they necessarily controlled

by the ostensible political leaders of their cities. We may never know the details, but it is probable that the real powers in the background were frequently financial tycoons more interested in private power than public welfare. The racket bosses paid for their privileges by services. They furnished money to buy votes and political publicity, and goons to see that elections went "right." They beat labor into submission. They protected shipments and warehouses from robbery and diverted lesser criminals away from Big Business and toward defenseless Little Business.

Behind the racketeers

The decline of the rackets came with the vigorous campaign waged by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and when the passing of Prohibition ended the rackets' chief source of income. No less important, however, was the arrogant threat of the racket bosses to annex Big Business, a threat which forced industrial and financial leaders to smash them. An interesting aspect of the situation was that the racketeers could seldom be reached through criminal law; they had to be prosecuted for Federal offenses, such as income-tax evasion or operating across state lines. Thus, Capone served a stretch in Alcatraz and then retired to die of paresis in a luxurious villa among the canals of Miami Beach.

Decline of the rackets

Police methods had been stubbornly antiquated partly because police had the prejudice of ignorant men toward science, partly because they had no intention of stopping or of severely punishing crime. The kidnaping and slaying early in 1932 of the infant son of Charles Lindbergh, first man to fly solo across the Atlantic, was the turning point as the public became aware of police bungling. When more than two years later the kidnaper was arrested and proved guilty by scientific methods, the case was a revelation in what intelligence and patience could do. Public and police were now ready, and the "G-Men" of the Federal Bureau of Investigation under John Edgar Hoover, a master detective who was also fortunately a master showman, began to train the nation's police in scientific methods.

The G-Men

By far the most significant and pervasive gift of the new technology was the automobile; in 1929 some 5.6 millions automobiles were built and 26.5 millions registered. They had been a powerful influence in lifting the nation out of the primary postwar depression, and by 1929 they were the basis of the largest American industry and directly and indirectly giving employment to 3.75 million workers. Within a few years the automobile was no longer a luxury but an ordinary necessity, and millions of families skimmed on food and clothing to buy and run a second-hand jalopy.

The effect of the automobile

The car brought the farm to the town by shortening the farmer's trips. It made it possible for the worker to live many miles from the job, and at

the same time it decentralized industry. Counties had been laid out so that a farmer could drive his horse to the county seat and back in a day; now the county seat was never more than an hour away, and local government became suddenly obsolete and burdensomely expensive—and still is. School buses enabled country schools to be consolidated and improved. Medical services and hospitals became more available. Trucks brought farm and garden products hundreds of miles in a single night to city markets, and express trucks accelerated interurban deliveries of freight. Country churches were consolidated, the work of their ministers facilitated, and, it was noted, rural congregations became less mean-spirited.

The moving-picture industry succeeded because it gave the people what they wanted: entertainment without effort, suppression of the unpleasant, and a whipped-cream topping of dream stuff. Hollywood took the United States and the world by storm, and the profits gave the industry the means to hire European stars and directors, to undertake technological research, and to experiment in the technique of direction and cutting. As a result Hollywood led the world in motion-picture progress until overcome by the fatty degeneration of the middle twenties.

The social effect was tremendous. Vaudeville was killed, the theater crippled, and the star took the place of the matinee idol. Hollywood has set styles in dress, social decorum, and architecture. American gadgetry receives free and powerfully effective advertising in the far corners of the earth. The motion picture supports capitalism by its glorification of the success story. It helped to remake popular standards; certainly it contributed to the decline of the Cult of Respectability with its humdrum good provider and its plugging wife and mother. At the same time, the motion picture instructed as well as entertained. The public became acquainted with other lands and other times, witnessed world events, and was swayed by visual propaganda. Moreover, the motion picture was a definite aid to scientific advance, became an instrument of religious and technical education, and an aid to business and commerce.

Radio telephony was invented before World War I but did not come into general use until after the war. The first Federally-licensed station was KDKA in Pittsburgh, and one of its first broadcasts spread the news of Harding's election. It was Westinghouse and Radio Corporation of America which by 1922 had brought commercially sponsored radio programs to the masses and offered receiving instruments for sale. By this time there were 220 stations on the air, and Federal control was trying to bring order out of aerial chaos. The setting-up of the Federal Communications Commission in 1934 climaxed a long period of evolution.

The prospective replacement of radio by television should not blind one to the enormous effect the radio has had for thirty years. Probably no other

medium has been so useful in advertising, though there are indications that American ears are becoming dulled to the praises of the sponsor's wares. Despite the low intellectual caliber indicated by sentimentalized soap operas, corny comedians, and mediocre music, the radio has introduced the public to some of the world's greatest novels, dramas, and music. With forty million radios waiting to bring in fireside chats, the political effect becomes obvious, especially when the speaker's voice is mellifluous and his diction perfect. **Its effect**

New social techniques were bound up with these new technological gadgets and often would have been impossible without them. We noted how the automobile made possible the consolidated rural school, the improvement of rural medical service, and the movement from the city into the country either for relaxation or for living. **New social techniques** The commercialization of amusements was already under way, but it now reached its heyday with the moving picture, the gladiatorial sports arena, the college stadium, the amusement park, and the country club. The advertising public-relations profession now came to the top as the radio, the moving picture, electric displays, and color printing gave it new mediums.

Manufacturers and retailers sought to increase their market by breaking down the traditional concept of thrift and persuading the consumer to spend his surplus and mortgage his future income by installment buying. Advertising specialists spared no pains or expense in their study of public psychology in order to find the weakest points **Advertising** for assault. In a nation so sexually inhibited and therefore sex-crazy, it was not remarkable that (whether blatantly or subtly) advertising has from first to last relied chiefly upon sex to sell goods.

Next to sex appeal came appeals to fear of disease or death, of loss of employment, or of destitution in old age. Then there was snob appeal. Obsolescence was invented to stimulate the new craze for keeping up with the Joneses, whether in lawnmowers or cars. The thrifty man who clung to the ancient virtues was assured by gents with snobbishly lifted eyebrows that he had better get over into the American way; the way to prosper was not to save but to spend. Advertisers presented themselves as public servants because they gave the public what it needed and stimulated the public to want what it did not yet know it needed.

Actually materialism may have been no greater than before, but the virtue of moderation was less in evidence. Business, necessary and healthful in itself, was invested with the same neurotic earmarks as the amusements. Gadgetry became a national craze. Fads and fashions whirled by at a dizzying pace. Violent forms of the dance took over, and jazz rose out of the cesspools of New Orleans **Fads and fashions** to accompany them. Bridge became a welcome substitute for intelligent conversation. Bathing beauties took off more and more. The flapper came

in, a miss with rolled stockings, kilted skirts, frizzed hair, violent make-up, ukulele, and dangling cigaret. She was only the first of a long line of female rebels.

Whatever one may say against the cult of respectability, it must be admitted that it sought to deepen old-fashioned virtues. Advertisers, the



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"It's broccoli, dear."


"I say it's spinach, and I say the hell with it."

Carl Rose here satirizes both the independence of the American child and the health faddists' cult. "Spinach" has come into the language as a synonym for bunkum.

moving pictures, the radio, and lurid romances joyously tended and watered the twentieth century's campaign against responsibility, hard work, thrift, moderation, and modesty of deportment. The world was portrayed as a fairyland in which every American could enjoy wealth, power, luxury, travel, and sex conquest. Even the schools joined in creating this false picture by teaching that every American was entitled to success in sports, in love, and in the economic struggle. Every effort was bent to stirring up discontent with one's status or possessions—which discontent, however, could be allayed by a new brand of cigaret, a new perfume, a new car, or a correspondence course. Now, discontent has its uses in spurring the individual and society to the creation of a better life, but carried to an extreme it breeds more frustration than improvement. This truism became clear during the depression, when the advertised standard of living was shown to be a delusion, at least for the present.

Other frustrations were not lacking. Traditional sex inhibitions had doubtless diverted American energy to economic ends, but the new emphasis upon sex satisfactions warred against the inhibitions and contributed to

SUICIDE, MURDER, DIVORCE, AND INSANITY RATE IN U.S.A. 1900-1950



the growing pattern of personal and social frustration. Half the hospital beds were filled with mental cases, suicide increased by a third, and crime was more than ever before traceable to attempts to gratify the new and artificially stimulated impulses.

Psychiatry has grown in significance as the stresses of modern life have forced the problem of maladjustment on public attention. Psychiatry has made a tremendous contribution to the whole field of social study by its demonstration that the problems of social and interpersonal adjustments are to be found in all economic groups. This demonstration has widened the focus of social work to include more than service to the lowest economic group. The modern aim

**Caring for
the malad-
justed**

is to treat the maladjusted and poverty-stricken with professional understanding, which seeks to help the client to help himself to reach a solution which is satisfactory to him and in harmony with the interests of the community.

Writers at the turn of the century had oscillated between the optimism of the Social Gospel and the dawning service state on one side and the deterministic triumph of brute force on the other, but usually they had believed in reason. Now irrationality took the boards, egged on by the announcement of science that it could find no certainty in the submicroscopic world. Freud found chaos in the subconscious mind, and fascists were soon to find chaos in society and offer to give it order by their iron strait jacket. In literature the same gospel was preached by the British and Irish novelists and poets of futility. Emphasis was placed on the primitive: sex, eating, sleeping, and fighting. Standards were rejected; there was no more immorality, no abnormality, no perversion. There followed a vast unintelligibility, regarded as profundity, which avoided issues rather than solved them. Indeed, the lack of standards became as stuffy and vulgar in its monotony as was the Victorian Age, and without the Victorian virtue of sincerity.

This atmosphere was transferred to America from the Left Bank of the Seine via Greenwich Village. Pragmatists, opposed to sterile intellectual structures but not to reason, were aghast at what was happening, though of course idealists chortled with sardonic glee at what they said was the result of Pragmatism's presumed materialism. The literary scene The writers and artists of the Lost Generation blamed the war for their frustration, and in part they may have been right. However, in looking back at the great changes which have gotten under way during the past generation, it is difficult to avoid the belief that a period of confusion would have come in any case.

Americans were (we may hazard the opinion) in the latter stages of national adolescence, longing for the security of childhood and resenting the looming age of responsibility. Artists and writers were fearful and futile, or merely mediocre; few were well-balanced, and rebels were likely to be clever but unconstructive satirists. They subscribed to the dictum: "The writer expresses; he does not communicate." Thus they laid themselves open to the suspicion that they had nothing to communicate. Novelists who did not go in for obfuscation were often smooth and competent but more reportorial than penetrating, clever rather than ethical. Sinclair Lewis, for example, seemed more impatient of dullness than shocked by sin. It was easy to satirize vulgarity, provincialism, and smug materialism, and to point with alarm to frayed nerves and to the alarming incidence of insanity; something more was needed to reform them.

Still, there were survivors among what now seemed to be traditionalists,

who kept their faith in values—sometimes even their optimism. Mostly they were poets who praised simple things and novelists who worked in the rich field of regionalism, with here and there a proletarian novelist who admitted a hope of reform. As significant as anything was the rise of gifted Negro poets and novelists.

It is tempting to paint an overly lurid portrait of the mad whirl of the 1920's. Yet it must be remembered that many older people refused to be affected, and probably the majority of younger people. We may attribute this to innate balance, religious training, the survival of the Cult of Respectability, or to sheer economic inability to buy largely of the gewgaws of *Vanity Fair*, but the fact remains that at the core the American people remained sound and unspoiled. The crises of the depression and of World War II proved this.

Soundness
at the core

At the same time the American became better informed about economic and social fundamentals, a fact which soon began to affect laws regulating corporations, the tariff and the stock market, police, schools, public institutions, and social services. He learned more about the world at large, and this knowledge was reflected in the difference between his attitude after World War I and after World War II. He became more sophisticated, as was witnessed by the passing of the country hick.

Nevertheless, the materialism of the postwar epoch only served to point up the triumph of science and the backwardness of the social sciences. Science seeks truth, and its discoveries can be translated into new technologies. Its readily apparent utilitarian basis thus makes it adored by the masses, readily supported by industry and even government, and, most significant of all, attracts the most brilliant minds. Even the fact that pure science is essential to technological progress is now generally recognized, and it receives more support than ever before. Historically there has been a fairly free international interchange of scientific information, and this situation was so true in the 1920's that there was amazing progress in its application to medicine, plastics, alloys, agriculture, and indeed to all fields of human material endeavor.

Science
breeds
gadgetry

Even more significant, though less known to the public, was the growing scientific realization of the meaning of the discoveries of the Curies (radium), Röntgen (X rays), Becquerel (radioactivity), Planck (the quantum theory), and Einstein (relativity). None of these, it will be noticed, was American, and indeed Americans made relatively few contributions to pure science until after World War I. Out of this progression, however, scientists began to recognize two things. First, the alchemists' dream of the transmutation of elements was within their grasp and with it vast power over the forces of nature and perhaps even the ability to loose an explosion which would destroy the world.

Wherein
science is
futile



Donald McKee, from "Judge"

Aladdin—I wish—I wish I had a—now—I wish I had sump'n to wish for!

The American surrounded by his wealth of gadgets (1925)

The second fact was that order disappears as one enters the realm of the submicroscopic and that in the final analysis there is no such thing as cause and effect, no certainty or reason.

This discovery was a stunning blow to philosophers, at least to materialistic philosophers, and it was not long until political theorists were saying that if nature had no order, then it was time that an élite impose order on the masses. Such was in large part the justification offered by fascists for their seizure of power. On the other hand comes the cheering realization that now that reality is rid of its lumpishness, the way is cleared for freedom of the will.

Fascists and totalitarians of all kinds were indeed stealing a march on democracy. Freedom and democracy depended upon restrained and intelligent social interaction, but it was becoming alarmingly clear that the social sciences were lagging in the effort to educate the citizen to control the vast mechanical power which scientists were heedlessly placing in his hands. There were many reasons, but we can name only a few.

The lag-
gard social
sciences

One was the failure of the social sciences to develop a method, and in fact the growing realization that human interactions are so fraught with endless possibilities that they can never be organized into a predictable, fool-proof pattern. Not only is the human being unpredictable, but he is influenced by endless natural factors which may or may not come under scientific control. Human views of any subject are thus liable to differences of interpretation which may rise out of timidity, selfishness, incomplete data, or honest inability to agree. The one important attempt to develop a method in the social sciences is the case study, as with the Lynds' *Middletown*, a case study of the social conditions of Muncie, Indiana. The method clearly has value, but even more clearly it has limitations.

A second reason for the lagging of the social sciences is public suspicion, of which we have seen numerous examples in the postwar reign of fear. Social sciences translate scientific findings into social terms and ask embarrassing questions, such as why must we have slums, or poverty, or race discrimination. People who ask such questions cannot expect to be popular with vested interests, by which we mean not merely Wall Street but our vested interest in a white skin, superior prestige, wealth, education, social position, or the hope of acquiring them if the *status quo* remains unchanged. Vested interests also exist among radicals who work for change because they think they or humanity will profit—and they are fully as suspicious of anyone who insists on consulting social or scientific facts.

**Menace to
vested
interests**

The truth is that science itself stands in danger because the social sciences are not educating the masses rapidly enough. There was a time when science was regarded as black magic; let the vested interests once more become aware of the fact that science is more interested in truth than in their selfish welfare, and it will again be denounced and persecuted as black magic. It is happening to-day in the Soviet Union, and it can happen here. This does not mean that we should take a holiday from science, but it does mean that progress in the social sciences must be speeded up.

**Science
also endan-
gers vested
interests**

3 *The Climax of Finance Capitalism*


The most dramatic accompaniment to Coolidge Prosperity was the sudden growth of the bull market into the so-called Great Bull Market, which began a rise in stock prices in March 1928 and continued without serious break until October 1929. During this period many stocks quadrupled in price, while the daily turnover rose from around 1 million to as high as 8 million. The wrangling over what caused the Great Bull Market is not over yet, but it seems to have been promoted by the ease of obtaining call money, by the Federal Reserve's lowering of the rediscount rate, by Mellon's reduction of the in-

**The Great
Bull
Market**

come tax, and by the very same devices which had been used so freely and heartlessly a generation before in the great day of corporate expansion—and with the same objective of shearing the lambs.

Despite these factors, there really was a growing problem of how to dispose of surplus capital and goods. Capital accumulations were mounting from war profits, tax rebates and reductions, and from the dividends and bonuses made possible by increased efficiency and by the squeezing of labor's wages. It was estimated, for example, that \$10 billion could not find investment in 1929. Excess production rose from overinvestment in plants and from the wartime stepping-up of the rhythm of production. Both capital and labor

**Problems
of excess
capital
and goods**



feared to slow down lest they bring on a disastrous panic. Improved technology was grinding out goods faster than America's effective purchasing power could absorb.

Americans had long possessed a petty business psychology, which had risen from the necessity of pinching every penny to obtain needed capital; suddenly they were confronted by a surplus both of capital and of goods. The proper ways to get rid of the surplus—if they were determined not to slow down production—were to raise wages so laborers could buy more goods and to invest abroad so foreigners could buy more goods. The theory that high wages would expand the market was approved by more businessmen than put it into effect. Indeed, one may question whether an industrialist can afford to act on the principle unless his competitors do likewise; Henry Ford saw this point, and while he claimed to raise wages and got credit with the public for doing it, he actually got around it by a series of well-planned maneuvers.

**Attempted
solutions**

Foreign investment was also incompatible with the traditional temper of petty business and so was never very heartily promoted. The United States was all but self-sufficient and could not grasp the necessity of becoming less so. In consequence, interest rates came down and speculation in stocks, building, and real estate ensued. Business concentrated on an

effort to expand domestic and foreign markets, but without greatly expanding purchasing power.

One of the vital causes of the growth of economic lopsidedness was the strides made by technology. We have repeatedly noted the development of the automobile, the tractor, the moving picture, and the radio. Aluminum led a long list of new metals and alloys. The chemical industry, though old in America, suddenly (largely as the result of the war) shot into a leading place with the manufacture of explosives, dyes, medicines, and a long list of plastics and other synthetic products largely based upon petroleum, coal tar, sulphur, brine, and industrial wastes. United with electricity, it brought on mechanical refrigeration and revolutionized the extraction of ores. Just over the horizon loomed the new science of electronics, which promised to revolutionize communication and to carry automatic processes to undreamed-of extremes. Factory planning and operation became technologies in themselves, as mass-production methods took over. Electric motors enabled industry to decentralize and to set up close to its raw materials, and industry consequently began to burgeon in Texas and other areas of the Great Plains and on the Pacific Coast.

**Techno-
logical
advances**

The rise of aviation deserves at least a paragraph. Postal subsidies and the transport of passengers and perishables encouraged the rise of numerous small lines in the 1920's, but the only large enterpriser was Pan-American Airways. It was Postmaster-General Walter F. Brown who in 1930, under the provisions of the McNary-Watres Act, wheedled the numerous domestic air lines into consolidating into three great east-west lines: United Air Lines in the North, Transcontinental and Western Airlines (the "Lindbergh line") which took the central route, and American Airways in the South. The pattern persists, with the addition of Northwest Airways in the extreme North and some smaller north-south lines. Brown was bitterly accused by the losers and by political enemies of having played favorites, but it now seems clear that he handled the situation as well as circumstances permitted. It was not until 1938 that regulation was begun by the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) under the Civil Aeronautics Authority, a bureau of the Commerce Department.

**Rise of the
air lines**

Possibly even more important than technological change was the revolution in business techniques, primarily undertaken in the hope of sustaining profits through new savings and of maintaining the rhythm of production through opening new markets. The movement toward business concentration was resumed at a pace which dumfounded and dismayed progressives. Moreover, the movement went right on through the New Deal era, apparently thriving on the very measures which were intended to block its growth. In 1930 the United

**Resump-
tion of con-
centration**

States boasted corporate assets of around \$150 billion, half of them under the influence of the House of Morgan. There were fifteen billion-dollar corporations. The 600 largest corporations owned half the corporate wealth; the rest was held by 400,000 little corporations. Electrical power was pretty well concentrated in six large groups, while the twenty-five largest banks held one third of the nation's deposits. Both banks and corporations were rapidly consolidating.

On the other hand, corporations were finding that size raised problems of efficient management, and many therefore consciously slowed down their growth and sought to find ways of promoting stability and flexibility. Thus **Limits of corporation bigness** U.S. Steel's proportion of national production fell from 66 per cent in 1901 to 33 per cent in 1950, and Standard Oil tumbled even more spectacularly. Observers believed that such corporations *could* have expanded if they had wished, hence the common feeling that *potential* monopoly was a menace, however self-denying the corporation may have been in fact. Middle-sized corporations, of course, took advantage of the situation to expand by growth and absorption, and their technique definitely worried the small businessman. Chain stores made devastating inroads into retailing, especially in food, drug, and variety stores.

One form taken by the movement toward concentration was a renewal of the old system of agreement which had failed to solve current problems in the 1880's. This time it took the form of trade associations, especially **Hoover's business codes** in industries which were divided into numerous small competing units. Secretary of Commerce Hoover saw this movement as a long step toward developing harmony and efficiency, and as "honest broker" he called numerous meetings of such associations to set up codes of "fair practices" and to improve efficiency. One notable effect was to reduce the deplorable variety of forms among products which easily lent themselves to standardization.

Of course, this whole movement was open to interpretation as restraint of trade within the meaning of the antitrust laws, but, as we have seen, the Supreme Court by the *Maple Flooring Case* permitted competitors to exchange statistical information, no doubt innocently supposing that mutual knowledge of costs and profits could have no bearing on competition. The result, however, was a considerable degree of regimentation by the associations since they could punish as an unfair practice any attempt by a member to get a competitive advantage by introducing new processes or products. These codes, as we shall see in good time, became the basis of the New Deal's National Recovery Codes. That Hoover anticipated regimentation as the outcome of his codes is unlikely, for he was a notable champion of flexibility.

One of the problems which confronted corporations in the 1920's was

what to do with their undivided surplus. Eventually the New Deal and World War II generously assisted, but for a decade they were left to their own devices. Advertising, if successful, might conceivably add to the surplus, but money appropriated to advertising was tax-exempt; so more and more found its way into that channel. Laboratories only found new savings and thereby added to the problem. Executive salaries and bonuses were raised. Factory restaurants, social centers, and hospitals were built, and contributions were made to community chests and to other community efforts. Employee-insurance and -retirement programs were expanded. Gingerly experiments were made in profit sharing. It was clear that a movement toward welfare capitalism was under way, and it might well have gone much further on its own initiative had it not been for the depression.

**Welfare
capitalism**

Traditional competition had been based on price and quality; now a great deal of it was in packaging and advertising. The business codes promoted this change, and so did the government's determination to prevent corporations (the larger ones, at least) from profiting by knocking out and absorbing a rival. At any rate, price wars became rarer as Little Steel accepted the prices set by Big Steel, a custom soon adopted by manufacturers of bread, soap, cigarets, and numerous other articles, and essentially by the automobile industry.

**Competi-
tion
changes
base**

The gasoline industry was an exception, largely because crude-oil producers had to pump frantically to keep their supply from being drained by competitors. There remained, moreover, forms of intra-industrial competition such as the struggle for control of mines or retail outlets. Alternative building materials were still competitive, and, of course, there was a grand campaign on the part of silk weavers to persuade the country to prefer silk undies to cotton. To carry the method to an extreme there was regional competition, as between California and Florida oranges—not to mention earthquakes and hurricanes.

Advertisers sought to solve the problem of surplus goods by: (1) breaking down the traditional concept of thrift, and (2) building themselves up as public benefactors. The first aimed not only at coaxing away the customer's surplus but at getting him to mortgage his future surplus by buying on the installment plan. Advertising is necessary and beneficial, but carried to the point where it induces overbuying there is doubt that it is economically beneficial. It accelerated the rhythm of production and gave a false picture of economic well-being as more and more of income went to pay interest and refunding charges on debt and weakened the country's financial structure.

**Economic
effects of
advertising**

Advertisers emphasized their public services with effective results. Thus the long dominance of the Ford, while due primarily to its cheapness and

economy, certainly owed a great deal to Henry's specious claims to be giving his workers the best wages and conditions in industry. Of course, advertisers found eventually that it helped to demonstrate the superior qualities of their goods. Too frequently, however, this superiority was merely a matter of cleverness in writing copy. It probably did not matter much, for articles in the same price range were apt to be pretty much the same. In the end, the collapse of the New Jerusalem promised in exchange for the abandonment of thrift also brought down the other elements of the structure. Not only did many customers become scornful of the truth of advertising, but they lost faith in the glib assertions that capitalism would bring eternal and automatic prosperity.

After World War I industrial managers began increasingly to move into banking positions. They were able to make this move partly because banks appreciated their practical ability, partly because their huge salaries and bonuses and their inside knowledge of the stock market enabled them to buy their way in. This movement should have made banking more conscious of the problems of management, and probably it sometimes did. There is ample evidence, however, that the pull was in the other direction, and that many managers joined in stock-market manipulations to milk the investors in the corporations which they were supposed to protect, and they were as intransigent toward labor as any bankers.

Stockholders were multiplying in number (in 1930 A. T. & T. had 567,000!), but the claim that this fact proved economic democracy was a bare-faced deception. Stockholders knew very well that all they had purchased was a right to such dividends as directors saw fit to declare. The actual control lay with the "insiders," and ordinarily it could be maintained by holding a bloc of stock, perhaps no more than five per cent of the whole amount of voting stock.

It was clear that the old competitive free-enterprise system was changing, but its place was not in general being taken by monopoly. Competition, as we have seen, was less in price than in efforts to stimulate and fill demands. The new managerial system was distinguished from the old free-enterprise system by (among other things) its separation of ownership and management, its interest in stability rather than in risk-taking, and its hierarchical organization, which laid a new emphasis on planning, policies, and concern for the future. The new pattern is not yet clear, but it is clear that industry can no longer "be set down as the great antithesis between competition and monopoly. It holds far too much of detail and drama, of color and variety, to be crowded into a few simple molds."*

On the other hand, it was apparent that the days were gone when a

* Walton H. Hamilton, *The Pattern of Competition* (1940), 25.

corporation could write its own ticket and do as it pleased, once that ticket was approved by the state legislature. Through the years the doctrine laid down in the *Dartmouth College Case* (which itself admitted of exceptions) had been effectually weakened. For one thing, state legislatures now reserved the right to amend or repeal grants of privileges to corporations. Corporations naturally objected to *ex post facto* legislation, but the Supreme Court ruled that state legislation was paramount and that a state could not be held to the provisions of contracts (corporation charters) which limited its right and power to govern.

State control of corporations

Actually these limitations did not greatly affect the power of corporations to grow nor the power of the insiders to dictate policies. The State of Delaware, activated by Du Pont altruism and by the legislators' yen for easy tax money, thoughtfully passed incorporation laws which gave corporation officials all but unlimited control of internal policies, including the right to issue stock in exchange for "services"—which meant to award it to themselves. Moreover, none of the directors needed to be citizens of Delaware, nor did meetings need to be held in the state. The result was that one ten-story building in Wilmington held (and may still hold) the headquarters of ten thousand corporations, with one clerk representing any number of them. Of course, when such corporations did business in other states, they were obliged to obey the tax laws and regulations of those states, but their internal policies remained free from interference.

The Delaware corporation

The above facts led to the new financial technique of *pyramiding*, a further development of the old holding-company principle. The pyramid was composed of a holding company at the apex, which in turn held several others, which in turn, etc., perhaps down as much as seven or eight levels. The term pyramiding came to mean an operation in which the entrepreneur organized a company, sold stock (carefully retaining control, however), and used the money to buy control of several operating or manufacturing concerns. He could then organize another holding company to buy control of his holding company and probably of others as well. By this means the pyramid was built from the bottom up, yielding meanwhile lucrative receipts from stock sales.

Pyramiding

The defense of the practice was that such a set-up could afford better managerial and engineering skills, cut costs, undersell competitors, and raise profits—and that was true if the set-up was honestly administered. It was sometimes, however, used to suck profits out of the operating companies by various clever devices. By such tactics it was possible for the insiders to draw out far more than the pyramided companies were earning, the differences of course being made up by the suckers who bought stock.

It is not necessarily true that the pyramiding insider was cynical in his

operations. Rather, let us say, he was an optimist caught up in the spirit of the times, who regarded himself as having earned the cream for his services in providing the national economy with a skeleton on which to grow. Nevertheless, it is hard to see how even a booming economy could replace such vast quantities of watered stock with sound physical assets. As this weakness became apparent to the pyramiders, and they saw their structures tottering, they frantically sought to shore them up by a maze of stock exchanges among the member companies, hoping that the stronger ones could support the weaker. New holding companies were organized and stock sold to bring in new life blood. Some of the pyramids crashed in spectacular ruin, but others managed to survive to become targets of New Deal legislation. The favorite fields for pyramiding were utilities, railroads, and banks and other financial institutions.

The promotional aspect of business had leaped amazingly, and it outshone, though it did not outbalance, the productive aspect. Sports promotion absorbed vast sums of capital as investment enterprises. The country was covered by real-estate booms—new subdivisions, hotels, country clubs, and resorts—many of them of so little real economic value that \$10 billion in mortgage bonds were to become worthless. Most amazing of all was the Florida boom of 1925–26, based on citrus fruits and prospects of the area as a winter-resort paradise. Lots deep under water changed hands at ever-mounting prices—really ten-per-cent binders which gave the purchaser an option which he promptly sold at an advance on like terms. Hundreds of thousands of acres, much of them under water, were sold and resold sight unseen until the great hurricane of 18 September 1926 collapsed the bubble. And yet, out of it all something like the envisioned paradise did rise as sand was pumped into the mangrove swamps and hotels and homes sprang up where once the alligator had reigned supreme.

Business advertised that it was cleaving to the old virtues of self-reliance and competition, and the National Association of Manufacturers led the propaganda. A recent view of a half-century of the NAM, however, shows that its historical policies have been to (1) discourage organized labor, (2) minimize taxes on industrial and management compensation, (3) oppose government regulation of industry, and (4) encourage public aid to industry if it does not conflict with the other objectives.

The result of the whole situation has been an astonishing amount of government aid to industry, and not merely in tax abatements or in tariffs. Water transport on canals, rivers, lakes, and at sea is incalculably subsidized by new canals, dams, locks, navigation facilities, postal subsidies, and the construction and practical donation of new craft. Plane manufac-

ture and air lines are based upon military purchases, unusually generous postal contracts, and public subsidy of airports and air technical facilities. The motor-trucking industry in its undercutting of the railroads is subsidized by expensive hard roads, which it mercilessly cuts to pieces and toward the maintenance and replacement of which it is accused of contributing too little. Fortunes have been founded upon magazine publishing, notably those of Curtis, McFadden, Nast, and Luce. It is curious that such men deplore government spending, yet their profits come in part from savings made by shipping through a heavily subsidized mail system. The indirect subsidization of advertisers is also apparent.

Businessmen have always complained about Federal bureaucracy, yet most of it has risen in response to their demands. Hoover was the parent of a concerted drive to further expand bureaucracy in an effort to study and meet the problems of private enterprise, to study and publicize business opportunities abroad, and to capture foreign markets. The Commerce Department mushroomed under his guidance and in many respects made the State Department (especially its consuls) an annex. So many of the burgeoning activities of private enterprise were connected with the public interest that even laissez-faire businessmen heartily supported the foundation or expansion of bureaus dealing with radio, customs, roads, merchant marine, aviation, and other aspects of transportation. However, one must note that up to 1933 the expansion of bureaucracy was not intended to manage business but to serve it through mediation, market research, and support in foreign ventures.

**Bu-
reaucracy**

Another aspect of bureaucracy was the rise of quasi-public "authorities" in the states. The greatest of these was the Port of New York Authority created in 1921, by compact between New York and New Jersey, to build and operate bridges, tunnels, airports, and other facilities. Such enterprises as the above were largely self-sustaining, supported by tolls, fees, and commercial sales, and on the whole have proved to be profitable. Some interstate problems were solved by compacts among the states affected, as the Colorado River or Boulder Dam Compact of 1922 among seven Western states for the exploitation of the Colorado River and the division of its waters and electrical power.

That Atomism was yielding slowly to Regulation even under Republican auspices was shown by the encroachment of the government on railroad management. The movement, begun by the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887 and continued under various supplementary acts, led finally to the Esch-Cummins or Railroad Transportation Act of 1920, passed by a Republican Congress and signed by a Democratic President. In part the law sought to reimburse the railroads for the unavoidable wear and tear of wartime traffic, but it

**Railroad
Transportation Act
of 1920**

also recognized at long last the fact that railroads are natural monopolies. The Interstate Commerce Commission was authorized to fix maximum and minimum rates, govern the issuance of new securities, pass upon the construction or abandonment of track, set aside state-fixed rates, and divide the country into rate districts. Even more significantly, the ICC was authorized to relax the regulations governing pools and long-short haul rates and was also directed to prepare a plan to consolidate the railroads of the country into a limited number of systems.

Railroads, indeed, were sick. The basic cause was probably the heartless exploitation of their financial structures before World War I and the consequent sense of futility in management as well as lack of money, which

**Railroad
stagnation**

slowed down the introduction of new and better equipment and methods. Now that automotive road transport, improved inland waterways, subsidized coastwise shipping, and avia-

tion had become serious competitors, the railroads did not know how to meet them nor could they raise the necessary capital from a disillusioned investing public. It was begging the question to blame the state of the business on government regulation; actually there had been no other way to protect the public welfare or to stop the railroads from suicidally draining their own blood. On the other hand, railroads were handicapped by the ICC strait jacket, which prevented them from abandoning poorly patronized runs and mileage. They were actually expected to haul mail at contract prices that hovered around the edge of loss. The railroads objected to the plan of reorganization proposed by the ICC. When that body prepared to set rates based upon a physical evaluation of railroad property on 1914 standards, the roads quite properly objected, and the Supreme Court blocked action in the *O'Fallon Case* (1929).

Rates rose consistently and when in 1933 Congress repealed the mandatory rate-setting provisions of the Esch-Cummins Act, the railroads organized regional associations which undertook to boost rates at their discre-

**Railroad
domination
of all
transport**

tion. Shippers had no recourse unless the ICC would veto the raises, yet it seldom did. The result was that rates in the South and West were moved up over Eastern rates, apparently to give the industrial East the advantage, for there was

little difference in cost of operation. The South and West were already suffering from discrimination, but now their rates (depending on class of freight) were from 37 to 71 per cent higher than corresponding freight originating in the East. Manufactured goods like textiles suffered most, but competing raw materials such as coal also suffered.

To cinch these measures, which they excused as essential to self-protection, the railroads began to buy into bus lines and to make routing and minimum-rate agreements with water carriers, truckers, and air lines.

Lastly they undertook to promote laws which would force their competitors under regulation. Whatever the merits of the total situation, there was no solution found during the interwar era—nor has there been yet.

The spirit of the times was such that even some presumably responsible leaders of the financial community joined the pyramidal dance. Investment trusts, ostensibly organized to aid the small investor, sometimes were mere agencies to collect money which the “insiders” could pour into their personal speculative enterprises. Actually the financial community was not a hierarchy. The great financial families, like royalty, had cemented alliances by marriages of heirs and heiresses, but there were also divorces and remarriages. Nevertheless, there was too much resemblance among them in their disregard of what Chief Justice Stone called the “fiduciary principle.”

**The spirit
of Wall
Street**

There was, of course, a considerable business element which deplored current business lack of morality and tried to do something about it. Petty swindles and commercial bribery were attacked through Better Business Bureaus. State laws against commercial bribery were largely ineffective on account of the interstate nature of the abuse, and thus far the Federal government has done little about it. Large-scale abuses were also attacked for both ethical and practical reasons. As Flynn whimsically remarks: “One can imagine the pious chagrin of a patent medicine advertiser who supposed he had been lying to 100,000 readers when he was lying to only half that number because the publisher was lying to him.”* Legitimate investment bankers naturally resented the success of stock swindlers in making away with several billion dollars a year which might be put to productive use. There was a growing consciousness that the conspiracy of silence which protected unethical practices only encouraged them, and voices were raised in support of pitilessly publicizing graft.

**Business
reform**

Where did all this money come from? Partly, of course, from the surpluses of individuals and corporations, but largely from bank credit (certainly over 26 billion). Banks were changing over from their traditional short-term loan policies to long-term loans and investments, which naturally placed them at the mercy of market conditions. Debt was piling up three times as fast as national wealth and income increased, and by 1933 had reached \$135 billion—about forty-five per cent of all national wealth (\$300 billion). Service charges on all debts in 1921 were seven per cent of the national income; in the midst of the depression they were twenty per cent.

**Where did
the money
come
from?**

Even many temperate critics of the financial scene of the 1920's have found it easy to accuse the pyramidiers and their ilk of a cynical intention

* John T. Flynn, *Graft in Business* (1931), 31.

to suck the economy dry and let it crash. While there may have been some such among their number, it is far more likely that most of them were simply guilty of overoptimism and of ignorance of economics. They knew that they were yielding to temptation, but they saw their sins as peccadilloes; the concept of infinity still ruled them, and they saw American resources as inexhaustible. In any case, the depression cannot be blamed solely on pyramiding.

At least equally culpable was the top-heavy productive structure which was grinding out goods in quantities far too great for the effective purchasing power to absorb. Capitalists understood this situation, of course, but they were blinded by the mythus of capitalism. This was the age-old conviction of the property holder which had been sedulously fostered by our political and psychological climate, the conviction that property had a right to multiply itself freely so long as it stayed within the law, which in a technical sense most businessmen were doing. They may have been cynical toward Europe, but they were proud of the United States, of the American way, and of democracy as they understood it. They had no idea that they were preparing to deal the American economy the most severe setback in its history.

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Chapter XLVI

THE AMERICAN IMPACT ABROAD

1 *The Early Phase*

WE HAVE frequently referred to the impact the United States made upon Europe even before World War I. As early as the American Revolution European observers had seen the headlong nature of American democracy and had speculated upon the possibility of its transferral to Europe. While it would be an exaggeration to attribute the French Revolution to the American example, it is fair to say that there was a distinct American inoculation of France. Franklin's *Poor Richard* had instructed the French masses (and to a lesser extent the remainder of Europe) in the bourgeois philosophy which was soon to undertake a social transformation of the continent. The Declaration of the Rights of Man was consciously based on the Declaration of Independence, while Jefferson had a palpable effect upon the first French constitution. The Constitution of the United States and the various state constitutions were models for the constitution framers of France, Switzerland, Belgium, and Norway, not to mention the Latin-American States and the members of the British Commonwealth.

In the eyes of the European élite America's sin was that it encouraged, even where it did not actually give birth to, the ideas which were shaking the foundations of their snug ascendancy. This statement refers not only to the old nobility and the conservative country gentry but to the rising class of capitalist entrepreneurs and financiers, whose liberality was chiefly a matter of striking the chains of tradition from their own enterprises—not in raising the masses. It applies less to England than to the Continent, for English entrepreneurs were burdened with the same Calvinistic ideas of the duties of wealth as existed in the United States.

Nevertheless, we find that the women's-rights movement (in part bor-

rowed from England) was carried from the United States to Europe by Fredrika Bremer, a Swedish writer and reformer; that Elihu Burritt carried his peace movement to Europe; that the more prohibitive phases of the temperance movement originated in America; and that Henry George's Single Tax made inroads on the lunatic fringe of European economic thought and that he was one of the inspirers of the British Fabian socialist movement. The reform of criminal codes found a model in the work of Edward Livingston (though it was rejected by Louisiana), while the Pennsylvania penal system was copied with its intent to reform rather than to punish and with its utilization of work and of occupational training. Just before World War I there began to emanate from the United States a new concept of education, John Dewey's instrumentalism, which challenged the typical European custom of educating only selected young men, and then by a sort of ivory-tower technique.

The ascendancy of the classic forms of architecture was challenged by the functionalism of Louis Sullivan and Frank Lloyd Wright, while American art students were joining their outcast European colleagues in the search for artistic techniques which could express current life. But long before this, American literary influence had become a power. Emerson was acclaimed as the champion of practical idealism, and Walt Whitman as the seer of democracy. Irving and Cooper popularized the drama of the American scene, and the latter introduced the sea tale which was carried to fulfillment by Conrad and McFee. Cooper, especially, has been credited with having stirred the interest of the European masses in America. Edgar Allan Poe exercised the most lasting literary influence as the father of the short story and the detective story, and the tutor of the French poetry of yearning which has led in our own time to a philosophy of futility.

Artistic
and
literary
influences

The American economic impact upon Europe was, of course, first felt through the export of raw materials and food. Indeed, American wheat exports helped Europe's own Agricultural Revolution to surmount the crop failures which from time immemorial had brought periods of semistarvation to the peasants. As we have seen, the American agricultural surplus had in considerable part financed the Civil War and the tremendous industrial expansion which accompanied and followed it. Though around the turn of the century wheat from other areas unhorsed American supremacy, the torrent of American grain was still regarded as an unsettling and depressing influence on European agriculture. By this time there was a growing export of manufactured articles: electrical equipment, farm machinery, typewriters, petroleum products, sewing machines, and leather goods.

Effect of
American
exports

Benjamin Franklin, Joseph Henry, and Willard Gibbs were the only American pure scientists of standing before World War I, but, as we have seen, American technology was making inroads in Europe as early as the

Science and technology 1850's. Americans are prone to exaggerate the uniqueness of our inventive genius, yet it is certainly true that in mass production and in marketing methods we were teaching the world before 1900, even though there was still considerable sloppiness about those methods; the conciseness necessary to the flowering of mass production was still waiting in the wings for its cue.

On the other hand, England was falling behind because its manufacturers and laborers were out to get all they could without undue effort; their interest was chiefly in keeping what they had. Moreover, government's indolent bureaucracy was hampering industry with laws and obsolete regulations. At the same time Germany, substituting hard work and painstaking thoroughness for genius, was forging ahead of England and gave promise of passing the United States until the genius of Frederick W. Taylor and Henry Ford intervened.

Encroachment on traditional European spheres When Europeans looked about them they saw other manifestations of American encroachment on traditional European spheres. American missionaries and American colleges were flourishing in the Levant, and these were regarded by Europeans and Levantines as forerunners of the American economic invasion. Turkey's bloody suppression of Armenian separatist societies was represented in the United States as religious persecution and provoked widespread demand for drastic action. Other annoyances followed—the kidnaping of a missionary lady was one—and American war-ships haunted Turkish waters to protect schools and missionaries.

Nor were American economic interests absent. As early as 1909 a retired American admiral was trying to get vast oil and mineral concessions in Turkey, much to the annoyance of the Kaiser's Berlin-to-Bagdad planners. Liberia, founded in 1822 by American Negro freedmen under the auspices of the American Colonization Society, had in 1880 been acknowledged by the State Department to bear "peculiar relations" to the United States. When British and French colonial authorities began to whittle away the Liberian border, Secretary Hay took public cognizance. Rumors of German desire for a protectorate over Liberia led TR in 1909 to undertake an investigation into the affairs of the country, which resulted in a measure of American administration being set up with the addition of British and French advisers.

In a sense the growing power of the United States was feared because it had no international manners—like Russia, with whom diplomats frequently classed it. On the other hand, American diplomatic manners were

The menace regarded as inseparable from its democracy; and down underneath it was democracy which was feared. It will be remembered that the élite of Europe welcomed the Civil War because it gave hope that the Western Giant would be split asunder, thus

destroying both its power and its radical democracy. When the North won the conflict, the élite saw its fears realized in the encouragement which the victory gave to European liberals. The masses, shut out of any hope of sharing the pleasant privileges of the élite, were leaving for America by the millions; even those who remained were turning to America for economic, social, and political patterns.

The whole traditional pattern of élite ascendancy was shaking, and its beneficiaries found the reasons not only in the teachings of Karl Marx but in the American democratic example. As the years sped by and the industrial might of the United States grew, as it unhorsed the hoary empire of Spain, nailed the warning of the Monroe Doctrine to the mast, and brashly interfered in the Far East, the powers of the European continent were annoyed and sometimes outraged. By the turn of the century the United States was filling the Old World with an unease quite out of proportion to its actual economic or cultural effect. The European fear, it is clear, was less for the present than for the future. It scarcely occurred to the statesmen of that generation (outside England) that the power of the brash young America might bring salvation as well as menace.

2 *America Invades the World*

The European of 1900 had portrayed the gaudy American, cocktail in hand, bestriding the narrow world, but as a matter of fact the invasion began seriously only after World War I. There were several reasons. The war weakened Europe and at the same time gave the United States a surplus of capital for investment. In the second place American technology (again partly because of the war) had stepped up the rhythm of production to the point where a surplus of goods existed and had to be disposed of.

Why America invaded the world

Thirdly, the United States was apparently approaching the end of some of its own raw materials, especially petroleum, copper, nickel, and aluminum, and the wealthy and aggressive industries which had been built upon these now naturally sought to gain control of foreign supplies. In addition, Americans felt obliged to combat the efforts of foreigners to manipulate a number of raw materials so as to create an artificial scarcity and raise the prices; among these may be named rubber, tin, tungsten, vanadium, and jute. Last among our factors but probably the key to all the others was the mere dynamism of a young and vigorous nation which delighted in business enterprise and strife just as a young man delights to pit his strength against his fellows.

The war had poured a quarter of Europe's wealth down the drain, destroyed or worn out much of its productive equipment, killed and crippled millions of its producers, and disrupted old trade ties. All these had

Havoc of World War I to be replaced or mended before Europe could recover the competitive position of 1914. Meanwhile it would be falling far behind the United States. With this in mind, one can see the feeling of desperation which drove British and French statesmen to undertake shady competitive practices. But this was not all. Recovery was retarded by revolutions, by fluctuating currencies, by trade wars, by lack of raw materials, by bad transportation, and by lost or dislocated overseas markets.


If ever the world needed a planned economic effort, this was the time. But the genius of *laissez faire* still hovered over the nations in both Europe and America and prohibited anything as radical as mutual aid. The inevitable result was that the Allies and the succession states
Cutthroat competition resumed reverted to internal and external cutthroat competition. Neomercantilism had been rising with the imperial surge, and now it came in with a swoop. Actually Wilson's own favorite policy of self-determination of nations encouraged the emerging pattern of economic conflict. Tariffs, subsidies, quotas, trade blocks, and barter agreements prevented the free flow of goods and led to internal hardships and international rivalries. Europe was so fractionated that it was impossible to introduce the savings of mass production; so the standard of living suffered. Individual nations and businessmen made the best deals they could with that great fount of credit and capital goods, the United States.

The economic ascendance of the United States was marked by three clear evidences. First, the war made it a creditor nation. By 1916 the American indebtedness to Allied citizens of \$4.5 billion had been wiped
U.S. a creditor nation out; by 1919 Americans had made \$14 billion available to the Allies. In 1929 there were about \$19 billion dollars loaned abroad (including the war debts) as compared to \$20 billion in British foreign investments. Solvency had made dollars attractive, and small nations in search of loans brought in American experts to reorganize their finances so as to qualify for American loans.

As a matter of fact, American loans should have been several times as large, for the United States had now reached the stage of economic maturity where it should have loaned generously and collected interest in the form of an excess of imports over exports. However, on the whole, it showed itself willing to dispose of its production on credit rather than risk the importation of great quantities of foreign goods. The reasons are readily apparent: continued fear of slowing down the rhythm of production; we were relatively self-sufficient in agriculture, raw materials, and industry; the opposition of business and labor to the introduction of competitive goods whether or not they were cheaper; and the survival of the old mercantile psychology that even a rich nation must sell more than it buys. The

result was that we stubbornly subsidized foreign purchases instead of taking goods in exchange.

American wartime and postwar loans had been sent to Europe in the form of goods, and the rhythm of agricultural and industrial production consequently had to be vastly stepped up to meet the demand. Before the



war American industry had lagged behind in some aspects of accuracy, efficiency, and utilization of the latest inventions, but the war brought mass production with its efficiency and standardization into full flower. In the three years before the United States entered the war, factory production rose one quarter; the war years saw this standard maintained despite the man-power shortage. This rise was continued after the war, as was shown by the rise in man-hour production from 1914 to 1925 in steel from 100 to 153; in automobiles from 100 to 310; in petroleum refining from 100 to 177; and in tires from 100 to 311. Between 1913 and 1927 the total industrial output rose from 100 to 141.

Another evidence of American economic ascendancy was the way in which it was taking over world markets. During the war the warring nations had found it impossible to furnish their old customers with goods, and as a result the latter turned to the United States. Even after the United States went to war its mass-production methods enabled it to go on shipping considerable quantities of goods to neutrals. Naturally there was a postwar battle over these markets, and American businessmen, despite some deplorable failings in tact, managed to increase their lead. The situation in Latin America in 1913 and 1927 illustrates what happened. In both years Britain sold about \$500 million; the United States rose from \$325 million to \$800 million. British

**Accel-
erated
rhythm of
production**

**World
markets**

investments dropped somewhat from \$2.5 billion; American rose from \$1.24 billion in 1913 to \$3.6 billion in 1930.

The war cleared the way for an American increase in wealth. It was not the war itself that made the United States wealthy, but it increased and modernized the production plant and left it in excellent shape, in contrast to Europe's deterioration. On the other hand, the war cost the United States about \$32 billion (more if interest is added), which was largely blown up, wasted, or put out in loans which were never repaid. This is saying nothing of the loss in human life and the sad effect on American national morale. Actually there was some loss in American income between 1913 and the primary postwar depression, which ended in 1923. Adjusted for changes in price and increase in population between 1900 and 1929, the annual gain in per-capita income was small, only about 1.3 per cent. Nevertheless, the contrast with the rest of the world was startling. In 1928 American national wealth was about \$380 billion, Britain's \$120 billion; American income was about \$90 billion as compared to \$20 billion. But Britons were paying about 20 per cent of their national income in taxes, while Americans were paying 10 per cent. No wonder that Britain could barely service its debt while the United States was making inroads on the principal of its debt!


The postwar depression of 1920-23 left the United States with the Fordney-McCumber Tariff. Its prohibitive import rates offered a strong argument that, if the United States was out to conquer the world, it did not know how to go about it. Some amazing antics followed in the attempt to escape the effects of the tariff—to eat our cake and have it. Of course, tourists still carried dollars abroad, but the limitation of immigration cut the export of remittance dollars by foreign laborers. American industrialists had blocked the flow of foreign imports and goaded other nations into erecting trade barriers; now they sought to get behind the barriers by buying foreign factories and making goods designed in America.

Traditionally the United States had espoused the *conditional* most-favored-nation principle. That is, favors granted *freely* to any nation would be granted freely to all those with whom it had most-favored-nation treaties; favors granted *conditionally* would be granted on the same conditions to all nations with which it had most-favored-nation treaties. In the nineteenth century Europe was a creditor and seller and was therefore trying to lower all tariff barriers, and it insisted that favors granted to one nation must be extended to all. The United States, a debtor and a purchaser, was after 1861 busily striving to erect tariff barriers, and refused to agree.

But in 1922 the United States was a selling nation, and in the Fordney-McCumber Tariff it suddenly reversed itself and provided that most-

favored-nation treaties must be treated as *unconditional*. From that time on, it negotiated nearly all of its treaties on that basis and even extended privileges to some nations that refused to reciprocate. The advantages which the United States now enjoyed in production made it wish to get access to all markets where it could undersell European goods, though it still did not wish to lower its own tariff wall. Tariff reduction, as we shall see, was brought in by the New Deal.

The problem of the Open Door for American commerce was closely related to that of the merchant marine. World War I had taught the United



States that if it expected to do business with the world it must have its own ships. The Merchant Marine Act of 1920 provided that government-owned ships should be sold to American-owned shipping companies and authorized the Merchant Fleet Corporation to make loans and to operate the remaining ships. Nevertheless, high costs placed American shipping companies at a competitive disadvantage, and they forced on the corporation contracts which gave them the profits and left the deficits to the government. High-cost tonnage was sold to private operators at absurdly low figures, but even so the American merchant marine still continued to lose.

**Problem
of the
merchant
marine**

The Jones-White Act of 1928 provided for the building of a modern fleet and the further subsidization of private companies through advantageous construction or mail contracts. The Shipping Board was now able to help shippers build ships at a loss, of course with the proviso that they must be available in case of war. Even such generous terms still failed to build up the desired merchant fleet, though American monopoly of coastwise shipping resulted in the creation of a tidy naval reserve.

**Jones-
White Mer-
chant Ma-
rine Act**

One peculiar result of the situation was that while American shipping

interests were carrying on a losing business, made profitable by Congressional subsidies, they were also investing in German and other foreign lines where national laws and conditions of labor made it possible to compete. There thus developed after 1930 a race in the North Atlantic passenger service between the British Cunard Line and the American-influenced German Lloyd-Hapag. The depression struck another shrewd blow at American shipping, which continued to decline until the New Deal in 1936 undertook heroic measures.

Despite such partial failures as these, it was evident that the dawning age belonged to America. The American was as ubiquitous in all parts of the globe as the Roman had once been in the Mediterranean. Tourists, The machine, the true invader salesmen, engineers, bank representatives, exporters and importers, and Hoover's Department of Commerce boys swarmed everywhere. But it was the machine that was the true invader, either actually or by its products and methods. It refused to be impressed by international boundaries but regarded the world as an integral market. American corporations crept under national barriers by buying or building factories in the desired marketing area, and their backlog of expensive research, designing, and business and production techniques made them almost unbeatable.

The superiority of American goods in quality, attractiveness, or cheapness forced European competitors to adopt American methods or face ruin. But Europe did not have the capital, resources, or market to build up Europe's failure to adopt U.S. methods native mass-production industries; and, even more to the point, it could not adjust itself psychologically. Its social ideals clashed with the acceptance of higher labor costs, which alone could build a market. There was the typical petty official's affinity for red tape and ritual, and the thrift which made it impossible to throw away a machine that was obsolete even though still fairly new and replace it by a better one. But most important of all was the failure to put into effect the spirit of freedom on the part of workers and engineers which is the core of the American know-how.

Germany sought to impose Fordism, that is, rationalization, as a national sacrifice to augment its power, and the government devoted a quarter of the national income to the change-over. All it did was to create labor dislocations, lose foreign trade, and hasten the coming of Hitler and his Nazi followers. The result was that German industry (with a few exceptions) remained based on the skilled worker. German engineers consequently sank into pessimism and warned that in case of a second conflict with America, Germany was doomed to defeat.

Russia was the closest approach to an exception to the rule of European inability to adopt American methods. Lately the USSR has sought to claim credit for all the great inventions. In 1930 even Stalin was prop-

erly humble. "We have never concealed," said he, "and we do not intend to conceal the fact that in the sphere of technique we are the pupils of the Germans, the English, the French, the Italians, and first and foremost, the Americans."* Throughout the 1920's American engineers, either hired singly or representing engineering or manufacturing firms, swarmed into Russia, and some of them remained through the 1930's.

Russia the
techno-
logical
child of
the U.S.

Fordism was carried to Russia by Ford engineers, and the word entered the language to denote the ruthless speed-up and stretch-out more usually called Stakhanovism. Curiously enough, this phenomenon was on the increase in the boasted "workers' state" while it was decreasing in capitalist America. This fact is one key to the Russian failure to profit fully by American teaching. In the United States the worker and the engineer retained the spirit of freedom; it brought discontent and strikes, but it also brought a cure to abuses and a certain pride in sharing in production. In Russia all decisions had to be made in conformity with rigid ideological principles which destroyed the spirit of freedom.

The impact of American cultural and institutional influences was second only to those of the machine. American arts were little regarded until World War II, but literature was a different matter, for even the futurists of America seemed vital beside the phosphorescent glow of European decadence. Attempts were made to copy American realism, but with indifferent success. Nevertheless, European writers were usually willing to capitalize on their glow by appearing in New York editions or by lecturing in America.

Cultural
and insti-
tutional
influences

The Continent was considerably affected by the example set by American welfare agencies during the war. Free clinics and dispensaries, community settlements, free libraries, and the practice of sending out visiting nurses, all were started or stimulated by the American example. John Dewey's instrumentalism made headway, and wider and better educational facilities were provided, often on the American model. The practice of student self-help spread. Probably the United States now drew more Oriental students than did Europe. Even the American Methodists had bishops in Europe, while atypical sects like the Mormons, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Christian Scientists continued to preach their doctrines and found converts.

During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Europe had flattered the French by imitating their ways, and in the nineteenth century Britain had become the model. Now the prestige of the United States was evidenced by a superficial imitation of things American. Bars, cocktails, jazz, dances, food, clothes, and card games imported from America became the mode. Before the war the

Imitation
of things
American

* *Time*, 7 November 1949, 34.

plump Viennese woman had been the ideal of Paris fashions, now the slim American woman became the standard of fashion—if not exactly of beauty. Bobbed hair made its way across the Atlantic. American slang, “permeating society from below,” found a reception among would-be smarties all over the world. The typical British sports, except for soccer, were not as adaptable to the common people as some of the American competitive sports such as baseball and basketball, and these found considerable vogue over the world.

The effect of the American moving picture is hard to estimate with accuracy, yet the bitterness with which many Europeans resented it gives evidences of its significance. Hollywood put out a superior product (or at least a smoother and more highly polished one), and, **American movies** moreover, it had the cachet of showing American scenes, fashions, dances, and living conditions. It was not intended as propaganda, but European politicians and businessmen rightly regarded it as that, for it spread dissatisfaction with living and working conditions. Presently the reaction came, as European leaders sought to build up their own cinema industries and launched a campaign of defamation against the American product.

The significant thing is that, though native films have largely displaced the Hollywood product, the world’s masses have not changed their minds. They flock to see practically any film from Hollywood but stay away in **U.S. impact on European masses** droves from their own. Of course, the American influence is often even more direct through the returned immigrant. There is scarcely an Italian village which does not hold a former resident of Brooklyn. Many of them have “American” quarters in which returned immigrants have built new houses equipped with plumbing, electricity, and a phonograph.

The European élite may be right in its claim that its culture is superior to that of America and its way of life more gracious. Yet it must be remembered that the élite can speak only for its own condition; the peasant or workingman has enjoyed few of these superior attainments and is unimpressed by aristocratic warnings of American materialism and standardization. He sees the United States as a land of hope, the traditional refuge from economic, religious, social, and political ills. He knows that some of his friends have failed to succeed there, but so many more have succeeded that he has come to look on America as a Great Rock Candy Mountain.

3 *Europe Fights Back*

From the viewpoint of Europe’s old élite it must be admitted that there was an American menace. America’s overwhelming economic power (aided by the war) had displaced Europe’s world economic supremacy, had sad-

dled it with debt, and threatened its very daily bread. It contributed to the ruin of European prestige in colonial areas, by the infiltration both of American economic controls and of economic and institutional ideas. The American example of a high standard of living was spreading discontent among Europe's workers, all the more so since emigration to the United States was no longer possible. Even more serious, the American example of democracy was contributing powerfully to the clearly approaching political and social crisis. Beyond all of these was an uneasy feeling that if economic leadership was lost, the leadership in the arts and sciences would soon pass to America.

Passing of
the Euro-
pean Age

The European movement to restore its position of world pre-eminence or at least to stave off further American encroachment took on two principal forms, one propagandistic and the other financial. Even before 1900 Europeans had frequently pointed with alarm at the increasing power of *Amerikanismus*, as the Germans called it. Americans admitted the fact of the Americanization of the world, but they saw it as the spread of the creative urge, a willingness to experiment with the new, and to trust the people with political power and with a high economic standard.

The
American
menace

The European view was not as complimentary. They saw Americanization, as Eric Fischer says, as the "conversion of the world into a purely materialistic state, where economic interests and power would prevail." Crass materialism, standardized mediocrity, and mass rather than quality were its earmarks. Wall Street and Washington, said this propaganda, were co-operating in a carefully laid plan to seize and exploit the world.

This propaganda was created primarily to influence the masses of the world. As was pointed out in the preceding section, the European masses have been able to enjoy few of the advantages of culture and are therefore inclined to regard such arguments with skepticism. They may or may not be capable of enjoying the fine and the beautiful, but they none the less resent the implication that they can not or should not. On the other hand, these arguments when used in imperial possessions had considerable success. The masses could accept American economic imperialism as an explanation of the way in which wages were squeezed and prices inflated, while the accusation of materialism appealed to the native élite of nobility and education. These lines had such success that they probably delayed the great colonial crisis; and now that the native élite has taken over, it still pacifies the submerged classes with horrendous tales of American imperialism. Here again, however, it may be that the masses are not as gullible as their leaders suppose.

Propa-
ganda
for the
millions

Propagandists in noncolonial areas found tinder lying about loose, ready for lighting. France and Italy each sought to capitalize on their Latin affinity with Latin America. Spain tried to build up a Pan-Hispanism



Berryman, permission The Star, Washington, D.C.

Berryman's comment on the shrinking Atlantic

in America aimed at the Colossus of the North. Britain moved to draw the Commonwealth nations together into an economic alliance. None of these efforts had much success, but whispering campaigns against American goods and American motives stirred a natural human resentment against the overly powerful.

Dominant as the United States was in the economic field, there was only nonsense in the accusation that it had reached that place and was maintaining it by a carefully prepared plan. If, as Coolidge averred, the people had awakened to the drumbeats of a new destiny, their march was strangely out of cadence. For one thing, if the United States wanted economic power, it refused to assume the accompanying political responsibility. It kept the psychological attitudes of a debtor nation and of a petty merchant. It refused to regard World War I as an organic part of American evolution but insisted that it was merely an unsuccessful moral crusade, a temporary aberration. It reacted sharply against government controls. It was determined that its new production plant must be used for private profit. It rejected credit or production planning and made no surveys of world conditions save such as Herbert Hoover offered. Even capitalistic combinations conducting the invasion of other countries were neither consistent nor co-operative in policies and aims.

There can be little doubt that this fact was well known to the men who inspired the propaganda, but they had a purpose to fulfill. At the outset it

was Europe's intention to capture American economic power and use it as her own. This plan was perhaps not as stupid as it might seem, for against the official picture of the American as a hard materialist European leaders really saw him as a sucker for flattery and an easy victim of social prestige. The seeming success of British propaganda during World War I made the plan seem easy. The system was to *flatter* Americans for the part they had taken in the war and *shame* them for not having done more. It was hoped thus to obtain the cancellation of the war debts and obtain further and unlimited credit. The argument that they could only pay in goods was not only economically sound but nicely calculated to play upon the American fear of imports.

Attempt to
capture
U.S. eco-
nomic
power

Any chance of success which this program might have had was killed by American disillusionment. Europe then passed to a propaganda of vilification. Each country had its own approach, some officially inspired and some not. Biting cartoons exploiting the "Uncle Shylock" jibe followed upon the American failure to cancel the debts. The war had ended before the United States could get its planned effort into the conflict, but the fact remained that it was American

Campaign
of vilifica-
tion



Fitzpatrick, permission St. Louis Post-Dispatch

A sardonic thrust at Harding's report: "In our foreign relations all is well."

power which had turned the tide. There was some ungracious boasting by Americans that "We won the war," but it was more nearly true than the counterclaim that the United States had contributed very little to the effort. Full advantage was taken of the absurdities of the tariff and Prohibition, violations of civil liberties were played up, and American failure to join the League was labeled as hypocrisy.

European exploitation of the American inferiority complex was a shrewd move. André Siegfried's *America Comes of Age* (1927) illustrated American masochism by attaining phenomenal success in the United States; its hatred could have been inspired only by fear. Siegfried saw civilization as the sole possession of France; the United States was placed without the pale; Britain and Germany were closer to the pickets, but they also were looking in from outside. Siegfried's was only one of a rash of anti-American books which one commentator estimates numbered as high as five hundred.

The financial struggle against the United States was no less dramatic and in the long run met with more success. The war loans were the center of the diplomatic aspect of the battle. They had been made on notes which carried interest as high as five per cent but specified no arrangement as to terms of repayment. About \$7 billion had been loaned by the United States government before the Armistice and \$3.25 billion afterward. About twenty states became debtors in one category or the other. For some time they sought to ignore the debts officially, nor did they consent to do anything about them until the Harding administration set up a Foreign Debt Commission and invited conferences.

The first conversations began with Britain in 1923, and a rather stiff settlement was reached; her \$4 billion debt was to be settled over sixty-two years at 3.3 per-cent interest. At this the other nations balked, and the principle of ability to pay had to be adopted before they would consent to acknowledge their obligations; as it was, they refused to sign agreements until, at least in certain cases, three-quarters of the debt had been wiped out. The United States claimed that the settlements actually canceled the principal of the wartime debts and collected only the interest on them, plus principal and interest of the postwar debts. The Allies refused to admit the claim and insisted that they were being bled by a heartless America.

From the time when they became convinced that the United States seriously meant to collect the war debts, the Allies had sought to make collection contingent upon the payment of German reparations. Of course, there was a general economic connection, but the United States refused to admit that the payment of national debts of honor should hinge upon other factors. Britain, convinced

War debts
settlements

Balfour
Note, 1923

that she had been forced into making an economically unsound and indeed impossible settlement, struck a shrewd propaganda blow at the United States. The Balfour Note of 11 August 1923 stated that Britain would collect from her debtors only enough to settle her debt to the United States. It so happened that the Allied debts to Britain just about equaled Britain's debt to the United States; if the latter would cancel the debt owed by Britain, as a result France, Italy, etc. would not need to pay Britain. In other words, Britain would lose nothing but would obtain praise as a generous creditor while Uncle Sam held the bag.

The repercussions were immediate. The Allies felt that they were paying their debts twice; boycotts of American goods were begun, French wounded veterans paraded in protest, and French mobs attacked American tourists—easily recognized by their horn-rimmed spectacles, even if not otherwise. The American attitude may have been **Its effect** economically indefensible since, in effect, the United States refused to receive payments in the form of goods. On the other hand, any American impulse to wipe out the debts was dried up by the well-founded conviction that good faith was notably absent in the debtors. By this time Coolidge was President, and he refused to be moved. His unimaginative comment was: "They hired the money, didn't they?"

Western Germany was the production center of Europe, and the continent could not prosper until Germany recovered. Nevertheless, as Germany showed signs of recovery, France became panicky and early in 1923 occupied the Ruhr industrial area. She succeeded in ruining **Dawes and Young plans** German steel production, but the effect on Europe as a whole was to prove disastrous. Given the French state of mind, it is a question whether even a Marshall Plan would have been of permanent help, but there was little or no disposition in the United States to offer government aid. This was a job for bankers.

Accordingly in 1924 an international commission under the chairmanship of Charles G. Dawes recommended the Dawes Plan. Essentially what it did was to reorganize the *Reichsbank*, scale down German reparations, and raise thumping big loans in Britain and the United States for reconstruction and to make the first reparations payments. In 1929 a committee under Owen D. Young set up the Young Plan, which provided for reparations payments on a sliding scale based on the state of German prosperity. These plans helped temporarily to counteract the damage wrought by the Ruhr occupation and the inflation of the mark, and by 1926 the Dawes Plan had enabled Europe to reach at least the economic point where it stood at the beginning of the war.

The Dawes and Young plans were but the most important indications that American private capital was beginning to venture abroad. Indeed, the world's financial capital had moved from London to New York. Britain

New York becomes financial capital was under sad handicaps in the investment race, for its supply of liquid capital was small and was needed at home to modernize old and start new industries. On the other hand, it needed to make foreign investments to stimulate foreign trade. In this dilemma Britain resorted to earmarking, that is, she made loans abroad on condition that the recipients buy British.

Washington frowned on such tactics by American bankers, but the bankers often got the same result by such subterfuges as installment selling. The various European corporations sought to limit control by foreigners of any nationality; thus, the Swedish Match Trust limited foreigners to 1/1000 of a vote per share. The American people and the American government may have been short-sighted in their economic policies, but the latter did encourage loans to foreign states and corporations. All together, up through 1929 about \$12 billion of private capital went abroad, though of course not all of it was owing at one time.

Still, American private investments in foreign countries were not as significant as the figures might seem to indicate. Europeans feared to invest in their own securities and therefore exported their capital to the United States; in turn, large sums of American capital were exported to Europe. Out of this Europeans expected to protect their own money and at the same time make it imperative for the United States to shore up the European economy. Nevertheless, as European securities dropped during the 1930's, considerable quantities of American capital were lost and at the same time European governments and investors were able to buy back their securities at panic prices. The growing prospect of war in the 1930's led European powers to build up military and naval forces at the expense of internal production of goods which might have eased their trade situation, with the result that there was an increase in public and private default on debts. This hit the investors of Britain, France, and the United States hardest.

The sequel is soon told, though we shall go into it in greater length later on. The League failed to settle Europe's problems, either political or economic, and Red radicalism grew by leaps and bounds. Dictatorships were set up to prevent social breakdown and to unify each nation in the struggle with its neighbors. The world depression overtook the United States in 1929. In May 1931 France spiked a proposed German-Austrian customs union by deliberately forcing an economic collapse in Central Europe. The London Economic Conference (1933) made a last desperate effort to tie reparations and war debts together and to get the United States to agree to remain on the gold standard; thus the United States would pay for European recovery because nations off gold could undersell it. From the European point of view this

was only reasonable; but Roosevelt felt that his first duty was to foster American economic recovery, and so he refused to agree. Soon afterward even token payments on the war debts ceased. Only Finland regarded itself as honor-bound.

Let us turn now to Europe's attempt to save itself by controlling markets. This practice extended not only to the markets in which it sold finished goods but to those in which raw materials were sold. Here enters the cartel. In its simplest form it is merely a pool, an agreement to divide materials, production, or markets, or to maintain prices; from this it ranges to binding intercorporate arrangements which serve the same purpose as a holding company. Exactly what the cartel magnates and their government backers had in mind may be open to various interpretations. German cartels hoped to dominate their fields, and some of their rivals in smaller countries were sucked into co-operation by a desperate desire to save what they could. Some organizers of cartels may have hoped to lay the basis for American-style mass production. If so, they usually forgot this as they saw in their situation a chance to drain competitors and lesser allies for the immediate benefit of private purse or national cause.

Cartels

During the interwar period European industry was organized in a network of cartels: steel, aluminum, copper, matches, cinema production, and especially chemicals. These cartels were powerful enough to force British and American industries to co-operate or else to form rival cartels. Herein lies one explanation for the fact which became evident before Pearl Harbor: that some American businessmen were in league with the Nazis; another explanation lay in the fact that the former were sometimes glad to get a safe part of the domestic or foreign market. American industry sometimes divided in the cartel struggle. For example, in chemicals Germany's I. G. Farben found allies in the Rockefeller and Ford interests, while British Imperial Chemical Industries found allies in the Morgan and Du Pont interests.

Cartels and U.S. industry

American corporations were able to enter into these agreements because the Webb-Pomerene Act of 1918 permitted combination in selling agencies for purposes of foreign trade, and this permission was in 1924 expanded by the Federal Trade Commission to allow price fixing and allotting export orders. However, the State Department vigorously championed the Open Door to foreign resources and trade, and in return it permitted foreign operators in oil (Shell), soap (Lever Brothers), and rayon (British and German) to raise American capital for production of their goods in the United States.

Governments took a strong hand in the struggle for raw materials, either to obtain them for the use of home industries or to peg prices at

artificially high levels. Such articles as rubber, coffee, nitrates, potash, tin, camphor, sisal, iodine, mercury, and Egyptian long-staple cotton were subjected to government controls. Favorite devices were to exclude foreign ownership of sources or means of production, and to lay embargoes and export restrictions. Whether or not foreign controls were aimed at the United States, the fact was that in their desperate attempt to rehabilitate their own finances foreign states had no alternative but to milk the United States. Though this country used one half of the mineral production of the world, it was deficient in thirty materials of vital importance in industry and warfare. Therein lay the foreign opportunity.

The American struggle for entry to world supplies of raw materials was marked by many a battle of diplomacy and finance. Ordinarily Britain was the enemy. Thus, American capital battled with British for Canadian nickel, Bolivian tin, and Rhodesian copper; usually it was able to force advantageous agreements even when it did not win control. One dramatic battle was over Malayan rubber, in which overproduction had caused a price tumble after the war. Since the United States used three quarters of the world's total, the British proposed to help out rubber planters and repay the war debt by imposing drastic controls, which would milk the American economy. Hoover led the anti-British crusade but somehow failed to note how American manufacturers seized the opportunity to pyramid the price of rubber goods. The situation stimulated the setting-out of American-owned rubber plantations in Brazil, Sumatra, and Liberia, but in the end it was Dutch refusal to abide by the cartel that sank the British program.

By far the most dramatic and complicated of the raw-materials struggles was over petroleum. If there had been any doubt over the significance of oil in the modern world, it was dissipated by the way in which "the Allies floated to victory on a wave of oil." During the war the United States produced enormous quantities of oil, and it was estimated that its remaining domestic reserves would last for no more than four or five years. Of course, other strikes extended that time by thirty years even with the enormously expanded consumption of the interwar years and of World War II. Nevertheless American oil producers in 1920 were seriously disturbed, and they demanded that the State Department support their efforts to horn in on foreign reserves. At the time the British controlled about three fourths of the world's known reserves, chiefly in the Persian Gulf area and in the Caribbean area.

In the Caribbean area British oil interests were in the hands of two British government-dominated corporations: Royal Dutch Shell, administered by the gifted Dutchman Henri Deterding, and British Controlled

Oilfields. Their chief activities were in Venezuela and Colombia; American companies gained access to both countries, to the latter only after the payment in 1921 of the conscience money for the rape of Panama. There was also considerable rivalry in other parts of Latin America, and this played some part in the struggle between Bolivia and Paraguay for the Chaco.

Latin-
American
oil

The richest known oil reserve in the world is in the countries around the Persian Gulf and is estimated to hold as high as 150 billion barrels; by way of comparison, the 1949 oil production of the United States was 1.84 billion barrels and of the entire world 3.35 billion barrels. Britain emerged from World War I with a strangle hold upon the oil of the Near East, a hold which was shared in small degree by the French government. Eventually Standard of New Jersey and Socony got a share in Iraq by signing the Red Line Agreement of 1928, by which they agreed to develop no independent fields in Arabia and the old Turkish Empire. In Saudi Arabia, Texaco and Standard of California wangled a concession from King Ibn Saud, probably because he wished to set up a rival to the British. The two companies formed Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco) and began to exploit the fabulously rich oil resources of the Arabian Peninsula. Minor concessions were made in various sheikdoms.

U.S. forces
entry into
Near East-
ern oil

The long effort to build Pan-American Airways into a world transportation system was successful due to a group of men led by Juan Trippe. He began with a short line between Miami and Havana but in the 1920's expanded it phenomenally in Latin America. In the late 1930's he crossed the Pacific to China and Australia, and flights to Europe were begun on the eve of World War II. Meanwhile several European nations—notably Britain, France, Holland, and Germany—had adopted the “chosen instrument” policy; that meant that they selected one company to control aviation, prohibited their own nationals from competing with it, and gave it lavish subsidies and favors. The United States refused to adopt this policy (though it granted mail subsidies and maintained airports) but licensed several companies to compete with each other on the North Atlantic crossing or to compete with Pan-American. American financial strength was shown by the alacrity with which these private corporations entered into competition with chosen instruments which had the full backing of their respective governments.

Aviation

There remains for notice the subject of communications. British capital had been interested in submarine cables from the first, and, in fact, it had largely financed Cyrus Field's first successful cable. British control of cables and landing places, while never complete, was sufficient to dominate the business and was to prove of inestimable benefit during World War I. Such American rivalry as

Cable
rivalry

existed was largely under the friendly House of Morgan, though John W. Mackay, a Comstock Lode miner, and his son Clarence also had certain interests. World War I resulted in the acquisition by Britain and France of the cables owned by nationals of the Central Powers. Meanwhile Britain had been Johnny-on-the-spot with Marconi's patent rights and by the beginning of the war had built up a considerable radio commercial network.

After the war the navy offered the use of its radio circuits to Morgan and General Electric if they would organize an American-controlled radio communications company to break the British communications monopoly.

R. C. A. The result was Radio Corporation of America (R. C. A.).

When it found that the British held important patents and a strong financial position, it promptly forgot its mission and entered into patent exchanges and territorial agreements with British-controlled American Marconi. It then turned to domestic ventures and found its chief interests in the National Broadcasting System, Radio-Keith-Orpheum movies, and Victor records, and with Bell Telephone, Westinghouse, and General Motors radio-manufacturing subsidiaries.

A more effective threat to British domination was offered by International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (I. T. & T.), organized in 1920 by Sosthenes Behn. Behn obtained enough Morgan backing to annex the

I. T. & T. Mackay interests and to advance into Latin America and most of the European countries. He had vast holdings in telephone-operating companies and electrical-equipment manufactures, and he cut so deeply into British radio and cables that in the late 1920's the British government united its cable and radio communications into a single giant system for self-protection.

It is difficult to assess the actual extent or success of the American invasion of Europe and the world. Private citizens of the United States had no more invested abroad during the interwar years than had Britain, nor

Summary of the American impact did they have as much invested in Europe (outside of the war debts) as did Europe in the United States. American technology and know-how made great strides in Europe, but they did not remake European industry in the American image. American cultural and institutional standards also made headway, but it is even more clear that they did not remake Europe even though their prestige excited much superficial imitation.

We have laid stress upon America's mass production and its youthful élan, and it is true that they are inestimable sources of national power. But the Soviet Union has something of both of them, yet it cannot command the loyalty of those men and women who can distinguish true values. A far more evident quality is America's triumph in maintaining human dignity and self-respect even during the decades when Spencerian harshness seemed to dominate.

Sources of U.S. influence

Therein lie the true nature of the American impact and the true source of America's power—in the recognition that it is the hope of the common man. Not only has it demonstrated that a higher standard of living is possible for the people of the world; it has offered a reasonable equality of opportunity. It has offered the democratic status which men of all nations desire so ardently that even the enemies of liberty have been forced to pervert the word "democracy" to their own uses. More than this, the United States has interfered politically with the affairs of small states less than has any other Great Power. These are elements of American strength which survive regardless of the spiteful and vicious lies of our enemies, and they may yet prove to be the decisive factors in the struggle for the world's salvation.

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PART VI

“WE CAN ONLY FACE IN ONE DIRECTION, FORWARD.”

Neither a man nor a nation can live in the past. We can go only once along a given path of time, and we can only face in one direction, forward. . . . I have always believed that the long view of man's history will show that his destiny on earth is progress toward the good life, even though that progress is based on sacrifices and sufferings which taken by themselves seem to constitute a hideous mélange of evils.

This is an act of faith. We must not let ourselves be engulfed in the passing waves which obscure the current of progress. The sinfulness and weakness of man are evident to anyone who lives in the active world. But men are also good and great, kind and wise. Honor begets honor; trust begets trust; faith begets faith; and hope is the mainspring of life.

I think . . . that the people of the world and particularly our own American people are strong and sound in heart. We have been late in meeting danger, but not too late. We have been wrong but not basically wicked.

[Let the] men of the generations who must bear the active part in the work ahead . . . charge us with our failures and do better in their turn. But let them not turn aside from what they have to do, nor think that criticism excuses inaction . . . and let them believe in mankind and its future, for there is good as well as evil, and the man who tries to work for the good, believing in its eventual victory, while he may suffer setback and even disaster, will never know defeat . . .

—Henry L. Stimson, *On Active Service in Peace and War* (1947), 671–2.

NATIONALISM IN TRANSITION:

from 1929

MR. DOOLEY WITH HIS USUAL INCISIVENESS ONCE REMARKED that the further you get from a period the better you can write about it because "you are not subject to interruptions by people who was there." Strange as it may seem, we are confronted by conflicts even in dates and statistics, in events and matters of which one would suppose there is no doubt. But even though the period since 1929 is imperfectly known and final conclusions cannot as yet be drawn, its significance will not permit us to stop short. It includes the entire life scope of many of those who will read this book, and indeed its events will seem like ancient history to some.

It seems scarcely possible that the acute phase of America's first venture into world affairs lasted less than four years. The result was frustration and disillusionment, and like a burnt child we retired into Normalcy. But the crash of the Great Bull Market in October 1929 exposed Normalcy as a hollow shell. In the years of depression that followed the American people had the lesson driven home that there are no easy answers to life's problems—that eternal vigilance and ceaseless experimentation are the price of democracy. The New Deal was the result. It had shortcomings in so far as it fobbed off on the government the task of solving many problems which might have been better met by a greater sense of private responsibility. Still, it did revive experimentation and give renewed emphasis to the democratic process. The answers found were not easy for everyone and they were far from perfect, but when in the history of mankind have answers been easy and perfect?

While the New Deal was absorbing the attention of the American peo-

ple the world was deteriorating toward an armed conflict between freedom and new forms of the old authoritarianism. It now became evident that the new maturity of the American people—imperfect as it was—carried with it a new and more critical attitude toward nationalism, a new willingness to accept a share of the world's responsibilities. The curve of responsibility was not smoothly upward, for the end of World War II saw a resurgence of the old desire for isolation. Nevertheless the lesson seemed to have been learned. As new crises arose and Britain, the old burden-bearer, tottered under the load, the United States began to assume these burdens one by one. Now, at least partially matured by responsibility, the American people have grimly taken the lead in the third and greatest struggle for freedom in this century. This is perhaps the day of decision for which American ideals and American power have been building.

Have the elder races halted?
Do they droop and end their lesson, wearied over there beyond the seas?
We take up the task eternal, and the burden and the lesson,
Pioneers! O pioneers!

Chapter XLVII

THE CRISIS OF ABNORMALCY

1 *The Hair Shirt of Herbert Hoover*

THE Great Bull Market reached its apex on the third day of September 1929, then began to show warning signs of an early break. The crash came with dramatic suddenness on Black Thursday, 24 October, wiping out the thousands of suckers who had bought on margin. By the middle of November a number of vigorous moves on the part of government and finance seemed to bring an end to the descent. Actually the market had merely come to rest on a plateau before undergoing further and even more disastrous plunges.

The crash
of 1929

What lay behind the Depression of 1929? Fundamentally it was a failure to find a way to distribute production to the consumer in both the domestic and the international market. Scientists and engineers had solved the problem of production, but as usual politicians and social scientists had lagged in their ability to solve the problems raised by their colleagues. Economists still disagree over the details, but we shall note here the causes most frequently mentioned.

Causes of
the Depres-
sion of
1929

(1) Credit was overexpanded: this situation led to careless investment and outright speculation, to installment buying of goods and stocks on easy terms, and to a mushrooming of interest payments to a figure out of all proportion to income.

(2) Capital kept too great a share of the profits: this condition encouraged speculation and cut down the worker's purchasing power.

(3) Industry was overexpanded: as the market for goods was satiated, the rhythm of production slowed down, men were thrown out of work, and capital failed to earn returns.

(4) Technological unemployment was growing faster than new industries or expanded old ones could absorb the workers.

(5) Agricultural overexpansion in the United States and the world forced prices down and ruined the farmer.

(6) When the United States instituted a high protective tariff and refused to accept foreign goods or continue its loans, foreigners could not purchase needed American goods and resorted to tariff retaliations and trade blocks in an attempt to become self-sufficient. The effect was to throw international trade fatally out of balance, bring on economic hardship, and strengthen the fascist and communist agitators who were striving for revolution. American exports, though never large, meant the margin of profit at home and the margin of economic and political contentment abroad. The growing power of American investments in Europe, though only a fraction of those at home, created resentment; in colonial areas American investments were forcing European imperial powers (they said) to tighten their exploitation—with consequent resentment, by both Europeans and natives, which was in considerable part directed at America.

Traditional economics had regarded depressions as periods of healthful reorganization. According to this theory bad investments should have been foreclosed or liquidated by bankruptcy proceedings, and prices and wages should have found a new level from which enterprises could make a fresh start. Finance capitalists had always found such times fruitful seasons in which they could pick up industries at bargain prices. This time, however, finance capitalists already owned or at least controlled the industries, and if the depression had run its course in the traditional manner they would have lost a large part of their assets.

It was quite natural, therefore, that they should try to escape the consequence of the policies which they had hitherto championed. They pointed out that it was no longer possible to let prices decline because overhead expenses of administration, machinery, and debt servicing could not be reduced. Moreover, their stock was held by millions of owners, and to wipe out any considerable part of it would only deepen the general misery. Doubtless they were influenced by the fact that their corporations actually owed the debts to their banks, but there was nevertheless substance to their fear that the repudiation of bad debts would mean total collapse of the American economy.

Under these circumstances the obvious thing for capital to do was to cut production but hold up prices while it tried to ride out the time of trouble. Promises to keep wages up were eventually forgotten, and workers were discharged and the remaining employees cut to a day or two a week. The “law” of supply and demand was deliberately flouted. While agricultural products dropped 6 per cent in quantity and 63 per cent in price, industrial goods dropped 76 per cent in quantity and only 20 per cent in price. The result was to reduce further the purchasing power of the consumer—which was the only thing

Refusal

to go

bankrupt


**The vicious
spiral**

that could pull the country out of the depression. No, not all, for there was still the government. So we have the curious situation of laissez-faire capitalists calling upon the government to help them out of the slough into which they had heedlessly walked. Hoover, the good public servant, heard their wail and came to their rescue.

Herbert Clark Hoover was an Iowan by birth and a Californian by adoption. As an engineer engaged in mining, railroading, and metals manufacturing (b. 1874) there were few corners of the globe with which he was not more or less intimately acquainted. We are assured that by the time he was forty he was universally regarded as the world's greatest mining engineer. In appearance he was tall, plump, and moon-faced. Those only slightly acquainted with him saw a man afflicted by a shyness that approached stiffness, and he increased the impression by wearing a painfully high collar. He was utterly without political experience or sense and handicapped by a lugubrious voice and monotonous delivery. While he gave a public impression of being unimaginative and colorless, it is a curious fact that in his private relations he made exactly the opposite impression.

His rise to public esteem was based originally on his humanitarianism, for he had served as relief administrator first in Belgium and later for all Europe, and between while as wartime Food Administrator in the United States. Probably more important, however, was his enthusiastically pro-business guidance of the Department of Commerce, which he sought to make a positive aid for improving the American standard of living according to "shower-of-economic-grace" tenets. The American public, fascinated by its gadget civilization, worshiped technology and efficiency and took Hoover to its heart as the Great Engineer. Nevertheless, his efficiency was interpreted by businessmen as regimentation, and many of them gave him only tepid support. In retrospect it seems clear that he relied not on government planning as much as on the enlightened self-interest of business as stimulated by government.

Hoover has been maligned unjustly as callous, reactionary, inept, and




even stupid. His policies may or may not have been shortsighted and mistaken, but it is evident that he always kept before him a zeal for promoting

His ideals human welfare and with this as his guide and principle never flagged nor deviated. His shortcomings—if these be such—lay in too great a faith in human reasonableness and in too great a faith that the economic forces which had made us great must continue to operate. He was an old-fashioned liberal who believed in local responsibility and preferred voluntary association to imposed controls. He believed in democracy and its precious diversities; but he also knew that if two men ride the same horse, one must go on the rump. He was equally opposed to control by special privilege of any economic class and control by Big Government; though he increased the number of service bureaus during his presidency, he actually reduced the total payroll. When he praised rugged individualism he was praising self-reliance, not predatory self-interest.

Even before the crash a reporter remarked that Hoover was “making enemies right and left—especially right.” He advocated Federal regulation of certain aspects of business, upheld fairly liberal labor policies, and came out in favor of co-operatives, social security, and a flexible tariff. Big Business profoundly distrusted him even before he became President, and some of its leaders went so far as to call him a radical. Taft, now Chief Justice, feared Hoover’s radicalism, and actually wrote, “I must stay on the Court in order to prevent the Bolsheviki from getting control.”


There is reason to believe that the above factors played a part in reviving Wall Street’s old game of playing off the two parties against each other. To do this, however, it was necessary to rehabilitate the Democratic Party, which was giving signs of breaking up under the impact of its defeat. In 1929 John J. Raskob (1879–1950), the party chairman, obtained the financial backing of the Du Ponts and others and set up a propaganda mill headed by two shrewd and unscrupulous operators whose business it was to attack Republican policies, but particularly Herbert Hoover in person. As the depression deepened, the mud gunners intensified their efforts to turn the American people against Hoover and (aided by other circumstances) were disgracefully successful. In considering Hoover’s efforts to pilot the nation through the depression we must remember that at every turn he was met with the malignant opposition of the Democratic machine.

Hoover’s battle with the depression fell into three parts: October 1929 to about mid-1930; mid-1930 to mid-1931; and from mid-1931 to the end of his term. Traditionalists like Andrew Mellon felt that a period of depression would be beneficial as an economic purge, but Hoover, an activist and a humanitarian, could not let it go at that. A period of conferences with business and labor led to agreements to maintain wages, prices, and construction programs, agree-



HOW AMERICAN TRADE WAS CARRIED

IN PER CENT OF TOTAL



ments which were kept fairly well for almost two years. A public-works program was rushed into operation and eventually reached \$2.25 billion. The Agricultural Marketing Act, already passed (June 1929) to combat agricultural deflation, set up the Federal Farm Board. The board purchased wheat and cotton surpluses in an attempt to bolster prices, but when its money ran out in 1932 and Congress refused to appropriate more, prices hit bottom. To many it seemed culpable that Hoover should reject farm subsidies when he was at the same time subsidizing transportation and defending the tariff as an aid to manufacture.

Foreign retaliation against the Fordney-McCumber Tariff was well justified, a fact of which Hoover was well aware. But when he sought to make the tariff a flexible instrument for bargaining, his leadership was so

poor that Congress overrode him and in June 1930 passed the Hawley-Smoot Tariff. The average 33 per cent of the Fordney-McCumber Tariff was raised to 40 per cent—with the result that retaliations multiplied.

Whatever good effects might have been brought by the above policies were canceled by successive strokes of ill fortune. Drought on the Great Plains led to crop failures and to starvation among farmers and their stock. Hard times led to widespread tax defaults and hampered local governments in their ability to meet the relief burden. State governments had more tax resources, but during the last generation they had formed the habit of looking to Washington for cash help in their various projects, the familiar “dollar-matching” policy. State politicians, especially in the poorer agricultural states, realizing that taxation was burdensome and unpopular, now began to turn to the Federal government for relief. There is no doubt, either, that they were conscious of the juicy jobs which would become available if relief bureaus were established in their states.

Hoover had at first been inclined to lay the crash solely to domestic excesses, but he presently became aware that foreign influences had played a part and he sought to combat the depression by action both at home and abroad. By 1932 Democratic accusations had so thoroughly laid the responsibility at the door of Republican policies during the 1920's—during which Hoover had sat in a Republican Cabinet—that the President sought a devil to beat. So it was that he presently came up with the explanation that Europe was altogether to blame. Nevertheless he never lost sight of his belief that the depression must be met on both home and foreign grounds, and he accordingly accepted the handicap of added complexities.

By the beginning of 1931 the situation seemed to be improving. Then in May a period of stress began, and Central Europe's banks were barely saved from collapse. Hoover sought to ease the situation by declaring a year's moratorium on war-debt payments and persuading banks to agree to a year's “standstill” on international credits. But Europe was too weak to profit even by this relief; in September Great Britain went off the gold standard and was followed by nearly a score of other countries, not including France. By the autumn of 1931 the foreign reaction to the new tariff was evident, and as twenty-five nations adopted retaliatory measures even some laissez-faire businessmen began to see the international character of the depression.

Domestic troubles were mounting. Not only were workers losing their homes and farmers their farms, but manufacturers were suffering from lack of credit. Banks did not have suitable collateral to present to the Federal Reserve, and so they could not borrow; in the agricultural regions they were in dire distress and failures were occurring by hundreds. Panic

was clearly spreading, and natives and foreigners were withdrawing gold to hoard. American banks were faced with a crisis, which Hoover solved (at least for the moment) by getting them to pool resources. Some homes and farms meanwhile were saved by Home Loan Discount Banks organized by fiduciary institutions interested in real estate.

The elections of 1930 had brought in a narrowly Democratic House of Representatives, which, upon meeting in December 1931, proceeded to organize with John Nance Garner of Texas as Speaker. Hoover laid before Congress a program which was in many ways a forecast of New Deal legislation. However, neither extreme was satisfied, and Democratic politicians, snuffing the prospect of victory in 1932, cynically set out to kill the program regardless of its merits, using the age-old tactics of obstruction, delay, and amendment. The Federal budget had gone into the red in 1931, and the operation was now repeated—and was to be repeated until 1948.

**Democrats
kill the
relief
program**

One rather unexpected result of the melee was the emergence of the Norris-La Guardia Act (1932), which strictly limited the use of antilabor injunctions by private parties to labor disputes and outlawed the yellow-dog contract and attempts to prevent boycotts and picketing. Norris we know. Fiorello La Guardia (1882–1947), an independent Republican of New York City, was a squat, tough-talking little man of Italian ancestry who was to become the New Dealing mayor of New York and, later on, Chief of Civilian Defense.

**Norris-La
Guardia
Act, 1932**

Congress finally agreed to three fundamental bills which set up what La Guardia called the “millionaires’ dole.” The Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) was created in January 1932 with authority to loan money to banks and other fiscal institutions, as well as to railroads because of the importance of railroad securities. The intention was to thaw out the frozen assets of credit institutions in order to oil up the nation’s industrial machinery. In July Congress set up Federal Home Loan Banks with RFC cash to aid mortgage-lending institutions to keep afloat, and thus save home owners. At the same time \$1.8 billion of RFC money was loaned to states and local governments to finance relief and public works. A year later the Glass-Steagall Act permitted banks to borrow from the Federal Reserve on collateral that was not ordinarily eligible for rediscount.

**The “mil-
lionaires’
dole”**

By the spring of 1932 world recovery again seemed to be under way. Europe actually continued to improve, but the American curve took another dive. Hoover’s accusation was that Democratic politicians, fearing the political effects of recovery, sought to scare the capitalists by filling the legislative hoppers with a new grist of inflationary and obstructionist bills. On the other hand, it must be recognized that many Congressmen had come to doubt the efficacy

**Recovery
by spend-
ing**

of Hoover's desperate insistence upon retrenchment, a balanced budget, and aid to business; more and more of them became convinced that only a generous expenditure of public money could cure the situation. They criticized Hoover both for preferring income-producing public works (such as toll bridges) and for undertaking them in a dribble when only a stream could have been of value.

One of the bitterest arguments concerned relief methods. Hoover objected to the politicians' favorite policy of the cash dole both because of its expense and because of its political implications. He believed that local private agencies and committees should bear the first responsibility and pointed out that once relief was established on a political basis, it would inevitably become permanent and would be used as an excuse to change the basic American principles of self-reliance and voluntary mutual assistance. He was, however, ready to have Federal money loaned and surplus wheat and cotton loaned or given to the states for relief purposes. Destitute and disabled veterans and their families were given preference on Federal payrolls. On the whole the Hoover policies were successful in preventing extreme hardships; it is significant that the Democrats during the campaign of 1932 made no accusations such as later became common—that mass starvation existed and was an issue.

This does not mean that there was no crisis. Accurate statistics are impossible to obtain, but when as in 1932 somewhere around 12 million workers are out of work there certainly is a crisis. Americans, reared in the faith that they were entitled to success, were becoming increasingly frustrated and resentful. These attitudes were sedulously fed by Raskob's propaganda mill, and its bald assertions that the President was responsible for the depression found increasing credence. The Great Engineer, said wisecrackers, had quickly ditched, drained, and damned the country. The expression "Hoover Depression" became popular. The shanty villages of down-and-outers in the city dumps were named "Hoovervilles."

Families doubled up to save rent and snatched desperately at small jobs, an art in which women and children were most successful, partly because they were less sullen than men and would work for less. The grueling shame of being on relief was destructive of morale. Men were seriously affected by "unemployment shock" and showed signs not only of irritation and frustration but of collapsed morale. A few proud souls silently starved to death, but most people got by, though with a mounting incidence of malnutritive diseases. The depression was a time of deep self-examination, with results that were sometimes cynical or radical. There was, moreover, a sharpened awareness of the importance of security and of resentment toward the prosperous.

The breakdown of a democracy or of a complex economy opens the way

for class conflict and for the emergence of leaders and groups who utilize all the weapons of force, fear, prejudice, and desire for vengeance. By their personalities or their programs these leaders attract support. **Breakdown and class conflict** They are usually good speakers and hard workers. They know their people. They blame the trouble on easily understood causes—Jews, Negroes, capitalists—and they offer a panacea which will straightway bring the New Jerusalem. During the early 1930's American democracy and the American economy showed alarming signs of breaking down. There were fears, prejudices, and desires for vengeance; there were scapegoats, even though different ones in different parts of the country; and there were panaceas: inflation, the capital levy, social security, Red baiting, and suppression of unions.

To avoid confusion we should recall here that, when put into practice, fascism becomes statism; in the same way communism also rises from chaos (though it denounces the profit system, and its élite cynically claims to rule in the name of the workers) and in practice becomes statism with the same horrible fruits as fascism. The two have certain theoretical distinctions in the propaganda phase, but when put into practice they both become gang rule and the victim, whether capitalist or worker, cannot tell the difference.

There was never any danger of the American workingman going communist, even though Reds were active leaders and stimulants to protest and violence. Radicalism far more often followed the inherited populist and utopian forms which are never far from the surface in Americans. Unfortunately they were seized upon by a group of leaders and given a twist which, while not fascist, was certainly proto-fascist. On the whole the new radicalism never took on any country-wide features either of organization or ideology—nor did more than a few abandon at least a lip service to democracy, though, of course some weird meanings were given to the word. **The new radicalism**

Proto-fascistic leaders had in common a desire to upset the democratic balance of social conflict and subject everything to government management for the benefit of an élite: the common man, the white man, the old man, the businessman, or the rich man. There were a number of organizations modeled on Europe's fascist parties, but most of them turned out to be promotion rackets. More prominent were those leaders who gave American trimming to their proto-fascism.

William Randolph Hearst in his campaign against liberalism and labor labeled as Red everything with which he disagreed. He advocated Hitler's technique of stamping out all opposition by government action. Father Charles E. Coughlin (b. 1891), an Irish-Canadian priest with a sirupy voice, preached a strange mixture of the papal encyclicals, populism, anti-Semitism, and Anglophobia. Technocracy, led by Howard Scott (b. 1890),

planned to put society under the absolute control of engineers who would carry mass production and scientific management to the ultimate extreme.

None of these, however, could compare in political power and in sheer drama with Huey Pierce ("The Kingfish") Long of Louisiana. Born in a family of poor, Bible-conscious yeomen, Long worked his way up in law and politics by brass and brilliance. He made a bad political start, but by 1928 he had won the election to the governorship and was entrenching himself as dictator of Louisiana. In 1930 he took over a senatorship, but did not appear in Washington until 1932.

He held the machinery of elections and of all the branches of state government in an iron grasp. His rule was ineffably corrupt. Every economic interest came to heel or was cut down to size. He had enormous drawing power on the radio and became so popular in surrounding states that their politicians trembled lest he invade their bailiwicks. His Share-Our-Wealth Clubs became glorified mailing lists with millions of members in the South and far up on the Great Plains. His slogan "Every man a king" headed a program which promised old-age pensions, free education through the university, abundant leisure, and a \$5000 income for every family. And yet he passed no social legislation and slyly favored the great corporations of his state.

Long's strength lay in the very fact that he was not ostensibly fascist but a ruthless and successful practitioner of traditional American political methods. As the personification of the hill-billy he was the strongest advocate of the Southern yeomen and poor whites since Jackson, and his fascination gripped millions of other common Americans so firmly that he was able to force Roosevelt to disgraceful extremes of rabble rousing in order to save the New Deal. His rule was a dictatorship, but its danger lay in the fact that he did much for Louisiana—gave it hard roads, bridges, a remodeled public-school system, a first-class state university, reduced utility rates, and lifted the tax burden from the poor. The seductive thing about dictatorship is that it brings a certain amount of efficiency (though actually no more than an ordinarily well managed democracy) and dulls the sense of freedom, until presently it is too late to regain freedom. The proverbially lucky Roosevelt never had such another break as he got when Long was shot down in the corridor of the Baton Rouge capitol.

**Secret of
his power**

2 *The Campaign of 1932*

The history of the campaign of 1932 and of the thirteen momentous years that followed is so much the history of Franklin D. Roosevelt that it is necessary to pause here to devote some space to his introduction. FDR

was a man of infinite subtleties and diversities, and any attempt to understand him is made more difficult by the fact that no figure since Jackson has been the center of such a whirlpool of loyalty and hatred. We have as yet barely begun to sort out fact from prejudice. Regardless of our personal opinions, it must be recognized that Roosevelt looms like a colossus over an enormously important period of domestic and foreign crises and, whatever the wisdom of his policies, will remain one of the key figures of American history.

The controversial FDR

Franklin Delano Roosevelt was born 30 January 1882 in the ugly manor house on the family estate of Hyde Park overlooking the Hudson in Dutchess County, New York. His father was already well along in years, but his mother, née Sara Delano, was still young. A woman of striking beauty, charm, energy, and will, she transmitted her attributes to her only child, Franklin, and primarily devoted herself to his guidance and welfare. FDR grew up in the current tradition of the country gentry and attended Groton and Harvard, but did not distinguish himself for hard work or deep thought at either. After that he attended Columbia Law School for a while, passed the bar examination, and presently entered a partnership in law and insurance and gave some polite attention to business.

The Roosevelt background

Meanwhile he had met and married his fifth cousin, Anna Eleanor Roosevelt, niece of Theodore Roosevelt. Sara sought in vain to break the engagement, then gave in and found solace in taking over the management of the young couple. Eleanor Roosevelt was a remarkable woman in her own right and would have become a public figure—and probably a center of controversy—even if her husband had never entered politics. She was possessed of undeviating candor and broad tolerance, and indeed was so obsessed by high ideals that she was sometimes exploited by cynical interests. Yet she was at times able to lend to her husband the firm grasp of principle which he apparently lacked. For twenty years she fought a silent battle with her mother-in-law for her right to occupy first place in her husband's life, and in the end she won.

Eleanor Roosevelt (b. 1884)

The Dutchess County Roosevelts were hereditary Democrats and therefore in no position to exercise much political influence in their bailiwick. In 1910 the local Democratic organization decided to make use of the magic name and nominated FDR for the state senate. He was elected by a narrow margin after a vigorous and unorthodox campaign. In Albany he plunged into a fight begun by a split in Tammany, taking the rebel side. An early follower of Wilson, he was rewarded by appointment as Assistant Secretary of the Navy. In this position he gained enormous experience and in addition became the unofficial distributor of Federal patronage in New York.

FDR enters politics

Meanwhile Democratic attempts to cash in on the magic name continued. He ran for the nomination for U.S. Senator in 1914 and was soundly trounced. Though as vice-presidential candidate in 1920 he put on a vigorous performance, he shared Cox's defeat. Nevertheless, it was at this time that he began to build up a secretariat headed by dour, faithful Louis McHenry Howe (1871-1936). At the time FDR was a lean figure, six feet two inches tall, with light hair, blue eyes, and a heavy-jawed ascetic face strikingly like his mother's, graceful carriage, and abundant vitality. Those close to him had unalterable faith in his destiny, but it must be admitted that the more usual view was that underneath his outsize charm he was arrogant, superficial, unstable, and distinctly a lightweight.

Suddenly in the summer of 1921 while at the family summer home on Campobello Island, New Brunswick, he fell victim to poliomyelitis. For weeks he hovered near death, and for a year he was unable to leave his bed.

Paralysis and its results As it was, his leg muscles were permanently crippled. From that time on he was a wheel-chair case; he never walked again without support, and then only for a few yards. Probably the psychological results of his illness were fully as marked as the physical. Never before noted for his persistence, he now set himself the grim and painful task of conquering his infirmity as nearly as was humanly possible. With herculean patience he exercised the atrophied muscles, swam, got down on the floor and crawled like a child, and lifted himself up stairways by main strength of arms and shoulders.

He won, but it was a different Roosevelt who returned to the political arena in 1928. The lightweight of 1920 emerged from the bout with death and invalidism with steel in his soul. Always an optimist, he was now almost frenetically optimistic; he could not afford the risk of the defeat that lay in pessimism or even too close a look at reality. Essentially a man of action rather than of thought, he now found a substitute for physical activity in excessive talk. His patience was now monumental and was henceforth to fail him at only a few important points. Fear was gone, and an enormous, unbelievable courage had taken its place.

It seems fair also to attribute to his ordeal an inordinate desire to appear normal by engaging in "heavy kidding" and "smart-alecky" humor. He became the hero of his own anecdotes. He was now the universal expert, perpetually beating the experts at their own games. He took delight in breaking precedents. Above all he now possessed an immense will to power, a quality which was to shape his actions increasingly as time went on.

Another striking change came in the sort of company he kept. Before

1921 he moved in what would now be called "the station-wagon set." Mrs. Roosevelt had always been restive in such society and had from girlhood worked in settlement houses and associated with social workers. She now introduced her friends to her husband, and he found in them a humanitarian point of view which was an immense stimulus. His illness had given him a new sympathy with the unfortunate which went deeper than his hereditary *noblesse oblige*, and this now expanded to an imaginative insight into the battles being fought on every side by the common people for mere existence—what Thoreau so perceptively saw as the average man's life of quiet desperation.

New
range of
sympathies

We must add to this, however, the fact that FDR was a politician, not a political philosopher. Now it is the primary business of the politician to find workable compromises, and this he cannot do if he admits that a given issue is a principle—for of course principles cannot be compromised. As a politician he possessed a sense of timing which rarely failed, but then with disastrous results. He had a sixth sense which told him what was going on at the grass roots.

FDR as a
politician

Above all he knew, like Jefferson and Jackson and the Progressives before him, that any crusade to get results in the national field could not be too choosy about local tools. The national ticket of the Democratic Party could rely only on the usually conservative South and certain corrupt city machines; these were the bases of such power as it possessed, and they must be placated even when the party was going through one of its periodical liberal spasms. Of course the only way to keep their support was by patronage. But beyond this, if the Democratic Party was to win, it must rally labor and agriculture to its banner. This was what FDR did in 1932 and subsequent elections. It was upon this strange quadrilateral alliance that the power of the New Deal was based.

Few of his enemies will deny that Roosevelt had the most dazzling personality of any man who ever occupied the American political stage. He genuinely liked people and was anxious to give of himself as well as to receive allegiance. This charm was one of the outstanding elements in his political and radio personality. He never tried to conceal his Groton-Harvard accent, and strangely enough it was not resented by the masses. After each Fireside Chat many a thoughtful listener tried and failed to find something solid in what had been said; the truth was that the effect lay not in the words but in the golden, resonant, and soothing voice—a voice which could smooth away obstacles, make inanities sound like profundities, and misrepresentations like a revelation from on high. In his Fireside Chats he undertook to teach simple lessons in social, economic, and political fundamentals. He was the perpetual despair of those who realized that the facts were not that simple.

The charm
school

No one on the inside could honestly claim that FDR was a good administrator. Indeed, a number of character defects made it impossible. He bore grudges. He was vain about what he knew and frequently secretive.

Administrative defects As his thirst for power grew he became increasingly snappish and petty and prone to attribute all opposition to personal motives; of course, it is true that he was under terrific strain.

The usual desire of the conscious charmer to please everyone he met meant that he gave callers the idea that he agreed with them and even that he had made them a promise. Inevitably there grew up the opinion that he was devious and untrustworthy. This inability to utter an outright negative made him frequently an ineffective, procrastinating administrator. He could not bear to fire anyone—unless he could first pick a quarrel with him—so frequently he assigned the same task to different men with the result that rivalries and jealousies were created and problems had to come back to him for adjudication.

The popular impression of his bold and decisive leadership was frequently the result of fast footwork or zealous covering-up. Actually there were many occasions when FDR was vacillating or hesitant and when he was pushed into action by public or Congressional pressure or had to run to catch up with his place at the head of the procession. These things are true, yet one must not lose sight of his ability to tolerate with patience a considerable degree of mulishness and procrastination in those under him. He was always aware that he was dealing with human beings, and that foibles and shortcomings were inevitable.

When in 1928 Al Smith won the Democratic presidential nomination, Roosevelt accepted the nomination to the governorship of New York and carried the state by 25,000 votes even though Smith lost. He was thus in
Governor of New York an unusual position to profit by the opportunity offered by the depression, and with consummate skill he used his high office to promote his ambition to become President. In 1930 he was re-elected by the unprecedented majority of 725,000. He pushed a mild program of reforestation, old-age pensions, and public-utilities controls through the Republican legislature. He plunged the state into debt in order to provide relief for the unemployed; indeed, New York was the only state that tackled the relief problem seriously. He shrewdly laid his groundwork in a series of speeches whose burden accused Hoover of laying undue emphasis on the trickle-down theory. By announcing that he opposed entering the League of Nations *as it had developed*, he laid the foundation for eventual support by the rabidly isolationist newspaper tycoon, William Randolph Hearst.

The group of men who did the research for Roosevelt's policy planning and wrote his speeches became known during the campaign as the Brain

Trust. Operating head was Raymond Moley, a rather conservative professor of public law in Columbia University, who was to become Assistant Secretary of State. Another was Hugh S. ("Iron-pants") Johnson, a hard-bitten army general, lawyer, and businessman, who was to become the sulphurous head of NRA. Political strategy was the function of the group already gathered under Louis Howe which had received strong additions in James Farley and Edward J. Flynn, leader of Tammany's liberal wing. Farley's principal task was to oust the Raskob element, which favored Al Smith, and he was so successful that before long support began to snowball among Democrats with liberal leanings, though most of the leaders (who were conservatives) held aloof for a long time.

The
secretariat

Roosevelt was the strongest candidate when the convention met in Chicago, but Tammany was against him, while McAdoo (now of California) and Hearst were promoting Garner. It will be recalled that a two-thirds vote was necessary for nomination. Farley knew that Hearst feared Roosevelt's reformism but feared Newton D. Baker's internationalism more and bore a grudge against Al Smith. By hinting of a break to one of the latter two, Farley was able to persuade Hearst to swing Garner into the Roosevelt column in exchange for the vice-presidential nomination. Roosevelt received the necessary two-thirds vote on the fourth ballot; he promptly flew from Albany to Chicago and launched his official campaign with a fighting speech. "I pledge you, I pledge myself," said he, "to a new deal for the American people."

Roosevelt
nominated

In the campaign which followed Roosevelt easily captured and kept the dramatic lead, but his program was tailored with caution and, it may be suspected, with deliberate purpose to mislead. He pointed out (rather unfairly to Hoover) the humanitarian duty of the nation and the necessity of staving off revolution. The program which he set forth demanded the lowering of the tariff, the repeal of Prohibition, public development and operation of Muscle Shoals, and agricultural relief. One politically safe issue he championed fearlessly: *relief*, immediate and direct, both by the dole and by made work. *Recovery* he promised without further burdening the budget; behind the scenes his advisers were readying a scheme of borrowing, lest taxes raise costs and lower wages. *Reform* received minor emphasis in fact, though frequent generalization.

The
Roosevelt
program

His greatest asset, however, lay in his personality. A nation wallowing in gloom was electrified by his optimism. It was a "laughing revolution." Traveling widely and speaking often, he offered evidence of his physical soundness and gave himself a chance to cast his mantle of magnetism over hundreds of thousands. Millions more were swayed by the same charm and

by the Groton-Harvard accent which came over the radio in such contrast to the lugubrious monotone of Hoover.


Hoover had been given the Republican nomination without excess enthusiasm. With no charm to spare, he pointed out with bitter realism that Roosevelt's breezy promises of work for all were cruel because they were absolutely impossible of realization. Bedeviled as he was by opposing forces within his own party, his speeches took on a conservatism and pessimism somewhat out of keeping with his character. What he feared most of all was a gigantic system of government support, not only because it would become politically corrupt but because "you cannot extend the mastery of government over the daily life of a people without somewhere making it master of people's souls and thoughts."

Hoover placed first the preservation of the separation of the powers of state and Federal governments and proposed "justice" to the holders of property as well as to others. A population dependent on Federal bounty would, he prophesied, mean the downfall of democracy—without easing the burden of depression, but actually making it permanent. He desired to continue the program of indirect relief and to adopt his plans for fiscal reform and aid to business. Relief would come when capital could resume production with profit.

Hoover's campaign had scarcely gotten under way when it was dealt a severe blow by the so-called Bonus Army episode of July 1932. In 1931 Congress, over Hoover's veto, had authorized veterans to borrow up to fifty per cent on their adjusted compensation certificates. In 1932 a bill was introduced to enable them to cash in the full value of the certificates, but it was shelved under administration pressure. Meanwhile, largely under communist inspiration, thousands of veterans and of nonservice riffraff gathered in the Capital. When Congress adjourned without acting on the bonus, Hoover got about 6000 of the men to depart by paying their fares home.

The radicals, seeing their grand gesture about to go for nothing, started a fracas with District police in which two men were killed. At the request of the District Commissioners Hoover ordered General Douglas MacArthur to intervene with troops. The bonus marchers were dispersed, and their shanty town on Anacostia Island was burned, perhaps by accident. Though the troops killed no one, the anti-Hoover press promptly proceeded to addle the two episodes and to charge the President not only with the death of the two veterans but with a cowardly and absurd use of troops to suppress a mythical revolution.

It was easy enough to satirize Hoover, as the *Swing Mikado* did later, as "the distinguished pessimist who never would be missed." Actually he was caught in the dilemma of the times—familiar to us by now. He be-



ELECTION OF 1932

531 ELECTORAL VOTES
 ROOSEVELT—Democrat: 472 electoral, 22,822,000 popular votes
 HOOVER—Republican: 59 electoral, 15,762,000 popular votes

J. W. CLEMENT CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.

lieved in business planning and in government planning of its functions, but he would have no part of over-all planning because it was socialistic and destructive of individualism.

Hoover's dilemma

He was seeking to cure the depression by voluntary action when it was believed by some of his opponents that only positive governmental action would work, if anything would.

As it was, he went farther toward government interference than any other depression President ever had, but his very planlessness probably promoted the trend toward planning on the part of the New Deal. In any case, Hoover was doomed. He was essentially a middle-of-the-roader crushed between two wings of angry futility. On one hand capital regarded him as a traitor to its interests. On the other the masses believed him responsible for the depression and accused him of standing idly by while they suffered. Even the Negro voters, Republican ever since reconstruction, went over to the Democrats.

Hoover, it must be admitted, was only indirectly attacking the problem of getting purchasing power into the hands of the masses; but perceptive voters saw that Roosevelt's program offered as little hope. About 900,000 of them, therefore, turned to Norman Thomas, the Socialist candidate, who saw the key log in the jam and attacked it with vigor. The interesting thing is that during the next four years the New Deal was to depart from the Democratic platform and to

The election of 1932

seek to implement the Socialist platform plank by plank, except for the one vital issue of government ownership of the means of production. The Republican defeat was even more disastrous than the Democratic defeat of 1928. Hoover carried only six states, with an electoral vote of 59 against 472. The popular vote stood 15.7 million against 22.8 million. The Democrats carried both Houses of Congress by thumping majorities. Riding into Congress on Roosevelt's coattails was thereafter to become a common political sport.

There followed four months of what was really an interregnum, for Hoover could do nothing and Roosevelt would do nothing until the responsibility was officially his. The Cabinet selected by the President-elect did obeisance to political necessities, but its majority was decidedly on the conservative side. Farley, in the Post Office, was scheduled to be patronage dispenser; eventually he proved to be a conservative. William H. Woodin, an Eastern financier and industrialist, was selected for the Treasury as acceptable to the business community. Cordell Hull, long a Congressman and Senator from Tennessee, welcomed the appointment to the State Department as a chance to put into effect his long-cherished plan to lower tariffs by special agreements with other countries.

The Cabinet had four liberals who were to become the core of the so-called New Dealers. Eldest of them was Harold L. Ickes (1874–1952), Secretary of the Interior, and old-time Republican Progressive from Chicago, who as a master of wisecrack and epithet kept the nation in stitches. Nevertheless, he was a careful administrator, and he never accepted the succession of panaceas that bemused his fellows. Henry Agard Wallace (b. 1888), a converted Republican from Iowa and son of Harding's Secretary of Agriculture, had made a fortune by developing and marketing hybrid corn. Though he had unorthodox ideas, he was at the time far from the woolly-mindedness which he developed later. Frances Perkins (b. 1882), at home Mrs. Paul Wilson, was a New York social worker with long experience in labor affairs who as Secretary of Labor was the first woman to hold a Cabinet position. Homer S. Cummings (b. 1870) of Connecticut as Attorney General was entirely sympathetic with the philosophical changes made by the New Deal and extended himself to find legal justifications for its acts.

Eventually the roster of top New Dealers included Henry A. Morgenthau (b. 1891), a Dutchess County neighbor of FDR, who became Secretary of the Treasury. Devoid of financial experience or economic knowledge, Morgenthau was probably a conservative, but his doglike devotion was to make him a satisfactory rubber stamp. No less important than any of the above, and later on Secretary of Commerce, was FDR's long-time

court favorite: lantern-jawed, Iowa-born Harry Hopkins (1890–1946). He was a New York social-work administrator prominent in FDR's state relief program, who exercised a similar function in the New Deal and on Louis Howe's death took his place in Roosevelt's confidence.

The New Dealers certainly were far from being devoid of ideas, and no one now should deny their idealism. On the other hand, critics asserted that their experimentalism in so many contradictory directions denoted lack of firm convictions and a primary interest in staying in power. Their defense, quite naturally, was that they were trying to do good against great odds, and that political and economic realities forced changes of direction upon them.

Let us return now to the last of the extended lame-duck sessions of Congress. The Twentieth Amendment was to go into effect on 6 February 1933. By this amendment new Congresses were to take office on the 3rd of January, and Presidents and Vice-Presidents on the 20th.

The institution of the lame duck went out in a blaze of disgrace. Congress grudgingly passed an unsatisfactory bankruptcy law, and less grudgingly the Twenty-First Amendment, which provided for the repeal of the Eighteenth, or Prohibition, Amendment; it went into effect 5 December 1933. Meanwhile beer was voted back.

The Lame Ducks

The Democrats, fearing (it was claimed) that the economy would show too many evidences of recovery before they came into power, deliberately gave it a blow by providing for publicity of all RFC loans. This publicization of a list of unstable fiscal institutions warned off others who might be contemplating appeals for aid and strengthened the growing impression at home and abroad that Roosevelt would carry the United States off the gold standard. The result was a mounting withdrawal of gold and currency for hoarding purposes. Hoover, saddled with responsibility without power, was unable to cope with any of his problems or to go to the rescue of the tottering state banks. Convinced that the trouble arose from foreign and domestic business distrust of the policies of the incoming administration, he pled with Roosevelt to join him in a declaration of fiscal policy.

The growing crisis

It was a tactless and futile attempt to force Roosevelt either to take the responsibility for the coming crash or to accept the Hoover program. Roosevelt, quite within his Constitutional rights, refused to concur. As though operating on a schedule, the acute phase of the banking crisis began late in February and a score of state governors closed banks or restricted their operation. The new Treasury officials went into conference with the old and decided that the only course was to persuade the remaining governors to do likewise. By noon on 4 March 1933, Inauguration Day, scarcely a bank was doing business.

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Chapter XLVIII

THE NEW DEAL

1 *The First New Deal: Relief and Recovery*

EVEN before his nomination Roosevelt had promised "bold, persistent experimentation. If it fails, admit it frankly and try another. But above all, try something. The millions who are in want will not stand by silently forever while the things to satisfy their needs are within easy reach." The result was that the New Deal was consistent neither in philosophy nor in policy. Actually it falls into three more or less distinct stages which we shall call First, Second, and Third New Deals. New Deal experiments

The first one accepted the idea that the American economy was mature, that agriculture and industry were overexpanded; as a cure it sought a national self-sufficiency which carried with it a strong effort (now almost forgotten) to restore business to its old primacy and to refurbish its reputation by asking it to give the other fellow a break. When business refused to play along, the New Deal sharply reversed itself by forcing reforms and seeking international co-operation; this was the stage which we now know as the Second New Deal. But even this did not bring the desired recovery, and in the stage which we shall call the Third New Deal the administration settled down to a permanent policy of pump-priming of which World War II was the most tremendous phase. And there, apparently, we still are.

The basic trouble with the country (it was thought) was the maldistribution of wealth which made it impossible for the actual producers of goods and services to purchase the wares which they produced in the service of an overexpanded industry. The problem that confronted the incoming administration was two-pronged. It had to save the financial structure and prevent general bankruptcy by raising prices so that debtors in business and agriculture could Basic remedies

earn the dollars to pay off the debts incurred when prices were high; essentially this action meant reinflation. In the second place it had to prevent a further decline of business and to start the wheels of industry to rolling by getting business to raise wages faster than prices.

It is evident that the blame for the depression was thus laid at the door of business, and business was asked to assume the major responsibility for correcting its mistakes. Many thoughtful businessmen were ready to have the government impose a control of competitive practices which would save business from itself, but others never agreed that the basic trouble was maldistribution, or if they did they blamed antitrust legislation. The latter group preferred letting nature take its course—that is, at least with their rivals. Labor was badly split, as always. One wing would have been satisfied with wage raises; the other demanded not only that wages be raised but that profits be lowered. Farmers were for the most part shortsightedly content to get higher prices for their products and could not realize that at the same time the prices of their purchases would rise.

Another serious split was within the ranks of New Deal experts, particularly the lawyers and economists. A strong element favored the theory of the British economist John Maynard Keynes, that “compensatory spending” of borrowed money by a government in time of depression was necessary to take up the slack in private spending. Taxes and expenditures should benefit the poor most and the rich least, on the ground that the former spent what they received and in this way stimulated production.

Then there were the Atomists and the Regulationists. The Atomists asserted that the re-establishment of competition by breaking up the great corporations would automatically restore good order in business and with it prosperity. On the other hand, the Regulationists insisted that Adam Smith’s automatic market controls could not be revived and the only reasonable alternative was bold government regulation. Roosevelt never made up his mind between the two wings, but stubbornly insisted that he had blended them. The result was growing vacillation, bafflement of supporters, alienation of well-wishers, and ridicule by critics.

The “Hundred Days” session (9 March to 16 June inclusive) of the Seventy-third Congress was one of the most dramatic periods of American history. Conflict of interests by no means disappeared, yet it was minimized by the decisive leadership of Roosevelt, a new soberness in the attitude of Congress, and a readiness of all elements of the population to substitute action for debate in an attempt to do anything which would give some promise of hauling the economic ox out of the pit into which it had fallen—or had been pushed.

At the time of the inauguration practically all of the nation's banks were closed, and a prompt executive order suspended the activities of all remaining financial institutions and the export of specie and currency.

When Congress met on the 9th of March it was handed an Emergency Banking Bill, which was passed and signed that same day. Under its provisions the Treasury called in all gold and gold certificates, issued emergency currency, and appointed "conservators" for banks in a shaky condition. Bankers were so frightened that they were ready to accept stiff reforms, but the Glass-Steagall Banking Act imposed only mild restrictions. It gave the Federal Reserve Board power over interest rates and other means of preventing overspeculation; separated investment and commercial banking; and set up the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). A Truth-in-Securities Act passed in the emergency period proved to have been poorly drawn, so in 1934 it was supplemented by a Securities Exchange Act, which set up the Securities and Exchange Commission to supervise the stock market and the issuance of securities.

**Emergency
legislation**

As might have been expected, hard times had brought back the old crusaders for inflation by means of either paper currency or silver. Roosevelt rolled with their punches by accepting *authority* to issue greenbacks and coin silver, then split them by ignoring the greenbackers but purchasing silver and thus raising its market price, as its backers really wanted. To prevent creditors from forcing debtors to pay in gold rather than cheap silver or currency, Congress voided all legal obligations to pay debts in gold; after a bitter battle the Supreme Court validated the action in the Gold Clause Cases of 1935.


**Inflationist
demands**

The New Deal program was calculated to raise domestic prices, but if it succeeded there was a danger that cheaper foreign agricultural products and some manufactures would rush in to take advantage of the rise. The President was consequently given the power to increase Hawley-Smoot rates. This method, however, though it might save the domestic market, would almost certainly kill the export market. A tempting alternative was to devalue the gold content of the dollar; by this means domestic dollar prices would rise, but with the fall of gold foreign traders would find it advantageous to buy in the United States.

**Nationalist
approach
to the
money
problem**

The London Economic Conference, which was coming up in June 1933, plainly confronted Roosevelt with the necessity of putting first either domestic recovery or international recovery. It was not a simple choice. Secretary of State Hull, basically a free trader, insisted that American recovery could be won only by world recovery and that to accomplish this it was necessary to stabilize currency, reduce tariffs, and settle outstanding problems, such as reparations and

**Hull's ap-
proach to
recovery**



the war debts. If Hull's ideas were adopted, it would mean that foreigners would be given access to American markets both because the tariff would be lowered and because with their paper currencies they could manufacture cheaply enough to undersell American goods made under a stable gold-based currency.

Upon the opening of the conference it became immediately apparent that the attending nations had only one object: to get the United States to adopt the Hull policy without insisting that it also be adopted by them.

FDR scuttles the London Economic Conference

This Roosevelt refused to do, and the conference broke up in all but total frustration. The decision must not have been easy to make, for it was already evident that the forces of aggression were gathering in the world. On one side there was the bare possibility that if the United States sacrificed its own welfare to world recovery, Europe might be strengthened against the aggressors. On the other hand, if the United States put its own recovery first, it could at least furnish a more concentrated and perhaps in the end stronger and more reliable counterforce. It seems clear that Roosevelt gambled on the latter course, perhaps persuaded to that end also by the realities of domestic politics.

Nevertheless, Europe chose to regard Roosevelt's decision as a declaration of economic warfare, and it accelerated the building of its tariff walls and trade blocks. When the Johnson Debt Default Act (April 1934) forbade American private loans to governments in default, it

The effects quickly resulted in the cessation even of token payments on the war debts. Europe and the United States had clearly arrived at an impasse. In spite of his intense disappointment Hull hung on to his job.

This was not from weakness nor from love of power or position, but from a grim determination not to give up his last chance of fulfilling his lifelong ambition of lowering tariffs.

Our examination of monetary policies has led us somewhat afield, so let us return to the Hundred Days and the more direct measures for relief. Congress appropriated \$500 million to be distributed to the states as grants rather than loans, and to handle the distribution the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) was created and placed under Harry Hopkins. The President's interest in conservation of natural resources led to the creation of the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), which set 300,000 young men to working at reforestation and to fighting erosion and forest fires.

Relief
measures

Meanwhile the RFC was strengthened and authorized to advance funds for the relief of insolvent banks and to make loans to farmers and small businessmen. An Emergency Farm Mortgage Act undertook to refinance farm mortgages through the Federal Land Banks, and thus rendered a service to banks and insurance companies as well as farmers. The Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) performed a similar service for urban homes. The Public Works Administration (PWA) was entrusted with \$3.3 billion which was to be expended on public works and thus furnish orders for building materials and manufactures and labor for construction men. As it turned out, Administrator Harold Ickes in his anxiety to avoid waste and corruption examined all proposed projects with such rigorous care that PWA was not of immediate benefit.

The creation of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was intended to redistribute income and at the same time satisfy the proponents of public control of power. This act, long championed by Senator Norris, drew into one plan schemes for flood control, navigation improvement, and the manufacture of hydroelectric power and of nitrates for use in peace and in war. Under the administration of a board of three, the TVA not only developed the original plan but put into effect corollary plans for soil conservation, reforestation, rural electrification, and industrialization which turned one of the most backward and poverty-stricken regions in the nation into a strikingly prosperous one.

Tennessee
Valley
Authority

The principal conservative complaints against TVA concerned the use of public funds to compete with and undercut private enterprise, especially in the field of hydroelectric power. Private power companies were quite willing to buy cheap government power and distribute it at high retail rates, but TVA was directed by Congress to give preference to co-operatives and local government units. TVA was challenged in the courts, but the Supreme Court in *Ashwander v. TVA* (1936) upheld its right to sell surplus power from Wilson Dam, then in

The power
yardstick

the "eighteen companies case" refused to reverse a District Court decision in favor of TVA. The TVA sought to provide a "yardstick" by which the public could judge the reasonableness of power rates. Private interests charged that TVA, being exempt from taxes and the necessity of paying dividends, could not provide a realistic yardstick; its advocates countered that conditions were evened by TVA's payments to states and municipalities in lieu of taxes. At any rate, power rates were lowered by private corporations, and some of them sold out to TVA.

To give him credit, FDR sought for a while to abide by his campaign promises of economy. Banking legislation was sweetened by a real effort to cut the regular expenses of government even at the grave risk of offending powerful political interests such as the veterans' lobby. However, New Deal spenders found allies in Congress who were not to be denied. Cuts in regular expenditures were restored in 1934, the veterans' bonus passed (by special arrangement with FDR) over the presidential veto, and extraordinary expenditures expanded. An attempt was made to show that the regular budget was balanced by the bookkeeping device of putting emergency expenditures in a separate column. The fact remained that during Roosevelt's first administration the public debt rose from \$21 billion to \$34 billion.

The agricultural situation which confronted the New Deal was confused by crosscurrents of theories and interests. On one side were the producers of staple products such as cotton, wheat, corn, hogs, rice, tobacco, and milk, who were represented by several organizations but most notably by the Farm Bureau Federation. Among the plans prominent in the 1920's the Farm Bureau had now settled upon the Domestic Allotment Plan, which, it will be remembered, proposed taking a proportion of farm land out of production and reimbursing farmers for their loss by a tax on the processing of agricultural products. In vigorous opposition to this were the tenant farmers and small general farmers represented by the National Farmers' Union and the Farmers National Holiday Association; since they were less dependent on staples, they saw little hope for themselves in the above schemes and boldly demanded inflation of the dollar.

Immediately upon assuming office Secretary of Agriculture Wallace went into conference with farm leaders and emerged with the general outline of the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It was agreed that the foreign market was lost, at least for the foreseeable future, and that a remedy must be found within the domestic economy by a scheme approximating the Domestic Allotment Plan. To find this it was necessary to set up a planned economy which would reduce crops, preferably by withdrawing marginal land from production. As a result the Secretary of Agriculture was authorized to enter

into contracts with individual producers of the seven staples noted above (later augmented by others) to reduce their acreage or livestock in exchange for payments provided by a tax on processors. Tenants and small farmers were placated by the inflationary measures previously treated.



J. N. Darling (Ding). Copyright, New York Herald Tribune, Inc.

How would they like to trade doctors?

An Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) was set up to carry out the act, and the county agricultural agents were made local administrators. To cut a long story short, the effect of the AAA (reinforced by other factors) was, while reducing staple production, to raise the farmer's real income by half between 1932 and 1935. The AAA, however, was unable to do much specifically to benefit laborers in farm-service occupations, small farmers, truck and fruit farmers, and sharecroppers. When landlords reduced their producing acreage, many sharecroppers were thrown off the land and became part of the growing army of migrant agricultural workers in South and West or were added to the relief roles.

Results of
AAA

It seems likely that the AAA would not have even partially attained its object without the intervention of nature, for there quickly developed a tendency to fertilize and cultivate crops so assiduously as to threaten to make up for the cut in acreage. However, in 1934 and 1936 droughts turned vast areas of the Great Plains into a Dust Bowl and cut the national agricultural yield by a third. Hundreds of thousands of farmers abandoned their dust-drifted fields, loaded their families and a few household goods into jalopies or trucks, and went farther west to find work. At the time fruit and vegetable growers in the Pacific Coast area were advertising for seasonal workers, but they could not use the swarms of the dispossessed which descended upon them. The result was starvation, exploitation, and labor strife which were only tardily relieved by the government. Northern Plains migrants poured into the Columbia Valley, while the "Arkies" and "Okies" of the South tended to go to California.

Let us turn now to the legislation of the Hundred Days which dealt directly with business recovery. The basic approach of the First New Deal to this problem was to enforce fair practices as advocated by a considerable wing of business, including the National Association of Manufacturers and the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Though Hoover had paved the way by his business codes, he had, true to his liberal tradition, turned down legal enforcement of them as fascistic.

The National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) as passed in June 1933 was an attempt to dovetail the demands of three interests: (1) of business, that its codes of fair competition be relieved from the operation of the antitrust acts and that the government undertake the enforcement of those codes; (2) of labor, in Section 7A, for minimum wages and maximum hours, and for legal protection of its right to organize and engage in collective bargaining; and (3) of the Keynesian enthusiasts for a redistribution of income in favor of the worker, who was also the small consumer. As head of the National Recovery Administration (NRA) Roosevelt appointed General Hugh Johnson, whose gift for pungent phrases promptly made him one of the most colorful members of the New Deal entourage.

Most onerous of NRA's tasks was the formation of a code of fair competition for each service and manufacturing industry, a task that resulted eventually in the approval of close to 600 basic codes. Those businesses which already possessed Hoover codes found them acceptable with minor changes. The provisions varied with conditions, but the tendency was to set wages at about forty cents an hour and hours of labor at about forty a week—thus presumably making more jobs. The right of labor to organize and bargain collectively was recognized, and child labor was abolished. Elaborate provisions were

often made for the regulation of production, prices, advertising, business graft, and so on.

It was clear that the enforcement of these detailed codes by government action would mean the collapse of laissez faire in the United States. Hence the common accusations that the New Deal was introducing "planning," if not actual fascism. Johnson had questioned the Constitutionality of some of the coercive features of NIRA, and he now launched a campaign to get the public behind the codes and to make their enforcement a matter of public spirit. A sticker bearing a Blue Eagle and the words "NRA—We do our part" was given to complying stores, restaurants, and industries and was placed in the windows of citizens who agreed to purchase only from places which displayed the Blue Eagle. Public interest and compliance were whipped up by committees, speakers, and parades as during the Liberty Loan drives. Before winter Johnson was able to claim that 96 per cent of all enterprises sported the Blue Eagle and an additional 2,800,000 people had been put to work.

Whether or not because of the optimism stimulated by New Deal measures, the stock market began to boom and prices to rise as merchants stocked their shelves. When the stock market crashed late in July, the nation awoke to several facts. Total purchasing power had not increased with prices and was now falling off along with production. Labor was being undercut by use of labor-saving machinery, the speed-up, and the stretch-out, and skilled and semiskilled workmen were being replaced by unskilled (frequently women). Section 7A did not strengthen national unions but only resulted in the mushrooming of company unions.

Quite naturally big industries had taken most interest and wielded most influence in drawing up the codes, and now small industries began to complain that the codes injured them. Big Business on the other hand began to wonder just what would happen to the control it had imposed when the government and the courts examined the results in detail. Moreover, though it had managed to impose its own interpretation of Section 7A, it feared the outcome of a struggle with a labor movement which had been endowed with new life by the New Deal. Big Business had profited so much by NIRA that liberals began to suspect the New Deal of an ulterior intention to introduce fascism.

The NRA itself was in hot water. Not only did Henry Ford refuse to espouse the Blue Eagle (on account of Section 7A), but it became evident that thousands of employers, big and little, were pretending to abide by codes but actually were chiseling on wages and hours. Johnson fulminated about how he was going to crack down on them, but he hesitated to undertake legal action; of 155,000 violations noted in the two-year life of NRA

only 564 reached the courts. Johnson was ready to admit that the NRA codes had defects, and in retrospect it seems probable that the effort would have been more successful if it had been confined to a few large industries. Nevertheless, his livid resentment of critics added fuel to the fire that was being built against him by business, Congress, and some of his subordinates who were sure he was favoring Big Business. In September 1934 he resigned, and a National Industrial Recovery Board took his place.

The collapse of the false recovery of the summer of 1933 was followed by a series of experiments with the so-called "commodity dollar." These experiments attempted, essentially, to reduce the gold content of the dollar so that prices would rise in terms of dollars. Meanwhile the Treasury took over all gold stocks at the old price and used the "profit" to stabilize the dollar in the foreign-exchange market. The experiments may have had some effect, but if so it was not enough. They were abandoned in January 1934, and the gold content of the dollar was set at \$35 per ounce—59.06 per cent of its former value. Out of this imbroglio silver interests managed to get the Silver Purchase Act of 1934, which set the two metals at a ratio of 27 to 1.

The Treasury was now obligated to support the ratio between gold and silver by making purchases on the world market. While such purchase drained the metals from other countries and weakened the value of their currencies, it was a considerable stimulus to American business because it enabled foreigners to obtain dollars and did away with the necessity of accepting foreign goods. In this sense it merely meant that American goods were being given away for gold to put in Fort Knox and silver to put in West Point.

The precise effect of the New Deal's tinkering with the gold standard is still a subject for debate, and one still hears complaints about "sixty-cent dollars." On the other hand, most Americans lost their fear that the economy would be wrecked unless silver and paper were freely exchangeable for gold. Actually the dollar has depreciated in purchasing power down through American history, even though the gold content remained about the same from 1792 to 1933. This depreciation in turn is just one aspect of the inflation which has been under way ever since the discovery of America's gold and silver mines. Economists pretty generally agree that while a stable unit of value is desirable, it is impossible of attainment.

The New Deal did not rely only on the "commodity dollar" to arrest the decline. In November (1933) Hopkins was placed in charge of a newly-created Civil Works Administration (CWA) with funds drawn from FERA and PWA and with orders to make jobs for four million unemployed. The "made-work" projects which CWA created—such as raking leaves—may not have added much to the country's tangible assets, but they did much to alleviate suffering

and raise morale. These and other measures at least "held the line" during the winter, and by spring business was picking up and industrial and farm prices were holding steady.

Roosevelt and his advisers seem to have regarded this as a favorable time to do something about foreign trade. Early in 1934 two banks were established to finance exports and imports; the two were united as the Export-Import Bank in 1936. The stabilization of the dollar at \$35 to the gold ounce proved to be permanent, but Congressional authority to vary the content was a convenient argument to force an agreement with Britain and France in 1936 to preserve an equilibrium among the three currencies. It was also Hull's turn to see at least a partial fulfillment of his dreams of lowering the barriers of world trade. It was evident that American exports since 1916 had been supported by loans and by gold purchases; Hull proposed that they should now be exchanged for imports of goods. Nevertheless, the United States could not unilaterally lower its tariff in order to attract imports without having its economy unbalanced by the inrush of goods.

Moving toward international co-operation

Hull recommended a hardheaded approach to the problem. The outrageously high Hawley-Smoot Tariff was to be retained, but reciprocal agreements on specific articles would be negotiated with separate countries, which could reduce the Hawley-Smoot rates as much as 50 per cent. On the other hand, bargaining power was to be strengthened by the proviso that the rates could be raised by 50 per cent against the goods of countries discriminating against American products. The Trade Agreements Act was passed in June 1934, but its limit of three years has been periodically renewed down to the present. Hull's hope that the reductions would forestall the impending war proved futile, possibly because the start was made too late. In 1945 Congress permitted a further drop of 50 per cent in the rates in force at the beginning of that year; the result was that by 1951 our tariff had dropped to about 12 per cent ad valorem.

Trade Agreements Act, 1934

The First New Deal's measures were obviously aimed at placating the three great pressure groups: business, labor, and agriculture. Of course, they bore hard upon the middle class and threatened its very existence. Hitherto the consumer had roughly—*very* roughly—been equivalent to the middle class, but its decreasing significance weakened the consumer as a political power. It has frequently been pointed out that while democracy operates through economic and other pressure groups, it has found no way of representing the citizen as consumer. Indeed, the New Deal almost gaily ignored the consumer, and unfortunately no consumers' pressure group rose to a degree of cohesion and power that is worth recording.

Problem of the consumer

Labor, agriculture, and business are more aware of themselves as fab-

ricators and purveyors of goods and services than as consumers and have had the superficial belief that their increased costs could easily be taken care of by increases in wages or prices. They have quite failed to see that this is a vicious spiral. On the other hand, it is an error to accuse the New Deal of beginning the undermining of the middle class; that began long



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Now, Stewart, you know the doctor told you that you shouldn't talk about Roosevelt.

With a change of names and costumes, this cartoon could fit almost any period of American history.

before, in the Gilded Age. The New Deal, in fact, may be credited with an attempt to build a middle class, not necessarily of white-collar workers but of manual workers who possessed enough property to acquire the middle-class respect for the sanctity of property.

As the electoral test of 1934 neared, there were clear signs that Big Business was abandoning the New Deal in spite of—or perhaps because of—perceptible evidences of economic recovery. One sign was the vicious

whispering campaign which got under way late in 1933, as soon as it became evident to reactionaries that FDR's policies included items which would bear hard upon them. Another sign was the formation of the Liberty League by a group of leading industrialists and reactionary Democratic politicians, such as the DuPonts and Al Smith, which sought to unite business against what it regarded as the radicalism of the New Deal. The core of the Liberty League's platform was the supremacy of property rights, and it fought the concessions which Roosevelt had made to agriculture, labor, and the unemployed. This stand was, of course, nothing more than a return to the status-quo-ante-New Deal and showed what New Dealers regarded as the bankruptcy of the opposition.

Election
of 1934

Labor was far from satisfied with the New Deal, but its leaders had to admit that the labor movement had been rescued from paralysis if not actual extinction. Agriculture also was not satisfied, yet it had no desire to return to a régime of complete frustration. The result was that Roosevelt not only preserved the alliance of labor and agriculture but expanded it by reversing the usual mid-term pattern at the polls. In the Senate the Democrats rose from 59 to 69, as against 25 Republicans and 2 Independents. In the House the Democrats rose from 313 to 322, as against 103 Republicans and 10 Independents.

2 *The Second New Deal: Reform*

The initiation of the Second New Deal was announced by the President in his message to the Seventy-fourth Congress, 4 January 1935. Though he took credit for such recovery as had been accomplished, this and future gains must be nailed down by reform. "We (said the President) find our population suffering from old inequalities, little changed by past sporadic remedies. In spite of our efforts and in spite of our talk, we have not weeded out the overprivileged and we have not effectively lifted up the underprivileged." Social security had become a primary objective of New Deal policy. It was not enough to tinker with the price system or to try to increase profits to the point where the benefit would drip down to the masses. Rather, specific benefits must be given to the people directly. In this effort profits must be limited in the public interest, because excessive profits create undue private power over private and public affairs. Henceforth the "right by work to earn a decent livelihood" would take precedence over "the appetite for great wealth and great power."

Launching
the Second
New Deal

Hitherto Roosevelt had sought to hold the balances equitably among rival interests. Why, now, did he reject the advice of his more conservative counselors and initiate the Second New Deal by this deliberate shift

Why the Second New Deal? to left-of-center? Undoubtedly he was under continual pressure from his progressive advisers, and they found cogent arguments in the business drive against the New Deal, particularly in the intemperate attacks by the Liberty League. That the problem of unemployment had not been licked was witnessed not only by statistics but by the growing pressure from Huey Long's Share-the-Wealth movement, which had to be countered by dramatic measures. There was the growing independence of Congress, now that it had gotten over its first scare and salted down its patronage. Lastly was a series of narrow Supreme Court decisions, which will be noted presently, that upset the apple-cart in several favorite New Deal enterprises. All of these factors and more had their share in driving the harried President to make impulsive statements and take impulsive stands from which it would have been embarrassing to retreat—perhaps even disastrous.

The new concept found expression in a number of bills intended to discourage the amassing of capital and to redistribute wealth. These emerged from the hopper during the spring and summer. The so-called "soak-the-rich" tax bill was intended to draw the strength from Huey Long. It proposed to wipe out corporate surpluses, but Congress balked at this though it agreed to increase taxes on inheritances and large incomes. A Public Utility Holding Company Bill contained a "death sentence" for all but actual operating utility companies. The battle over this was bitter, and in the end Congress permitted two levels of holding companies to exist. This situation was generally disregarded until the Supreme Court in April 1946 in the case of *North American Co. v. S.E.C.* declared the act Constitutional.

The Second New Deal also launched a number of programs intended to aid the needy and raise the standard of living. The Works Progress Administration (WPA) started in May 1935 with the purpose of taking off relief rolls all persons who were employable and giving them work. Projects of a public nature—roads, bridges, buildings, flood control, etc.—were undertaken, and in addition professional workers were given jobs suitable to their training.

At the time hundreds of thousands of young people had struck out for themselves, and destitution had driven many of them to lives as tramps or as criminals. The National Youth Administration (NYA) was intended to provide work for these and other young people, or to give them opportunities to learn trades or attend school. The Resettlement Administration (RA) tackled the problems of farm tenancy and migratory agricultural labor; actually the problems were too vast to be solved by the money and effort which were put forth, but they did have some experimental value. More successful was the Rural Electrification Administration (REA), which extended power lines and raised the farm standard of living and at

the same time expanded the market for power and electrical gadgets.

One curious accompaniment of the WPA and NYA was the radical attempt to organize unions among the workers and agitate for higher wages; there were even some strikes despite the absurdity of striking against relief. Such actions, however, were a part of the Red technique of spreading discontent and chaos. Another aspect of the problem was the federation of political youth organizations into the National Youth Congress. The component parts ranged in color from Pink to Red, but they embarked in so zealous a campaign against war and fascism (which in their context meant a campaign against capitalism) that conservative souls were alarmed. Mrs. Roosevelt took a motherly interest in the Congress, with the result that she shared the distrust which it aroused.

**Radicals
on relief**

The Social Security Act of August 1935 was necessary to counteract the clamors of old-age pension agitators and the demand of labor for unemployment insurance, which might be drawn upon in case of strikes. The system has received some tinkering since and probably would profit by even more. At any rate the Federal government assumed responsibility for the payment of pensions to the aged. The money was supplied by a pay-roll tax on both employer and employed. Additional features of the act were aid to the blind, the indigent aged, dependent children, and related public responsibilities; they were to be administered by the states, but Federal grants-in-aid were provided on a dollar-matching basis. Unemployment insurance also was to be administered by the states, but it was financed by a Federal pay-roll tax.

**Social
Security
Act, 1935**

In spite of the suspicion that NIRA had failed to bring recovery, FDR asked for the renewal of the act. Congress complied on 16 May 1935, possibly because recent Supreme Court decisions seemed to point to its being washed out in the near future. Sure enough, on 27 May the Court by unanimous vote handed down a decision which effectively disposed of NIRA. This case originated in the refusal of the Schechter Poultry Corporation of Brooklyn to obey the Live Poultry Code. The Supreme Court upheld the corporation on the ground that the infraction of the code was not "in" interstate commerce and so was not amenable to Federal law. The Court also upheld the contention that in passing NIRA Congress had to an unconstitutional extent delegated legislative functions to the President.

**The
Schechter
Case, 1935**

The decision in the *Schechter Case* was a victory for businessmen who feared the encroachment of government on business. More than this, it was a victory for the Brandeis school of Atomists, who asserted that NIRA was promoting Big Business. FDR commented bitterly that the Court had relegated the country to "the horse-and-buggy definition of interstate commerce." However, after a period

**A victory
for
Atomism**

of hesitation he seems to have decided that if the Second New Deal was to be Atomistic, the Supreme Court had done him a favor in wiping out this Regulationist feature of the First New Deal. Certainly it was possible to get around all of the Court decisions on NIRA by a redrawing of the legislation. This was what was eventually done with most of its features, but not with the codes for the regulation of competition.

Roosevelt had opposed an earlier attempt to strengthen Section 7A by the Wagner-Connery Labor Relations Bill, but with Section 7A gone he made the best of the situation and signed the bill when it was laid before him on 5 July. This law, often regarded by labor as its Magna Charta, not only confirmed the guarantees of Section 7A but put teeth in them, and created a three-man National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) with almost dictatorial powers over labor-employer relations. It forbade employers to dominate a union in any way; to discriminate against or discharge employees for belonging to or being active in a union, or for filing charges with or testifying before the board; and to refuse to bargain collectively with their employees or to interfere in any way with their conduct of their right to bargain collectively.

The American Federation of Labor, largely made up of craft unions, had failed to organize the mass-production industries such as steel, rubber, automobiles, and electrical equipment, partly because the workers believed that they should be organized as industrial rather than craft unions. Finally, in November 1936, the eight industrial unions of the AFL, led by John L. Lewis and his United Mine Workers, organized the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO) to undertake the job. William Green of the AFL and his puppet masters promptly read it out of the federation. Presumably the quarrel was inevitable, but the result was to divide the house of labor. It began an endemic warfare marked by jurisdictional disputes and fights over who should organize what, opened the way to employer-sown quarrels, and thoroughly confused the public. The battle between the two federations was often more dramatic and bitter than their battle against capital. Nevertheless, the success of unionism was undoubted: in the ten years after 1929 membership was lifted from 4 million to 11 million.

On the whole, the AFL has maintained the conservative program of Gompers and has concerned itself with wages, hours, and conditions of labor and left management problems to the employer. The CIO has moved toward the left, and its left wing has accepted the socialist view that the business of the employer should be open to inspection by and advice from the workers. The CIO differed from the AFL in another particular: it welcomed Negroes, immigrants, and women. In spite of their warfare, the two federations have

Wagner-
Connery
Labor
Relations
Act, 1935

AFL versus
CIO

Differing
approaches

usually presented a common front against hostile legislation and for or against candidates for public office.

The CIO's efforts to organize the mass-production industries had phenomenal success. John L. Lewis, in general charge of organization, conducted the over-all strategy and frequently carried on bargaining talks or directed strikes in person. A heavy-set, deliberate man with pugnacious jaw, beetle brows, and iron-gray hair, Lewis had a gift for airing his contempt in pungent, purple-hued rhetoric, and was adored or hated according to one's point of view—but he was effective. Electrical workers, longshoremen, lumber workers, and glass

CIO organizing drives



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workers were organized, and Sidney Hillman, in charge of the Textile Workers Organizing Committee (TWOC), actually gained a permanent foothold in the South for the United Textile Workers.

Philip Murray (1886–1952), a mine worker born in Scotland, was a quiet man with leanings toward piety and compromise. He successfully directed the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC), which for the first time effectively organized the steel industry. The result was that in

March 1937 Big Steel capitulated and recognized the SWOC. Little Steel, however, refused to surrender. Bloody strikes followed, and the SWOC was decisively defeated. Nevertheless, in 1941 Little Steel capitulated to a NLRB order and made contracts with Murray's United Steelworkers of America.

The effort of the United Rubber Workers to unionize Akron led in 1936 to the first widespread use of the "sit-down" strike, in which the workers remained near their machines where they could prevent a lockout or the introduction of strike breakers. Later on it was used by the United Automobile Workers in the battle for recognition in the Detroit area. It was actually the seizure of company property and eventually was banned by the Supreme Court. However, it had already been given up when the Supreme Court validated the right of the NLRB to hold elections in plants, by which the workers could select their collective bargaining organization. Not only did this mean the subsidence of the wave of violence, it also meant the decline of the company union; workers naturally preferred to be connected with national unions which could furnish them with skilled bargaining agents and financial backing.

Let us return now to the fortunes of the Second New Deal. The *Schechter Case* was followed on 6 January 1936 by the Supreme Court's invalidation of the AAA in *U.S. v. Butler*, better known as the *Hoosac Mills Case*, and a week later in *Richert Rice Mills v. Fontenot*. The decisions held that the processing tax was unconstitutional since it had been levied for the benefit of a particular class, the farmers, rather than for the general welfare. But even if it was for the general welfare, it would not be valid because it was an attempt to regulate agriculture.

Rewriting could not save the AAA, as it had the desired features of NIRA, and the wheels of AAA ground to a stop. The administration lost no time, however, in trying to find a substitute. The Soil Conservation and Domestic Allotment Act was passed in February and was, in reality, an expansion of the minor Soil Erosion Act of 1935. The letter of the new act purported to get farmers to fight erosion by any of a number of methods, chiefly by decreasing their acreage of soil-depleting crops and increasing their acreage of soil-building crops, such as grasses and legumes. Farmers who agreed to co-operate were to receive payments from the general funds of the government. As we shall see later, the new method did not plug the gap but permitted the building-up of surpluses and a decline of prices.

By the time of the campaign of 1936 it was clear that the Second New Deal had abandoned all hope of finding compromises which would promote

the interests of business, labor, and agriculture in common, and it had become a farmer-labor government. Roosevelt's growing dislike of business was evident to those around him as business accelerated its war on unionism, and as the Supreme Court, usually by five to four decisions, wiped out one New Deal Act after another. The Supreme Court, FDR told newshawks, was creating a No-man's Land "where no Government—State or Federal—can function." The Second New Deal was effectively trapped. At the same time the whispering campaign carried on by anti-New Dealers was apparently getting under Roosevelt's skin, and he was coming more and more to regard himself as the focal point of the coming struggle.

**Second
New Deal
stymied**


The situation at least had the virtue of clarifying the issues at stake in the campaign of 1936. The Democratic convention in Philadelphia renominated Roosevelt and Garner without question. The President took advantage of his ascendancy to substitute a simple majority for the two-thirds which had historically been necessary to nominate. The South's veto over the nomination was thus killed, though the South was consoled by a proviso for extra delegates in proportion to the Democratic votes cast in elections. A number of Northern Democrats—including Al Smith of the Brown Derby—"took a walk" which carried them into the Republican ranks. Roosevelt's acceptance speech pulled out the stops of invective against "economic royalists."

**Opening
the cam-
paign of
1936**

The Republicans were assured of the support of business and of most conservatives; their problem was to win over enough farmers and workers to tip the balances in their favor. William Randolph Hearst, long since at outs with the New Deal, now recommended Alfred M. Landon of Kansas, governor of a farm state and at the same time an oil millionaire who could appeal to business. Moreover, he was an honest and pleasant but relatively colorless man who would be likely to listen to instruction and therefore would appeal to the Old Guard. As a result Landon was nominated along with Frank Knox (1874–1944). Knox was a far more vigorous personality, a former Rough Rider and Bull Mooser, a World War I colonel, and now owner and editor of the *Chicago Daily News*. During the following campaign the moderate platform was floated down the creek on a wave of slander against FDR and open promises to repeal the New Deal, lock, stock, and barrel. In the last days of the canvass the high command had to call on Hoover to furnish some intellectual contrast to Landon's inanities and the fury of party orators.

**Alfred M.
Landon
(b. 1887)**

The election returns proved a surprise even to confident New Dealers. Every state except Maine and Vermont went Democratic—thus giving rise



ELECTION OF 1936

531 ELECTORAL VOTES
 ROOSEVELT—Democrat: 523 electoral, 27,750,000 popular votes
 LANDON—Republican: 8 electoral, 16,680,000 popular votes

J. W. CLEMENT CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.

to a wry variation of an old theme, "As Maine goes, so goes Vermont." The electoral vote stood 523 to 8, and even the popular vote was an unbalanced 27.8 million against 16.7 million. The Republicans lost eight Senators, making the score 75 to 17, with four Independents; in the House they lost 14, making the score 333 to 89, with 13 Independents. Norman Thomas drew only 190,000 while Earl Browder, Communist candidate, drew a puny 80,000. More successful was the Union Party, formed by proto-fascist groups led by Father Coughlin, Gerald L. K. Smith (reputed heir of Huey Long), and Dr. Francis E. Townsend, advocate of a wild scheme for old-age pensions and head of the politically potent Townsend Clubs. Actually no responsible groups would get behind the Union Party, and its candidate, Rep. William Lemke of North Dakota, managed to draw only 900,000 votes.

Justly proud of the astounding victory of 1936, Roosevelt took the inaugural oath on 20 January 1937, a new date set by the Lame Duck Amendment. In a fighting speech he rallied the nation to the conquest of poverty, as once had the ill-fated Hoover. The static year of 1936 had been devoted to planning, and the New Deal now proposed to initiate a program no longer aimed at overcoming a cyclic depression but at conquering the permanent depression in which dwelt one third of the nation, ill-housed, ill-clad, and ill-nourished. This conquest was to be made by razing slum tenements and replacing

them with garden homes, and by the rehabilitation of sharecroppers and migrant laborers.

But these endeavors lay within the No-man's Land which the Supreme Court had been marking out between the rights of the states and of the nation. If the program was to go through, the narrow conservative majority of the Supreme Court must be cleared from the path. Here was the issue on which the Second New Deal was to go down to defeat, and that very fact has confirmed a widespread impression that in attacking the Supreme Court the New Deal was doing something unprecedented. In the light of Jefferson's and Jackson's battles with that body and of the tampering by reconstruction Congresses, the impression is to say the least erroneous. Constitutionality can be rigorously observed without a watch-dog Supreme Court, but it so happens that the Supreme Court has performed that function in the United States. Historically it had preserved the balance within the Federal government and between that government and the greedy states. One effect was to restrain first the states and then (after the Civil War) the Federal government from preventing the build-up of industrial power which has made this country a world power.

**The
Supreme
Court
blocks
the way**

With these facts in mind, it is easy to see why so many diverse elements rallied to the defense of the Supreme Court, even though some of them may have felt that it had lost some of its former alertness. To the Southerner, the Court was the guardian of state rights; to the industrialist, the champion of laissez faire; to the lawyer, the crowning glory of that perfect structure, the law; and to the ordinary citizen, the symbol and guardian of a mystic national unity. Each of them, firmly believing that his will was the will of the nation, chuckled at the witticism that "the Supreme Court follows the election returns" but quite without cynicism labeled it judicial "statesmanship" when the Court implemented his wish. The Court itself quite simply believed in its own probity.

**Why
defend it?**

At this time (1937) four of the Justices were rock-ribbed conservatives, if not actual reactionaries. On the liberal side were Louis Brandeis, Benjamin N. Cardozo, and Harlan Fiske Stone. Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, appointed by Hoover, was with the Philadelphia lawyer Owen J. Roberts a resident of the conservative side. Both of them occasionally roamed into the progressive pasture, but on most of the significant New Deal setbacks at least one of them had stayed at home and made the decision five to four. Since it was quite evident that any vacancy would be filled by a New Dealer, the four conservative Justices—it was claimed not quite accurately—decided to sacrifice on the altar of patriotic duty any prospect of well-earned retirement and outwait the New Deal. Actually at least two of them wished to retire.

**The con-
servatives
stick**

The New Deal high command had mulled over several remedies and for a number of reasons decided to adopt the simple proviso that for any Judge who reached the age of seventy without retiring the President might appoint one additional Judge. Six of the Supreme Court Justices (including all four conservatives) were over seventy; so the President would thus be able to make six appointments. The beauty of the plan, however, was that it would apply to all Federal judges, and it had the very plausible excuse that the Federal dockets were so overcrowded that the extra judges were badly needed. No more than fifty of these additional judges could be appointed, nor could the membership of the Supreme Court rise above fifteen. Certain much-needed procedural reforms were added to the bill. In order to encourage retirements the President approved of a pending bill providing that actual resignation would not be necessary for retirement.

The Judiciary Reorganization Bill was laid before Congress by the President on 5 February 1937 with a speech which blundered by laying stress on the need of more Judges to perform the business of the Judiciary, but which said nothing about the five-to-four decisions being handed down and whose very narrowness cast legitimate doubt on their soundness. Conservatives in and out of Congress immediately leaped to the attack with accusations that the President was being slippery and devious, and that his real object was to pack the Judiciary with the intention of dominating it as he already dominated Congress. This time they had an issue which could be sentimentalized even within the New Deal camp. Early in March FDR tried to rectify his blunder and point out the seriousness of the issue to the New Deal's reforms, but it was too late. Such sanity as remained in Congress had been cast aside as the wave of popular and pressure-group opposition mounted.

Most decisive, however, was the sudden switch of Hughes and Roberts to the liberal camp, a move which however "statesmanlike" it may have been cannot be denied to have had some connection with the election returns. As adherents of judicial integrity they must have been aware that the Court was adopting the surest method of assuring that it would eventually be relegated to a minor role. The result was that in rapid succession and by five-to-four votes the Supreme Court reversed itself on a series of decisions, including the lifting of the former ban on state minimum-wage laws by the decision in the case of *West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish*. Then, to prove its change of heart it validated the Wagner Labor Act and the Social Security Act in several close decisions. Under the circumstances the judiciary bill lost its significance and Congress shelved it, though it did pass the retirement act and the procedural reforms.

Roosevelt had lost the battle and gained the war—but the victory, in the modern fashion, was as disastrous as a defeat. In June a string of retirements began, and Cardozo's death followed, so that by the end of 1941 only Roberts and Stone (the latter now Chief Justice) were left of the 1937 Court. But it was too late; the New Deal was losing its dynamism and was never to recover it. The Democratic Party may have a liberal tradition, but circumstances have made the Southern states and certain city machines a part of it, and they tend to be liberal only as long as the loaves and fishes last. The Judiciary reform bill gave the conservatives within the Democratic Party an opportunity to split with the New Deal on an issue which would win the sympathy of their constituents. The wound was never healed.

**Results of
the fight
over the
Judiciary**

This fact does not mean that the New Deal stopped dead in its tracks, but it does mean that Congress rejected or drastically amended its legislation. It turned down the "Seven TVA's" Act to institute TVA-like authorities in the great river valleys. An administration bill to reorganize executive departments was so hedged about that though it was finally passed in 1939 it accomplished little.

**New
legislation**


Congress also gave greater coverage to the Pure Food and Drug Act, plugged some gaps in minor legislation, and set up the U.S. Housing Authority (USHA) to clear slums and build low-cost housing for low-income groups. The Fair Labor Standards Act of June 1938 set an eventual floor of 40 cents an hour under wages and 40 hours a week over hours of work, provided time-and-a-half pay for overtime, and outlawed child labor in industry. So many exceptions were allowed, however, especially for the South, that there was doubt as to its efficacy.

Agriculture had never recovered from the blow dealt by the *Hoosac Mills Decision*, and now the administration proposed cures. Under authority of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, the Farm Security Administration (FSA) was set up in July 1937 to collect under one head the various rural rehabilitation projects. It also launched into a new program intended to help tenants and migratory workers not eligible for commercial loans to buy and stock farms, to train them in scientific farming, and to promote co-operatives. That the people it helped were eager to make good was shown by the high percentage of loan repayments. It did not, however, alter the fundamental situation largely because the South opposed making its tenants and agricultural laborers independent. The FSA was intended to aid rural classes which had not been helped by the AAA and, in fact, had been injured by it. White and Negro sharecroppers had in 1934 organized the Southern Tenant Farmers' Union. It had grown in numbers despite brutal intimidation by night-riders who were alarmed not only at its economic demands but by its implications of racial equality. Eventually the Union

**Aid to ten-
ants and
share-
croppers**

affiliated with the CIO and furnished a Southern counterpart to the National Farmers' Union.

The apparent economic success of the Second New Deal led to fears that another runaway market boom would get under way. But a rude shock came in August 1937, when production and prices began to fall. What caused the "recession"—as it was politely called—was a mystery. New Dealers found a deliberate "strike of capital," that is, withholding of investments, while business blamed it on the distrust resulting from the administration's policies. Business recovered by the end of 1938, but it refused to give any credit to New Deal spending. The stubborn fact was that though employment



may have risen since 1932 (statistics notoriously prevaricate), there were nevertheless at least 10 million Americans still unemployed. Despite the supposed rise in business and employment, the relief rolls were still loaded—for political reasons, or because young people were emerging from school and failing to find employment, or because those not already on relief had spent all their savings and now had to ask for support. Worst of all, the nation became conscious of a fact hitherto ignored: that a large proportion of those on relief were unemployable and would remain a burden on the public.

FDR had for four years proved his political genius by his ability to unite urban and rural interests and the Democratic machines of the South and of the great cities. By 1937 the solidarity of the Democratic Party was lost, and the passage of domestic legislation depended upon a voting alliance of the East and the West, while foreign-affairs legislation depended upon the East and the South. But these alliances were at best temporary, and within each

faction a group of leaders was working skillfully to destroy the New Deal. Roosevelt was confronted by the stark fact that those leaders must be removed or the wheels of the New Deal would soon grind to a halt.

During the summer of 1938 he made known a list of Congressmen whose political philosophy was so at variance with that of the New Deal that their defeat in the fall elections had become a "must." Despite Roosevelt's active participation in the campaign and flagrant pressure brought by the WPA on voters in many places, all but one of the proposed purgees were triumphantly returned to Congress. For the first time since 1928 the Republicans gained, but, though they captured six Senate seats and 80 in the House, the score was heavily against them. The election was probably the bitterest yet. Practically all of the large-circulation magazines and 95 per cent of the newspapers were against Roosevelt. We are assured that one candidate announced to the plaudits of his audience that all he would do for the unemployed would be to put a chicken dinner on top of a flagpole and then grease the pole!

Elections
of 1938

3 *The Third New Deal: Stalemate*

The election may have been a technical victory for the Democrats, but actually it marked the collapse of the Second New Deal. Like the New Freedom before it, it had foundered on the rock of Southern conservatism. The Third New Deal now came in, distinguished from its predecessors by its lack of dynamism and by its limited legislative objective of holding the gains made during the past five years. This attitude, of course, owed something to the growing international crisis (indeed, the Munich Conference occurred before the elections) and to Roosevelt's conviction that it had supplanted domestic reform in significance. One by one the expansive dreams of the New Dealers had to be dropped.

Third New
Deal
ensues

Thereafter in its domestic policies the New Deal had to depend upon two tactics: pump-priming and administrative aggression. Keynesian economists relied upon pump-priming to start the flow of national prosperity, but the New Deal had never poured as much credit into the pump as they recommended. All it could do now was to keep on pouring as much money as Congress would grant, in the hope that it could at least keep the economy functioning even if it could not bring back the dreamed-of prosperity. When rearmament began in 1940, business accused the New Deal of rushing into foreign adventures to save itself from domestic ills, a policy as old certainly as the Athenian Empire. It is difficult to believe the specific charge was just—and yet the fact re-

Permanent
pump-
priming

mains that World War II was the most gigantic pump-priming operation in history. Some economists insist that the postwar prosperity was nothing more than pumping out the credit poured into the economy during the war. If that is true, the New Deal was a disastrous failure so far as its economic remedies are concerned.

The Third New Deal lacked dynamism, but it did not lack a certain shrewd and ruthless spirit of aggressiveness in preserving its former gains and in extending them by executive action. Since the political existence of the Roosevelt régime now frankly depended on the support of labor and agriculture, this administrative initiative aggression was largely exercised in their behalf.

The fact that farm surpluses had been piling up and prices of staples had been dropping showed the inadequacy of the makeshift legislation passed after the *Hoosac Mills Decision*. The result was the Second AAA, passed in February 1938 and implementing a pet project of Secretary Wallace, the "ever-normal granary." By his plan farmers received payments from the U.S. Treasury if they followed soil-conservation practices and planted allotted acreages calculated to meet normal demands plus exports and a reasonable reserve. Surpluses could be stored and could be pledged as security for loans. If prices went down, the farmer would still have his money; if they went up to parity or over, he could sell and pay the note.

Growers of wheat, corn, cotton, rice, and tobacco were in addition to receive parity payments. The period from August 1919 to July 1929 for tobacco, and August 1909 to July 1914 for the others were "base periods"; growers were now to receive "real" prices (equal purchasing power) to make their income up to 75 per cent of what their produce had brought during the base period. More than this, crop insurance against natural disasters was available to wheat farmers; this was later extended to some other crops. Marketing quota agreements, a feature of the First AAA, were instituted. It was clear that staple farmers had now attained their dream of guaranteed prices, a system which was to be to agriculture what the tariff had been to industry. As the years went on, the parity system was to be extended to other farm products.

Even more clear was the administrative aggression practiced by the National Labor Relations Board. From 1935 to 1947 a barrage of NLRB rulings and Supreme Court decisions steadily encroached on the rights of the employer. The best that can be said for it is that social practice often swings from one extreme to the opposite before it finds the happy medium. Certainly many employers who had abused their power were now finding out how it felt to be ridden over rough-shod. They almost, but not quite, lost the right to hire and fire without union consent. They had to recognize the majority union and bar-

gain only with it, but the minority union could strike if it chose. If they committed one "unfair" act in an attempt to operate a struck plant, they had to take back all strikers with back pay. The use of strike breakers was labeled an illegal interference with the right of labor to organize, and the movement of strike breakers in interstate commerce was prohibited.

Unions, on the other hand, were practically freed from the criminal provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act. They could engage in jurisdictional strikes, and they could strike to prevent the use of new equipment or to compel the employment of unnecessary employees—**Carte blanche for labor** "featherbedding." It was legal for a union to strike in violation of a contract, in violation of state laws or injunctions, or to compel an employer to violate the NLRA! Picketing was legal even though it was done to get the employer to commit an "unfair" labor practice. More than this, even though an employer had recognized a union in compliance with a ruling of NLRB, he could be picketed and hampered in his business by a union which wished to gain entry—and he could have no dealings with it. Boycotting now became legal in practically any form and for practically any purpose, even to force an employer to violate the NLRA. Though unions were technically suable, there were so many exceptions that in effect they were in many places relatively untouchable.

Before leaving this phase of the labor movement, it must be noted that circumstances gave communists an excellent chance to weave their red thread into the developing texture. John L. Lewis, though no Red, was so desperate for experienced organizers that he took on hundreds of Reds in that capacity. He was confident that he could manage them, but when the showdown came they were **Communism in labor** more powerful than he was. Their power was based not only upon ability but upon parliamentary manipulation: calling meetings on sunny Sunday afternoons when the membership preferred to go picnicking, or protracting evening meetings until so few members were left that the initiated could cram their candidates or policies through. Though communists were divided into numerous factions, the Stalinites were by far the strongest, perhaps about 100,000 in number. Financed and directed by the Comintern, they were able to get such a throttle hold on labor that they were able to dictate to the CIO and even to intimidate the AFL. As we shall see, they were to be expelled in an epic battle after World War II.

The burgeoning of war industries benefited the labor movement enormously by opening new millions of employees to organization. The AFL shared in the membership increase, especially after truces were arranged with the CIO in certain fields such as building construction. **Dictatorship in labor** By this time many employers had learned by rough experience that they could not stave off unionism, so they turned to the AFL as the mildest of their alternatives. Now if the CIO could be

accused of communism, the AFL was no less open to the charge of fostering a considerable number of big and little dictators who sometimes passed over the line into racketeering. Labor's feeling during the war that it was being exploited by racketeers and communists probably had considerable to do with the later Congressional reaction against the Wagner Act.

No less remarkable than its promotion of agriculture and labor was the policy of administrative harassment which the Third New Deal used to force business to its will. In this endeavor the Antitrust Division of the Attorney-General's Office was the chief instrument. Suits were instituted on unprovable or imaginary charges of monopoly or malpractice, not with any hope of winning them but with the intention of harassing business into agreeing to "consent" decrees which perhaps hampered their legitimate practices. If the corporation stood firm and accepted the expense and damage to its prestige of long litigation, it might have the satisfaction of seeing the suit dropped on some convenient pretext—probably, however, to be succeeded by another attack from a new direction.

Such tactics were (and are) deplorable, of course, but it must be admitted that a considerable segment of business had long followed similar procedures against rivals whom it wished to embarrass or coerce; the small businessman, in particular, had suffered. Moreover, it must be admitted that the Antitrust Division's method got results after a fashion. Big Business got the jitters at the approach of a Federal lawyer or accountant and minded its competitive p's and q's much more carefully. On the other hand, the effect on business initiative and confidence is readily apparent.

It is at present impossible to state precisely the origin of this policy of harassment. The Third New Deal, as nearly as we can judge, failed to make up its official mind between Regulation and Atomism, whether because of the loss of its political power, because of the traditional ambivalence of democracy, or because of political opportunism. There are signs that government officials had come to recognize the necessity and inevitability of Big Business but could not for political reasons be frank about it. For half a century Atomistic Progressives had been hammering on the curse of bigness, and farmers and laborers had become convinced. The result may well have been that the Third New Deal had to put up a show of being Atomistic if it was to keep its farmer-labor backing.

In practice government policy-makers recognized that neither Regulation nor Atomism is universally applicable. An analysis of fair-competition laws shows that they act both to encourage and to discourage competition. As though its attitudes toward business were not confusing enough, the New Deal complicated the situation by organizing upwards of fifty corporations which undertook to manufacture and distribute power and a long list of com-

Harass-
ment of
business

Possible
origins

Govern-
ment in
and over
business

modities, and engaged in shipping and railroading, banking, warehousing, and real estate. These corporations even had interlocking directorates and were able to bargain and borrow among themselves.

The Washington of the New Deal years was electric with excitement, the excitement of political opportunity, of free spending, of impending change. Restaurants, hotels, and bars were crowded, and the money changers thronged the halls of Congress and of the executive departments. The newspapers and official reports were studded with alphabetic symbols for government agencies to an extent never before approached—but then neither had bureaucracy ever mounted so high before. The magnificent buildings erected on the Mall by Coolidge and Hoover had been expected to house the departments for a century, but now the “emergency” bureaus and corporations were overflowing into commandeered hotels and apartment buildings. Washington had suddenly become the center of the biggest business on earth, the United States Government. Money was poured into new bridges, parks, boulevards, and parkways until Washington became one of the most beautiful, if not the most beautiful, city in the world and had by 1943 become the core of a complex of 1,250,000 people.

We know now that there were a few men holding office who were actually passing information to the Comintern. Greater in number were the socialists, but they were more likely to be of the Norman Thomas than of the Marxian type. They expected socialism, but they expected it to come by a process of evolution. These shaded off into what might be called national planners. The heyday of the planners was during the Second New Deal, but even then such old-time Atomists as Cordell Hull did not go along, nor, more to the point, did Congress. With the collapse of the Second New Deal, planning had to give way to spending except in the limited sphere of agriculture. Nevertheless the fact remains that, whether or not by the machinations of the planners, the Federal government assumed control of American finance, worked out drastic controls over private industry, socialized a considerable part of the country's public utilities, and even entered into competition with private industry in the fabricating field.

In looking back upon the leaders of the New Deal, it is apparent that as individuals they were usually incorruptible and were filled with high ideals and with a sense of responsibility for the public welfare. Unfortunately this is not the whole story. They were overly slick in political maneuvers, and some bore the earmarks of political shysters. They purchased loyalty, misrepresented facts, and made easy promises which were soon broken. As a class they lacked political integrity. This judgment, however, requires to be set in the background of the times and of American history. There is no evidence that the opposition to the New Deal could boast of any greater integrity, and

**Hectic
Wash-
ington**

**National
planning**

**Integrity
and the
New Deal**

apparently the voting public distrusted its ideals. The New Deal was accused of being faithless and ruthless, and perhaps it was. Yet this was the traditional pattern of American political reform movements, as we saw in the times of Jefferson, Jackson, and the Progressives. In this sense, at least, the New Deal was in the authentic stream of American history.

4 *Progressivism in the Stream of American History*

The fact that the Rooseveltian policies of the 1930's were called the New Deal should not conceal the fact that they stemmed from and were in a sense the long-delayed culmination of Progressivism. We have seen Middle-class Progressivism that the period between the Civil War and World War I was the heyday of the middle class in America. Its values, as in any bourgeois society, were moralistic, and for a while it managed to conceal its own evils behind the façade of the Gilded Age. But presently Pragmatism began to tear down this façade and demand that changes be made—though of course it demanded amendments rather than complete rebuilding. Moreover, the high cost of living was destroying the preferred position which the middle class had occupied since the Civil War. The middle class was in a quandary. Duty demanded reform, but self-interest was unwilling to alter the existing very pleasant mode of living. The stage was now set for the entry of Progressivism.

TR by his Regulationism showed the middle class how to enjoy the glow of a moral crusade by striking at business abuses, which were now undermining its standard of living, and at the same time permit the continued growth of the mass-production economy which had made life so comfortable and convenient. The City of God: Regulationist or Atomist? was to be a place of brotherhood and co-operation where only occasionally would the angelic cop find it necessary to thump his jeweled nightstick on the golden pavement. This, said TR, was evolution, the predestined course of the American Way. This was all very well, but—curious omission for the apostle of the strenuous life—it did not satisfy the Calvinistic urge for growth through struggle.

The ascetic Wilson sought to supply this lack by his Atomism. The City of God would be given over to a "handsome rivalry" conducted with Princetonian gentility which (the angelic cop would see to this) would result in every man winning a prize, graduated according to ability and effort, of course, but nevertheless a prize. And yet, and here the transcendentalist side of this modern Calvin appeared, the prize itself was not the goal; rather was the goal the spiritual strength gained in the struggle and the joy of seeing the City of God erected on this earth.

We have seen how Wilson sought to force his "handsome rivalry" upon the domestic and international scenes, and how the moral strain was too

great for the American people. The result was the reaction of Normalcy, with its savor of materialism and its ten-years struggle to suppress the twinges of the conscience which Pragmatism had revived and which Wilson had given a sense of urgency and responsibility. And yet, in a curious sense, Normalcy did not lose sight of the pragmatic goal. With a strangely warped sense of fact it interpreted Progressivism as the revolt of the common man rather than a bourgeois effort to reconcile conscience and comfort. The common man has failed to bring the City of God, said Normalcy: now let the businessman and the engineer take over. The approach was proto-fascist, as was the custom of the time—in itself not out of keeping with Calvinist belief in the social and political responsibility of the “elect.”

—or proto-fascist?

The significance of the collapse of Normalcy is open to various interpretations. Was it brought on by a mere cyclic depression? Was it the death throe of capitalism brought on either by its suicidal dissipations or by a natural evolution toward another economic system? Or was it merely the crash of a structure which was made top-heavy by concentration and which should have covered more ground instead of having ambitiously grown so tall? And what was the remedy—patient waiting enforced by machine guns on the house-tops, traditional Atomistic reform, TRooseveltian Regulation, or root-and-branch socialism? Could the democratic process still be made to run, or had its pistons rusted in their cylinders during the winter of Normalcy?

Why did Normalcy collapse?

The New Deal has come and gone, but we do not yet know all the answers, nor are we likely to know them in this generation. There has been bitter controversy over whether the New Deal was revolution or evolution. Perhaps it was neither—or both. The New Freedom had ended in 1916, and Normalcy had sought to destroy or to prevent the effective use of its reforms. The result was that time built up a flood of changes which in the end were bound to break down the dam of Normalcy. The refusal of Normalcy to let evolution work resulted in their coming at last with a rush, whose very speed made it seem like a revolution.*

New Deal—revolution or evolution?

Jefferson had held that government is the natural enemy of the citizen, and it is not yet certain that he was wrong. The New Deal faced once more the old, old dilemma. Either direction that it took around the circle might wind up at totalitarianism. Should political democracy enlarge economic democracy, or should economic centralization restrict political democracy by refusing to feed the unfortunate? Should we switch from legal protection of the fortunate individual at the expense of society to the protection of the unfortunate in-

The New Deal's dilemma

* For an interesting presentation of all sides of this question see Edwin C. Rozwenc, ed., *The New Deal: Revolution or Evolution?* (1949).

dividual as a member of society at the expense of the fortunate individual? The New Deal stalled and vacillated. It borrowed capital's surplus and gave it to the consumer by means of made work, placating capital's bankers by allowing them to create part of the credit which the government borrowed. It forced up wages in order to increase purchasing power, and prices in order to preserve the life of the capitalist structure by making it possible to pay debts and interest.

The First New Deal made a heroic attempt to save capitalism by imposing Regulationism with the consent of enlightened businessmen. It had proposed to business that it save itself by granting to labor and agriculture a degree of equality which should result in an effective social and economic balance among them. But the operation performed by the First New Deal surgeon resulted in an excruciating pain, which convinced business that the surgeon was determined to kill rather than cure. Nevertheless, its power to move had been restored, so it hopped off the operating table, threw its crutch at the surgeon (as FDR said), and presently managed to bring down its presumed benefactor in ruin.

A glance back over the demands made on business by the First New Deal will bring understanding of the businessman's point of view, whether or not it stirs sympathy. After all, he had merely tried to bring the City of God after Progressivism had failed; was he now to be blotted out of existence for a failure which at worst was only temporary and which a few more years could easily see reversed? Business never agreed that the First New Deal was in the authentic stream of American evolution and that it was made inevitable by the excesses of Normalcy.

Business had refused to propitiate labor and agriculture in order to provide a political substitute for the middle class. When labor and agriculture found that they were being eased out of their recompense for agreeing to NIRA they rebelled. The Second New Deal, deprived of business support, was driven to rely on a farmer-labor alliance and to revert to the farmer-labor favorite policy of Atomism. The actions of business (and of its ally, the Supreme Court) convinced the Second New Deal that fundamental reforms were necessary to adjust the nation to the new day. Some of these it managed to force through, but in the end it was checkmated chiefly by the South, always an element in the collapse of American reform. The puerile aggressiveness of the Third New Deal and of the Fair Deal may or may not have been the dying lunges of a great historic movement.

The New Deal was to the end torn by the conflict between Atomism and Regulation. Roosevelt insisted that he had harmonized the two views, but in doing so he only exposed his disregard of economics and of business

confidence. He admired Pragmatism, which judges a policy by its results, but as time went on he became increasingly unwilling to judge by results; many policies begun as experiments were plainly failures, but he convinced himself that they were well thought-out and irrevocable. Those around him who protested were dropped, and the narrowing circle of the faithful was more and more composed of those who responded satisfactorily to their master's voice.

Business objected to the Regulationism of the First New Deal on the ground that it was creeping socialism. Certainly the 1930's saw the government put into effect or seek to put into effect most of the planks of the Socialist Platform of 1932 with the significant exception of government ownership of the means of production. Even this, said critics, was implied in the vast expansion of government corporations such as TVA. It was not as evident then as it is now that socialist doctrine is being redefined to permit the retention of the private profit system under government control. The problem of whether such a system is socialism or capitalism cannot be settled here. At any rate, when business washed out the First New Deal, it laid up trouble for itself. It should have considered while it was crowing over the *Hoosac Mills Decision* that laborers and tenant farmers have a weak sense of the sanctity of property. If the anchors of the middle class and the owner-farmer are dragged, the next wave of reform may well bring socialism. There is some logic to the judgment that FDR was the greatest conservative since Hamilton.

Both FDR and Truman were well aware that capitalism was committing suicide, and their attempts to redistribute economic power were intended to reinforce the decreasing middle class with new blood—to endow workers and tenant farmers with enough property to ensure that property would become at least a little more sacred to them. Thus the Second New Deal's return to Atomism was a desperate attempt to revive the middle class, or at least supplement it, as an element in the balance of social forces. Not even yet do more than a handful of businessmen seem to grasp the probable fact that it was the New Deal that saved private enterprise. It sought to pacify public resentment and yet preserve the bigness necessary to mass production by fostering the growth of rival giants in industrial fields where they did not already exist. This was in a way the putting into effect of Wilson's amendments to La Follette's original Atomism, which would have been disruptive. At any rate, it suggested a way to avoid the dilemma posed by Atomism and Regulationism.

In a way, the New Deal's own mistakes and confusion helped to conceal what it was trying to do. It violated traditional morals and gave too

—fall be-
tween two
stools

Creation
of social
fissures

New Deal
tries to save
private
enterprise

much room to political opportunism and to a too-human stubbornness or resentment. But the fact remains that in demanding government aid, business lost part of its independence. It became necessary for the Federal government to assume control of credit, to tinker with the gold standard, to finance exports and imports, and to enter even the fields of private, state, and local finance. The government has thus become responsible for and responsive to economic ups-and-downs as never before.

Regardless of the theoretical and actual dangers involved in change, the complexities of the twentieth century made it necessary to explore the possibility of using government as the protector of the citizen. This entailed a number of new departures. One of them was the enlargement of the old definition of democracy as a political process by the acceptance of the belief that the citizen also has economic rights. Up to 1932 economics had in general wagged politics; now it was necessary for politics to wag economics—merely the American phase of what was going on all over the world.

To implement this it was necessary to oil the creaking wheels of democracy by resuscitating the party system, restoring the atrophied powers of the President, and altering and extending the administrative bureaucracy so that it could cope with its problems. The purpose of all this was to undertake at least a moderate degree of planning, both social and economic. The government acknowledged and carried out its duty to promote the welfare of the individual citizen. It made and carried out plans for the restoration and conservation of natural resources. It accepted the responsibility to rebuild blighted areas all the way from city slums to the rural slums of the Tennessee Valley. This has been called welfare statism, and probably it is; what is often forgotten is that it came because business and Progressivism between them had undermined *laissez faire*, and with decreasing opportunity the average man saw no other way to assure himself of reasonable security.

In the end the Supreme Court went over to the New Deal and began to remove one by one the dams which it had so laboriously erected against further change. It granted to Congress unprecedented powers over agriculture and labor, and it expanded its right to delegate administrative functions. It removed much of the barrier of substantive due process, which had limited the power of the government to subordinate private property to social ends. Without relinquishing its duty to interpret the Constitution, it had especially acknowledged its mission to find legal ways of enforcing the popular will as expressed in election returns. So far as we can see, the Federal government is now legally sovereign and "dual federalism" has vanished. Curiously enough, in washing out "dual federalism" the Supreme Court has at least partially deprived itself of one of its most

Introduc-
ing the
welfare
state

The
Supreme
Court fol-
lows the
election
returns

important functions, that of judging between states and Federal government. The result may well be a decline in the significance of the Supreme Court as an agent of Constitutionality.

The New Deal has been accused of a long list of crimes. One of them was indifference to the piling-up of the public debt; if that was a crime, the responsibility should probably be laid at the door of the advertisers' campaign to destroy the ancient virtue of thrift. It has been accused of turning the people into a supine herd whose votes could be purchased by relief and made-work handouts. Actually the voter's attitude toward government has always been based upon an opinion of whether or not it promotes his welfare. Even the Republican Party received its long tenure for no other reason than the belief of the middle class that Republican policies promoted its welfare. If the New Deal used bribery, it was merely a change in the form rather than the fact. In any case, it is true that the New Deal partook of the growing popular tendency to resort to trick phraseology and juggling of statistics to prove a case. Such antics confirmed the country's growing skepticism, which was well illustrated in the saying that there are lies, damn lies, and statistics.

**Crimes
of the
New Deal**

The New Deal has been accused of destroying state sovereignty and with it the motivation of state pride by winning an ascendancy over state policies by its grants and its dollar-matching with or without strings. The charge has merit, but the policy may well have grown because the states had lost their dynamism and were no longer properly fulfilling their functions. It seldom occurs to such critics to look behind the fact to see what can be done to restore local dynamism. Paradoxical as it may seem, the states are busier than ever, for they have received new powers to experiment and to tax. They have become partners with the Federal government in administering a vast complex of legislation. They can and do attack their problems by interstate compacts. All in all, the state still touches the daily life of the citizen far more than he is touched by the Federal government.

**Loss of dy-
namism by
the states**

Lastly, the New Deal forced a re-examination of the smug cliché that the United States is normally a Republican country. If this was ever true, the statement is best limited to the period between 1900 and 1928, during which Wilson came into office because of a Republican split.

And yet even there we may get the wrong impression because of our curious habit of not looking beyond the electoral college returns. Actually the Democratic Party was then, as always, flourishing on the state and local levels; indeed, when the analyst presents the political picture of those levels at almost any time throughout American history, one is forced to acknowledge that the country has normally been Democratic. The long Democratic tenure in Federal office after 1932

**normally
Democratic**

should at least be a warning to the Republicans that the platform upon which they rode the waves for two generations is no longer seaworthy.

The significance of the New Deal is not found simply in its attraction to the voter or in its verging upon the service state as an alternative to social and economic chaos. Even more important was its search for an alternative to the break-down of democracy. It is easy enough to say that the answers it found were incomplete and socially expensive—but when have answers been both cheap and satisfactory? If it departed from the stream of American evolution, which is as yet not at all certain, the departure was forced by the hardheadedness of its enemies. Two things are sure. By one means or another it maintained and strengthened democracy in a world from which the process was rapidly disappearing. No less important, it shored up American economic power so that when the crisis came the country was ready to serve as the arsenal of democracy.

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Chapter XLIX

THE COMING OF WORLD WAR II

1 *The Day of the Dictators*

THE basis for World War II had become crystal clear by 1933. Two new totalitarian ideologies, communism and fascism, were pursuing their programs with a dynamism which the world had not seen since the great Rise of the waves of democratic revolt. To the peoples who had been totalitarian submerged by defeat or a long history of tyranny they promised a higher standard of living and a renewal of power and dictators prestige. It cannot be emphasized too strongly that, whatever the theoretical differences between the two ideologies, they arrived at the same place: statism, absolute, monolithic, and indistinguishable. The leaders of the two drew differences to fool their gullible followers, but actually the struggle between the two was nothing more than a struggle for power—indeed, a new phase of imperialism.

Russian communism in its theory was government control of the means of production *and* of distribution and consumption. Marxian socialism's credo—*from* each according to his ability, *to* each according to his *need*—became: *to* each according to his *work*. (See 1:22 of this Sovietism in action book.) Control was in theory to be in the hands of a dictatorship of the proletariat exercised through local and federal soviets (committees) of the Communist Party. The capital for economic expansion was to be found by the state. The West had built its economy by centuries of scraping and saving. The Soviet Union undertook to do it all in a generation by regimentation of population and resources, and in the process it resorted to trading wheat for machinery and letting hundreds of thousands of people starve.

The springs of Soviet policy were the same as had governed Russia for centuries under the Czars, and were shaped by an isolation from the world which on one side partook of the smug self-satisfaction and the pathologi-

cal suspicions of the backwoods villager, and on the other of claustrophobia (fear of enclosed places). Russia thought with some justice that Western Europe was trying to keep it penned in; so it strove all the harder to get out. It broke out to the Baltic, to the Pacific, to the White Sea, to the Black Sea, but all of these were handicapped by ice or by strong guardians. Hence the Russian desire to dominate Scandinavia and Turkey with their outlets to the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. In this search communism's doctrine of world revolution proved to be a welcome addition to the Russian imperialist arsenal. Nevertheless, Lenin and Stalin officially (but not in reality) played revolution down in order to gain time to build up Russia for the final struggle.

**Springs of
Soviet
policy**

Despite American fear of communism, it had become clear by the 1930's that the Soviet government was stable and that refusal to recognize it was ignoring a fact. At any rate conversations began in 1933 and resulted in recognition. It was agreed that Russia would discontinue its propaganda in the United States and that the question of Czarist debts should be settled by negotiations. A trade treaty was negotiated, but though trade increased it never became important. On the plea that we did not live up to a commitment to extend credits, Russia allowed the debt negotiations to bog down. Of course Red propaganda in the United States did not cease for a moment.

**U.S. rec-
ognition of
U.S.S.R.,
1933**

Fascism sprang in part from revulsion against the threat of communist revolution; hence its frequent characterization as counterrevolutionary. Its original backers were members of the élite classes—aristocrats and industrialists—who were seeking a means of preserving their privileges. In time they were joined by the middle class ("petty bourgeois"), which in Europe as in the United States was being squeezed out of existence. During the postwar disorders the capitalists hired certain nationalist and terrorist gangs of political agitators to harass the communists and finally permitted them to set up pro-capitalistic governments. From then on it was easy for the gang leaders to ditch their backers, seize their property, and launch upon a program of national aggrandizement. Italy's Mussolini dreamed of a restored Roman Empire, while Germany's Hitler preached a thousand years of empire with the German super-race ruling over a world of slave states.

**Rise of
fascism**

Hitler had no sooner taken power (January 1933) than he summoned a corps of financiers and industrial managers and put them to work laying the economic basis for Germany's reassertion of its place as a world force. In six years of the most ruthless and amazingly successful effort in history they put the country back on its feet by stamping out liberty and regimenting people and resources under absolute controls. Those who needed a scapegoat to relieve an in-

**The resto-
ration of
Germany**

feriority complex, a bad conscience, or nervous strain were told the absurd lie that Germany was encircled by a world-wide Jewish conspiracy and were encouraged to take out their spleen on Jews. Nevertheless, Hitler was hampered by popular fears and pressures. The onset of war found him with an army that was good rather than large, while he was short of weapons and stockpiles. Actually he had not expected a real war until he was ready to tackle Russia and build a monolithic Eurasia. He had planned to triumph by the "strategy of terror"—the use of propaganda, lies, threats, fifth columns in the countries selected as victims, and strong-arm squads disguised as "tourists" to seize control of centers of power at a given signal.

Japan developed a little differently. Though it had become technologically modernized, it actually had never emerged psychologically from its peculiar form of feudalism, which subverted the individual. At the same time emperor worship had served to prevent the rise of overwhelmingly powerful individual leaders, such as Hitler, and Japan's own fascism had historically placed leadership in the hands of an oligarchy. It now began to beat the drum for a Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. That did not conceal the age-old conviction that the emperor was destined to rule the world and that expansion in China was simply an attempt to acquire the mineral and man-power resources to accomplish this end. Fascist gangs found a parallel in Japan's military secret societies, which were protected by the army and which did not hesitate to order the assassination of statesmen whose policies were too moderate to suit them.

Why did the democracies take no resolute action to prevent the rise of the dictators and the triumph of their aggressive policies? For one thing, it is difficult for democrats to understand the nature of aggressive power; they are so used to the Constitutional process of change that they are slow to recognize a threat of violence. Why were the dictators tolerated? In the second place, the democracies had lost dynamism, partly as a result of World War I, partly as the result of a failure to reformulate the democratic faith in the light of the age of transition. In the third place, there was the development among the democratic peoples of a guilt complex over the Treaty of Versailles. Of course some of the terms of Versailles were unwise, but on the whole the treaty was not unduly harsh and most of it could have been enforced had not the democracies relapsed into their original rivalries—another reason in itself for their refusal to recognize the crisis.

Again, the fact that there were two totalitarian ideologies confused and split the democracies. Liberals believed against all evidence the none-too-subtle communist preachments of universal peace and goodwill; conservatives were so frightened by the Red menace that they gladly accepted against all evidence fascism's claim to be the champion of capitalism.

Hitler knew his human race when he said that a lie would be believed by those who wished to believe it, and the bigger the lie the easier it would be to believe it.

Last, and as cogent a reason as any, was the fact that the dictators rose basically from economic stress, and economic means were essential to combat them. These the Western democracies did not possess, at least as long as the United States washed its hands of responsibility. In flying from responsibility the United States did not permanently evade problems but only accepted "events shaped by the will of others."

**The U.S.
and world
problems**

American diplomacy impinged at many points on world problems. The war debts were perpetually roiling the waters of international feeling. The French occupation of the Ruhr and the Dawes and Young Plans were a part of the complex. Japanese resentment flared up at the abrogation of the Gentlemen's Agreement by the immigration law of 1924, and it became evident that she was making up for her limitation in capital ships by building other categories. The same thing, incidentally, was true of the other signatories of the Five-Power Treaty except the United States, which, as usual, had lost interest in defense. In the hope of persuading the other powers to limit all categories of ships, Coolidge called a naval conference at Geneva in 1927. France and Italy excused themselves, and the experts of the other three powers failed dismally to find a formula.

Meanwhile there had been developing a movement which was to duncap the absurdities of the interwar era. Conscience-stricken isolationists sought to atone for their rejection of the League by having the nations agree to amend international law by passing a law against war. It was as simple as that. One step led to another until finally the so-called Kellogg-Briand Pact emerged with a promise to outlaw war as "an instrument of national policy." It was signed on 27 August 1928 by fifteen powers while hosannas ascended from a world thus finally relieved from the age-old curse of war. Eventually the pact was signed by forty-eight other nations. The Senate approved, but a committee resolution made it clear that the United States rejected any obligation to enforce the pact. The Senate, stronghold of isolation, refused the request of five Presidents to permit the appointment of an official member to the World Court.

**Kellogg-
Briand
Pact (Pact
of Paris),
1928**

Despite such head-in-sand tactics, there was a gradual softening of the State Department's attitude toward the League. To a considerable extent this change was due to the courage and common sense of Hoover and of his Secretary of State. This was Henry Lewis Stimson, a New York lawyer who was in and out of national office from the days of TR to FDR. He served as Secretary of War for two years with Taft, stayed with the Republican regulars in

**Henry L.
Stimson
(1867-
1950)**

1912, went to the Philippines as Coolidge's governor general, then was brought back by Hoover to serve four years as Secretary of State. Henry Stimson was an example of the highest type of conservative, an administrator of ability, a politician with a broad tolerance for those who disagreed with him, and a statesman with patience and vision.

Hoover and Stimson revived the hope of limiting the building of lesser naval craft and called a naval conference for London early in 1930. The London Naval Conference essentially extended the 5:5:3 ratio to other than capital ships in the navies of Britain, the United States, and Japan. France and Italy refused to be governed by the arrangement. Indeed, the adherence of Britain and Japan was made possible only by concessions in light cruisers and submarines and by an "escalator clause" which permitted them to build higher if a nonsignatory power began a building program which threatened their safety.

Meanwhile the Far Eastern pot had begun to boil again. Japan, waiting patiently for a chance to assert its rights in North China, was annoyed by the clearly evident recovery of Russia and its renewal of interest in Manchuria. When in the early 1920's the United States refused Sun Yat-sen's request for counsel and economic aid, he turned to Russia. Within a few years he and his successor, Chiang Kai-shek, at the head of the Kuomintang Party had managed to give relative unity to a country long torn among war lords. In the process Chiang ousted the Red advisers and drove the Chinese Communists out of their primacy in the government when they presumed to set up a separate army of their own. After five years of bloody warfare the latter found safety on the Russian border, where Mao Tse-tung as political leader and Chu Teh as military leader proceeded to set up the Chinese People's Soviet Republic.

During the wars in South China, Japan took advantage of the "Mukden Incident" (September 1931) on the South Manchuria Railroad to pour in troops and take over Manchuria. In vain the League invoked the Kellogg-Briand Pact and then sent the Lytton commission to Manchuria to investigate. In January 1932 Stimson sent an identical note to Japan and China stating his refusal to recognize any change brought about in violation of the Pact of Paris. This Stimson Doctrine harked back to Bryan's protest of 1915 (against the Twenty-One Demands), which refused to recognize any changes which violated the Open Door.

In the melee that followed, Japan occupied Shanghai, defied the Great Powers, and gave Stimson a stinging rebuke. It then (1932) set up Manchuria as a puppet state and met the League's censure by strutting out of that body. It now began frantically to develop Manchuria's agriculture

and minerals as an economic base for further expansion on the continent.

Stimson went beyond the traditional American policy of co-operative action in the Far East by offering to exercise joint pressure with Britain and France and by his willingness to exert unilateral pressure. Nevertheless the Stimson Doctrine was a failure, in the end a cataclysmic failure. Whether or not Stimson himself was to blame is open to argument. He was confronted not only by divided opinions in Congress and among the press and public but by rifts in the State Department and by Hoover's opposition to sanctions. Under the circumstances he was compelled to offer international co-operation with one hand but to retain independence of action in the other. Britain and France were perfectly aware of the situation and did not propose to be pushed out on a limb and abandoned there. At any rate, this crucial opportunity to forefend the new age of aggression was allowed to slip by.

Why did the Stimson Doctrine fail?

The Philippines had tasted the sweets of autonomy under Wilson and resented the restoration of controls by the Republicans. Politicos publicly demanded "immediate, absolute, and complete independence," but privately they admitted their dependence on the American market and were worried about the looming Asian struggle. Consequently they sought what was essentially dominion status—the right on their part to flout American controls, but the obligation on the American part to give military, economic, and political guarantees. Special interests in the United States were complaining of Philippine competition—labor, sugar, tobacco, dairy, peanut oil, and cottonseed oil. Finally in 1933 these interests combined with the traditional do-gooders and timorous isolationists to pass a Congressional bill which was, to say the least, ungenerous. The United States was to retain a veto over island actions during a ten-years transition period and American goods were to be admitted free; on the other hand, Philippine exports to the United States were to be subjected to quotas, while a rising export tax was to go into a sinking fund to pay the islands' public debt. An immigration quota was to be applied immediately, and even after independence the United States was to retain military and naval bases.

Filipino demands for independence

The Philippine legislature was quite justified in rejecting the offer on the ground that the economy of the islands would be ruined. However, when it became evident that dominion status was out of the question, it reluctantly accepted the Tydings-McDuffie Act of March 1934, which grudgingly made the retention of bases subject to negotiation. For lack of better terms Filipino politicians supported the act, and it was duly ratified by vote of the Filipino people. A constitution for the new Commonwealth of the Philippines was drawn up, ratified, and accepted by

Setting up the Commonwealth of the Philippines, 1935

President Roosevelt, and on 15 November 1935 Manuel Quezon took office as president and Sergio Osmeña as vice-president. Complete independence was to be assumed on 4 July 1946.

Meanwhile on the other side of the world the danger of war was every day becoming more acute. Germany was once more ringed about with prospective foes. It is appropriate to ask why Germany, under this disadvantage, took the risks which led to war. Actually it took them because of the need for haste engendered by its own dynamism. Hitler's people were the most advanced of the totalitarians and therefore knew of the possibility of a higher standard of living and were exerting great pressure for the fulfillment of his promises. Accordingly he was forced to move in an attempt to seize needed natural resources from the surrounding countries and to divert to German use as much as he could of the democracies' production and trade. His program did not necessarily mean war against the West, at least in its early stage. Just as satisfactory in the long run would have been the erection of sympathetic fascist governments in Britain and France, which would have opened the way to German use of their domestic and imperial resources in Hitler's program to acquire domination of Eurasia.

Mussolini, the original fascist, was ready to share in the program and the spoils, and Japan's program was merely an Oriental modification of Hitler's. With such a program in common and with Russia as a common obstacle, it was only natural that the three fascist powers should co-operate. Germany and Italy formed the Rome-Berlin Axis in October 1936. The next month Japan joined them in a common front signified by the Anti-Comintern Pact. Ostensibly anti-Communist though it was, it doubtless signified also common action against the democracies.

In order to prepare the way for the final sharp blows which would put their program into effect, the Axis nations—and here we include Japan—needed to consolidate their position strategically and economically. At the same time they needed to test the cohesion of the democratic powers. Three questions must be answered. (1) Would the League enforce collective security? (2) Would the European democracies stick together? (3) Would the United States come to the rescue as in 1917?

The democracies were well aware of what was going on, but their leaders acted as men mesmerized. Even the United States lost no time in making quite clear its indifference to European events. This attitude was partly owing to its preoccupation with the New Deal but even more to a resurgence of isolationism brought on by a mistaken belief that Britain and France had let Stimson down in the Manchurian crisis, by the clear intention of the European

debtors not to pay another sou on their obligations, and by a new wave of pacifism. Expertly managed and slanted propaganda appeared to the effect that munitions makers ("merchants of death") had profited enormously by World War I; therefore, it was asserted, they had caused the war. Probably some time it will be demonstrated that the propaganda had secret fascist or communist backing. At any rate, a Senate committee undertook an investigation and came up with a host of irrelevant facts, and popular pressure swelled for legislation to prevent acts which would involve us in case war broke out in Europe.

Roosevelt's attitude toward the proposed legislation has never been clearly defined. Perhaps at the time he really believed that the United States could stay out of a general conflict. At any rate, a Neutrality Act of August 1935 directed the President in case of war abroad to embargo munitions and authorized him to warn Americans traveling on vessels of the warring powers that they did so at their own risk. The next year Congress added another act prohibiting loans to belligerents. The meaning was unmistakable. It warned Britain and France that under no circumstances could they expect aid from us. Even more significant, it gave notice to the fascist powers that they were free to attack without danger of American interference. If democratic appeasement was probable before, it was now made inevitable.

Neutrality
Acts, 1935,
1936

With the answer to their third question thus on record, the fascist dictators confidently pursued their quest. Mussolini strengthened Italian control over Albania to block the exit to the Adriatic, built up the army and the navy, and at last in 1935 invaded Ethiopia. That country was a member of the League, and for a while the latter contemplated drastic action in the form of an oil embargo against Italy. However, when the British refused the use of their fleet, the League had to back down. One excuse given was that the United States would not obey the embargo; indeed, it is easy to imagine the reception which would have been given by the isolationist press to the news that a British cruiser had forbidden an American oil tanker to enter Italian waters.

Collapse of
the League
of Nations

Meanwhile Hitler had walked out of the League, denounced the disarmament clauses of Versailles, and had been making tentative thrusts beyond his border. In March 1936, at the height of the Ethiopian crisis, his untried legions marched into the demilitarized Rhineland; once more the League proved to be helpless. Thereafter the League rapidly faded in significance. In 1940 its bureaus were moved to Princeton, New Jersey, and in 1946 it quietly folded.

The curtain on World War II rose in 1936 in Spain, where during three years of civil war the moderate center was ground to powder between the extremes. In the end the fascists won because of German and Italian aid

The U.S. and the Spanish Civil War and, no less, because of the amazing fear and ineptitude of the democracies, which actually united to hamper the beleaguered Spanish democratic Loyalists. Even the American State Department went along and instituted what was in effect an embargo on arms for Spain—technically against both sides, but it was only the Loyalists who needed them. If this looked like appeasement, it only looked like what it was.

The Neutrality Acts had not envisaged the problem of civil war; so Roosevelt now asked for legislation to legalize his policy. Congress obliged promptly, then went on to redraw and expand the neutrality legislation.

Neutrality Act of 1937 In case of war the President was in effect directed to *forbid* Americans to travel on ships of belligerent nations and to deny to American ships the right to carry arms to belligerents or to mount guns against attack. If belligerents purchased arms in the United States, the terms must be cash on the barrel-head, and the arms must be exported in non-American ships.

If Roosevelt had favored the new neutrality act, he must have regretted it quickly, for it soon became evident that Congress had given public opinion a means of forcing the President to limit his own ground for diplomatic maneuver in dealing with foreign broils. He was convinced that war was coming and that sooner or later it must involve the United States, as world wars always had. Still, he was tied by the Neutrality Acts and even more by American isolationist sentiment and as a result could not boldly throw the American sword into the scale in an effort to prevent war. Even his mild attempts to work for peace were criticized. In October he made a speech in Chicago which suggested that aggressors should be "quarantined" by international action. The storm of protest which arose promptly slapped him down.

Meanwhile further dangers were developing in Asia. Japan was plainly building up a Monroe Doctrine for Asia, and in 1934 it sweepingly warned other powers against any actions in China which conflicted with its interests. This took in, and was intended to take in, practically any act they performed. The United States had failed to build its navy up to treaty strength, but Japan had taken such complete advantage of its rights that the two navies were approaching effective parity. When in 1934 Congress authorized further building—though it did not appropriate the money—Japan regarded the action as a threat and gave the legal two years' notice that it would no longer abide by the ratios. Under the circumstances the Second London Naval Conference (1935–36) could do no more than construct a treaty with so many "escape clauses" that it was useless, and Italy and Japan refused to sign even that. President Roosevelt now began urging action on Congress and by May 1938 was able to obtain a billion dollars as the first installment for the construction of a two-ocean navy.

By 1937 Japan had reached the place where it felt able to take over all China. The "Peking Incident" at the Marco Polo bridge—announced as a Chinese attack on Japanese railway guards—gave the excuse in July, and Japanese troops began to move into the north and up the Yangtse toward Shanghai. At this juncture the British woke up and began to angle for a common policy in China, but popular hostility to "foreign entanglements" was so great that Roosevelt had to turn them down. Of course, he realized that Japan was playing ducks and drakes with the Open Door, but there was nothing much that he could do. An application of the Neutrality Act of 1937 would cut off munitions to both parties, but Japan did not need them badly while they were vital to Chinese resistance. He therefore took advantage of the fact that neither side had declared war and made no attempt to enforce the act.

Undeclared war in China

American public opinion had been made abundantly clear by the Neutrality Acts and the popular reaction to FDR's "quarantine" speech, but the careful Japanese militarists (possibly without government approval) resolved to double check. On the Yangtse River the U.S. gunboat *Panay*, flying two American flags, was engaged in evacuating American refugees and escorting American merchant vessels. Suddenly on 12 December 1937 Japanese aviators bombed and sank or beached the *Panay* and three oil tankers, then strafed the survivors as they tried to reach the shore. Three were killed and 74 wounded.

***Panay* Incident, 12 Dec. 1937**


Not only was the American public willing to regard the affair as a case of mistaken identity, but immediately on the heels of the news the Ludlow Amendment was introduced into Congress, providing that war could be declared only as a result of a popular referendum, except in case of actual invasion. It took all of the administration's power to prevent its passage. The Japanese government apologized and eventually paid an indemnity. Nevertheless the militarists now had their demonstration that the United States would not resent even a direct kick in the teeth. Petty persecution of and insults to American diplomats, missionaries, and businessmen were stepped up.

By 1938 the Axis powers had the answers to their queries vis-à-vis the democracies and were ready to proceed to the final stages of their program. In March 1938 German troops marched into Austria and annexed it to Germany. In September Hitler moved to annex the Sudeten German element which inhabited the western border areas of Czechoslovakia. Britain and France were unprepared for war, nor were they willing to call upon Russia to help supplement the magnificent Czechoslovak Army, which was ready to fight. Accordingly at Munich they weakly surrendered the Sudeten Germans to Hitler, the remainder of the country fell into its component parts, and in March 1939 the remainder of the Czech region was annexed by Germany.

Hitler's final moves: the Munich surrender

EXPANSION OF NAZI POWER

- Germany and Satellites at height of Nazi power
- United Nations
- Neutrals
- International boundaries overrun by Germany and Russia
- Boundary of "Great Germany"



Roosevelt was thoroughly alarmed by the signs that war would be joined in the summer of 1939, and public opinion polls agreed with him that the United States should aid the democracies by every means short of war. That Roosevelt was secretly trying to strengthen the democracies was disclosed in January 1939, when a military test plane crashed with a French officer on board. Isolationists immediately rose in wrath and made it necessary for FDR to deny that he favored support of Britain or France, much less had a secret understanding with them. Nevertheless, Congress was not convinced, at least of the first accusation—nor was anyone else with perception. Congress refused to amend the Neutrality Act of 1937 in order to give him more ground for maneuver, though it did not renew the “cash-and-carry” proviso, which expired on 1 May.

**FDR's
battle
against
isolation**

If there had ever been any chance of the democracies confining Hitler's aggressions to the East, that chance was probably gone. Hitler had broken his word so often that his offer to leave the British Empire alone (even to guarantee it) in exchange for a free hand in the Slavic lands was met with skepticism. As a result the British Cabinet desperately sought to curb the tide of aggression by taking a stand; this took the form of supplementing the old Franco-Polish Alliance by a guarantee of the independence of Poland.

**World
War II
begins**

The British and French now played their last diplomatic card by trying to win Russia to a “peace front.” Stalin placed his price at the right to cross Poland in case of war and an Anglo-French guarantee of Soviet territory against Germany and Japan—indeed, against any change in the *status quo* in disfavor of Russia. Meanwhile he had been negotiating with Germany, and on 23 August 1939 capped the whole structure of appeasement by signing a 10-year non-aggression pact with Germany. They agreed to exchange military information, divide Poland between them, and turn over Lithuania to Germany and the other Baltic States and Finland to Russia. A later modification gave Lithuania to Russia. The denouement was not long delayed. On 1 September Hitler's army moved into Poland, and on the 3rd Britain and France reluctantly entered the war.

Once more we are confronted by the question of American responsibility for a world war. Primary blame, of course, rests upon the aggressors, exactly where it belongs. Nevertheless, the victims share the responsibility because they did not take strong action to prevent the crime—because they allowed the development of an atmosphere favorable to crime. It is commonly claimed that the United States could have prevented World War II if it had entered the League, but it seems likely that in view of the American psychological climate mere membership in the League would have meant little or nothing. The democracies, as we have been at some pains to show,

**Problem of
responsi-
bility for
World
War II**

all suffered from a loss of dynamism and vision. Given the psychological factors (and perhaps the economic), there was bound to be another crisis started either by the fascists or by the communists. Circumstances turned up the fascist crisis first.

2 *The Good Neighbor*

In the field of relations with Latin America the United States moved for some years with a certainty and consistency which was in refreshing contrast to its policy toward the rest of the world. This change for the better arose in part from the pressure of liberal and anti-imperialist elements, but there was also the growing realization by businessmen that one does not gain the goodwill of the customer by holding a gun on him while bargaining. Another cause was the belief that the European strategic menace to the Caribbean had been wiped out by World War I. When the Axis dictators began to sow alarms, it was realized that Latin-American goodwill was essential if the southern flank was to be made safe in case of war. Even isolationists accepted the policy, for they were anxious to entrench the Western Hemisphere against the rest of the world.

Catholic conservatives in Latin America were deeply troubled by the Indian communalism which was rising from the grass roots and by the waves of statist radicalism which were sweeping out of Europe. They had long despised the United States for its "materialism" and its headlong mass democracy, but now to their own amazement they found that its conservative capitalism and religious tolerance were far more congenial than the statism and antireligionism of the Soviet and fascist régimes. Latin-American democrats, for their part, found new comfort in the reforms of the New Deal and the high intentions of the Good Neighbor Policy. Because they were Westerners and Catholics, they felt that they must lay aside their ancient prejudices and for reasons of self-preservation find a basis for common action with the Colossus of the North.

The switch in the attitude of the United States toward Latin America did not wait upon the New Deal but began as early as the Coolidge administration in our relations with Nicaragua and Mexico. In both cases Congressional pressure forced Coolidge to seek peaceful solutions of outstanding differences. The difficulties were especially great in Mexico, where it will be recalled that Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917 had placed ownership of minerals and oil with the government, and where there was strong pressure to dispossess foreign investors. These investors spared no expense in laying their case

before the American public, and in 1927 managed to work up a war scare which only subsided when Coolidge sent Dwight W. Morrow (1873–1931) as ambassador to Mexico to iron out the differences. Morrow was aided by several factors, including numerous oil strikes throughout the world, which pointed the lesson that foreigners could get along without Mexico's oil. As a result American oil rights granted prior to 1927 were retained, and progress was made toward solving other problems.

The new day was marked by the Hoover-Stimson policy of keeping hands off when a wave of revolutions swept Latin America and promptly recognizing *de facto* governments—thus abandoning the Wilsonian moral test, with some exceptions in the Central American republics. **Hoover-Stimson policies** The policy also accepted a radically limited version of the Monroe Doctrine as a unilateral declaration of the United States versus Europe, *not* the United States versus Latin America. The Theodore Roosevelt Corollary was not justified by the Monroe Doctrine; if it had been justified by strategic considerations, that was a different matter. At any rate, the Monroe Doctrine was not to be interpreted as an instrument for subjecting and exploiting Latin America but as a guarantee of its freedom, security, and territorial integrity against Europe.

In his first Inaugural Address, Franklin Roosevelt proclaimed that in hemispheric relations he “would dedicate this nation to the policy of the good neighbor.” At the Seventh Pan-American Conference in 1933 at Montevideo, Hull agreed that “no state has the right to intervene in the internal or external affairs of another.” Already the policy of nonintervention had been applied in Cuba, where by August 1933 depression had bred revolution and dictator Machado was forced to flee. A struggle for power followed, and to deal with the emergency Roosevelt sent Sumner Welles to Havana as ambassador. Welles recommended that the chains of the Platt Amendment be struck off, and in May 1934 they were. Presently the treaties of “protection” in the other Caribbean republics were abandoned, and the marines were withdrawn from Haiti, the last country remaining in occupation. **Launching the Good Neighbor Policy, 1933**

It seems evident that the success of the Good Neighbor Policy was in large degree due to Sumner Welles, Assistant Secretary of State and later Under-Secretary. He coldly and realistically held that the United States should strive for agreements among the nations, but if agreement was not possible it should choose between accepting with good grace what it could get or using force. On the other hand, if Cordell Hull could have had his way, he would have reinstituted Wilson's moral diplomacy. Hull's tendency to subject foreign representatives to grouches and moral preachments made him unfit to handle the more delicate aspects of diplomacy, but he could not be ousted **Welles versus Hull**

because of his political strength in the South. This support, moreover, made him the nearest exception to the rule that the Senate is suspicious of any Secretary of State.

Both Welles and Hull believed ardently in the Good Neighbor Policy; so their differences did not become apparent immediately. As the 1930's progressed, however, the battle was joined, and it became more and more bitter until 1943, when at last Hull brought his big political guns to bear. Meanwhile FDR allowed Hull to play front man and to tinker with tariff agreements, while Welles served as his real adviser on foreign policy. Roosevelt saw the coming world storm and the necessity of protecting the American flank by a friendly Latin America, and he agreed that this protection could be won only by the Welles method of multilateral agreements.


The Achilles' heel of the entire Good Neighbor Policy was Argentina, which had inherited and accentuated Spain's extreme individualism and its rabid desire for dominance. Under the circumstances Argentineans regarded the United States as an obstacle to their hegemony, and, moreover, they resented certain American trade practices, particularly the exclusion of Argentine beef, which they rightly insist is the best in the world. At any rate, if it could not dominate the Americas, Argentina at least proposed to see to it that the United States did not. At every Pan-American Conference it was the dissident, and of over a hundred inter-American treaties and conventions Argentina ratified only twelve unconditionally. The only alternative to patient forbearance was to bring Argentina to book by sanctions or open force—but that would have alienated the other American states.

The American states gathered in 1936 at Buenos Aires in a special conference to consider problems incident to the gathering European storm. FDR, "traveling salesman for peace," opened the conference with a declaration that aggressors "will find a Hemisphere wholly prepared to consult together for our mutual safety and our mutual good." The result should have been a prompt agreement to make the Monroe Doctrine multilateral, but no such thing happened. Argentina coldly insisted on unanimity in all decisions—which, of course, would put it in a place to make or break policy. The best that could be done was to agree that upon an outside threat the American powers would meet to consult upon a "co-operative solution." However, two years later the Declaration of Lima added the vital provision that any foreign minister should have the right to call a meeting of all foreign ministers for consultation.

Latin America had been waiting for the ultimate proof that the United States would not intervene to save the investments of its nationals. Mexico posed the first inescapable test when President Cárdenas abruptly expropri-

ated foreign land and oil holdings, thus accepting the most radical interpretation of Article 27. The fact that the property was expropriated implied that payment would be made; confiscation is quite a different matter. Two facts now became evident: first, that the United States would not use force in representing its nationals' claims; and second, that it would no longer serve as bill collector for the British and Dutch oil claimants. It was not until

Mexico expropriates oil properties



Elderman, permission The Washington Post

Expropriation Hurts!

Cárdenas's seizure of American-owned land to distribute to landless peasants was a stern test of the sincerity of the Good Neighbor policy.

Ávila Camacho took the presidency that the Cooke-Zevada Settlement of 1942 was made. By this the oil corporations took the rap to the tune of around 90 per cent of their claims and received the remainder in installments payable up to 1947.

The Cooke-Zevada Settlement was a triumph for the Good Neighbor Policy and for the principle that Latin-American states have a right to handle domestic affairs as they please. On the other hand, it underlined a situation which was already becoming evident. The 1930's had seen wide defaults of government bonds in Latin America, and American banks were shy about handling further loans. American capital had gone into Latin America only because it could counterbalance the risk by large profits and the prospect

Discouragement of American capital

of State Department support. With Latin-American governments putting the screws on foreigners' labor policies, limiting their profits, and blocking the removal of profits from the country where they were earned, American capital was not eager to make new ventures. Indeed, it was frequently glad to escape from the old ventures even with a loss. Henceforth American firms were willing to sell goods and furnish technical aid, but serious financial commitments were avoided or undertaken only when hedged about with safeguards.

The result was a nasty threat to the Good Neighbor Policy, for it was quite naturally regarded by Latin Americans (despite their lofty contempt for "materialism") as useful only in so far as it promoted their security and economic well-being. It was quite evident that if the United States was to be a good neighbor, it must provide material benefits and that without insulting the Hispanic sense of dignity. Latin America must be helped to help itself. The program adopted was various and involved, but basically it meant that the United States stepped into the financial breach left by private capital and at the same time gave aid to the Latin-American countries in the exercise of their public functions. The effort suffered from inexperience, do-goodism, and haste, but nevertheless it was one of the most amazing the world has ever seen and perhaps pointed the way to the solution of many of the world's problems. Truman's Point Four suggestion was based upon this precedent.

The over-all direction of the program was vested in an agency which, though it changed names twice, is best known as the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (CIAA). Its head was the youthful and enthusiastic Nelson Rockefeller (b. 1908), son of John D. Rockefeller, Jr. CIAA arranged for the loan of U.S. government experts who co-operated with Latin Americans in carrying out studies and demonstrations for improvements in public health and the utilization of natural resources. The Reconstruction Finance Corporation was authorized to set up subsidiary corporations to purchase strategic materials, and these became vital agents for stockpiling and opening new sources of supply. In 1940 the Export-Import Bank actively began to finance Latin America, not simply in marketing but in long-range development. Thus highways, electric power plants, and steel factories were built with American money and equipment. Such loans are still being made as supplements to private investment.

There is some substance to the opinion that the United States because of the very fact of its economic and military power was doomed to intervene. Practically anything that the United States did in its aid program required judgment and selectivity and consequently could be interpreted as a kind of intervention. Overproduction of coffee and sugar led to the imposition of quotas upon the producing countries and agreements for price control; the power thus

Uncle Sam
takes the
risks

Substitutes
for marines

available for exercise over the economy of Latin America is readily seen. The distribution of Lend-Lease weapons caused heartburnings among rival states. Not least was the ability of the American ambassador to exercise social recognition or nonrecognition as a means of signifying approval or disapproval of a local faction or point of view.

It would be naïve to assert that the United States has steered clear of using these pressures; indeed, it would have been suicidal not to have used them. With all its faults and inconsistencies, the United States has yet dedicated itself to the preservation of freedom and democracy, and it has been forced to use power to that end. Nevertheless it is confronted by dilemmas which, whether it acts or not, earn distrust and hatred not only in Latin America but in the world. If it does not intervene to support democratic elements, it is injuring the democratic fight for security and supporting fascism and/or communism; if it does intervene, it lays itself open to bitter recriminations by all those who feel themselves injured. The history of the Good Neighbor Policy (and in large measure of its post-World War II diplomacy) has been the attempt of the United States to escape from the dilemma of power by finding a truly multilateral means of assuring the triumph of its ideals.

After the outbreak of World War II these efforts necessarily seesawed with its own view of its relations to the war. At first its endeavor was to build up an armed neutrality. A meeting of foreign ministers immediately upon the outbreak of war issued the Declaration of Panama (3 October 1939), which drew a line about the Americas, excluding Canada, within which belligerents were warned to do no fighting. Both sides flouted the declaration, and it quickly became inoperative. The Nazi blitzkrieg of 1940 opened the alarming prospect that Germany might seek to control the colonies of the conquered countries. This was countered (July 1940) by the Act of Havana, which provided that in case of such danger any one or more American states could take over the threatened colony. This the United States eventually did in the case of Greenland and the Dutch Caribbean colonies, but not under this act. The conference also declared that outside aggression against one state was aggression against all. Thus at long last the Monroe Doctrine was made multilateral.

That a new spirit of continental solidarity had sprung up was evidenced by the arrangements made for co-operative use of ports and air bases. These were particularly valuable in the case of Brazil, which is so close to Africa on one side and to the stepping stones of the Caribbean Islands on the other that it affords the logical entry for any invasion of the Americas. As a result, Brazil and the United States have always found a mutual interest in defense. Other measures of co-operation included the reception of American military

**The
dilemma
of power**

**Monroe
Doctrine
made mul-
tilateral**

**Continental
solidarity**

missions as technical advisers to the Latin-American forces and the clearing of German and Italian personnel from air lines and to some extent from other enterprises. One significant factor in military preparation was the dispatch of great quantities of Lend-Lease weapons from the United States.

The attack on Pearl Harbor was immediately recognized as a threat to the entire hemisphere. Nine of the Caribbean and Central American republics declared war on the Axis and Japan that same month. In January 1942 the Third Meeting of Foreign Ministers met at Rio de Janeiro. The object of Welles, who represented the United States, was to implement the Havana agreement against aggression by getting unanimous consent to a pledge to break relations with the Axis and Japan. Argentina refused to agree, and Brazil feared to take any stand which would strain the always delicate relations between the two countries. Consequently Welles was forced to make his resolution recommendatory, and it was unanimously approved in that form. Hull burned up the wires in sulphurous protests to Welles, but Roosevelt decided to follow the judgment of the man on the scene of action. As a matter of fact, all of the other nations but Argentina and Chile promptly broke relations, and Brazil and Mexico entered the war within a few months.

As usual Argentina was the crux of most of the wartime trouble in Latin America. Under the guidance of the "Colonel's Clique" it was moving toward fascism and making the United States fearful of having an Axis ally on its flank. If ever a crisis called for diplomatic skill this was it, but Hull chose the moment to drop Welles. The result was the development of cracks in the Good Neighbor Policy which all but wrecked it. Finally in November 1944 Hull's failing health forced his retirement, and Edward Stettinius took his place.

Something had to be done to patch up the situation; so a conference of American nations "co-operating in the war effort" (which now included all but Argentina) met at Mexico City, February-March 1945. Stettinius got an undeserved break from two sides. In Europe the Soviet armies had broken through into Germany, and Catholic Latin America trembled lest they seize the ancient centers of Western Civilization and menace the rest of the world. In South America, Argentina was threatening to restore the boundaries of the old Viceroyalty of the Plata, and the neighbors were eager to ensure the aid of the United States by making action against all aggressors mandatory. The result was unusually smooth going in Mexico City.

The Act of Chapultepec, which emerged from this conference, was an

amazing reversal of several historic policies and a proof that suspicion of the United States was waning. Aggression or the threat of aggression against one nation from *inside or outside the Americas* was to be regarded as against all, and was to bring immediate consultation on what should be done. Though all the signatories accepted the role of guardians of the Monroe Doctrine, the act was primarily an attempt to bind the United States to a mutual defense pact far stronger than anything ever envisioned by the Monroe Doctrine or any of its interpreters. There were other provisions, but of chief significance was an invitation to Argentina to ratify the act and declare war against the Axis. Argentina promptly did both, but there were no other signs of moral regeneration.

The Act of Chapultepec

Fear of communism lay behind the startling spirit of unity which molded the Act of Chapultepec. The Latin Americans now saw that Russia might well dominate the United Nations, and they proposed to erect an American structure so firm that the United Nations would never need to intervene in the New World. In the coming San Francisco conference there was to be a determined effort to uphold the United States and even to force it to exercise positive leadership. Latin-American conservatives and reactionaries made no secret of their hostility toward the democratic ideals of the United States, but they preferred them to the atheism and robotism of Russia. It is clear that the Act of Chapultepec marked the final awakening of the American nations to the need for solidarity.

Significance of the Act of Chapultepec

3 *The American Approach to War*

The Nazi conquest of Poland (Sept. 1939) was accomplished in three weeks of blitzkrieg (lightning war) aided by the Russian entry on the east to grab its share of the spoils. The winter passed in comparative calm while Hitler prepared a new army to deal with Britain and France. In April 1940 a second blitzkrieg began. Denmark, Norway, Holland, and Belgium were overrun, and by the end of June the Allied armies in France had been cut to pieces by Hitler's racing panzers. Germany retained control of northern and western France and turned the rest over to a puppet régime set up at Vichy under the aged and timorous Marshal Pétain. In June Mussolini had entered the war, and presently he opened campaigns against Greece and against the British in North Africa.

The blitzkriegs

Meanwhile a British and French remnant had escaped across the Channel from Dunkerque. London became the seat of several refugee governments, including that of the Free French headed by General De Gaulle.

Battle of Britain, Aug.-Nov., 1940 Under the remarkable leadership of Winston Churchill the British Empire girded itself to battle alone. Hitler did not undertake to invade the island, but instead sent his air armadas on massive raids. As a result, in three months of the Battle of Britain, the British Spitfire fighters destroyed the cream of the German pilots, a loss from which Hitler's Luftwaffe never recovered.

Even before the end of the Battle of Britain, Hitler had decided to attack the British lion from another direction, and at the same time assure his more fundamental object of controlling Europe. In September Germany, Italy, and Japan had signed a Tripartite Pact which recognized that Europe and Africa belonged to the first two and East Asia to the last. Hitler immediately sought to fit Russia into the pact. Stalin apparently was agreeable to Axis expansion in Africa but objected to Germany's demand for control of the Balkans, even though sweetened by approval of Russian expansion toward India. By December 1940 Hitler had revived his original plan to crush Russia and seize the Ukraine and the Caucasus with their wheat and oil. He planned to make this a part of a gigantic pincers' movement. The northern prong would envelop and capture or destroy the Russian armies and hold the




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The new allies Hitler and Stalin hold rendezvous over the carcass of Poland.

centers of production, running from Leningrad through Moscow to Stalin-grad, while the panzers moved across the Caucasus and into Persia. Meanwhile the southern prong was to move through North Africa and conquer Egypt and Syria; on this movement, however, Hitler seems to have blown hot and cold.

What was to come next may not have been definitely planned, but it is obvious that the German armies could have moved on to form one jaw of a gigantic nutcracker which would close on India. The other jaw, of



course, would be Japan. We know now that as early as October 1940 the Japanese generals and admirals had resolved to move into southeast Asia regardless of the attitude of the United States, though they were apparently willing to by-pass the Philippines for the nonce if the United States did not prove hostile. If necessary, a sharp blow would be struck at Pearl Harbor to cripple the American fleet.

Japanese plans

Hitler's war against Russia was delayed by the necessity of bailing out Mussolini's craven legions in Greece and of overrunning Yugoslavia and the other Balkan States in the process. In May 1941 Hitler's paratroopers were in Crete, and Rommel's *Afrika Korps* was well along with its African adventure. The British forces, hopelessly weakened by their losses in Greece, yet played seesaw with Rommel until in July 1942 the exhausted combatants came to rest at El Alamein, sixty miles from Alexandria.

The war spreads

Hitler's invasion of Russia opened on 22 June 1941, and at first his panzers engulfed the Russian armies according to plan. But newly-trained armies and new tank divisions confronted him, and an unusually early winter turned the war into a white hell. Hitler's generals had warned him that Russia's mud, its winters, and its vast spaces would make supply a major problem and might well swallow any panzer army that dared to invade it. Even as it was, the Germans reached the line between Leningrad and Moscow though they were unable to take either city. The Ukraine fell, and late in 1942 the armies locked at Stalingrad on the Volga, key to the Caucasus.

In treating what happened in Europe and Africa we have necessarily overrun the course of events in the United States. From the first it had been evident that Roosevelt intended to adopt a policy of defense through aid to the Allies. Congress was asked to repeal the arms embargo, but in return the President was willing to insist that purchasers must pay cash and take delivery in American ports, and he offered to establish danger zones near the warring countries which American ships were to be forbidden to enter. It seems likely that at

Problems of
neutrality



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Very well, alone.

Low's portrayal of Britain's determination to carry on despite the fall of France struck a responsive chord in Americans.

this time FDR really believed that American entry would not be necessary for Allied victory. The public and Congressional debate was waged bitterly for six weeks, but finally, early in November 1939, the compromise was approved and Roosevelt promptly proclaimed a danger zone which extended from the Spanish border of France on the Bay of Biscay northward around the British Isles.

As before 1917, most American difficulties were with the Allies. Britain revived the tactics of World War I, and the United States protested and reserved its rights. At the beginning of the April blitzkrieg, FDR extended the danger zone northward, and when Italy entered the war he added the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.

The collapse of France affected many Americans like a bucket of cold water poured over a daydreamer. They suddenly realized that only British warships and Spitfires stood between them and a Europe dominated by

totalitarianism. For the first time they were shocked into an awareness that the British Navy had long been our first line of defense, and that it (rather than American power) had been the historic bulwark of the Monroe Doctrine. Panzers, dive bombers, and paratroopers made it poignantly clear that our methods of defense were outmoded. Roosevelt went before Congress to ask for large arms appropriations, for construction of capacity to build 50,000 airplanes a year, and for immediate expansion of all the armed services. These requests were increased as the events of the summer unfolded, and by October Congress had appropriated \$17.7 billion. Industry slowly and reluctantly had begun to convert to war manufactures.

**Effect of
the French
collapse**

The appropriations had been supported by storm-cellar isolationists, who wished to abandon Europe to its fate and concentrate on hemisphere defense. They were not as cordial in support of the Burke-Wadsworth Bill, introduced in June, which proposed to man the guns by the first peacetime selective service act in American history. Nevertheless, in September Congress authorized the drafting of 900,000 men between 21 and 36 to serve for one year. Meanwhile Roosevelt had in June moved to consolidate national support by bringing into the Cabinet two Republicans, both active interventionists. They were Henry L. Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank Knox as Secretary of the Navy. Both were promptly read out of their party by its dominant leaders.

**Peacetime
draft act**

Meanwhile the Treasury froze the assets of the nations conquered in the blitzkrieg in an attempt to hamper Nazi activities, and Roosevelt turned "surplus" arms and "over-age" planes over to private parties to be forwarded to Britain. Particularly evident was the drawing together of the United States and Canada. As in August 1940, Roosevelt and Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King set up a Permanent Joint Board of Defense to prepare plans for mutual defense, Roosevelt and Churchill opened a personal correspondence which almost took the place of diplomatic exchanges and was to prove to be a vital factor in the war.

**Accelerated
aid to
Britain**

One of the first fruits of this correspondence was the announcement made on 3 September 1940 that the U.S. had agreed to trade fifty "over-age" destroyers to the British for ninety-nine-year leases for a string of sites on British possessions which could quickly be turned into an advanced screen of naval and air bases for defense of the Americas. After the bargain had been struck, Roosevelt *informed* Congress of an accomplished fact. While in the light of Britain's perilous position there was considerable relief at the acquisition of the bases, there was nevertheless a widespread feeling that the deal was only the latest of a series of executive actions which had effectively destroyed any technical American claim to be neutral.

**The de-
stroyer-
bases deal**

In the great debate that followed upon the fall of France, the majority in the East and South favored aid to Britain and increasingly leaned toward armed intervention. The Midwest and West hesitantly approved the

The great debate of 1940-41 first and decisively opposed the second. Active in the debate were about 700 organizations, most of them intended to promote some aspect of isolationism. Most important of the latter was the America First Committee, centered in Chicago, the great focus of isolationism. In its top ranks America First was dominated by



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Samuel! You're not going to another lodge meeting!

At least until 1940 the American people were clearly opposed to any more ventures into foreign entanglements.

several diverse elements, whose first hate was Roosevelt and who were ready to take Hitler in order to see Stalin defeated; the two were then at peace, but America First was rightly confident of an eventual break. America First was probably not intended to be actively pro-German, but it was an obvious instrumentality for all those who opposed entry into the war or

aid to Britain. Fascists contributed to its finances and zealously distributed its propaganda, and communists (obligated to Stalin's pro-German party line) were just as ardent in its support.

On the other side of the fence was the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies. Organized in April 1940 by William Allen White, it advocated aid but not war. It included both idealists of the Wilson type and hardheaded realists who felt that American freedom must eventually be submerged if totalitarianism took over Europe and probably Asia. Its line, however, was not strong enough for some; therefore in April 1941 the Fight for Freedom Committee was organized to urge the view that we were actually in war so we might as well make it official; it was soon followed by an explicit declaration of the CDAAA in favor of war.

The early stage of the great debate occurred just as the presidential campaign of 1940 was getting under way. Since Roosevelt had apparently decided to seek a third term, the Republicans felt that they would receive the support of millions of devotees of the two-term tradition. The New Deal had plainly lost its dynamism, and the logic of politics called for a Republican return to "clean up the mess." Moreover, public-opinion polls showed that Americans then stood two to one against helping Britain at the risk of war. Since this was plainly what Roosevelt was doing, sound political strategy demanded that the Republican Party espouse isolation. The principal contestants for the nomination were isolationist or at least leaned in that direction, but after the first few convention ballots they were swept aside by a political tyro.

**Republican
hopes in
1940**

Wendell Lewis Willkie was the son of parents who were both lawyers in Elwood, Indiana, and grandson of four Germans who had all been driven from their country by the troubles of 1848. He was a fine figure of a man with black hair, broad face, and magnetic personality. From his youth he had taken such a vigorous and unorthodox interest in the world around him that even as a student he gained a reputation as a campus radical. Nevertheless, his practice as a corporation lawyer led him to New York, where he became president of Commonwealth and Southern, the holding corporation for vast Southern power interests. In this position he fought and lost an epic battle with TVA for control of the Tennessee Power Company.

**Wendell
Willkie
(1892–
1944)**


Meanwhile he had been writing, lecturing, and speaking on the radio, striking hard at the New Deal's acceptance of the mature-economy theory and its reliance on permanent pump-priming. His admirers lost no time in spreading the good word to the waiting Republicans that a new Abraham Lincoln was looming over the horizon. The detail that he had been a Democrat until recently was played down, while his internationalism was a godsend to those Republicans who distrusted their isolationist leaders. When Hugh Johnson suggested him for

**Boom and
nomination**

the presidency, Willkie promptly replied that he might be forced to take the job if the New Deal kept on taking his business away. Without once letting its disguise of amateurism slip, there now got under way one of the slickest professionally directed preconvention presidential booms in history. The Old Guard, always suspicious of anyone it feels it cannot manage, was appalled, but on the sixth ballot the Philadelphia convention broke to its new Lincoln. Senator Charles L. McNary (1874–1944) of Oregon was nominated for the vice-presidency.

Roosevelt did not permit it to become certainly known that he would accept the nomination until the opening of the Democratic convention in Chicago on 17 July. Farley and Garner had seen which way the wind lay and formed a cabal to block a third term, but Roosevelt was easily nominated on the first ballot. Garner, of course, was out, and the vice-presidential nomination was given to Henry Wallace despite the bitter opposition of many of the delegates.

Roosevelt's campaign was conducted with the old masterly touch. Ostentatiously he toured defense installations, plugged for preparedness,




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"Democracy is just a big fake," says Hitler when both Roosevelt and Willkie endorse aid to Britain.

recounted the triumphs of the New Deal, and ridiculed Willkie as the creature of the Old Guard, Wall Street, and isolationism. Roosevelt had defended every new aid to Britain as a means of staying out of war. When he was now accused of consciously moving toward war, he told mothers and fathers: "Your boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars."

Campaign
of 1940

A liberal by background and perhaps conviction, Willkie was in the



ELECTION OF 1940

531 ELECTORAL VOTES
 ROOSEVELT—Democrat: 449 electoral, 27,242,000 popular votes
 McNAMARA—Republican: 82 electoral, 22,327,000 popular votes

J. W. CLEMENT CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.

embarrassing position of “agreeing with Roosevelt’s entire program and feeling that it was leading to disaster.” He favored aid to Britain—and staying out of war. He also assured mothers and fathers that he would enter no foreign wars. However, when public-opinion polls continued to show that he was trailing, he finally cast consistency to the winds and launched into unbridled denunciations of the New Deal and prophecies of the doom of democracy.


The results of the election were by no means close despite the unprecedented size of the popular vote. Roosevelt took 449 electoral votes and 27.2 million popular votes, while McNamara carried ten states with 82 electoral votes and 22.3 million popular votes. The Senate stood 66 to 28, a slight Democratic loss, and the House 268 to 162, a slight Democratic gain. Whatever else it meant, the election of 1940 constituted no plebiscite on war and peace, for both candidates were equally in favor of strong measures against the Axis.

**Election
of 1940**

Roosevelt now assumed that he had received a mandate to aid Britain, and he proposed to make the United States the “arsenal of democracy.” In his annual message to Congress of 6 January 1941 he stated as the object of the world struggle the survival and continued spread of the Four Freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear. In this message

**Lend-Lease
Act, March
1941**

he also asked for Lend-Lease to Britain and its struggling little allies as a measure to defend the United States. Loans of money were politically and economically impossible, but he proposed to loan "defense articles" which could at least in part eventually be returned. The act would clearly strip away the last shreds of pretense that the United States was neutral and



might even lead to the end of nonbelligerence. Isolationists fell upon the proposal with vicious glee, but it was rammed through and an initial appropriation of \$7 billion was made.

The German irruptions of 1941 into the Balkans and across North Africa led to renewed doubts of British ability to win and to a series of precautionary acts. Axis ships in American ports were seized. German consulates and information agencies were closed. A black list of Axis persons and firms was published, and Americans were forbidden to deal with them. The danger-zone sign was lifted from the Red Sea so that American ships could carry matériel to Egypt. Arrangements were made to occupy Greenland, Iceland, and the Dutch colonies in the Caribbean. The Vichy-dominated French West Indies were forced by an embargo on foodstuffs to stop favoring the German "tourists,"

who might have turned out to be submarine repairmen. However, when De Gaulle seized St. Pierre and Miquelon in the Gulf of St. Lawrence, Washington forced him to return them to Vichy; it was that important to keep Pétain from increasing his co-operation with Hitler. Hitler's invasion of Russia brought several astonishing reversals of conduct. One was that American communists suddenly became antifascist and plunged zealously into aid to Russia and Britain. Already, 27 May 1941, Roosevelt had proclaimed a state of unlimited national emergency.

Roosevelt was resolved that *when* the war began he would not be caught flat-footed without any plans, as Wilson had been in 1917. As early as August 1940 American and British staff officers began conversations on grand strategy. They planned on a two-ocean war, against both Japan and the Axis, and definitely agreed to treat Europe as the decisive theater of war—though the navy tended to be Pacific-minded. It was during this period of approach to war that Harry Hopkins, though he was ill much of the time, came into prominence as Roosevelt's expediter and personal representative. He made his first trip to London in January 1941 to lay the basis for co-operation. Later he went to Moscow to urge the seemingly reluctant Stalin to accept Lend-Lease aid; probably Stalin was simply forefending any necessity of giving guarantees of good conduct in return.

A further step in planning was clearly undertaken when from 10 to 12 August 1941 Roosevelt and Churchill met in Argentia Bay, Newfoundland, one of the new American bases, and discussed many common problems. Out of this meeting there emerged the so-called Atlantic Charter, largely written by Sumner Welles. It had eight points, which, since they were not very precise, cannot be violated in their spirit by summarization. (1) No territorial or other aggrandizement. (2) Territorial changes only in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants. (3) The right of peoples to choose their form of government. (4) Equal access to trade and raw materials, with due respect for existing obligations. (5) Collaboration among nations for economic improvement. (6) Peace for all nations, and freedom from fear and want. (7) Freedom of the seas. (8) Disarmament of aggressors. This declaration was the harbinger of the United Nations and seemed to crystallize the objectives of the democratic belligerents in the war.

In the previous May Germany's U-boat campaign had begun to affect Americans despite the danger-zone policy when in quick succession two American ships were sunk in the South Atlantic and the North Atlantic. It seems likely that the above sinkings were the German answer to Lend-Lease; certainly the Axis regarded Lend-Lease as putting America in the war. There was as yet no Congressional authority to convoy cargo ships carrying Lend-Lease goods,

Anglo-American
planning

The
Atlantic
Charter

The sink-
ings begin

but about the first of July Roosevelt instituted naval patrols which extended to Iceland, where the British took over the task.

On 4 September the destroyer *Greer* dogged the path of a U-boat and reported its position to the British; when the sub turned and fired two torpedoes (which missed), the *Greer* dropped depth charges. The navy misreported the encounter as wanton aggression upon a U.S. destroyer which was innocently minding its own business. FDR now seized the opportunity to order destroyers to strike first at the "rattlesnakes of the Atlantic" and asked Congress to repeal the danger-zone act and authorize the arming of merchant ships. On 17 October the destroyer *Kearny* was damaged by a sub with the loss of eleven seamen, and on the 30th the *Reuben James* went down with the loss of about 100. Congress promptly acquiesced in the President's requests. The United States was now engaged in a naval war; only one more step remained.

The war in Europe had given Japan the coveted opportunity to accelerate its Asian policy. Already in 1938 it had severely defeated the forces of Chiang Kai-shek and pushed him far up the Yangtse to Chungking, where he held on by aid of a dribble of supplies sent over the Burma Road and through Indo-China. However, Japan's control was largely confined to the cities, rivers, and railway lines, and its troops were never free of a plague of guerrillas. The United States was in a dilemma in dealing with the Far East. It could neither agree to nor ignore the situation. Public indignation mounted over the confiscation of American property and even more over the Japanese method of retaliating upon the "superior" race by slapping white people around and stripping them and exposing them to ridicule. Probably on account of their traditional approval of the Open Door, isolationists were more in favor of a strong policy toward Japan than toward Germany.

Yet public opinion would probably not have approved of war; in any case, the army and the navy were not ready. The administration was therefore reduced to making loans and forwarding war matériel to Nationalist China and to showing its displeasure by denouncing the trade treaty with Japan. On the other hand, it could not afford to take the initiative by cutting off Japanese purchases of such things as scrap iron and aviation gasoline lest the Nipponese decide there was no alternative to war and so begin their threatened movement into the Philippines.

Japan's dilemma was even more fatal. The launching of war against the democracies was bitterly opposed by Japanese moderates. They more nearly understood the strength and staying powers of the English-speaking nations than did the armed services, especially the army. The China venture had bogged down, with the result that discontent was growing at home and that Japan was becoming unpopular among other Asiatics. The truth was that Japan was trembling

on the verge of economic ruin, with resources strained and people undernourished, overwrought, and nervously exhausted. Against it were the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand with strategic positions, enormous natural and productive resources, and populations half again as large as that of Japan and still relatively fresh and vigorous. The leaders of the armed services knew also that their situation was desperate, but they felt that Japan must strike then for empire or resign itself to a position as a third-rate power.

Some militarists bore an exalted contempt for the United States as so completely materialistic that its people would not fight; they confidently expected the American Navy to make a few token forays and then retire while the government undertook negotiations which would leave Japan ascendant in Asia and with the rich resources of the East Indies at its disposal. This absurd assessment was due to desperation, wishful thinking, Japanese racial arrogance, and to a complete misunderstanding of the Anglo-Saxon mentality, which makes us bear considerable pushing around before we suddenly make a stand, perhaps on some relatively unimportant issue. Even those Japanese militarists who knew better than the extremists thought the gamble of war worth taking. They hoped by striking at Pearl Harbor to gain time to entrench themselves in the coveted "southern resources area" so firmly that no power could dislodge them. They could then ameliorate the living conditions of the Japanese civilian population and prepare for the next step, possibly seizure of Eastern Siberia.

During 1940 the moderate Konoye Cabinet was in office in Japan, but it was under pressure from a hungry populace and from the militarists who traditionally had ruled Japan and whose secret societies now threatened with assassination anyone who departed from their favored policies. It was under these pressures that Konoye forced Vichy France to permit occupation of northern Indo-China, signed the ominous Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, and made a neutrality pact with Russia. The United States served a warning by stopping exports of scrap iron and steel except to Britain and the Western Hemisphere. Konoye's attempts to melt the American obstacle were so unsuccessful that by the beginning of 1941 the militarists were pressing for his overthrow and the use of direct action against the United States.

Hull was no help to the moderate Konoye. He even refused in April 1941 to consider a compromise which would have interpreted away the anti-American features of the Tripartite Pact in exchange for giving to Japan much the same political and economic position in China that Britain had long exercised in the Yangtse Valley without American protest. It was about as practical as any plan could be under the circumstances; at least it offered a chance of put-

**Militarists
misjudge
the U.S.**

**Japan's
continued
encroach-
ments**

**Hull en-
sures a
showdown**

ting off the Far Eastern crisis until after the European war. With the attitude of the United States made clear, the Japanese in July 1941 decided to risk a further move into southern Indo-China. Konoye seems to have hoped that the move would wake Hull from his trance and lead to a compromise. Instead, Roosevelt retaliated by freezing Japanese assets. Trade was practically at a standstill.

Hay's original bluff over the Open Door which had been continued by his successors for forty years had now reached a showdown. Prince Konoye made a last desperate play for peace and asked for a personal meeting with Roosevelt. Hull, however, convinced Roosevelt that the outline of any agreement must be settled first, then proceeded to state four impossible points, which were really a repetition of the Open Door and the Stimson Doctrine. Yet Konoye was so desperate that he actually told Ambassador Grew in Tokyo that he would accept them in principle, using them as the basis for talks which would include consideration of the program submitted the previous April. Moreover, he gave assurance of army and navy agreement, and of good faith in carrying them out.



But Hull would have nothing less than an abject surrender, and when this fact became clear in Tokyo the Konoye Cabinet was displaced (in October) by one headed by the rabidly militant General Tojo. He also would have nothing less than an abject surrender, but he was aware of the uncertainties of warfare and he resolved to give Hull one more chance to back down. Even while an aircraft-carrier expedition against Pearl Harbor was being prepared he dispatched a special envoy, Saburo Kurusu, to Washington to aid Ambassador Nomura. When the final conversations were opened in Washington in November 1941, Hull restated his demands; the Japanese offered to withdraw from southern Indo-China if the United States would abandon its economic sanctions. Hull insisted on withdrawal of Japanese troops from Indo-China and China, support of Chiang Kai-shek, and a treaty promising to make no more aggressions. In return the United States would remove its sanctions. This was the breaking point, and on 1 December Japan rejected the demands and labeled them fantastic.

Admiral Nagumo's striking force of six carriers had been steaming eastward under the screen of local Pacific rain squalls, and at 6:00 A.M. of 7 December was about 300 miles north of Oahu. It is a curious comment on the relaxed situation in the military forces that several occurrences should have stirred an alarm but did not. At 7:50 the Japanese planes roared out of the cloud banks over Oahu and scattered to their appointed tasks. The ships at anchor in Pearl Harbor—almost 100 in number—were attacked along with the planes sitting on the airfields. Only a few planes got aloft and managed to shoot down half a dozen of the enemy. Of course the first wave of attack sent all

personnel to battle stations, and they manned their guns gallantly. Nevertheless, of 351 Japanese planes only 27 failed to return safely to their carriers. The American loss, largely in navy personnel, is not accurately known but was around 2400 killed and 1200 wounded. Four battleships and three destroyers were sunk, and many other craft were heavily damaged. Three of the battleships were raised, but one of them was unserviceable and sank after the war while being towed to the West Coast.

Pearl Harbor was up to that time the most disastrous defeat in American history. The intention of the Japanese was to immobilize the American fleet while they put their main punch into the Philippines, the Malay Peninsula, and the Dutch East Indies. As it was, they made several serious blunders. The planes destroyed on Oahu were obsolescent and so were no great loss. The fleet carriers happened to be at sea, so escaped unscathed. At Pearl Harbor the Jap planes went after battleships, a serious error since battleships were to be of only secondary importance. In their concentration on ships, the Japanese left relatively unharmed the machine shops and fuel-storage facilities which, if destroyed, would have made Pearl Harbor untenable as a base and would have forced the fleet back to the continent. Lastly, they failed to occupy Midway Island.

Jap mistakes at Pearl Harbor



Pearl Harbor was not the full measure of the American disaster. *Nine hours after Pearl Harbor*, though word of the beginning of war had been received, Japanese planes from Formosa caught the Philippines air-defenses craft on the ground at Clark and Nichols Fields, and Far Eastern disasters riddled them. Japanese landings followed quickly, and the defenders were forced to retreat to Bataan and Corregidor. Meanwhile the Japanese were spreading swiftly and engulfing Hong Kong, Singapore, the Dutch East Indies, and the Solomon Islands. We shall return eventually to a more detailed examination of the Pacific war.

Public shock over the disaster of Pearl Harbor was so great that investigations had to be undertaken. The first, made early in 1942 by Justice Roberts, blamed the local commanders—General Walter C. Short and Admiral Husband E. Kimmel—who, of course, had already been removed from their commands and were soon retired, with the public given the impression that they were awaiting court-martial for neglect of duty. The next, in 1945, was the army and navy official report which again blamed Short and Kimmel. In the same year Congress launched into yet a third investigation. As might have been expected, the committee split on partisan lines, and there the matter rests.

These investigations brought out a number of curious facts. For one thing, Grew had long since passed on from Tokyo a rumor of a coming surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Washington cryptologists had cracked the Japanese secret code and were therefore able to follow every diplomatic move in advance. Even though it was evident that war was just over the horizon, the warnings sent to American outposts in the Pacific were subject to various interpretations. The accusation is made that the deliberate intention was to lay the blame for war on Japan by permitting her to attack. It would seem that Washington expected the first attack to fall in the Orient, probably on the Philippines, not Pearl Harbor. In any event, it is strange that Short and Kimmel were never brought to trial by courts-martial, and there is a deepening conviction that to have done so would have made disclosures which would have disintegrated public confidence in the political and military leaders who now had the onerous task of directing a war.

Pearl Harbor solved the administration's basic problem of casting the moral responsibility for war on the enemy and thus uniting the American people in resistance. On Monday, 8 December, Roosevelt's request that The U.S. Congress declare that "a state of war has existed" since "the 'accepts' unprovoked and dastardly attack" was promptly approved war by the Senate 82 to 0 and by the House 388 to 1; the single dissident was Jeanette Rankin of Montana, who also had voted against entry into World War I. On the same day Britain also declared war against

Japan. On the 11th Germany and Italy declared war against the United States, and Congress accepted war without a dissenting vote, Miss Rankin abstaining. Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania entered the war on the 12th, but the United States waited until June to notice their acts. When Thailand went over to the Japanese, its action led to a declaration of war on 26 January 1942.

The great debate of 1940–41 hinged upon three points: loyalty or antipathy for Roosevelt, the wisdom of his foreign policies, and the deceitfulness of those policies. The first, however influential it may have been, is scarcely open to assessment. The second boils down to this: could the United States continue alone to preserve its free political and economic institutions in a world which had become totalitarian? Whether or not Germany and Japan actually planned attacks on the United States was regarded by Roosevelt and Hull as beside the point. They were proved aggressors, and the world was now too small to permit aggression to go unpunished and unresisted. Roosevelt believed that the American way was in dire peril, for he had no faith that Germany and Japan could be trusted to settle into the accepted international pattern of give-and-take. Another aspect of his problem was whether to risk a communist Eurasia later, or to let Germany beat Russia and then risk the menace of a monolithic Nazi Eurasia. In a very real sense the decision was up to Roosevelt, for he was in an excellent position to force Britain to make a negotiated peace.

Problem of the wisdom of entry into war

As Roosevelt took each step toward war on the Atlantic front, he announced that this would be enough, that it would assure British victory. Those who say that he was honestly intending to prevent the necessity of entering the war (at least after the fall of France) must portray him as naïve enough to believe his own propaganda. This is so absurd that most of his apologists have quite frankly excused his tactics as necessary to bring a stupid nation to the point where it would be able and willing to fight the necessary battle for survival.

Accusation that FDR used deceit

Nevertheless, the accusation that Roosevelt deceived the American people into war is in itself a deception. *He did not deceive any considerable number of people who did not wish to be deceived.* It may be that his reassurances were aimed at the mothers of sons of military age, many of whom are emotionally predisposed to accept any alternative to war, even a surrender which will lead to the loss of freedom. On the other hand, he certainly did not deceive the isolationists, for they knew and loudly proclaimed that he was heading for war. No more did he deceive the interventionists, who were ready and willing to enter the war.

A public-opinion poll as early as September 1940 showed a slight majority in favor of aiding Britain at the risk of war, and by January the

majority had become two to one. Also in September 1940 a poll showed that over half of those expressing an opinion were ready to risk war with Japan rather than permit it to become more powerful. Despite the fact that a poll of October 1941 showed that 80 per cent of the people desired to stay out of war, the inescapable conclusion from the polls and from the actions of Congress is that the American people knew that they were taking risks and approved the taking of them—and this despite the louder vocalization of the isolationists.

Nevertheless there was this point which was to become increasingly plain as 1941 advanced. It is an article of the American mythus (not based on truth) that we cannot enter war unless the enemy first performs an overt act of aggression. The American people knew very well that they were heading *toward* war, but it is highly probable that they would have delayed the plunge until it was too late, had Japan not obliged by bombing Pearl Harbor. As Robert Sherwood admits in *Roosevelt and Hopkins*, Roosevelt had gone as far toward war as he dared; he could take no further steps until Japan furnished final provocation.

Roosevelt felt that the United States (like Britain and France in 1939) had to take a stand or allow the method of aggression to triumph. The logical place to make the stand was in our relations with Japan, not only because it was rushing into the Far Eastern power vacuum but because American isolationists would more clearly approve a stand in that direction. But did Roosevelt *want* war with Japan? Even the question seems absurd. What he wanted was that Japan stop its aggression. If he wanted a war, he wanted it with Hitler, and obviously a simultaneous war with Japan would increase the risk of Allied defeat. Still, the chance of war with Japan had to be taken, for in the time necessary to defeat Hitler the Nipponese, if left unhampered, might have riveted a tight hold on the Far East. Roosevelt and Hull therefore left it up to Japan to stop its aggression or choose war. It chose war.

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Chamberlin take a strongly critical position, while Rauch wrote expressly to controvert Beard and is concerned with white-washing his hero. Feis is about as dispassionate a study of the Pacific approach as we can expect. William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940* (1952) will be followed by another book extending the account to Pearl Harbor.

PEARL HARBOR: The above critiques of Roosevelt's policy bear heavily on the problem of why Pearl Harbor was left open to attack. To them should be added Walter Millis, *This Is Pearl!* (1947), which makes FDR pure as the driven snow; and George E. Morgenstern, *Pearl Harbor* (1947), which presents him as a sooty villain. See also U.S. Congress, Joint Commission, *Report . . . of the Pearl Harbor Attack* (1946). Kazuo Sakamaki, *I Attacked Pearl Harbor* (1949) is an account by a Japanese airman.

AXIS AND JAPANESE PLANS: See the above critiques and also George C. Marshall, *Report—The Winning of the War in Europe and the Pacific* (1945); Peter Mendelssohn, *Nuremberg Documents* (1946); Raymond J. Sontag and James S. Beddie, eds., *Nazi-Soviet Relations: 1939-1941* (1948); Far Eastern Military Tribunal, *Proceedings*.

Chapter L

WORLD WAR II: PRODUCTION AND BATTLE

1 *The Arsenal of Democracy*

THE disastrous defeat at Pearl Harbor united almost all elements of the American people in a common acceptance of the war. Thenceforth arguments were over policy and strategy. Nevertheless, Americans had just emerged from twenty years of political and economic disillusionment, and the effect was seen in the relative absence of the crusading spirit of 1917-18. Actually, not even the internationalists had *wanted* war even though they had advocated it as the wisest course. The President and other propagandists tried to sell the war as the "War for Survival," yet the nation remained for the most part glumly unconvinced. A war made necessary because we had allowed aggression to get out of hand, yes; but a war for survival in any immediate sense, no. It is safe to say that a war against Russia would have been far more popular than a war against Germany. Moreover, among combat men in all theaters there was a greater vindictiveness toward the Japanese than toward the Germans.

A necessary
but un-
wanted war

World War I had been a singing war; this one was grim and practical. World War I barely permitted American productive machinery to get into stride; this one lasted three years and eight months in addition to pre-Pearl Harbor preparations, a total of about five years. Civilian shortages in World War I had been minor; in this one there was rationing, though as it turned out no actual civilian needs went unfilled. World War I had seen a total of only 5 million men in the armed forces; in this war about 15 million men and women wore the uniform at one time or another.

Contrasts
with World
War I

And yet in looking back it is clear that the United States never approached the maximum effort of which it was capable. It is true that men and women volunteered to work on draft and rationing boards and spent their leisure in service organizations and their nights on civil patrol duty. They gave their blood to the Red Cross blood banks. They organized car pools or trudged to work on foot. Housewives left their kitchens and went into factories. Many laborers worked overtime uncomplainingly, and professional men and women doubled their duties in order to carry the loads of associates who were in service. Many a civilian broke under the burden or even dropped dead—as much a war casualty as anyone hit by enemy fire. Still, there was another side. Money was plentiful; and the trade in luxury goods boomed, and places of amusement did a land-office business. Some men moved from job to job to get high wages, regardless of where they were needed most. Some manufacturers profiteered by lowering quality or refusing to make goods whose price was controlled. Black markets in meat, gasoline, and other scarce articles abounded. Strikes and absenteeism were far too common.

Witch-hunting was not as widespread as during World War I, partly due to the way in which Reds and most socialists supported the war, partly to the administration's disinclination to engage in petty persecution. There were some actions undertaken against fascist leaders and periodicals, and the FBI kept a sharp eye on spies and saboteurs. The most tragic exception to the prevailing self-restraint of the war period was the evacuation of 112,000 Japanese and Japanese-Americans from the West Coast. The House Special Committee to Investigate un-American Activities had been set up in 1938, and it is probable that it ran down some subversive activities which needed airing.

Russia did not lack for apologists—nay, eulogists. Such people, honestly troubled by the social and economic problems of the depression, were bemused by Russian planning and denied the plain evidences that the Soviet government was merely a more brutal variation of the same totalitarianism as fascism. It was “smart” to join any of scores of “Popular Front” organizations which actually were thinly disguised communist cats’-paws. Communists and fellow-travelers were able to infiltrate the government, especially the key Office of War Information, Office of Strategic Services, and State Department. Secret documents were filched and published or forwarded to Russia. Bellwether of the Russian apologists was Henry Wallace, Vice-President of the United States, who became so fulsomely pro-Russian that the director of the atomic energy project refused to let him see the reports of progress. Willkie should have been in a different emotional class, but when he returned from a flying trip around the world his book *One World* (1943) painted a lovely picture of communism and democracy working together.

The story of American production during World War II is an epic of confusion at the governmental level and of Herculean struggle and success at the managerial and engineering levels. It was evident that conversion of industry to war production would entail a period of un-
 profitable transition and of unemployment. The government, therefore, had to go along with the industrialists' maximum demands. It financed the change-over, built thousands of new factories which the operators were entitled to purchase at a tithe of their value, guaranteed profits even in case of the sudden end of the war, and encouraged concentration by suspending the antitrust laws. Contracts went to Big Business for the obvious reason that it was best fitted to undertake mass production in a hurry.

**Problems
of conver-
sion**

The government was slow in relearning the lessons of World War I, largely because of political pressures in Congress and the President's own reluctance to delegate final authority. Roosevelt made a half-hearted effort to straighten out the mess by creating the Office of Economic Stabilization (OES) to supervise all controls over civilian purchasing power, prices, rents, wages, salaries, profits, rationing, subsidies, and all related matters. As its head he selected James F. Byrnes (b. 1879) of South Carolina, former Senator and at the time a Justice of the Supreme Court. But the organization was still too loose for efficiency, as was persistently demonstrated by the Senate Special Committee Investigating the National Defense Program. This committee, under Senator Harry S. Truman of Missouri, fought the system of independent "czars" (in petroleum, synthetic rubber, etc.) and demanded concentration of authority.

**Byrnes as
"Assistant
President"**

As a result, in May 1943, Roosevelt finally set up the Office of War Mobilization (OWM) under Byrnes as a planning committee for the whole war effort and, more to the point, with effective control over both civilian and military priorities, production, purchasing, and rationing. Byrnes met with success partly because President and Congress trusted him as a calm and affable politician who was famed as a smooth operator; thus he was in a position to exercise authority. But more than this, Congress and public were frightened and were ready to support any policy which would get results. Thus Byrnes became "Assistant President" and during Roosevelt's long absences was in effect Acting President. OWM's small staff performed no operational functions and, indeed, had to borrow experts to prepare its studies and recommendations. Nevertheless, it did a good job of straightening out lines of authority, and where necessary it knocked heads together in its determination to force co-operation.

OWM not only exercised general supervision over the army, navy, and air-force procurement programs but co-ordinated the numerous civilian agencies. OES, now under Judge Fred M. Vinson (b. 1890) of Kentucky,

Other agencies another politically smooth operator, continued to handle certain of its old functions. The War Production Board (WPB) sparked the production effort, especially in mechanical fields. The War Manpower Commission (WMC) handled labor priorities. Housing for war laborers, petroleum, and synthetic rubber were assigned to special offices. The Foreign Economic Administration (FEA) supervised Lend-Lease and allocation of goods to foreign purchasers. The Office of Price Administration (OPA) built up a gigantic staff to handle prices (except in agriculture) and to administer rationing. The very nature of its duties made it and its officers unpopular. It got under way too late to prevent a 27-per-cent rise in the cost of living, but with the aid of rent and other controls it held the line after May 1943.

The rise in the cost of living previous to FDR's Hold-the-Line Order of May 1943 brought on a rash of jurisdictional and management-labor disputes and of wildcat strikes which smashed the National War Labor Board's (NWLB) wage policy (the Little Steel Formula). **Labor and the war** Congress feared that chaos might follow, so in June 1943 it passed the Smith-Connally War Labor Disputes Act over Roosevelt's veto and the bitter opposition of labor. Whether the act helped is disputed; at any rate, there was considerable labor trouble, and coal miners and railroaders proved so intransigent that the government had to seize mines and railroads. On the whole, the NWLB used its power so generously in favor of labor that at no time during the war was production seriously endangered by strikes, with the possible exception of the coal troubles. One advantage labor had was that it was paid overtime rates for all time worked above forty hours a week.

The War Food Administration (WFA) sought increased production through a system of subsidies which kept farm prices around 110 per cent of "parity." While it is true that this was a drain on the Treasury, it was **Agriculture and the war** regarded as more feasible than allowing runaway prices which would raise costs to both the consumer and the government. Farmers argued that food prices should be allowed to rise freely, but Roosevelt feared that such rise would result in labor trouble and vetoed two bills which would have removed ceilings. The war years saw a succession of bumper crops, and farm income doubled. Even though prices of machinery and other goods had gone up, the war was a period of unprecedented prosperity on the farm. It was also a period of unprecedented hard work under the inevitable labor shortage.

The railroads of the country had not recovered from the depression and actually had fewer employees and less rolling stock than during World War I. Nevertheless under the over-all direction of the Office of Defense **Transportation and the war** Transportation (ODT) they did a far better job than before. The Merchant Marine Act of 1936 had created the U.S. Maritime Commission and given it generous funds to subsidize

private construction and operation of ships and, if necessary, to build and operate on its own account. The beginning of war in Europe forced it to accelerate its program, but now even that was inadequate. The War Shipping Administration (WSA) under Admiral Emory S. Land (b. 1879) took over the commission's ships, took control of privately owned shipping, and in addition built 5425 more cargo ships.

World War I had cost the United States \$32 billion; World War II cost \$350 billion. About one third of the cost of the war was paid out of current income. Taxes, of course, were increased all along the line, and they were supplemented by eight drives for the sale of war bonds which brought in from small investors a total of \$40 billion. The chief reliance, however, was on the banks, which were allowed to create the necessary credit and loan it to the government. Of the cost of the war, about \$50.7 billion were devoted to Lend-Lease, and about \$7.8 billion were furnished by our allies in the form of Reverse Lend-Lease.

**Financing
the war**

Rearmament had been undertaken after a period of depression during which millions of men had lost their skills and more millions had grown up without acquiring any. Not only were machine tools in short supply, but the men had to be trained to make them. There were shortages of steel, aluminum and other metals, and electric power. As it was, production almost doubled, partly because of new war plants (many of them in the hitherto under-developed South), but also because of new techniques and longer hours. Prices of consumer goods went up about 30 per cent, but wages almost doubled—up about 45 per cent in real purchasing power. For about three years half of the American economy was devoted to war. An appalling price was exacted from our soil and from our reserves of timber, coal, ore, and petroleum. Unfortunately, much of the new productive capacity was not suitable for peacetime use, and in any case roads, streets, and railroads were badly worn.

**Economic
changes**

The mere man power used in the armed forces was enormous. Ground and service forces held about 8,300,000; air forces 2,300,000; the navy and its allied coast guard 3,570,000; and the marines 485,000. About 215,000 women were recruited for noncombat jobs, chiefly clerical.*

**Armed-
forces
personnel**

The military draft included men 18 to 44 inclusive. The huge size of the services and the complexity of command problems led to the creation of the five-star ranks of general-of-the-army and fleet admiral, corresponding to field marshal. The job of training personnel and receiving and forwarding matériel required in the continental United States about 1200 bases of all sorts and sizes; many of them had to be built from scratch.

Almost 300,000 men died in battle or from wounds: 225,000 in the army

* The above statistics, though taken from official sources, are probably somewhat inaccurate.

and air force, 50,000 in the navy, 22,000 in the marine corps, and 1000 in the coast guard. In addition about 670,000 were wounded. The loss of

Casualties wounded after treatment at dressing stations was only three per cent, half that of World War I. This saving of life was due to the use of blood plasma and whole blood on the battle field to reduce shock, to the "miracle" drugs penicillin and sulfanilimide, and to the practice of air evacuation to hospitals. Though many of the stations overseas were infested with diseases known and unknown, the nonbattle deaths were kept down to the same rate as that of the civil population at home. A common affliction in combat was "combat fatigue." Psychiatrists made a special study of these cases, and it is estimated that about a third of those treated were able to return to combat duty and at least as many more to other types of duty.

The technical groundwork for the armed forces of World War II was not laid by a process of smooth and intelligent evolution. It is a curious fact that most of the new bases of modern warfare were developed (at least concurrently with other countries) in the United States, but

Opposition to modernizing the services the armed forces refused to adopt them whole-heartedly or did so only after a long struggle. Among these bases we may mention the submarine, the airplane, the dive bomber, the paratroop, the glider, the aircraft carrier, and the caterpillar tractor, which was the basis of modern armored divisions.

The struggle over the adaptation of the airplane to military use as flying cavalry and artillery is, of course, the most famous illustration of the above situation. Army air officers advocated a unified Department of Defense in which Army, Navy, and Air Force should be on a

Rise of U.S. air power parity. Naval air officers, however, were more conversant with their peculiar problems and wanted a naval air arm equipped with aircraft-carrier vessels to provide an air cover for the fighting ships and to strike the enemy as long-distance artillery. Against the stiff opposition of "battleship admirals" they gradually made headway.

The struggle for air power in the army was more dramatic and probably no less bitter. When in 1925 the navy's dirigible *Shenandoah* crashed in a storm in Ohio (thereby putting an end to a promising lighter-than-air program), General William Mitchell charged both the army and the navy commands with deliberately falsifying facts in order to hamper aviation. The result was a court-martial before a court of ground officers which sentenced him to five years' suspension. He promptly resigned in order to free himself to carry on his campaign as a civilian. The officers who testified for Mitchell were sent into military exile, but the case had aroused the interest of Congress and public, and this interest was soon enhanced by Lindbergh's trans-Atlantic flight. In 1926 army aviation was given status as a corps, and a little money was provided for new planes and for experimentation.

The air corps, driven to emphasize every vantage point, became expert at public relations. The romance of flying was emphasized, Hollywood was wheedled into making shamelessly overdramatized versions of air-corps life, and eventually the corps publicized its greatest secret weapon—a bombsight that (it was soberly claimed) would enable a plane to drop a bomb in a pickle-barrel from steen thousand feet. In 1938 Henry H. (“Hap”) Arnold (1887–1950) became Air Chief, and as a man with both drive and political ability brought the corps rapidly to the front. When in 1942 the army was reorganized, the air forces were placed on a practical parity with the ground forces and the service forces.

Air-corps strategists, following both Mitchell and the Italian military writer, Giulio Douhet, regarded the airplane as a prima donna and thought in terms of winning wars with air power. They planned to get “command of the air” and then to destroy the enemy’s war industries by bombing and in the process break the will-to-war of enemy civilians. The role of the ground forces, they asserted, was merely that of holding a front until the foe collapsed, while the navy was chiefly useful in keeping supply lines open. Of course the other services denied that air power could win wars alone. They pointed out that air was in reality a negative weapon, able to destroy but not control, able to hamper but not stop the advance of ground forces; and they objected to its waste and brutality not only for moral reasons but as evidences of an immature reliance on force.

Theory of
air power

There was a lively controversy within the corps over types of planes, operations, and weapons, but with the building of the first experimental B-17 in 1935 it was evident that bombers were winning. This was a defeat for those who insisted that at least equal stress should be laid on fighters which could harass the enemy’s battle front and transport and could cover the bombers bound on distant missions. The time was to come when a heavy penalty had to be paid for the underemphasis on fighters, both because our own front was inadequately protected from enemy air and because our bombers were sadly vulnerable without a cover of fighters.

The Army Ground Forces Command had tested its own weakness in a series of 1940 maneuvers (the first important land war games in American history) and consequently hastened reorganization both of infantry and of armor. Mechanization necessitated the training of millions of technicians in a variety of specialties. Moreover, the infantryman had to become a weapons specialist and to learn to react promptly and correctly to unexpected situations.

Reorgani-
zation of
ground
forces

The army raised and trained 67 infantry divisions of varying strength (some running as high as 17,500) and 16 armored divisions, five airborne, one mountain, and one cavalry. All but two saw combat, and all went overseas. Among its special units were parachute, ski, jungle, antitank and anti-aircraft troops. The Service Forces, at first known as the Services of

Supply (SOS), were enormously expanded and hundreds of types of specialized units organized. General Brehon B. Somervell (b. 1892) was its chief all during the war.

The navy has traditionally operated in foreign waters and with its marine corps has been the force utilized in all but a few of the 150-odd military operations undertaken abroad by presidential order. Because the navy operated abroad, it early became semi-autonomous. In a sense Mahan only preached the doctrine of expansive power which he learned in the navy. The navy's long awareness of the significance of sea lanes has at times given the impression that it feels it should command all armed forces beyond the sea frontiers of the United States and has tended to obscure its view of itself as part of a team.

At any rate, the navy did the most remarkable job of its career during World War II. It developed numerous special-purpose ships and smaller craft and at the close of the war had well over 100,000 craft on its list. In addition numerous technical specialists were trained, including around 70,000 airplane pilots. Eventually navy and marines had about 22,000 combat aircraft, a number which compares very favorably with the 40,000 combat aircraft in the air force, though of course thousands of the latter were strategic bombers. Here is a comparison of the major categories of naval craft before Pearl Harbor and at the close of the war.*

		<i>Sunk</i>	<i>Built</i>	
	<i>1941</i>	<i>1941-5</i>	<i>1941-5</i>	<i>1945</i>
Battleships	17	2	8	23
Aircraft carriers	7	5	27	28
Escort carriers	—	6	110	70
Cruisers	37	10	48	72
Destroyers	172	71	349	373
Destroyer escorts	—	11	412	365
Submarines	113	52	203	240

The U.S. Marine Corps, though an integral part of the navy, has always had the mission of landing on hostile shores. It was therefore only natural that it should long have been interested in the technique of amphibious landings. The marines had a shrewd suspicion that some day there would be war against Japan among the Pacific islands, so despite opposition in army and navy and despite Congressional parsimony they geared their research, planning, and training to amphibious warfare. As a result they emerged with a striking force designed for short, sharp actions, especially for assaulting beachheads and then

* These figures, though based on King's reports, are not guaranteed. The discrepancies are explained (among other things) by Lend-Lease construction, withdrawals, and changes in category.

spreading into the jungle for a short distance. Their aviation, composed of fighters and dive bombers, was trained to support the ground advance by delivering accurate attacks within as little as fifty yards of their own front lines.

In no previous war had the contestants drawn so largely upon scientific knowledge. The Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), under Vannevar Bush (b. 1890) of the Carnegie Institution, was established in May 1941 and was in general charge of the scientific program and let out special projects to university and corporation laboratories. One of its major research activities was in medicine. The division most closely concerned with weapons was the National Defense Research Committee (NDRC) under President James B. Conant (b. 1893) of Harvard. There was a great deal of interchange of information among Allied scientists, particularly American and British. The result was the development or adaptation of such things as rockets, incendiaries, jet planes (by the British), infra-red devices, and special vehicles to operate in mud, snow, or amphibiously. Research in electronics led to the development of the proximity fuse, guided missiles, controlled gunfire and air bombing, and to devices which enabled ships and planes to detect approaching raiders and to operate in fog and darkness. Poison gas was not used, but vast stocks were kept on hand in case of need, and Germany developed a nerve gas of unprecedented destructive power. Both sides experimented with bacteria, and on V-J Day a cargo of bacteria was en route to be used against the Japanese rice crop.

**Science
mobilized**

The most terrible single weapon used in the war was the atomic bomb. The theory that matter could be converted into energy—that the atom could be exploded with terrific force—was based upon the formula propounded by the German physicist and mathematician Albert Einstein, in 1905. This was $E = mc^2$; that is, energy equals mass multiplied by the square of the velocity of light. During the years a succession of European and American physicists added the knowledge which by 1939 gave promise that it could be done, especially by the separation of U-235, a form of uranium which became vital to the atomic bomb.

**The men-
ace of
atomic
energy**

Late in 1939 Roosevelt became convinced that victory might depend upon the solution of the problem of atomic fission. Such a project would be enormously expensive and would have to be carried on in secret, but Congress was persuaded to appropriate around \$2 billion for unspecified purposes. Atomic scientists were gathered from the Allied nations, and in 1942 the enterprise was transferred to the Army Engineers under the code name MANHATTAN DISTRICT, with General Leslie R. Groves (b. 1896) in charge. Enormous plants were erected at Oak Ridge, Tennessee and Hanford, Washington, close to the necessary sources of electric power and wa-

ter to provide graphite, U-235, and plutonium. Such an enormous and widely scattered scientific and industrial project could not be hidden from view, and German and Russian spies were continually seeking to penetrate the secret. We may never know just how much information the Russians got, chiefly from naïve scientists who thought it was a shame to hide information from the idealistic communist ally. We do know that the Germans had an atomic-energy project and that it got off on the wrong track. The physicists and engineers were not sure that they could build an atomic bomb with the proper trigger mechanism, but this was accomplished early in July 1945 at the super-secret laboratory at Los Alamos in the New Mexican desert, then in charge of J. Robert Oppenheimer (b. 1904) of the University of California. On 16 July 1945 the first atomic mushroom cloud bloomed near Alamogordo in the New Mexican sky—"the first cry of the new-born world."

2 *The Strategy of the War*

The six months that followed Pearl Harbor saw an almost continuous succession of disasters which effectually concealed from the Allied world the fact that it still held the ace of trumps: American production. If any-

Material basis of Allied victory	thing more was needed to win, it was furnished by American man power. America's part in World War II thus fell into the basic pattern of most of our wars—unlimited supplies and unlimited reinforcements. The method was both legitimate and successful, even though the enemy complained that he was smothered by matériel, not by superior courage or fighting qualities. We excelled in those battles where technical ingenuity was needed, that is, where ships and planes, communications and supplies were key factors.
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But even there we must acknowledge certain weaknesses. The Germans and Japanese, one or both, outclassed us in torpedoes, mines, anti-aircraft artillery, tanks, long-distance missiles, jet aircraft, and certain types of ships, notably battleships and submarines. As it was, the Allies had to play their cards well in order to win. American military production did not get into full swing until 1944, so until then care had to be exercised in its distribution. Errors in intelligence resulted in exaggerated ideas of enemy strength and vitally affected decisions on strategy. Russia never co-operated freely with the West but never hesitated to demand the impossible both in the way of material aid and especially in an immediate invasion of Hitler's Fortress Europe. There was, as we shall see, friction even among the Western Allies. And then, of course, there were the problems of learning how best to utilize the weapons of modern warfare and how best to weld them into a winning land-sea-air team.

Soon after Pearl Harbor, Churchill appeared in Washington for the first of the wartime conferences. The conference approved the basic decision already made that the main punch would be put into the Atlantic front. This decision was followed despite the rather general American opinion (with which the navy agreed) that our strongest blows should be directed against Japan. On the other hand, the Allies could not afford to permit the Japanese to entrench themselves unhindered in the islands of the Western Pacific. Their spread must be stopped, and they must be kept off balance and if possible forced back. The airmen's favorite thesis, that a war could be won by air action alone, was not accepted by the other armed services—and, indeed, it was probably impossible with the weapons then available. Nevertheless, it was admitted that in the cases of both Japan and the Axis, bombing should be given a chance to soften up the enemy for invasion. Existing bombers could reach the Axis and a new Very Heavy Bomber, the B-29 (now a medium), was rushed into production to reach Japan from bases in China and the Marianas.

**Basic
strategy**

The Allied bomber war was originally aimed at military and industrial installations, but it increasingly got away from them in both Germany and Japan and plastered residential areas in an attempt to break civilian morale. The logical result was seen in the great fire raid on Tokyo which took 97,000 lives and, of course, in the atomic raids on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which were only less destructive of life. However, in the face of German raids on London and Antwerp and Japanese raids on the open city of Manila, failure to retaliate in kind would probably have evoked more protests that we were not trying to win the war than were heard about our forbearance in Korea. There were then, and there are now, many who question the military value of area bombing, but it is often excused on the ground that it was necessary in the struggle for survival.

Final decisions on strategic moves lay with Roosevelt and Churchill, the civil heads of their respective countries, but they depended for military advice upon the heads of their armed services. Taken together, the British and American military heads were known as the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). They sat permanently in Washington, where the British chiefs were ordinarily represented by deputies. However, air travel made possible frequent conferences of the chiefs either in Washington or London. A generation before this Britain had dreamed of making the United States a junior partner, but now with reduced political and economic power it no longer asked for hegemony. It asked only that the United States (1) help it preserve as much as possible of its liberties, its economic system, and its empire against the totalitarian tide, whether Axis or Soviet; and (2) acknowledge British leadership in political and politico-military affairs because of its

**Direction
of strategy**

greater experience. British civil and military chiefs were invariably a unit in the policies which they advocated in conference.

The American chiefs were not. They shared the ambivalence of their fellow citizens. On one hand they were convinced of their own infallibility; on the other they viewed Britain with inherited suspicion. They resented British attempts to use American strength to preserve its empire and in consequence sometimes reacted in favor of Russian policies. They prided themselves upon their single-minded pursuit of victory, upon their determination to win the war with the least expenditure of blood and time. Most of them remained as ignorant as boys of the postwar consequences of what they did, and British attempts to point these out only made them more stubborn.

The heads of the U.S. Armed Services comprised the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and as such were in charge of military supply, plans, and operations. The ranking members were Marshall, King, and Arnold (Army, Navy, and Air Force). Admiral William D. Leahy (b. 1875) was the personal representative of Roosevelt as Commander-in-Chief, and as such Chairman of the JCS. Essentially the JCS ran the Pacific war to suit themselves, deferred to the British and Chinese in the China-Burma-India theater, and acted in conjunction with the British on the Atlantic front. The JCS had their internal divisions, but they agreed upon the principle of unity of command, that is, in each theater the top commander had absolute control of all elements (land, sea, and air) and was in a position to co-ordinate them as he saw fit. Unity of command has obvious advantages, and it definitely was a factor in hastening victory. The British accepted the principle perforce when operating with Americans, but not when operating alone. Some of their military disasters were chiefly due to consequent lack of co-ordination among the services in the face of the enemy.

The Chief of Staff of the Army was George Catlett Marshall, a Pennsylvanian who had entered the army after graduating from Virginia Military Institute. After long service in the Philippines he went to France and became Pershing's most trusted planner. After the war **George C. Marshall** (b. 1880) he served in China and at other posts, then became Chief of Staff in 1939 just as World War II broke out. He did a masterly job. In this war there was no long search for competent generals, as there had been in other American wars. Marshall believed thoroughly in the system of placing responsibility on a single commander and then backing him. He coldly demanded results, and those who did not produce had the boom promptly lowered upon them.

It is possible that he was too single-mindedly military and thus prone to ignore political factors, but though already advanced in years he was more flexible than many a younger man. His ability to get along with peo-

ple came not so much from unruffled temper or political flair (though he had these) as from a breadth of knowledge and grasp of detail which gave his opinion weight—not that he was always right. It is necessary to note that some of his critics accused him of being a militarist, that is, of believing that the needs and views of the army should mold national policy even in peacetime.

In the sweep that followed Pearl Harbor Admiral Ernest J. King, an Ohioan, was brought from command of convoy operations in the North Atlantic to serve as Chief of Naval Operations and Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet. Tall, lean, and gimlet-eyed, King Ernest J. was a cold and capable executive and strategist who King had always been famous for running a “taut ship.” He (b. 1878) was in naval parlance a “sundowner”—just the sort of ruthless, efficient man that was needed to run a war. Curiously enough, this was King’s third war, for as an Annapolis cadet he had seen combat duty in Cuban waters. He was one of the few senior commanders who was qualified in all three parts of the navy: surface, submarine, and air. King was accused of being an advocate of the navy’s case for command wherever an overseas war was being waged; indeed, there was continual complaint that he was indifferent to anything except his pet Pacific war, which was largely being prosecuted by the navy. Still, an excellent brief can be drawn up to support the contention that he was a better strategist than Marshall.

In order to cover his rear Hitler had converted Western Europe into a fortress (*Festung Europa*) which could be reached only by air and amphibious operations. Spain and Portugal were obvious landing places, but while technically neutral they were frankly pro-fascist and any threat to them might have resulted in their occupation Approaches to *Festung Europa* by Hitler. There were two feasible remaining approaches. The first was a direct assault upon North Africa in order to open up the Mediterranean, then a crossing to Sicily and Italy, or alternatively to Salonika and the Vardar Valley entrance to the Balkans. The second was to use Britain as an aircraft carrier for softening up *Festung Europa* and as a staging ground for an amphibious assault, probably on France.


The United States had scarcely entered the war before Stalin began clamoring for an invasion of France in order to ease the pressure upon the Eastern front. However, an attack in force was clearly out of the question, at least until 1943. There were advocates of each approach among the political and military brass of both nations, but the official American position favored the Western approach and the official British position favored the Eastern. Marshall’s argument was militarily realistic—that the Western approach was most easily mounted and supplied and took the shortest route to the enemy’s jugular. The Mediterranean approach dissipated strength and, even if successful, would be indecisive. British interest in

STRATEGY OF THE ATLANTIC WAR

PRINCIPAL ALLIED AND RUSSIAN THRUSTS, 1942-45

Held by Germany on V-E Day

Moscow



the Mediterranean lifeline was reinforced by the desire to build a postwar barrier between Stalin and the Mediterranean and the desire to avoid the bloodshed of a frontal assault on France.

The Allies were confronted by certain inescapable preliminaries to strategic action. For one thing the Atlantic war against submarines was being lost. German submarines were operating within sight of the American coast, and the navy was quite unprepared to combat them. Scientific brains were marshaled to provide new weapons and means of detection, and hundreds of patrol craft (PC-boats) were built. From the beginning of the war through 1942 more shipping was sunk than was launched: about 18 million tons sunk as against 151 German subs lost. However, 1943 saw a phenomenal change. Allied losses decreased and launchings increased, while 237 submarines were sunk. During the entire Battle of the Atlantic 23.3 million tons of shipping were lost, 42.5 millions built, and 782 German U-boats sunk, most of them by the British. The effectiveness of U-boat warfare was witnessed by the much greater loss of troops in transit than during World War I.

**Battle of
the At-
lantic**

A second preliminary to strategic action was the build-up of reinforcements and supplies. The icy Murmansk route to Russia was supplemented in 1942 by the Persian Gulf route. The Egyptian front was strengthened by supplies brought laboriously around the Cape of Good Hope. The principal base, however, was the British Isles (except Eire). By the spring of 1942 American troops of all categories were pouring into the islands. Air routes had been opened across the North Atlantic by way of Newfoundland, Greenland, and Iceland, and across the South Atlantic by way of Brazil, Ascension Island, and Accra on the Gold Coast of Africa. The ancient British alliance with Portugal bore fruit in 1943 when the Azores Islands were opened as a way-station for aircraft.

**Build-up
for action**

As 1942 advanced it was felt that something had to be done to relieve the pressure on Russia and to rescue the British Eighth Army in Cyrenaica, which was being smashed by Rommel. In July the Combined Chiefs of Staff met in London and okayed a decision to invade French North Africa. The decision was regarded as a limited victory for Churchill's Easterners, and, on the whole, the Americans agreed cheerfully.

**The
Balkans
or France?**

It eventually proved that Churchill had no intention of letting up with the seizure of North Africa. When that objective had been attained he argued eloquently for an attack on the "soft underbelly of Europe." His strategy was to insist upon just one more step: first Sicily; then southern Italy to Naples and Foggia; then Rome; then the line of the Apennines; and finally Trieste. Though as early as May 1943 Churchill agreed to the French invasion, it presently became clear that British official policy was to sabotage it. Not until January 1944, when the Italian Campaign became


a bloody stalemate, did Churchill agree to take the primary punch out of Italy and devote it to preparations for the Normandy invasion.

The strategic picture in the Western Pacific did not become clear until well into 1942. General Douglas MacArthur had assumed command in the Philippines in July 1941, but he seems to have been unimpressed by the likelihood of war. The Japs struck his airfields on Pearl Harbor Day and presently landed large forces on Lingayen Gulf. MacArthur had less than 90,000 troops of all kinds and both races, well scattered over the islands, most of them raw recruits. Moreover, they were miserably equipped, lacking planes, ammunition, and medicines. It was a foregone conclusion that MacArthur would be forced to abandon Manila.

He then took refuge in the Bataan Peninsula, north of the narrow entrance to Manila Bay, which held the rock-fortress of Corregidor Island. The peninsula was a natural defensive position and from January into April it was held by main heroism and makeshift tactics against constant Japanese pressure, first under General Homma, then under Yamashita. On 11 March, MacArthur, under orders from Washington, left for Australia by PT-boat and plane. Jonathan Wainwright (b. 1883) took command. On 9 April, with food and ammunition gone and with his men weakened by malnutrition and malaria, the commander on Bataan was forced to surrender with 36,000 men. Then followed the brutal story of the Death March out of Bataan to prison camps. Corregidor, with several thousand men holed up in its rock tunnels, held out for another month but on 6 May was taken by an all-out invasion.

Meanwhile the Japanese had been swarming through the East Indies and Malaya and had taken the British strongholds at Hong Kong and Singapore and had invaded Siam and Burma. A small American naval force from the Philippines under Admiral William A. Glassford (b. 1886) joined with scanty British, Dutch, and Australian units under Dutch Admiral Helfrich. Two Jap fleets caught him in the Java Sea on 27 February and Helfrich, helpless without air power, was all but wiped out.

For the most part the United States Navy had to devote itself to licking its wounds, but it did make a series of hit-and-run raids on Jap-held islands. On 19 April sixteen AAF bombers under command of Lt. Col. James Doolittle took off from a fleet carrier and bombed Tokyo. Finally from 4 to 8 May, planes from the U.S. carriers *Lexington* and *Yorktown* under Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher struck shrewd blows at two Japanese fleets in the Coral Sea. The *Lexington* went down, but the Japs also lost one carrier and had two more knocked out. The battle put a temporary end to the Japanese southward advance.



Admiral Nimitz, at Pearl Harbor, deduced that the next Japanese move would be an attempt to seize Midway and use it either to neutralize the Hawaiians or as a staging ground for an invasion. He was right. On 4 June planes from his carriers sighted the Japanese fleet west of Midway, and during the next three days carrier and land-based aircraft stopped the Jap advance and sank four of its carriers. Only one U.S. carrier went down: the *Yorktown*, crippled by air but finished off by a Japanese submarine. Midway was advance notice that

Midway,
 4-6 June
 1942

the desperate Japanese bid for empire was doomed to failure. It is true, of course, that Japanese policy-makers were still willing to gamble on offering such stiff resistance that the United States would leave them at least part of their "southern resources area." But they knew now that they were wrong in their estimates that the American Navy would not fight—or at least could not afford to.

The battle of Midway was also the proof of naval air power. Even the army air force and the battleship admirals had to admit this. The admirals had accepted air as cover for their battlewagons, but now most of them were convinced that air should also serve as long-range artillery. Midway desperately crippled Japanese naval air power through the loss of half of its big carriers and the most experienced of its pilots. Thereafter the Japanese had to feed naval pilots into battle before they were properly trained with the result that their losses were increased. Meanwhile the U.S. Navy's huge pilot training program enabled it to draw increasingly on thoroughly trained men. On the other hand, each side now had about equal carrier strength and could not afford to risk it in any attempt to penetrate deeply into the enemy's country. The result was a sort of stalemate until in the autumn of 1943 the new and far more powerful *Essex*-type carriers began to arrive in quantity.

The Pacific war was fought by a coalition, the same as in Europe with the addition of China, and with the difference that the British dominions were far more important factors. Rivalries between the U.S. armed services were far more evident than in Europe, partly because the commanders of Pacific theaters were strong-willed men who were able to go their own ways with a minimum of supervision from Washington. Since the Atlantic front had first call on Allied strength, the Pacific forces had to make up in skill for what they lacked in men and matériel, and after the first bloody educational bobbles they developed an ability to co-ordinate the land-sea-air team which not even the Normandy invasion could approach—and to which, indeed, the latter owed its success.

Marshall and King disagreed vitally over which was the best road to Tokyo. King insisted that the proper approach was to leapfrog from one to another of the numerous small islands scattered from the Solomons to Japan, and that the war should be fought largely by ships, naval planes, and marines. Marshall, with a soldier's partiality for land warfare, favored moving along the large islands of the Southwest Pacific to the China coast and then slugging a way northward overland. At the outset Marshall actually envisioned a war which might last until 1947 or 1948. One of his objects was to retrain and equip the Chinese army in order to pin down the million or two of Japa-

nese already in China and keep them from reinforcing the Pacific garrisons. General Stilwell was sent to the China-Burma-India theater to accomplish this object, but since so many of his activities are political we will take up his story in connection with the diplomacy of the war. In the end the navy's island war was so spectacularly successful that it ended the war two or three years ahead of schedule and canceled the army's plan for fighting Japan in China.

Neither Marshall nor King had his way fully, for the Southwest Pacific became an army command under MacArthur while the rest of the Pacific became naval domain. Both of their movements, however, initially had to overcome the barrier of the Bismarck Archipelago, in which at Rabaul Admiral Yamamoto had his area headquarters and a heavily defended base. The Solomons and New Guinea campaigns lasted almost two years and were the decisive actions of the Pacific war. Not only was the long battle to smash the Bismarcks barrier a strategic and tactical defeat for Japan, but it was the rock on which the Japanese army, navy, and air forces dashed themselves to pieces.

It is not fair to insist that the makers of strategy in the Pacific war should have acted on the lines which hindsight now indicates, but it is at least worth while to indicate what those lines might have been. Present knowledge would show that King was more nearly right than Marshall, and that the navy strategy of leapfrogging was the shortest and cheapest road to Tokyo. The key to victory on the periphery of the Japanese Empire was the destruction of Jap air and sea power and the consequent ability to interdict supply and condemn Jap garrisons to die on the vine. No more islands needed to be invaded than were necessary for use as American bases. In the same way the key to victory over the Japanese home islands was the destruction of the country's remaining air and sea power and the interdiction of its railway and interisland transportation. All these could have been accomplished by the navy and marines with some assistance from specially trained army air and infantry.

**Lessons of
the Pacific
war**

This brings up the problem of the strategic validity of MacArthur's campaigns along the north coast of New Guinea and in the Philippines. It is certainly conceivable, as the navy argued, that most of the effort expended in the Southwest Pacific was wasted—that it arose from the army's misplaced belief that all wars must be turned into land wars. The curious consequence of this view is that—however arduous it may have been for the men who fought the battles—it turns MacArthur's Southwest Pacific career after the breaking of the Bismarcks barrier into a gigantic build-up of the commander's personal reputation, capped by a quite unnecessary though gratifying "return" to the Philippines.

3 *The Atlantic Front*


The war waged by the Western Allies on the Atlantic front was to a remarkable degree the story of one man, Dwight David Eisenhower. Born in Texas and reared in Abilene, Kansas, during the years when the dust of the cattle pens and the Chisholm Trail had not yet settled, Dwight D. Eisenhower (b. 1890) he was in every sense a product of the heart of America. Though he was a West Pointer, he had not been with the AEF but had seen long service in the Philippines and was well grounded in logistics and planning.

A tall man with thinning light hair and an infectious grin, "Ike" Eisenhower had a canny sense of the possible in any political situation but also possessed the will to clamp down when necessary. While some analysts have doubted that he was more than ordinarily competent as a military man, it must nevertheless be remembered that he had a mission different from that of the traditional general. This is a day when a top general is less a battle commander than a business executive and a reconciler of quarrelsome planners, generals, and national interests. Coalition armies are notoriously hard to command because each national element is suspicious and jealous of its allies. Eisenhower was to prove notably successful in his role as a welder of a team.

The group of American commanders who were to rise to historical significance under Eisenhower deserve at least mention. Among them was his chief of staff, Walter Bedell ("Beetle") Smith, the perfect detail man.

U.S. commanders Mark W. Clark, lanky and self-sufficient, came of an army family. Carl ("Tooey") Spaatz was air commander and leader of the bomber school which had won over the pursuit ship; closely associated with him were Ira C. Eaker and James H. Doolittle, who had already flown over Tokyo. Probably best-known during the war was the armor expert, George Smith ("Old Blood and Guts") Patton (1885-1945). A blustering, profane driver, Patton was so highly charged with emotion that he was continually getting himself—and Eisenhower—into hot water.

In the end it was a quiet, publicity-shy Missourian who was to stand head and shoulders above the rest. Omar Nelson Bradley was a tall, lanky man with a bulging forehead, thinning hair, and a pug-face lined with wisdom and patience. Neither built, dressed, nor stanced like a soldier, his drawl and his gold-rimmed spectacles gave him the appearance of a country schoolteacher; nevertheless he was a superb athlete and a sure shot. Bradley was more concerned with results than with spit and polish. He was a calm, unhurried man, whose temper was rarely ruffled even by a series of slights and snubs which would have tried the patience of Job. He was also that rare bird, a general who took no kowtows and who was not feared by his staff. Probably no other



general in the army so completely won the confidence of the men. "When you fight for Bradley," they said, "you do a lot of walking—but not so much dying."

The decision to invade French North Africa (Operation TORCH) was not made until July 1942, and to ensure favorable weather it had to be carried out by November. Because of the French antipathy for the British, Americans had to assume the leading place, and Eisenhower was placed in command. The plan was to make simultaneous landings at Casablanca, Oran, and Algiers. Tunis was not included because it was within easy reach of Axis aircraft, but the Algiers force was to move upon it immediately.

Planning
Operation
TORCH

Not only was TORCH planned on a shoestring, but it faced possible hostility from Spain or might even stimulate a German move through Spain. Even more serious in the end was the problem of Vichy France. After a bitter struggle between Pierre Laval and Admiral François Darlan, the former had won ascendancy over the "Old Marshal" (Pétain), but Darlan had remained commander of the armed forces. De Gaulle was not only hard to get along with, but he was hated in North Africa—and the Allied object was to win North African co-operation. In this extremity the Allies secretly brought from France the respected General Giraud as their candidate for governor of North Africa.

Late in October the Egyptian front exploded into action. In top command in the area was General Harold Alexander, quiet, efficient, and reasonable—in every sense a great soldier. He was, however, outshone by his tactical commander, a cantankerous, cocky, grandstanding Scotch-Irishman named Bernard Montgomery. The latter had some brilliant tactical successes to his credit, but he depended most on overwhelming power. At any rate, after an initial defeat by the British Eighth Army at El Alamein, Rommel was forced to retreat westward.


Montgomery and
El Alamein

The North African invasions began on 8 November. Patton fought some stiff actions around Casablanca, and there was some resistance at Oran. Algiers fell promptly, but its French officer corps, loyal to Pétain, refused to accept Giraud. It so happened that Darlan was in TORCH landings, 8 Nov. 1942 Algiers at the time, and when Pétain secretly gave him freedom of action he was able to counsel co-operation with the Allies. The Germans promptly moved into Vichy France, and Darlan assumed control in North Africa until his assassination on Christmas Eve, probably by a De Gaullist. Thereafter began a tug of war between Giraud and De Gaulle in which the latter finally won out.

The Germans had rushed troops into Tunisia under Von Arnim and by 16 November were in sufficient force to blunt the Allied advance. Then the rainy season began, weeks earlier than usual, and the Allies bogged down in the mud. They were still there when in January Winter in Tunisia Montgomery's Eighth Army reached Tripoli and continued to push Rommel across the sands toward the Tunisian border. In February 1943 Von Arnim launched a sudden offensive against the green American troops in central Tunisia and forced them westward through the Kasserine Pass into Algeria. However, the Germans had outrun their supplies, and when counter pressure began they retired to Gafsa.

Alexander was in top operational command in Tunisia when the spring offensive opened late in March 1943. Patton jumped off from Gafsa and pressed on Rommel's western flank, thus confining him to a narrow cylinder between the Americans and the sea while the Eighth The end in Tunisia March-May, 1943 Army drove northward like a piston. Patton then went off to train the U.S. Seventh Army for the coming invasion of Sicily. His place was taken by Bradley, whose corps was now transferred to the extreme north as the Axis armies of Rommel and Von Arnim retreated into the hill-encircled northeast corner of Tunisia. The final assault opened on 5 May. The U.S. and British capture of the key strong points in the northern rim of hills opened the way for armored drives to cut the Axis forces into segments. By the middle of the month more than a quarter of a million prisoners were in Allied hands. Rommel fled to fight again.

The conquest of Sicily (Operation HUSKY) was regarded as an important step in freeing the narrow waist of the Mediterranean from enemy air attack, and also as useful for advanced air bases. As early as May the air forces from North Africa and Malta began to soften up strong points and road and rail communications in Sicily and the near-by mainland. Alexander was again in immediate Prelude to HUSKY command, while Patton was to land on the southwestern coast and Montgomery's gallant Eighth Army (reinforced by Canadians) was to land on the east below Syracuse.



The attack on Sicily opened in the early morning of 10 July with the descent on key points of airborne troops by parachutes and gliders. Messina, across the strait from the Italian toe, was the essential port of Axis entry. Since Montgomery was closest to this, he had to face dependable German troops stationed to hold the narrow road between Mt. Etna and the sea. Patton, facing chiefly Italians of poor morale, pushed across the center of the island and took Palermo on the 22nd. While Patton was advancing with his tanks, Bradley was slugging across the island with his infantry on Montgomery's left. After he reached Palermo, Patton turned and raced eastward along the northern coast toward Messina. Meanwhile the Canadians had flanked Mt. Etna, and the Germans withdrew to Italy. On 17 August both Allied armies entered Messina.

Fall of Sicily, July-Aug. 1943

Mussolini was deposed (25 July) from his position, and a new govern-

ment under Marshal Badoglio secretly sued for peace. When the Germans refused to evacuate Italy, the new Italian government declared war against them and was accepted by the Allies as a co-belligerent. On 3 September Montgomery moved across the straits from Messina, and on the 8th Mark Clark's Fifth Army, composed of both U.S. and British troops, landed at Salerno, southeast of Naples. Alexander was again in top operational command. The Fifth Army encountered stubborn German resistance at Salerno, but finally it gathered the strength to punch through the Sorrentine hills. On 1 October Naples was occupied.

Engineers began at once to clear up the port of Naples for military use. Meanwhile on the other side of the boot Montgomery had seized the port of Bari and the complex of airfields around Foggia. Sardinia and Corsica fell without much opposition and were utilized as air bases. From the Italian airfields during the following months bombers operated against objectives as far away as Vienna and the Ploesti oil fields of Rumania.

In January 1943 Eisenhower and his principal commanders went to England to organize the coming invasion of France. The Allied forces in Italy, including the Fifteenth Army Group (composed of the U.S. Fifth Army and the British Eighth), were now under British command, Maitland Wilson first and Alexander later. The Nazi High Command took advantage of Italy's easy defensibility to pin down Allied forces in the peninsula and thereby weaken Allied efforts elsewhere.

During the winter of 1942-43 Von Kesselring's small but highly efficient force held the Gustav Line across Italy. It was anchored on Monte Cassino, on which stood the ancient hilltop Benedictine monastery which was one of the centers from which Western Civilization had spread. Despite Clark's bloody attacks, the Gustav Line held firm. In January 1943 an Allied landing at Anzio was intended to threaten Rome, but it was contained with disheartening promptness by the Germans. Monte Cassino's monastery and the town below were reduced to rubble by air action and artillery, but they only became even more impregnable centers of resistance.


In the end it was air action which enabled an Allied break-through, by cutting the rail connections along the narrow Italian boot and keeping them cut. With his supplies interdicted, Von Kesselring withdrew when the Allied spring offensive opened. Rome was entered on 4 June amidst paeans of popular rejoicing. Two days later the Normandy invasion began, and from that time on the Italian front was distinctly secondary. On 4 August the Allies entered Florence and found all but one of its historic bridges blown up and mounds of rubble at the ends of that one.

GERMANY
(AUSTRIA)

SICILIAN AND ITALIAN CAMPAIGNS, 1943-45

Statute Miles

0 50 100 150 200



Bitter commentators protested against the "senseless" war in Italy, saying that Naples and Foggia were all that were needed for practical purposes. Nevertheless, during the winter of 1944–45 a pitifully small force composed of troops from eleven nations fought the Germans along the Gothic Line amidst the snow and mud of the Apennines. Finally in April an American mountain division pierced the Gothic Line, and the Allies broke into the Po Valley. Italian partisans had meanwhile hung on the German supply lines; now they rose in the cities. On 28 April, Mussolini was caught by partisans and shot, and his body was hung up by the heels in Milan. By this time Von Kesselring had been ordered to another command, and on 2 May his successor surrendered.

The invasion of France (Operation OVERLORD) was preceded by "around-the-clock" air bombing of German military and industrial objectives—at night by British and in daylight by U.S. bombers. The U.S. effort was hampered until 1944 by shortage of aircraft. Especially disastrous was the lagging of the fighter-construction program; for lack of fighter cover, the losses of bombers almost put an end to the bomber war. Targets, such as airplane-engine, tank, and ball-bearing factories, were selected with an eye to destroying the German war effort. Nevertheless a postwar survey demonstrated several things. Bombers were not as accurate as claimed and increasingly tended to adopt "saturation" bombing. Bombing priorities were sometimes selected without much understanding of industrial interrelations.

On the whole, German industry showed remarkable resilience, and engineers exercised great ingenuity in reclaiming scrap and developing substitutes. It is believed that despite its reliance on skilled workers rather than on mass production, the German war effort remained relatively unaffected by the bomber war until a few months before the end. The bombers' chief effects were seen in two tardily adopted policies: the destruction of rail transport and of synthetic oil plants. As a result of bomber activity Germany lost 300,000 lives; another 780,000 were wounded; 3,600,000 dwelling units were destroyed, and 7,500,000 people rendered homeless.

It is well to pause here and consider Eisenhower's delicate situation and the contribution he made to victory. Having consented to an American Supreme Commander, the British felt that they were entitled to appoint the second-level commanders, the men who would be in actual charge of operations. Churchill (unlike Roosevelt) was conscious that the war was passing from the military to the political phase. Military moves should now be guided by political considerations, and Churchill wanted his own men in the places where they could do so. He got his way with air and naval commanders, but on the ground commander the Americans balked at the appointment of Montgomery, who to tell the truth was not popular even with

The bomb-
er war

Eisen-
hower's
difficult
rôle

the British military men. Particularly cogent was the argument that U.S. ground forces would eventually be triple those of the British.

As a result Montgomery was given a vague assignment to exercise tactical co-ordination under Eisenhower. He promptly assumed command of the ground forces. Eisenhower was most painfully caught between fires. He had been cast as the chairman of a board on which British voices would decide all significant questions of strategy. His actual powers were presumed to include only the ultimate command of American forces, the management of supplies (because they were largely American), and dealing with De Gaulle and the minor allies—a headache which the British were glad to get rid of.

Though circumstances altered this snug program and Eisenhower emerged as his own ground commander, he was able to satisfy no one. Americans thought he was dominated by Montgomery; Britishers thought he was dominated by Bradley; and De Gaulle was sure that he was insulting France. One accusation was that he merely stroked fur the right way and worked out compromises. On the other hand he was accused of considering only military aims and of being blissfully ignorant of political realities. Without denying a modicum of truth in both charges, it is only fair to point out that under the circumstances any Supreme Commander who did not act as Eisenhower did might well have seen his authority dissolve under him with a consequent danger to the war effort.

The opinion has been expressed that Hitler might have won the war if he had seen himself not as a conqueror but rather as the welder of a new European unity in which each people should play an autonomous role. Certainly his war against Russia was popular in the West. However, his brutal and exploitive policies led eventually to the creation of an effective underground movement, though it was badly split among communist and other political elements.

**Hitler's
failure in
Europe**

The invasion date—D-Day—was set for the 5th, 6th, or 7th of June 1944. There was reason for haste. German long-range missiles were almost ready for use, and the best hope of stopping them lay in capturing the launching sites. The V-1, or “buzz-bomb,” reached London on 12 June. More formidable was the V-2, a stratosphere rocket which fell with such speed (3000 feet per second) that there was no defense. Moreover, it was so accurate that if it had been ready in time to plaster the southern coast of England while it was loaded with troops and equipment, it is possible that it would have broken up the invasion. As it was, the V-2 was not used until 12 September, but it was to prove very destructive in port areas such as London and Antwerp.

**Long-range
missiles**

June 6th offered the break in the weather necessary for the invasion of Normandy, and it became D-Day. An elaborate series of deceptions had convinced the German commanders, Rommel and Von Rundstedt, that the

Invasion of Normandy, 6 June 1944 attack was coming in the Calais area, so the place of invasion was a complete surprise. The operation was opened by a tremendous air bombardment before dawn and by the dropping of two divisions of airborne troops at the base of the Cotentin Peninsula to prepare the way for the capture of Cherbourg. The waterborne assault force of 4000 vessels carrying five infantry divisions had crossed the Channel during the night. There was now really little that any commander could do as the ponderous plan for the beach landings unrolled and the mighty machine crawled up the bluffs and into the hedgerows. On the left were three divisions: British and Canadian infantry and a third airborne division. On the right two infantry divisions of Bradley's U.S. First Army landed on beaches called OMAHA and UTAH.

By the next day a secure foothold had been gained, and reinforcements and supplies were pouring ashore. Rommel lost no time in closing in and succeeded in stopping the invasion from spreading more than a few miles inland. However, within a month there were 1,000,000 men available, and the army was presently given its permanent organization. Montgomery's Twenty-First Army Group was composed of the Canadian First Army and the British Second. Bradley's Twelfth Army Group was made up of the U.S. First Army commanded by General Courtney H. Hodges and Patton's Third. Hodges, a careful and efficient Georgian, after having been washed out of West Point had come up from the ranks.

Rommel had been badly wounded on 19 July, and Von Rundstedt assumed tactical control of the German forces until replaced by Von Kluge. It was during July that a plot among the old Junker nobility in political and military positions barely failed of causing Hitler's death.

German handicaps The immediate effect was a shake-up in command and the extermination of thousands. Rommel and Von Kluge were among those who died. Not only was the morale of German commanders shattered, but Hitler now began more than ever to interfere in tactics. German troops in France and the Low Countries apparently were more numerous than those the Allies brought to bear during the summer of 1944, but they were second-class and, moreover, they had to cover an enormous coastline.

The Norman coast was covered by an ancient network of ditches and hedgerows (the *bocage*) which not only afforded concealment and fortifications but were death traps for tanks. On the left Montgomery attracted and pinned down the German panzers, but his attempts to seize Caen only resulted in reducing that noble medieval city to ruins. The British had committed all they had to the invasion, and now their armor was so hard hit that thereafter U.S. armor had to be assigned to them. Meanwhile the capitulation of Cherbourg was

forced by General Joseph L. ("Lightning Joe") Collins, a veteran of Guadalcanal, and the city was readied to supplement the docks floated in to the coast by the invaders.

The plan was that while Montgomery busied the Germans on the left, the American right would swing like a door on the British hinge. The breakout came near St. Lô, when during the last days of July the infantry bored a five-mile channel through the German defenses. Patton's armor dashed through the gap and on the 31st reached Avranches. While, at Mortain, Hodges blunted the German attempt to close the gap, Patton circled to the south and pushed into the German rear at Argentan (13 August). The "Falaise Pocket" thus formed cut off 100,000 Germans and probably would have resulted in the capture of the entire army had not Montgomery pressed on the German north flank instead of closing the mouth of the pocket as planned.

St. Lô to
Falaise

Meanwhile Patton's right wing drove for the Seine, and the fleeing Germans barely managed to get across. Paris was isolated and its German commander, plagued by partisans, surrendered. By now the German retreat was a rout. American armor and motorized infantry cut through it like a hot knife through butter and kept going until they ran out of gasoline. Had the Allies devoted less attention to bombers and more to air supply, the German armies could not have escaped from France.

Second
Battle of
France

On 15 August the U.S. Seventh Army commanded by General Alexander M. Patch, a veteran of Guadalcanal, and composed of American and French divisions, landed on the Riviera and moved rapidly up the Rhone River. German resistance was light, and those units remaining were largely left to be cleaned up by partisans. On 11 September contact was made with the U.S. Third Army near Dijon. The new force, composed of the U.S. Seventh Army and the French First, was now constituted as the Sixth Army Group under General Jacob L. Devers and moved into position on the Allied right next to the Swiss border.

By the end of August, France (except Alsace-Lorraine and Brittany), Belgium, and Luxembourg had been occupied, and the Germans were piled up against their frontier in confusion. But the Allies had outrun their supplies and could move no farther. September passed in a frantic effort to open supply lines, and the Germans, now under Von Model, found it a welcome respite. They tightened their hold on the mouth of the Scheldt, thus making Antwerp useless and forcing the Allies to bring their supplies all the way from the beachhead area and from Marseilles.



Supply
problem

OVERLORD had from the first called for putting greatest pressure on the left in order to obtain useful seaports—especially Antwerp—and to

SECOND BATTLE OF FRANCE

Dotted line marks front at end of Sept. 1944

Statute Miles



outflank the Siegfried Line, which defended the German frontier. Montgomery entered Antwerp on 4 September, but instead of clearing the Scheldt to enable supplies to enter by a short route he dreamed up a plan to end the war that autumn by a dash on Berlin. In this process he would have to use all of the Allied surplus supplies and several American divisions; the American armies would perforce remain stationary in the south.

**Strategic
decisions**

Montgomery was permitted to try out the first step of his plan on 17 September by dropping three airborne divisions (two of them U.S.) astride the Rhine estuary at the Dutch end of the Siegfried Line. Unfortunately the Germans were there, and, though Montgomery managed to reach the main branch of the Rhine, the key city of Arnhem north of the river was not taken. The disillusioned Eisenhower refused to put any more weight into the thrust on the ground that it would probably be flanked and destroyed. His decision accordingly was to move on a broad front as the supply situation warranted. Montgomery was ordered to turn to clearing the Scheldt; he obeyed—on the third order.

Meanwhile Hodge's First Army was reducing Aachen and fighting through the Huertgen Forest. On its left, the U.S. Ninth Army was activated under General William H. Simpson and pushed on to the Roer River. Meanwhile Patton's Third Army smashed into Metz. On the south Patch's Seventh reached the Rhine, but the French failed to clean out the so-called "Colmar Pocket."

**Autumn
advances**


The Allied plan allowed no winter respite but sought to keep the Germans off balance by continual attacks, despite the fact that there simply were not enough troops available to hold the entire line. As a result Bradley with Eisenhower's consent took the "calculated risk" of holding the 75-mile front between Monschau and Luxembourg east of the Ardennes Forest with only four divisions. He was well aware of the possibility of a German attack at this point but estimated that a break-through could not get far. Von Rundstedt took advantage of the situation (16 December) to send four powerful German armies through the Ardennes line under cover of fogs to split the Allied armies in two and interdict supply from Antwerp. By the 22nd he had driven fifty miles and almost reached the Meuse, but his tanks were running out of fuel. Meanwhile Bradley had ordered up reinforcements on each flank and given Hodges and Patton the plan for a counterattack which was expected to cave in the sides of the salient.

**Battle of
the Bulge,
Dec.-Jan.
1944**

The British had always distrusted the American penchant for taking calculated risks, and now Montgomery demanded command of the northern flank. Eisenhower yielded and gave him the Ninth and First armies temporarily. If Montgomery had been fearful of the safety of Antwerp or had felt a call to save the Americans from their own blunders, he now

reacted strangely. He stopped the attack of the First Army in its tracks, then ordered a retreat. The Ninth Army was not utilized in this situation, and he committed only one British brigade to the line.

Meanwhile Patton mounted a crescendo of attacks on the southern flank and crashed through to relieve the 101st Airborne, which was be-



sieged in Bastogne. On the 23rd the weather cleared, and the air force pounced on the Germans. By the beginning of January the danger was over, and Montgomery now consented to mount a gingerly attack. By the middle of the month the Germans were almost back to their jump-off point. Patton picked off perhaps as many as 120,000 Germans in casualties and prisoners; German losses, indeed, were so heavy that the end of the war was appreciably hastened by the Battle of the Bulge. The American loss ran to 59,000 men, about 7000 of them killed.

The sudden reversal of the tide of victory was not regarded as serious by the American commanders, but the Allied world went into a panic and screamed that the war was lost. Montgomery and Churchill shrewdly seized the opportunity to renew the demand for ground command, which the British felt was absolutely essential if their politico-military objectives were to be attained. Bradley and Patton threatened to resign if Montgomery was put over them, and Eisenhower placated the Britisher by letting him retain the U.S. Ninth Army. Bradley and his generals apparently were now convinced that, if the war was to be won, it was up to them to do it on their own.

Aftermath
of the
Bulge

Though up to this point German combat troops in the West outnumbered the Allied, they had three times as many in the East. Russian armies were not like those of the West. True, their artillery and armor ranked with the Germans', but there in a real sense the resemblance ceased. Their air force was almost altogether tactical. With the exception of the élite divisions of infantry, the army was largely a half-disciplined horde. Outside of some cheap equipment and of course ammunition, the soldier received nothing and was expected to get his food by plunder, regardless of whether he was in friendly or enemy country. The medical service was limited, and the army did not bother to keep records of personnel below field grade. Russian commanders laughed at such gadgets as mine detectors; they simply marched their men across mine fields and the survivors went on with the war.

The Red
Army

During 1944 the Russians swept westward across the Polish Plain and across Rumania and up the Danube Valley. In January 1945 the armies broke into Warsaw and Budapest, and in April they entered Vienna and Berlin. It was in largest part the Russian armies which cut up the *Wehrmacht* and ground it to powder. But wherever they went they plundered and raped and sowed the seeds of abhorrence. On the other hand the Russians, primed with stories of the superiority of the Russian way of life, were amazed at what they saw of the standard of living in the West, and the seeds of doubt were planted. A bitter European remarked that Stalin made two mistakes: letting Europe see the Russians, and letting the Russians see Europe.

The Rus-
sians in
the West

Western strategy was still to put the force on the left, which meant that Bradley and Devers should confine themselves to defense. Nevertheless, their defensive thrusts somehow developed a habit of reaching the Rhine. On 7 March a First Army unit found a half-blown bridge at Remagen and pushed across. Other American spearheads also came tearing up to the Rhine and promptly threw over pontoon bridges. Montgomery's armor, once it was across the Rhine, was routed through such swampy country that knots of German paratroopers were able to hold it to a crawl. Meanwhile Simpson (now back under

Crossing
the Rhine

Bradley) and Hodges sent their armor to encircle the industrial Ruhr and then cut it up. By 18 April they had hauled in 300,000 prisoners.

Eisenhower was now ready to back Bradley's plan of loosing American armored sweeps (supplied by air) which would cut western Germany to pieces. Simpson and Hodges raced for the Elbe, and the latter staged a U.S. armor meeting with the Russians on 25 April at Torgau, south of chops up Berlin. Patton headed for Prague but was stopped short on Germany the line of Pilsen, Linz, and Salzburg. Patch pushed through Munich to Innsbruck and struck hands with the Fifth Army, now under Lucien Truscott, coming up from Italy. The military prison camps were emptied, and the political prisoners—those who survived—were released from the Nazi death camps.

The British were especially anxious to occupy Berlin, and it seems that it could have been done if the other sweeps had been stopped and supply diverted to that objective. Eisenhower refused to permit this for a number of reasons, but primarily because the occupation zones agreed upon at Yalta had promised Russia control for more than 100 miles west of Berlin—that is, somewhat west of the line where U.S. armored spearheads were halted.

During April, while Allied armor was roaming about Germany at will, the Russians were breasting a tide of fire to cross the thirty miles between the Oder and Berlin. By the 25th they had surrounded the city and were moving in against fierce resistance in the streets. On the 30th German Hitler committed suicide, and his body was burned. Berlin, surrender now in flames, was given over to pillage and rape. Up to the very end the men around Hitler seem to have hoped to make a truce with the West while they resisted the East; they may even have expected Allied assistance against the Russians. However that may be, the Anglo-Saxons refused to sell out Russia or to receive any proposals for surrender that were not also addressed to the Russians. Upon Hitler's death Admiral Doenitz assumed control and offered surrender. An agreement was signed at Reims on 7 May; it was to go into effect at 2301 Central European time on the 8th—V-E Day. The ceremony was repeated on the 8th in Berlin for Russian benefit.

4 *The Pacific Front*

The decision to give the army and the navy separate Pacific theaters in which each could prosecute the war after its own fashion became effective in April 1942. MacArthur took over the Southwest Pacific Area (SWPA) including Australia and the entire East Indies. His Solomon Command divisions Islands, however, were added piecemeal to navy responsibility, though operations in the western islands were technically subject to his approval. The remaining combat area of the Pacific was as-

signed to Nimitz at Pearl Harbor. He farmed out the South Pacific Area (SOPAC) to a subordinate, eventually Halsey.

Douglas MacArthur requires some attention because of his position as Southwest Pacific and later Far East commander, as well as Supreme Commander in Japan. Quite without the ingratiating characteristics of an Eisenhower, he was yet rather generally successful in selling himself at his own valuation. MacArthur was the son of the Philippines proconsul, whom he greatly resembled in character. After West Point he served in the Philippines and chalked up a brilliant record as a field commander in France. Afterward he served a term as chief of staff during which he nipped the rising ambitions of air and armored forces and tolerated an army attempt to disband the marines. He then departed to become Field Marshal of the new Philippine Army. During his career he did not fail to make clear his disapproval of such subordinates as George Marshall and Dwight Eisenhower.

MacArthur was every inch the soldier, handsome, graceful, and remote. Always dressed in spic-and-span suntans, he wore no ornament save the scrambled eggs rampant on the rakish cap; his corn-cob pipe, however, was a dramatic contrast. He was courageous even to rashness, possessed a fine brain but devoted it to details, and had a high ideal of duty based on the rather typically muddled American moral sense. He could turn on the charm but usually preferred to be cold and aloof, avoiding ordinary contacts and adopting deliberately regal habits of administration. Convinced of his own dignity and infallibility, he was one of those rare American generals who believed he was a man of destiny.

The greatest weakness of such commanders is that they build staffs whose members tell them what they want to hear, and so they sometimes come croppers. His critics accused him of judging the *intentions* rather than the *capabilities* of the enemy; they said this was what deluded him into wildly overestimating his strength on the eve of Pearl Harbor and blundering in his planning. Certainly his communiques were frequently unreliable, and he had a tendency toward heedless optimism and underestimation of the enemy. Though he had softened toward air power since the Billy Mitchell days, he still had inadequate ideas of its capabilities. He had an original antipathy toward the navy which he did not always bother to conceal and which was apparently made worse by his Pacific experience. On the other hand, he was the victim of the toadies in his entourage who took it upon themselves to interpret his views, attitudes, and plans.

Admiral Chester W. Nimitz was a calm, unhurried Texan, who had come up with unspectacular steadiness by way of submarines, cruisers, and battleships. Ten days after Pearl Harbor he assumed the Pacific command. Though he lacked MacArthur's ability at self-dramatization, he performed with even greater brilliance. His operational admirals were ruthlessly transferred if they did not deliver

Douglas
MacArthur
(b. 1880)

Character

Chester W.
Nimitz
(b. 1885)

even against odds, and in the end he emerged with a list of commanders and with a navy which for the first time in history outperformed the exploits of the British Navy.

His most brilliant subordinates were Halsey and Spruance. William F. Halsey (b. 1882), born in New Jersey into a navy family, during his career compiled the unusual record of spending twenty-five years on sea duty.

Halsey and Spruance Originally a destroyer specialist, he did not take up air training until he was in his fifties but then quickly rose to command of a carrier-task force. "Bull" Halsey's explosive and sometimes derogatory comments were frequently embarrassing, but he was probably the most colorful figure the navy had produced since Farragut. He was perhaps not as brilliant as some of his colleagues; but he never failed in boldness, and this was what the situation required. Raymond A. Spruance (b. 1886) was born in Baltimore but considered himself an Indian. No airman, it was Halsey's illness at the time of Midway that put Spruance in command of an air task force. He performed so brilliantly (with the aid of Halsey's air staff) that he became a command fixture. By the end of the war Halsey and Spruance were alternating in operational command of the Central Pacific fleet.

After the battle of Midway, though the services had to operate on limited resources well into 1944, the American strategic situation was never as desperate as pessimists thought. Intelligence reports far overestimated Japanese power—not only its production and military strength but its administrative and psychological factors. **Japanese problems and errors** Actually Japanese military production at its peak was only ten per cent of that of the United States. Though we put only a third of our power into the Pacific, Japan was hopelessly outclassed.

It is now evident that the Japanese co-operated in promoting their own defeat—sometimes through stubbornness and miscalculation, but also through insurmountable necessity. The Japanese Army and Navy were bitter rivals, and neither would agree to the principle of unity of command. The navy had strongly opposed entry into the war, yielded only to an order of the weak-willed Mikado, who was under the army's thumb, and from Midway onward sought for a negotiated peace. The Japanese did not have enough petroleum products to fight a long war and therefore had to husband their fuel and cut their tactics accordingly. Once they had lost the initiative, the Japanese, with numerous island garrisons to defend, did not know where the Americans would strike. By scattering their ships and planes they threw away their only hope, which lay in concentration. The result was that after their first triumphal sweep they usually sent a boy to do a man's work.

In their battle plans they had a tendency to make grand elaborations which fell down if the Americans did not move as expected. The Japs pre-

sumed that the Americans would have to hop from one strongly defended island to the next and would find the process so exhausting that they would negotiate a peace. They quite failed to anticipate the leapfrog tactics of by-passing the strongest bases, merely neutralizing them by bombardment and blockade. They failed also to grasp the reality of America's enormous productive power, which would enable it to put 27 carriers (besides escort carriers) into service in less than four years and to dare to challenge the land-based air defense of the homeland. Finally, the Japanese were so convinced of their own rectitude that they acted pettishly when thwarted: hence their deliberate maltreatment and execution of prisoners. The effect on Allied morale was the opposite of that intended.

A few actions served to blast the hasty idea that the Japs were extraordinarily good, but it also became evident that they had little fear of death. Usually they were not physically equal to hand-to-hand combat with Americans. They made poor use of intelligence information and were untrained in security. They were brutally trained in combat methods, required little in the way of food and personal equipment, and did not complain of hard living conditions or boredom. Their chief failing was lack of flexibility. Their original training had been in attack, but they did learn to put up magnificent defenses. They specialized in desperate *banzai* charges—usually helped along with *sake*. Those who remained alive after the battle had passed frequently committed suicide, or holed up in caves and swamps, living on what little they could find and issuing forth to raid the victors.

**The Jap
soldier**

Army and marine definitions of amphibious landings are so different that it is impossible to reconcile their statistics. One army estimate has it that during the Pacific war there were 55 major amphibious landings, of which the army participated in 52 and the marines in 22; there were 324 secondary landings by the army (mostly un-

**Pacific
tactics**

opposed) of which 30 were participated in by the marines. Most of the secondary landings would be counted by the marines as mere "movements" rather than as amphibious operations. Quite obviously we can mention only a few even of the major landings. These operations had to be elaborately planned and carried out with split-second precision. Many of them violated the rule of thumb that the attacker should have the advantage three to one; on the other hand, the Americans usually had the advantages of air supremacy, naval gun fire, and superior fire power in the attacking units.

A fleet under way or in action at sea was another machine which required delicate planning and handling. Of course there were variations in organization, but the most significant was the carrier group. From one to seven carriers wielded the punch of such a force; but, since they were thin-skinned, they operated inside a moving barricade of cruisers and de-

stroyers which could ward off enemy submarines and could stiffen the heavens with anti-aircraft fire.

The work of U.S. submarines was one of the most significant factors in the defeat of Japan, even though for two years the service was handicapped by defective torpedoes. Some 3500 lives were lost out of a roster

Rôle of submarines whose seagoing personnel never rose above 16,000. Submarines were used as scouts in enemy waters, as screens before the fleet, as patrols to rescue downed airmen, and as contacts with guerrillas and spies. They are credited with having sunk 1 battleship, 4 carriers, 4 escort carriers, 12 cruisers, 43 destroyers, 23 submarines, and 189 other naval craft. Their favorite meat, however, was merchantmen, of which they sank 1042—about 55 per cent of Japan's merchant fleet. Japan could not build fast enough to replace these losses. Japanese commanders had hoped that their submarines could whittle the American Navy to a size where they could cope with it, but presently U.S. fleet and air action and a shortage of transportation forced them to take their subs from combat and set them to carrying supplies to isolated garrisons. As it was, the end of the war found the Pacific dotted with Japanese garrisons so weakened by starvation that they could not have put up a fight.

The Japanese had put their South Pacific strength into the Bismarck Archipelago and had thrust out tentacles down the Solomons and across New Guinea in order to cut the Allied supply line. The Solomons, about


Solomons Campaign: 750 miles in length, is made up of two rows of islands, one on each side of the passage called the Slot. The navy opened its counteroffensive on 7 August 1942 with marines in the jungle of Guadalcanal. In the darkness of the second night a Jap task force caught the slightly weaker U.S. and Australian fleet off Savo Island and sank four cruisers.

The Allied fleet hastily departed, and the marines were left for a month alone in the fetid rain forest without further supply. The Japs ran in reinforcements on the nightly "Tokyo Express" down the Slot and were able to put up a six-months battle. Eventually marine and army reinforcements arrived, but it was not until February 1943 that the island was declared secure. Meanwhile the navy fought half a dozen major actions, all but two of them slugging matches between surface ships. So many ships went down in Savo Sound that the sailors wryly named it Ironbottom Sound.

The march up the Solomons, leapfrogging from one island to another, lasted almost two years. In November 1943 the invaders reached the northernmost stronghold, Bougainville, and fought a six-months battle

March up the Solomons' ladder second only to Guadalcanal. Halsey had won naval and air ascendance during the day, but the Japanese were still masters of the night. A most serious loss to the Japanese was the death of Admiral Yamamoto, when his plane was shot down

BREAKING THE BISMARCKS BARRIER



Longitude East from Greenwich

J. W. CLEMENT CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.

(18 April 1943) by U.S. fighters which had been set on his trail by secret intelligence. He was succeeded by Admiral Koga; upon the death of Koga a year later Toyoda became commander in chief.

Unfortunately American commanders had too much confidence in the superiority of their gadgets. Trust in radar (not yet perfected) led to blunders, and they had to learn the hard way that Jap torpedoes would travel ten miles and deliver twice the explosive power of ours. The post-Guadalcanal period saw seven major naval battles fought. In most of them the Japs had the tactical advantage, but they did not have the power to stay and take their profit.

We turn now to MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Area. Australian troops were holding the New Guinea front, and American troops joined them late in the summer of 1942—the Sixth Army under General Walter Krueger.

Southwest Pacific Area “MacArthur's Navy” was the small Seventh Fleet, designed chiefly for amphibious operations. The Fifth Air Force had to undertake many of the functions performed by the fleet elsewhere—sea patrols, ferrying of troops and supplies, and fighting naval battles. General George C. Kenney, in command of U.S. and Australian air, was a blunt and breezy little man more interested in results than in protocol. His hospitality to experiments proved to be a valuable factor in enabling his scanty force to find ways of doing its job.

The battle of the Coral Sea had prevented the Japanese from approaching the southern coast of New Guinea by sea. Late in 1942 they planned a movement across the Owen Stanley Range on the Kokoda Trail and a naval move around the east coast. The latter was blocked when the Allies reached Milne Bay first and held it in a desperate infantry and air battle. On the Kokoda Trail the Japs and Aussies locked in combat in the rain forest, and the invasion was stopped only thirty miles from Port Moresby. By November the Allies had seized several airstrips on the north coast, and after three more months of the nastiest sort of campaigning amidst rotting swamps and jungles secured the Jap bases at Buna, Sanananda, and Gona.

MacArthur's next move so clearly had to be westward toward Lae and Salamaua in the Huon Gulf that Rabaul decided to reinforce them. On 2–4 March 1943 Kenney caught the reinforcing fleet of a dozen or so ships and in the battle of the Bismarck Sea all but blotted it out. MacArthur now seized Huon Gulf; moved over into New Britain, closest of the Bismarcks; and took the Admiralty Islands northwest of the Bismarck Sea. The Solomons and Papuan offensives had by March 1944 broken the Bismarcks barrier, and Rabaul with its 100,000 troops was left to die on the vine.

MacArthur now turned westward and made a series of leapfrog landings which by September reached Morotai in the Moluccas, within bombing distance of the Philippines. Meanwhile on the right the fleet was like-

wise leapfrogging. In November 1943 Spruance's Fifth Fleet covered a marine and army attack on the coral atolls of the Gilberts with landings on Makin and Tarawa. Errors in planning and execution made Tarawa a bloody conquest, for it cost the marines 3000 casualties. Numerous carrier strikes into the "Indian country" quickly followed, among them some designed to soften up the Marshalls. In February 1944 landings were made at Kwajalein and Eniwetok. The center of Japanese power in the Carolines was Truk; it received the compliment of being by-passed except for carrier and bomber raids intended to neutralize it.

Leapfrog-
ging, east
and west

Halsey now came north, and he and Spruance took turns at planning campaigns at Pearl Harbor, then commanding operations. When Halsey commanded, the fleet was called the Third; when Spruance commanded, it was called the Fifth. In operation the fleet was usually organized in divisions called Task Forces. Next on the list was the Marianas. Soldiers and marines under Marine General Holland M. ("Howlin' Mad") Smith attacked Saipan in June 1944. Stubborn resistance held up the movement to other islands, but Tinian and Guam fell by August, and the troops moved on to take the Palau Islands, another stubbornly contested conquest. Meanwhile U.S. and Japanese carrier planes had met in the first battle of the Philippine Sea, 19-20 June. Three Jap carriers were lost, two of them to submarines.

Marianas,
June-July
1944

In a conference at Pearl Harbor, Roosevelt approved MacArthur's plan for a return to the Philippines over King's desire to seize Formosa. The plan was to separate the Japanese in Mindanao and Luzon by attacking the Visayans in the center, landing first on Leyte. MacArthur was in command, and he had the Sixth Army for the initial landings with the Eighth to follow later under General Robert L. Eichelberger. The Seventh Fleet, now under Admiral Thomas Kinkaid, was in support with nearly a score of escort ("jeep") carriers. Halsey's Third Fleet (not under MacArthur's control) was to ward off any Japanese naval attack that might be launched against them. The landings began on 20 October 1944.


Philippines
invasion

A few days later disaster was escaped by a narrow margin when the Japanese Navy gathered for its last great integrated effort of the war—known as the second battle of the Philippine Sea, or the battle for Leyte Gulf. A northern force of carriers coming from Japan was to retreat on contact and thus entice the U.S. carriers away; a southern force would dash through Surigao Strait, south of Leyte, and a central force through San Bernardino Strait between Luzon and Samar. The latter two would converge upon and destroy the invasion forces.

Plan of
battle for
Leyte Gulf

American patrol submarines gave warning of the approaching central and southern forces, but Halsey and Kinkaid did not co-ordinate. Halsey

put up his entire air arm to batter Admiral Kurita's central force in the Sibuyan Sea on the morning of the 24th and erroneously supposed he had put it out of action. He then turned to meet the Jap fleet approaching from the northeast; air contact followed, and the green Japanese aviators fell like leaves. Admiral Ozawa's carrier fleet, designed as a sacrifice, turned and ran. Halsey followed, for once doing exactly as the Japanese had planned.



Far to the south Kinkaid encountered the southern force in Surigao Strait and in a dramatic night battle all but obliterated it. But suddenly on the morning of the 25th Kurita's central force emerged from San Bernardino Strait and headed for Kinkaid's baby flat-tops off Samar. A melee followed, and Kinkaid's invasion fleet seemed doomed to destruction when suddenly Kurita pulled off and went back through the strait. The only possible explanation is loss of morale. Meanwhile, at Kinkaid's frantic appeals, "Bull" Halsey pulled off part of his fleet and headed south—arriving just too late to head off Kurita.

While it is clear that Halsey was the dupe of a stratagem and Kinkaid failed to send out proper air reconnaissance, the over-all result was the greatest victory in modern naval warfare. The Japanese lost 4 carriers, 3 battleships, 20 cruisers and destroyers, and most of the 700 or so aircraft involved. The American loss was relatively light. Thereafter there was no Japanese Navy worth mentioning. A feature of this battle was the appearance for the first time of the Japanese *Kamikaze* (literally *Divine Wind*) suicide planes, which were to cause increasing destruction during the remainder of the war.

The reconquest of the Philippines was far from a push-over, even though MacArthur had the aid of guerrillas operating behind the Japanese lines and plentiful air help from both the army and the navy. Late in December the Eighth Army took over the Leyte job. Meanwhile Krueger leapfrogged the central Visayan Islands and landed on Mindoro, within easy fighter distance of Manila.

Conquest of the Phil- ippines

In January 1945 a force landed in Lingayen Gulf, and a smaller force landed north of Subic Bay to block any Jap retreat into Bataan. Manila was now closed in from all directions, but the city was desperately defended, and it was almost ruined before resistance ceased on 23 February. Meanwhile on 16 February paratroops were dropped on Corregidor, and troops landed from boats. For two weeks a battle raged in the tunnels of Corregidor, ending only when the last few hundred defenders blew up their refuge and sealed themselves in. The fall of Manila and the opening of Manila Bay by no means ended the battle for the Philippines. Scores of landings had to be made and the Jap garrisons smoked out where they lived.

The most neglected front in the Pacific war was Alaska. Geographically the shortest approach to the United States from Japan is by the North Pacific and within sight of the Aleutian Islands. As a military approach the Aleutians look more important on a globe than they probably are in fact, for they are the home of the world's vilest and most unpredictable weather. The Japs may have been used to such weather. At least their carrier planes bombed Dutch Harbor at the time of Midway, and a few days later landing forces took the all but unoccupied islands of Kiska and Attu.

The Alaska front

Straightway a clamor went up that the Japs should be driven from American soil. Since the loss was not important, the services played it down as much as possible, hoping that they would be allowed to put their men and supplies into more important theaters. Actually there was no chance that the Japanese would (as barber-shop strategists suggested) push along the Aleutians and make them a base for the invasion of the Puget Sound region. Nevertheless, army engineers and equipment were set to building the Alcan Highway from Dawson Creek, British Columbia

to Fairbanks, so that Alaska could be supplied without interference from the sea.

In March 1943, when the enemy tried to reinforce their garrisons, light surface fleets clashed in the battle of the Komandorskies. The Americans took a beating, but the Japs ran short of fuel and ammo and had to leave, herding their transports before them. Meanwhile the army had been building up strength to the sum of 150,000 men. In May the Americans made a landing in force on Attu, despite the usual vile weather. After 18 days of sharp action the Japs wound up with the usual *banzai* charge and mass suicides. Out of 2300 defenders only a handful survived. In August 1943 another full-dress landing of 35,000 Americans and Canadians on Kiska found that the birds had flown.

By the end of 1944 it was evident to the Japanese High Command that it had lost its bid for empire. The Japanese Navy and the air arms had suffered such attrition that they could not be restored; in any case, gaso-
 Japan's line and fuel oil were almost exhausted. The B-29's were
 desperate now bombing from the Marianas, and it was only a matter of
 situation time until the carriers reached Japan; their first raid occurred on 16 February 1945. Factory wheels had almost stopped turning for lack of fuel and raw materials, and millions of workers were idle. Japan faced the prospect of soon having its cities as thoroughly gutted as those of Germany.


The fall of the Marianas led to Tojo's displacement by Koiso, and in January 1945 the latter made an unofficial offer of surrender on the sole condition that the titular authority of the Mikado be retained in order to forestall chaos. No response was made. Possibly American leaders were convinced that Japan was still spiritually undefeated and intended to go down fighting. Certainly Japanese civilian morale was still higher than it had a right to be, for the people had been hoodwinked by false accounts of victories. It is probable also that official Washington split on the question of whether to dethrone the Mikado or to retain and use him.

American planners set forth three more stages in the war to eliminate the Japanese Empire: (1) bombing; (2) Russian conquest of Manchuria to deny its resources to Japan; and (3) invasion of the home islands with
 Planning or without Russian participation. The belief that Russia
 the rest of must attack Manchuria was based upon the erroneous re-
 the war port that Japan still had its best army there and that the stubbornly militarist Japanese government might make a last stand in that area, which was an important raw-materials and industrial complex. Actually, the Manchurian army had been drained away and replaced by inferior units, and even its air cover had been withdrawn and consumed by the Pacific war.

In preparation for the invasion of Japan the island of Okinawa, in the

CLOSING IN ON JAPAN, 1944-45

 Air Thrusts
 Ground Thrusts



Ryukyus, was to be seized as a base. In November 1945 Kyushu, the southernmost home island, would be invaded by MacArthur in Operation OLYMPIC; on 1 March 1946 Operation CORONET would be carried out against Honshu, the main island. It was anticipated that a million casualties would be suffered in the invasion of the home islands.

During the island war the army air forces had aided in the softening up of Jap strongholds preparatory to amphibious attack and had been assigned the tasks of neutralizing those which had been by-passed. In the latter part of 1944 the various air forces were united under USAAF against Japan as the Far Eastern Air Force. Only the giant B-29 bombers of the Twentieth Air Force were excepted.

In January 1945 General Curtis E. LeMay took command of the B-29's in the Marianas. As nearly as could be learned, the B-29's were not destroying their industrial targets in Japan, and LeMay therefore resolved to burn them out and mounted a 10-day series of fire raids. The first raid, on the night of 9-10 March, was made by 285 B-29's against Tokyo. The Japanese estimated that 97,000 people were roasted alive and 1,200,000 made homeless. Attacks on one city after another followed until the stock of incendiaries ran out. After pausing to aid the Okinawa campaign, the raids were resumed with incendiaries and high explosives. By the end of May the industrial half of Tokyo was in ruins, and the leading cities of Nagoya, Yokohama, Osaka, and Kobe were devastated. Thereafter scattered raids began on lesser cities. Only Kyoto, an artistic and religious center, was spared.

After Leyte Gulf the fleets went where they chose, raking targets from Tokyo to Saigon. The only remaining base of any significance which blocked the Pacific approach to Japan was Iwo Jima, a cinder pile about six miles long which lay midway between Tokyo and the Marianas. From 19 February to 26 March the marines in their greatest operation took Iwo Jima against outstandingly stubborn opposition. The price paid was 5350 dead, but it may have been worth it for eventually as many as 25,000 air crewmen made emergency landings there.

The final operation of the Pacific war was the battle for Okinawa. This island, over 65 miles long and 7 miles at the widest, lies 350 miles south of Kyushu. The Japanese plan was to retire to the southern tip and fort up while *Kamikazes* from Kyushu knocked out the American fleet. The invading force was the largest yet gathered in the Pacific for a single landing. There were 318 combat ships and 1139 auxiliaries (not including LC's), and a total of about 550,000 men of all services. The landing force was the U.S. Tenth Army commanded by General Simon B. Buckner (1886-1945). He had two corps: one marines, commanded by General Roy S. Geiger (1885-1947), and one army, commanded by General John R. Hoge (b. 1893). Seven divisions

were available for the operation. Spruance, under Nimitz, was in overall command.

"Love-Day" was Easter Sunday, 1 April. The landing was all but unopposed and the marines cleared the northern half of the island in short order. The real battle centered in the south, as the Japanese had to be dug out with grenades and flame throwers. Buckner was killed during the battle, and Geiger took command. The *Kamikazes* proved a disappointment to the Japanese, for few either of them or of air-force raiders got through. All together there were about 1900 suicide attacks and 36 ships went down, but no combat vessel larger than a destroyer was sunk. Total American casualties on sea and land were 12,100 dead and 36,000 wounded.

Battle of
Okinawa,
1 Apr.–30
June 1945

The navy had never agreed with the JCS estimate of how hard it would be to crack the Japanese home citadel. Secretary of the Navy Knox had died in April 1944 and had been succeeded by James V. Forrestal (1892–1949). Forrestal approved a radio campaign aimed at the Japanese High Command and based on the theme: *Time is running out for Japan*. The invasion of Okinawa was followed by the appointment of Admiral Suzuki as premier, evidence that the peace party, represented by the Japanese Navy, had come openly into political power. There was still danger that Tojo's war party would stage a *coup d'état*, but the new government moved toward peace as rapidly as it could. Its one objective was to save the "sovereignty" of the Mikado, and it began to explore in devious ways whether "unconditional surrender" would permit that.

Japan
moves to-
ward peace

In June Suzuki asked Stalin to request the Allies to clarify the meaning of unconditional surrender and ask for peace terms. Stalin was moving an army into the Far East to seize Manchuria and had no intention of promoting a surrender which would have spoiled his plans. However, it seems likely that the Allies knew of Suzuki's move from other sources. The Potsdam Declaration of 26 July (though this part was not signed by Stalin until later) laid down Allied demands in detail but said nothing about the Emperor. It was fully evident that Suzuki was stalling, perhaps in hope of terms, and had not made an unequivocal offer of surrender. On the other hand, Washington was also in balance over the question of whether to retain the Mikado and refused to encourage surrender by announcing an affirmative attitude.

An A-bomb was dropped on Hiroshima on 6 August (Far Eastern date), and its blast snuffed out 80,000 lives. On the 8th, Russian troops jumped off on their invasion of Manchuria. The weak Japanese Army promptly collapsed. On the 9th an atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki. The next day the Japanese government accepted the Potsdam Declaration, but asked that Hirohito remain as emperor. As soon as this action was known there was a short,

Closing
events

sharp revolt which centered in the palace guard but was suppressed. While this was in progress Secretary of State Byrnes answered that the Emperor would be retained for the present, subject, however, to the orders of the Allied Supreme Commander.

On the 14th Truman announced that Japan had surrendered, and a few days later a Japanese delegation flew into Manila and signed the preliminary documents. Finally on 2 September (Far Eastern date), in Tokyo Bay on board the U.S.S. *Missouri*, MacArthur presided over the full-dress surrender.

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Chapter LI

WORLD WAR II: DIPLOMACY

1 *Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Russians*

WE TURN now to the international political front, where the Western Allies even while they were pounding the Axis into submission were throwing away the fruits of their victory. Throwing it not to the defeated powers but to their sullen and unco-operative Eurasian ally. The blunders of Versailles and even of the period of the Long Armistice pale beside those of the wartime conferences; nor in the showdown did the mighty Churchill exercise appreciably greater sense of reality than his American opposite number. Losing the war by diplomacy

Seen in retrospect, the diplomacy of World War II resolves itself into a fundamental political struggle between Britain and Russia, with the United States futilely oscillating between the two but in the sum standing more often with Russia than with Britain. The higher echelons of the American administration did not at the time realize what is now commonplace knowledge: that Stalin's great objective (where he could not get immediate control) was to promote chaos and misery in order to pave the way for eventual seizure. As we have pointed out, Stalin may not have been concerned with communism except as a propaganda line and as a club to use in softening up his enemies. His great objective was the victory of Russian imperialism, and at the end of the war he had better reason to be satisfied with his winnings than did Britain or the United States. He had just about everything he had expected except Trieste and the Ruhr. Russian imperialism

We have noted before that Britain's leaders, conscious of their weakness, had desired American support to save British liberties and empire against the totalitarian tide. They reasoned that because of their greater

TABULATION OF PRINCIPAL CONFERENCES OF WORLD WAR II

Code Name	Place	Date	Chief Participants	Decisions
	Argentia Bay	Aug. 1941	Roosevelt, Churchill	Atlantic Charter. Discussion of mutual problems.
ARCADIA	Washington (1)	Dec.-Jan. 1941-42	Roosevelt, Churchill	Primary emphasis on Atlantic Front. UN Declaration. Set up Combined Chiefs of Staff.
	Washington (2)	June 1942	Roosevelt, Churchill	Discussed No. African invasion. Strengthen Egypt against Rommel.
	London	July 1942	Comb. Chiefs of Staff	Decision to invade No. Africa; France postponed. Pacific postponed.
SYMBOL	Casablanca	Jan. 1943	Roosevelt, Churchill	Unconditional-surrender declaration. Decision to invade Sicily. Build-up to in- vade France. Accelerate Battle of the At- lantic.
TRIDENT	Washington (3)	May 1943	Roosevelt, Churchill	Continue pressure on Italy. Increase bomber war on Germany. Decision to in- vade France. Accelerate war in Pacific and CBI.
QUADRANT	Quebec (1)	Aug. 1943	Roosevelt, Churchill	"Firm" decision to invade France. S.E. Asia Com. under Mountbatten and Stilwell.
	Moscow	Oct. 1943	Hull, Eden, Molotov	Four Nations Agreement. Approved es- tablishment of the United Nations; "demo- cratic" régimes in Italy and Austria; pun- ishment of war criminals.
SEXTANT	Cairo	Nov.-Dec. 1943	Roosevelt, Churchill, Chiang	Manchuria promised to China.
EUREKA	Teheran	Nov.-Dec. 1943	Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin	Plans for second front. Aid to Yugoslav partisans.
	Bretton Woods	July 1944	Economic rep. from 44 nations	Set up International Monetary Fund and International Bank for Reconstruction.
	Dumbarton Oaks	Aug.-Sept. 1944	Stettinius, Cadogan, Gromyko	Proposed charter of United Nations.
OCTAGON	Quebec (2)	Sept. 1944	Roosevelt, Churchill	Morgenthau Plan approved.
	Malta	Jan. 1945	Roosevelt, Churchill	Planned final campaign against Hitler.
ARGONAUT	Yalta	Feb. 1945	Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin	Manchuria, etc., to Soviets for aid against Japan. Polish boundaries set. Occupation zones set. Compromise on other problems or Allied refusal to agree.
	San Francisco	Apr.-June 1945	Rep. of 48 nations	Charter of the United Nations.
TERMINAL	Potsdam	July-Aug. 1945	Truman, Churchill, Attlee, Stalin	Potsdam Declaration. Boundary and reparations.

experience they should lead in political and politico-military affairs, but they were doomed to see this leadership flouted partly because of American haste to win the war—and this even though, in general, Roosevelt and Hopkins were pro-British. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had little sympathy with the British view that war is an extension of politics. They wanted victory, cheap, quick, and overwhelming, and quite without regard to the postwar political coloration of the world. There is no use denying that both civil and military chiefs correctly reflected the nuances of American public opinion, including all its naïvety, heedless optimism, and juvenile reliance on naked power in the prosecution of the war. **American haste to win the war**

Not only did American leaders fail to grasp the political implications of many of their military actions; the decisions to pulverize Germany and Japan were militarily unnecessary, unforgivably destructive of centers of civilization, and psychological and physical deterrents to postwar recovery. Worst of all, they ended by giving the Soviet Union a tremendous edge in the inevitable power controversy; indeed, Russia might not have become a world menace without the pulverization of its nearest power rivals. The United States sought to convince Britain, France, and Holland that, to avoid catastrophe, freedom or commonwealth status must be given to their colonial empires—a good long-term project but one undertaken with more haste than judgment. Russia was to be supported against Britain. The place of the old balance of power was to be taken by a new league, the United Nations. **The American program**

It now takes no deep perception to see what was wrong with the American program. It failed (1) to recognize that the Soviet Union was in no essential different from Nazi Germany, except perhaps in having a shrewder dictator; and (2) this being true, no league of nations could hope to be effective, since effectiveness must be based upon a mutual agreement on ideological objectives, at least among the Great Powers. Until this fundamental agreement was reached, the balance of power was the only realistic status in world politics. It seems fair to say that Churchill saw those two points, but he failed either to clarify the issues or to sell them to the West, thus helping to tear down the British case for leadership.

On the fundamental question of what to do about Russia there is no indication that Roosevelt (until the last few days of his life) ever heeded the warnings which were given him by the few realists who managed to slip by the palace guard. Harry Hopkins, who seems most to have influenced Roosevelt's attitude toward Stalin, may have possessed a certain shrewdness, but he was eager to be in on "the know," and he was susceptible to flattery. Churchill and Stalin both laid themselves out to charm him, but the latter had the edge because Hopkins was sympathetic. **Roosevelt and the Russians**

Next to Hull and Hopkins the molders of American policy toward Russia were Stettinius and Morgenthau. Stettinius was a handsome but utterly trusting young man who inherited Hull's mantle. Morgenthau was Jewish and as such not unnaturally emotionally antipathetic to Germany. Some authorities claim that there is adequate proof that these secondary figures, while not themselves communists, were influenced by advisers who were fellow-travelers if not actually secret Communist Party



From the Arizona Republic

The Three Musketeers

By no means all Americans believed in the goodwill of the Soviet "ally."

members. That Russia in its dealings was faithless, sullen, truculent, and insulting was well known to Roosevelt. Nevertheless, taking his cue from Hopkins, FDR actually thought that he could convert Stalin to democracy by persuasion, by the celebrated Roosevelt charm, by giving him everything he requested, and by sowing in the American mind a favorable impression of the Soviet Union.

The first steps of the American program became evident at the Casa-

blanca Conference in January 1943. Roosevelt, possibly on a sudden impulse, proposed to Churchill that they state unconditional surrender of the Axis as the military aim of the war. Churchill promptly agreed. Thinking men were appalled—and Axis propagandists overjoyed. Not only did it knock the props from under Allied psychological warfare, but it proved to be a powerful weapon in welding Germans and Japanese in fanatical resistance. In the first case it resulted in the collapse of all responsible authority at the close of the war.

Uncondi-
tional-sur-
render de-
mand

Though the inevitable consequences were repeatedly brought to his attention, Roosevelt stubbornly refused to alter or clarify the demand. And yet the fact remains that neither Italy nor Japan surrendered without conditions. Churchill later tried to wriggle out of the responsibility for the Casablanca demand, yet at the time he heartily concurred. It has been suggested that he expected it to be a counter to the Atlantic Charter, which he had come to regard as inconvenient.

As we have seen, the rigidity of the unconditional-surrender demand led to conflict among the policy-makers in Tokyo and Washington and probably prolonged the Pacific war for months and led to the horrors of the B-29 fire raids and the A-bomb. However, the most striking effect of the demand in the light of what we know now was that it was a powerful factor in giving Stalin control of Europe and Asia by assuring the utter destruction of his rivals. Stalin shrewdly used it as a propaganda weapon in Germany in favor of Russia and against the Western Allies. No less significant, it convinced him that the Western Allies would not make a separate peace and that he could browbeat them safely whenever it suited his purposes.

Plays into
Stalin's
hands

The above circumstances fitted neatly into Stalin's perpetual snarling demand for a second front. The British project for an invasion of the Balkans would interpose Allied forces between Russia and its traditional goal, the Mediterranean, and might be taken as a tip-off to Hitler that he could concentrate his forces against the Russians and look toward a negotiated peace with the West. Quite naturally Stalin countered by categorically demanding a full-dress invasion of France, where it would do him the most good and the least harm. It was probably as a counter to Britain's Balkan scheme that Stalin organized a National Committee of Free Germans and entered into secret conversations with Hitler. These "secret" conversations were well known to the Western Allies and paralyzed them with fear. They probably had something to do with the British acceptance of Marshall's militarily realistic and politically naïve plan for the French invasion.

Churchill possessed great historical knowledge and imaginative insight (except where British imperialism was involved) and was at no great loss to interpret totalitarian thought processes even though it was not always

Churchill and the Russians possible to anticipate them. Indeed, he called the shots on both Hitler and Stalin with uncanny accuracy, and it is possible to argue that his errors in dealing with them were largely due to political and psychological factors beyond his control.

As soon as Poland was divided in 1939, both Germany and Russia undertook to blot out its educated class. We are familiar with the horrible way in which the Nazis killed perhaps as many as 6,000,000 Jews, largely Poles. Stalin was less wasteful and consigned millions of Poles to prison work camps. It soon became evident that Poland divided Stalin would listen to no nonsense about his right to retain the Baltic States and eastern Poland. When Hull went to Moscow (October 1943) Stalin took him into camp by promising eventually to join the war against Japan, and apparently he caused Hull to forget all about Poland.

Despite the protests of the London Polish government, Churchill agreed to leave eastern Poland to Russia; in return Poland was to receive Germany east of the Oder. In July 1944 the Red Army on the outskirts of Poland a Warsaw gave the signal for a rising of the Polish underground, which would pave the way for Russian entry. For Red satellite two months the heroic Poles battled in the city while the Russians sat on their tails outside. The Polish patriots were slaughtered and the back of Polish nationalism broken. Stalin now recognized the puppet "Lublin Polish government." At Yalta Churchill and Roosevelt accepted it on condition that it be "democratic" (whatever that meant), take London Poles into the cabinet, and establish free elections, universal suffrage, and the secret ballot. No serious attempt was ever made to see that Russia observed these provisos. World War II, let it be recalled, had begun in an attempt to save Poland from Hitler. The mission was successful—only Poland was allowed to fall to Stalin.

The abandonment of Poland finds some excuse in military necessity, but that is not true in the case of Yugoslavia. Churchill had his choice of favoring nationalist or communist partisans in that country and for Churchill some inexplicable reason chose the latter, led by Moscow-trained Tito. In October 1944 Churchill and Eden went to Tito Moscow and, in the Kremlin, over glasses of vodka, arranged to divide the Balkans into spheres of influence. Russia was to have a three-quarters say in Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria, and half say in Yugoslavia! Stalin must have chuckled into his mustache; when his armies reached the Danube, he had *all* the say. Churchill, in a panic lest the Russians occupy Greece, dropped British paratroopers to fight the Communist underground.

While Roosevelt and Churchill were blandly turning their minor allies over to that great humanitarian, Uncle Joe, they were also considering

the problem of what to do with Germany. Henry Morgenthau, always anxious to mold high policy, moved in on this problem. A fellow-traveling economist named Harry Dexter White headed a Treasury committee which drew up a plan which would have excluded British and American troops from the occupation of Germany, impounded its natural resources, and reduced it to an agricultural economy. White's purpose was to turn effective control over to Russia and to so frustrate the Germans that they would turn to communism.

The Morgenthau Plan for Germany

The amazing thing is that Morgenthau got both FDR and Churchill to adopt the plan. Under Hull's and Stimson's prodding Roosevelt presently awoke to his blunder, but Morgenthau was already far out in front. His "chaos boys" had infiltrated everywhere, and even Stimson had to approve of a notably stiff directive (JCS 1067) for the government of Germany. Actually, as Churchill may or may not have foreseen, events were to prevent the full enforcement of the Morgenthau Plan, but even at that it has cost the American taxpayer a half-billion dollars a year.

In February 1945 the Allied Big Three met at Yalta on the Black Sea to discuss the problems of a war which was plainly coming to an end. Here was Roosevelt's chance to win the honest and effective co-operation of Stalin. He lost, but this was not immediately evident in the decisions made (with the exception, perhaps, on China), and, indeed, Roosevelt and Churchill felt that they had bargained shrewdly and well. They won a compromise on the United Nations Charter, but Stalin retained the power to wreck its effectiveness. They insisted that France must be treated as a full partner in the postwar occupation of Germany and got their way later on. At the moment, however, Germany was divided into three zones of occupation; Berlin, over 100 miles within the Russian zone, was divided up also, but no lane of ground communications with the West was assured.

Yalta compromises

Stalin demanded that Germany east of the Oder and Neisse rivers be turned over to Poland, and "temporary" consent was given. Russia's claim to 80 per cent of Germany's heavy industrial equipment was stalled, but Stalin did get implied consent to drafting labor as a form of reparations. His maneuvers to get political control of Germany and the Slavic lands were blocked, at least that was what Roosevelt and Churchill thought.

Far more important in view of our excellent hindsight were the provisions concerning China and Japan. The Cairo Conference had guaranteed Chinese possession of Manchuria, and at both the Teheran and Moscow conferences Stalin had expressed his intention of entering the war against Japan. Despite the navy's objection, Marshall had carried in the JCS his recommendation to get Rus-

China sold to Russia



sia into the war against Japan; eventually he also swung the CCS and Churchill into line. There is no doubt that at this time Roosevelt was a dying man, and it is only charitable to suppose that his judgment was clouded and that he was overpersuaded by Marshall. He was told that there was no certainty of ending the war before 1947; moreover, there was as yet no certainty that the A-bomb would prove to be practicable.

The result, at any rate, was one of the most far-reaching decisions of the war. In order to get him into a war which he was itching to enter in any case, Stalin was given the rights which had been lost by the Russo-Japanese War: the southern half of Sakhalin, the lease of Port Arthur, pre-eminent interest in Dairen, and joint control with China of the Manchurian railways. The Kurile Islands were to be transferred from Japan. Russia's existing dominance of Outer Mongolia was confirmed.

Defense of this surrender to Russia rests on several factors upon whose validity it has thus far been impossible to get agreement. The belief that it was a military necessity was based upon misinterpretations which even

**Defense
of Yalta**

then were regarded by many experts as fantastically cautious. The second item, that the return to Russia of its Manchurian rights was only doing justice, obviously depends upon one's concept of whether that was reconcilable with justice to the Chinese—the original owners of the province. The third point, that Stalin demanded what he got and there was no way to prevent him from taking it, is a curious inversion of moral outlook as well as inconsistent with the facts of Allied power then available. The fourth point, that Chiang got out of Yalta what he wanted—a deal with Stalin over Manchuria in the form of a treaty—seems justified by present knowledge but may be modified when more is known about his thinking at the time. Last is the view that the action was essential to get Stalin's co-operation in the United Nations; this is, to say the least, an unrealistic view of the fundamentals of international co-operation, which needs no further comment in the light of subsequent events.

**Defeat of
the West-
ern Allies**

The Yalta agreements slammed shut the Open Door, which we had gone to war to keep open against Japan. But, more than this, they smashed the Four Freedoms and the Atlantic Charter to smithereens. The conference was not two weeks past when the triumphant revival spirit began to dissipate. Stalin calmly put his own interpretations on Yalta's vaguely worded agreements, read "temporary" as "permanent," and assumed those political controls which Roosevelt and Churchill had refused to give him. Red troops and proconsuls in the Balkan States abruptly excluded the Western Allies from consultations and shot those members of the underground who had co-operated with them. Stalin set up his own puppet government in Austria. The Polish arrangements were already weighted in favor of Stalin, but he insolently took what was left and dared the Allies to do anything about it. Roosevelt and Churchill were preparing to take up the dare when the former died.

**Opportuni-
ty's last
knock**

Truman was handicapped by inexperience and the general feeling that an impression of harmony with Russia must be maintained, and even by the fact that there was no record of some of Roosevelt's agreements. Officials were continually on edge lest the Russians spring one of these agreements on them. Despite the evidences of bad faith on the part of Stalin, Allied leaders did not have the courage to challenge him, for they knew (and had connived at) the power exercised by fellow-travelers over public opinion. In March 1945 Germany was anxious to surrender in the West and continue the fight in the East, but the Western Allies did not dare use Stalin's own methods against him. Here was the opportunity (with Allied troops on the scene) to retrieve the disasters of the wartime conferences and force Stalin to disgorge—but the courage and vision were lacking.

The Potsdam Conference of July–August 1945 saw Russia firmly lodged

in Central Europe and the Allied armies in process of dissolution, with the consequence that there was no way to thwart Stalin's wishes, if he was determined to take what he wanted—as seemed to be the case. They pretended to make only temporary settlements pending the coming peace conference (which has never come and probably never will), and a Council of Foreign Ministers was set up to settle details. Czechoslovakia was restored, and Poland received its new boundaries. East Prussia was divided between Russia and Poland. Russia hung on to the Baltic States. Germany's living standards were to be held down to that of its neighbors—a condition easily enforced since the west was cut off from the food-producing east, and the Soviet armies robbed the latter of its surplus. Russia assumed the right to remove industrial equipment from its own zone, and it was to be given 25 per cent of that removed from the other zones. About the only significant success of the Allies, in the end tremendously significant, was that they were able to block Stalin's demand for a hand in the control of the Ruhr.

The next year a supplementary agreement provided that industrial production was to be cut almost in half and a large part of the remaining production was to go to Russia, part of it in exchange for products of East Germany. Russia made no pretense of fulfilling its part of the bargain, but it demanded rigid fulfillment of the Allied share. The Potsdam Declaration, of which the above provisions are merely a simplified résumé, made mass unemployment and dependence on Allied doles inevitable. There is something ironical in one clause of which the negotiators were very proud:

It is the intention of the Allies that the German people be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis.

2 *The War and Imperialism in Asia*

Despite the fact that he was half American, Churchill was prone to errors in dealing with Americans. He lacked adjustability and reliability in his contacts with them—as, indeed, did many of his British confreres—and this weakness led to friction. He was too prone to bring pressure for the removal of American commanders who shared the national penchant for adopting the quickest and most direct means of winning the war. His stubborn campaign for a Balkan front was perhaps wise, yet it is doubtful if he ever tried to sell it as an *anti-imperialist* measure, the only appeal it could offer to most Americans. He was quite incapable of realizing that unless imperialism was changed, the British Empire would crack wide open, as it presently did.

Roosevelt saw that Churchill was undermining the Atlantic Charter, vague as that was, and so was losing world support for the Allied cause.

Americans increasingly got the impression that the partnership was changing base, and that the British were more and more openly using them. This idea may have had something to do with Roosevelt's effort to convince Stalin that Britain and the U.S. were not allied against him. Roosevelt regarded the war as, among other things, a grand effort to eliminate Western imperialism in Asia. On the other hand the Dutch, De Gaulle, and Churchill, though forced frequently to play up to Roosevelt's desires, were stubbornly determined not to liquidate their empires, particularly in Asia, where the colonial demand for independence was loudest.

Clash over
imperi-
alism

Churchill made his stand clear in his well-known pronouncement that he had not taken the position of head of His Majesty's government in order to liquidate the empire. Accordingly he was continually concerned that the events of the war be interpreted to save British face in the Orient, and in this the Dutch and French made common cause with him. The result was an epochal melee among British, Americans, and Chinese. Imperialism was doomed to defeat partly because of the American stand, partly because of the coming victory of the Labor Party in Britain. But China was a different story.

In China the United States was confronted by a dilemma, either horn of which posed disastrous possibilities. Chiang's resistance to Japan had been strong at first, but by 1941 it had flagged due to exhaustion, shortage of munitions, and the growing corruption in Kuomintang ranks. That the Japs were bogged down in China was a tribute to the silent and effective opposition of its people and its unorganized guerrillas rather than to its armies, whether Red or Nationalist. Moreover, the hatred between the two parties was so great that they devoted their chief energies to watching and at times fighting each other, leaving the Japanese as much as possible to time and the United States.

U.S. di-
lemma in
China

There was little to choose between the two parties. The Reds were (by Chinese standards) efficient and incorruptible, but their chiefs were rigidly Marxist in theory and pro-Russian in sympathy. Still, Marxism was not applicable to peasant China; so the Reds masqueraded as agrarian reformers and did not emphasize publicly (though they did not deny) their true nature. Actually they did distribute land to the peasants, though their object was to get the goodwill of the people until such time as they should be strong enough to collectivize the land. Foreign liberals fell for the deception and failed to realize that the Reds were only patiently playing the game which would win power. The Nationalists were under no foreign thumb, but that was about their only virtue.

The political situation that followed upon the fall of Burma was instructive to any student of human nature. The loss of Burma was not re-

garded by the British as an unmixed disaster. True, it meant loss of face, but it also closed the Burma Road by which a trickle of supplies had been going through to the Nationalists. The British had for some time feared that the rise of a strong Nationalist movement or of an effective Nationalist army would be a postwar menace to their economic control of China and a bad example to the subject peoples of Asia. Chiang hated the British and the Russians. His real sympathy was for Germany, partly because he favored fascism, partly because he wanted it to beat Russia—and thereby also defeat the Chinese Reds. Germany would have a better chance to do so if the United States would put first priority into defeating Japan. Quite obviously it would go far toward solving all of Chiang's problems because it would defeat Russia and Japan, weaken Mao Tse-tung's Reds, and lose face and economic power for Britain.

The United States had a sentimental weakness for China, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff favored the Open Door in China as a matter of course. But just now they were interested in finding a way to pin down the million or two of Jap troops in China, who otherwise might be poured into the South Pacific. However, the crises in Europe and the Pacific would not permit them to divert even a single division of infantry to China, though they could spare some arms and airplanes. Accordingly they looked to Britain and China to co-operate in keeping the Japs busy in China.

Now Britain and China had no intention of fighting in Asia. This may sound unpleasant, but it was only natural; moreover, they regarded it as no worse than America's dilatory actions before Pearl Harbor. Chiang planned to wheedle great stores of Lend-Lease arms and squirrel them away for the day when Japan was defeated and he could move against the Reds. The British had lost a million men in World War I, and the empire's leadership plainly showed the effect. Churchill had no intention of repeating the mistake but was anxious to win military and political victory cheaply. One way was to let the United States fight the Pacific war—indeed, Britain had no forces to send into it—but to see to it that it was presented to Asiatics as an *Allied* effort. At the same time he could make hay by picturing the United States as a supporter of British imperialism.

Roosevelt may have made many mistakes, but at least he did not fall into this trap; indeed, he went eventually to the opposite extreme and fell into other traps. He renounced U.S. extraterritorial rights in China—a good move—and overrode Britain and Russia to get China rated as a Great Power in the United Nations Council. He refused to let the truth be told about Chiang but fostered the prevarication that the Gismo was a patriot and a democrat. He accepted

British ver-
sus Chi-
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tionalists

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for China

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Roosevelt
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the radical alibi that the Chinese Reds were merely agrarian reformers and tried to promote the JCS desire to unite Chiang and Mao against the Japs. He made a tragic mistake, but it was of a piece with his others: a failure to grasp the connection between war and politics and to realize the fundamental irreconcilability of totalitarianism and democracy.

During the last two years of the war, State and War Department informants agreed that the Chinese Reds were rising in power and aggressiveness as Nationalist robbery and corruption alienated the people. Repeated warnings were sent to Washington that a war between the two parties was in the cards and that it could scarcely help but involve Russia and the United States. The latter, therefore, must find a way of reforming the Nationalists in order to win Chinese popular support or else it would be forced to deal with the victorious Reds. It was out of this dilemma that there arose the project for a coalition between the two parties. The project fascinated the State Department simply because it was a desperate alternative to disaster. It was well known that there were honest and able men in both régimes who were neither communists nor fascists, and it was hoped to mold them into a middle force which could re-establish order in China and build up democracy.

**Basis of
U.S. policy
in China**

The man who was selected to force the British and the Chinese to help win their own war was General Joseph Warren ("Vinegar Joe") Stilwell, born in Florida of New York stock. He was a wispy little man with an acid tongue, a sardonic sense of humor, and a mind filled with suspicion and a high sense of duty. Stilwell had spent fifteen years in China. There he had learned the language fairly well, become acquainted with Chiang, and trudged through the mud observing the Chinese armies in action. Stilwell was well conversant with Chinese administrative corruption, but he always believed in Chinese soldiers and the Chinese people. It must be recognized, however, that he was an old-fashioned soldier and had a limited appreciation of the significance of administration, intelligence, planning, logistics, and, finally, of air power.

**Joseph W.
Stilwell
(1883–
1946)**

The CBI theater—which Stilwell irreverently called the manure pile—stretched across southern Asia for 3000 miles from Karachi, its chief port of entry, to Kweilin, its chief air base in China. Stilwell was C-in-C of all U.S. forces, Lend-Lease administrator for India and China, U.S. representative in Allied councils, and Chiang's chief of staff. The last job was intended by the JCS to help him goad Chiang into committing troops to battle, but Chiang regarded it as making Stilwell his subordinate and therefore obligated to obey military orders and—most to the point—pour in Lend-Lease matériel. Chiang would never admit that Stilwell had a double role. In a way one can understand his point. Britain and Russia were

receiving Lend-Lease without stipulations, and Chiang regarded it as insulting that Stilwell presumed to specify what should be done with his.

Marshall supposed that the war would last until 1947 or 1948; so Stilwell's instructions called for a long-range program. He was to retrain and equip the Nationalist armies and, if possible, the Red armies in order to enable them to pin down the Japanese and presumably prepare for the day when the U.S. Army would reach China. In order to do so, Stilwell saw that he would have to open a ground-supply route from India to China, which meant that Burma had to be taken from the Japs. He began by getting Chiang's reluctant permission to retrain and equip the Chinese army which had escaped from Burma to India.

Meanwhile Stilwell had run head-on into Chiang's determination to sit out the Pacific war. Chiang had found powerful support for his policy in his air adviser, General Claire L. Chennault, a black-avised Texan who had quit the U.S. Air Force in disgust at the victory of bombers over fighters. Chennault's Flying Tigers had fought the Japanese brilliantly, then he had become head of the U.S. China Air Task Force, eventually the Fourteenth Air Force. Chennault got along with Chiang because he was willing to accept the Nationalists as they were, and he resented Stilwell's power and his attempts to change Chiang.

Supplies had to be flown into China over 17,000-foot mountains (the Hump) from India, and it was not until the summer of 1944 that the difficulties of the operation were licked. Chennault, an ardent advocate of air power, had no use for troops except as guards and did all he could to undercut Marshall's plan to reform the Chinese Army. His confident guarantee was to force the collapse of Japan within a year if he was given modest air reinforcements. Chiang backed him in obtaining his demand for the bulk of the supplies flown over the Hump. Stilwell warned him that if he pestered the Japs too much they would move in on his airfields; let him wait until Chinese troops were trained and armed to defend him. Chennault apparently did not grasp the significance of training.

Late in 1943 Stilwell invaded northern Burma with his Chinese troops aided by U.S. advisers, American air, and a special commando unit known as Merrill's Marauders. After one of the most colorful and stubbornly contested campaigns of the war he actually pushed back the Japs and opened the way for the construction of the Ledo Road—which, however, came too late to be of use. At any rate, he had proved that the Chinese could fight.

Stilwell sealed his own fate by his victory. British propaganda in Asia was carefully tailored to represent all successes as British or, at most, Allied. Stilwell had committed the unpardonable crime by leading Chinese

troops to victory in a campaign whose success British experts had confidently called impossible. The British had given some halfhearted support to the Burma Campaign and were now put to the trouble of completing the conquest of the country in order to maintain their prestige, instead of waiting quietly for the Japanese collapse after American victory in the Pacific.

**Stilwell's
fate sealed
by his vic-
tory**

Chiang made propaganda about having gone to the rescue of the British, but he was mortally offended at Stilwell's success and afraid of Stilwell's Chinese generals. Also, Chennault's nose was out of joint and, to make it worse, the Japs—as Stilwell had warned—had suddenly begun to gather in his advanced fields. Both Chennault and Chiang blamed Stilwell for this situation because he was using in Burma the only Chinese troops fit for action. Accordingly Stilwell's Chinese were marched and flown hastily across the mountains to the rescue, but Chennault's important base at Kweilin fell anyhow.

The question of Chinese command and Chiang's demand for control of Lend-Lease now reached a crisis, but Marshall's firm support of Stilwell beat down opposition from all sources. Then, in Washington, Harry Hopkins blabbed to Chiang's brother-in-law that Roosevelt was not unalterably in favor of Stilwell. Chiang promptly demanded and got Stilwell's withdrawal.

CBI was divided into two theaters, and General Albert G. Wedemeyer was placed in command in China. General Patrick Hurley, an Oklahoma politician and once Hoover's Secretary of War, became ambassador. Hurley stopped off twice in Moscow and naïvely accepted the assurances of Stalin and Molotov that they did not regard the Chinese Reds as communists and would be pleased to see Chiang strengthened. Thereafter Hurley publicly supported the coalition but privately supported Chiang. As a result, the latter saw no reason to accept anything short of complete domination of China, while the Reds were confirmed in their resolution to conquer.

**Deteriora-
tion of the
Chinese
situation**

When Marshall finally went on his postwar mission to China, it was too late for the coalition, if such a thing had ever been possible. The Chinese moderates could not stomach the Nationalists' corruption and their support of the tyrannical landlord system. Chiang blocked the American move by slaughtering the Nationalist left wing, and those who escaped death fled the country or turned to the Reds and were joined by revolting peasants and bankrupt merchants. American attempts to find a middle ground reckoned without the greed of the effective Nationalist leaders and the stubborn Marxism of the Red leaders. The coalition policy proposed by the U.S. antagonized both extremes and was regarded as unwarranted interference even by many middle-of-the-roaders. Chiang's slaughter of the leftists deprived him of his ability to play off the wings of his party against

each other, and he became the prisoner of the rightist reactionaries and corruptionists. In the end the Gismo's military genius proved to be hollow even with the acquisition of American arms, and the Reds swept over China.

Britain's China Hands chortled with glee, for they had foretold the result of American policy; the trouble was that their cure of strict and repressive imperialism would have been as bad or worse. They resented the

Anti-imperialism of the U.S. freeing of the Philippines and American pressure for the freeing of India, the Dutch East Indies, and French Indo-China. It is to the credit of Roosevelt that he never adopted a policy

of supporting imperialism, though both British and communist propaganda tried to make it appear that he did. Unfortunately, also, American fumbling in the Philippines and in China gave some color to the claims. The continual attacks upon State Department policy in China by such men as Chennault and Hurley and by the Scripps-Howard, Luce, and other periodicals have also given the impression that effective American opinion is imperialist and reactionary. It is closer to the truth to say that everywhere in Asia American policy-makers were faced by a dilemma from which there was no escape.

3 *Roosevelt and the United Nations*

There will always be an argument over whether Roosevelt was justified in seeking third and fourth terms on the apparent implications that he was both indispensable and physically fit to bear the burden. At any rate the

FDR's physical decline strain of the war years was clearly beyond his strength either physical or mental. His resilience declined, and one suspects that his weariness and lowered vitality had something

to do with his growing tendency to make snap judgments and to refuse to admit failures and errors. At Teheran he contracted an influenza which left him with bronchitis. Just what else had gone wrong is still open to question; perhaps, as was rumored, he had suffered a slight stroke, or technically a cerebral vascular spasm. One thing is sure: a first-class heart specialist was commissioned in the navy and ordered to remain always by the President's side. From that time onward Roosevelt made few public appearances, and those brief and carefully staged. He was away from the White House much of the time, usually sunning in the South or taking slow, luxurious trips.

The elections of 1942 had lowered Democratic power in the Senate to 57 to 38 (with one independent) and in the House to 222 to 209 (with four independents). The result had been to give the Southern Democrats the

FDR runs for fourth term balance of power, and they utilized it to get rid of some of the remaining New Deal agencies. But when it came to the matter of a fourth term for Roosevelt, there was little opposition to him within the party because of the conviction that they could not

win without him. No other candidate was seriously considered by the convention, and Roosevelt was overwhelmingly nominated on the first ballot.

By this time it was well known to insiders that Roosevelt was a dying man and that, if he won the election, the Vice-President elected with him



Werner, copyright 1944, the Chicago Sun (note the Chicago Sun-Times)

I don't forget so easy, either.

The Republican Party had loyally supported the war, but the vote in 1944 hinted that its prewar record was not forgotten.

would certainly become President. The struggle behind the Democratic scenes therefore was over who should be vice-presidential candidate. Wallace, as Vice-President, had moved farther than ever toward the left and was now backed by Communist Party liners and by the CIO. Quite clearly he would be unacceptable to the convention.

Truman
made run-
ning mate


Roosevelt blew hot and cold on several candidates, but in the showdown agreed to accept either Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas (b. 1898), an Oregon New Dealer a little more to the right than Wallace,

or Senator Harry Truman, a middle-of-the-roader who had won public attention with his investigation of the national defense program. The conservatives, who controlled the convention machinery, put their delegations behind Truman, and he was comfortably nominated on the second ballot. Later on Roosevelt ousted Jesse Jones from the Department of Commerce and gave it to Wallace as a consolation prize.

The Republican convention had already selected its nominees with unusual harmony. The conservative Senator Robert Taft of Ohio and the rather hesitant liberal Harold Stassen (b. 1907) of Minnesota were both aspirants, but Governor Dewey of New York received the nod on the first ballot. As running mate he received the decorative but stodgily conservative Governor John W. Bricker (b. 1893) of Ohio. Thomas E. Dewey, by birth a Michigander, first went to New York to pursue a career as a singer. However, the law proved more attractive, and after his graduation from Columbia Law School he went on to a career as a racket-buster in the district attorney's office. Upon becoming governor in 1942, he immediately began gathering a corps of strategists and brain trusters to guide his bid in 1944. He had the disadvantages of youth and a certain stuffiness, and his voice, while rich and resonant, gave the impression of belonging to a professor of public speaking. These handicaps were now counteracted by building up a façade of efficiency, dynamism, and courage in advocating new ideas. He was a middle-of-the-roader, no isolationist, and he had the advantage of not having to mix it with rivals in Congressional debate.

As a candidate Dewey could not, and of course would not, oppose the war—yet he had to criticize its conduct. He favored full co-operation with the Allies—yet he could not approve pro-Sovietism. He could not repudiate in toto the works of the New Deal, for that would have been political suicide—yet that very thing was done for him by many of his supporters, who were more concerned with hating Roosevelt and Russia than they were with constructive ideas, either domestic or diplomatic. Dewey did go so far as to say that the government was being run by “tired old men” (as was perfectly true), but otherwise he laid himself open to the charge of “Me-tooism.” Most serious of all, he was up against the old maestro himself. Roosevelt was in no physical condition to campaign, but the nation did not know that. Anyhow, he did not need to. All he really needed to do was issue statements and photographs date-lined Quebec and Hawaii to make it clear that he was so busy running a war that he had no time to devote to Tom Dewey.

At any rate, Roosevelt won. He carried 36 states with 432 electoral votes and 25.6 million popular votes; Dewey took 99 electoral and 22 million popular votes. The Senate remained as before: 57 Democrats, 38



ELECTION OF 1944

531 ELECTORAL VOTES
 ROOSEVELT—Democrat: 432 electoral, 25,610,000 popular votes
 DEWEY—Republican: 99 electoral, 22,180,000 popular votes

J. W. CLEMENT CO., BUFFALO, N. Y.

Republicans, and one independent, but the House stood respectively 242,190, and two. Though this was the smallest popular majority a winner had taken since 1916, Roosevelt confidently announced that his domestic policy would still be “a little left of center.”

**Election
of 1944**

Immediately after the fourth inaugural Roosevelt departed for Yalta, where among other things the proposed United Nations organization was slated for discussion. In order to understand the situation we must go back to the time of Pearl Harbor. On 1 January 1942 Roosevelt had dramatized the war as a co-operative effort by the United Nations Declaration, signed by the United States, Great Britain, China, and the U.S.S.R. The next day twenty-two other governments signed, and eventually the total UN membership reached 60 (Jan. 1952). The Declaration was in effect an instrument of alliance. It stated that the signatory governments:

**UN Dec-
laration**

Being convinced that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands as well as in other lands, and that they are now engaged in a common struggle against savage and brutal forces seeking to subjugate the world,

DECLARE:

1. Each Government pledges itself to employ its full resources, military or economic, against those members of the Tripartite Pact and its adherents with which such Government is at war.


2. Each Government pledges itself to co-operate with the Governments signatory hereto and not to make a separate armistice or peace with the enemies.

It soon became evident that the internationalism of the Wilsonian era was once more stirring and that it was meeting with considerable public approval. There was a notable tendency among publicists to shake off the old attitudes toward isolationism, the protective tariff, co-operation with other nations, and particularly toward collective security. While this change may be attributed in part to growing American maturity and to a willingness to look at the real implications of facts, we must give credit to Roosevelt's patient educational campaign.

Both the Senate and the House adopted resolutions proposing that the UN be made into a permanent organization for enforcing collective security. That the change in Congressional opinion was no flash in the pan was shown by Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg (1884-1951) of Michigan, long a fairly dependable isolationist and ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. On 10 January 1945 he delivered an address advocating a permanent alliance with the other powers (even Russia) and the future enforcement of peace by presidential use of the armed forces without waiting for the consent of the Senate.

The Four Nations Agreement issued by the Foreign Ministers Conference at Moscow in October 1943 gave international impetus to a permanent UN. The originators were Hull, Eden, and Molotov, and the document was presently signed by the Chinese Nationalist ambassador. However, the path had to be cleared by finding bases for co-operation in economic and other fields. A United Nations Food Conference had met at Hot Springs, Virginia in May 1943 and set up a Food and Agricultural Organization as a fact-finding agency. This was followed in November 1943 by the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), intended to provide food and other aid for the liberated peoples. A conference in July 1944 at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire made steps toward mutual economic assistance by establishing an International Monetary Fund intended to support the value of national currencies, and an International Bank for Reconstruction intended to provide funds to member nations for internal rehabilitation and to underwrite private loans made for that purpose. One significant sign

ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS



for the future was Russia's refusal to participate officially at Bretton Woods or to join the two financial organizations.

These and certain other preliminaries cleared the way for planning the agenda of a conference to set up a permanent UN organization. From August to October 1944 at Dumbarton Oaks, an estate in the District of Columbia, the skeleton of the later UN Charter was constructed. There was to be a permanent Secretariat; an Assembly in which every member nation should be represented; and a Security Council of eleven members on which the United States, Great Britain, France, the U.S.S.R., and China should be permanently represented, and six others elected by the Assembly for two-year terms. The Security Council was charged with primary responsibility for maintaining peace by both military and nonmilitary measures; it could call on member states for military forces and was expected to build up a force of its own. Permanent members of the Security Council could exercise a veto on its decisions—a provision without which it is unlikely that any of the Great Powers would have agreed to the Charter. A permanent court was to be set up or the old World Court adopted. Provisions were made for committees to deal with international economic, social, cultural, and other problems.

The proposed United Nations Charter had a number of advantages over the old League of Nations. For one thing, it was to be organized before the considerable measure of co-operativeness born of the war could be dissolved by wrangles over the peace terms. It avoided the elaborate machinery and the long list of fundamental principles of the League Covenant. It laid chief emphasis upon measures and methods to advance collective security; no definition of aggression was made, but wide powers were given to deal with any kind of conflict or threat of conflict. While the Charter was to be criticized from many angles, and perhaps with justice, its general flexibility and its careful attention to collective security were elements of strength.

The Dumbarton Oaks Conference failed to agree on voting procedure in the Security Council, and the problem was taken up at Yalta. There it was decided to distinguish between "procedural" and "substantive" matters. The former concerned the UN's internal affairs and, it was agreed, were not subject to Great-Power veto; the latter were subject to veto. However, in substantive matters a Great-Power party to a dispute could not veto discussion and pacific settlement, but could cast a veto when forcible action was under consideration.

The United Nations Conference on International Organization gathered at San Francisco on 25 April 1945 to consider the Dumbarton Oaks proposal for a Charter. There were seven U.S. delegates present, including

Stettinius, Stassen, and Senators Connally and Vandenberg. Forty-seven nations were represented. The primary business of the Conference was to alter and polish the Dumbarton Oaks document into final form. The end of the European war on 8 May, however, gave political problems unexpected prominence. It was then that Russia became the most stubborn contender over mooted points, and its current violations of the Yalta agreements did nothing to enhance trust in its good intentions. The Latin-American nations in their determination to build a New World bloc against Russia had insisted on the admission of Argentina as a quid pro quo for Russia's insistence on admitting Byelorussia and the Ukraine. However, Russia won the exclusion of Spain.

San Francisco Conference, 25 April–26 June 1945

Though Roosevelt died thirteen days before the San Francisco Conference opened, that meeting and the Senate's adoption of the Charter 89 to 2, may justly be called the fulfillment of his ideals. For some months the President had been experiencing momentary mental black-outs and had labial difficulty in speaking. The end came by a massive cerebral hemorrhage on the afternoon of 12 April at Warm Springs, Georgia.

Death of Roosevelt, 12 April 1945

Roosevelt as War President showed the same mixture of strength and weakness which had always marked his actions. During the war this mixture rose not only from complex political, economic, and international pressures but from growing physical infirmity. He vacillated or operated on hunches—either one might result in stop-gap measures which had as deplorable an effect as outright bad leadership. This weakness is quite evident in the vacillating and secretive manner of the approach to war before Pearl Harbor and, of course, in the later kowtowing to Russia.

Roosevelt the War President

There was a tendency to make personal arrangements which were not disclosed to the proper officials, and he thought nothing of short-circuiting the State Department without bothering to let it know. We have noted also the President's failures on the civil front: the encouragement of administrative rivalries and the reluctance to concentrate authority in appointed officials. There were also the policies of knuckling-under to the demands of special interests: to the demands of capital for guaranteed profits and to labor's undermining of the legal machinery set for the adjudication of labor disputes.

On the other hand, we must give Roosevelt credit for a series of contributions to the war and to the postwar scene. It was in large part the popular faith in Roosevelt which obtained backing for a war effort the origins and necessity for which neither soldiers nor citizens ever clearly understood. Roosevelt consistently backed the responsible military chiefs, and, indeed, they must share the

Roosevelt's contributions

blame for whatever mistakes were made. It was Roosevelt who had the courage to undertake the MANHATTAN DISTRICT PROJECT, a major and yet vitally necessary gamble of the war. It was Roosevelt, almost alone among the first-line Allied leaders, who saw that imperialism must go or the fruits of the war would be lost; the fact that he saw British, French, and Dutch imperialism as great menaces is an illustration of the peculiar myopia of his idealism. It was Roosevelt and Churchill who, despite their many honest yet bitterly contested differences, realized that Anglo-American solidarity was essential to preserve the peace, once it was won—especially in the light of Russia's encroachments, which at the time they may sincerely have felt powerless to prevent. Finally, the United Nations was the creation of Roosevelt more than of any other man.

There is a striking similarity between certain aspects of Roosevelt's policy and Wilson's. Both tried zealously to co-operate with their war partners, both opposed imperialism, both appeased the Soviets, and both sought

FDR, Wilson, and the balance of power	to smash the balance of power and put collective security in its place. Like Wilson with the League, Roosevelt expected the United Nations to compensate for the destruction of the balance of power. And also like Wilson, he failed to realize that the success of such an institution depends (like democracy) upon fundamental ideological agreement among its members.
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It may be held with some justice that Roosevelt should have learned from Wilson's failures, and it must also be admitted that in some ways he did learn. Roosevelt's chief failure lay in his too easy persuasion that Stalin and his Red Politburo would turn away suddenly from lifetime habits of deceit and treachery and from the fundamental totalitarianism and imperialism which prohibits honest co-operation with others. Their training and their ideology demanded domination of everyone with whom they came into contact; and they refused to accept less, save as force barred their way. Roosevelt erred in failing to grasp the necessity of ideological agreement if collective security was to succeed. As a result we are now painfully reconstructing the balance of power.

Still, if the world is ever to attain the peace with freedom of which men dream, collective security must sometime take the place of the balance of power. The latter is too much a broken reed; it may stave off wars for a while, but they are bigger when they come. It is clear that Wilson and Roosevelt failed in the short view. The final verdict must be left to history.

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Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Russians

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Chapter LII

CHANGING PATTERNS IN AMERICAN SOCIETY

1 *Capitalism in Transition*

THE last twenty years have witnessed the early stages of the startling reorientation of economic and political pressure groups which is still under way. We know them now as Big Business, Big Labor, Big Agriculture, and Big Government. By the 1940's the new capitalism had become reconciled to a system of controls. Competition still existed in farming and retailing, though there was some price fixing in the latter. Manufacturers, however, *tended* to confine competition to advertising and packaging and to "follow the leader" in setting prices. Only large-scale capital could embark on important enterprises, thus further limiting freedom of enterprise. Some of the risks inherent in the old order were minimized by the government's acceptance of the duty of preventing extreme ups-and-downs in the economy. Actually the term "free enterprise," which in fact was not used until the 1930's, was an expression more of nostalgia than of actual conditions.

The Federal government still made political obeisance to Atomism but had in fact adopted Theodore Roosevelt's Regulationism. It regulated by threats, orders, and bribes, and political exigencies made its actions ridiculously inconsistent—but nevertheless it regulated. It placed a cushion under agricultural prices. It protected labor by wage-and-hour laws, social security, and favors to unions. It sweetened the disposition of bankers by allowing them to create the credit which it borrowed, actually a subsidy. Directly or indirectly it subsidized transportation, scientific research, education, and publishing. Federal services burgeoned. Manufacturers received tax favors to encourage expansion,

and Congress wrote down the costs to national defense. They received cheap hydroelectric power and purchased war-surplus plants and machinery at rock-bottom prices. In 1946, not a war year, it was estimated that the Federal government subsidized business and agriculture to the tune of \$2.25 billion, while another billion went to the states as grants-in-aid. Since World War II around 16 million people have received Federal payments annually, and the government has pumped about \$40 billion a year into the credit structure.

The cushions which limit capital's risks and the controls which limit its activities are designed to promote the public welfare and individual security. Probably they do, though some observers think the price is too high, and there is the possibility that the present system will permanently cripple private initiative and put an end to our economic expansion. On the other hand, it is certainly conceivable that the phenomenal expansion of the 1940's and early 1950's would never have occurred without the stimulus of government expenditures for war. It may be that this mixed system will prove to be a practical way of avoiding the pitfalls of socialism on one side and of a too rugged individualism on the other.

The mixed system

The decline of Wall Street as a source of new capital is matched by the failure of ordinary commercial banks to fulfill their traditional function of financing and tiding along community enterprises. There are a number of reasons for this failure but possibly most responsible is the fact that a sure profit can be made in less hazardous ways—acting as depositories, agents for transfer of funds, and other such humdrum activities. Most lucrative of all is the ability to create credit (on the basis of its deposits) for the purchase of government bonds, which draw trouble-free interest, will be readily cashed by Federal Reserve Banks, and long remained at a guaranteed level.


Changes in banking

The Atomism of so many Americans may be due not only to the preaching of progressives but to the tendency to mistake size for monopoly. Of course there are some monopolies, but not many, and government harassment has convinced many corporations that they cannot afford to absorb a larger share of the market. The result has been that middle-sized corporations have been growing faster than big ones. This situation has been promoted by what John Galbraith calls the "countervailing power" of large buyers such as chain stores, mail-order houses, and consumers of crude materials (as motor-car manufacturers of steel) to force concessions from suppliers. Labor and agriculture have also used organized pressure and political power to boost wages and prices. The Federal government has strengthened these countervailing forces by promoting the rise of rival producing corporations in fields—such as aluminum—where it considered that one corporation held a mo-

"Counter-vailing power"

nopoly. The new order probably owes a great deal to Wilson's New Freedom with its implied compromise between Atomism and Regulationism.

The American production record since 1929 shows a phenomenal rise. The over-all gain in the twenty-one years ending in 1950 was 75 per cent (production, not dollars), but this pales beside the peak of the war effort (1944), which showed a gain of about 150 per cent. Actually, the productive *capacity* of the American economy doubled in the 1940's. Current plans to increase it by 20 per cent by 1953 in order to enable it to provide both guns and butter mean that it will suddenly add a production capacity equal to that of the British Isles. From



\$40 billion at the depth of the depression, the national income rose to \$72 billion in 1940 and \$275 billion in 1950; the last year, however, saw a rise of only about 60 per cent in "real" dollars over 1940. It is claimed that productivity per man-hour rose at the rate of about 2.5 per cent a year.

Who owns this enormous American productive plant? An estimated 25,000,000 Americans own stocks, but of course control is a different matter. While it is possible to attack in some details the theory of the "managerial revolution," it is nevertheless impossible to deny that the large industrial corporations are typically run by managers rather than owners. The five years after World War II saw corporate profits around six per cent on sales after taxes, yet it must be borne in mind that these profits were made on volume of business rather than wide margins of profit, and they were in inflated dollars. The profit in "real" dollars was actually below that of 1940, and about half the profits

had to be set aside as a reserve to cushion financial shocks, devoted to research, or spent in replacements and expansion. Even then postwar inflation made it necessary for corporations to borrow something like a third of the needed capital from outside sources.

One of the most startling changes in the American business and political scene is the passing of the protective tariff. A long series of reductions culminated in 1951 with agreements made at Torquay, England, which lowered the American tariff to about 12 per cent. Free-traders have always agreed to the collection of a 10-per-cent tariff "for revenue only," so the United States has in effect returned to its pre-Civil War status as a free-trade nation. In spite of this fact, there is no hope in the near future for a balance between exports and imports. American-made goods are so cheap and attractive that we have little stimulus to buy foreign-made products; for the same reason foreigners prefer American articles to many of their own. This situation is nothing new but has been in existence ever since the United States became a creditor nation in 1916. In thirty-five years the American investor, taxpayer, and donor has poured something like \$110 billion into the world economy. Most of it is gone forever.


**Subsidizing
the world**

This vast outpouring of credit has not been entirely unselfish. In the first place neither business, labor, nor agriculture would consent to decelerate the rhythm of production to the point where we could absorb all the goods we make. Their fear has been that deceleration would bring depression, and it may well be that the decline in capital export was a factor in the crash of 1929. At any rate, the surplus was shipped abroad and, because foreigners did not have the dollars to pay for it (and we did not want their goods), we charged it. It may be significant that the 10 per cent of U.S. production exported during the last generation just about represents the profits of enterprise.

**Its advantages to
the U.S.**

The second of the great pressure groups in the American economy is labor. Its apologists consistently deny that there is such a thing as Big Labor. Certainly it does not have the financial resources of Big Business nor even as much unity. Union membership in 1950 ran to around 16,000,000—that is about one eighth of the population and somewhere between a quarter and a third of the labor force. The power of labor does not lie in its economic strength. Rather, it is derived from its shrewd even though divided leadership, its ability to get out the vote, the way in which unemployment-insurance finances protracted strikes, and the Federal government's long support of practices which enabled labor to hijack businessmen and consumers. This does not mean that labor always got its way, but until the passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 it at least had the advantage in the power struggle.

**Source of
labor's
strength**



Labor-management's major disputes have now become so involved with the public interest that a protracted strike in almost any industry, or a short one in railroads, trucking, or power manufacture, will vitally affect the economy. Strikes may cripple industries for years, blight communities, and cause major industrial shifts—as from the use of coal to the use of gas and oil. Both labor and management are now reluctant to permit a strike to develop, and they recognize that even a bad settlement is preferable. Public impatience with strikes, as exhibited by government pressure for peaceful settlements, has doubtless had something to do with this situation. Not far behind is the union fear that too free a use of the strike weapon will lead to the imposition of compulsory arbitration.

The undoubted devotion of John L. Lewis to building up the economic position of coal miners and of mass-production workers was not at all inconsistent with his search for personal power. When in 1940 the CIO refused to obey his desires, he flounced out of it with his UMW, possibly expecting the CIO to collapse. It did not; indeed, under the guidance of the unspectacular Philip Murray it grew in power. Meanwhile the Red organizers whom Lewis and Hillman had utilized to build up the CIO during the early days had entrenched themselves in powerful positions and had built up devoted

followings of Stalinists. The communist struggle for control of the CIO was carried on with the usual weapons of parliamentary maneuvers, lies, rumors, personal defamation, and use of *agents provocateurs*. It was only after an epic battle in 1950 that Murray managed to turn out the communists, losing some of his left-wing unions in the process.

The CIO eventually cleaned out its communists, but the AFL made little attempt to rid itself of the racketeers who had begun to infiltrate it in the 1890's and who actually took over some of the most powerful unions upon the collapse of prohibition. Racketeering flourishes because, presumably, some officers fear they are not secure enough in their jobs to move against it. A second factor in its continuance is that businessmen fear it and/or find it cheaper to pay the racketeers than to pay their employees.

Labor
abuses

Another labor practice, not always prompted by racketeers, is the policy of laying restrictions on normal business processes. Some unions refuse to accept new methods or to train apprentices, and insist on the hiring of useless hands. These and numerous other actions (frequently with the collusion of shortsighted businessmen) result in saddling business processes with uneconomic costs and gradually destroy initiative and undermine capitalistic enterprise.

No doubt there are ten honest union leaders for one communist or racketeer, but abuses quite understandably led to a long drive for the amendment of the Wagner Act. This drive finally culminated in the Taft-Hartley Act of June 1947, which was passed handily over Truman's veto. The act changed the NLRB from a general agency to a judicial agency and lodged administrative and investigatory functions in a General Council. Other provisos banned the closed shop, permitted damage suits against unions, and limited the unions' expenditure of funds in political campaigns; the last was later emasculated by a Supreme Court decision. More important in the long run were four other provisos: (1) The freeing of employers from certain restrictions on speech and conduct. (2) The prohibition of union coercion of employees, featherbedding, and forcing employers to commit unfair practices. (3) The setting-up of an independent Federal Mediation and Conciliation service. (4) When a strike or threatened strike endangered the "national health or safety," the President was authorized to appoint a fact-finding board and apply to a court for an eighty-day injunction; if no solution was found, the problem was up to Congress, which was expected to pass an act authorizing seizure.


Taft-Hart-
ley Labor
Relations
Act, 1947

Union men called the act a slave-labor law. Cooler comment has agreed that it did make some salutary changes; yet it was poorly drafted, its terms were sometimes unclear, and its tone was hostile to labor. Its effect

THE LONG-TERM TREND OF WAGES


WHOLESALE PRICES

1926=100




WEEKLY WAGES AND THE VALUE OF THE DOLLAR

1914=100



REAL WEEKLY WAGES

IN 1935-39 DOLLARS



was a revival of union interest among workers and of rank-and-file support, but it slowed down organization drives as unions sought to strengthen themselves against the blast. If Congress had planned to arrest the march of unionization, the act certainly accomplished the purpose.

An observer once commented that trade unions need capitalism like a fish needs water. Only under capitalism can unions pursue Gompers's famous program of "more." A socialist society would put the unions in a position of responsibility and curb this program; even in partly socialized Great Britain the unions were embarrassed by their sudden realization of this fact. This may be why even the leftist CIO has shown little tendency toward socialization except among Walter Reuther's followers.

What labor wants

On the whole, labor has preferred to let capital take the risks while it scoops up as much gravy as it can. Over a long period profits and the general standard of living have been rising even in terms of "real" purchasing power. Certainly the American worker in 1950 could buy three times as much for an hour's work as he could in 1900, and better goods and in greater variety. The result is that aside from the left wing of the CIO most union leaders prefer to remain a separate power bloc which would deal as an equal with the managerial bloc. The rank-and-file may still feel that they are not receiving enough of what they produce, but the leaders recognize that profits depend on an enormous turn-over and that wages cannot safely go up unless production and efficiency increase.

The fundamental identification of the interests of labor and industry is shown by the frequency with which they have been on the same side of the fence in arguments over politics, the tariff, and government interference. Indeed, labor leaders have sought to convince managers that industry-wide bargaining would make cutthroat competition unnecessary. Labor, no less than capital, has given only lip service to the law of supply and demand in its own bailiwick. The market test of prices stands in peril, not only when they rise but when they ought to decline. Labor's occasional attempts to prevent the introduction of new methods or the training of new workers, and its featherbedding demand for unnecessary hiring of stand-by workers, shows that it has absorbed the modern preference for security over competition.

Labor undermining competition

The American labor movement, like American capital, owes much to government care and feeding. In Great Britain the great majority of the industrial labor force is unionized; in this country some 30 per cent. Indeed, unions have depended so largely upon government favor that they have quite failed to build the well-disciplined mass basis which would make them the power bloc which they dream of becoming. As a result labor feels itself overshadowed by capital and wails like an abandoned child when government tries to read-

Labor's coming crisis

just the balances among pressure groups. It is haunted by the fear that capital and government may revive the abortive alliance of the First New Deal and dreads the next depression as the time of crisis. Thus far it has not developed either the mass basis or the statesman-leaders with the skill and the vision to meet that day.

Let us turn now to agriculture. In considering this subject one must bear in mind certain continuing factors. One was that the farmers were American Physiocrats, arrogantly convinced that they were the source of all wealth. They were Atomists in their view of industrial and finance capitalism, and the struggle of labor for a higher standard of living was regarded as certain to push up farm costs without a relative rise in the farmer's selling prices. In the second place, the farmer was a capitalist; so if he had to choose an alliance with either labor or capital, he was likely to lean toward the latter. Third, the farmer believed that he was an exception to the law of supply and demand—that is, he believed that his production should be unlimited and should be sold at good prices.


As farmer discontent rose in the 1920's, conservatives feared that it might result in a political alliance with labor, a fear which had little basis at the moment but was realized in 1932. Even before farm discontent had become apparent to the nation as a whole, conservatives sought to gag and bind the farmer by the American Farm Bureau Federation. This federation, founded in 1919 under the aegis of U.S. and state departments of agriculture, drew together existing local and state farmers' organizations. From the first it was evident that the leaders of the Farm Bureau were allied with business and often were personally engaged in banking, railroading, or marketing agricultural supplies and products. The Farm Bureau found allies then and later in the Grangers, grown conservative in old age, and in numerous associations among such specialists as milk producers, butter makers, sugar growers and refiners, and cotton growers. Speaking as they did for the most prosperous farmers—"gentlemen farmers," their enemies said, not quite fairly—the allies opposed schemes to better conditions of sharecroppers or migratory farm laborers.

However, even the most conservative farmers are intense individualists, and there were numerous squabbles among the members of the alliance. In the end the West and Middle West, the most dynamic of the discontented areas, forced the leaders to propose first the Equalization Fee and then (with Grange support) the Export Debenture plans of Federal intervention. It will be recalled that these were scuttled in turn by Coolidge and Hoover.

Considerably to the left of the Farm Bureau was the National Farmers' Union, founded in Texas in 1902 but strongest in the Middle West. The

union was split among factions which variously opposed or favored Federal aid, but the latter was usually ascendant. It laid stress on co-operatives and rather generally favored production controls through the Domestic Allotment Plan. The legitimate heir of Populism, it also contained a strong element which favored inflation by either silver or greenbacks. As spokesman for the smaller and

National
Farm
Union



harder-pressed farmers, the Farmers' Union showed interest in the plight of sharecroppers and migrant farm workers, and was friendly to industrial labor.

Farmers point out that high farm prices do not make high food costs; actually half of what the consumer pays goes to transporters, processors, wholesalers, and retailers. An extreme example is seen in the fact that only 13.3 per cent of the selling price of a loaf of bread goes to the farmer. Nevertheless, the farmer shares the same mythus of laissez faire as the businessman. Mike Di Salle illustrated it neatly when he said: "It's called the law of supply and demand when the price is going up, but everyone hollers for supports when the price goes down." Everyone is familiar with the crippling restrictions which the dairy lobby laid on the sale of oleomargarine. The Grange could demand these restrictions, yet in the next breath demand the reduction of "production costs by removing punitive taxation and unnecessary trade barriers between the states." Another curious contradiction to the farmer's idea of laissez faire is the overwhelming use of co-operatives to obtain favorable prices in buying and selling. No one (at least nowadays) begrudges their use, but the contradiction is still there.

The farmer
and laissez
faire

The farmer's point of view can carry great political weight. The house of agriculture may be divided on details, but it manages at times to develop amazing unity, not so much against outside interests as in favor of special privileges for itself. The strength of the farm states in the Senate makes it possible for them to hold a veto over the legislative process, once they put their strength together. Much of the thought and effort on the part of agricultural lobbyists in Washington is devoted to building such a bloc by trading support (log-rolling) among the various interests.

Agrarian unity

Agrarian struggle during World War II

The First New Deal's hospitality to Farm Bureau advice was one of the counts used in convicting it of proto-fascism, but as the New Deal moved to the left the Farmers' Union found more favor with it. When shortages of farm products during World War II led to a demand by the Farm Bureau that production and price controls be removed, the Farmers' Union opposed the idea in the belief that shortages rose not from controlled prices but from insufficient farm labor. In the end, the administration permitted prices to rise to 110 per cent of parity (certain jokers in the legislation let them rise considerably higher) and gave cash support when prices lagged below 90 per cent of parity.

War prosperity greatly altered the situation of the farmer. His expenses rose, but only about two thirds as much as his income. His land and stock rose in value, mortgages were paid off, and tenant farmers were able to buy farms; indeed, the national proportion of tenants to owners fell from 42 per cent in 1930 to 30 per cent in 1950. On the other hand, industrial labor was still better off than most of the stationary or migratory farmers. The removal of controls in June 1946 resulted in a farm price boost of about 25 per cent.

It was clear that the support system no longer reflected actual farm conditions. Many products were now grown at smaller cost and tended to seek a relatively low market level. Their support was soaking the consumer twice—once as consumer and once as taxpayer. Not even the farmers were a unit in support of the system. The Farmers' Union, for instance, never tired of pointing out that the system meant very little to the small general farmer and that most of the payments went to staple growers, especially the large operators—like the Fresno man who received on his 1948 grain, cotton, and flax a subsidy of \$3,759,000. Out of the melee emerged the Hope-Aiken Act of 1948, which continued support at 60 to 90 per cent of parity but envisioned a system which would be flexible enough to change as production methods changed. This was a Republican measure which the farmers regarded as intended to pave the way for removal of supports. As such it may have had something to do with Truman's victory that autumn.

Postwar quarrels over sup- port

Any system of government controls and parity prices is full of flaws and contradictions, but one of the most serious lies in the fact that production methods have changed enormously since 1914, and not to the same degree in all products. Faster-growing hogs, hybrid corn, improved soybeans, and cotton with twice the strength of the old are taking over. In the 1940's crop production went up 30 per cent. This was partly due to a new technique described as the "proper integration of all production factors," which promises 200 bushels of corn to the acre, 500 bushels of potatoes, and so on through the gamut of crops. There have been other changes. In the old days cotton was hand-hoed and handpicked; now it is weeded by flame-throwers, sprayed from airplanes to force the bolls to open simultaneously, and picked by machines.

**Flaws in
the parity
program**

Despite its intent to raise farm fertility and remove marginal land from cultivation, it seems clear that the farm program actually sets the margin for the production of staples higher than is economically reasonable. This high margin raises surpluses and further squeezes the small general farmer out of producing some staples. There is real need to get some so-called farmers off the land and to turn that land to other uses. The system of doling out artificial profits takes away capital that is needed for industrial expansion, retains on the land man power needed elsewhere, wears out tired acres, and at the same time bids up the price of land and adds to farmers' capital cost. It was no surprise that the census of 1950 showed a half-million drop in the number of farms; an increase in the average acreage; a great increase in the yield; and the lowest proportion of farming population to the total in the nation's history—23,600,000, about 16 per cent of the total. A truly economic distribution would reduce the farm population further. There is a fabulous absurdity in letting the scientist and the government teach the farmer how to grow more and at the same time paying him to grow less than he would if left unchecked.

**Big Agri-
culture
commit-
ting sui-
cide**

Certainly the policy bears the seeds of disaster, if for no other reason than that it hampers the expansion of the industrial production which in the last analysis is the only thing that will solve the farm problem. Thus far there seems to be no politically feasible way out. Big Agriculture—the grower of staples as represented primarily by the Farm Bureau—has made the discovery that it can tap the U.S. Treasury. When in 1949 the so-called Brannan Plan threatened to limit supports to time of downright depression, it bred opposition even in the Farmers' Union. Any attempt to carry this threat into existence might well bring the Farm Bureau and the Farmers' Union together in a common effort to continue the drain on the American economy.

When we turn to Big Government, we find that the very size of its

bureaucracy creates problems which no finite intelligence can solve. We have observed some of the resultant absurdities, such as promoting free enterprise but seeking out and punishing its practice, or paying the farmer to grow less and less while he is shown how to grow more and more. Much of the confusion is deliberately created for political purposes. Congress votes authority, then cripples it by contradictory rules or by withholding funds. It fumes about economy but destroys it by forcing Federal agencies to keep endless vouchers and self-defensive records. These agencies must always operate with an eye on Congress and the public; the result often is that a service to one pressure group must be balanced by a bow to another. They must make arbitrary administrative decisions. They must spread rewards and punishments to all interests.

They must find collusion among business interests where it does not exist, and a young legal squirt makes a name for himself by instituting a lawsuit which is presently compromised, or dropped, or thrown out of court. It has been suggested that these practices could be minimized by making the government liable to full damages and expenses when it drops or loses a suit. Actually Congress would be the first to howl, for these maneuvers are the gifts the Congressman bears to his Atomist constituents.


Good policy leadership is not rare in executive offices, but (as intimated above) it is subject to Congressional heckling and blocking, to ruthless pressure groups (liberal as well as conservative), and is thwarted by defective chains of command, judicial delays, and internal vendettas. Talented and at the same time impartial routine administrators are hard to find or to get into office, and they can be frustrated by Congress, undercut by fellow administrators, or have their programs stalled by underlings. Government action can be clogged by bureau heads who are concerned only with preserving or expanding their own authority—"empire building," it is called.

Congress, despite a handful of blowsy prima donnas and vicious stooges for special interests, is largely composed of honest, hard-working men with high concepts of public service, but with the inevitable problem of getting re-elected. Conflicting pressures hamper its reorganization of its own procedures, let alone those of the Executive. It works without adequate technical assistance for doing reference, research, and drafting of bills. The Congressman is incredibly pushed for time to answer even the routine letters from his constituents, of which he may receive a thousand a day. Sessions used to last three or four months; now they usually last for ten. Yet Congress hangs on to its control over certain executive powers as exercised by independent commissions. One thing that neither people nor Congress seem to understand is that greater efficiency can be obtained and democratic responsibility exercised by the Executive only if he is permitted to

THE NATION'S LEDGER FROM BUST TO KOREA

FEDERAL FINANCES


BILLIONS OF DOLLARS YEARLY




FEDERAL RECEIPTS

IN PER CENT OF TOTAL

INCOME




OUTGO



NATIONAL DEBT AND NATIONAL INCOME

BILLIONS OF DOLLARS



exercise authority subject only to the Constitutional restraints by electorate and Congress.

After all is said and done, we must face the fact that bureaucracy is here to stay, for it rose not primarily from a search for power but from the necessity of dealing with a complex civilization. Even though Big Government seems to have developed its own ideas, ambitions, initiative, and appetite for power, the fact is that it rose in answer to (1) the legitimate demand of private enterprise for aid in solving its problems, and (2) the legitimate demand of the people for protection against irresponsible private enterprise. The first was responsible for the rise of the Civil Service and reached its acme under Hoover and the First New Deal. The second demand has been no less evident throughout recent American history. It is significant that the Hoover commission, which in 1947 undertook to study the government, made plenty of recommendations for improving efficiency by sweeping changes and reorganizations, but it did not recommend the abolition of any functions and, indeed, urged the expansion of some.

Over a generation ago Woodrow Wilson pointed out that the states were confronted not so much by a loss of sovereignty as by a loss of vitality. Such vitality as they possessed has now been bogged down by vested political and economic interests aided and abetted by public ignorance and apathy. Rather than strive manfully to maintain themselves, the states (at least in this century) have vied with each other for Federal benefits. T. V. Smith has pointed out that what the Federal government "has done has been done not to destroy the states but to save their solvency, to preserve their dignity, to further their integrity." The states have deliberately defaulted by refusing to streamline their administrations and reorganize their tax structures. It has been easier to call upon Congress for grants-in-aid than to force reforms down the throats of the rural electorate and the urban real-estate lobbies. In a very real sense Federal budget deficits are the measure of the refusal of the states to finance themselves.

The year 1951 saw perhaps 63 million Americans engaged in gainful work and piling up a gross national product estimated as worth \$326 billion and personal incomes aggregating \$250 billion. Even admitting the fact of inflation, the figures were astounding. Not only did the United States possess the highest standard of living ever known to civilization, but it was able to put 15 per cent of its production into aiding its military and economic allies and into preparing itself for possible war.

It was clear that the New Dealers had been mistaken in their warnings that we had reached economic maturity and must henceforth avoid exer-

cise and must take the elevator instead of climbing the stairs. And yet, in looking over the economic scene, it was also evident that (as in the 1920's) prosperity was not spread equitably. A quarter of the country's 40 million families were living on less than \$2000 a year, and 4 million individuals were living on less than \$1000; in these categories were 35 million persons, almost a quarter of our 150 million people. This does not imply that \$2000 is a sufficient family wage.

**Inequitable
distribution**

The cure for most of this poverty lies only partly in an extension of charity and social security. Rather, we must get over the idea that an old person must be forced to retire; we must find ways in which (if he wishes) he can continue to earn his way. The physically handicapped must be fitted into the niche which they are competent to fill—and there are many. Even the so-called unemployables can often be used in simple tasks. These are things which must be done if our productive capacity is not to be wasted, and in doing them we also lift morale and increase production of goods, not to mention retard the growth of bureaucracy. The problem of marginal workers can be solved only by a further increase in national productivity which will put them into paying jobs or, if their present jobs are essential, will warrant society in paying them a living wage. Here also in large part lies the solution to the problem of racial minorities.

**The cure
for poverty**

The problem of underprivileged groups is acute, but naming them by no means calls the roll of the little man. He is not only the unorganized or exploited and underpaid wage earner in town or country. He is the worker and private enterpriser who does not belong to any of the great pressure groups. He is the professional or white-collar worker who by failing to advance his own prosperity with that of the country is becoming economically submerged. He is the man who cannot demand and receive a raise in pay when the pressure groups raise streetcar fares and the price of milk, shoes, and gadgets. It is the little man who bears the brunt of present inflation and who will suffer most if there is another depression.

**Submerged
middle
class**

The little man lives in dread of inflation and depression, either one of which can wipe out his small stake. Washington is now the center of power, if not literally of finance. Whether this fact means immunity to future depressions is open to merry argument. It is clear that our present policy encourages the vicious spiral of inflation, but so far no one in authority has had the courage to do anything about it—for example, balance the national budget.


**Can we
have an-
other de-
pression?**

The only comfort about the present situation is that there would be even more political pressure for inflation if the government organized its own bank and loaned to itself without interest.

THE DECLINE OF


WHO IS IN THE MIDDLE CLASS?

IN PER CENT



GROUPING OF U. S. LABOR FORCE

IN PER CENT



Sociologist C. Wright Mills, in *White Collar: The American Middle Class* (1951), has made a bold attempt to define the middle class and to show how it changed between 1870 and 1940. His general conclusions are shown in Figures A and B.


Some economists assert that any attempt to view the relative economic decline of the so-called middle class is handicapped by the lack of reliable income statistics by social-economic classes prior to 1940. We can, however, roughly estimate (Figure C) the percentage changes in the various classes of workers, at least since 1910, and (Figure D) the wholesale price index.

It is apparent that a rise in prices squeezes those who live on fixed incomes (salaries,

THE MIDDLE CLASS

THE MIDDLE CLASS

IN PER CENT OF TOTAL LABOR FORCE



(B)


rents, pensions, interest on bonds) and businesses which get fixed prices for their products (public utilities, gold mining). Wage earners, on the other hand, can usually get more in a period of rising prices because business is usually prosperous at such times; when prices fall, wages go down far less rapidly. Fixed incomes rise slowly and grudgingly, and the evidence is that they have lagged much farther behind prices than wages have. A glance at the wholesale price index shows how grievously salaried people and many *rentiers* were affected by rising prices. It is thus clear that while white-collar and professional workers have increased in numbers, the industrial and service workers have been overtaking them in income.

U. S. WHOLESALE PRICES

1890-1950

1926=100

(D)



Not the least of the little man's worries, and of traditional capitalists also, is the drain imposed upon the economic system by the rising tax exactions of the welfare state: social security, veterans' benefits, unemployment compensations, etc. It destroys the venture capital which is essential in a free society, thus menacing industrial expansion and the march toward greater output per man-hour. It breeds new pressures for social and business subsidies and for tax supports of this and that interest. Some economists believe that (in view of the existing debt) if taxes reach 25 per cent of the national income, the economy may take a nose dive and social subsidies will have to be reduced to the point of filling only the direst needs. The Federal budget of 1952-53 reached the figure.

Just what will happen to other subsidies opens up an enchanting vista. Big Agriculture, Big Labor, and Big Business may be able to roll with the punches by forcing the government to support parity prices, provide made work, and guarantee profits and investments. There may even emerge a new régime whose object would be to foster production and thus solve domestic problems. At the same time world rearmament and Point-Four aid to underdeveloped countries offer an opportunity to do for the world what the New Deal did for the United States. At least they have the virtue of warding off depression, for though the American taxpayer would have to provide much of the money, it would be spent in the United States and so would act as a subsidy to American business. Such a program has an obvious resemblance to the much criticized New Deal. Nevertheless (such are the effects of time) it could actually be set up by Big Business rather than by liberals. It is a union of pressure blocs, each retaining its identity but in reality subject to the state's managerial and political experts, who are largely furnished by Big Business.

2 *Regionalism and Its Problems*

Sectionalism has in the United States carried with it such dire implications of civil and military strife and even at times actual threats to the existence of the nation that recent commentators have preferred to use the weaker term *regionalism* for modern geographic sectionalism. Traditional American sectionalism looked toward cultural, social, and economic self-sufficiency and isolation, and finally political independence. Modern regionalism is to a very great extent created by problems common to the region; these may rise from conditions in a metropolitan area or a river valley or in a much wider geographical or social context.

But modern regionalism, whatever its present or future geographical boundaries, is quite different from the old sectionalism. It fosters certain cultural, social, and economic unities, but it does not aspire to isolation or

independence; it does not even actively aspire to administrative unity or autonomy, and sometimes there is not even a focal metropolitan center—or there may be two or three. It has a certain amount of geographic and climatic unity, but these must not be overstressed, for there is a great deal of internal variety. The best guide, perhaps, is found in the local *feeling* of homogeneity, and this results from psychological and historical factors as well as from authentic cultural, economic, geographical, and climatic factors.

The feeling of homogeneity may cover certain problems and interests and turn to bitter hostility on others. For this reason students of regionalism recognize (1) broad belts of uncertainty on the borders between regions, where the people may turn first in one direction then in the other, and (2) the existence of subregions, in which the people may qualify or attempt to reject the regional attitude toward any given problem. It must also be borne in mind that there are binding as well as separating factors. The effect of a common political and economic federalism is obvious. No less clear is the effect of the scores of privately-run national organizations which bring together businessmen, laborers, farmers, educators, churchmen, reformers, and veterans.

There are three grand regions, North (or East), South, and West. These are not based solely upon geography.

(1) The North finds common expression in a balance between city and country, industry and agriculture, and in a rather general and conscious attempt to find progressive solutions for its problems.

Grand regional divisions of the U.S.

(2) The South is still overwhelmingly rural and agrarian. It is united by a sense of historical injury and by a long struggle to retain white supremacy and to attain economic equality with the North.

(3) The West is dominantly dependent upon agriculture, stock raising, and the extractive industries and is united (at times divided!) by its desperate need for water and by a sense of current injury from the remainder of the nation.

The above are the grand regional divisions created by historical, cultural, economic, and geographic factors, but each of them has regions within itself which have developed the *feeling* of homogeneity noted above as the chief criterion by which the existence of a region can be recognized. Thus the North is divided into the dominantly urban Northeast and the balanced Middle West. The South is the best integrated of all, more for historical than for natural or economic reasons. The West has its Missouri Valley with grain, cattle, and minerals; its Texas-Southwest with cotton, cattle, grain, petroleum, and chemicals; and its Far West with California, the Great Basin, and the valleys of the Colorado and Columbia rivers; each is jockeying for a larger voice in regional and national councils.

Today the Northeast and the Middle West are in virtual alliance both economically and politically and may be lumped together as the North or the East. For the last two generations the North has been able to stack the cards in its favor. We have seen how the tariffs historically have been written largely to favor industry. Corporations have been the chief beneficiaries of tax rebates, and they have at times been able to dragoon Federal and state governments into settling taxes for a fraction of the sums assessed. With a few exceptions the great corporations are effectively controlled in the North, regardless of where their stockholders live.

Patent pools have served to strengthen the position of a few manufacturers who got in on the ground floor. Given sufficient capital, it is usually possible to find a new process to substitute for an old patented one, but it is difficult to make headway against an industry united against the newcomer and ready to resort to subtle means of sabotage. Despite all the antitrust laws on the books and all the decisions in the courts, it is still possible for competitors to form cartels which control patents and raw materials, set prices, and divide markets.

Northern ascendance has also been maintained by a system of railroad freight rates which discriminate against goods manufactured in South and West, at least in the opinions of those regions. At any rate, the system is now shaking under the impact of suits begun by Southern states. Another Northern weapon was the basing-point system which added to all wholesale prices a freight charge estimated from a favored Eastern center. Thus steel rates were based on Pittsburgh, an encouragement to the steel industry in the North. The system enabled retailers to charge uniform prices over most of the country—not ordinarily west of the Rockies—but it was accused of being a method of raising profits by pocketing phantom freight. In April 1948, in the case of *Federal Trade Commission v. The Cement Institute, et al.*, the Supreme Court washed out the basing-point system. Thus far attempts to legalize it have not succeeded. It is not likely that the bankers of the North have either “conspired” or consciously sought to impose “tyranny” as such. Their motivations are probably no more sinister than a logical and rather shortsighted search for profits.

The North has furnished the capital and the technical skills for the development of the remainder of the country and has managed in the process to add to its capital and frequently to keep effective control and to milk away the profits, even where local capital and initiative have built a business. On the other hand, Congress has drained away much of the North’s profits by imposing upon it a tax burden far greater than that upon the remainder of the country. The complaint is frequently heard that the Northern corporation simply passes on its taxes to the ultimate consumer, yet it

is difficult to see how this action could apply to the income tax and to the excess profits tax. At any rate, not only has the North paid the lion's share of the taxes which have gone to defray such national ventures as wars, but it has contributed to the pork-barrel appropriations to other regions, to dollar-matching funds, and to farm subsidies.

The South is the most homogeneous of all the regions of the United States. This homogeneity does not mean that its economic pattern is uniform: its agriculture varies greatly, its industry is based on cotton and wood products and steel. It is still dependent on the North for machine tools, and so it does not possess the ability to renew itself. It is rich in material and human resources but lagging in capital wealth, in technology, and in the institutions which bring together the other factors to create a satisfactory society. The South therefore is a land where human and material resources are wasted, where imbalances reign in culture and economy, and where old fears and prejudices still are more powerful than scientific facts. The blame can fall upon the South only in part, for it has been the victim (as well as in some respects the beneficiary) of an expanding economy—the aphid to the industrial ant. The Bourbon brigadiers made their "Treaty of 1877" with the North on terms which seemed most likely to preserve the way of life which they and the South treasured; in other words, they sought to preserve the very status of agricultural and social imbalance which now is accused of being at the core of the modern South's difficulties.

Let us look first at the people of the majority race. The South is still rural and conservative in its outlook, even in the cities, and is tinged everywhere with the paternalism which accompanied the old planter economy. Family ties are strong, and the traditional regard for religion is still potent. Labor is of a low order of skill but is improving. The white Southerner is not ordinarily given to analysis, least of all social analysis. He (even more than the Northerner) judges by sentiment and prejudice. Part and parcel of this attitude is the Southerner's supreme race-consciousness, what Odum calls the Southern Credo, the belief that the Negro "could not be expected ever to measure up to the white man's standard of character and achievement."

Southerners are inherently as intelligent and enterprising as any people in the world, but the typical diseases of the South are bred or encouraged by poverty, and they in turn discourage the victim from striving to emerge from poverty or to learn how to fight his ailments. Deaths from disease and childbirth as well as infant mortality are considerably higher in the South than in the North, while the region lags in its proportion of physicians, trained nurses, clinics, and hospitals. And yet the South's population gain outstrips that of any other region, while at the same time millions of its people have been moving into

**Southern
imbalances**

**The dom-
inant white**

**Problems
of poverty**

the North and West. These problems all throw an added strain upon the educational system. Actually the South devotes to education a larger proportion of its income than does the North, but the South is poorer and, moreover, it feels that it must maintain a double school system for whites and Negroes.

Opposition to change is not a Southern monopoly in the United States, but it is seen at its boldest in the South. The tendency is less to solve problems by finding and curing the causes than it is to impose social and legal controls. Prohibition won favor as a means of controlling the Negroes; few intended that it should deprive the white man of his liquor. The crusade against the theory of evolution was merely the spearhead of a group of movements to blot out the advances made by the modern heresies which were questioning the foundations of Southernism. The Ku Klux Klan of the 1920's, we are assured, was primarily intended to block the entry of Yankee ideas; its strength lay in its ability to lend its sheeted riders a sense of their dramatic unity with the heroes of the South in the defense of the Southern way against the world. Nevertheless reaction was bound to fail in the South: the region had too many men who were possessed of good sense and imbued by the old respect for learning. Moreover, there was shame at the ridicule of the world; and the leaven of modern ideas was working deep down, even in the masses.

On the other hand, the reactionism of the South cannot be completely sloughed off so long as it is bound up with vested interests in race, economics, and psychology. Hence the Southern demagogue. His mission is to strengthen reactionary economic interests by winning votes; this he does by pandering to the voters' vested interests and prejudices, and it is notable that he is most effective with the illiterate, underprivileged, and yearning masses. Actually demagogues are in the minority among Southern politicians. The false impression of their number rises from the simple fact that it is news when a statesman in deference to his constituents takes off his shoes before rising to address them. The majority of Southern politicians are conservative because the South itself is conservative, and the mechanics of Southern politics are designed to keep it that way. The one-party system lends itself handily to the creation of personal machines based often on courthouse gangs and road contracts; and, since there is no other party to lead a popular revolt, they become entrenched and conservative. New talent, especially if it is liberal, finds it difficult to rise. The poll tax (now rapidly vanishing) and primary systems contributed to one-party government.

Nevertheless, the South has had a long history of liberalism (remember the Jacksonians and the populists), and it is possible to show that it swings back and forth with the rest of the country. This tendency is concealed by

the fact that it is always Democratic; when the country goes conservative Republican, the South merely supports conservative Democrats. Even on a "closed" subject like race relations the leaven of liberalism is working. Unsympathetic observers attribute changes to the threat of Federal legislation, to the slowly growing solidarity of white and Negro labor, and to the fear that the Negro will leave and deprive the region of a valuable cheap labor force. There may be something in these claims, but it would be unfair not to mention also the conscience of the South. Lastly, Southern conservatives do learn by experience—which is frequently more than can be said for Northern conservatives. Witness the reversal of Southern conservative attitudes toward the TVA.

**Southern
liberalism**

The general economic picture of the South has improved greatly during the last two decades, but it is still a colonial area, more so even than the other areas which have felt the heavy hand of the imperial North. The Census of 1940 revealed that the Southeastern states enjoyed only about one half the per-capita income of the rest of the nation. The agriculture of the South has suffered from a vicious circle not dissimilar to that which afflicts its people. Poverty forces the mining of the soil, with the result that production declines and poverty becomes deeper. Heavy rains quickly leach or erode the light soils of the South.

**Southern
agricultural
problems**

It is true that the rate of farm tenancy is no higher in the noncotton South than in some Midwestern and Missouri Valley states, but the income is certainly lower. The Cotton South, moreover, labors under a peculiarly vicious system of sharecropping, which has notoriously discouraged both owner and tenant from making permanent improvements. Then there is the coming effect of the mechanization of cotton farming, which is sure to force hundreds of thousands of sharecroppers to leave the farm and to seek work in industries as yet unborn. For a generation swarms of migrant families, traveling in decrepit flivvers from harvest to harvest, have given witness of the economic maladjustments of the South.

The change and to a certain extent the maladjustments in the industrial scene are just as evident. The period of the 1920's was one of depression in Southern coal mines and textile mills, and this brought on a series of furious, almost revolutionary, strikes in the Upper South. The result was that the New Deal was greeted with greater enthusiasm in the South than in any other part of the country, even though its social ideals countered those of the South at almost every point. Reared in a Spartan school, which taught self-sacrifice in the cause of the garrison South, the Southern common man was bewildered by the New Deal's preachments that he should be a beneficiary rather than a martyr.

**Effects of
the New
Deal**

It was true that conservative Southern Congressmen supported the New Deal only on condition that the common man of the South should not be "spoiled" by equal benefits. Nevertheless the Southern industrial scene was radically changed, and that by other factors as well as the New Deal. Unions made entry against violent opposition, but they made entry. As one organizer put it: "They used to kill you for organizing a union; now they just knock all your teeth out." Mill owners increasingly lost control of their villages; this situation was not always clear gain for the workers, for while paternalistic duties passed, paternalistic privileges sometimes remained. A new middle class grew by leaps and exercised a moderating and progressive influence in politics and social legislation. The conditions of child labor (aided by Federal legislation) were mitigated.

**Industrial
change**


One of the most potent factors in the rehabilitation of the South both in agriculture and in industry has been the Tennessee Valley Authority. There are certain cogent objections to the theory behind the TVA and to its processes, but here we are concerned with its effect upon the South. Flood control and aids to navigation have been among its important contributions. Not only has its cheap electrical power attracted new industries to the Southeastern states and expanded the old ones, but it has by its rural electrification program revolutionized the farm home and opened a new market for electrical equipment.

TVA

Of even more positive benefit has been TVA's battle against malaria, its program of agricultural education through demonstration, its reforestation and anti-erosion activities, and its restoration of the soil through proper plowing, crop rotation, and the provision of cheap phosphates and nitrates. In 1933 the Tennessee Valley (and adjacent areas in seven Southeastern states) was a poorhouse. In less than two decades it has become almost an agricultural paradise, while its significance as the home of important electro-metallurgical, chemical, aluminum, ceramic, woodworking, and atomic-energy industries is well known. TVA has consciously stimulated this advance not only by cheap power but by its research in new processes and equipment which are now handled by private enterprise. TVA is the central reason for the clear fact that the South's wages, production, and general welfare are increasing at a rate greater than that of the nation as a whole.

Each writer on American regionalism sets his own boundaries to that vast region called the West. Here we shall arbitrarily set the line at the western boundaries of the first tier of states west of the Mississippi, noting once more that there are broad belts of ambivalence along all regional borders and that Oklahoma and Texas are sometimes with reason assigned to the South. The states of the West have certain problems in common: (1) they are colonial areas subject to Northern


The West



THE TENNESSEE VALLEY

— Boundary of the Tennessee Valley

Statute Miles



financial and sales exploitation, and they suffer from unreasonable freight rates and other deliberate discouragements to industry; (2) great areas within the borders of most of the states are owned by the Federal government and are either withheld from use or carefully supervised in their use; (3) many of them depend upon Federal bounty to maintain essential public services; (4) they have a common Jeffersonian tradition with its deeply implanted suspicion of government; and (5) there is an all but general lack of easily-available water.

The Northern Plains have problems fully as serious as those that confront any part of the country. Water-power sites are legion in the Rockies, but either they are not used or the corporations which utilize them raise the price of electricity to unreasonable heights. As a result the Northern Plains industry cannot enter, and apparently is not wanted. The amount of rural electrification is low, and not only do farmers lack conveniences but manufacturers are shut out of what should be a profitable market. We have from time to time noted that the High Plains have been subject to flood and drought, and that it was unwise to turn its grazing areas into wheat lands. At any rate, overgrazing and dry farming have turned the subregion into recurrent Dust Bowls.

The result has been that the Northern Plains states have been the only ones in the nation to decrease in population. Federal and state governments have sought to teach soil-conservation methods, have controlled grazing, and have undertaken other measures to arrest erosion and restore fertility. But the states have not integrated their efforts, and the problem will probably not be solved until they do. The area close to the mountains has desired to increase hydroelectric and irrigation facilities, and it has found the old-established U.S. Bureau of Reclamation sympathetic to and useful in this endeavor. The areas farther downstream have been more concerned with using the rivers as cheap arteries of navigation to undercut the railroads, while the cities on the lower course of the Missouri have been concerned with both navigation and flood control; the lower river has found allies in the Corps of Engineers, which has had a long history of coping with navigation and flood control.

The difficulty (it is claimed) is that adequate irrigation on the High Plains will not leave enough water for a nine-foot channel down river; so the opposing subregions and government bureaus have been at each others' throats. Weary and disgusted observers in the region and in Congress have proposed a Missouri Valley Authority modeled somewhat upon the TVA, and they have demonstrated to their own satisfaction that only thus can the region be restored and developed. The threat of "socialism" brought the warring factions into a grudging alliance in support of a patched-up compromise called the Pick-Sloan Plan, drawn up by engineers and Bureau of Reclamation men who were afraid of losing their jobs. The MVA project

may or may not be dead. Much depends upon how effectively the Pick-Sloan Plan is revised and implemented.

When one turns to the Southern Plains, he finds an area with a spirit of optimism and initiative quite in contrast with the Northern. The secret may lie partly in the greater resources of the Southern Plains and partly in the frontier vigor of its people, but one is entitled to suspect that it lies largely in the intense local patriotism which rose from Texas's consciousness of its mere *size* and of its unique history. If the Missouri Valley had developed as one state, it is perfectly possible that it also would have exhibited many of the same characteristics. At any rate, Texas has played such a major part in the development of what is often called the Southwest that we are warranted in calling it the Texas-Southwest to distinguish it from the Pacific Southwest.

Texas-Southwest

The progress of the Texas-Southwest has been phenomenal, but its problems are legion. Essentially these stem from the survival of the concept of infinity and from the area's colonialism. Soil erosion and the wastage of gas and petroleum have never received adequate attention. Texas and Oklahoma breed millionaires as do few other states. Of course, some of them are the servants or allies of Eastern corporations, but Texans have shown a genius for the calculated risk, which not only makes fortunes but accounts for the success in the armed services of such Texans as Nimitz. Nevertheless Texas, as one of its sons has observed, is the largest and most profitable colony in the world. One result is that corporation taxes are held down, and that Texas is unable to give proper attention to public works and social welfare. Texans, like the people of any area in which the rural tradition dominates, are inclined to be antilabor—just as at least some of the corporations want. In order to preserve rural dominance, the legislature for thirty years refused to redistrict the state in order to give the rising city population due weight; then it passed an amendment which limited any county to a maximum of seven representatives.

Its problems

No one can gainsay the significance of Texas. It leads in the number of farms and acreage of crops, and in the production of beef, cotton, wool, and mohair. It produces more petroleum and natural gas than any other state. These facts are enough to prove the point, though any Texan can reel off a number of other *firsts* and *biggests*. Unfortunately these are countered by the state's rank far down the list in such things as disease controls, infant mortality, social services, and education. There has been a tendency to drive out or cripple its intellectuals, but this was typical of the entire South until recently. At present Texas is engaged in a struggle to attain regional responsibility and is slowly becoming accustomed to the idea that material changes will be destructive unless they bring social and psychological improvements. In a

Texas paradox

sense Texas is still in the Jacksonian Era, which, it will be remembered, was a welter of anti-intellectuals, Bible shouters, populists, political lick-spittles, and worshipers of social mediocrity and material accomplishment. And yet it must not be forgotten that the Jacksonian Era held the seeds of all that has made the United States a great material and spiritual power.

When we look at the Far West we find that it falls into five principal subregions with jagged boundaries: (1) California, west of the Sierra Nevada; (2) Southern California, the area south of the Tehachapi Mountains; (3) the Colorado Valley; (4) the Great Basin, the area between the Sierra and the Colorado Valley; and (5) the Columbia Valley. In a sense the Far West is a congeries of subregions rather than a region. There is relatively little communication among many of its parts. For example, though almost all the mountain ranges run north and south, the roads and railroads usually run east and west. State lines were drawn up to suit political exigencies or without much understanding of the climatic and other natural factors involved.

The states of the Far West have in common their colonial subjection to the East and the fact that their water resources are not distributed by Nature to the points where they are most needed. Of course, there is not enough water to irrigate the entire Far West even if that were topographically possible, but there is plenty of water for urban and farm use for a population possibly as great as that of the United States today. However this may be, we can be sure that vast areas of the Far West will always remain the refuge of solitude. The problem, then, is not so much in the scarcity of water as in its seasonal and geographical distribution, and not less in the baffling technical problems which follow on any attempt to use it. There is, moreover, grave doubt that wholesale irrigation is desirable in a time of agricultural surpluses, especially when there are vast tracts of rain-fed land in North and South which can be reclaimed with less trouble and expense. The usual argument in favor of Western irrigation is that the land will grow specialized crops. The trouble is that the lands are in fact often devoted to raising cotton, wheat, and other crops which might better be grown on unirrigated land.

Just as troublesome are the problems of politics and vested interest which are involved and which frequently doom any integrated effort to develop or preserve resources for the future. "What," demand some Westerners, "has posterity done for us?" They resent Eastern exploitation, but frequently the attitude rises less from a desire to preserve and use wisely their heritage than from a desire to share the gravy. Eastern interests never have any difficulty in finding allies in any Western state. For a price there are Western lawyers and publicists who will apologize for discrimination in freight rates and for high mortgage rates on real estate, and who will find reason for open-

**The Far
West**

**Far West-
ern water
problem**

**Human
problems**

ing the national forests (and even the parks) to unlimited grazing, timber cutting, and power exploitation.

A third and sometimes no less potent welding factor in the Far West is its common fear and distrust of California. Not only is California the oldest and most mature, but its population and developed wealth are greater than all the rest of the Far West combined. Separated from the remainder of the nation by a vast, sparsely inhabited area, endowed with statehood within two years after the gold strike, and guided by a group of articulate writers and politicians and self-sufficient financiers, California came to look upon itself as a nation, and like a nation developed its own regional and economic clashes for power and its own imperial tentacles. An urban state almost from the first, it was harassed by labor and agrarian discontent and dominated by mining, railroad, power, and food-growing and processing corporations.

**California
as Far
Western
problem**

San Francisco became a branch office of Wall Street, entrusted with the administration of the Far West. It was willing to accept disadvantages vis-à-vis the East in return for superior advantages in intraregional competition. As a result the Far West came to regard California as an exploiter and in many ways a double-dealer. This attitude was shown by Far Western alarm when California began to talk of developing out-of-state power sites for her own use and of bringing water from the Columbia River. California has managed to divert to its own use water which should go to Nevada, and despite an interstate compact it has managed to get the lion's share of Colorado River water and power—to the detriment of the Great Basin and Colorado Valley states. It has loaded the development of the Central Valley upon the Federal government but has sought to devote the facilities primarily for corporate uses rather than to develop the valley as a region of farm homes.

**California's
imperi-
alism**

Only Washington and Oregon have been able to hold out against California. In all the Far West the Columbia Valley has the most favorable conditions for conquering the perennial problems of water and power and for developing a self-sufficient agricultural and industrial economy. Here the New Deal began early to develop the second largest river on the continent. The Army Engineers built Bonneville Dam (1939) above Portland, and the Bureau of Reclamation built enormous Grand Coulee Dam (1942). Irrigation is in prospect in the near future. World War II put the newly-available power to work in dozens of new enterprises, most notable of them the atomic-energy plant at Hanford. Swarms of people moved in, chiefly from the Missouri Valley, and stayed when the war was over. The Columbia Valley has not been able to afford work for all, but it has hopes based on sound prospects.

**Columbia
Valley**

The states of the American Union have always been political rather than natural entities, and they are now losing their vitality; there even are times when most of them seem to be held together by the baling wire of the vested interests of office holders. They are caught between the logic of regional co-operation on one side and the demands (half pleading, half arrogant) of the localities on the other. This clash of interests and loss of dynamism is no joking matter in a time when co-operation is essential to national welfare and survival. Motor-vehicle "border wars," neglect of watersheds, indifference to stream pollution, and quarrels over water utilization are vital matters of general concern.

Blundering attempts have been made to impose common policies by various methods. Congress has used its Constitutional powers to pass pure-food-and-drug acts and to regulate conditions of labor and of land use. It has used grants-in-aid to bribe the states to devote more attention to roads, schools, soil preservation, control of disease, and social welfare. It has encouraged interstate compacts such as the Colorado River Compact and the Ohio River Valley Water Sanitation Commission. It has encouraged interstate organizations to deal with common public utilities, such as the Port of New York Authority. Interstate compacts on crime prevention received blanket Congressional authorization in 1949.

These arrangements have been salutary, but they are not enough to meet modern complexities. Any attempt to restore local vitality must consider such programs as the amalgamation of states and the expansion of the use of interstate compacts—compacts in which Federal participation might well find a place. Regional reorganization must consider administrative needs as well as psychological, cultural, economic, climatic, hydrological, etc. It must decentralize political power and administrative procedure, but it must also preserve democratic balance and equilibrium and promote self-help. American history tells us that there is no chance of a clear-cut and sweeping reform, but that fact does not excuse us from working to make what improvements we can. A nation which in its infancy was able to invent and apply the federal system should have enough of that genius left to go on with its further adaptation.

Attempts
at inter-
state co-op-
eration

Regional-
ism may
be an an-
swer

3 *Minority Problems*

The United States was created by minorities—racial, religious, and social—who each had suffered from the legend of inferiority and the blight of discrimination. The fact that a number of the earlier minorities have

Minority
rule

coalesced to form the "white, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant majority" by no means proves that it will act together; indeed, it is rent by rivalries, chiefly social and economic. The re-

sult has been a curious paradox. Minority groups are not freely accepted as equals by the majority (and at times actually are deprived of economic and civil liberties), yet they exercise such powerful and at times decisive political pressures as to make the majority seem like merely another minority. No less true is the fact that these minorities are suspicious of each other and also are torn by internal rivalries.

There is not space here to notice all the minority groups as they deserve, nor even to name them all. Only a few of the more numerous can be treated. Anti-Semitism had little vogue in the United States until the middle class began to slip economically, and it is a curious fact that Henry Ford, an unintentional instrument of middle-class decay, was active in preaching that Jews were obtaining a monopoly of economic power. Nevertheless, the Jew is the one consistent butt of hate groups, no matter what their ostensible primary antipathy may be. Such groups refuse to allow Jews to discard their Jewishness; on the other hand, they fight every attempt to preserve it.

Anti-Semitism

The 100-per-cent American dislikes the Irishman, the Negro, or the Mexican for his presumed laziness, wastefulness, stupidity, and lack of ambition. With the Jew (and the Levantine and the Jap) the complaint is exactly the opposite. He is too industrious, thrifty, and ambitious—too intelligent and resourceful, or, as some prefer to put it, sly and unscrupulous. We intone piously that “Some of my best friends are Jews,” but label the race as loud-mouthed, pushing, flashy, vulgar, and unscrupulous. Of course some of them are (though even those are decreasing), for milleniums of oppression and of having to engage in risky marginal occupations have inevitably put their stamp on them. If they are rich, we see them covered with dollar marks; if they are socially conscious and advocate social experiments, we call them radicals; if they give their money to aid the poor and to protect civil liberties, we call them disrupters of society. All this about a people who have given us such remarkable leaders as Brandeis, Cardozo, Ochs, Baruch, Gompers, and Stephen S. Wise, to name only a few.

The Jewish stereotype

Mexicans have been in the Southwest, from California to Texas, what the Negro has been in much of the remainder of the country: the settled peon, the underpaid migratory worker, the submerged stratum which serves as an economic cushion when strata above him must retrench, and, not least, the butt of the white man's own sense of guilt and fear. The Mexicans are basically Indian in blood, descended from the agricultural peoples whom the Spaniards found in possession of the land. They have taken over Spain's language and much of its culture but are proud of their Indianism. In recent years the Mexican government has sought to regulate the outward flow of migratory laborers and to force the United States to guarantee minimum wages, social services, and civil protection. The policy has not succeeded.

The Mexicans

Mexican laborers are so anxious to earn American dollars that they enter illegally, often wading the Rio Grande—hence the name “wet-backs”—and take any wage they can get.

American-born Mexicans may live and work on their own holdings or seek employment from near-by ranchers and farmers. They may live in the slums of the cities and work in industry, fisheries, or canneries, or in American-born Mexicans season pile the family into the jalopy and seek “stoop” employment in the sugar-beet fields or truck gardens. Even for those born here, segregation and other discriminations as well as economic handicaps make the process of Americanization slow. Nevertheless, their contacts with an alien culture have led the young to rebel against parental and religious restraints and have resulted in maladjustments and juvenile delinquency.

Perpetually confronted by discrimination, the younger generation has become painfully race-conscious and resentful, but its longing to be accepted has led to the adoption of extreme behavior, such as an addiction to violent jazz and jitterbugging and the wearing of the ridiculous costumes called zoot suits. Mexican boys seek companionship in neighborhood gangs, and under the circumstances it is not strange that they undertake criminal enterprises. With their usual lack of imagination, the “Anglo” police meet the situation with mass raids and endemic terrorism—which only increase resentments and crime. The “Zoot-Suit Race Riots” of June 1943 in Los Angeles were precipitated by servicemen, joined by police and urged on by newspapers. This sadistic spree touched off a series of race riots clear across the country, including disastrous orgies in Detroit and Harlem.

There are in the United States today something like 350,000 Indians, depending upon how many are included of those who have white and Negro blood. The Dawes Severalty Act had regularized the policy of Indian assimilation, which might be cynically labeled a policy of extinction. As the twentieth century advanced, the Indian Bureau stepped up its policy of forcing final titles to land allotments on Indian families. This action may be explained in part by the fact that such land was subject to local taxes and could be sold—both of them ends desired by whites in the neighborhood of reservations. The Indian Bureau further forced the liquidation of tribal herds of cattle and found ways to put the grazing lands under lease to white cattlemen or farmers.

Finally in 1922 the Bureau in cahoots with the notorious Albert Fall, Secretary of the Interior, drew up an Indian Omnibus Bill which would have completed the distribution of lands in severalty, disposed of the remainder, and relieved the government of future responsibility for the Indians. The possibilities of loot for insiders were enormous, especially

since oil had been discovered under Navaho lands. Fall supplemented his drive by undertaking to prohibit the practice of all native religions, a move which meant the break-up of tribal organization, for the two are inextricably intertwined.

Fall must have been surprised by the vigorous resistance which began among all the Indians, but especially among the highly organized Pueblos. The public also was aroused, for it had become conscious of Indian culture through the activities of a group of writers about the Indians. "Old Bob" La Follette led the attack against Fall's schemes and defeated them. The Indian Bureau's policy of extinction went on, but the Indian nations had been aroused to a new fighting mood and began to form a tacit common front, which with the aid of sympathetic white lawyers and legislators fought off one raid after another.

This was the situation when the New Deal's Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (the Wheeler-Howard Act) moved to restore tribal autonomy by law and to break down the allotment system. The new Indian Commissioner, John Collier, had as an underling in the Indian Bureau long fought for the new policy. In spite of its sweeping changes, Congress failed to provide for the turning-back of allotments to the tribal holdings nor did it stop the fractionalizing of allotments among heirs and lessees. While the restoration of tribal autonomy gave new life to Indian institutions, it led to confusion concerning rights and responsibilities. Though Indians are entitled to vote in the states, technically in certain cases they are exempt from local taxation and on their reservations are exempt from state laws.

**Indian
Reorgani-
zation Act,
1934**

The wisdom of the reorganization legislation is still bitterly debated. Church groups tend to insist that the Indians really desire assimilation and accuse the government of thrusting them back into paganism. Actually each Indian tribe has been entitled to accept or reject the reorganization bill. About three fourths of the Indian population have accepted and have set up what in effect are self-governing corporations. These corporations are concerned not only with political functions but with schools, agriculture, sheep and cattle, land conservation, and manufacturing enterprises. Health and living standards have been raised rather generally. Nevertheless the present land base (most of it sterile and irreclaimable) will soon become insufficient for the growing population, even if utilized to the limit of efficiency. At the present rate of growth, there should be about 1,000,000 Indians by 1980. Even if those who are really whites and Negroes are weeded out, the remaining pressure on the available land will be serious. The Navaho, the Sioux, and the Cherokee now number more than they ever did before. The last-named may under Oklahoma's influence become assimilated, but assimilation is not as likely to happen with the other two.

Its results

By 1940 there were 125,000 Japanese on the mainland of the United States, three fifths of them American-born Nisei. Though their opportunities were limited, the Japanese were intelligent, industrious, and frugal and they amassed considerable property—homes, business blocks, and farming land which they had turned from desert into productive oases. Those who lived in cities were gathered in segregated areas called Little Tokyos. Their success carried the seeds of their downfall. In every community there were men who coveted their wealth, and these were joined by some farmers' organizations and labor unions. As war loomed in the Pacific, propagandists warned that the Japanese-Americans were, like the Greek soldiers in the Trojan Horse, sent here to open the gates to the conquerors. They even circulated tales of Japanese arming and drilling and of plots to massacre the whites at a given signal. Needless to say, there is no proof that these tales were true. Not a single Japanese-American was to be convicted of sabotage or treason.

In the Territory of Hawaii, where a large proportion of the population was Japanese, there was no sabotage, as was eventually confirmed by official investigation. Largely owing to the calm good sense of the head of the local FBI, the army met the situation wisely and refused to confine or evacuate the Japanese. This decision was further based upon the clear fact that if this were done 160,000 workers would be lost, and the islands' economy would fall apart. There were, of course, some internees, people who were later removed to the mainland.

Unfortunately moderation did not prevail on the mainland. Certain interests saw a chance to acquire Japanese property at fire-sale prices, and their purpose was served by heedless patriots, weak-kneed politicians, and a notoriously ill-balanced and racist West Coast army commander. Congress and the administration were ill-advised and yielded to pressure for drastic action. Beginning in March the coastal Japanese (112,000 in number and 71,000 of them citizens) were uprooted and forced to move inland to ten huge reclamation centers administered by a War Relocation Authority. As anticipated and intended, they had to take what they could get for their property in the few weeks given them to prepare for removal.


The later history of the evacuees cannot be followed here in detail. Property and jobs gone, subject to official caprice, bandied about by examiners who knew nothing of their situation, the episode would have been ludicrous if it had not been tragic. At the very same time recruiters were trying to get the young men into the army; amazing as it may seem, thousands joined up. Eventually the need for agricultural workers in the Mountain States led to the inmates

of the relocation centers being widely scattered. In time other opportunities opened up, and by the end of the war two thirds of the evacuees were gone. A tardy sense of shame overtook the American people, especially as they saw the splendid record made by Nisei soldiers in Italy. By this time about half were scattered over the country and were finding a greater measure of acceptance than in their old homes. The remainder went back to the West Coast. At first they were met with threats and occasional outrages by barroom commandos, but presently public opinion rallied to their protection and they managed to obtain a new foothold.

At present about ten per cent of the American population consists of Negroes, many of them so light that it is well known that thousands "pass" over each year and thereafter are known as whites. Northern states and communities confront the Negro with a reaction that is different from the South's in degree rather than kind. Social discrimination and economic exploitation are less in the North, but Negroes complain that they are never certain what rights they can exercise there; in the South they know. Still, in the North the Negro's wages and schooling are better, and he receives a higher degree of legal protection. Most encouraging

is the North's credo of democracy and equality, which (however much it may be violated) still pricks the Northerner's conscience when he sees injustice and frequently makes him an active worker for reform.

The South has many reformers also, and it may well be that Southerners have been responsible for the more practical measures which have aided Negro advancement; yet few Southerners can defy the Southern Credo—which means that few Southerners can work for total equality. It is here that the North makes its greatest and most controversial contribution. Its financial gifts to Negro welfare have been large. It furnishes the bulk of support for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People. It gives political backing to Fair Employment Practices aspirations. Its Supreme Court justices are the ones who are gradually moving toward



equal civil liberties for Negroes in South as well as North and are whittling away at segregation.

The crux of the battle for total equality in North and South alike lies in the attempt to break down segregation. The motivation of the propaganda for white supremacy and the sharpening of race prejudices often lies in the desire (interpreted as the necessity) for cheap labor. CIO unions have led in opposition to segregation in both South and North, but thus far have been joined by few others. The Fair Employment Practices Commission, set up during World War II to promote race equality in industry, did a fair job as long as the war lasted, then passed away (30 June 1946) amid the hosannas of its enemies. The abolition of segregation in the armed services is apparently working well.

Advocates of segregation have claimed that its end would bring "social equality," by which they mean race intermarriage. Actually few reformers, Negro or white, ask for that but sensibly realize that individuals have a right to select their friendships and to set up social clubs to suit themselves; even the Supreme Court refused to try to "abate individual and group predilections, prejudices, and choices." What is asked is equal civil, legal, and economic rights and equal access to residential areas and to facilities set up to serve the public, whether under public or private ownership. As for intermarriage, they ask that it be legalized simply because the right of free choice in marriage is an elementary human right, not because of any desire to promote miscegenation. It is frequently pointed out that twenty-nine states prohibit marriage between Negroes and whites, sometimes with restrictions more severe than Nazi Germany provided in its anti-Semitic campaign.

The Anglo-Saxon democratic process has never welcomed new participants to a share in government until they have demonstrated their fitness and earnestness by a prolonged struggle for that end. Sometimes the newcomer must even prove himself more fit than the older sharers. Since the Civil War the American Negro has been engaged in this struggle, aided, as always in a democracy, by certain men of goodwill. The old quarrel between the Booker T. Washington and W. E. B. DuBois schools has been resolved in favor of the latter, the Immediatists. A new Negro leadership based on a new intellectual and professional élite has come to the front in both North and South. The Northerners can afford to be more radical and less tactful, but their followers are even more extreme. As Northern Negroes acquire sophistication, some display a retaliatory spirit and regard common courtesy as evidence of servility; and the growing belief that some Negroes are ready to demand their rights without further evidences of fitness alienates many potential white friends.

Issue of
segregation

The "New
Negro"

The silent Southern Negro masses wait with who knows what inscrutable thoughts behind their mobile faces. The traditional disguise of antic stupidity in white presences is slowly passing, and a stubborn unwillingness to be happy about anything is taking its place. As Cash noted, there was "a rising sullenness before brutality and indignity, a growing tendency to fierce outburst when pressed too hard." Communism advocates social equality for the Negro, and partly because of this the South not only became solidly anticommunist but jumped to the conclusion that communism must have an irresistible appeal to Negroes. Actually Negro resentments are not sufficient to breed revolution, even if Negroes have not realistically disbelieved the fatuous communist line that Southern white commoners would join in. Nor does the solemn Marxist vision of a dull and unvarying proletarian order "fit with his vast humorousness, his restless casualness, his supreme hedonism and love of the spectacular and dramatic, and his individualism. . . . And the atheism of Communism was calculated to offend and frighten his intense religiousness."*

Southerners may regard their Credo as undebatable, but there is a great backlog of goodwill toward the Negro—even expressed in the Credo itself. The plain truth is that the South in its treatment of the Negro faces a dilemma akin to the vicious circle imposed by Southern poverty. On one side there is the poverty of the region which (egged on by Northern capital) demands the cheapest possible production costs and imposes an undue share of the sacrifice on the Negro not only in wages but in deprivation of good schools and other public facilities. The South simply cannot afford adequate public services for one race, let alone "separate-but-equal" services for both, as proposed by the Jim Crow laws. On the other hand, if the Southern white is to advance he cannot afford to permit Negro communities to remain centers of poverty, crime, and disease which will inevitably infect the white South. This view has nothing to do with "social equality"; it is a mere matter of white self-preservation. Some observers believe that this may lead to greater attention to Negro housing and sanitation, to his right to earn a livelihood, and to common use of the rarer and more expensive facilities, such as professional schools.

At any rate, Southerners are making progress. Lynching, once the "ritual of white supremacy," has all but disappeared in industrial regions and in rural regions where one race is in great majority; it survives chiefly where the races are about balanced. Unfortunately Northern papers regard a lynching as more newsworthy than a Southern sheriff's successful effort to thwart a lynching. North Carolina is leading a movement to put white and colored schoolteachers on the same salary schedule. Unions are slowly breaking down the barrier

The South-
ern di-
lemma

Southern
progress

* Wilbur J. Cash, *The Mind of the South* (1946), 317.

between white and Negro labor. Threats of Federal interference are easing Jim Crow restrictions. White self-interest dictates that the Negro laborer be given a break lest he pick up and move North.

Southern efforts to resolve their dilemma are aided and in part stimulated by a long series of Supreme Court decisions. These have washed out peonage and modified the Jim Crow laws as applied to vehicles in interstate commerce. They have denied the right of cities to legally force Negroes and whites to live in separate sections. Supreme Court decisions They have outlawed white primaries. The Supreme Court decided that "separate-but-equal" professional schools must actually be equal; otherwise a Negro must be permitted to register and study in a white school. The decision in the case of *Gitlow v. New York* (1925) inserted a wedge under state rights when it declared that the Fourteenth Amendment, in imposing upon the Federal government the defense of due process of law against state encroachments, intended to defend free speech and press as specified in the First Amendment. When in the Scottsboro Case an Alabama judge sentenced nine Negroes to death for rape, the Supreme Court twice (1932, 1935) overruled the sentence on the ground that the Negroes had not received adequate legal safeguards. The enforcement upon the states of the safeguards of the Federal Bill of Rights is by no means yet complete, nor perhaps can it be whenever juries reflect local sentiment rather than law.

Most of what has been said thus far is an outside view. What is the Negro's own attitude? On the subject of specific objectives, it is a curious fact that the Negro wants exactly the things which the white is most willing to yield. These stand, in order (1) economic rights, What the Negro wants (2) civil rights, (3) political rights, (4) equal rights in the use of public facilities, (5) equal rights in social usages, and (6) abolition of the bar against interracial marriages. The last is demanded as a pledge of the removal of the stigma of racial inferiority, not because Negroes favor interracial marriages any more than whites do.

It is asked why the Negro, despite a history of bloody repression, will work and fight for the United States. As well ask why downtrodden English peasants and workingmen fought for the royal Georges! The Negro, as one of them says, loves America as the wife loves her husband even though he beats her. For one thing, this is the land of his birth.

I, too, sing *America*,
I am the darker brother,
I, too, am America.

Within its borders the United States has received all but universal loyalty from the oppressed minorities. This loyalty, it is clear, springs less from benefits bestowed than from a consciousness of the promises of the demo-

cratic process. No other way of life gives such hope. The day is not here when full delivery is being made on the promises of democracy, but it will come. It is this knowledge that buoys up the spirits of men and women of goodwill everywhere.

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Chapter LIII

INTERIM REPORT ON THE AMERICAN SPIRIT

1 *Mass Production and the Mass Mind*

WHILE the machine with its utilization of natural resources promises ultimate solutions, it has also accelerated at least for the present the growth of personal, social, and economic conflicts. The disease of the modern world is anxiety, what the French sociologist Émile *Anomie* Durkheim called *anomie*. Its symptoms are a loss of orientation and a sense of confusion, frustration, and futility. It arises from a conflict in social "directives," such as the American beliefs in economic competition and ethical co-operation. Out of this arises the American conflict between the Calvinist emphasis on simplicity and work for work's sake and the Catholic exaltation of beauty and of work for social ends.

Anomie is not solely an American disease, but we are here concerned with its American manifestations. In present-day America we find a mythus which serves the same purpose as the ancients' fear of the gods. Its core is the democratic mythus of human freedom and dignity, but it has added an amazing encrustation of contradictions between theory and practice and between clashing ideas. It is impossible to live by them all, but they are defined as the essence of Americanism to which one must conform if he wishes to be accepted.

They are clearly evident in our attitude toward such things as laissez faire, education, race relations, the possession of wealth, and the rôle of government. The average American seldom digs deeply enough to have more than a vague sense that contradictions exist. Society and technology

have fed us upon dreams and promises which have been aspirations rather than immediately attainable goals, and when they have fallen seriously short of fulfillment there has been political protest. One may safely connect some of the bitterness of the political revolt in 1932 with Hoover's assurance just before the depression that the conquest of poverty was in sight. We had a Cinderella complex, promoted by the assurance that we had a right to success in business, in sports, and in love simply because we were Americans. We had not learned the lesson of moderation, which would have taught us to limit our expectations even where we could not limit our needs and ambitions.

The spread between promise and performance has reinforced the contradictions within the mythus in accentuating American anti-intellectualism and escapism. Anti-intellectualism arose from the Anglo-Saxon farmer's avoidance of too much planning lest it hamper his ability to meet emergencies. The method had its advantages **Conformity** and no doubt lay at the root of England's creation of an empire. It emphasized "character"—that is, predictability and reliability—an excellent and essential quality which, however, has a tendency to deteriorate into mere conformity. Probably, also, conformity has been encouraged by the machine's promise of reward if we will meet its demand for standardization.

The demand for conformity finds expression through a variety of mass media which have taken advantage of American *anomie*. In order to increase the demand for their goods, manufacturers and retailers have become "merchants of unhappiness." They fight the ancient virtues of thrift and contentment, call it a sin to possess an obsolescent car or to wear last year's frock if we can possibly obtain new ones, and strive to force us to conform to their suggestions. **Mass media and security** The menace, long evident in such mass media as newspapers, magazines, moving pictures, and radio, has been suddenly pointed up by television's welding of all their techniques. There is no inherent reason why these media should treat the public as a uniform audience with exactly similar tastes, needs, and mental development, but they have evidently considered that it is easier and cheaper. The aim is to cajole everyone into an "outer-directed" mold which will make him amenable to the advertisers' campaign to destroy thrift and breed discontentment. If this habit is inculcated it will also clearly be useful to the political demagogue and the preacher of social and economic hatreds. The "inner-directed" man who refuses to conform will be represented as the enemy of society.

Conformity is nothing new in American life, but alarmists insist that never has it come so close to becoming the be-all and end-all of life, and never has it come so close to pulling down the pillars of society in a grand finale of frustration. Certainly the insistence that one must be able to win

friends and influence people (in itself of secondary importance) has reached the place where one who cannot qualify runs some risk of being deprived of his living. One result has been to make economic security a grand social aim. Now there actually can be no such thing as economic security, and it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that what is sought is a secure place in the esteem of one's associates. We wish social approval, and the great guides to its attainment are the mass media. We look to the movies and the magazines for fads and fashions, to the radio for our slang, and to the advertisements for tips on sex conquest.

It is a familiar fact that this is an age of specialization. Indeed, the lesson has been so well taught that the modern student too often despises as "impractical" any course or discipline which does not obviously contribute to his intended specialty. This is particularly evident in scientific and technological fields; true, the old contempt for pure science has passed, but only because it has demonstrably become the foundation of "practical" advances. Now it cannot be denied that specialization is essential in a complex civilization which relies more and more on mass-production techniques. Indeed, we are confronted by a dilemma which forces us to choose between narrowness and superficiality. We have chosen the former, and specialists have become (in the words of Ortega) "learned ignoramuses." They know only one thing but have a sense of power and speak with authority on all things. When medicos unite to teach economic lessons, engineers draw up social blueprints, and scientists in belated panic at the terrible results of atomic research try to influence politics, they are no different from the mass man.

As a matter of fact, experts are often notoriously wrong even in their own fields because they share the human tendency to freeze present methods and attitudes. One has only to recall Pasteur's battle over the germ theory; Justice Holmes's over organic law; and John Dewey's over instrumentalism. As a result the missionary, in order to sell his new view, has to vitiate it by claiming too much for it. There seems to be a growing distrust of expertness and a growing confidence in political nostrums. One reason may be because businessmen, economists, and engineers fought the fumbling attempts of the New Deal to find ways of distributing purchasing power to the masses. Specialists are necessary, but there is need for developing a class of integrators, or at least of finding a way to organize specialists in teams so that they can check and inform each other.

We have previously noted some of the failures which have resulted from the American attempt to reach the democratic ideal of mass education. It is ridiculous that the schools should be accused of teaching radical doctrines; actually the accusations (when they do not betray mere personal prejudice) show desires to implant demagogic or conservative values. In the outcome the two

Education
for con-
formity

can be equally disastrous. Far from teaching radicalism, American schools are most notable for their efforts to teach social conformity and their failure to instill the habit of thinking. Indeed, they instill the mythus and gloss over our errors so completely that they pave the way for cynicism when the adult learns the truth.

They have valid excuses. They do not have enough money to deal properly with the students with all interests and degrees of ability who crowd into the schools. The teachers, discouraged by the weight of their problems and themselves believers in mass values, tend to release children from rules, restraints, and the performance of unpleasant tasks. The family, the church, and other social agencies fail to share as they should in the responsibility for training the child. At any rate, the result is a danger to democratic emphasis on self-restraint and individual responsibility. The generation is balking at the age-old truth that monotony is the price of knowledge, and too many of its youth have gone overboard for the mass concept of the search for happiness.

The fundamental trouble, of course, is that education no longer has a primarily moral and social basis. Its aim is to help the individual to happiness by way of attaining economic success; the result is that not only are moral and intellectual values subordinated, but subsequent failure to attain economic success—to reach the top—brings frustration. There has been a long struggle between those who would base education on science and those who would base it on morals. The former are led by President James B. Conant of Harvard and the latter by former President Robert M. Hutchins of the University of Chicago; what they have in common is a misunderstanding of the nature of the pragmatic process.

Science or
morals?

It is obvious that science cannot define the ethical aims of education; it is just as obvious that moralists desire to teach some form of absolute which serves their religious or economic ends. Those who take the extreme view in favor of science accuse their opponents of being tyrannical or else vague and utopian; the extreme moralists accuse the other side of being "moral nihilists." Probably both are right. It is here that the pragmatic process of democracy with its practical search for a moral end should serve as a guide.

Without denying the existence of many discouraging factors, there is thus far no reason to anticipate failure, for the assets overbalance the liabilities. Young Americans *do* learn the Three R's; whether or not in the schools they *do* learn the cultural heritage of the race; and an encouraging proportion of them persist in thinking. The democratic ideal of an informed and reflective citizenry is a worthy aim, but reaching it is a slow process. Meanwhile survival will depend on the courage and self-restraint of the lesser number.

Educa-
tional suc-
cesses

Europeans accuse American education of being superficial and materialistic, and so it is typically. Perry Miller notes that on the other hand Europe educates its young by rote, selects the best memories for the universities, and then sentences them for life to a narrow discipline of professional training and practice. They do absorb the cultural heritage, but usually at home—where they are regarded as “badges” of class and status—or by deliberately breaking away from their specialty. “The American often leaves his campus still vulgar and uninformed but we do have the opportunity, more by good luck than by good management, of impressing upon him the glimmerings of a notion that learning is not something apart from life.”*

One of the most frightening aspects of American anti-intellectualism is the increasing muttering against science. It has been adored by the masses because it has given us gadgets; now it has given us the ultimate Science gadgets, the atomic and hydrogen bombs, and they have at in the last pointed up the shortcomings of science itself. Michael atomic age Amrine thus sets them forth.†

Knowledge is power, but power is not of itself a good. Wisdom is not knowledge but the judgment which can properly use knowledge.

Science can help us to live longer, but it is not nearly so much help in our struggle to live with each other.

Civilizations can perish. At the same time that the bomb says, “Here is the physical way you can be destroyed,” it also reminds us that there are other perversions of knowledge and power that can destroy society.

The bomb attacks directly the belief almost unconsciously accepted by Western man: progress is inevitable.

It is no wonder that scientists are frightened. Their long search for “truth” regardless of the consequences to society or of the problems they posed to social scientists has at last come up against the prospect of poetic

Naïve sci- justice. If it endangers the pleasant way of life it has helped entists to create, it may well be relegated to its medieval status as black magic. The so-called scientific mind is merely the mind

that has the aptitude and the training to face the facts of nature; indeed, the pure scientist is the closest exception to the rule that experts oppose new light. But when the scientist is faced by the unpredictable complexity of society, he is as bewildered as anyone else and can, like the ordinary citizen, champion freedom and thought-control in the same breath. It would be silly to advocate a holiday in scientific research as the cure, but it would help if the scientist were to relearn the old truth that the proper study of mankind is man.

* Perry Miller, “What Drove Me Crazy in Europe,” *Atlantic Monthly*, March 1951, 43.

† Michael Amrine, “What the Atomic Age Has Done to Us,” in *New York Times Magazine*, 6 August 1950.

Human society has always been subject to pressure for conformity, and those who have an interest in the matter find that it is useful to convince the masses that they are in a crisis, that their way of life is in danger. Mass media have offered welcome means for utilizing the crisis both in democracies and in totalitarian states. Whether or not a crisis actually exists is beside the point; one can be created by use of the smear technique.

**The smear
technique**

The smear technique can be and is used normally, but it finds its greatest usefulness when a political party has been long out of power and desperately needs a victory to preserve its life; it is also useful when the parties are not divided by real issues or when they fear to bring them up. The smear technique was a standard resort during the generation after the Civil War, when there was little real difference between the parties. The Democratic Party used it with brutal and conscienceless effectiveness from 1929 to 1932, and the method was utilized by both parties during the New Deal era. The Old Guard based its 1952 pre-convention campaign almost altogether on the smear technique, probably because it feared to lay emphasis upon its economic ideals after repeated trouncings by the New Deal. While it attacked bureaucracy and high Federal expenditures, Republican participation in their growth was nevertheless too clear to carry conviction of its sincerity.

Accordingly it turned to an exposure of governmental corruption and official connivance with communism. There were authentic instances of corruption, but attempts to prove that it was deliberate Democratic Party and administration policy were not convincing. Certainly they were slight when compared to some famous Republican scandals in the past and to the relative size of present-day Federal expenditures. Evidently they had never read James Bryce's estimate made in the 1880's that direct bribery in Congress was confined to about five per cent of the membership and indirect bribery to about fifteen per cent. Such governmental corruption as there is seems to consist mostly of the variety which John Flynn called business graft—such as gifts and kickbacks to intermediaries. Part of it (as also with business graft) is possible because the laws have never been tightened. Thus far even the bitterest critics of corruption have refused to join in tightening the laws.

**Issue of
corruption**

On one phase of corruption, however, there was real evidence. This became clear when during 1950 Senator Estes Kefauver of Tennessee gained a modicum of welcome attention by investigating the billion-dollar crime industry, based largely on gambling, whose racketeer controllers had even obtained virtual control of such businesses as wire service in order to aid their rackets. The conditions disclosed by the investigation were justly regarded as disgraceful, but their real cause and significance went unheeded. They rose from much

**Kefauver
investi-
gation**

the same situation as Prohibition—an attempt to govern human behavior with undue rigidity. When it was pointed out that legalized and publicly controlled gambling would go far to eliminate the crime disclosed by the Kefauver Committee, the proposal (as with the proposal to repeal Prohibition) was regarded with horror by the churches and opposed by the racketeers. Nevertheless, as the public watched the parade of thugs pass across their television screens, the more simple-minded or prejudiced part of the public laid the blame for crime on the Democrats. Some of Kefauver's own Democratic colleagues suffered the consequences in the election of 1950.

More important in the long view were the accusations that the Truman administration was really in sympathy with Moscow. The masses, basically though perhaps unconsciously conservative, were already jittery from

The Red smear *anomie*, shaken by the atom bomb, disillusioned by Soviet sabotage of the peace, and fearful of a new world war. Consequently they reacted, for a time at least, with satisfactory

hysteria. The most frightening use of the smear technique was engineered by Senator Joseph R. McCarthy, Republican of Wisconsin, who adopted anti-Communism as his trademark. This was excellent, so far as that goes, but the curious thing was that despite the vicious unfairness of his attacks, McCarthy seems to have been without personal malice toward his victims or real understanding of the issues. He was merely engaged in a boyishly amoral struggle for victory for "our side," in which foul blows were used as a matter of course; it was just as easy to envision him as the champion of thought-control as of democracy. The effect on the reputations of innocent persons was devastating.

McCarthy made his more serious accusations of "guilt by association" on the floor of the Senate, where he was immune to suit. It was inevitable that in charging so many he should name some who were really guilty, and

"McCarthyism" some were eventually convicted though not on his evidence. It was so clear that McCarthy was riding a popular issue that Congressmen of both parties feared to try to moderate

his hit-or-miss accusations lest he turn on them and ruin them in reputation and politics. It was also apparent that McCarthy's aim was to promote a Republican victory at the polls by charging not only that the Democrats had precipitated the world crisis by their diplomacy (chiefly in China) but that it was a part of a deliberate conspiracy to promote Red world conquest. Secretary of State Acheson was the particular butt of this campaign. When Senator Tydings did not conduct an inquiry to suit McCarthy, the latter engaged in the Maryland election of 1950 and by the use of unproven charges that he was friendly with communists promoted Tydings's defeat.

"McCarthyism" was probably the most terrifying attempt since

reconstruction days to enforce conformity on dissenters by using smears, innuendoes, and half-truths to rouse public hysteria. Opposition to communism did not need to be carried on in conformity to the moral code: it had become in itself a part of the moral code. The technique has the advantage that constructive solutions do not need to be offered. All that is needed is to accuse one's opponent of having made a blunder in the past or having associated with a blunderer; ergo, his motives were evil and are still evil. The effect of such smears, whether originating with a Roosevelt or a McCarthy, is to undermine public confidence in government—not simply in the party in power. It is worse than government by demagogues. It is government by witch doctors.

The phenomena cited above are symptoms of an American *anomie*, inevitable in a time of shifting values. American history shows that at least since 1775 we have lived constantly in a state of transition and have always been plagued by more or less confusion. Pessimistic (or wishful) observers have in every generation asserted that this simple *anomie* was about to pass into the acute stage with a consequent dissolution of the American social and political structure. Without for a moment denying the seriousness of our situation, there is no reason to be so certain of the failure of our democratic experiment. Psychiatrists doubt very much the frequently uttered assertion that the American insanity rate is increasing. The curve of treatments has gone up, but that increase is because we are able to detect mental diseases and do something about them. It may even be that the democratic habit of compromise reduces the number of breakdowns among people confronted by conflicting standards and desires.

Are we approaching
break-down?

Again, the claim that the curve of conformity is moving upward is subject to doubt. References to quiz programs, book clubs, public-opinion polls, and the *Reader's Digest* prove oversimplification rather than uniform reactions. Obviously no statistics out of the past are available for comparison, but social interpreters might try to learn more about the past before they make their generalizations. Those who complain about spectator sports forget about Roman gladiatorial combats and medieval tournaments, and about bear-baiting, cock-fighting, and horse-racing. Millions of Americans are engaged in hobbies which range from the trifling to the highly cultural. Hollywood occasionally makes adult films, and some have held that the rigid demands of such agencies as boards of censorship and the Legion of Decency prevent the production of more. The radio brings us good music, drama, and commentary, though there is a complaint that these programs are falling off. Television gives little promise of elevating taste; that may or may not come when its techniques are fully developed.

Counters
to conformity

Mass media are backed by businessmen in search of profit, but it is

necessary to understand that they also are confronted by a dilemma. Their Calvinist responsibility to attain business success and to improve the masses can only be attained if they attract and hold the masses through their use of mass media. With all its dangers and contradictions the controllers of mass media do have a concept of service. Aristocratic and communistic Europeans alike resent this and jeer at the "Coca-Colonisation d'Europe." Even many Americans have historically misunderstood the rôle of the businessman; sometimes, it must be admitted, because the businessman placed power before service. At any rate, historians and novelists have sometimes portrayed the Great Entrepreneurs as "Robber Barons" and in so doing have given a political impetus to Atomism which will doubtless continue for another generation.

There are other counters to the deadening effects of mass conformity. Some of them even rise out of the very conformity which mass production and the mass mind promote. Ford's Model-T actually led to a demand for cars with improved lines and better performance, and the demand could be satisfied because mass production had provided the purchasing power. The motor car has exploded the city into the country and brought back the amateur gardener. There has been a passionate demand for things that are *different*, from hats to domestic décor, and this has led to study of the principles of art and to improved tastes. Home and garden magazines, which show slight interest in standardization, have met enthusiastic response. Manufacturers have learned that an attractively designed refrigerator will sell better than an unattractive one.

Mass production's gift of leisure may not always be well employed, but to millions it means that life is far more worth living. Hobbies have multiplied until today they not only form the basis for personal satisfactions, but supplying them with tools, materials, and instruction has become Big Business. Amateur musicians, players, and painters swarm in every community and show intense interest not only in classic techniques but in modern experimentalism. Thousands of Americans make their living by writing, but multiplied thousands make loving contributions of books on every subject under the sun, and that without prospect of monetary reward.

The modern philistine, as Peter Viereck points out, has become stereotyped and devotes himself to philistine-baiting. One of the philistine-baiter's silliest preachments is that standardization is necessarily bad. True, if democracy's mass production brings irretrievable conformity, we must admit that it is only another bad political theory, for it thus cancels its supreme values of diversity and individualism. But it is not conformity in any invidious sense when 90 million people listen weekly to Toscanini on the radio, or enjoy Fred Allen, or hear the President launch the Community Chest drive.

Cultural
pursuits

Uses of
standardi-
zation

What is wrong with the mass production and mass circulation of books, periodicals, records, and cinema films? And would it not be silly to custom-make automobiles and plows? The real danger lies in another direction—in the possibility of the debasement of quality and of public taste. Still, it seems more likely that the public musical taste, for example, has risen rather than declined since radio broadcasting was commercialized. Walt Whitman, the seer of democracy, grasped the point that democracy includes both self-reliance and interreliance:

One's Self I sing—a single, separate Person;
Yet utter the word Democratic, the word *En Masse*.

To make any advance, one must move off center and run the risk of a spill. There are always people who oppose such risks. Those who fear for America must have a dim comprehension of the historical paradox and of its accompaniment, the social paradox. The writing of history is unfortunately a process of telescoping which requires the use of generalizations, oversimplifications, and misleading references to the "typical American." Americans are well-traveled in their own land, yet they tend to underestimate our diversities in geography, climate, economics, society, politics, psychology, and history. None of these things lend themselves to handy generalization except for a few majority traits or opinions, such as acceptance of the democratic mythus—and even then one does not have to go far to find exceptions.

American
diversity

We will not take the space to draw precise contrasts between the farmers of Vermont, Georgia, Iowa, and California, between the factory workers of the North and South, or the apartment dweller and the villager. Still, it is apparent that in each of them there is a certain independence along with a certain understanding of the necessity of interreliance, and also a certain cool skepticism. The radio exhortation frequently goes in one ear and out the other, Hollywood's confections are accepted as escape not gospel, public-opinion polls are taken with salt—at least since 1948—and the old political clichés have been losing their charm since the collapse of 1929. There are so many Americans that even a small proportion of them can give the impression that a fad or a hysteria is sweeping the country. Actually the main body will still be primarily interested in kids and crops, in home and school, in church and business. There is a basic acceptance of facts and an ability to roll with the punches. Franz Boas insists that the judgment of the masses is sounder than that of the classes where sentiments and values are concerned. Perhaps the dawn of maturity approaches.

American
skepticism

The nation is knitted together not only by laws and politics but by the strands of veterans, fraternal, business, and labor organizations and women's clubs. Still, anyone who has been able to peer behind the scenes

Allegiance to local ways and interests of a national convention of any of these will recognize that they are basically state and regional alliances which survive by a perpetual application of compromise and logrolling. American conformity is not to the national whole except in such crises as that which followed Pearl Harbor. Rather, it is to the mores of one's locality, region, age group, social group, or possibly to an evolving class. We still glamorize the individual, for example, by annually choosing a typical American mother. We still sympathize with the underdog, the individual who is in danger of being overwhelmed by the mass. The American Physiocrat still clashes with the labor theory of value and the capital theory of value. The Atomist is still inveighing against the Regulationist.

2 *The American Quest*

This book has been a chronicle of the American quest for a way of assuring as much as possible of human dignity and freedom in a world which we frankly believe can never be perfect. The quest reaches into

Human dignity and freedom every crevice of American life—political, economic, social, artistic, and moral—and each affects the others by its continuous remolding of the material and psychological climate.

American liberalism has traditionally been concerned with removing abuses and equalizing opportunity rather than with the European pattern of changing the basic economy by introducing socialism. The basis of liberalism is, as Ortega puts it, "considerateness for one's neighbor—the right which the majority concedes to the minority." This allegiance to fair play is the essence of the democratic process, and democracy is menaced when demagogues hit below the belt with lies or, even worse, with half-truths. Liberalism welcomes social and political diversities as the roots of progress. Ideas are ideals on the way to becoming realities. The liberal, as Clement Eaton says, is a person who is willing to experiment for the improvement of society.

To establish a free trade in ideas, it is not sufficient that government shall practice restraint in interfering with private opinions—a purely negative role; nor that a society shall be willing to listen to conflicting views. There must be ideas to interchange; there must be vigorous minorities; there must be a crop of critics, skeptics, and rebels; there must be a changing, dynamic civilization, fermenting and full of creative energy.*

If anything is evident in American history it is the continuous existence of this creative ferment, always present to do battle with democ-

* Clement Eaton, *Freedom of Thought in the Old South* (1940), viii-ix.

racy's tendency to glorify mediocrity. It is frequently overlooked that perceptive conservatives have been essential to the ferment.

A writer in a newspaper's *vox populi* column was not far off from the truth when he defined a liberal as a conservative with a conscience which bothers him. Conservatives like the Adamses, Hamilton, Root, Hughes, and Stimson have contributed a balance which the liberals could not. Their vision of social and political responsibility and their view of America's place in the world have frequently been broader than the liberals' more narrow interpretation of the solution to domestic and foreign problems.

Creative
ferment

Viewers with alarm have a certain justification, but most of them fail to see things in historical perspective. Certainly we are living in perilous times, but there is always thunder in the air of a democracy. Many of our issues of today have been duplicated in the past. There are and always have been those who would deny or violate fundamental principles in their pursuit of power, and there are those so attached to tradition that they will see nothing else. Any attempt to convince them of deeper issues is futile: like a mule in a thunderstorm, they just close their eyes and kick.

This is
where we
came in

Pragmatism's quest for a way to implement moral values is inherent in the democratic process. Americans have "always carried a great deal of moral baggage around with them." No nation has so actively sought what William James called the moral equivalent of war, and there has been a growing comprehension of the uses of co-operation in avoiding both domestic and international conflict. There has been an awareness of the fact (not so apparent to more logical peoples) that the efficient way is not always the advisable way in a democracy. We have by compromise avoided the disastrous individualism of Europe, which has given that continent a hard choice between tyranny and futility. We have persevered in our attempts to utilize private pressure groups and private collective enterprise as social guides. We still have a healthful resentment of government controls and taxation as intrusions—even those of us who agree to their necessity.

America's
moral
baggage

It is, of course, evident that we have blundered. Our idealism has at times been headlong and heedless. Because it is impossible for a people to live continuously on a high moral plane, we have been prone to disillusionment. Concrete moral achievements are harder to attain than straight practical achievements, so we have sometimes oversimplified solutions by naïve reliance on the efficacy of force, as our Indian Wars and the indiscriminate bombing of World War II demonstrate. And yet, as the London *Economist* once put it, "no nation is more firmly on the side of the angels in the long run." It has always been true and is no less true today that there must be a moral issue behind any American undertaking.

Today's struggle for survival obtains much of its strength from the moral issue of the search for a way of advancing human dignity and freedom.

Western Civilization's claim to distinction lies in its faith that the long-term triumph of spiritual values can best be assured by laying a material basis for spiritual advance. It is the business of the creative artist

Mission of the artist to reconcile mass production and the art of living. He must tame mass production to social usefulness, and to do this he must teach that our aim is not always to find the most efficient method but rather to find the most feasible degree of individual freedom and development consistent with social survival. Where he cannot find solutions, he must show us how to equilibrate uncertainties; society, after all, is like a man with heart trouble who must learn to get along with what he cannot cure.

American artists in all aspects of creative endeavor have too often failed because they have not grasped the lessons of history. Each generation of artists has looked upon itself as the first to discover that life can be tragic or futile. They cried vainly for a meaning which they could grasp with their finite minds and overlooked the values each within itself of the individual life, of experience as an end in itself. Art had no value of its own and no message of hope; it was only a morbid examination of putrid flesh. There was too often a failure to realize that civilization is dynamic, changing by a process of conflict and of decay out of which springs new life. The unfolding picture may seem superficially to be one of confusion, but out of it will rise maturity, stateliness, beauty, and harmony—which in turn will decay. The artist needs perception, balance, a sense of what and when to choose, and above all faith, in order to interpret the phenomena about him.

The battle of function against form lags, but it is far from lost. A group of perceptive painters is still groping to solve the problem of expressing this mechanical civilization. Composers of serious music are also seeking. Playwrights have perhaps been more vital and incisive than any of our novelists and most of our poets. **Function versus form** Architecture has turned the traditional shell—the house—into a machine equipped with heating, plumbing, lighting, air conditioning, kitchen, and bath. Even at that, technological advances are being made so rapidly that they limit the desirable life of the house to the generation that built it. Strangely enough, the skyscraper, that exuberant birth of the turn of the century, had brought problems of congestion which defeated its savings. It became a question whether they would long continue to be built. Nevertheless, the functionalism which had inspired the skyscraper continued to be applied to architecture, both domestic and industrial, but without any certainty of early conquest.

Functionalism (streamlining) had an obvious utility in designing air-

planes to offer the least resistance to the air; it did not meet with favor in other fields. For decades designers had been itching to apply functional principles to all industrial production, from flatirons to railroad trains. The depression gave them their big chance, for industrialists were willing to try anything to boost their sales. The result was the meteoric rise to public consciousness of such names as Norman Bel Geddes, Raymond Loewy, Walter Dorwin Teague, and Henry Dreyfuss. While they did "streamline" trains and to a certain extent automobiles, the word is misapplied when used to describe the new forms given to radios and refrigerators. Indeed, those who sought to design such utensils so as to give the illusion of movement were betraying the tenets of functionalism. Sound designers, on the contrary, sought to bring out the grace and beauty inherent in the object without being false to its utilitarian purpose. That much designing was debased and over-pretentious does not destroy the fundamental correctness of the functional approach.

Modern
design

American writers, like most Americans, have been concerned with moral strife; yet they, like other artists, have found no answers. They are vital, hard-working, and earnest, enraged and embittered by their failure to find the golden thread that *must* run through the web of human existence. Most of them fail to realize that it is the mission of the writer not simply to reflect life but to guide it. Their duty is to utter the faith which will find that golden thread. It is plain that American literature has been under eclipse, though it seems to have had some effect upon European writers.

Literature

On the other hand, American writers by their journalistic search for the sensational exception to portray overlooked the strong and consistent currents in American life, and their false inscription only reinforced Hollywood's curiously contradictory portrayals of gloomy sadism and gay irresponsibility. They became unintentionally, as Gerald Johnson says, a secret weapon in deceiving the world about American potentialities for both war and peace. Foreigners, no doubt influenced also by their desires, got a picture of a nation that could not or would not act. It happened in World War I, in World War II, and again in Korea. There has indeed been something amusing in the foreigners' amazement at each fresh rediscovery that the American is a bad man to monkey with.

The artistic ferment remains in America, but except in literature it is the work of figures who are little more than names to the average reader. Magazine articles are more searching than they used to be, and the specialized journals of research and social welfare have graduated—many of them—from mere spadework. Journalistic historians and social analysts are telling the general reader where he came from and where he *was* going; let us hope they

The artistic
ferment

know. They have a nostalgia for the Cult of Respectability which may have a healthful influence. Debunking biography has passed, and there has been a return to the solid, multi-volumed biographies of yesteryear. All over the land people are searching for fresh tales, legends, and bits of folklore, studying dialects, recording old tunes and charting old square dances, discovering that the American painters of a hundred years ago sometimes had an imagination in advance of European painters.

The American quest for moral standards has been bound up with economic, social, and psychological factors—another proof that we have been groping toward some principle of unity. Heavy thinkers in the field

Groping toward unity of modern history point out that the Renaissance and Reformation split European society between the “Catholic Esthetic” and the “Protestant Ethic”—what they mean essentially is a split between the social and spiritual on one side and the competitive and material on the other. It is clear that the Protestant Ethic has been both stimulus and instrument in conquering the material problems which hampered the development of the good life in ancient and medieval times. Mass production promises to give us (if we will be true to its spirit) what both the capitalist and society have always wanted: maximum profits from maximum production at minimum cost.

We now have the prospect of replacing the old economy of scarcity by an economy of plenty and of carrying cultural and spiritual pursuits to undreamed-of heights. The vista which opens before us is the most expansive in human history. Machines will be the servants which make it possible for us to place social aims first. Puritanism's compulsions can be moderated, and economics once more subordinated to morals. Esthetics will at last find a secure base. The faith of the future will be affirmative, based upon human brotherhood and unity.

The way is open to reconcile the paradox of competition and co-operation, but not all problems will be solved. We can never fully understand natural phenomena because we can never see them as they are but must apprehend them through mechanical instruments and through humanity's sensory perceptions. Niels Bohr assures us that there will always be uncertainty in physics because we can never know whether light consists of waves or particles. Similarly we can never know whether life is a mechanical phenomenon or a vital principle, or whether the mind is a camera or the agent of free will.

Complementary view of the universe

Bohr insists that both are true—that the two views are complementary. If this premise is right, there will always be room for human judgment but there will always be things we do not understand, uncertainties which must be equilibrated. There will be no smug permanent answers. There

will always be a danger of taking the wrong track. Living will never need to become boresome.

Fisher Ames, no friend of the masses, once spoke a profound truth. "A monarchy is like a merchantman. You get on board and ride the wind and tide in safety and elation but, by and by, you strike a reef and go down. But democracy is like a raft. You never sink, but, **Adolescent** damn it, your feet are always in the water." The truth of **character-** this observation is well illustrated in American history and **istics** psychology, for it has been a record of crises brought about by ever-new problems and the pragmatic struggle between changing standards. As a consequence American character, molded by the pragmatic struggle, has preserved some striking resemblances to that which emerged at the end of the first generation of national history. Our penchant to grasp historical burrs lightly has concealed many things from us or presented them in strangely deceptive ways.

While we cannot escape the proof that our psychology is still in some ways adolescent, there are also evidences of increasing American maturity. True, the improvements are not always consistent, but at least they give promise. We are less hysterical than we used to be when the raft tilts and we get our feet wet. We are calmer and grim- **Increasing** mer in meeting crises. We are less confident that the world **maturity** moves in perceptible grooves. Our aristocracy (or plutocracy, if you prefer) is showing a new sense of responsibility. Tolerance is making headway despite the efforts of demagogues to thwart it. We are more curious about universal values. We laugh at ourselves oftener. We do our duty without regard to outside criticism. We no longer, most of us, expect the world to love us for our gifts. We face facts—reluctantly, it is true, but we face them.

Americans still have a minimum of reverence for the man on top. Envy is tempered by pleasure in others' success and by innate friendliness and neighborliness; in the international sphere this is shown by proofs of goodwill unprecedented in human history. Americans still have an instinctive sympathy for the underdog (unfortunately with some unreasoning exceptions). Despite our industrial efficiency we have grasped the fundamental of human living, that the most efficient solution is not always socially the most desirable. We still possess the ability to avoid static contentment. We still work hard, harder than most other nations. We still believe in human dignity and freedom, and we are seeking for ways of spreading their observance at home and abroad. We still have plenty of kickers and experimenters, the advantages of mingled bloods and cultures, enormous remaining resources, and, best of all, the democratic process for meeting changed conditions and sudden crises.

The United States has had a longer experience in democratic self-government than any other nation. Moreover, it shows a greater political maturity in domestic affairs despite the superficiality and demagoguery of

American strengths many politicians and Congress's unfortunate lack of dignity. Even at that, the notable thing is that Congress has a core of responsible men who are able to moderate even where they cannot squelch the demagogues. It is, moreover, fair to say that we have the most effective government of modern times—not necessarily the most efficient, though its efficiency is not to be underrated.

The American knows that democratic government can function only where people agree on fundamental principles. Our parties are therefore instruments of government rather than crusaders for new departures in fundamental principles. Hence there is before every election a frantic search for "issues" which will sway the voter, but the attempt to present them as "principles" is more likely to excite derision than belief.

The sum of the matter is that the United States stands today as the most important creative social and economic force in the world. Only diplomatic creativeness lags, and even there we are learning. Despite our historic fluctuations, uncertainties, and inconsistencies (which the world never tires of throwing up to us in oddly misinterpreted form), our starry-eyed pragmatism has produced better end results than any other nation in history. Here there is being enacted a new chapter in the human story; there is being shaped a way of life that some day will be the core of human existence everywhere.

Come, I will make the continent indissoluble,
I will make the most splendid race the sun ever shone upon,
I will make divine magnetic lands,
With the love of comrades,
With the life-long love of comrades.

—Walt Whitman, *For You, O Democracy*

3 *How Fares the American Mission?*

The American way has in the domestic sphere been a resounding success, and we have no apologies to make for the shortcomings which were inevitable during a long history of experimentation. We have tried to show

The American mission how our institutions and our resources have combined to make a freedom of opportunity unparalleled elsewhere in the world. This has bred democracy and its accompaniments, science and technology, and led to the method of mass production, which at last offers democracy a chance of conquering the physical problems which in the past always wrought its downfall. Mass production, moreover, promises to reconcile private enterprise and social welfare because

it makes possible maximum profits by maximum production at minimum costs. More than this, mass production confirms democracy because it will fail without the free co-operation of both labor and society.

The American mission is to offer these to the world as sound bases for a better way of life. It is not our intention to force the world to adopt them, but we believe in them so thoroughly that we will stop at nothing to preserve them. Let the world take warning: American quarrels are not over the meaning of the American mission but over the way in which it should be carried out. Whatever way is taken, there will have to be many, many adjustments made, for, as we have noted before, the most efficient method is not always socially the most advisable. Continual experiment and forethought will be necessary to solve our problems. Even more difficult will be the application of democratic mass production in the world at large. In the light of this long pull the present communist menace—significant though it is—becomes only one crisis in a long history which began two centuries ago and will extend indefinitely into the future.

The American mission has at various times and in various connections been interpreted as expansionist, isolationist, and exemplary. We have seen how expansion found expression in 1812, in 1846, and in 1898, and how in each instance a considerable part of the nation objected and finally summoned the strength to stop it. The opponents of expansion argued that it was not the mission of America to expand democracy by crusades, but rather to preserve and perfect the process and afford an example of peace and prosperity which the world could follow when it tired of the old order. Instead of abandoning the world, America was actually seeking to serve its eventual welfare. Even expansionists basically accepted this view. They claimed that their great object was to insulate democracy against the outer barbarians, thus to preserve it pure and undefiled so that it would be ready for universal adoption whenever the world should come to its senses.

Expansion,
isolation,
example

Britain has always regarded the ocean as a highway; we have traditionally thought of the Atlantic and the Pacific as guardian moats. As long as we stayed between those moats, expansionism had some logical excuse for claiming that it aimed at preserving the democratic example through isolation. The Caribbean phase of the Spanish-American War could be similarly excused, but the intrusion into the Orient was not as easily explained. The Philippine annexation arose chiefly from a mistaken view of the necessities of economic development, but it also portended the American mission's change of base from passive example to active crusade. This change of base became clearly evident in 1917, was eclipsed in the 1920's, and was renewed and confirmed in the 1940's.

Transition
to the
method of
crusade

Now, isolationism has never been incompatible with taking a strong

WHY ISOLATION HAS BECOME LESS PRACTICAL

1620
MAYFLOWER



65 DAYS



1838
FIRST STEAMSHIP



15 DAYS



1938
QUEEN MARY



4 DAYS

1943
FERRY COMMAND



7 HOURS

1950
JET PLANE



4 HOURS

stand in international affairs that concern our own interests. However, a considerable number of men (notably Hoover, Hearst, and McCormick) asserted that World War II and the Cold War did not seriously imperil the United States if we stayed at home and minded our own business—the only realistic thing in any case, for we could not possibly muster the strength to force our will on the world. Things would work out, given time. Even a totalitarian régime would wish to trade. It could not in any case choke us industrially, for we could always find substitutes for vital raw materials as we found primaquine for quinine and made rubber from petroleum. A totalitarian world would, as always in human history, be torn by rivalries, economic and military. Imperialisms would still clash with each other and tend to cancel each other. Even if they did get together to attack North America (some said the Western Hemisphere), the Atlantic and Pacific would still serve as protective moats, and even if they sought to land armies the convoys would be sunk at sea and those armies which did land could not hope to conquer.

It gradually became apparent after Pearl Harbor that a serious split had developed in isolationist ranks. Some isolationists felt forced to become crusaders, partly by the logic of events, partly by the political effects

of Roosevelt's leadership. They became neo-isolationists. But they insisted that the crusade must "go it alone," in contrast to Roosevelt's search for international co-operation. They sought to confine our intervention in the world to instances where American national democratic interests, not necessarily all democratic interests, were clearly jeopardized.

Neo-isolationist argument

They may have been either disappointed or persistent idealists, but their arguments could not justly be shrugged off. They were willing for the United States to accept world responsibilities, but only on American terms. Essentially they wished a United Nations in which only the United States held the veto; this would mean a unilateral *Pax Americana* imitating the "splendid isolation" of the *Pax Britannica*.

The neo-isolationists quite correctly pointed out that since world welfare depended basically on American economic health, it should be a grand object to prevent the draining of the American economy by too much aid to the world either by Marshall Plans, Point Four, or aid to foreign military establishments. Armaments should be held down and first reliance placed on naval and air striking forces. The bloody and expensive attempt to stop aggression in Korea showed that no more such ventures should be undertaken: either pull back on all such danger spots or go for the jugular. At this point the neo-isolationists quarreled: was the jugular in China or in Western Europe?

Most of the men in the Old Guard were nostalgic isolationists, but reality compelled them to play along with the neo-isolationists. Their favorite strategy was to lay stress on China rather than Western Europe. An isolationist, ran a current joke, was a man who wanted to fight in Asia. The reasons were probably mixed. Entry into the Far East had been initiated by the Republicans, and they had long been willing to exercise more international co-operation in that direction than toward European problems. Business, dominantly Republican, had even before World War II admitted that it had something to defend in Asia; at any rate the Philippines, like it or not, were a defense responsibility.

Neo-isolationist stress on China

The enormously influential magazines of Henry Luce, born into a missionary family in China, were internationalist but, more to the point, intensely in favor of Nationalist China. The old romantic notions of the wealth of the Orient still exercised a strong pull on the American imagination. By no means the least decisive reason was a certain tendency to put Asia first simply because Roosevelt said that Western Europe should come first. These factors added to Pearl Harbor resulted, as we saw, in a widespread feeling among Americans that the Pacific war was our real task. Distrust of Red Russia and (among some) a certain tolerance of fascism made the European war less popular.

The internationalists contradicted both the isolationists and the neo-isolationists at almost every point. They denied that we could become completely self-sufficient. They believed that totalitarian philosophies (whether fascist or communist) were so dynamic that they must spread into every corner of the world or perish. Hitherto empires and ideologies had operated in limited geographical areas, so that it was possible for them to exist on the same globe without affecting each other. Now that we had finally reached the limit of geographical perspective, we were faced by a showdown. A totalitarian state could not afford to allow the "bad" example of a free state to continue to exist, and therefore could not rest until freedom was extinguished. Moreover, the very existence of a free state as powerful as the United States exerted a pressure which forced totalitarians to resist it by creating a monolithic structure. But in this case, if no war followed immediately, the free economy would be so strained that it must be subjected to controls which increased to the point where the free state became as totalitarian and monolithic as its rival.

As for the possibility of successful defense, they pointed out that offensive weapons are always ahead of defense, and never more so than in this age of the H-bomb and bacteriological warfare. As for the United States imposing its will upon the whole world, they agreed that it was impossible but denied that it was either necessary or desirable. Their hope was to find a basis of common action with other nations; in any case they believed that democracy must be preserved in the vital area of Western Europe, by war if absolutely necessary. If that was done, the remainder of the world would gradually tend toward freedom.

It is readily apparent that the crisis of the twentieth century is not solely of communist or even totalitarian origin. The political and technological revolutions of the 1700's and 1800's have bred social and economic revolutions in this century which have put material and psychological weapons in the hands of modern totalitarians. The revolt of the colonial areas of the world—particularly Asia—did not arise from communism but from the political and social teachings of democracy. At any rate, the conflict has resulted in the crash of all but two of the great powers and has to an alarming extent put the fate of the world into their keeping.

It would have been much more convenient if the present crisis had waited a few generations in order to coincide with American maturity, but things did not happen that way. We have glimpsed some of the fears, emotions, and prejudices which confuse American opinion.

There is a feeling of inadequacy, which breeds fear and some hysteria. This is all the more remarkable when we

consider that no nation in history has ever faced a crisis with so much in its favor. We are politically mature in most domestic concerns. We have had a long experience in dealing with interracial and intercultural conflicts and yet keeping reasonably close to the democratic process. We have the material and military resources. The question is, Do we have the diplomatic and moral resources?

It is not greatly oversimplifying the truth to point out that the faults of the American view of foreign affairs stem from our preoccupation with morality. The democratic process forces us to make compromises of questionable morality on the domestic scene, but our ignorance of the world leads us to believe that we can make up for this by championing the moral order in foreign affairs. Here are concentrated the historic American flaws. Our sense of mission tends to make us divide nations into good and bad, and to regard as immoral those who disagree with our viewpoint.

**Stress on
morality**

We are concerned first with good order, and so we tend to promote a legalism which stultifies ideas and accepts paper promises instead of agreements based on facts. Our sentimentalism refuses to recognize or is incapable of recognizing reality; consequently we are little inclined to practice the first essential of statesmanship: a cold assessment of our own capabilities and those of our opponent. We have historically failed to realize that statesmanship is not the art of doing the best or most just thing, but of picking the best course among unsatisfactory alternatives. We have believed that we are omnipotent; "we never started a war and never lost one." When we finally attained world power and found ourselves unable to overawe the Russians, belief in omnipotence received a rude shock. What more natural, then, than to blame it on the State Department as being full of communists?

The results of the faults in our view of foreign affairs has been a clash between the democratic process and the necessities of statesmanship, a fact which explains the long antagonism between the Senate and the State Department. When the suspicious framers of the Constitution gave each division of government a check upon the others, they not only made it difficult for the government to interfere with the private citizen (as was good), but they made it unlikely that our leaders could hew out a consistent and realistic foreign policy (as was bad). The first generation of American diplomats had considerable success, perhaps partly because they were dealing with a Senate which was not elected by the people and was therefore not always responsive to sentimental pressures.

**Constitu-
tional hin-
drances**

Now the Senate is popularly elected and is handicapped not only by public pressures but by a lack of basic dignity along with an inflated

sense of dignity. The Executive is torn between fear of Congress and fear that it will fail to be re-elected unless it does what the people wish. The result is that it frantically seeks to follow, instead of educating and leading public opinion. Even when cold assessment dictates a line of policy, it feels that it must sell the policy to Congress and the public by shock tactics—by overstating the case or drumming up a crisis. In the long run this only leads to doubt, confusion, and further distrust of executive leadership. Even when one balances the above by our economic power, our domestic political stability, and our strong belief in the democratic principles which appeal to peoples everywhere, it is no wonder that the world has doubted American ability to lead.

Of course we have pursued our national interest (usually security), but we have also had a peculiar idea that morals are incompatible with national interest. The tendency, therefore, has been to pose as champions of morals and to try to force others to solve problems by legal and moral rules—that is, our democratic process of formalized conflict with its successive compromises. George Kennan has shown the consequences to our diplomacy. It accepts nations as instruments of international action and thus freezes them in their present form when they really should be in process of change and amalgamation as in the past. It assumes that nations can solve their own internal problems and thus ignores numerous factors out of which international strife can and does arise. It assumes the efficiency of collective action, when as a matter of fact a group of nations never has and never will act together without friction and consequent loss of energy and effectiveness.

Our reliance on rules means that subversives can take over a government without breaking the rules (as they did in Czechoslovakia), and we have no ground for protest. Our preoccupation with legal and moral rules means that we are slow to adopt force as an international instrument. Out of this arises the fact, seen over and over in American history, that it is difficult to get democracies to use force for “rational and restricted purposes rather than for purposes which are emotional and for which it is hard to find a rational limit.”

When we do go to war, we are stirred more by the provocation which has made us adopt force than by the wrong out of which the provocation sprang. Thus, anger over the sneak attack on Pearl Harbor was far greater than over Japan’s long course of oppression. As a result destructive democratic wars (still George Kennan) are punitive rather than expedient; the lawbreaker must be destroyed. “A war fought in the name of high moral principle finds no early end short of some form of total domination.” Wars over what the contestants believe are moral issues are bloody and destructive, as were the appalling religious

wars of the sixteenth century. War was then formalized to reduce its destructiveness, but the American Revolution re-introduced the ideological basis, and it found further illustration in the Civil War and World War II.

The above is not intended to intimate that morality has no place in the conduct of foreign affairs; on the contrary, we can never afford to lose sight of it. Nevertheless it is evident that diplomats who operate under the above handicaps are at a disadvantage, and never more so than when dealing with the cynics in the Kremlin. Sovietism has defined morality as that which brings success to it. There is argument over its aims (whether they are ideological or merely imperialist), but there is no doubt that the Kremlin has cast off the inhibitions of the old diplomacy and is conducting a "diplomacy of civil war." Its political action, says George Kennan, is a fluid stream which moves constantly toward a given goal, filling every nook and cranny in the basin of world power. If blocked, it accepts the situation philosophically and tries some other direction; but always the pressure is there, ready to take advantage of the least weakness or of any failure to guard the dikes.

**Soviet di-
plomacy**

The Soviet Union suffered enormous economic losses in World War II, and its people are half-starved and its satellites discontented. Thus far it has not wanted war, and the future may or may not alter the pattern. "The soundest strategy in war," said Lenin, "is to postpone operations until the moral disintegration of the enemy renders the delivery of the mortal blow possible and easy." Soviet strategy, therefore, is to soften up the world for easy conquest by reducing it to misery and chaos. It aims to promote the "inevitable" collapse of capitalism, especially in the United States. It promotes local wars and crises in order to drain the economies of the democracies. It uses the UN and other international conferences as sounding boards for propaganda and vicious slanders hitherto strangers to diplomacy. When the Soviet makes a concession, it is "interpreted" out of existence when the recipient calls to collect.

The Soviet system is deliberately destructive of moral values and material welfare. Its economic statism is probably even more destructive than socialism. It has time and again sabotaged peace. It uses veiled aggression in order to breed the chaos which will soften up the world for Soviet domination. It seeks to enslave men's minds and to entrench a selfish élite. Its demand for conformity stops the intellectual and cultural ferment which is essential to progress. It elevates a mortal man (Stalin) to the rank of divinity and exhorts the faithful to kiss the stones over which his holy feet have passed. It practices race discrimination and denies civil liberties, even to reducing ten million men and women to labor as slaves. Its ethics are destructive of the good faith without which neither man nor nations can get on together. A Viet Nam villager summed it all up in a statement that drew power from its simplic-

**The evils
of Sovi-
etism**

ity: Communists need neither God, nor family, nor love; we need all three.

Soviet success has not resulted solely from the astuteness of its policies. Far more responsible has been the shortsightedness of the democracies. Actually a close look at Soviet diplomacy shows that it is so stupid that in

**Soviet
stupidity**

the end it may be suicidal. It has a genius for making come true the very things that it fears the most. It interprets the outside world according to its own ideological formula, and

therefore does not see things as they are. It has aroused strong resentments at home and abroad; Stalin made two mistakes, runs a European wise-crack: he let Europe see the Russians, and he let the Russians see Europe. His greatest blunder was the alliance with Hitler in 1939; but when he had a chance to retrieve it, he deliberately alienated British and American goodwill. He has played fast and loose with the dearest wishes of the peoples of France and Germany. Worst of all, he has driven the democratic world to co-operate against him by a long string of aggressions whose portentousness only the most wishful thinkers could misinterpret.

An inescapable example of Soviet intransigence is seen in the history of the attempt to place atomic weapons under the control of the United Nations. Bernard Baruch's plan as adopted by the UN Atomic Energy

**Atomic
weapons**

Commission (June 1946) was to turn over to an International Atomic Development Authority: (1) managerial control or ownership of all atomic-energy activities potentially

dangerous to world security; (2) power to control, inspect, and license all other atomic activities; (3) the duty of fostering the beneficial uses of atomic energy; and (4) responsibility for research and development. The veto was not to be used in the Security Council to block action by the Authority.

This plan not only was an unprecedented surrender of sovereignty by the United States but showed an unusual hospitality to socialization. Nevertheless Russia turned the plan down cold. The reasons were very clear: not only could it not agree to the limiting of the veto, but it could not afford to have inspectors going where they pleased behind the Iron Curtain. It could not afford to let the world know about the weakness, tyranny, and crime which lay at least partly concealed behind the Iron Curtain.

The United States has dedicated itself to the preservation of freedom and democracy and has been forced to use power to that end. Any other course would have been suicidal. Nevertheless, it has continually been

**U.S. di-
lemmas**

confronted by dilemmas which, whether it acts or not, earn distrust and hatred. If it does not intervene to support democratic elements, it is injuring the democratic fight for secu-

rity and supporting fascism or communism; if it does intervene it lays itself open to bitter recriminations by all those who feel themselves injured. The history of the United States in the postwar world has been its

attempt to escape from the dilemma of power by finding a truly multi-lateral means of assuring the triumph of its ideals.

The United States has not overcome all of the handicaps incident to its basic moral approach, yet it must be acknowledged that it has been making a remarkable effort to set up a régime of enlightened co-operation. We have seen how the Monroe Doctrine was made multilateral and shall presently see how the United States has fought aggression by means of the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the Atlantic Pact, and by the defense of South Korea. It demanded and obtained equality for the small nations in the UN Assembly and has resisted Soviet pressure to settle world problems without regard for the wishes or interests of those nations. This may or may not have been wise (even the small nations disagree on that point), but it at least shows a desire to use power with due regard for the interests of others.

**Growing
maturity**


This is an impressive list and in itself no mean indication that the United States is meeting world crises in an increasingly mature manner. Indeed, history shows no precedent in which a nation deliberately taxed itself in order to restore the war-torn economies of its trade rivals, late enemies as well as allies. Henri Spaak of Belgium admitted, "If I had to persuade my constituents to pay ten per cent more taxes for aid to America, and to tell them that Belgian conscripts should serve in Arkansas, I am fairly certain that I should not be re-elected." The Marshall Plan not only was the ultimate step in reversing the method of the American mission; it defined it as positive aid to attain freedom for all.

The American purpose, of course, has been to use the most effective means to save itself and the democratic way of life. Few Americans believe that the world will suddenly go democratic, but they hope to block totalitarianism so that the nations can trend toward democracy. In the long run totalitarianism can be tolerated only if it is decadent. All this is perfectly clear. The confusion arises from the dilemmas that haunt our program. Isolationists and neo-isolationists view the entire undertaking with fishy eye and would prefer to return to the old policy of preaching by example—or, if we must intervene, to "go it alone."

**Obstacles
to the
American
mission**

Britain, the balance wheel of the nineteenth century, operated in "splendid isolation" and loaned its capital instead of giving it away. Both policies were feasible then. There were minimum obstacles to sending goods and investments abroad and to bringing back the interest and profits earned. Today it is common for borrowing countries to refuse to allow interest and profits to be exported; they lay all sorts of obstacles in the way of trade; and there is always a risk that they will seize investments, as have Mexico and Iran, to name the most important seizures. In the light of this situation there is something ineffably absurd in the accusation that

DISTRIBUTION OF THE WORLD'S GOODS



the United States is "using" the weaker nations and colonies. The shoe is on the other foot.

The pothor about Point Four is an apt illustration of the changed situation. The belief that the United States could fight communism by raising the standard of living in underdeveloped areas rose naturally from Nelson

Origins of Point Four

Rockefeller's World War II program to organize and utilize Latin-American resources. The Rockefeller family presently began to risk its money in just such enterprises. The United Nations began a study of the problem and undertook a few small projects. The U.S. Export-Import Bank had been making loans for many years to undertake development and reconstruction. Aspirations for world improvement found expression in Point Four of President Truman's inaugural address, 20 January 1949. "We must," said he, "embark on a bold

new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas." Technical assistance was to be given to development projects, and private investment was to be encouraged. Eventually Congress made an initial appropriation of \$35,000,000.

Point Four adopted the cheerful idea that by numerous small concerted efforts and the aid of some capital the peoples of underdeveloped areas could quickly lift themselves to considerably higher levels of prosperity. Now there are projects (especially in agriculture) by which a much greater production can be gained quickly and at negligible cost. Most projects, however, prove on examination to be based upon the expectation of a continuous flow of American dollars, occasionally billions. Since 1916 the United States has sought to maintain its rhythm of production and to help the world out of various awkward situations by exporting something like \$110 billion; much of this, plus hundreds of additional billions at home, have gone for the necessary but uneconomic purpose of warfare. If this expenditure is kept up beyond a limit (at present undetermined), it will kill the goose that laid the golden egg; this is the hope of the Kremlin and is doubtless why Earl Browder was an original advocate of the Point Four idea. If the United States is to continue to be a bulwark of power and security, it must retain the means of multiplying its own capital, that is, capital and profits.

The Point Four idea was spawned because the governments of underdeveloped countries have made it risky for private capital to enter their borders. Their hope, of course, is that the U.S. government can be blackmailed by threats of going communist into furnishing capital without hope of profit—and probably eventually without hope of getting it back. Governments may occasionally have good reason for giving away money and goods for political or social ends, but they must never forget that such capital is thereby removed from the essential business of earning profits and thereby weakens the donor. An economy (even a socialist economy) cannot long exist without profits.

Point Four, if carried too far, is bound to encourage further blackmail and further seizure of American private capital. The only cure is to clear the way for private investments to be reasonably safe and to earn a profit. This view must be unequivocal; the U.S. government can extend tax-exemption inducements to investors (as Truman has suggested), but to guarantee such investments only continues the evil. Private investments are the life blood of the world's economy; and if they cannot circulate, the economy will sicken and die. Here is a task for the United Nations. If it can induce some countries to grant reasonable conditions to private investors with UN right to adjudicate disputes, the result may be the renewal of economic vitality all over the world.

**Economic
drain
on U.S.**

**Blackmail-
ing U.S.
dollars**

**The eco-
nomic
remedy**

This reasoning does not forbid the expenditure of some capital in attempts to help the peoples of underdeveloped countries to help themselves. But this expenditure must be made in terms that they can understand and by methods that they can use. It must begin with simple processes and simple tools, not with vast projects and complicated machinery unless the foreign governments themselves will furnish the capital or encourage investors. The world's standard of living can and will be raised, but it will take time—generations, perhaps centuries. It will take boldness, imagination, and perseverance—and not only on our part. Our share will be useless unless those we help also wish to help themselves.

Europe is convalescing from an attempt at suicide: suicide by its smug allegiance to tradition, which made it refuse to adapt itself to the new age of science and technology. The result was wars and accelerated decline.

The United States is now engaged in a series of blood transfusions intended to adjust it to the new age and to restore its dynamism. Now it is a truism that there is no such thing as international gratitude, but some Americans have lagged in understanding this point, and so are surprised by the European reaction to our well-meant ministrations. Europe, judging by its own history, is suspicious of altruism and shrugs off the whole matter with the wishful explanation that we must expect to get more than we are giving. The European sense of solidarity of political interests is so rudimentary that the movement for continental unification actually depends upon America for life.


There is a rather general rule that a country is better analyzed by foreigners than by its own citizens, but the rule falls down when applied to the United States. Few foreigners other than De Tocqueville and Bryce have understood us. Germany twice and Japan once made ghastly misjudgments of American psychology; as a result the German and Japanese empires ceased to exist and along with them the empires of Austria-Hungary, Turkey, and Italy. The American is thought of as faceless, a force, an expression of emotion, impulse, and the machine. There is some contention over whether we are barbarians or the most highly skilled of all nations. American standardization, materialism, and mediocrity are overemphasized.

These views are not attempts to state the truth; rather, they are intended as propaganda weapons. By and large the world has failed to understand the real meaning of the American mission because it has failed to see how deeply the Calvinist sense of election has penetrated the American fiber. Or perhaps perceptive enemies of the United States even among the democracies do understand this and seek to frustrate it, lest it remake their hallowed traditions. It is curious how the nations want us to restore and inspire them—but do it without shocking them out of their compla-

cency, disrupting their egos, forcing them to surrender personal and class perquisites, and above all without involving *them* in war. They criticize the United States for giving them economic aid but offering no "vision." The answer they deserve is that the vision is there, but they do not wish to see it; they refuse to acknowledge that a vision must have a material basis or it is useless.

The American mission can conceivably fail because of the democratic world's own failure to help itself. The way in which the noncommunist nations constantly bait the United States plays into the hands of the isolationists and neo-isolationists, who still nurse the opinion that it is against our interests to co-operate with foreigners. The convalescent is sometimes too demanding. Given the wrong juncture of events, it is still conceivable that the United States would pull back to the Western Hemisphere and leave the Old World to the Soviets. Advocates of the Third Force should remind themselves that the United States can stop the Cold War in ten

The American mission can fail



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A British cartoonist illustrates European ambivalence toward the United States.

minutes simply by abandoning the Old World to Russia. Even if a war must be fought, there are good arguments for entrenching ourselves in America rather than trying to defend an unco-operative Old World.

On the other hand, failure can still arise from domestic conditions. We lack economic and technical experts with detailed knowledge of foreign countries, and Americans are suspicious of planning at the government level. Our chief failures, however, are executive and legislative. The Truman administration on the whole had a realistic view of the world crisis and how it should be met, but fell

U.S. official failures

short in the application. Its view of the domestic situation (whether or not correct) persuaded it to hesitate in taking action, and then to send a boy to do a man's work. It did some of the needful things but gave the wrong reasons (usually moral rather than realistic) and guaranteed impossible results.

It failed in the duties of educating and leading the public. It acknowledged that Russia would have the A-bomb in from three to five years, and it preached that power was the basic necessity in dealing with Russia. Nevertheless, its fears of Congress, taxpayers, and moralistic voters kept it from boldly advocating rearmament. This paralysis was not ended by proof that Russia had the A-bomb, nor even by the Korean War until the reverses of November 1950.

The fundamental failure of the leaders of American foreign policy was that they did not have the courage to boldly state their considered judgment of the situation and to stand or fall upon their judgment of the proper course of action. Their fear, of course, was that if they lost control neo-isolationism would come in, but their confusion actually gave arguments to the neo-isolationists and increased the chances of their triumph. And it made it less likely that the Administration would acknowledge its mistakes and try to rectify them.

All this harks back to the moral basis of American thinking in foreign affairs and to the failure of responsible leaders since the days of Woodrow Wilson to teach that diplomacy must also have a realistic basis. We need to apply to foreign affairs more of the pragmatism which has had a reasonable degree of success in the domestic sphere. We cannot, of course, make national interest the sole test of action any more than pure morality, for national interest changes as new scientific and social concepts emerge and as political conditions change. While we cannot hope suddenly to implement a moral order, we cannot afford to ignore the fact that the world is straining toward a moral order of co-operation and peace. Both Wilson and Roosevelt thought that the realization of the moral order was just over the horizon, and both sought to substitute collective security for the balance of power.

Both failed, but that fact does not disprove the theory that some day collective security may be realized. Russia has posed to the United Nations the problem of rebuilding a balance of power which can be succeeded by collective security, whether by evolution or war. Meanwhile the UN is hampered by clashing national interests and sovereignties which force it to ignore important problems or to straddle them. Sometimes the United States, impatient at UN bumbling, makes up its mind to act and pushes the UN into a decision. Whether such American decisions arise from national interest or from a view of world welfare is bitterly argued.

What steps can the United States take in order to retrieve past disasters and prevent future ones—if they are preventable?

1) It can rearm and stay rearmed. It must also rearm its allies to block any sudden aggressive move by the Soviets either in Europe or Asia, but the continental United States must be the reservoir of arms and man power. Solving the dilemmas of power

2) It can re-examine the bases of our diplomacy and seek to establish a balance of guiding principles suitable to a great power which must insure its own security and freedom by a program of co-operation with other freedom-loving states in promoting world order and welfare. The State Department has not done so badly in its assessments, but it needs to cultivate a sense of participation in Congress; it cannot please all the demagogues and self-seekers in Congress, but it can develop a disposition on the part of well-balanced Congressmen (and there are many) to defend it against the vicious attacks of some of their colleagues.

3) Its leaders can begin the process of re-educating the American people in the real nature of diplomacy. Three of the essentials in combating the demonic forces abroad in the world are vigilance, patience, and self-sacrifice; no sudden solution is likely to appear, nor can we afford hysteria or snap judgments.

4) It can loyally support the United Nations as a forum of world opinion, an arbiter of conflicts, and the coming Parliament of Man. Equality of nations in the UN Assembly is a valuable corrective of power, just as our agricultural Senators keep industry from wielding too much power. On the other hand, it cannot afford to allow recriminations and blackmail to deter it from needful actions. Strength used intelligently and decisively will win respect and co-operation; love among nations as among politicians is likely to be based on a certain contempt.

5) It can give economic transfusions in so far as they do not injure its own economic health, in an endeavor to aid the world to a better standard of living. It should not aim at modernizing underdeveloped countries suddenly but should use simple, easily grasped techniques. Probably this program should be handled by the United Nations; the United States might not get as much credit, but the UN could draw skills and capital from other countries, and its ministrations would be more willingly accepted in countries which have an outmoded concept of Western imperialism. This aid should not be charity except in isolated cases; it must help people to help themselves. Above all we must restore the right of private investments to go where they can make a profit; otherwise there is little hope of restoring the world's economic vitality.

6) It can develop and put into effect an integrated and practical plan not merely to counter communist and Soviet propaganda but to carry the message of freedom all over the world—especially behind the Iron Curtain.

The object quite frankly must be to undermine Soviet power. In the long run the war against tyranny can be won only in the minds and hearts of men.

7) It can keep the door open for a deal with the Soviet Union. If such a deal can be based on facts, it will probably be kept. Nevertheless, no deal should be made which does not recognize on our part the clear truth that democracy cannot survive unless totalitarianism is on the way to losing its dynamism. Such loss, of course, is unlikely unless Sovietism sees itself inescapably confronted by the frustration of its aggressive program. Such a deal may not be possible. In that case the Soviet government must understand that if it continues its tactics of draining the democracies, the Cold War will become hot; and war, no matter who starts it, will result in the destruction of the Soviet system.

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Chapter LIV

THE COLD WAR

1 *The Ordeal of Harry Truman*

THE man who succeeded Roosevelt in the presidency was Harry S. (for nothing) Truman, born and reared on the Kansas-Missouri border. After leaving high school he served a stint as a bank clerk, then family financial reverses induced him to spend twelve years as a farmer. He Harry S. Truman (b. 1884) went to France as an artillery officer, served with credit, and returned a major. He then married and settled in Independence and, with a wartime comrade, opened a haberdashery in Kansas City just before the postwar depression struck. He failed as a storekeeper—but then so did Lincoln.

Truman had always been friendly and popular, and he now turned to politics. In 1922 he was elected a Jackson County Judge, the term given to county commissioners in Missouri. He was defeated by the Ku Klux Klan in 1924 but came back in 1926 and remained until 1934. His political rise Meanwhile he gave the county a good road system and other public works at reasonable cost. Truman was a country ally of Tom Pendergast's Kansas City machine, a machine as corrupt as those in other cities. No politician could long remain active in Jackson County without Pendergast's sufferance, but Pendergast could not afford to antagonize Truman because the latter enjoyed the hearty support of the semi-rural areas of the county. Pendergast seems to have respected Truman's honesty but was not very anxious to help advance his fortunes. It was not until Pendergast faced the trouble which later put him in prison that he gave Truman support for the senatorship.

Truman's senatorial record, marked by profarm and prolabor policies, made enemies, but in 1940 he came from behind and won re-election without administration aid. His rise to national attention was slow; it was only as chairman of the Special Committee Investigating National Defense that

he won the public and administration regard which moved him into the vice-presidency in 1945. Within less than three months he was President.

The new President was a lean little man of 61, gray-haired, with thick-lensed spectacles, and an infectious grin. Mrs. Truman, retiring but self-possessed, was a contrast to Mrs. Roosevelt; their only child, Margaret, later went on to a career as concert and radio singer and actress. Truman, a music lover from boyhood, liked nothing better than to play old songs on the piano while Margaret sang, and he was given to playing Mozart and Chopin in solitude. Harry Truman was the average man. There was nothing striking in his appearance, and he could easily have been lost in a crowd. He was not well educated, well informed, nor intellectually well endowed. Swamped by the processes of a vast governmental machine, he often oversimplified, jumped to conclusions, contradicted himself, and trusted to luck rather than foresight.

His character

Unlike Roosevelt, Truman was no orator and he never ceased to stumble and bumble over set addresses. Nevertheless, he was a master of extemporaneous talk, and his delivery was of the vigorous and picturesque kind that appeals particularly to crowds gathered at county fairs or around the rear platform of a campaign train. He liked people; he liked to chin with them about crops and trivia, to attend lodge meetings, and throw balls at carnivals. He was given to off-the-cuff pronouncements, the significance of which he apparently did not realize, and his patient press secretary frequently had to cover for him. Indeed, the nation was to learn that this deceptively mild and humble little Missourian possessed a hair-trigger temper and was a fighter when once he was aroused.

Politics was his meat and drink, and like most politicians he was a little too ready to accept human nature. The result was a blunted moral sense in some matters which nonpoliticians and parties out of office regarded as important. Nevertheless he stood by his guns and in the long run proved stubbornly honest in upholding what he regarded as right, regardless of the political consequences. Like all Presidents, he gathered about him men whom he knew and trusted, and frequently he supported them even after they became political liabilities; some of them did not deserve it. Like all politicians he hesitated to take strong action, but once he was convinced of the necessity he moved swiftly.

Truman the politician

The problems which faced Truman in April 1945 yielded nothing in difficulty to those of any former President. The war in Europe was almost over, but trouble was looming with the sullen Eurasian ally. Pentagon wiseacres gave the Pacific war eighteen months to go; actually it was over in four. The problems of peace which followed upon the heels of war were no less difficult. The usual postwar popular demand to "bring the boys home" swept Congress before

Truman's problems

it and stripped the President of power in negotiating with Russia. Truman yielded to the further demands to immediately stop Lend-Lease and wash out most price controls—to his later regret. The United States thus handicapped itself in playing its rôle as the only remaining democratic power which could meet the problems left by the war: mounting Russian aggression all around its periphery from Norway to Korea, the economic reconstruction of Europe, the government of Japan, and the colonial cry for independence.

On the domestic scene there were not only the headaches of reconversion to civilian industry but a looming struggle over the unification of the armed forces, and a resurgent conservatism which looked forward to destroying the New Deal and all its works. Truman was probably a middle-of-the-roader, if anything a little to the right, but he was saddled with the necessity of preserving the New Deal's alliance of farmers and laborers. The postwar swing to the right made this a difficult task, and it is likely that Truman himself knew that he had no chance of forcing a liberal program through Congress. The best he could hope for was to keep the issues before the electorate and use them as talking points at election time. Unfortunately his relations with Congress rapidly deteriorated, and he failed spectacularly in his attempt to hold together the diverse elements in his party.

FDR had in January 1944 issued his Economic Bill of Rights which sought for America's security in a high standard of living. "America's own rightful place in the world," he asserted, "depends in large part upon how fully these and similar rights have been carried into practice." In an address to Congress, 6 September 1945, Truman launched his Fair Deal by calling for a long list of improvements: housing, full employment, higher minimum wages, extension of the social-security system, better farm price supports, scientific research, a Fair Employment Practices committee, and more TVA's on the Columbia, Missouri, Arkansas, and in California's Central Valley. Right-wing Republicans and Bourbon Democrats were shocked out of their confidence that Truman could be used in washing out the New Deal, and he compounded Southern antagonism by asking Congress for legislation to eliminate the poll tax, punish lynching, and revive the FEPC.

To make matters worse, Truman had to deal with three men who felt that they had been unjustly bilked of the purple. Wallace had lost renomination by a nose, and Barkley and Byrnes each felt that Roosevelt had promised him the vice-presidential nomination and had reneged. Barkley remained in his post of majority leader of the Senate, and Wallace remained as Secretary of Commerce. Byrnes found poor consolation in Truman's appointment of him to the State Department. When, shortly after his return from Potsdam, Truman

recognized that Stalin had gotten away with too much, he began the early phases of his "get-tough-with-Russia" policy, much to the dismay of Wallace, avatar of the fellow-travelers, and to the annoyance of Byrnes, who had the job of dealing with Russian diplomats.

The crisis came in September 1946 when Wallace delivered in Madison Square Garden a speech that had been cleared by Truman. Nevertheless Byrnes, at the moment laboring in Paris, regarded some of Wallace's statements as undercutting his work, and he protested so vigorously that Truman fired Wallace. On the other hand, Byrnes still hoped for agreement with Russia and resented Truman's realism. Moreover, to Truman's own resentment, Byrnes tended to regard the President as a nonentity and did not check with him frequently. Finally in January 1947 Byrnes retired on a plea of ill health—which did not prevent him from promptly becoming leader of the anti-Truman Bourbons. He was, of course, accused of having abandoned a hopeless task and a sinking ship. Truman later bluntly stated that "he ran out on me."

Some of Truman's nominations for high office were not suitable, and the Senate pounced upon and rejected them with rather unbecoming ghouliness. The departure of "Honest Harold" Ickes in February 1946 rid the Cabinet of the last of the original Roosevelt slate and left it with many second-raters. Vinson, a first-class man, served briefly in the Treasury, then became Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Another able exception, despite a certain stuffiness in public, was General Marshall, who in January 1947 became Secretary of State; later on he was to become Defense Secretary. We shall examine Marshall's policies later, but it is well to point out here that his military belief in "loyalty up and loyalty down" meant that at times he supported his subordinates to the injury of himself and of administration policy.

**End of the
New Deal**

A long campaign for unification of the armed forces had led to the creation in July 1947 of the Department of Defense. Within it Secretaries of the Army, Navy, and Air Force administered the branches, and strategy was handled by the Joint Chiefs of Staff under the chairmanship of a fourth member. There were other features intended to integrate national defense. The National Security Council (NSC) was to study domestic, foreign, and military conditions and needs and to recommend integrated policies. The National Security Resources Board (NSRB) was to co-ordinate natural resources, industrial power, and man power. The Research and Development Board (RDB) co-ordinated scientific research and national defense. The Munitions Board was to plan for and purchase supplies for the services. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) for the first time in American history attempted to bring together in one place all available information on foreign military services and their plans and capabilities.

**National
Security
Act, July
1947**

Scarcely had the Department of Defense been set up when it became clear that unification was merely a name and that navy and air force were struggling for control. As the price of unification, the navy had exacted the **Battle of the Pentagon** appointment of its Secretary Forrestal as first Secretary of Defense. Crux of the struggle was the navy's projected construction of a supercarrier on the ground that it could not otherwise utilize modern jet fighters with their great size, speed, and burden of gadgets. The air force insisted that its new B-36 bomber made the supercarrier unnecessary. Forrestal was an able and sincere man, the highest type of public servant, but his navy sympathies made it impossible for him to adjudicate satisfactorily and subjected him to a crescendo of personal and political attack. In the end he broke down, and soon after his retirement committed suicide.

Forrestal's successor was Louis Johnson, a hard, rough-talking West Virginia attorney, who was utterly without judicial capacity. Johnson made some laudable economies, but in cutting off the fat he cut into the **Congressional investigation, 1949** fighting muscle by reducing divisions to "Johnsonized" skeletons. Moreover, he began a hampering and unnecessary feud with the State Department. One of his first acts was to stop the building of the supercarrier, an undoubted victory for the air force. The navy, faced with the loss of its old semiautonomy, saw no alternative to precipitating an open Congressional investigation. This was held in the summer of 1949, and the public airing of tempers may have served to clear the atmosphere. It would seem that the consensus was that the navy had failed to prove its case.

Nevertheless the basic differences remained, particularly between navy and air force, and there was no telling when they might burst into the open. The struggle among the armed services indicated that there was great difference of opinion over the nature of the next war and what sort of preparations should be made. Congress remained stubbornly unconvinced of the administration view that armed force was a primary element in the world situation. It resumed its old habit of starving the services, though it continued a limited version of selective service.

The common opinion of Truman's ineptness persuaded Democratic managers to keep him under wraps during the Congressional campaign of 1946. The Republicans campaigning confidently under the ironic slogan **Eightieth Congress** "Had enough?" carried the House 246 to 188 (one maverick) and the Senate 51 to 45. The change was more official than actual, for the Republican-Bourbon alliance against the Fair Deal had thwarted Truman's domestic program and continued to do so. The Eightieth Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Act over the vigorous protest of labor and over Truman's veto. It submitted to the states the amendment which on 26 February 1951 was ratified as the Twenty-second and

which limited a President to two terms. It was clearly an attempt to forestall the rise of another Roosevelt, and, though the current incumbent was excepted, Truman's critics presently called upon him to live up to the "spirit" of the amendment.

On the other hand the Eightieth Congress, as we shall see, accepted the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan. It set up the Hoover Commission on Reorganization of the Executive Branch; this commission reported in January 1949, and President and Congress accepted an unprecedented number of its recommendations.

The fact that Congress deliberately flouted Truman both as President and as a man brought a revival of public sympathy, accompanied by considerable radio and press criticism of Congress. Nevertheless there was a universal tendency to belittle Truman. Suddenly in April 1948 on a tour of the "whistle stops," Truman threw off the wraps and lambasted the "do-nothing" Eightieth Congress as the worst in history. He was talking to crowds that he knew how to reach, and the reaction was a revelation to sophisticated politicians and newspapermen. Nevertheless, there was a concerted Democratic movement to draft Eisenhower (then president of Columbia University) as candidate, and it lost headway only when he emphatically took himself out of the race. In the end a defeatist convention at Philadelphia nominated Truman with Barkley as running mate and went home to sit on its hands. Truman himself was the only important exception to the opinion that he could not be elected—he and the voters.

Truman re-nominated

The Republican Party was split in several directions: between the Old Guard and the progressive heirs of Willkie, and among the isolationists, neo-isolationists, and internationalists. While there were exceptions, it was usual for the Old Guard to be either isolationist or neo-isolationist and the progressives to be internationalist. The core of the Old Guard lay in the old Middle West, while the weaker progressives came chiefly from the Northeast and the Pacific Coast. There was, however, no doubt that the Old Guard was in control of the party machinery, as it had been since 1912, and that its dearest wish was to wash out the New Deal and all its works.

Old Guard intransigence


In vain did the progressives urge that, unless the party accepted facts and proposed constructive domestic and foreign programs, it would cease to exist. The Old Guard had apparently inherited from the Federalists and Whigs the conviction that it had a natural right to the control of government—that the Democratic Party was really a superfluity, though at times a convenient stand-in to convince the country that the rotation-in-office aspect of democracy still existed. The Old Guard laid Democratic success to the fact that the voter does not shoot Santa Claus. There was justice in the charge, but the Old Guard refused to see the further fact that the

Democrats (despite their bumbling) took more interest in the problems of the little man.

Leader of the Old Guard and chief contender for the Republican nomination for President was Senator Robert Alphonso Taft of Ohio. We have already seen him in action as co-author of the Taft-Hartley Act and as an isolationist and then a grudging neo-isolationist. Son of President Taft, and coming up through the law and Cincinnati's machine politics, Senator Taft had over a long and arduous career earned the right to be regarded as "Mr. Republican," the epitome of the party. His resemblance to a balding kewpie was deceptive. Astringently honest, deeply intellectual, and rigidly logical, Taft was able to be amazingly inconsistent; the reasons apparently lay in the pitfalls of logic rather than in any awareness of historical paradoxes. His record showed that he had either opposed or hedged on almost every measure of administration domestic and foreign policy since he had entered the Senate in 1939. Actually, an examination of Taft's hedging remarks and votes showed that he was at times more liberal than his Old Guard colleagues, especially in domestic affairs, and so earned their distrust. On the other hand, he was deeply skeptical of the possibility of world co-operation and seemed to lean farther toward a unilateral *Pax Americana* than toward the United Nations.

Taft was the logical choice of the Republican convention at Philadelphia, and there is little doubt that he was favored by the machine. Nevertheless the party, made skittish by four successive defeats, doubted that he had the requisite drawing power. The result was that Dewey's well-oiled apparatus gave him the nomination—the first time in its history that the Republican Party had given a second chance to a loser. Governor Earl Warren of California was made running mate on the theory that he could pull liberal votes.

There was no apparent doubt that Dewey could beat Truman, but just to make sure the fates now split the Democratic Party three ways. Henry Wallace, proclaiming that Harry Truman had sold out the New Deal and was heading for war with Russia, accepted the nomination of the hastily formed Progressive Party along with Senator Glen H. Taylor of Idaho. Everyone but Wallace seemed to know that the party was a communist front; he failed to tumble even when the Communist Party openly joined in supporting his candidacy. Bourbon Democrats had made dire threats that they would bolt the ticket if Truman were nominated. The more dissident Bourbons, known as Dixiecrats or Dixiegops, met at Birmingham, organized the States' Rights Party, and nominated Governor J. Strom Thurmond of South Carolina and Governor Fielding L. Wright of Mississippi. Most of the Bourbons, however, refrained from openly supporting the States' Righters. They feared to lose the committee chairmanships in Congress which gave them great power



under Democratic administrations. Moreover, they had hopes of yet restoring the two-thirds rule and thus regaining their veto over Democratic nominations.

Truman, left with the active support of only a handful of despondent hacks, proceeded to put on an amazing one-man show. Pointing to Dewey's liberal platform, he summoned the Republican Eightieth Congress into a special session to pass legislation to implement it. While the nation looked on in amusement the Republicans boggled for a few weeks, then adjourned. Truman at once took to the road and talked to the people in language which they well understood. Cries of "Give 'em hell, Harry!" should have forewarned Republican strategists, but did not. Dewey, blandly certain of victory, patronized Truman, skirted issues in a loftily statesmanlike manner, and pulled his punches on the New Deal so clearly that he was accused of "me-tooism."

Campaign
of 1948

By the beginning of November politicians were convinced that Dewey would win by a landslide, and the public-opinion polls had his victory safely in the bag. But to the amazement of everyone except Truman, the day after election saw him returned by a safe majority. He took 303 electoral and 24.1 million popular votes; Dewey took 189 electoral and 21.97 million popular; Thurmond took 39 electoral and 1.17 million popular; and Wallace polled 1.16 million popular and no electoral votes. Truman lost New York, Maryland, and

Truman re-
elected

Michigan because of Wallace and dropped thirteen other states (including Pennsylvania) to Dewey; he lost Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina, and one Tennessee elector to Thurmond. The House returned to the Democratic fold 263 to 171 (plus one maverick) and the Senate 54 to 42.

Only 60 per cent of the voters had turned out, and Truman was returned by no landslide, but the results were nevertheless embarrassing to the Republicans and the pollsters. For months the wiseacres sought the reasons for Truman's victory; the best reason, offered quite without humor by Walter Lippmann, was that more Democrats went to the polls than Republicans. Labor claimed the credit, but the fact was that it had not turned out the vote for Truman and he had barely squeaked through in many industrial centers; it had, however, defeated many Congressmen who had voted for the Taft-Hartley law. The most likely explanation was that the midwestern farm belt had voted for Truman. Some analysts even attributed this to the Republican's passage of the Hope-Aiken Bill and to Congress's failure to provide additional warehouses for farm surpluses.

Truman's inaugural address, 20 January 1949, restated the Fair Deal and in Point Four outlined a "bold new program" intended to help the countries of the world to develop a higher standard of living. But if any-
 Truman's domestic political failure one was so naïve as to suppose that Truman's victory made him the effective leader of his party, they were mistaken. The Dixiecrats and the Bourbons maintained their alliance with the Old Guard, and many Northern Democrats were able to show that in their districts their majorities had run ahead of Truman's. The helplessness of the Fair Deal was marked by Congress's refusal to repeal the Taft-Hartley Law. Republicans were now able to hurl Truman's taunt in his teeth and ridicule the "Eighty-Worst" Congress. It was crystal clear that Harry Truman, while he might be a fighter, lacked Roosevelt's genius for grand strategy, his ability to build up national emotion behind a cause, and push it to victory over the protests of special interests. Roosevelt was no man to muffle an opportunity or boggle a dramatic climax; Truman was. The United States, at least domestically, was again becalmed in the Madisonian doldrums.

It was no surprise when the elections of 1950 reduced the Democratic House majority to 235 (against 200 opponents) and the Senate majority to 49 (as against 47). A Republican Senator chortled that now they had the perfect set-up: power without responsibility. The Republi-
 Election of 1950 cans, sure of Southern support, acted as though they had won the victory and proceeded to break 160 years of precedent by trying to force the President to dismiss a Cabinet member (Acheson) and trying to strip the Executive of power to dispose of the defense forces.

One of the most significant nubs of political controversy during the Fair Deal years was the extent of disloyalty among government servants. American courts had hewn close to the Constitution by defining treason quite simply as (1) an attempt to overthrow the government or (2) acting as an agent of a foreign power against the interests of the United States. The Soviets' stooges, however, had added a third approach to treason. Their indoctrination removed the political conflict from the open arena where truth has nothing to fear from error. They preached the necessity and inevitability of revolution. They hid behind civil liberties while they engaged in undermining the foundations of free society with the aim of bringing chaos. They utilized socially disruptive tactics, whose cynicism made the worst repressions of rugged industrialists look like paternalism. The growth of this new technique raised the question whether Justice Holmes's "clear and present danger" test was now sufficient.

**What is
disloyalty?**

Throughout the 1920's and 1930's there was a growing realization of the dilemma imposed by the new technique: either we violate and deny civil liberties in order to preserve them, or we let treason operate undisturbed under the cover of civil liberties. Finally in 1940 Congress passed the Smith Act. This act made it a crime (1) to advocate the forcible seizure, overthrow, or destruction of any government in the United States; (2) to engage in the dissemination of such doctrines in printed form; and (3) to organize or belong to any society which advocated such doctrines.


**Smith Act,
1940**

Meanwhile the House Committee on Un-American Activities headed by Rep. Martin Dies of Texas had in 1938 begun a series of investigations. The committee's technique of opening up with a public accusation of treason and then tailoring the proof to fit the charge was, to say the least, not in the spirit of the laws. One of the most distressing effects of the Dies Committee was to destroy much of the effectiveness of the work of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in getting the goods on communist activities. The FBI, still ably headed by J. Edgar Hoover, worked under astounding handicaps. In its investigation of subversive activities it had to lay stress on the two traditional tests of treason. It might investigate the third but in order to prosecute, it would have to prove an overt act. It could not enter premises on suspicion; it could not open the mail of suspects; it could not tap telephone lines, though this resource was eventually permitted under absurdly rigid restrictions. The courts so uniformly enforced the restrictions on FBI investigations that it became common to throw out cases on the ground that the evidence was illegally obtained.

**Handicaps
of the FBI**

A wealthy New Yorker named Philip Jaffe had back in 1937 started a slick-paper magazine, called *Amerasia*, which was intended to forward the

Red Chinese cause by making a dignified appeal to scholars and bureaucrats. Its management interlocked with that of the Institute of Pacific Relations, whose editorial and research staff had been infiltrated by communists. In May 1945 the FBI became suspicious and made illegal nocturnal entry to *Amerasia's* office and found there 1700 stolen government documents of varying degrees of secrecy. After a period of observation, Jaffe and five of his associates and Washington contacts were arrested. The judge asserted and the prosecution had to admit that the FBI had engaged in illegal searches and that its evidence could not be admitted. Three of the accused had to be cleared, one was dismissed, and Jaffe and one other were fined for "conspiracy to embezzle and receive government property." The episode proved to be a



Little in *The Nashville Tennessean*

America's Problem

This cartoon and the one on the facing page concern the dilemma confronted in dealing with domestic communism.

handy political football. Congress repeatedly investigated and made wild charges that government and FBI were soft toward treason, but it did not do much to plug up the loopholes which made their efforts futile.

The *Amerasia Case*, along with other events, led the administration to seek to clear communists from Federal office. The Hatch Corrupt Practices Act of 1939 (though aimed primarily at corruption in elections) forbade

the government to hire anyone who advocated its overthrow by force or violence. During the war known communists and fellow-travelers had been appointed to many offices and some of them were later thought to have been spies. In November 1947 Truman turned over to the Civil Service Commission the job of clearing out the communists. The assumption was that working for the Federal

Truman's
Loyalty
Program,
1947



Herblock in The Washington Post

You mean not use the ax at all?

Government was a privilege, not a right. While discharge on suspicion of disloyalty did not legally brand one as a traitor, that was its practical effect. It is significant that in 1947 an employee could be discharged only on the positive finding that there were "reasonable grounds" for believing he was disloyal; in 1951 the test was changed to the negative one of "reasonable doubt" of his loyalty.

After the war the Dies Committee was taken over by a group of men who refused to use it to make political capital and seriously undertook to track down subversives. It listened to the testimony of a number of repentant communists, and in 1948 one of the latter, Whittaker Chambers, accused Alger Hiss, a second-level State Department official, of having furnished secret information for transmission to Russia. Hiss denied the accusation under oath and was

The Hiss
Case

later (March 1951) sent to prison, not for being a communist or a traitor, but for having sworn falsely.

In 1949, eleven top Communist Party officials were finally brought to trial under the Smith Act. The prosecution deliberately invoked the narrowest meaning of the act and demonstrated that the accused and their party were engaged in active incitement, conspiracy, and preparation to overthrow the government of the United States. The trial began in January 1949, and for nine long months Judge Harold R. Medina presided with notable calm. By disclosing some of its undercover agents, the FBI proved the case conclusively; ten of the eleven were sentenced to five years' imprisonment and \$10,000 fines; the eleventh got off with three years because of his war record.

An appeal to Circuit Court resulted (August 1950) in Judge Learned Hand's sustaining the verdict. He drew a careful distinction between heresy (which is Constitutional) and conspiracy (which is treason), but then proceeded to amend the test set up by Holmes by asserting that a conspiracy becomes treason when it "creates a danger of the utmost gravity and of enough probability to justify its suppression." Hand's decision was upheld by the Supreme Court in 1951; probability thus became a third test of treason.

The Smith Act, as validated by the trial of the Eleven, automatically made any communist guilty of treason. The FBI had patiently collected evidence against 12,000 party members and was ready to proceed against them as soon as the Supreme Court handed down the final verdict. Now Congress, no doubt prompted by public impatience, had always been critical of the FBI's slow and careful attempts to build airtight cases which would stand up in court. No doubt the McCarran Internal Security Act of 1950 (passed over Truman's veto) intended to strengthen the Justice Department's hand against subversives, but it ineptly struck a staggering blow against enforcement of the Smith Act. It was clear that so long as the Smith Act held that party membership was a crime, communists would refuse to register (under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 and the Voorhis Act of 1940) on the ground that to do so would be self-incriminating. Congress therefore ordered them to register and provided that membership should not in itself constitute a crime. The result was to knock the bottom out of the prosecutions the FBI had been preparing against Communist Party members.

A Subversive Activities Control Board was to hear evidence and decide issues, but it could not punish obstreperous lawyers and witnesses. Totalitarians and anyone formerly a member of any technically totalitarian organization were barred from public office or from working in a defense plant; such people were barred from entry into the United States,

and those already here were forbidden to apply for passports to leave. The result was a national scandal. People who as children had belonged to totalitarian organizations were excluded; so also were those who had been spies for the United States, or who had fled from the Iron Curtain countries. The United States was thus in large part prevented from rewarding its allies and utilizing the skills and protecting the persons of men and women who knew by experience in high office what was going on in Totalitaria. Actually any alien who cited subversive material in order to refute it was technically barred from naturalization. It was scarcely cause for wonder that a journalist called the act "The McCarran Pro-Communist Law."

The atomic bomb had been developed under military supervision, but no sooner was the war over than atomic physicists brought strong pressure to put the project under civilian control. After a long and bitter conflict Congress passed the McMahon Atomic Energy Act (July 1946), which set up a five-man Atomic Energy Commission; it was concerned not only with the production of atomic weapons but with the development of atom-powered engines for planes and submarines, and the use of radio-active isotopes in medicine. Indeed, it seemed likely that atomic energy could remake the world in a better pattern if only atomic warfare could be avoided.

Despite this the dread specter of atomic warfare loomed over the world. During 1946 popular hysteria was at its height, deliberately fanned by atomic physicists who were aghast at what they had done. The usual solution offered was "one world or none," and wishful thinkers closed their eyes to Russia's stubborn refusal to go along with international control and inspection. There was a strong movement to turn American atomic bombs and installations over to the UN or destroy them in the hope that Russia would relax and give up its efforts. Elmer Davis countered the hysteria by warning that Russia would not hesitate to use the whip thus handed to it and asserted that it was better to have "no world, if necessary." In the end, clear heads prevailed and American atomic installations were even expanded. In July 1946 at Bikini Atoll in mid-Pacific tests were made of atomic bombs far more powerful than those exploded in Japan. Other tests were eventually made, some of them in Nevada, probably of smaller bombs intended for tactical use.


The United States had scarcely begun its atomic-energy program when Soviet agents, usually American-born communists or fellow-travelers, were on the trail. The FBI turned up spies under every stone, but most of them could not be prosecuted either because of legal technicalities or because it was not wise diplomacy. The most important leaks, however, originated with Klaus Fuchs, a brilliant

**Atomic En-
ergy Act,
1946**

**Hysteria
over the
A-bomb**

**Atomic
race with
Russia**

young physicist. Born in Germany, he had gone to Britain and, though an acknowledged communist, had been cleared for work in the United States on MANHATTAN DISTRICT. Fuchs was still a member of Britain's atomic project when in 1949 he was arrested. He had enabled the Soviet Union to so shortcut the experimental phases of its own atomic program that no one in the free world knows how many years of security were thus lost. On 23 September 1949 President Truman announced that an atomic explosion



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Baby play with nice ball?

had occurred in the U.S.S.R. Truman made the American reply 31 January 1950 when he announced an order to begin work on the hydrogen bomb, estimated to be many times more powerful than the most destructive A-bomb yet made. The atomic race with Russia was on.

2 *Rebuilding the Balance of Power*

The errors of Allied diplomacy during World War II left Russia in possession of almost all it could have desired except Trieste and the vast manufacturing facilities of the Ruhr. As though to confirm their gifts to Russia, the Western Allies were hastily tearing down their armed forces so that they deprived themselves of the ability to protest effectively against Russian actions. Stalin's grand strategy was to sow discontent in capitalist countries, introduce confusion and chaos, and then take the countries over, usually by his men in coalition governments who controlled the ministries of army and police. To gain adherents in the West he adopted the tactic of playing to Western fear of Germany. He thus planned to turn Germany's resources

Russian
postwar
tactics in
Europe

over to Soviet front men, remove factories, and turn its people into peasants; this also prevented the reassertion of German rivalry to Russia itself. A very interesting corollary of Stalin's policy was the attempt to drain from the conquered countries so great a proportion of their resources that the United States would be forced to pay for their maintenance and restoration, thus weakening itself and strengthening Russia.

While this was going on, international attention was turned to the trials of Axis war criminals, especially the trial of the Nazi bigwigs at Nuremberg from 20 November 1945 to 1 October 1946. Of the twenty-one accused, eleven were sentenced to death; Goering managed to commit suicide. Meanwhile lesser criminals were being tried in other courts, and "de-Nazifying" courts were purging German public and professional life of former Nazis. The trials set a new precedent, which was variously hailed as a salutary advance in international law and deplored as a perversion of justice. It was pointed out by critics that the trials violated concepts of justice because they were before prejudiced judges, were based upon *ex post facto* definitions of crime, and were dependent upon prejudiced interpreters and sometimes upon extorted confessions. Not the least important charge was that the Soviet Union was only less criminal in its war methods than Germany; even more ironic, the Soviet had been a partner of Hitler in the initiation of aggressive warfare against Poland.

Trials for war crimes

For a couple of years after V-E Day, Stalin's tactics seemed to be on the verge of giving effective control of France and Italy to their communist parties. Byrnes, acting for the most powerful of the Western Allies, had been reared in the atmosphere of democratic compromise, and he sought to meet Russia halfway. If his course is open to criticism, it must also be said in his favor that, if he had entered upon the postwar conferences with a belligerent attitude, those who criticized his "softness" would have been asking why he did not first try an offer of co-operation. The same, incidentally, is true of Roosevelt's wartime attitude toward Russia. During most of his activities abroad Byrnes was aided by Connally and Vandenberg, respectively the Democratic and the Republican leader of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Vandenberg, especially, may have helped to stiffen Byrnes's attitude toward Russia.

Byrnes tries co-operation

Conferences among the victorious powers at London (Sept.-Oct. 1945), Moscow (Dec. 1945), and Paris (May-Oct. 1946) resulted only in treaties with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Rumania, and Finland. The ink was scarcely dry before Russia made it clear that the treaties would be interpreted according to her desire; only in Italy did she fail to gain control. Trieste was not given a governor appointed by the UN, as earlier planned, but most of it remained under Anglo-American control; the rest was *de facto*

annexed by Yugoslavia. The treaty with Austria was permanently stalled to give Russia a legal excuse to keep "line-of-communication troops" in the near-by Balkan States.

By the summer of 1946 the outlines of Soviet policy were so plain that he who ran might read. In a speech at Fulton, Missouri (March 1946) Churchill warned that Russia had erected an Iron Curtain around itself

The Cold War and its satellites and called for an Anglo-American alliance to build up economic and military strength to defend liberty.

Certainly the two nations had much in common: language, institutions, economic interests, and ideals. If these were not enough, there was the matter of survival. At any rate in July 1946 Congress approved a \$3.75 billion loan to Great Britain. At almost the same time the UN was offered the Baruch Plan for the international control of atomic weapons and of atomic energy, and Russia made it very clear that the plan would not be acceptable. Baruch was clearly justified in giving the name "Cold War" to the Russian offensive against the West.

The key to the postwar settlements, of course, was Germany, for its industrial potential was the core of Europe's economic strength and was essential to European survival. By the original arrangement the industrial

The German key West of Germany would have been able to trade with the agricultural East, but Russia, though constantly demanding manufactured goods, sabotaged the delivery of food. The West, with three fourths of Germany's population plus millions of refugees, was saved from mass starvation only by Allied importation of food. American taxpayers alone spent \$3 billion in five years to keep Germans alive.

Americans of the occupation forces were impressed by the Germans' cleanliness and their gadgetry and felt that a people so much like us could not possibly be guilty as a nation of the crimes charged. Those responsible

American attitudes for German restoration saw that, after all, the Nazi élite had been magnificent planners and managers; so their naïvety in foreign politics—and utter dread of communism—made them first condone, then trust the Nazis, accept their advice on personnel and reconstruction problems, and get them back into administrative positions as quickly as possible. It is clearly evident that American efforts to sell the idea of democracy to the Germans (for that matter even to define it) were successful to only a limited extent. For the most part Germans remained glumly convinced that Nazism was a good idea badly carried out.

A further inducement to make Americans favor the relaxation of German controls was the patent Russian attempt to siphon out at the East what America brought in at the West. By September 1946 even Byrnes's

Controls relaxed in Germany patience was exhausted, and in a speech at Stuttgart he outlined a program which gave Germany hope of regaining self-government and the right to rebuild its trade. In December

the British and U.S. zones of occupation were united economically ("Bizonia"), and the French zone joined the arrangement in 1949. At first it had been an American object to break up the German cartels which had paved the way to war and had forced on American companies agreements which had limited production in certain strategic fields. This objective was presently quietly sabotaged by American administrators, largely drawn from industry; the British socialist government had the same trouble with its underlings.

One after another restrictions on German industry were relaxed, the cartels were quietly reintegrated, and the export of German factories to the Iron Curtain countries was discontinued; the result was an acceleration of German recovery. Originally the occupation had been expected to last only two years, but Soviet obstruction made an indefinite extension inevitable. In 1949 the Western Allies replaced their Military Control Commission by a civilian High Commission. As a result the U.S. State Department took over the American zone from the War Department, and John J. McCloy replaced General Lucius D. Clay.

Byrnes's policy had barely begun to stiffen when in January 1947 he was succeeded in the State Department by General George C. Marshall, who in fact had not yet returned from his mission to China. The reorganization of West Germany was under way when the Big Four foreign ministers met in Moscow in March 1947: Marshall, Bevin, Bidault, and Molotov. The new Allied policy in Germany was a severe blow to the Soviet ambition to control Germany, and Molotov sought to counter it by gaining a veto over the administration of Ruhr industry. There the conference stuck, and after seven futile weeks it adjourned. For the first time the Western Allies had flouted their rule that each conference must produce some face-saving gesture and had allowed the chasm between East and West to yawn unconcealed.

While the Moscow Conference was in session a move was made to block Russian aggression in another direction. The Truman Doctrine did not emerge from the quarrel as a brilliant improvisation, as the American public was led to believe. Rather, it was the result of an evolution which had begun with the invasion of North Africa. By this action the United States had bought in on Britain's old policy of trying to stabilize the Levant, though it refused to go along with Churchill's desire to block Russia by occupying the Balkans. American security dictated an interest in Near Eastern oil, in the safety of Near Eastern commercial routes, and consequently in any attempt of Russia to fulfill its old ambitions of reaching the Mediterranean. There was American criticism of Britain's support of the landholding conservatives in Greece, Turkey, and the Arab countries, but the State Department had no alternative to offer which would not get the United States so deeply embroiled in the Near East that it could never get out.

Moscow,
1947: the
worm turns

Problem of
Mediterranean
stability



Sharpe in The Glasgow Bulletin

Liberty makes a move.

Two views of American foreign policy in 1951

Nevertheless, as Britain's financial and military strength waned, it became increasingly clear that a power vacuum was forming in the Near East and that Russia was only waiting for an opportunity to fill it. Early in 1947 the British Labor Government informed the United States that it must withdraw both troops and financial support from Greece. That country was swarming with communist guerrilla bands, and unless the United States chose to take up the burden it would inevitably become a Soviet satellite.

On 12 March 1947 Truman appeared before Congress and recommended that the United States support Greece financially. In addition Turkey was to receive financial aid. Congress appropriated \$400 million Aid to Greece, Turkey (one quarter for Turkey), and in later years followed this by other sums. Ambassador Dwight P. Griswold became political and economic adviser in Greece, and presently an American military mission was detailed to train and advise Greek troops in their war against the partisans. By the end of 1948 the danger of communist conquest had passed, partly due to Yugoslavia's growing quarrel with Russia.



Evans in The Columbus Dispatch

Alice in Wonderland

Despite everything, however, the Americans were able to persuade the reactionary Greek government to make reforms only by threats which constituted an interference in the affairs of a foreign nation unequaled since the American ventures in the Caribbean. Turkey proved to be much more receptive to American economic and military advice, perhaps because there was no political crisis involved and no immediate communist danger. The object, rather, was to strengthen Turkey as a bulwark against any Russian flank attack on the Mediterranean.

Hitherto the American mission had taken the form of active interference in Europe only in time of war. This policy was now dramatically changed as the United States committed itself to resist aggression wherever it appeared. More than this, the Truman Doctrine's pointed by-passing of the UN as the chosen instrument for promoting international welfare was an answer to the dilemma which faced the Anglo-Saxon powers. We were now bound to settle controversies through the UN, a situation which gave Russia a veto over our policies; that country not only found the UN useful both as a propaganda sounding board and as a sprag on others' actions but

**Signifi-
cance of
Truman
Doctrine**

was still free to use its weapons of strikes, sabotage, *coups d'état*, and fifth columns. The UN (as it then existed) was helpless to deal with Russia's tactics. The Truman Doctrine boldly cut the Gordian knot. There were dangers that the policy would preserve divisions, set back the hope of fighting the Soviet by promoting world prosperity, and finally end by killing the UN. But the dangers had to be faced.

The official entry of the United States into the Near Eastern scene did not solve the other British problems. Indeed, the fact that the United States had mounted guard on the northern bastions toward Russia was a blow to British prestige in the Arab states. Another was the impending arrangements for freeing India, Pakistan, and Burma. Britain retreated slowly because it still hoped to retain Near Eastern footholds which could in case of necessity be used against Russia. The decision to abandon Palestine was taken reluctantly, but the mandate had become a financial burden and Arabs and Zionist Jews each demanded Britain's full support of their right to run the country—and both resorted to terrorism.

During long months of negotiation the United Nations sought to partition the country between the claimants, but no one was satisfied. The United States was embarrassed by Jewish political agitation at home, the oil companies' pressure for the Arab states from whom they held their leases, and recognition of the need of an Anglo-American military base in the Near East. As a result Truman steered a fumbling and fatuous course which in the end favored the Jews. When the British withdrew in May 1948, the Jews promptly set up the state of Israel and were recognized on the same day by Truman. The Arab League states with British backing began an imposing invasion of Israel from all sides—and were just as imposingly defeated.

The Greek crisis drove home the lesson that Europe was trembling on the verge of collapse. The world wars had drained its blood, blown up or worn out its productive apparatus, dissipated its capital, and frustrated Europe's and discouraged its people. European industrialists, still aliens to American mass-production methods, could not hope to compete with America and saw the latter underselling them and drawing off Europe's pitifully scarce dollars in payment. Europe was doomed unless it quickly experienced a renaissance. Such a renaissance must revive its economy first, but must be confirmed in the psychological and political realm.

American security and the cause of liberty alike demanded a prosperous and contented Europe. Such crises the world had faced before, but it was the measure of American statesmanship that for the first time in history a nation offered economic aid to unfortunate friends and foes alike, deliberately seeking to restore the competitive power of its trade rivals. The American plan found full ex-

Near East-
ern imbroglio

Europe's
impending
collapse

The Mar-
shall Plan

pression in Secretary Marshall's speech at Harvard University in June 1947. The European Recovery Program (ERP), or Marshall Plan, as it was promptly dubbed, not only offered U.S. financial aid but envisaged shipments of machinery and raw materials and the sending of American industrial experts to enable European industries to increase their efficiency and get back on their feet. It also called upon the nations to pool their monetary and economic resources. A concerted effort was to be made to tear down tariffs and trade barriers and to minimize the weakening effects of Europe's division into so many rival powers. Implicit in the whole program was the American hope that Western Europe, at least, could find a basis for political and economic unification.

Russia prohibited the Iron Curtain countries from joining in ERP, but sixteen free nations could and did join. There followed a period of intensive study by American and European experts and by Congressional committees. In the end Congressional skeptics managed to hold the first year's appropriation (of a four-years program) to \$4 billion, with the prospect of an annual decrease thereafter. However, close to \$3 billion more were contributed to direct relief, to occupation costs, and to military and economic aid to nations inside and outside ERP.

**Economic
Co-operation
Act,
1948**

There is not space to follow the fortunes of the Economic Co-operation Administration (ECA) which was set up under Paul Hoffman. The plan ended with 1951, after having poured \$12 billion into Europe; the postwar total of American aid to the world had by then reached \$35 billion, with more to come. There were undoubtedly good effects. Europe's production increased by half over prewar levels, its external trade by half, and its internal trade by thirty-five per cent. Nevertheless, the long-term effects were in danger of being canceled by the rearmament program, soon to be noticed.

**ECA's suc-
cesses and
failures**

Europeans complained that the Marshall Plan sought to solve a psychic illness by economic measures; actually they were balking because the medicine tasted bitter and because the doctor expected them to put forth some effort and sacrifice to effect their own cure. The "spiritual" remedy was inherent in the Marshall Plan's hope of bringing about European unification and in its attempt to sell the concept of an expanding economy. The aim was not only to aid the recovery of the democracies but to make European economic opportunities great enough to absorb German energies in peaceful pursuits. This purpose implied the adoption of better production methods (not necessarily full mass production) and the betterment of Europe's antediluvian labor relations. The process was bound to be painful, and there certainly were short-term arguments against it, but Europe's stubborn refusal to integrate boiled down to a basic unwillingness to sacrifice and co-operate for the eventual mutual good.

That the neo-isolationist distrust of Europe was well based was shown

by the determined efforts of Europe's social and industrial élite to drain ECA funds into their own pockets, and their refusal to accept higher taxes. There undoubtedly was a strong hope that the United States could be blackmailed into granting permanent subsidies; there was no understanding that there was a bottom to Uncle Sam's cookie jar. More than this, though Hoffman leaned over backward to keep from interfering, there was a continual chorus of complaint that the United States was presuming to dictate; perhaps it should have dictated more.

Russia made an attempt at the London Economic Conference in December 1947 to reverse the new American policy. When the attempt was blocked, Stalin was confronted by the necessity of changing his tactical **Red tactics** approach to the strategy of promoting European chaos. Since **changed,** the war Western communists had been permitted to do much **1948** as they pleased and even to uphold national patriotism. Now this directive was reversed. The reins of power over the parties were held tightly in Moscow, and it was forbidden to place one's own country before the good of "world communism," a euphemism for Russia. In order to turn Germans against the Western Allies, the party began to foster German nationalism and to demand the rebuilding of German industry. In October 1947 the Cominform (Communist Information Bureau) was formed to integrate communist propaganda abroad and the actions of the Soviet satellites at home; in February of 1948 Czechoslovakia was seized by a communist coup without the use of a single Russian soldier.

Nevertheless, the Soviet had lost the initiative. The effect of the new policy was to alienate millions of Western adherents. The Western Allies promptly moved to strengthen West Germany and presently announced their intention of setting up a West German government. **Red** Strikes intended to paralyze France were put down, and the **disasters** Communist Party lost the crucial Italian election. Finally, and most crushing blow of all, Moscow's plan to cut down Yugoslavia's industrial development and to drain away its resources impelled Tito to break with the Kremlin (June 1948). Tito claimed to be a better communist than Stalin, but he was now forced to make common cause with the West and in so doing to let up in some of his more obvious tyrannies. Moscow, apparently in a panic lest other satellites follow Tito, began a series of purges among its front men and moved Red army marshals into positions of actual (though not always technical) command of satellite armies.

We noted the ghastly mistake of 1945 in not seeing to it that Berlin was connected with the West by a corridor. Russia now cut off ground communications with the intention of forcing the Western Allies out of **Berlin crisis** Berlin; their retirement not only would be a great victory **and airlift,** for Russia but would enable it to appeal to all Germans to **1948-49** support a German communist government seated in the his-

toric capital. From 19 June 1948 to 12 May 1949 the Allies were forced to supply Berlin by air. The effect was so marked in galvanizing the democratic spirit in the western sectors of Berlin and, indeed, throughout Western Europe that the Russians finally lifted the blockade. Their price was a Big Four conference at Paris (May 1949) at which they restated their old demand for a veto over the Ruhr. Nothing came of it but more Red propaganda. In August, West German elections were held, and in September a conservative coalition under Adenauer set up a government. War with Germany was ended by Congressional action, effective 19 October 1951.

Marshall resigned in January 1949 and was succeeded by a man who had long been in and out of the State Department. The new "Laird of Foggy Bottom"—from the State Department's location on the Potomac flats—was Dean Gooderham Acheson, son of a former **Dean Acheson** Episcopal Bishop of Connecticut. He had served in the State Department during the war, was thoroughly conversant with its routine, and had master-minded some of its debatable policies. He was firmly convinced that American security should come first, and that this demanded co-operation with other free nations. A man of brilliant parts, he was apparently well fitted for his task. However, Senators are always suspicious of brilliance, but never more so than in a Secretary of State; so it was inevitable that they should tangle with Acheson, only to find themselves decapitated by a single whistling sentence, as James Reston put it.

Not only was Acheson burdened by unprecedented problems, but he had the duty of reorganizing and administering a State Department that had grown fivefold in ten years to keep up with America's stature in the world. It was therefore fatally easy to find something to criticize, especially if one was not disposed to follow his cold and concise reasoning. It was much simpler and publicly more effective to call him a communist; unfortunately he had brought this on himself by his stubborn assertion before the conviction of Hiss, "I will not turn my back on Alger Hiss."

The Berlin crisis was the final argument needed to bring the North Atlantic nations together in a twenty-years defense pact which had been advocated in some quarters ever since the war. During the following winter emissaries of twelve Western states drafted the North Atlantic Treaty: the members were the U.S., Canada, Great Britain, France, the Benelux countries (the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg), Denmark, Norway, Iceland, Portugal, and Italy. The Senate finally gave approval in July 1949, but only because the commitment by each nation to give assistance in case of attack was limited to "such action as it deems necessary." Dean Acheson was thus able to assure the Senate that the pact did not commit American troops

**North
Atlantic
Treaty,
1949**

to the permanent defense of Europe. A Council and a Defense Committee were to be set up.

Friends of the treaty argued that the existence of the pact would do much to prevent World War III and was necessary to stiffen European will to resist. Its enemies held that it would commit us to action in European quarrels which did not affect U.S. security and would be more likely to bring on than to prevent World War III. These problems were to be kept before the American electorate by the rush of events during the next three years.

Before turning to the Orient it will be useful to note what was meanwhile going on in Latin America. The postwar sellers' market in the United States quickly drained away the Latin-American dollars amassed during the war and hampered economic adjustment in those countries. When North American investors hesitated to risk their capital under Latin America's rigid controls, the latter countries demanded U.S. government loans. Some loans were made by such agencies as the Export-Import Bank, but Latin-Americans wanted more and came to resent the fact that no Marshall Plan was set up to aid them. Indeed, they felt that the United States *must* supply their economic needs in order to protect itself; the fact that Latin America's own safety depended on the United States was discreetly played down.

For these and other reasons there was a slump in Good Neighborliness. Argentina, as usual, was most violently anti-Yankee, and its fascistic General Peron rose to power largely on that program. Peronism was an open challenge to the American program of winning multilateral support for democratic ideals, and for a while there was so much bad blood between the two countries that it crystallized Latin-American resentments against the United States. When a rapprochement began in mid-1947 after the accession of Marshall to the State Department, it was the United States that changed, not Argentina.

The Inter-American Conference for the Maintenance of Peace and Security was held at Rio de Janeiro in August 1947. Its task was to turn the wartime Act of Chapultepec into a permanent scheme for reciprocal assistance against aggression. The treaty of Reciprocal Assistance proposed by the conference and eventually adopted by the twenty-one republics provided for consultation and the imposition by a two-thirds vote of sanctions of varying degrees of severity. In deference to the sole right of national congresses to declare war, the proviso was included that "no State shall be required to use armed force without its consent." This was the first of the regional arrangements for which the United Nations Charter had made allowance.

The Ninth International Conference of American States was held at Bogotá, 30 March to 2 May 1948. It had the unique experience of wit-

nessing a radical revolution in Bogotá—probably staged to embarrass it. Nevertheless it accomplished considerable business.

1) It adopted the Charter of the Organization of American States, which gave permanent form to the old Pan-American Union. Interestingly enough, the charter unequivocally rejected intervention in any way, shape, or form, except as the Rio Reciprocal Assistance Treaty or the United Nations Charter provided. Bogotá
Conference,
1948

2) The Pact of Bogotá (Treaty of Pacific Settlement) integrated past treaties for settling disputes and provided definite procedures for conciliation, arbitration, and appeal to the World Court. However, the United States refused to accept its provision that there should be no further recourse after domestic courts had passed on cases involving foreigners within their jurisdiction.

3) A beginning was made at solving the problem of recognition by considering the "Estrada Doctrine," that the act of recognition should be dispensed with; thus diplomatic relations would be continuous, and the problem of recognition would never arise. This doctrine was postponed for further study, but it is evident that it was favored as a means of depriving the United States of its old weapon of recognition or nonrecognition.

4) A proposal for a Marshall Plan for Latin America was turned down by Secretary Marshall, who suggested that it would be better to make the conditions of investment attractive to American private investors.

A Conference of Foreign Ministers held in Washington in the spring of 1951 gave only polite attention to problems of external security, apparently convinced that the United States was now responsible for such matters. The main interest was in getting the United States to finance development of strategic materials, buy those materials, and guarantee to return manufactured goods of equal real value. Latin America could not be blamed for wishing to avoid a repetition of postwar economic dislocations, but on the other hand the United States did not feel that it should bear the full cost of hemisphere defense. There the matter rested. Washing-
ton Confer-
ence, 1951

3 *Far Eastern Dilemmas*

Perceptive observers had for many years warned the imperial powers that retreat from Asia was inevitable, and that they had better prepare for it in such a way as to forefend a period of chaos which would disrupt trade and increase human misery. Such warnings were not heeded except by the Anglo-Saxon powers, and by them rather grudgingly. At any rate, World War II and the sweep of Japan's conquest and its defeat hastened the crisis. Asia de-
mands U.S.
support

Asiatics pointed to the Atlantic Charter as a guarantee to accept their

decision to be free; moreover, the United States had wished to block the Allies' plans to re-establish their Asiatic empires on the old terms and had sought to convince them that they must recognize facts and accept the early prospect of losing them. British, French, and Dutch colonies drew from this the corollary that the United States would support their independence movements, even to the extent of exercising economic pressures on the imperial powers which would force them to face the alternative of collapse at home or letting the colonies go in peace—taking European investments with them.

To Americans, with their concepts of legality and order, it seemed quite natural that the imperials should restore their legal governments even if only as a prelude to an orderly transition to independence. But once they were back in force, the Dutch and French proved U.S. post-war policy reluctant to give up the possibility of restoring something dangerously akin to the old controls. They went further and deliberately misrepresented U.S. aid as intended to rivet their rule on the colonies permanently. The interesting aspect of the business is that the colonies blamed the United States more than their old masters. We had sold them out! The slow, consistent pressure being exerted by the United States was too quiet to be given much credit, though in the long run it was certainly a factor in their winning of freedom.

The liberation of the Philippines promptly on schedule (4 July 1946) only partially allayed Asiatic criticism. It was pointed out that the islands were bound to permit free trade with the United States until 1954. When in exchange for this the United States poured \$620 million Philippine fortunes into the Philippines for reconstruction, the Philippine élite drew much of it off into their own pockets and set up a clamor for more. The universal pattern of blackmailing Uncle Sam was clearly apparent as Filipino politicians who had collaborated with the Japanese rode into influence. The movement owed its force to MacArthur's support of Manuel Roxas, most important Filipino collaborator with the Japanese, who was thus able to boost himself into the presidency. Those leaders who had fought the Japanese were quietly eliminated from politics or from life, and every effort was made to undermine any remaining regard for the United States. Nevertheless, economic and security factors led the new rulers to agree to ninety-nine-year leases of military bases to the United States.

That reform was being disregarded was demonstrated by the misery of the people, unequaled since the Spanish days, and by the rise of guerrilla bands (*Huks*) of communists in the mountains. In 1950 Daniel W. Bell, on behalf of President Truman, made an economic survey of the islands and reported on the above conditions and on the unbalanced economy, which was the heritage of American tariff policies and of the long failure

to make land reforms. As a result the United States granted further aid, this time under strict supervision. Whether conditions would improve remained to be seen.

Generations of Western occupation of Asia had bred a white-collar class too numerous for the available jobs, and also by protecting the old élite had given it the hope of increasing its wealth and exercising untrammelled power. The result was discontent not only among the potential leaders but among the commoners, who, upon the Japanese surrender, for the first time found themselves possessed of arms. Communist tenets violated the traditional values of Asia—religious devotion, family loyalty, and village democracy—but the Reds shrewdly played down their dialectical materialism. Instead, they offered a program of nationalism and the prospect of overthrowing not only the imperialists but the native élite. The main communist attraction was its promise of the redistribution of land. Westernization (like any transition) had cut two ways: it had built up economically while it tore down socially. Communists were able to take advantage both of native resentments and of their newly-glimpsed hopes, and to stir up the capacities for an idealistic crusade which are never far below the surface in Asia.

Basis of
Asiatic
discontent

The United States is confronted by the dilemma of power in Asia as everywhere else: it stands between contradictory demands within the Orient, and it stands between the contradictory demands of the Orient and of Western Europe. The clash of wills in Asia makes nothing more sure than that some interest will read any policy as injustice to itself. Doing "justice" to Asia will further the ruin of European prestige and investments, and shoring up the strength of Europe against communism does "injustice" to Asia. No party is willing to understand the dilemma but firmly demands that the United States sacrifice everything else, even its own security, to win their favor and co-operation; we must finance it in order to keep it from going communist. It is becoming clearer every year that, even if we yielded to a single interest, the result would be not gratitude but contempt, after the way of the world.

U.S. di-
lemmas

There has been talk of how America possessed "moral" leadership in Asia. This is a specious oversimplification; say rather that it was the least hated of the universally hated white powers, and that Asiatics expected to get something from it. Such "moral" leadership as this was certain to vanish as soon as we began to demand practical results. No one can blame Asia for not wanting to get caught in another world-war deluge, but its profound indifference (in any effective way, at least) to the issues at stake made it a bad risk. This fact was all the more true because each faction, as it lost the hope of using the United States, became bitterly—even viciously—anti-American and devoted itself to an attempt to trade Russia

and the United States off against each other. Even some of the more enlightened countries made this the basis of their foreign policy.

It was no subject for wonder that the State Department, with American security as its prime object, felt it more realistic to turn to Europe. Despite its flaws Europe could more cheaply be made into an ally, and a more reliable and understanding one. In the end it seemed that the Cold War could be lost in Asia but not won there. With the victory for democracy won in Europe, there was ample reason to believe that Asia would gradually move in that direction. If the United States had to spend itself in rescue efforts, it was apparent that Europe was more worth the effort.

The most convincing demonstration of the hopeless situation in Asia was China. To set forth the pros and cons of American policy in China would require the explanation of so many nuances that it would fill a book. We noted how during World War II the State Department sought to weld the liberals in both Communist and Nationalist parties into a moderate center. After the war Marshall went to China and spent almost a year in a vain effort to put the policy into effect. In both the political and the military field the course of events and the results are still obscured by clouds of concealments and biased arguments. One side insisted that if there had been a moderate group it had ceased to exist or was powerless; the truces which Marshall negotiated between the Reds and the Nationalists only gave the former time to gather strength. In any case, the Chinese Reds (like those of Europe) could not afford to make a peace which would forefend the chaos so necessary to their plans.

The other side asserted that Chiang could not have won popular support without making land and other reforms, and his refusal to do so only made inflation and taxes that much worse. In addition many of the men around him were cynically diverting Lend-Lease and other public property to the nest eggs which they were laying up for the time when they abandoned China to its fate and sought refuge in South America. Marshall had no way to coerce the Reds, and he brought most pressure to bear on the Nationalists. At one time he cut off all military aid to Chiang, an action which is bitterly charged with having resulted in the eventual Nationalist defeat. Marshall's critics assert that he fell victim to the pro-communists around him and in the State Department; he should have supported Chiang, corrupt or not, on the ground that corruption is inevitable in Asia and, at least, Chiang was anti-Red.

It is difficult to claim that Marshall played a canny game, but on the other hand Chiang's dealings with the United States were not always very wise. Indeed, he was convinced that the United States would in the end

be forced to come to the rescue no matter how much the Nationalists looted the people and the American Treasury or insulted American envoys. His power had been based on playing left against right in the Kuomintang. When he countered the Marshall strategy by slaughtering the moderates he could reach, the others escaped into exile or went over to the Reds. Chiang became the prisoner of the reactionaries, who promptly proceeded to block what little chance there was of reform. The result was that the miserable people turned in despair to the Reds, less attracted by their promises than ready to try any change. Nationalist troops failed to grasp the tactics of modern warfare, and their generals proved amazingly incapable. The Reds, better trained and better led, made rapid headway. During 1949 the Nationalists collapsed, and in December Chiang and his remaining followers retired to Formosa. The Nationalists still held a seat in the Security Council of the UN, but power had passed to Mao Tse-tung as was shown when Britain recognized him in accordance with its historic policy of recognizing *de facto* governments. The British contention was that China would depart from the Marx-Lenin-Stalin line. If Marshall agreed with this, he could still not afford to recognize the Reds.

Nationalist
collapse

When the Republican Party regained control of Congress, it lost interest in Chiang (except for a few gadflies) and turned to cultivating the domestic issues which it expected would bring victory in 1948. As early as 1947 it was clear that Chiang was destined to defeat unless the United States backed him even to the extent of risking World War III. General Wedemeyer made a report in 1947 which recommended this course, provided Chiang remedied the corruption and incompetence which he blamed for the Nationalist failure. The State Department refused to risk anything more in China, and when early in 1948 Congress reluctantly voted \$400 million for China, \$125 million of it for military aid, the Department deliberately held up the military aid for months. Acheson claimed that during the postwar period the United States had given to China over \$2 billion in the form of food, machinery, arms, and support of currency. Critics cogently pointed out that much of the supposed military aid should actually have been charged to expenses incident to the Japanese surrender, while untold further millions were in surplus war stocks which were worthless or never arrived.

Sabotage
of aid to
China

The approaching end of the Pacific war in 1945 had precipitated a struggle between army and navy over which should administer Japan. Truman's decision was in favor of the army under MacArthur, and a State-War-Navy directive was prepared called the "United States Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan." It was expected that MacArthur would serve as Supreme Commander of the

Occupation
of Japan

Allied Powers (SCAP). The existing government of Japan was preserved intact, but it was to operate under the control of SCAP and was obligated to carry out MacArthur's directives, which were intended to remold the institutions of the country.

Postwar Japan was by the Moscow Conference of December 1945 placed under the Far Eastern Commission, sitting in Washington and composed of representatives of the Pacific and Asiatic allies. Its function was to formulate policies for the direction of SCAP in Japan and to review its actions. At the same time an Allied Council for Japan was set up in Tokyo, composed of the U.S., U.S.S.R., China, and the British Commonwealth. It was to advise the Supreme Commander and was to sit under his chairmanship or that of his deputy. The Allies played a minor role as anticipated, all the more because the commander was MacArthur; indeed, the Allied machinery was almost ignored and such policies as he chose to recognize were largely American in origin.

MacArthur's very defects (defects in most Western eyes) may have helped him to fill the rôle of Yankee Mikado. The Japanese had been used to government by a remote, mysterious, and all-but-invisible fountain of power—"the man behind the bamboo screen"—more symbol than human being. MacArthur had a great deal of sympathy with Orientals, though also a tendency to offer "democracy" and "free enterprise" as immediately applicable solutions. Perhaps he overdid the man-behind-the-bamboo-screen rôle. He barely left Tokyo during his incumbency and wore a furrow between his home and his office in the Dai-Ichi Building. He rarely talked to Japanese at any length; anyhow, they were notoriously likely to reflect the views of anyone they talked to.

For information he depended on reports by subordinates; they quickly learned to tailor them to his expectations, so that his announcements came to have a ring of smug optimism. Sometimes underlings indulged in some incredibly comic antics, as when the censors destroyed all issues of a newspaper that had denied that General MacArthur was descended from the Sun Goddess. The occupation staff, of course, had both wise men and fools, but there was a growing tendency for sound administrators to get out of Japan; if they did not, they were frequently shoved aside by the mounting horde of military mediocrities and humorless idealists.

It is certainly possible that a more typical commander would have hopelessly botched the Japanese job (not but what there were claims that MacArthur did). As it was, he abolished the status of Shinto as a state religion, stripped the Mikado of the symbolism which the West had misinterpreted as divinity, and insisted that the Mikado must pay an official call upon him. Having thus made it clear that he was the boss, MacArthur did not rub it in further. American power was all but invisible except in Tokyo and other centers where "military government teams" operated.

What changes had to be made were carried out by the Japanese government under SCAP directives.

The Japanese were willing to accept the fact of defeat since the absence of the "symbols of dishonor" meant that there was no necessity to seek revenge. Their degree of co-operation with the occupation was remarkable for a number of reasons: respect for authority, an original lack of enthusiasm for the war, the prestige of American industry and of military success, the Japanese ethical code which permits an about-face, and finally the universal relief that the islands were not given over to rape and pillage. True enough, the behavior of some of the conquerors stirred resentment. Moreover, erratic American policies caused puzzlement over the meaning of "de-mok-ra-sie," but there was a general willingness to study a political theory which, it was solemnly asserted, had been the main factor in American economic and military success. Eventually, of course, there was a growing wish to get rid of the interlopers. By 1950 it was clear that the Japs were merely sitting out the occupation. There was question as to how sincere they were in the enormous prestige which they awarded to MacArthur.

Japanese
attitudes

As the result of the war Japan was confined to its home islands. Sakhalin and the Kuriles fell to Russia. The Pacific islands and Okinawa went under the trusteeships of the United States with the approval of the United Nations. The country was completely disarmed; the armed forces disbanded, arsenals and fortifications dismantled, and equipment and weapons broken up or sunk at sea. War criminals were tried as in Germany and seven high officials, including Tojo, were executed; about 700 lesser offenders suffered death and possibly 3000 more were given prison terms. The old militarists were driven into retirement, and the educational system was shaken up in order to re-orient its teaching objectives and purge those teachers who would not go along. Reparations were supposed to be in the form of machinery, but the program fell down because the Soviet government claimed its Manchurian seizures as war booty and refused to allow them to count as reparations. Also, the economic burden of supporting Japan led to a demand that it be permitted to re-establish its industry and trade.

Penalties
of the war

SCAP's reforms were a weird combination of conservatism and New Dealism, nor was consistency an object even in one field. The long list of reforms included such things as breaking up the *Zaibatsu* business monopolies, redistributing land to the peasants, fostering the growth of labor unions, emancipating women, and introducing the externals of democracy. Just how effective these changes were is subject to bitter argument, and no sure answer will be available in the near future. Much will depend on how deep a change has occurred in Japanese thinking. Certainly there was widespread misunder-

The reform
program

standing of the motivations and nature of the reforms. This was particularly true in the item of democratic methodology. On the credit side one can say that the occupation sought to lessen the old pressures on the individual: that slavishness to the opinions of others which made every Japanese conscious that the eyes of the world were always upon him. It was doubtless this which had made the average Japanese a bundle of inhibitions and which had helped to lead his government into the disastrous ventures of the China Incident and the Pacific war.

The first phase of the occupation was devoted to a program of severe tutelage in reform; but the mounting consciousness of Soviet world strategy led to a tightened hold upon Japan, to the suppression of the Communist Party, to cracking down on labor, and to a reintegration of the *Zaibatsu*. The determination to hasten Japan's ability to support itself led in 1949 to the imposition of an Economic Stabilization Program, because of which Japanese industry and trade began to pick up. Before World War II Japan had chiefly exported consumer goods; it now began to export machinery and other capital goods, a fact which promised an increasing industrialization of the Far East and probably growing stability. By mid-1949 industrial activity was about 75 per cent of what it had been in the early 1930's. The Korean War gave an economic fillip to Japan and clarified the American objective of strengthening it as a bulwark against communism. On the other hand, the entry of Red China into the Korean War was to lead to the discouragement of trade with China without which, it was asserted, there could be no Japanese recovery.

The Korean War spiked any hope of a Russian agreement over a peace treaty with Japan. The State Department put the matter of the treaty in the hands of the capable and tactful John Foster Dulles, a Republican Japanese Peace Treaty, 1951 internationalist, and finally in the summer of 1951 he emerged with a treaty which pleased no one but was grudgingly accepted by most. The occupation was to be withdrawn upon ratification by Japan and a majority of ten Pacific signatory powers, including the United States. Japan was given untrammelled self-government and the right to rearm. The smaller Pacific states were to receive reparations in the form of goods manufactured from their raw materials; their security was assured by two mutual-assistance treaties, one by the United States with the Philippines, and one by the United States with Australia and New Zealand. Another mutual-security pact was signed between the United States and Japan, by which American armed forces were to hold bases in the islands. The final signatures (forty-nine states) were affixed at a full-dress conference in San Francisco in September 1951. Independence became effective on 28 April 1952.

The reactions of Asiatic nations were varied. India refused to attend the conference and, along with the Arab states, criticized the treaty on the

ground that it left too much room for American interference; the bow toward Moscow was unmistakable. The lesser Pacific powers, with their ingrained suspicion of Japan, refused to accept at face value Premier Yoshida's professions that Japan was a new nation "dedicated to peace, democracy, and freedom." In the Japanese view, the old problems remained: the Russian and American menaces, overpopulation, scarcity of resources, and psychological resentments to which had been added the results of one of the most calamitous defeats in all history. The small Pacific nations professed to see a future in which a rehabilitated and rearmed Japan would play off the United States and Russia against each other, restore its control of Manchuria, and reassert ascendancy over East Asia. Who could stop this course? Would the United States fight another Pacific war to tear down the power it was rebuilding? These were pointed and far from meaningless questions, whose answers were shrouded by the future.

What next?

Korea is a rugged, sterile peninsula inhabited by about 30 million people, chiefly rice farmers. As "a pistol pointed at the heart of Japan" it had been a source of contention between Russia and Japan. World War II revived Russia's ambitions to control Korea, but the United States refused to accept less than independence for the country. With the collapse of Japan in the offing, an agreement was made that Russia should accept the surrender of Japanese troops north of the Thirty-Eighth Parallel and the United States south of that line; the division had no economic or geographical justification. South Korea was technically under MacArthur, but it was actually administered by a deputy, General John R. Hodge.

The Korean problem

The Moscow Conference of December 1945 established a U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission to set up a Korean provisional government, but neither side would agree to the demands of the other. The United States was now cast in the anti-Russian rôle lately occupied by Japan. Meanwhile numerous Korean political parties had sprung up and were impatiently demanding that the foreigners depart; if they did, there promised to be an epochal free-for-all, since the leaders did not hesitate to use mob demonstrations and even assassination.

Korea split

Finally, at the request of the United States, the United Nations sent in an organizing commission. Though it was refused admission to the Russian zone, it held elections in South Korea and in mid-1948 set up a constitution and government. The conservative Syngman Rhee, long a worker in exile for Korean independence, was elected president. As such he quite overshadowed the technically more powerful prime minister. Russian troops left North Korea in 1948 but soon sent in a military mission to train a heavily equipped North Korean army. U.S. troops left in June 1949, leaving behind \$110 million in equipment and a military mission to

train a South Korean army; no heavy equipment was provided, however, lest Syngman Rhee use it to make good his threats to invade the North. As it was, skirmishing was endemic along the Thirty-Eighth Parallel, but later events were to cast doubts upon the effectiveness of the training given to the 96,000-man South Korean army.

The American occupation government had made some halfhearted attempts at land and fiscal reform, but they had little effect. When the Reds cut off electric power in 1948, the effect on industry was severe. Under the circumstances it was no wonder that South Korea began to suffer from inflation. Acheson pled for aid, and a little was given by the RFC, but Congressional opposition to expenditures abroad and to anything that Acheson recommended delayed substantial aid until the spring of 1950. At that time Korean aid was placed under the administration of the Economic Co-operation Administration. The outbreak of the Korean War in June blocked any hope of recovery.

Economic troubles

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Chapter LV

KOREA: RALLY TO FREEDOM

1 *The United States and the Korean War*

Deteriora- tin- and rubber-producing states of British Malaya. The
tion in East Philippine battle against the communist *Huks* had also
Asia developed into large-scale operations. It was evident that the
democracies could not hope to restore their old position in East Asia with-
out risking all-out war with Red China. The latter, moreover, had a treaty
with Russia by which they would give mutual aid in case one was at-
tacked by Japan or any power based on Japan. This may have explained
why General MacArthur stated that "anyone who commits the American
Army on the mainland of Asia ought to have his head examined," and why
Secretary of State Acheson pointedly omitted South Korea and Formosa
from a formal delineation of the western "defensive perimeter" of the
United States.

It may be that Stalin hoped to counter his European setbacks by seiz-
ing South Korea. At any rate, on 25 June 1950 the North Korean Army,
Russian-trained and Russian-equipped, sent its tanks storming across the
Korean War Thirty-Eighth Parallel. The lightly equipped R.O.K. (Re-
begins public of Korea) troops broke before the onslaught, aban-
doned Seoul, the capital, and fell back southward. At the
moment Russia was boycotting the UN Security Council, so the Council
was in a position to agree promptly when Truman requested approval of
U.S. aid to South Korea. Truman followed this with an order to the Sev-
enth Fleet to prevent military action across the Strait of Formosa by
either Chinese Reds or Nationalists. He also provided additional military
aid to the governments of Viet-Nam and the Philippines in their battle
with internal communist elements. By the 30th, on MacArthur's recom-

mendation, ground troops of the Eighth Army were flown to Korea to stiffen the retreating South Korean forces.

MacArthur was now appointed official UN commander, and British Commonwealth nations announced their intention of sending troops to his command. In the light of later dissensions over the Korean War it is worth noticing that Truman's decision to intervene met with almost universal approval in the free nations. Soviet opposition, however, was indicated by Russia's return to the Council to carry on a vendetta against UN attempts to sift the origins of the war. Indeed, Soviet obstruction became so marked that the Assembly (at Acheson's instigation) adopted the "Uniting for peace" plan by which it could *recommend* action against aggression in case the Council failed to *order* action.

UN actions

General Walton Walker's poorly trained and poorly equipped Eighth Army fought a six-weeks delaying battle beside the shattered R.O.K. forces. In early August he entered a fortified quadrangle about 60 by 100 miles in size at the southeastern tip of Korea, and the battle of the Pusan Beachhead began. The inadequate port of Pusan was his base, and the defense was hinged upon the city

Retreat and return

of Taegu. For six weeks Walker shifted his forces about the perimeter in a brilliant bid for time to build up the UN forces. Then on 15 September, MacArthur made a landing at Inchon, the seaport of Seoul, and drove toward the capital city. The North Korean Army collapsed, and the UN troops under a vague authorization by the UN Assembly crossed the Thirty-Eighth Parallel and took the Red capital of Pyongyang. By the end of October three widely separated UN spearheads were moving through rugged mountains toward the Yalu River, which marks the border between Korea and Manchuria. Walker's Eighth Army was in the west, and General Edward H. Almond commanded the X Corps in the east.



Edwin Marcus in *The New York Times*

The real bridgehead

The Korean War revived Chiang's hope of receiving American support for an invasion of the mainland, and this hope was encouraged by the neo-isolationists in Congress and probably by MacArthur, whose authority covered the Seventh Fleet. The nations of Western Europe were so frightened by this prospect that they openly sought to prevent any move to support Chiang's plans and even began to criticize the movement into North Korea. It was well known that

The plot thickens


MacArthur was privately and finally openly critical of the Administration's refusal to spread the war, but in a meeting with Truman on Wake Island (14 October) he allegedly agreed to accept Administration policy.

Red China was already planning intervention, whether or not MacArthur knew it; the latter point is bitterly debated. Precisely why Mao Tse-tung chose to enter the war is uncertain. He may have felt that Manchuria was in danger of occupation; he may have been pulling Soviet chestnuts from the fire; or he may actually have been seeking to strengthen his own position in Manchuria and Korea against his Russian neighbor. At any rate, there can be little doubt that Stalin desired to keep ambitious Red China busy and dependent and at the same time keep America's attention off Europe by getting it bogged down in East Asia.

Late in October clashes occurred between advanced UN troops and Red Chinese "volunteers" under General Lin Piao. The Joint Chiefs of Staff tried to stop MacArthur at the Yalu watershed, but he persisted in moving into the river valley. On 24 November he opened his "end-the-war" offensive; three nights later the Red Chinese, who had passed between the spearheads, struck the UN flanks with murderous force. The spearheads promptly crumpled, and a chaotic retreat began which did not stop until mid-January, when the troops reached a defense line which slanted southwestward from the Thirty-Eighth Parallel. The Eighth Army, on the western coastal plain, was able to bring artillery and tanks to bear while it reorganized. The X Corps in the frozen eastern mountains had no room for maneuver but had to make its way as best it could to Hamhung, whence it was evacuated by sea and rejoined the Eighth Army.

UN ability to hold owed much to naval control of coastal waters, to naval air support, and to bombers based on Japan and Okinawa. The Reds' lack of modern transport meant that they depended at least partly on human burden-bearers who traveled at night and so were difficult for air raiders to detect. It became evident soon after the Red Chinese entry that both sides had tacitly agreed to confine the war to Korea and to make Manchuria and Japan "privileged sanctuaries." The UN gladly accepted the handicap of this limited war in order to preserve the fiction that it was not at war with Red China, even though there was at that stage some doubt that China was capable of launching air raids against Japan.

Walker had been killed in a jeep accident (23 December), and his place was taken by General Matthew Ridgway, a World War II airborne commander. Ridgway refused to listen to panicky demands for withdrawal from Korea but contained the Red offensives and replied with thrusts whose purpose was to kill Reds and restore Eighth Army morale. The result was to demonstrate that superior fire power could break the "human sea" tactics upon which Lin



Adapted from New York Times maps, by permission

Piao relied to overwhelm the UN Army. Seoul was retaken, and the UN line moved across the parallel except at the western end. With MacArthur's recall in April 1951, Ridgway moved to Tokyo and his place was taken by General James A. Van Fleet, a veteran of Normandy and of Greek guerrilla warfare. There were some setbacks during the spring and summer, but on the whole Van Fleet bettered his position and took a Red toll of four to one. By mid-1951 UN air superiority was being seriously challenged by MIG-15 jet fighters (probably manned by Russian and German "volunteers") which were based on Manchuria but haunted the western coastal plain so constantly that it became known as "Mig Alley."

By summer it was evident that the Reds could not break through; but it was also evident that unless the United States chose to strengthen the UN forces greatly, the only outcome would be a stalemate. Truman was caught among three fires. The neo-isolationists, now led by MacArthur, wished to extend the war to China; the Western Europeans desired a "cease fire" at any price short of complete surrender; and the Asiatics not only wanted a "cease fire" but were ready to give up Korea to the Reds. At Russian bidding, Mao began negotiations with UN (actually U.S.) representatives between the battle lines on 10 July 1951. As usual the Reds took advantage of the opportunity to accuse their opponents of atrocities and faithlessness, and on 23 August the talks ceased. However, they were resumed on 10 October, and on 27 July 1953 an armistice was finally declared.

Full statistics are not available, but it seems likely that there were never more than 260,000 U.S. troops in Korea, and at that the aim was to rotate every man at the end of a year's service. There were approximately the same number of R.O.K. troops, a full division of British Commonwealth men, and some other UN elements. Out of a total casualty list of over 500,000 the U.S. had suffered about 25,000 killed—probably more, when the roll of the missing was tallied. The destruction of Korean cities and industries was appalling, and rebuilding after the war was certain to be a problem. Even worse was the loss of civilian lives. On the whole, that generation of Koreans had little cause to rejoice, no matter who won the war.

On the domestic scene the most vital problem was whether we should embark on full mobilization or take a chance on a longer drawn out partial mobilization. If we did convert to full war status, there was danger that Russia would try to forestall us by moving into Western Europe; on the other hand, if there was no war, we ran a serious risk of breaking the economy. Certainly the taxpayers would clamor for demobilization, with the result that in the end we might be more vulnerable than ever. The decision finally made was to undertake partial mobilization and to tool up for full war production in case of ne-

Armistice
negotiations

Casualties

Problems of
rearmament

cessity. A three-years program (later stretched over four years) was set up to increase the American productive capacity by a fifth. In this way it was hoped to prepare for war without destroying the civilian standard of production and consumption on which American economic strength was based. It was expected that the armed forces would reach about 3,500,000, but this figure was subject to change. The cost of rearmament was expected to run as high as \$60 billion in peak years.

The Office of Defense Mobilization (ODM), first headed by Charles E. Wilson of General Electric, was in command of the production program. Under it were various defense agencies, especially the Economic Stabilization Agency (ESA) which dealt with prices and was over the Wage Stabilization Board (WSB). These agencies ran into the routine problems of shortages, priorities, black markets, and complaint by domestic and foreign interests which felt they were being unjustly treated. The fact was that everybody favored controls—but only for the other fellow. At any rate, creeping inflation set in and there was enormous political opposition to taking the drastic measures which would arrest it.

The unity with which the American people met Red aggression in Korea began to dissolve with the Inchon come-back, especially as MacArthur's attitude became known to the public. MacArthur's disastrous reverse in November put an end to what unity was left, as the public lined up for or against him—or what was much the same thing, for or against Truman. MacArthur was convinced that the main communist punch was coming in Asia, and he demanded that the free world meet it head-on. The Administration felt that the Asiatic crisis was basically an opportunistic feint and that sooner or later the main Red attack would be made in Europe. MacArthur, rather inconsistently, denied that Russia would actively interfere if we opened up on Red China; the Administration (without committing itself as to future policy) felt that that was exactly what Russia wanted, and it would probably take advantage of such a situation to move into Western Europe.

Would Russia fight?

MacArthur, irked by his defeat, naturally sought a scapegoat. Truman seemed to fit the rôle neatly. MacArthur issued a long stream of private complaints to individuals and newspapers that the limited character of the war prevented the winning of a victory; the essential thing was to subject China to naval blockade and intensive air bombardment. The Pentagon, however, objected to squandering its air power in a war which could not be conclusive, and it also feared that the Russians might counter with "volunteer" submarines. In any case, Chinese power in Korea could not be interdicted without cutting its overland connections with Russia, the source of its munitions. For the moment, at any rate, the Pentagon preferred to preserve the "privileged sanctuaries."



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About 20 March 1951 the JCS informed MacArthur that the President was about to propose diplomatic negotiations over Korea. MacArthur later denied that he got the message; nevertheless, he was certainly trying to force the Administration's hand when on the 25th he publicly told Red China that it was beaten and called on it to sue for a truce or to face a collapse before naval and air harassment. A few days later House Republican leader Joseph W. Martin made public a MacArthur letter which demanded the extension of the war. Europe, hysterically fearful of "MacArthurism," frantically sought to forefend a danger which did not exist. Truman had already made up his mind, and on 11 April 1951 he recalled the general.

MacArthur returned amidst the plaudits of multitudes and on 19 April addressed Congress. Early the next month the Senate Armed Services and Foreign Relations committees under the chairmanship of Senator Richard Russell of Georgia began a series of hearings which probed foreign policy clear back to Pearl Harbor. The hearings lasted long enough to pall on the public, and, indeed, MacArthur's clarion call to action in Asia was somewhat deadened by his admission that he did not have a knowledge of the global aspects of the communist menace. At any rate, he put himself on record in favor of the "go-it-alone" policy of the neo-isolationists.

Omar Bradley, Chairman of the JCS, epitomized the Administration

view by saying that MacArthur wished to fight the wrong war in the wrong place at the wrong time and against the wrong enemy. Secretary of State Acheson offered no sure way to avoid World War III but held that resistance should be posited upon strategic points, first of all Europe, and upon a long and patient program to build prosperity, democratic sympathies, and the will to resist aggression all around the Soviet perimeter. If there was any result of the hearings, it was found in the Administration's accelerated aid to Chiang and in a greater courage in enforcing and defending its policies.

2 *The European Key*

One of the least noticed things brought out by the MacArthur hearings was the probability that if we failed to stiffen European resistance to Sovietism we would probably have to choose between war and (at least temporary) isolation. There was very little chance that we could singlehanded implement the "go-it-alone" policy of the *Pax Americana* or hope to thwart communist world aggression by blockading and bombing China. The State Department's conviction that Western Europe was the key to world peace had already led to a series of actions to strengthen that continent against aggression. It had, for instance, encouraged, against British official distrust, the Schuman Plan to place Western Europe's coal and steel under control of an international board.


Other gestures made to integrate Western Europe seemed insufficient to the United States, so it welcomed a move to organize a North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) army under a common commander. By an agreement made in December 1950 General Eisenhower was asked to assume command, and soon afterward he opened headquarters near Versailles. An elaborate complex of land, sea, and air commands was set up after considerable jockeying among the powers for the prestige of naming their nationals to choice positions. It soon became evident that the hope of building an army (96 divisions were envisioned by the end of 1954!) was going to be expensive. Moreover, the man power was lacking unless Germany was drawn upon. The *bête noire* of the revival of German military might now drove France to propose a unified European army (the Pleven Plan) in which each continental member of NATO would furnish divisions.

The U.S. contingent in the NATO Army was set at six divisions, of which only two were already in Germany. The Executive's assumption that he had a right to send over the four new divisions seemed to Congress


Significance
of Europe
to the U.S.

Where will
the divi-
sions come
from?

U. S. SECURITY SYSTEM, 1952



U. S. and its Allies
Communist bloc



NORTH ATLANTIC PACT, 1949

- | | |
|------------------|--------------|
| 1 UNITED STATES | 8 BELGIUM |
| 2 CANADA | 9 LUXEMBOURG |
| 3 ICELAND | 10 PORTUGAL |
| 4 NORWAY | 11 FRANCE |
| 5 UNITED KINGDOM | 12 ITALY |
| 6 NETHERLANDS | 13 GREECE |
| 7 DENMARK | 14 TURKEY |

JAPANESE PACT, 1951

- | |
|-----------------|
| 1 UNITED STATES |
| 38 JAPAN |

PHILIPPINE PACT, 1951

- | |
|-----------------|
| 1 UNITED STATES |
| 37 PHILIPPINES |

SOUTH PACIFIC PACT, 1951

- | |
|-----------------|
| 1 UNITED STATES |
| 35 NEW ZEALAND |
| 36 AUSTRALIA |

RIO PACT, 1947

- | | |
|-------------------|--------------|
| 1 UNITED STATES | 25 COLOMBIA |
| 15 MEXICO | 26 VENEZUELA |
| 16 CUBA | 27 ECUADOR |
| 17 HAITI | 28 PERU |
| 18 DOMINICAN REP. | 29 BRAZIL |
| 19 HONDURAS | 30 BOLIVIA |
| 20 GUATEMALA | 31 PARAGUAY |
| 21 EL SALVADOR | 32 CHILE |
| 22 NICARAGUA | 33 ARGENTINA |
| 23 COSTA RICA | 34 URUGUAY |
| 24 PANAMA | |

a commitment that risked war without its consent. There was also the problem of whether the UN and NATO treaties obligated the United States to furnish the military aid which these organizations apportioned, thus by-passing the authority of Congress. In the end (April 1951) Congress authorized the sending of the four additional divisions to Germany, but no more.

Meanwhile Congress was looking forward to the end of the Marshall Plan. Europe had made encouraging progress toward economic recovery, but rearmament was likely to destroy this advance. At the close of 1951 Congress appropriated an initial \$7.3 billion for European rearmament, \$1.44 billion to pay for European manufacture of arms. Director of the new Mutual Security Agency (MSA) was William Averell Harriman, a man with long and diverse experience in government administration and diplomacy. He held a number of other jobs closely related to MSA.

**Mutual Security
Agency,
1952**

Harriman was also one of the "Three Wise Men" whom a NATO Conference at Ottawa (September 1951) appointed to expedite organization. A full-dress conference of NATO nations (now also including Greece and Turkey) at Lisbon in February 1952 made considerable progress both toward integrating the European economy and toward setting up the European Army. The size of NATO forces was pared down to fifty divisions by the end of 1952—and not all of these would be fully operational. France, bleeding from the Viet-Nam war, was almost certain to fall short of its commitment. U.S. promises of weapons and planes were not being fulfilled. The Pentagon desired to acquire bases in Spain in order to be able to retreat behind the Pyrenees rampart in case of necessity, but the other members of NATO wished to have the first, last, and only stand against Russian invasion made no farther west than the Rhine. By the end of 1952 the NATO Army had reached about 50 divisions, regular and reserve, and a conference in Paris decided to rest content with fleshing these out. The decision, ostensibly, was based upon the availability of "new weapons" and upon a belief that Russia would not attack.

**NATO de-
velopment**

More basic was the growing neutralism of Western Europe and the reluctance of the governments to endanger their economies by trying to reach the Lisbon goals. Traditional hatreds among the nations of Western Europe were hampering the sincere efforts of the more farsighted leaders to unite them in order to build economic and military strength. One good omen was the setting-up of the Schuman Plan in August 1952 under the name of the European Coal and Steel Community. It was in effect a sovereign power, with its High Authority (or executive), its Assembly, and its High Court. Jean Monnet, father of the Schuman Plan and President of the Community, believed that in ten years the new venture would

succeed in raising the West European standard of living by fifty per cent.

While NATO was slowly gathering power in Europe, the situation was deteriorating in the Near East. The landholding class in this area, pressured by popular discontent and rising nationalism, managed to deflect popular resentment toward the British and Americans. Suddenly in May 1951 Iran confiscated the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company's holdings and refused to compromise the matter with Britain. To Iran's bitter anger, the United States refused either to lend oil experts or to finance the all but insolvent Iranian government. Later in the same year Egypt ordered British troops out of the Suez Canal area. This was the situation when in July 1952 a military dictatorship was set up under General Naguib.

Near East-
ern crises

3 *The Campaign of 1952*

As the presidential campaign of 1952 approached, a welter of issues came to the front, each backed by one or more pressure groups or factions. The reactionary, isolationist, and neo-isolationist Old Guard of the Republican Party was bent upon destroying the welfare state and was tarring the Democrats with accusations of "softness" toward communism; Senators McCarthy and Jenner did not hesitate to accuse the Truman administration of being in league with Moscow. Senator Robert Taft, the Old Guard's leader, sought to take advantage of this partisan bitterness without actually approving it *in toto*. Moderate Republicans, whom we can call the Young Guard, felt that the party was failing in the conservative mission of offering a program which would moderate, consolidate, and rationalize the reforms of the New Deal. Backed by men prominent in the steel and automobile industries, and by such publicists as Henry Luce, the Young Guard espoused a program of international co-operation, low tariffs, and business ascendancy. Logical leader of the Young Guard was Thomas Dewey, but two defeats had weakened his prestige, and public leadership therefore fell to such men as Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts and Senator James Duff of Pennsylvania.

The Democratic Party was stalemated by its internal divisions; the very success of the New Deal meant that the Democrats feared to move lest they be accused of destroying what they had built. Further charges against Truman were based upon his alleged extravagance and bungling in foreign policy. One issue which hurt was the charge of corruption in the disposition of war surplus materials, in the RFC, and in the Internal Revenue Bureau. While most of this corruption was in the form of "business graft" and arose from efforts

The case
against the
Democrats

to overcome the antibusiness bias of the administration, "that mess in Washington" became a valuable Republican talking point. Truman's obtuseness in recognizing the situation led to the accusation that he intended to do nothing about it; on the other hand, Congress was strangely reluctant to grant effective powers for a clean-up. The alliance between the Truman administration and labor was demonstrated to the satisfaction of critics when in April 1952 Truman seized control of the steel industry to prevent a strike. Presently the Supreme Court in the case of *Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co., et al v. Charles Sawyer* restored control of the industry to its owners. Truman had been widely criticized for not having resorted to a Taft-Hartley injunction in place of seizure, and the Court decision was now widely approved as reversing the twenty-year tide of executive "usurpation" and of government aggression against private industry. The steelworkers struck, and it was not until Truman yielded a price increase in steel (to justify a wage raise) that peace was made. When Philip Murray died soon after the November elections the CIO asserted its intransigence by electing Walter Reuther in his place. William Green, head of the AFL, died at about the same time and was replaced by the moderate George Meany.

Taft's campaign for the Republican nomination seemed destined to sweep everything before it until, in June, "Ike" Eisenhower returned from Europe to campaign for the nomination with the backing of the Young Guard. A bitter convention battle resulted in Eisenhower's victory. Senator Richard Milhous Nixon (b. 1913) of California was named running mate. The Democratic Party had received with relief Truman's declaration (29 March) that he would not run again. However, since Truman had failed to groom an heir-apparent—perhaps wisely under the circumstances—the race for the nomination was wide open. The Democratic Convention was badly split among a number of contestants, with Senator Kefauver in the lead. In the end it accepted the judgment of the party politicians and drafted Governor Stevenson of Illinois. Senator John Jackson Sparkman (b. 1899) of Alabama was made running mate.

The party
convention

Adlai Ewing Stevenson, grandson of Cleveland's Vice-President of that name, came of a family long active in Illinois politics. After graduating from Princeton and Northwestern Law School he practiced law, then served in the AAA and, during World War II, in the Navy and State Departments. He was an official at the San Francisco UN Conference and later served on the American delegation to that body. Nominated to run against the corrupt Green administration, he swept Illinois by an unprecedented majority and gave the state an administration much like that of Dewey's in New York. Slightly built, with receding dark hair, prominent eyes, and a rueful smile, Steven-

Adlai
Stevenson
(b. 1900)


son was earnest, hard-working, and a worrier. Experienced, vigorous, and comparatively young (52), he was a middle of the roader whose modesty of deportment did not conceal his statesmanlike qualities. He spoke with humor and usually with wisdom, maintaining until late into the campaign a cool and self-deprecatory detachment which endeared him to the intellectuals, whom the Republicans contemptuously called the "eggheads." Indeed, no candidate since Wilson in 1912 had approached him in his announced purpose to "talk sense to the American people."

It has been said that Eisenhower's campaign depended on mood and that of Stevenson upon persuasion. The Young Guard offered its candidate as a "crusader" destined to save the American Way, but it also caused

The campaign him to reflect the local coloration of every region he entered so faithfully that he was laid open to charges of inconsistency. Eisenhower's first purpose was to heal the breach in the party by a compromise with Taft, which the latter evidently took to mean that he had joined the Old Guard save for certain reservations on foreign policy. Stevenson was handicapped by the fact that his name, unlike Eisenhower's, was not well known to the public. Labor stood by him in general, but the conservative farm organizations did not. Southern leaders were cool, and many of them declared neutrality or went over to Eisenhower. Actually the two candidates did not differ fundamentally in either domestic or foreign policy, but Stevenson had to support the administration record and Eisenhower had to placate his restive Old Guard supporters by finding serious faults with the very policies he had helped to formulate and carry out as a military commander. Thus Eisenhower gave the impression that he would find a way of freeing the Russian satellites and of ending the war in Korea. There is a political axiom to the effect that it is not what you say that matters—it is what people think you say. Nevertheless, twist and turn as they might and paint it up as brightly as possible, neither candidate could come out with any foreign policy but containment for the foreseeable future.

The pollsters had been badly mistaken in their forecasts of the results of the 1948 election, and now they refused to believe their own statistics when they showed that Eisenhower would win. As a result both men were

The election "running scared" up to election eve, and Stevenson actually thought he might win. Yet the vote was an Eisenhower landslide. He took 39 states with 442 electoral and 33.9 million popular votes; Stevenson was fortunate to take 9 states (two border and seven Southern) with 89 electoral and 27.3 million popular votes. That it was a personal triumph for Eisenhower was shown by the narrow Republican margin in Congress. The Senate stood 48 to 47 (Morse of Oregon had seceded from the Republican Party) and when the House met in January it stood 221 to 211 (3 independent or vacant). Nevertheless the



margin was sufficient to carry the Old Guard into the chairmanship of most of the important committees. Taft became majority leader of the Senate and Joseph W. Martin resumed his former place as Speaker of the House. Eisenhower had promised to call upon the best brains the country afforded and he now selected a businessman's cabinet headed by John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State. Stassen was made Mutual Security Director, and Lodge was made head of the delegation to the UN.

Eisenhower's basic vote probably came from citizens who were fed up with taxes, war, fumbling, and the same old names, and so struck out at them by voting against the government. His resounding majority probably came from his military glamor and the rather general impression which he sedulously fostered that he could find some formula for avoiding the difficult time of stalemate in the Cold War which Stevenson frankly warned the public that it must face. Despite all the campaign verbiage it was difficult (especially in the light of his previous statements) to see wherein Eisenhower differed vitally from Truman, except that he wished to clean up the rough spots, institute logical planning and economy, and operate with more vigor and imagination—all of them areas of Truman weakness.

With Eisenhower's accession the little "Man of Independence" stepped out of an office of which he had always stood in awe. It was not likely that

The significance of Harry Truman Eisenhower, with the self-confidence engendered by a lifetime of command and with the added accolade of winning his crusade, would ever be troubled by a feeling of inadequacy. And yet in a way both men sprang from the people, and in them the great concept of rule by the people was on trial. Truman had wavered and vacillated, backed and filled, but in the end he had come through with some of the greatest decisions in history. The Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, the defense of South Korea, the North Atlantic Treaty, the drive to integrate Western Europe—all these were epochal reversals of American policy, some of them reversals of the economic and political policies which have motivated nations from time immemorial. Those who come afterward can build wisely, but only on the foundation which Truman laid. It is, of course, too early to say whether these policies will succeed in arresting the deterioration of Western Civilization. But they needed to be tried, and no one can take from Harry Truman the glory of having done that.

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Years of the modern!
 Years of the unperform'd!
 Your horizon rises, I see it parting away for more august dramas,
 I see not America only, not only Liberty's nation but other nations preparing,
 I see tremendous entrances and exits, new combinations, the solidarity of
 races,
 I see that force advancing with irresistible power on the world's stage,
 (Have the old forces, the old wars, played their parts? are the acts suitable
 to them closed?)
 I see Freedom, completely arm'd and victorious and very haughty, with Law
 on one side and Peace on the other,
 A stupendous trio all issuing forth against the idea of caste;
 What historic denouements are these we so rapidly approach?
 I see men marching and countermarching by swift millions,
 I see the frontiers and boundaries of the old aristocracies broken,
 I see the landmarks of European kings removed,
 I see this day the People beginning their landmarks, (all others give way;)
 Never were such sharp questions ask'd this day,
 Never was average man, his soul, more energetic, more like a God,
 Lo, how he urges and urges, leaving the masses no rest!
 His daring foot is on land and sea everywhere, he colonizes the Pacific, the
 archipelagoes,
 With the steamship, the electric telegraph, the newspaper, the wholesale
 engines of war,
 With these and the world-spreading factories he interlinks all geography, all
 lands;
 What whispers are these O lands, running ahead of you, passing under the
 seas?
 Are all nations communing? is there going to be but one heart to the globe?
 Is humanity forming en-masse? for lo, tyrants tremble, crowns grow dim,
 The earth, restive, confronts a new era, perhaps a general divine war,
 No one knows what will happen next, such portents fill the days and nights;
 Years prophetic! the space ahead as I walk, as I vainly try to pierce it,
 is full of phantoms,
 Unborn deeds, things soon to be, project their shapes around me,
 This incredible rush and heat, this strange ecstatic fever of dreams O years!
 Your dreams O years, how they penetrate through me! (I know not whether
 I sleep or wake;)
 The perform'd America and Europe grow dim, retiring in shadow be-
 hind me,
 The unperform'd, more gigantic than ever, advance, advance upon me.

Walt Whitman, *Years of the Modern* (1865), 1881

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Dictionary of National Biography (21 v., 5 supplements. Oxford reprint, 1938). The DNB is useful for information on the many Britishers whose careers touched American history.

Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (E. R. A. Seligman and Alvin Johnson, eds., 15 v. New York, Macmillan, 1930-35).

Encyclopedia of World History (W. L. Langer, ed. Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947). Successor to Ploetz's *Epitome*. Essential.

Historical Statistics of the U.S., 1789-1945 (Washington, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1949).

Webster's Biographical Dictionary (Springfield, Mass., G. & C. Merriam, 1943). Useful for quick reference.

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Nearly every state and region, and many interests and institutions, publish periodicals devoted to history. Usually they are quarterlies and are useful vehicles for news of what is going on among professional historians, for book reviews, and for the results of research projects too brief to warrant separate publication. Many of them publish also annual reports or proceed-

ings devoted to the results of research. In addition many universities publish or have published with more or less regularity "Studies" devoted to history and the social sciences. Only a few of the periodicals can be listed here.

American Academy of Political and Social Science. *Annals*, 1890-

The American Historical Review, 1895-

American Journal of Sociology, 1895-

American Political Science Review, 1906-

Journal of Southern History, 1935-

Mississippi Valley Historical Review, 1914-

New England Quarterly, 1928-

Pacific Historical Review, 1932-

Political Science Quarterly, 1886-

Social Forces, 1922-

Sociology and Social Research, 1916-

Survey, 1897-

CO-OPERATIVE HISTORIES

These include the sets devoted to all or part of the field of U.S. history when each volume or part is written by a person presumably expert in the field.

The American Nation: A History (A. B. Hart, ed., 28 v., New York, Harper, 1904-18).

Some volumes still of outstanding value.

Harper promises an entirely new series within a few years.

Bemis, S. F., ed., *American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy* (10 v., New York, Knopf, 1927-29). The standard work on the subject.

Chronicles of America (Allen Johnson, ed., 54 v., New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1919-51). With certain exceptions, especially the later volumes, useful chiefly to beginners or the lazy.

Economic History of the U.S. (9 v., New York, Rinehart, 1945-).

History of American Life (A. M. Schlesinger, Sr. and D. R. Fox, eds., 13 v., New York, Macmillan, 1929-48). Fair accomplishment of a task impossible to be done well. Very useful bibliographies.

History of the South (W. H. Stephenson and E. M. Coulter, eds., 10 v., Baton Rouge, La., Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1947-). Now being issued; will supplant the old *The South in the Building of the Nation* (13 v., 1909-13).

Winsor, Justin, ed., *Narrative and Critical History of America* (8 v., Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1884-89). This massive co-operative work summarizes the history of the Americas to about 1850 with particular attention to bibliography; richly illustrated with reproductions of original maps and drawings.

MONUMENTAL WORKS

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Andrews, Charles M., *The Colonial Period of American History* (4 v., New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1934-38). Decidedly Tory in outlook, but most valuable of summaries of the colonial period.

Bancroft, George, *History of the U.S.* (6 v., rev. 1883-85, New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts). The pioneer work on the period down to 1789; how God's hand molded the American nation. Written in the turgid style of the period, it is heavy going for moderns.

Bancroft, Hubert Howe, *Works* (39 v., San Francisco, A. L. Bancroft, 1882-90). Extensive histories of the Pacific West. Still standard.

Beer, George L., *Commercial Policy of England toward the American Colonies* (New York, Columbia College, 1893); *Origins of the British Colonial System, 1578-1660* (New York, Macmillan, 1908); *Old Colonial System, 1660-1754* (2 v., New York, Macmillan, 1912); *British Colonial Policy, 1754-65* (New York, Peter Smith, 1933, Reprint). The first named summarizes the others. These are the classic works on the subject.

Channing, Edward, *History of the U.S.* (7 v., New York, Macmillan, 1927-32). Outstanding effort by an individual in spite of certain disproportions, and written largely from source materials. Extends to 1865.

Doyle, John A., *English Colonies in America* (5 v., New York, Holt, 1882-1907). Written by an Englishman; especially valuable for political history.

Fiske, John, *Historical Works* (11 v., Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1888-1902). These deal with colonial history. Though there is no originality and there are many errors in fact and fairness, these volumes remain among the most readable and popular on American colonial history.

Gipson, Lawrence Henry, *The British Empire Before the American Revolution* (7 v., Caldwell, Idaho, Caxton Printers, 1936-49).

McMaster, John B., *History of the People of the U.S. from the Revolution to the Civil War* (8 v., New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1883-1913); *A History of the People of the U.S. During Lincoln's Administration* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1927). The first attempt to write the history of the people rather than the politicians. McMaster pioneered also in the use of newspapers as sources, so his work partakes of a newspaper's topical interest and too much of its superficiality.

Oberholtzer, Ellis P., *History of the U.S. Since the Civil War* (5 v., New York, Macmillan, 1917-37).

Osgood, Herbert L., *American Colonies in the Seventeenth Century* (3 v., New York, Macmillan, 1904-07); *American Colonies in the Eighteenth Century* (4 v., New York, Columbia Univ. Press, 1924-25). Concerned with legal, institutional, and administrative development of the British continental colonies; avoids the larger imperial problems, for which one should turn to Beer and Gipson.

Parkman, Francis, *Works* (12 v., Boston, Little, Brown, 1902-03). The subject is the French in North America. A one-volume abridgment by John Tebbel, *The Battle for North America* (1948), enhances Parkman by omitting footnotes and much of the background detail.

Rhodes, James F., *History of the U.S. from the Compromise of 1850 to the End of the Roosevelt Administration* (9 v., New York, Macmillan, 1928).

Schouler, James, *History of the U.S.A. Under the Constitution* (6 v., New York, Dodd, Mead, 1894-1904).

Von Holst, Hermann E., *Constitutional and Political History of the U.S.* (8 v., New York, Callaghan, 1900).

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- Adams, James T., *Album of American History* (5 v., New York, Scribner's, 1944-49).
- Bonte, George W., *America Marches Past* (New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1936).
- Butterfield, Roger, *The American Past* (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1947).
- Collins, Alan C., *The Story of America in Pictures* (New York, Doubleday, 1935).
- Davidson, Marshall B., *Life in America* (2 v., Boston, Houghton Mifflin in association with the Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1951).
- Gabriel, Ralph H., ed., *The Pageant of America* (15 v., New Haven, Yale Univ. Press, 1925-29). A fascinating pictorial record. The approach is by subjects.
- Kouwenhoven, John A., *Adventures of America, 1857-1900: A Pictorial Record from Harper's Weekly* (New York, Harper, 1938).
- Lorant, Stefan, *The Presidency: A Pictorial History of Presidential Elections from Washington to Truman* (New York, Macmillan, 1951).
- Murrell, William, *A History of American Graphic Humor* (2 v., New York, Whitney Museum of American Art, 1938).
- Nevins, Allan and Weitenkampf, Frank, *A Century of Political Cartoons* (New York, Scribner's, 1944).

GENERAL COLLECTIONS OF DOCUMENTS, CRITICAL ESSAYS, AND ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIAL

- Billington, Ray A., et al., eds., *The Making of American Democracy* (2 v., New York, Rinehart, 1950).
- Chicago University, *The People Shall Judge* (2 v., Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951).
- Commager, Henry S., *Documents of American History* (4th ed., New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1948). Well selected and soundly edited. Indispensable aid.
- Earl Latham, et al., eds., *Problems in American Civilization* (Readings Selected by the Department of American Studies, Amherst College. 19 v., Boston, Heath, 1949-52).
- Sheehan, Donald, *The Making of American History* (2 v., New York, Dryden, 1950).
- Potter, David M. and Manning, Thomas G., *Select Problems in Historical Interpretation* (2 v., New York, Holt, 1949-50).

DOCUMENTS

This heading refers especially to collections of documents of official and semi-official nature. No attempt is made here to mention more than a few leading collections. It should be noted that every state has its collections of documents, records, and statutes.

- American Archives* [forming a documentary history of the North American Colonies] by Peter Force (9 v., 1837-53).
- American State Papers* (38 v., 1832-61). Carries legislative and executive papers up to 1838 in various categories. In 1817 issuance of *Public Documents* was begun.
- Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774-89* (J. C. Fitzpatrick, R. R. Hill, W. C. Ford, and Gaillard Hunt, eds., 34 v., 1904-37).
- Letters of Members of the Continental Congress* (Edmund C. Burnett, ed., 8 v., 1921-36).
- Territorial Papers of the U.S.* (Clarence E. Carter, comp. and ed., 16 v., 1934-48. Still in process of publication).
- U.S. Congress: Records first published as *Debates and Proceedings* (1789-1824) and often called *Annals of Congress*; succeeded by the *Register of Debates* (1824-37), *The Congressional Globe* (1833-73), and by the present *Congressional Record*.
- U.S. Laws: *Statutes at Large of the U.S.* The first 8 volumes, issued in 1845-46, contain the acts, treaties, and executive proclamations to that date; most of the time since then the materials have been issued currently.
- U.S. President: *Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents* (James D. Richardson, ed. Originally issued in 1897 in 10 v. Has been several times re-issued with continuations).
- U.S. Supreme Court: *United States Reports* (1790 to present). Until 1874 decisions were cited by the name of the court reporter and the volume number. They were: Dallas, v. 1-4; Cranch, v. 5-13; Wheaton, v. 14-25; Peters, v. 26-41; Howard, v. 42-65; Black, v. 66-67; and Wallace, v. 68-90.
- War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Record of the Union and Confederate Armies* (130 v., 1880-1901). *Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies* (30 v., 1894-1922).

CONTEMPORARY NARRATIVES AND COLLECTIONS

- Hart, Albert B., *American History Told by Contemporaries* (5 v., New York, Macmillan, 1897-1929).
- Jameson, J. Franklin, *Original Narratives of Early American History* (18 v., New York, Barnes and Noble, 1906-17).
- Thwaites, Reuben G., ed., *Early Western Travels* (32 v., Cleveland, A. H. Clark, 1904-07). Incomparable collection and republication of travel accounts.
- Thwaites, Reuben G., ed., *Jesuit Relations and Allied Documents: Travels and Explorations of the Jesuit Missionaries in New France, 1610, 1791* (73 v., Cleveland, Burrows Bros., 1896-1901). Condensation of the above is *The Indians of North America* (Edna Kenton, ed., 2 v., New York, Harcourt Brace, 1927).

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